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SUNGA vs.

TRINIDAD
G.R. No. 125629, March 25, 1998

Facts: Petitioner Manuel Sunga was a mayoralty candidate running against respondent Ferdinand Trinidad, the
incumbent mayor Municipality of Iguig, Province of Cagayan, in the May 1995 elections.

On April 1995, Sunga filed a letter-complaint with the COMELEC for disqualification against Trinidad accusing him
of using 3 local government vehicles in his campaign and employing threats, violence, intimidation, terrorism, or
other forms of coercion which are both violations of Omnibus Election Code. This was followed by an amended
petition for disqualification consolidating the charges in the 2 letters-complaint including vote buying. There are
hearings held in wherein Sunga presented evidence while Trinidad showed none.

Meanwhile, election results showed that Trinidad garnered the highest number of votes, while Sunga trailed
second. Sunga moved for the suspension of the proclamation of Trinidad. Despite the motion, Trinidad was
proclaimed the elected mayor thus prompting Sunga to file another motion to suspend the effects of the
proclamation. However, both motions were not acted upon by the COMELEC 2nd Division.

From the COMELEC law department, a report was submitted to the COMELEC en banc recommending charging
Trinidad. Eventually, the COMELEC en banc filed 4 information against Trinidad for various election offenses. On
the other hand, the disqualification case was filed before the COMELEC 2 nd Division for hearing.

Sunga filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend the Effects and Annul the Proclamation with Urgent Motion for Early
Resolution of the Petition. However, the COMELEC 2nd division through Resolution 2050 dismissed the petition for
disqualification because it was filed after the elections. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Sunga but was
denied by the COMLEC En Banc. Soon after, Trinidad was proclaimed mayor and assumed the position of Mayor.
Thus, Sunga a petition for certiorari contending that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the petition for disqualification, on the grounds that:

1. According to Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646, the COMELEC is required to resolve the disqualification case even
after the election and proclamation, and the proclamation and assumption of office by Trinidad did not
deprive the COMELEC of its jurisdiction;

2. COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 is null and void as it contravenes Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646;

3. The filing of 4 information, which were authorized by the COMELEC, against him is a violation of the
penal provisions of the Omnibus Election Code that shows more than sufficient and substantial evidence
to disqualify Trinidad; and

4. Since Trinidad was a disqualified candidate, it is as if petitioner was the only candidate entitled to be
proclaimed as the duly elected mayor.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the COMELEC was correct in dismissing the petition of Sunga for disqualification. NO.
2. Whether or not Sunga should be proclaimed as mayor. NO.

Ruling:

1. The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and had assumed the position of mayor did not divest
the COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to continue the hearing and eventually decide the
disqualification case.
Nothing in COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 declaring, ordering or directing the dismissal of a disqualification case
filed before the election but which remained unresolved after the election. What the Resolution mandates in such
a case is for the Commission to refer the complaint to its Law Department for investigation to determine whether
the acts complained of have in fact been committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified

Moreover, Resolution No. 2050 as interpreted in Silvestre v. Duavit infringes on Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646, which
provides:

Sec. 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong.

Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case
to its conclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. The word "shall" signifies that this requirement of the
law is mandatory, operating to impose a positive duty which must be enforced. The implication is that the
COMELEC is left with no discretion but to proceed with the disqualification case even after the election. Thus, in
providing for the outright dismissal of the disqualification case which remains unresolved after the election,
Silvestre v. Duavit in effect disallows what RA No. 6646 imperatively requires. This amounts to a quasi-judicial
legislation by the COMELEC which cannot be countenanced and is invalid for having been issued beyond the scope
of its authority.

A candidate guilty of election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of punished, by the dismissal of
the disqualification case against him simply because the investigating body was unable, for any reason caused
upon it, to determine before the election if the offenses were indeed committed by the candidate sought to be
disqualified. All that the erring aspirant would need to do is to employ delaying tactics so that the disqualification
case based on the commission of election offenses would not be decided before the election. This scenario is
productive of more fraud which certainly is not the main intent and purpose of the law.

In the present case, the proclamation of Trinidad as the mayor and having assumed such position does not divest
COMELEC of the authority and jurisdiction to continue the hearing and eventually decide the disqualification case.
The fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not signify that his disqualification is deemed
condoned and may no longer be the subject of a separate investigation.

2. The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later disqualified for the office
to which he was elected does not entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of
votes to be declared the winner of the elective office.

Sunga’s contention that he is entitled to be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Iguig,
Province of Cagayan, in the event that Trinidad is disqualified finds no support in law and jurisprudence. The
fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later disqualified for the office to which
he was elected does not entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be
declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a disqualified person may not be valid to install
the winner into office or maintain him there. But in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary
political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was
qualified, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless. In the absence of a statute which clearly
asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that
the candidate was qualified, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if
a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed winner and imposed as
the representative of a constituency, the majority of whom have positively declared through their ballots
that they do not choose him. Here, Sunga totally misconstrued the nature of our democratic electoral
process as well as the sociological and psychological elements behind voters' preferences. Election is the
process of complete ascertainment of the expression of the popular will.

While Sunga may have garnered the second highest number of votes, the fact remains that he was not the
choice of the people of Iguig, Cagayan. "The wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified
winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration of election in favor
of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes and does not entitle a candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes to be declared elected."

It is in the case of permanent vacancy that the duly elected vice-mayor shall succeed as provided by law. This is
expressly mandated by Section 44 of RA No. 7160 and this has been echoed in Art. 83 of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the Local Government Code of 1991.

Therefore, Sunga may not be proclaimed as mayor even though Trinidad is disqualified.

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