Secretary of Justice v.

Lantion

Constitutional Law. Political Law. Fundamental Principles and State Policies. Article II, Section 2.
Incorporation Clause.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION

322 SCRA 160

FACTS:
The Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request from the United
States for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States pursuant to PD No. 1609 prescribing the
procedure for extradition of persons who have committed a crime in a foreign country. Jimenez requested
for copies of the request and that he be given ample time to comment on the said request. The petitioners
denied the request pursuant to the RP-US Extradition Treaty.

ISSUE:
Whether or not treaty stipulations must take precedence over an individual’s due process rights

HELD:
The human rights of person and the rights of the accused guaranteed in the Constitution should take
precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting party, the doctrine of incorporation is applied
whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with a situation where there is a conflict between a rule of
the international law and the constitution. Efforts must first be made in order to harmonize the provisions
so as to give effect to both but if the conflict is irreconcilable, the municipal law must be upheld. The fact
that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy
of international law over municipal law in the municipal sphere. In states where the constitution is the
highest law of the land, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the
constitution.

GOVERNMENT OF USA V. PURGANAN - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

GOVERNMENT OF USA V. PURGANAN   G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002

FACTS:

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government, through diplomatic
channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 requesting the extradition of Mark B.
Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo.

Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The TRO prohibited the Department of
Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was,
however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the
Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent
copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period
within which to file a comment and supporting evidence.

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000,
Resolution.By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and
reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This Resolution has become final and executory.

1|ICMC V. CALLEJA
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the
Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was
docketed as Extradition Case No. 01192061.

Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion, which prayed that petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for
hearing.

In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing
on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the
trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of
arrest.

After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his
Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to
post bail in the amount of P100,000.

The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below
issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail
for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted
the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4,
2001.

ISSUE:

WON an extraditee is entitled to notice and hearing before issuance of warrant of arrest
WON the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings

HELD:

1. NO. It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word
”immediate” to qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by
setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing
parties, receiving facts and arguments from them, and giving them time to prepare and present such facts
and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered immediate.The law could not
have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of
urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.By using the
phrase if it appears,the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage.
The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual
situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then available
to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to
make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused.

Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice
or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:

“Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons orthings to be seized.”

2|ICMC V. CALLEJA
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the
examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is
no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.

At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further examine
complainants and their witnesses. In the present case, validating the act of the respondent judge and
instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant
with the rationale for the entire system. If the accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present
evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, what would stop
him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in his effort to negate
a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-
blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. This scenario
is also anathema to the summary nature of extraditions.

That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the
adoption of a set of procedures more protective of the accused. If a different procedure were called for at
all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite -- would be justified in view of respondent’s demonstrated
predisposition to flee.

2. NO. The court agrees with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It
does not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of the respondent,
proceedings had already been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the
requesting state before those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with the
due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process now has thus become hollow. He
already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

GOV’T OF HONGKONG V. JUDGE OLALIA - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

GOV’T OF HONGKONG V. JUDGE OLALIA    G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007

FACTS:

On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong
signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20,
1997.

On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s Republic of China and became the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region.

Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense
of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery
Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to
defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999,
warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14)
years for each charge.

3|ICMC V. CALLEJA
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the
provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the
provisional arrest of private respondent.

On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private
respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.

On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas
corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.

On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.

On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R.
No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.

On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the
validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final and executory on
April 10, 2001.

Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed
with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No.
99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private
respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.

After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail,
holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a
high "flight risk."

On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-
95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.

On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his
application for bail. This was granted by the respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001
allowing private respondent to post bail.

On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by
the respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.

ISSUE:

WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail.

HELD:

YES. An extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process.
A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer

4|ICMC V. CALLEJA
to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the
process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.

Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated
until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been
detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an
extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this
prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no
provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution.

The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings.
In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused. As
Purganan correctly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of
admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the
issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential
extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice.15 Given the
foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight
risk and should be granted bail.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations
under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure
to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of
extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the
Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where
these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution but also by international conventions, to which
the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail,
provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can
neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance
of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in
administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the
prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate
Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and
convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard
should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The
potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will
abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight
risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."

5|ICMC V. CALLEJA
Human Rights Law Case Digest: Mejoff v.
Director of Prisons (1951)
G.R. No. L-4254             September 26, 1951

Lessons Applicable:  characteristics of human rights, constitutional guarantee that no person shall be
deprived of liberty without due process of law,

Laws Applicable: Bill of Rights

FACTS:

 Boris Mejoff, an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country from Shanghai as a
secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's regime in these Islands. (The
petitioner's entry into the Philippines was not unlawful; he was brought by the armed and
belligerent forces of a de facto government whose decrees were law furing the occupation.)
 He was arrested on March 18, 1948 as a Japanese spy, by U. S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps.
and later there was an order for his release.  
 But on April 5, 1948, the Board of Commissioners of Immigration declared that Mejoff had
entered the Philippines illegally in 1944 and ordered that he be deported on the first available
transportation to Russia. 
 He was transferred to Cebu Provincial Jail and then Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa on October,
1948.
 He then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on the basis that too long a detention may
justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus - denied 
 Over two years having elapsed since the decision aforesaid was promulgated, the Government
has not found way and means of removing the petitioner out of the country, and none are in
sight, although it should be said in justice to the deportation authorities, it was through no fault
of theirs that no ship or country would take the petitioner.
 This is his 2nd petition for writ of habeas corpus

ISSUE: W/N the writ of habeas corpus should be granted since he was detained longer than a reasonable
time

HELD: YES. writ will issue commanding the respondents to release the petitioner from custody upon
these terms: The petitioner shall be placed under the surveillance of the immigration authorities or their
agents in such form and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he keep peace and be
available when the Government is ready to deport him. The surveillance shall be reasonable and the
question of reasonableness shall be submitted to this Court or to the Court of First Instance of Manila
for decision in case of abuse. He shall also put up a bond for the above purpose in the amount of P5,000
with sufficient surety or sureties, which bond the Commissioner of Immigration is authorized to exact by
section 40 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.

6|ICMC V. CALLEJA
  Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum therein even if they are
"stateless," which the petitioner claims to be.
 The protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law and except for crimes
committed against the laws of the land is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all
residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality. 
o Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of Nation." And in a resolution
entitled "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and approved by the General
Assembly of the United Nations of which the Philippines is a member, at its plenary
meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental
rights as applied to all human beings were proclaimed. It was there resolved that "All
human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that "Everyone is
entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of
any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status" (Art. 2): that "Every one has
the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating
the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9); etc.
 petitioner's unduly prolonged detention would be unwarranted by law and the Constitution, if
the only purpose of the detention be to eliminate a danger that is by no means actual, present,
or uncontrollable
  Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but unconsummated offenses is so
unprecedented in this country and so fraught with danger of excesses and injustice that I am
loath to resort it, even as a discretionary judicial technique to supplement conviction of such
offenses as those of which defendants stand convicted.
 If that case is not comparable with ours on the issues presented, its underlying principle is of
universal application.
 As already noted, not only are there no charges pending against the petitioner, but the
prospects of bringing any against him are slim and remote.

Rodriguez v. Hon. Presiding Judge of RTC Manila Branch 17

GR. NO. 157977 Feb. 27 2006
QUISUMBING, J

Lessons: Notice and Hearing for Cancellation of Bail in Extradition

Laws: 

FACTS:

    After the arrest of petitioners Eduardo Tolentino Rodriguez and Imelda Gener Rodriguez,
they applied for bail which the trial court granted on September 25, 2001.  They posted cash bonds for

7|ICMC V. CALLEJA
the bail set for P1M for each. The US government moved for reconsideration of the grant of bail which
was denied.  The US government filed a petition for certiorari entitled Gov’t of the USA v. Hon.
Ponferrada where the court directed the trial court to resolve the matter of bail guided by this court’s
ruling on Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan.  The lower court, without prior notice and hearing,
cancelled the cash bond of the petitioners and ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest.   Petitioners
filed a very urgent motion for the reconsideration of the cancellation of their bail which was denied.  
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition directed against the order for cancellation of
cash bond and issuance of a warrant of arrest.

ISSUE: Whether or NOT there should be notice and hearing before the cancellation of bail

HELD: YES.  Petition is GRANTED IN PART.  SET ASIDE for petitioner IMELDA GENER RODRIGUEZ.

The grant of the bail, presupposes that the co-petitioner has already presented evidence to
prove her right to be on bail, that she is no flight risk, and the trial court had already exercised its sound
discretion and had already determined that under the Constitution and laws in force, co-petitioner is
entitled to provisional release. 

Under these premises, co-petitioner Imelda Gener Rodriguez has offered to go on

voluntary extradition; that she and her husband had posted a cash bond of P1 million each; that her
husband had already gone on voluntary extradition and is presently in the USA undergoing trial; that the
passport of co-petitioner is already in the possession of the authorities; that she never attempted to
flee; that there is an existing hold-departure order against her; and that she is now in her 60’s, sickly and
under medical treatment, we believe that the benefits of continued temporary liberty on bail should not
be revoked and their grant of bail should not be cancelled, without the co-petitioner being given notice
and without her being heard why her temporary liberty should not be discontinued.  Absent prior notice
and hearing, the bail’s cancellation was in violation of her right to due process.

We emphasize that bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon a clear and
convincing showing that:
1)    he will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
2)    there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances

Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Judge Olalia and Muñ oz,
G.R. No. 153675, 29 April 2007.

FACTS: Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3)
counts of the offense of “accepting an advantage as agent,” in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. Petitioner Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private
respondent. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail,
holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private
respondent is a high “flight risk.” Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing and
the case was raffled off to another judge. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of
the Order denying his application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge. Petitioner filed
an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied. Hence, the instant petition.

8|ICMC V. CALLEJA
ISSUE: Is the contention of the Petitioner, that the potential extraditee has a right to bail under
the Constitution or statutory law, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings, tenable?

HELD: NO, the contention is untenable.

The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the
individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual
person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine
that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards
the second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II
resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as
violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under
the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes
against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the
individual person is now a valid subject of international law.

On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states
gave recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United
Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the
right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While
not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as
customarily binding upon the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v.
Director of Prisons, this Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under
the Constitution, the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In
1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined
therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process.

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be
allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition
cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person
detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this
jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines
concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the
presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to
liberty of every individual is not impaired.

G.R. No. 207342, August 16, 2016 - GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION,
REPRESENTED BY THE PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Petitioner, v. JUAN ANTONIO MUNOZ,
Respondent.

Extradition is "the surrender by one nation to another of an individual accused or convicted of an

offense outside of its own territory, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which,
being competent to try and to punish him, demands the surrender."25 It is not- part of customary
cralawred

international law, although the duty to extradite exists only for some international crimes.26 Thus,

9|ICMC V. CALLEJA
a state must extradite only when obliged by treaty to do so.27 The right of a state to successfully
request the extradition of a criminal offender arises from a treaty with the requested state.28
Absent the treaty, the duty to surrender a person who has sought asylum within its boundaries
does not inhere in the state, which, if it so wishes, can extend to him a refuge and protection even
from the state that he has fled. Indeed, in granting him asylum, the state commits no breach of
international law. But by concluding the treaty, the asylum state imposes limitations on itself,
because it thereby agrees to do something it was free not to do.29 The extradition treaty creates
the reciprocal obligation to surrender persons from the requested state's jurisdiction charged or
convicted of certain crimes committed within the requesting state's territory, and is of the same
level as a law passed by the Legislatures of the respective parties.

Presidential Decree No. 1069 defines the general procedure for the extradition of persons who
have committed crimes in a foreign country, and lays down the rules to guide the Executive
Department and the courts of the Philippines on the proper implementation of the extradition
treaties to which the country is a signatory. Nevertheless, the particular treaties entered into by
the Philippine Government with other countries primarily govern the relationship between the
parties.

The RP-HK Agreement is still in full force and effect as an extradition treaty. The procedures
therein delineated regulate the rights and obligations of the Republic of the Philippines and the
HKSAR under the treaty in the handling of extradition requests.

For purposes of the extradition of Munoz, the HKSAR as the requesting state must establish the
following six elements,30 namely: (1) there must be an extradition treaty in force between the
HKSAR and the Philippines; (2) the criminal charges that are pending in the HKSAR against the
person to be extradited;31 (3) the crimes for which the person to be extradited is charged are
extraditable within the terms of the treaty;32 (4) the individual before the court is the same person
charged in the HKSAR;33 (5) the evidence submitted establishes probable cause to believe that
the person to be extradited committed the offenses charged;34 and (6) the offenses are criminal in
both the HKSAR and the Philippines (double criminality rule).

The first five of the elements inarguably obtain herein, as both the RTC and the CA found. To
start with, the RP-Hong Kong Agreement subsists and has not been revoked or terminated by
either parties. Secondly, there have been 10 criminal cases filed against Muñoz in Hong Kong,
specifically: three counts of accepting an advantage as an agent and seven counts of conspiracy
to defraud 35 Thirdly, the crimes of accepting an advantage as an agent and of conspiracy to
defraud were extraditable under the terms of the RP-Hong Kong Agreement. Fourthly, Muñoz
was the very same person charged with such offenses based on the documents relied upon by the
DOJ, and the examination and determination of probable cause by the RTC that led to the
issuance of the order for the arrest of Muñoz. And, lastly, there is probable cause to believe that
Muñoz committed the offenses charged.

However, it was as to the sixth element that the CA took exception as not having been
established. Although the crime of conspiracy to defraud was included among the offenses
covered by the RP-Hong Kong Agreement, and the RTC and the CA have agreed that the crime
was analogous to the felony of estafa through false pretense as defined and penalized under

10 | I C M C V . C A L L E J A
Article 315(2)36 of the Revised Penal Code, it was disputed whether or not the other crime of
accepting an advantage as an agent was also punished as a crime in the Philippines. As such, the
applicability of the double criminality rule became the issue.

Under the double criminality rule, the extraditable offense must be criminal under the laws of
both the requesting and the requested states".37 This simply means that the requested state comes
under no obligation to surrender the person if its laws do not regard the conduct covered by the
request for extradition as criminal.38 chanrobleslaw

The HKS AR defines the crime of accepting an advantage as an agent under Section 9(1)(a) of
the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO), Cap. 201,39 to wit:
Section 9. Corrupt transactions with agents.

(1) Any agent who, without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, solicits or accepts any
advantage as an inducement to or reward for or otherwise on account of his –

(a) doing or forbearing to do, or having done or forborne to do, any act in relation to his
principal's affairs or business; or

G.R. No. 85750 September 28, 1990

INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC MIGRATION COMMISSION, petitioner
vs.
HON. PURA CALLEJA IN HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR
RELATIONS AND TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES
(TUPAS) WFTU respondents.
Facts and Issues
A. G.R. No. 85750 — the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) Case.
As an aftermath of the Vietnam War, the plight of Vietnamese refugees fleeing from South Vietnam's
communist rule confronted the international community.
In response to this crisis, on 23 February 1981, an Agreement was forged between the Philippine
Government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees whereby an operating center for
processing Indo-Chinese refugees for eventual resettlement to other countries was to be established in
Bataan (Annex "A", Rollo, pp. 22-32).
ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee processing center
in Morong, Bataan. It was incorporated in New York, USA, at the request of the Holy See, as a non-profit
agency involved in international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly registered with the United
Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative Status, Category II. As an
international organization rendering voluntary and humanitarian services in the Philippines, its activities
are parallel to those of the International Committee for Migration (ICM) and the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) [DOLE Records of BLR Case No. A-2-62-87, ICMC v. Calleja, Vol. 1].
On 14 July 1986, Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed with the then
Ministry of Labor and Employment a Petition for Certification Election among the rank and file members
employed by ICMC The latter opposed the petition on the ground that it is an international organization
registered with the United Nations and, hence, enjoys diplomatic immunity.
On 5 February 1987, Med-Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin sustained ICMC and dismissed the petition for
lack of jurisdiction.
On appeal by TUPAS, Director Pura Calleja of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), reversed the Med-
Arbiter's Decision and ordered the immediate conduct of a certification election. At that time, ICMC's

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request for recognition as a specialized agency was still pending with the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DEFORAF).
Subsequently, however, on 15 July 1988, the Philippine Government, through the DEFORAF, granted
ICMC the status of a specialized agency with corresponding diplomatic privileges and immunities, as
evidenced by a Memorandum of Agreement between the Government and ICMC (Annex "E", Petition,
Rollo, pp. 41-43), infra.
ICMC then sought the immediate dismissal of the TUPAS Petition for Certification Election invoking the
immunity expressly granted but the same was denied by respondent BLR Director who, again, ordered the
immediate conduct of a pre-election conference. ICMC's two Motions for Reconsideration were denied
despite an opinion rendered by DEFORAF on 17 October 1988 that said BLR Order violated ICMC's
diplomatic immunity.
Thus, on 24 November 1988, ICMC filed the present Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction
assailing the BLR Order.
On 28 November 1988, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the holding of the
certification election.
On 10 January 1989, the DEFORAF, through its Legal Adviser, retired Justice Jorge C. Coquia of the
Court of Appeals, filed a Motion for Intervention alleging that, as the highest executive department with
the competence and authority to act on matters involving diplomatic immunity and privileges, and tasked
with the conduct of Philippine diplomatic and consular relations with foreign governments and UN
organizations, it has a legal interest in the outcome of this case.
Over the opposition of the Solicitor General, the Court allowed DEFORAF intervention.
On 12 July 1989, the Second Division gave due course to the ICMC Petition and required the submittal of
memoranda by the parties, which has been complied with.
As initially stated, the issue is whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunites to ICMC
extends to immunity from the application of Philippine labor laws.
ICMC sustains the affirmative of the proposition citing (1) its Memorandum of Agreement with the
Philippine Government giving it the status of a specialized agency, (infra); (2) the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 21
November 1947 and concurred in by the Philippine Senate through Resolution No. 91 on 17 May 1949
(the Philippine Instrument of Ratification was signed by the President on 30 August 1949 and deposited
with the UN on 20 March 1950) infra; and (3) Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which
declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land.
Intervenor DEFORAF upholds ICMC'S claim of diplomatic immunity and seeks an affirmance of the
DEFORAF determination that the BLR Order for a certification election among the ICMC employees is
violative of the diplomatic immunity of said organization.
Respondent BLR Director, on the other hand, with whom the Solicitor General agrees, cites State policy
and Philippine labor laws to justify its assailed Order, particularly, Article II, Section 18 and Article III,
Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution, infra; and Articles 243 and 246 of the Labor Code, as amended, ibid.
In addition, she contends that a certification election is not a litigation but a mere investigation of a non-
adversary, fact-finding character. It is not a suit against ICMC its property, funds or assets, but is the sole
concern of the workers themselves.
Findings in Both Cases.
There can be no question that diplomatic immunity has, in fact, been granted ICMC and IRRI.
Article II of the Memorandum of Agreement between the Philippine Government and ICMC provides
that ICMC shall have a status "similar to that of a specialized agency." Article III, Sections 4 and 5 of the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies, adopted by the UN General
Assembly on 21 November 1947 and concurred in by the Philippine Senate through Resolution No. 19 on
17 May 1949, explicitly provides:
Art. III, Section 4. The specialized agencies, their property and assets, wherever located and by
whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any

12 | I C M C V . C A L L E J A
particular case they have expressly waived their immunity. It is, however, understood that no waiver of
immunity shall extend to any measure of execution.
Sec. 5. — The premises of the specialized agencies shall be inviolable. The property and assets of the
specialized agencies, wherever located and by whomsoever held shall be immune from search,
requisition, confiscation, expropriation and any other form of interference, whether by executive,
administrative, judicial or legislative action. (Emphasis supplied).
Thus it is that the DEFORAF, through its Legal Adviser, sustained ICMC'S invocation of immunity when
in a Memorandum, dated 17 October 1988, it expressed the view that "the Order of the Director of the
Bureau of Labor Relations dated 21 September 1988 for the conduct of Certification Election within
ICMC violates the diplomatic immunity of the organization."
The foregoing opinions constitute a categorical recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government
that ICMC and IRRI enjoy immunities accorded to international organizations, which determination has
been held to be a political question conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarrass a political
department of Government.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is
recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the
duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law
officer of the government . . . or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled
principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction . . . as to embarrass the executive arm of the
government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial
department of (this) government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the
latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction. 3
A brief look into the nature of international organizations and specialized agencies is in order. The term
"international organization" is generally used to describe an organization set up by agreement between
two or more states. 4 Under contemporary international law, such organizations are endowed with some
degree of international legal personality 5 such that they are capable of exercising specific rights, duties
and powers. 6 They are organized mainly as a means for conducting general international business in
which the member states have an interest. 7 The United Nations, for instance, is an international
organization dedicated to the propagation of world peace.
"Specialized agencies" are international organizations having functions in particular fields. The term
appears in Articles 57 8 and 63 9 of the Charter of the United Nations:
The Charter, while it invests the United Nations with the general task of promoting progress and
international cooperation in economic, social, health, cultural, educational and related matters,
contemplates that these tasks will be mainly fulfilled not by organs of the United Nations itself but by
autonomous international organizations established by inter-governmental agreements outside the United
Nations. There are now many such international agencies having functions in many different fields, e.g. in
posts, telecommunications, railways, canals, rivers, sea transport, civil aviation, meteorology, atomic
energy, finance, trade, education and culture, health and refugees. Some are virtually world-wide in their
membership; some are regional or otherwise limited in their membership. The Charter provides that those
agencies which have "wide international responsibilities" are to be brought into relationship with the
United Nations by agreements entered into between them and the Economic and Social Council, are then
to be known as "specialized agencies." 10
The rapid growth of international organizations under contemporary international law has paved the way
for the development of the concept of international immunities.
It is now usual for the constitutions of international organizations to contain provisions conferring certain
immunities on the organizations themselves, representatives of their member states and persons acting on
behalf of the organizations. A series of conventions, agreements and protocols defining the immunities of
various international organizations in relation to their members generally are now widely in force; . . . 11

13 | I C M C V . C A L L E J A
There are basically three propositions underlying the grant of international immunities to international
organizations. These principles, contained in the ILO Memorandum are stated thus: 1) international
institutions should have a status which protects them against control or interference by any one
government in the performance of functions for the effective discharge of which they are responsible to
democratically constituted international bodies in which all the nations concerned are represented; 2) no
country should derive any national financial advantage by levying fiscal charges on common international
funds; and 3) the international organization should, as a collectivity of States members, be accorded the
facilities for the conduct of its official business customarily extended to each other by its individual
member States. 12 The theory behind all three propositions is said to be essentially institutional in
character. "It is not concerned with the status, dignity or privileges of individuals, but with the elements
of functional independence necessary to free international institutions from national control and to enable
them to discharge their responsibilities impartially on behalf of all their members. 13 The raison d'etre for
these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies
concerned.
The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC and IRRI is clearly necessitated by their
international character and respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and
interference by the host country in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department
of Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of
international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by
the host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered
performance of their functions.
ICMC's and IRRI's immunity from local jurisdiction by no means deprives labor of its basic rights, which
are guaranteed by Article II, Section 18, 14 Article III, Section 8, 15 and Article XIII, Section 3 (supra),
of the 1987 Constitution; and implemented by Articles 243 and 246 of the Labor Code, 16 relied on by
the BLR Director and by Kapisanan.
For, ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there are disputes to be settled. Section 31 of
the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations 17
provides that "each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a)
disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a
party." Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of Agreement between ICMC the the
Philippine Government, whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC, the Government is free to
withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded. Thus:
Art. IV. Cooperation with Government Authorities. — 1. The Commission shall cooperate at all times
with the appropriate authorities of the Government to ensure the observance of Philippine laws, rules and
regulations, facilitate the proper administration of justice and prevent the occurrences of any abuse of the
privileges and immunities granted its officials and alien employees in Article III of this Agreement to the
Commission.
2. In the event that the Government determines that there has been an abuse of the privileges and
immunities granted under this Agreement, consultations shall be held between the Government and the
Commission to determine whether any such abuse has occurred and, if so, the Government shall withdraw
the privileges and immunities granted the Commission and its officials.
The immunity granted being "from every form of legal process except in so far as in any particular case
they have expressly waived their immunity," it is inaccurate to state that a certification election is beyond
the scope of that immunity for the reason that it is not a suit against ICMC. A certification election cannot
be viewed as an independent or isolated process. It could tugger off a series of events in the collective
bargaining process together with related incidents and/or concerted activities, which could inevitably
involve ICMC in the "legal process," which includes "any penal, civil and administrative proceedings."
The eventuality of Court litigation is neither remote and from which international organizations are
precisely shielded to safeguard them from the disruption of their functions. Clauses on jurisdictional
immunity are said to be standard provisions in the constitutions of international Organizations. "The

14 | I C M C V . C A L L E J A
immunity covers the organization concerned, its property and its assets. It is equally applicable to
proceedings in personam and proceedings in rem." 18
We take note of a Manifestation, dated 28 September 1989, in the ICMC Case (p. 161, Rollo), wherein
TUPAS calls attention to the case entitled "International Catholic Migration Commission v. NLRC, et
als., (G.R. No. 72222, 30 January 1989, 169 SCRA 606), and claims that, having taken cognizance of that
dispute (on the issue of payment of salary for the unexpired portion of a six-month probationary
employment), the Court is now estopped from passing upon the question of DOLE jurisdiction petition
over ICMC.
We find no merit to said submission. Not only did the facts of said controversy occur between 1983-1985,
or before the grant to ICMC on 15 July 1988 of the status of a specialized agency with corresponding
immunities, but also because ICMC in that case did not invoke its immunity and, therefore, may be
deemed to have waived it, assuming that during that period (1983-1985) it was tacitly recognized as
enjoying such immunity.
En passant, the Court is gratified to note that the heretofore antagonistic positions assumed by two
departments of the executive branch of government have been rectified and the resultant embarrassment
to the Philippine Government in the eyes of the international community now, hopefully, effaced.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 85750 (the ICMC Case), the Petition is GRANTED, the Order of the Bureau
of Labor Relations for certification election is SET ASIDE, and the Temporary Restraining Order earlier
issued is made PERMANENT.

ISSUE: Was the amendatory Ordinance No. 8187, allowing the continued stay of oil depots in Pandacanvalid and
constitutional? NO.Pandacan oil depots should leave for violation of the right to health and the right to a healthful and
balanced environment

No violation of environmental laws

The scope of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases is embodied in Section 2, Part I, Rule I thereof. It
states that the Rules shall govern the procedure in civil, criminal and special civil actions before the MeTCs, MTCCs,
MTCs and MCTCs, and the RTCs involving the enforcement or violations of environmental and other related laws,
rules and regulations such as but not limited to: R.A. No. 6969, Toxic Substances and Hazardous Waste Act; R.A.
No. 8749, Clean Air Act; Provisions in C.A. No. 141 and other existing laws that relate to the conservation,
development, preservation, protection and utilization of the environment and natural resources.

Notably, the aforesaid Rules are limited in scope. While, indeed, there are allegations of violations of environmental
laws in the petitions, these only serve as collateral attacks that would support the other position of the petitioners –
the protection of the right to life, security and safety.

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