61. Sps. Coronel v. Quesada, G.R. No.

237465, October 07, 2019

Facts:

Spouses Coronel allege that the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged since
Rodrigo could not have participated in the transaction as he was in Hawaii,
USA during that time.

Issue:

Whether or not mere allegation is a competent evidence.

Ruling:

No, mere allegation is not an evidence.

In Lopez v. Bodega City, 558 Phil. 666, 679 (2007), “It is settled that
each party must prove his affirmative allegation, and that mere allegation is not
evidence.”

Here, the allegations of petitioner are not rendered conclusive simply

because it was not met with evidence from the defense.
62. People v. Lagman, G.R. No. 168695, December 8, 2008

Facts:

Zeng contends that the prosecution failed to prove a basic element of the
crime charged – that he did not have authority to possess shabu.

Issue:

Whether or not the said element was sufficiently proved.

Ruling:

Yes, said element was sufficiently proved.

In People v. Manalo, G.R. No. 107623, February 23, 1994i, “It is not
incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce positive evidence to support a
negative averment the truth of which is fairly indicated by established
circumstances… the fact that he has a license is a matter which is peculiarity
within his knowledge and he must establish that fact or suffer conviction.”

Here, the negative averment that Zeng had no license or authority to

possess shabu could have easily been disproved by presenting a copy of the
license or authority or any other document evidencing authority to possess it.
This he failed to do.
63. Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, June 19, 2018

Facts:

Based on record, there is no showing that Sereno filed her SALNs for
calendar years 1999 to 2009 despite being employed in the government. Thus,
there is prima facie evidence that she did not file her SALNs during these years.

Issue:

WON the prima facie evidence presented is sufficient.

Ruling:

Yes, the prima facie evidence is sufficient.

In DepEd v. Tuliao, 735 Phil. 703 (2014), “The duty or burden of

evidence thus shifted to respondent to controvert the Republic's prima facie
case, otherwise, verdict must be returned in favor of the Republic.”

Here, respondent merely offered in response to the Republic's evidence is

an unsubstantiated claim that she had filed all her SALNs. Without admissible
documentary and testimonial support, this bare and uncorroborated assertion
scarcely overcomes the Republic's case.
64. Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005

Facts:

The petitioner insists that nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil Code
does it require that there must first be a judicial declaration of death before the
rule on presumptive death would apply. Thus, absent any malice or intent, he
must not be held liable for Bigamy.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is correct.

Ruling:

No, the petitioner is not correct.

In People v. Vogel, 46 Cal.2d. 798; 299 P.2d 850 (1956), “When the act
or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or
committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional.”

Here, the petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent
when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or
good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by
dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the
law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia
legis neminem excusat.
65. UM v. BSP, G.R. No. 194964-65, January 11, 2016

Facts:

Petitioner argues that the execution of the mortgage contract was ultra
vires. As an educational institution, it may not secure the loans of Saturnino
Petalcorin, a third person.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is correct.

Ruling:

Yes, the petitioner is correct.

Under Rule 131, Sec. 3, Rules of Court, disputable presumptions are

presumptions that may be overcome by contrary evidence.

In this case, the presumption that the execution of mortgage contracts was
within petitioner’s corporate powers does not apply. Petitioner does not have
the power to mortgage its properties in order to secure loans of other persons.
66. Sps. Trinidad v. Imson, G.R. No. 197728, Sep. 16, 2015

Facts:

Petitioners argue that when they bought the subject property from its
former owners, they stepped into the shoes of the latter who were the lessors of
respondent and that, as lessee, respondent is barred from contesting the title of
her lessor or her lessor's successor-in-interest, who are herein petitioners.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent is barred from contesting the title.

Ruling:

No, the respondent is not barred.

Under Sec. 2(b), Rule 131, Rules of Court, the tenant is not permitted to
deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of
landlord and tenant between them.

Here, what respondent is claiming is her title to the subject property

which she acquired subsequent to the commencement of the landlord-tenant
relation between her and the former owners of the questioned condominium
unit. Thus, the presumption under Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court
does not apply.
67. PHILTRUST v. Gabinete, G.R. No. 216120, Mar. 29, 2017

Facts:

Respondent insists that the CA did not commit grave and serious error in
giving credence to the findings of the NBI document examiner which ruled that
the signature of respondent Gabinete in the Continuing Suretyship Agreement
was forged. He further asserts that the presumption of regularity of a notarized
document is a mere presumption that may be rebutted by evidence.

Issue:

WON respondent is correct.

Ruling:

No, the respondent is not correct.

In Heirs of Bucton v. Go, G.R. No. 188395, Nov. 20, 2013, “As a rule,
forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.”

Here, one who alleges forgery has the burden to establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is of greater weight or more
convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. In this case, the
respondent was not able to prove the fact that his signature was forged.
68. Palacios v. Amora, A.C. No. 11504, Aug. 1, 2017

Facts:

Complainant allege that for Php1.8 million, he contracted the service of

respondent to secure resolution from SB of Silang approving the conversion of
AFP-RSBS' properties to residential/commercial. However, there is already a
resolution passed and that respondent did not render any services for the
complainant. He wanted the return of the said money paid.

Issue:

Whether or not complainant is entitled for the return of the money paid.

Ruling:

No, he is not entitled.

Sec. 3(f), Rule 131, Rules of Court provides that, “The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence: x x x x (f)That money paid by one to another was
due the latter; x x x x”

Here, complainant never presented any evidence to prove that the

resolution was passed without the intervention of respondent. Verily,
complainant failed to overcome the above mentioned disputable presumption.
Mere allegations cannot suffice to prove that respondent did not render any
service to complainant and, therefore, not entitled to the payment of
Php1.8Million.
69. People v. Macaspac, GR No. 246165, Nov. 28, 2019

Facts:

Accused-appellant alleged that there was a gap in the chain of custody

because the forensic chemist was not presented in court to testify whether the
seized item he examined was the same item presented in court.

Issue:

WON the chain of custody rule was sufficiently established.

Ruling:

Yes, the chain of custody rule was sufficiently established.

In People v. Cabilles, 810 Phil. 969 (2017), “unless the presumption is

rebutted, it becomes conclusive.”

Here, appellants' bare denial cannot prevail over Agent Otic's positive
testimony, much less, the presumption of regularity accorded him and his team
in the performance of their official duty.
70. Sps. Hanopol v. Shoemart, G.R. No. 137774, Oct. 4, 2002

Facts:

Petitioners claim overpayment to Shoemart. However, during the

duration of the contract, they failed to question the statement of account
presented to them.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner may claim overpayment.

Ruling:

No, they cannot claim overpayment.

In Salvador v. Ortoll, 343 SCRA 658, 667 [2000], “The principle of

estoppel in pais applies wherein when one, by his acts, representations or
admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or
through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist
and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be
prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.”

Here, by their silence and inaction, petitioners are deemed to have

admitted the correctness of the Statement of Account of Shoemart.
71. Poe-Llamanzares v. Comelec, G.R. No. 221697, Mar. 8, 2016

Facts:

Petitioner alleged that the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen is on the respondents. Otherwise stated, she has a presumption
in her favor that she is a natural-born citizen of this country.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

Ruling:

Yes, she is a Filipino citizen.

Art. 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention provides that, “A foundling is,

until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the
State in which it was found.”

Here, the presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems

from the presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines.
72. Angeles v. Maglaya, G.R. No. 153798, Sep. 2, 2005

Facts:

Petitioner averred that respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco

for, although she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the
corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him.

Issue:

Whether or not the legitimacy of the respondent is proven.

Ruling:

No, respondent’s legitimacy was not proven.

In Tison v. CA, 276 SCRA 582 [1997], “There is no presumption of the

law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate.”

Here, there is absolutely no proof of the decedent’s marriage to

respondent’s mother, Genoveva Mercado.
73. Fajardo v. People, G.R. No. 239823, Sep. 25, 2019

Facts:

SB found that Fajardo's failure to adequately explain the whereabouts of

the missing funds in order to rebut the presumption that she had
misappropriated the same was conclusive of her guilt of the crime charged.

Issue:

WON the SB is correct.

Ruling:

Yes, the SB is correct.

Art. 217 of RPC as amended by RA1060 provides that, “The failure of a

public officer to have duty forthcoming any public funds or property with which
he is chargeable upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima
facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.”

Here, having established that the total amount of P3M was in her custody
by reason of her public position, it was incumbent upon her to produce the same
upon demand or explain its whereabouts; failing in which, the presumption of
misappropriation arises
74. Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, Oct. 22, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his
birth certificate in the RTC of Manila. He underwent sex reassignment surgery
in Bangkok, Thailand.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner can change sex in his birth certificate.

Ruling:

No, he cannot change sex.

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of

the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is
determined at birth.

Here, words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-
known meaning is presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context
compels to the contrary. It cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is
something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative
male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category "female."
75. Vda. De Jacob v. CA, G.R. No. 135216, Aug. 19, 1999

Facts:

Petitioner could not present the original copy of the Marriage Contract
stating that it was lost. In lieu of the original, Tomasa presented as secondary
evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978.

Issue:

WON absent original marriage contract will invalidate the marriage.

Ruling:

No, it will not invalidate the marriage.

In De Guzman v. CA, 260 SCRA 389, Aug. 7, 1996, “It is settled that if
the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court,
upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents
may be proved by a copy or a recital of its contents in some authentic document,
or by recollection of witnesses.”

Here, upon a showing that the document was duly executed and
subsequently lost, without any bad faith on the part of the offeror, secondary
evidence may be adduced to prove its contents.
76.