9. Charles Bernard H. Reyes vs. Antonio Yulo Balde II, GR No.

168384, 7 August 2006

Atty. Francisco I. Chavez filed the Motion to Inhibit the Chief Justice and Motion to Refer Case to the Court En
Banc on the ground of his perception that the Honorable Chief Justice “has not acted in an objective, impartial
and neutral manner in disposing of incidental issues and motions presented by the parties." The movant adds
that "the dizzying pace by which private respondents’ motions have been received and favorably acted upon in
record time supports Atty. Chavez’s perception that private respondents’ motions – without as much as
requiring petitioner to respond thereto – have been granted special attention and favor by the Honorable Chief
Justice."
ISSUE:
1. whether the Motion to Inhibit the Chief Justice is meritorious
2. whether the Motion to Refer Case to the Court En Banc is proper

RULING:

There is no truth or basis to the allegation that the case has been given "special attention." All actions on the
motions and incidents have been performed regularly, to wit

(1) The actions taken on the various motions and incidents enumerated by the movant were made by the
entire membership of the First Division.
(2) The alleged "unpleasant interaction these past 19 years between Atty. Chavez and Atty. Sedfrey
Ordoñez with whom Chief Justice worked either as associate or partner sometime ago" has nothing to
do at all with the concurrences made by the Chief Justice on this case.
(3) The Chief Justice has inhibited himself from cases in which Sen. Salonga was/is a party or a counsel
(4) When so warranted by the facts and law, the Chief Justice has voted in favor of causes and parties
represented by Atty. Chavez.
(5) There is no irregularity when the Resolution denying respondents’ motion was issued when the Chief
Justice was on official leave.

WHEREFORE, the Motion to Inhibit the Honorable Chief Justice is DENIED. The Motion to Refer Case to the
Court En Banc is GRANTED.

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10. Maria Luisa Park Association Inc vs. Samantha Marie T. Almendras and Pia Marie T. Almendras, G.R. No.
171763, June 5, 2009

FACTS:

On February 6, 2002, respondents Samantha Marie T. Almendras and Pia Angela T. Almendras
purchased from MRO Development Corporation a residential lot located in Maria Luisa Estate Park,
Banilad, Cebu City. After some time, respondents filed with petitioner Maria Luisa Park Association,
Incorporated (MLPAI) an application to construct a residential house, which was approved and thus,
respondents commenced the construction of their house.

Upon ocular inspection of the house, MLPAI found out that respondents violated the prohibition
against multi-dwelling stated in MLPAI's Deed of Restriction. Consequently, on April 28, 2003, MLPAI
sent a letter to the respondents, demanding that they rectify the structure; otherwise, it will be
constrained to forfeit respondents' construction bond and impose stiffer penalties.
The Respondents, as represented by their father Ruben D. Almendras, denied having violated
MLPAI's Deed of Restriction. MLPAI, in its reply, pointed out respondents' specific violations of the
subdivision rules, to wit: (a) installation of a second water meter and tapping the subdivision's main
water pipeline, and (b) construction of "two separate entrances that are mutually exclusive of each
other." It likewise reiterated its warning that failure to comply with its demand will result in its
exercise of more stringent measures.

Respondents filed with the RTC of Cebu City, a Complaint on for Injunction, Declaratory Relief,
Annulment of Provisions of Articles and By-Laws with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO)/Preliminary Injunction.

MLPAI moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and failure to
comply with the arbitration clause provided for in MLPAI's by-laws.

The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, holding that it was the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) that has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
Respondents moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied.

Aggrieved, the respondents questioned the dismissal of their complaint in a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals granted the petition in its Decision

MLPAI filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether the appellate court erred in ruling that it was the trial court and not the HLURB that has
jurisdiction over the case
RULING:

The Court agrees with the RTC that the instant controversy falls squarely within the exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), now HLURB.

Originally, administrative supervision over homeowners' associations was vested by law with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 535, the
HIGC assumed the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the SEC over homeowners' associations.

Moreover, by virtue of this amendatory law, the HIGC also assumed the SEC's original and exclusive
jurisdiction under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A to hear and decide cases involving:
Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among
stockholders, members, or associates; between any and/or all of them and the corporation,
partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and
between such corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns their
individual franchise or right to exist as such entity.

Consequently, in Sta. Clara Homeowners' Association v. Gaston and Metro Properties, Inc. v.
Magallanes Village Association, Inc., the Court recognized HIGC's "Revised Rules of Procedure in the
Hearing of Home Owner's Disputes". Later on, the said powers and responsibilities, were transferred
to the HLURB pursuant to Republic Act No. 8763, entitled "Home Guaranty Corporation Act of 2000."

In the present case, there is no question that respondents are members of MLPAI as they have even
admitted it. Therefore, as correctly ruled by the trial court, the case involves a controversy between
the homeowners' association and some of its members. Thus, the exclusive and original jurisdiction
lies with the HLURB.
Hence, the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7, is hereby REINSTATED.

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11. Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation v. Domingo, G.R. No. 180765, February 27, 2009; 580 SCRA 397
FACTS:
Petitioner, a domestic corporation duly organized under Philippine laws, is engaged in the real estate
development business. Respondent is the assignee of L and M Maxco Specialist Engineering Construction (LMM
Construction) of its receivables from petitioner.

Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation (FBDC) entered into a Trade Contract with LMM Construction for
partial structural and architectural works on one of its projects, the Bonifacio Ridge Condominium. According to
the Contract, petitioner had the right to withhold the retention money equivalent to 5% of the contract price
for a period of one year after the completion of the project.

Due to the defect and delay in the work of LMM Construction on the condominium project, petitioner
unilaterally terminated the Trade Contract and hired another contractor to finish the rest of the work left
undone by LMM Construction. Despite the pre-termination of the Trade Contract, petitioner was liable to pay
LMM Construction a fraction of the contract price in proportion to the works already performed by the latter.

Petitioner received the several Notices of Garnishment and letters against the receivables of LMM Construction
from CIAC, from the respondent, from the NLRC to satisfy the liability of LMM Construction to Nicolas Consigna,
and from the RTC of Makati Branch 133.

Petitioner categorically denied respondent's claim on the retention money, reasoning that after the completion
of the rectification works on the condominium project and satisfaction of the various garnishment orders, there
was no more left of the retention money of LMM Construction.
It would appear, however, that petitioner fully satisfied the first Notice of Garnishment in the amount of
P5,110,833.44 only on 31 January 2006,7 the very the same date that it expressly denied respondent's claim.
Also, petitioner complied with the Notice of Garnishment and its accompanying Order of Delivery of Money in
the amount of P558,448.27 on 8 February 2006, a week after its denial of respondent's claim.
The foregoing events prompted respondent to file a Complaint for collection of sum of money, against both
LMM Construction and petitioner. Instead of filing an Answer, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioner argued that since respondent merely stepped
into the shoes of LMM Construction as its assignor, it was the CIAC and not the regular courts that had
jurisdiction over the dispute as provided in the Trade Contract.
RTC issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss of petitioner, ruling that a full-blown trial was necessary to
determine which one between LMM Construction and petitioner should be made accountable for the sum due
to respondent.
Petitioner sought remedy by filing a Petition for Certiorari with the CA for grave abuse of discretion.
The CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari and affirmed the Order of the RTC denying the Motion to Dismiss of
the petitioner. The appellate court rejected the argument of petitioner and its Motion for Reconsideration

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 06-0200-CFM.

RULING:

Yes.
The adjudication of Civil Case No. 06-0200-CFM necessarily involves the application of pertinent statutes and
jurisprudence to matters such as obligations, contracts of assignment, and, if appropriate, even preference of
credits, a task more suited for a trial court to carry out after a full-blown trial, than an arbitration body
specifically devoted to construction contracts.
This Court recognizes the laudable objective of voluntary arbitration to provide a speedy and inexpensive
method of settling disputes by allowing the parties to avoid the formalities, delay, expense and aggravation
which commonly accompany ordinary litigation, especially litigation which goes through the entire hierarchy of
courts. It cannot, however, altogether surrender to arbitration those cases, such as the one at bar, the extant
facts of which plainly call for the exercise of jurisdiction by the regular courts for their resolution.

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12. Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation v. Sorongon & Fong, G.R. No. 176709, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 613
FACTS:
Philippine laws, is engaged in the business of real estate development. Respondent, Valentin Fong (respondent)
doing business under the name VF Industrial Sales is the assignee of L & M Maxco Specialist Construction’s
(Maxco) retention money from the Bonifacio Ridge Condominium Phase 1 (BRCP 1).

Petitioner entered into a trade contract with Maxco wherein Maxco would undertake the structural and partial
architectural package of the BRCP 1. Later petitioner accused Maxco of delay in completion of its work and on
August 24, 2004 sent the latter a notice of termination. Petitioner also instructed Maxco to perform remedial
measures prior to the contract expiration pursuant to Clause 23.1 of the contract.

Maxco was sued by its creditors including respondent for debts unrelated to BRCP 1. In order to settle the
collection suit, Maxco assigned its receivables representing its retention money from the BRCP 1.

A subsequent exchange of correspondence failed to settle the matter.

Respondent filed a complaint for a sum of money against petitioner and Maxco in the RTC of Mandaluyong City.
He claimed that there were sufficient residual amounts to pay the receivables at the time the notice of the
assignment was served.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioner
argued that since respondent merely stepped into the shoes of Maxco as its assignee, it was the CIAC and not
the regular courts that had jurisdiction over the dispute as provided in the Trade Contract. Judge Edwin
Sorongon issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same
was denied.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. The CA denied the petition for
lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

RULING:

Yes.
A cause of action is present in the complaint filed a quo. Respondent has specifically alleged that the undue
preference given to other creditors of Maxco over the retention money by petitioner was to the prejudice of his
rights.

The other judgment creditors are entitled to the fruits of the final judgments rendered in their favor. Their
rights are distinct from the rights acquired by the respondent over the portion of the retention money assigned
to the latter by Maxco. Their interests are in no way affected by any judgment to be rendered in this case.

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13. HUTAMA-RSEA JOINT OPERATIONS, INC. v. CITRA METRO MANILA TOLLWAYS CORPORATION [G.R. No.
180640, April 24, 2009 (3rd Div., Chico-Nazario, J.)

FACTS:
HUTAMA-RSEA Joint Operations Incorporation (Petitioner) and Citra Metro Manila Tollways Corporation
(Respondent) are corporations organized and existing under Philippine laws. Petitioner is a sub-contractor
engaged in engineering and construction works. Respondent, on the other hand, is the general contractor and
operator of the South Metro Manila Skyway Project (Skyway Project).

Petitioner and respondent entered into an Engineering Procurement Construction Contract (EPCC) whereby
petitioner would undertake the construction of Stage 1 of the Skyway Project. As consideration for petitioner's
undertaking, respondent obliged itself under the EPCC to pay the former a total amount of US$369,510,304.00.

Upon completion of the project, Petitioner, through counsel, sent a letter to respondent demanding payment
of the following: (1) the outstanding balance on the interim billings; (2) the amount of petitioner's final billing;
(3) early completion bonus; and (4) interest charges on the delayed payment. Thereafter, petitioner and
respondent, through their respective officers and representatives, held several meetings to discuss the
possibility of amicably settling the dispute. Despite several meetings and continuous negotiations, lasting for a
period of almost one year, petitioner and respondent failed to reach an amicable settlement.

Petitioner finally filed with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) a Request for Arbitration,
seeking to enforce its money claims against respondent.

In its Answer ad cautelam with Motion to Dismiss, respondent averred that the CIAC had no jurisdiction over
CIAC Case No. 17-2005. Respondent argued that the filing by petitioner of said case was premature because a
condition precedent, i.e., prior referral by the parties of their dispute to the Dispute Adjudication Board (DAB),
required by Clause 20.4 of the EPCC, had not been satisfied or complied with. Respondent asked the CIAC to
dismiss petitioner's Request for Arbitration

CIAC issued an Order favoring petitioner. The CIAC ruled that it had jurisdiction over the case, and that the
determination of whether petitioner had complied with Clause 20.4 of the EPCC was a factual issue that may be
resolved during the trial. It then ordered respondent to file an Answer to petitioner's Request for Arbitration.

ISSUE:
Whether CIAC has jurisdiction over the case
RULING:

This is not a case wherein the arbitration clause in the construction contract named another forum, not the
CIAC, which shall have jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties; rather, the said clause requires prior
referral of the dispute to the DAB. Nonetheless, we still hold that this condition precedent, or more
appropriately, non-compliance therewith, should not deprive CIAC of its jurisdiction over the dispute between
the parties.

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14. Equitable PCI Banking Corporation, et al v. RCBC Capital Corporation,G.R. No. 182248, December 18, 2008;
[Velasco, Jr., J.]
FACTS:
Petitioners Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. (EPCIB) and the individual shareholders of Bankard, Inc., as sellers, and
respondent RCBC Capital Corporation (RCBC), as buyer, executed a Share Purchase Agreement5 (SPA) for the
purchase of petitioners' interests in Bankard, representing 226,460,000 shares, for the price of PhP
1,786,769,400. To expedite the purchase, RCBC agreed to dispense with the conduct of a due diligence audit on
the financial status of Bankard.

Under the SPA, RCBC undertakes, on the date of contract execution, to deposit, as downpayment, 20% of the
purchase price, or PhP 357,353,880, in an escrow account. The escrowed amount, the SPA stated, should be
released to petitioners on an agreed-upon release date and the balance of the purchase price shall be delivered
to the share buyers upon the fulfillment of certain conditions agreed upon, in the form of a manager's check.

On June 2, 2000, RCBC deposited the stipulated downpayment amount in an escrow account after which it was
given full management and operational control of Bankard. June 2, 2000 is also considered by the parties as the
Closing Date referred to in the SPA.

On December 28, 2000, RCBC paid the balance of the contract price. The corresponding deeds of sale for the
shares in question were executed in January 2001.

Thereafter, in a letter of May 5, 2003, RCBC informed petitioners of its having overpaid the purchase price of
the subject shares, claiming that there was an overstatement of valuation of accounts amounting to PhP 478
million, resulting in the overpayment of over PhP 616 million.

Following unsuccessful attempts at settlement, RCBC, in accordance with Sec. 10 of the SPA, filed a Request for
Arbitration dated May 12, 2004 with the ICC-ICA. In the request, RCBC charged Bankard with deviating from,
contravening and not following generally accepted accounting principles and practices in maintaining their
books.

To the Request for Arbitration, petitioners filed an Answer dated July 28, 2004, denying RCBC's inculpatory
averments.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court acted contrary to law and judicial authority in refusing to vacate the arbitral award,
notwithstanding it was rendered in plain disregard of the parties' contract and applicable Philippine law, under
which the claim in arbitration was indubitably time-barred.

RULING:
The losing party who appeals from the judgment of the court confirming an arbitral award shall be required by
the appellate court to post a counterbond executed in favor of the prevailing party equal to the amount of the
award in accordance with the rules to be promulgated by the Supreme Court.

It is clear from the factual antecedents that RA 9285 applies to the instant case. This law was already effective
at the time the arbitral proceedings were commenced by RCBC through a request for arbitration filed before
the ICC-ICA on May 12, 2004. Besides, the assailed confirmation order of the RTC was issued on March 17,
2008. Thus, petitioners clearly took the wrong mode of appeal and the instant petition can be outright rejected
and dismissed.
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15. Luzon Hydro Corporation v. Hon. Rommel O. Baybay, etc and Transfield Philippines, Inc., CA-G.R. Sp. No.
94318, November 29, 2005
FACTS: NO CASE WITH THIS TITLE FOUND
ISSUE: GUYS..SORRY.. =(
RULING:
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16. Empire East Land Holdings, Inc. v. Capitol Industrial ConstructionGroups, Inc., G.R. No. 168074,September
26, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner Empire East Land Holdings, Inc. and respondent Capitol Industrial Corporation Groups, Inc. entered
into a Construction Agreement whereby the latter bound itself to undertake the complete supply and
installation of "the building shell wet construction" of the former's building known as Gilmore Heights Phase I,
located at Gilmore cor. Castilla St., San Juan, Metro Manila.

Respondent further agreed that the construction work would be completed within 330 calendar days from "Day
1," upon the Construction Manager's confirmation.7 Petitioner initially considered February 20, 1997 as "Day 1"
of the project. However, when respondent entered the project site, it could not start work due to the on-going
bulk excavation by another contractor. Respondent thus asked petitioner to move "Day 1" to a later date, when
the bulk excavation contractor would have completely turned over the site.

After a series of correspondence between petitioner and respondent, February 25, 1997 was proposed as "Day
1." Accordingly, respondent's completion date of the project was fixed on January 21, 1998. Prior to and during
the construction period, changes in circumstances arose, prompting the parties to make adjustments in the
initial terms of their contract.

In view of the limitation on the target accomplishment to P1 million worth of work per month, respondent
asked that the topping-off be moved to February 1999. Respondent likewise requested a price adjustment with
respect to overhead and equipment expenses and legislated additional labor cost. These requests were not,
however, acted upon by petitioner.

Respondent demanded the payment after the completion of the side trimmings and excavation but it was not
acted upon.

Respondent was constrained to file a Request for Adjudication with the CIAC.

CIAC rendered a decision in favor of the respondent.

Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The CA
affirmed the CIAC's findings of fact and conclusions of law with a slight modification.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA committed reversible error when it affirmed CIAC's award for the payment of alleged overhead
expenses

RULING:

Respondent claimed P13,976,427.00 as additional overhead expenses brought about by the delay in the
completion of the project due to petitioner's own acts. The CIAC, however, awarded only a nominal amount
which is 10% of respondent's claim because of its failure to present supporting documents to prove such
additional expenses. The arbitral tribunal observed that respondent only presented its own computation
without any other document to substantiate its claim. The CA, in turn, affirmed the CIAC findings, ratiocinating
that petitioner's failure to present countervailing evidence was an implied admission on its part that the
computation made by respondent was correct.

It is undisputed that the only piece of evidence presented by respondent in support of its claim for additional
overhead cost was its own computation of the said expenses. It failed to adduce actual receipts, invoices,
contracts and similar documents. To be sure, respondent's claim for overhead cost may be classified as a claim
for actual damages. Actual damages are those damages which the injured party is entitled to recover for the
wrong done and injuries received when none were intended. They indicate such losses as are actually sustained
and are susceptible of measurement. As such, they must be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty.