Angles John Phillip 84774 Binder3

Bar Misc.
5992
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA R0b~,"t ~J.F.~a-i’u~’~ Clerk
IN BANK
IN THE MATTER OF JOHN PHILLIP ANGLES
MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
It is hereby ordered that John Phillip Angles be disbarred from
the practice of law and that his-name be stricken from the roll of
attorneys. It is further ordered that he comply with rule 955,
California Rules of Court, and that he perform the acts specified in
subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 days,
respectively, after the effective date of this order.* This order is
effective April 14, 1989.
*See Business and Professions Code section 6126, subdivision
(C) ¯
,/)
,< d/C/ c-’’: .....

~,--
" : " ’~:’i’L:\l-<" I 5 ,~,~n,:~o,~ " .... Chief - ~’ i~ "
.............. ,::,:Li:,:: o{’ ¯ ..............................-}.-~ .... /.) ., L~} .......
’(: ’ / / //
¯ :J .... ,"i"-’-’-
....
," / I ./";
’if I y"’bL.//,:., ,
........ ~..~ ~, ~
~:’t"’~ ~’ ;~ " kwiktag ~ 018 035 249
1988
STATE BAR COURT
CLERK’S OFFICE
LOS ANGELES
STATE BAR COURT
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
REVIEW DEPARTMENT PUBLIC MATT
83-0-I 1213 - In the Matter of John P. Angles
I, Judy Duffield, hereby certify that I am Clerk of the State Bar Court, and
that as such, I am the custodian of all records and files of the State Bar
Court, and that the following is a full, true and correct copy of a resolution
or resolutions adopted as the decision or recommendation of the Review
Department of the State Bar Court on November 3, 1988, insofar as it
relates to the following proceeding:
After discussion and consideration by the Review Department of the record

in the above-entitled proceeding and upon motion made, seconded and
adopted it was
BEJ&O~J6FJ~ that the decision of the Hearing Panel after

reconsideration filed June 20, 1988, in the above-entitled matter is hereby
adopted.
Voting Yes: Referees Boyle, Carlin, Dean, Katsky, Kirkham, Lawson,

Mitchell, McElhinny, Schafer, Tilles, Vogt, Walenta, Whelan,
Wilczynski and Craig.
Dated:
DECLARATION OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, over the age of 18 years, whose business

address and place of employment is 818 West Seventh Street,
Los Angeles, California, declare that I am not a party to
the within action; that in the City and County of Los
Angeles, on the date shown below, I deposited a true copy of
the within
MINUTES OF THE REVIEW DEPARTMENT
in a sealed envelope as follows:
In a facility regularly maintained by the United States

Postal Service with postage thereon fully prepaid addressed
to:
John Phillip Angles, Esq.

303 West Mission Boulevard
Pomona, CA 91766
In an inter-office mail facility regularly maintained by the

state Bar of California addressed to:
Erica Tavachnick, Attorney at Law

Robert Deering, Esq.
Dated: December ~, 1988
I declare under penalty of

perjury at Los Angeles,
California, on the date shown
above, that the foregoing is
true and correct.
Charles Nettl~s~ - ~
Administrative Assistant
Effectuations Unit
Office of the State Bar Court
THE s XrE BAR
OFFICE OF STATE BAR COURT
0FCALIF0RNIA ,,,,,c,o,. STu,gl",,.
COURT CLERK’S OFFICE, 818 WEST SEVENTH STREET, SUITE 201, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-3432 (213} 689-6200
PEI~SONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

NOTICE ACCOMPANYING SEKVICE OF
ItEAKING PANEI/S AMENDED DECISION IN
CASE NUMBEI% 83-0-].1213 IN THE MATTEK OF John P. Angles
Enclosed is the Hearing Panel Decision filed in the above-numbered matter.
A copy of Kules 450-452 and 562 are enclosed for reference. Kule 562 permits.
an application for hearing de novo or to present additional evidence within ten
(10) days after service of the Decision. The rules also provide that a written
request for review may be made within fifteen (15) days after service of notice
of action by the hearing panel on such application or within fifteen (15) days
after service of the enclosed,Decision (Rule 450(a)).
Please consult the text of the enclosed Kules of Procedure for the exact
statement of procedures.
Please note that if review is not requested, an ex-parte review will be

conducted by the Review Department which will be binding within the State
Bar Court.
The Court Clerk’s Office of the State Bar Court can provide the dates upon
which the I~eview Department is Likely to act on this matter. Formal
notification of the action in this matter will be forthcoming from the
Effectuation of Decision section of the Court Clerk’s Office. Time Limits
required by the applicable rules will commence from the date of the final
notification.
DECLAKATION OF SEItVICE
I, the undersigned, over the age of 18.year_§, whose business and place of
employment is 818 West Seventh Street, Los Angeles, California, declare that I
am not a party to the within action; that in the City and County of Los
Angeles, on the date shown below, I deposited a true copy of the above Notice,
Hearing Panel Decision and Kule of Procedure 450-452 and 562; in a sealed
envelope as follows:
In a facility regularly maintained by the United States Postal Service

with postage thereon fully prepaid addressed to:
John ~. Angles, Eso., 303 West ~ission Blvd~ Pomona, CA 91766
Erica Tabachnick, ~tty at Law, 818 ~’[est 7th ’St., Los Angeles, CA 90017
Robert Deering, Es~. 1230 West 3rd Street, Los Angeles, C.D 900].7
In an inter-office mailfacility regularly maintained by the State Bar of
California addressed to:
I declare under penalty of perjury at Los Angeles, California, that the

is true and correct. Dated, this
foregoing19 8 8 " 2]_s__~__~.. ~day/~L/~i~’~ ~"
J~ng~)~D2~~.~ ’
Lydia’ ~o~s,~eXpu~Y~ Co-ur~ Clerk

Copy of this Notice to: Hearing Panel ~
Fran Bassios
1
3 JUN £ 0 ~
STATE BAR COURT
4 CLERK’S OFFICE ).~’"
LOS ANGELES
5
STATE BAR COURT
6
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
7
DISTRICT 7
8
IN THE MATTER OF ) 84-1-570 LA
9 )
10
JOHN PHILLIP ANGLES, ) DECISION AFTER
) RECONSIDERATION
A MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR )
11
)
12 The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on
13 June 24, 1987, September 28, 1987, November 18, 1987 and March 7,
14 1988. Present at all the hearings were John F. Busetti, Principal
15 and sole Referee and Robert Deering, Examiner for the State Bar.
16 John Phillip Angles, Respondent in this proceeding, was present
17 only on June 24 and September 28, 1987.
18 All matters (84-I-570 LA, 84-I-630 LA, 86-0-180 LA and 87-I-
19 Ii SR) were consolidated by stipulation.
20 The hearings on June 24, 1987 and March 7, 1988 were reported
21 by Alida Vazquez; the hearing on September 28, 1987 was reported
22 by Virginia Peteraetis; and the hearing on November 18, 1987 was
23 reported by Judy B. Elmore.

24 At the hearing on November 18, 1987, the parties were ordered
25 to submit briefs on culpability issues. The State Bar filed its
26 brief, but Respondent did not.
27 The matter was thereafter set for hearing on February 19,
28 1988, but Respondent requested and was granted a continuance due

1 to his being required to appear as a witness in an out-of-state
2 matter. Upon that request for a continuance, the parties selected
3 March 7, 1988 as the next hearing date. Respondent failed to
4 appear at that hearing, with no explanation.
5 .At the March 7, 1988 hearing, the Referee ordered that

6 Respondent had ten days to petition to reopen the matter upon a
7 proper showing, and that if no such petition were filed and
8 granted, the matter would stand submitted.
9 On March 17, 1988, the Referee was presented with

10 Respondent’s Petition to Re-Open. That Petition addressed solely
11 purported reasons for Respondent’s failure to appear on November
12 18, 1987. That Petition was denied, without prejudice, by Order
13 dated March 18, 1988. No renewed request to reopen the matter was
14 thereafter presented.
15 On or about May 17, 1988, the Office of Trial Counsel filed a

16 Request for Reconsideration. Respondent did not oppose that
17 Request. The Request was granted.
18 The undersigned Principal and sole Referee makes the
19 following findings of fact as to which the main, but not
20 exclusive, evidentiary basis for each finding is cited in
21 parenthesis after said finding:
22 FINDINGS OF FACT
23 As specifically alleged in the Notice to Show Cause filed
24 herein:
25 i. The Respondent, John Phillip Angles, was admitted to the
26 practice of law in the State of California on December 13, 1978.
27 (Oral stipulation.)
28 //
-2-
I Count One
2 (Craig)
3 2. Jennie Craig (Bruccheri) hired respondent on or about
4 December 23, 1983 to collect back child support from her ex-
5 husband. (Craig testimony.)
6 3. She paid him $750 as and for advance attorneys’ fees to

7 institute the requisite proceedings. (craig testimony.)
8 4. She particularly needed the back support because she was

9 on disability, and Respondent knew this. (Craig testimony.)
10 5. On or about April 4, 1984, Respondent filed an Order to

11 Show Cause and related papers with the Los Angeles County Superior
12 Court on behalf of Ms. Craig, which he had prepared. (Exhibit 26,
13 Superior Court file.)
14 6. One of the filed documents was Ms. Craig’s financial
15 declaration, which showed her financial situation and needs.
16 (Exhibit 26.)
17 7. However, service was not effected on the former husband

18 and the hearing set for Mayl, 1984 was taken off calendar.
19 (Exhibit 26, containing minute order of that date.)

20 8. Thereupon, Respondent told Ms. Craig that a new hearing
21 would be arranged and that, if necessary, he would personally
22 serve her ex-husband. (Craig testimony,)
23 9. She never heard from Respondent thereafter (with the

24 exception hereinafter noted), trying some 15-20 times to reach him
25 by telephone, without success. (Craig testimony; Exhibit 27,
26 telephone bills.)
27 I0. By letter dated December 18, 1984 from Respondent’s
28 secretary, Ms. Craig received another financial declaration, which
-3-
1 she signed and returned. (Craig testimony; Exhibit 29 (cover
2 letter) a~d Exhibit 28 (declaration).)
3 ii. Nothing more was ever done by Respondent. (Craig

4 testimony.)
5 .12. Respondent never refunded the fees Ms. Craig paid to

6 him. (Craig testimony.)
7
Count ’~ro
8
(Villani)
9 13. Darlene Villani and her ex-husband had entered into an
10 agreement to purchase a home, making a $5,000 deposit, but the
11 sellers (the Turners) refused to make certain repairs prior to the
12 close of the transaction. (Villani testimony.)
13 14. Ms. Villani knew Respondent from having done work for
14 him as a court reporter and from a referral from another lawyer.
15 On or about April 20, 1982, she retained Respondent to recover the
16 $5,000 deposit, on which occasion a $i,000 advance attorney fee
17 was paid to Respondent. (Villani testimony; Exhibit 11, a copy of
18 the retainer check.)
19 15. On that day, she met with Respondent, who told her that
20 since escrow had not been started, there was no problem in
21 retrieving the $5,000 deposit. (Villani testimony.)

22 16. He then filed a lawsuit on their behalf and also had a
23 lis pendens recorded on May 20, 1982. (Villani testimony; Exhibit
24 12, Superior Court case file.)
25 17. Respondent took the depositions of the sellers in or

26 about October 1982; Ms. Villani said these were a waste of time.
27 (Villani testimony.)
28 18. The lis pendens was also expunged on or about September
-4-
1 14, 1982, by motion of the Turners, because the suit involved
2 return of a deposit, that is, not to enforce an interest in real
3 property, so that no legal basis existed for recording a lis
4 pendens. (Villani testimony; Exhibit 12; Exhibit 13, Respondent’s
5 billing statement dated January 4, 1983.)
6 19. There was no reference on the January 4, 1983 billing

7 that the li___~s pendens had been expunged on or about September 14,
8 1982. (Exhibit 13.)

9 20. When she received this billing, Ms. Villani was not
10 aware that there had been a motion to expunge the lis pendens or
11 that it was granted. (Villani testimony.)
12 21. After receiving the billing, Ms. Villani and her husband
13 heard nothing more from Respondent. (Villani testimony.)
14 22. She even wrote to Respondent on August 15, 1983,

15 documenting all of the unsuccessful attempts to reach him,
16 including cancelled appointments in June 1983. (Villani
17 testimony; Exhibit 14, a copy of that letter.)
18 23. She never received a response to that letter and
19 reviewed the court file herself, realizing for the first time that
2O the lis pendens had been expunged and that Respondent did not even
21 appear at the hearing on the motion to expunge. (Villani
22 testimony; Exhibit 12; Exhibit 13.)
23 24. In addition, because Respondent filed a baseless lis
24 pendens, a judgment for attorneys’ fees and costs was awarded
25 against the Villanis and in favor of the Turners in the sum of
26 $764. (Exhibit 12.)
27 25. The Villanis never recovered the $5,000 deposit and were
28 never refunded any of the fees they had paid to Respondent.
-5-
I Count Three
2 (Ray}
3 26. The State Bar requested that this count be dismissed.
4 Count Four
5 (Frankot)
6 27. John Frankot is an auditor for the State Board of
7 Equalization, resides in Sacramento, California, and is typically
8 on the road two-to-three times a month. (Frankot testimony.)
9 28. He hired Respondent in June 1983 to represent him in a

10 paternity matter. (Frankot testimony.)
11 29. On or about June 8, 1983.,~Mr. Frankot sent Respondent a
12 letter enclosing a check for $500; Respondent thereafter requested
13 an addition $i,000 as advance fees, and on July 2, 1983, Mr.
14 Frankot sent that additional sum. (Frankot testimony; Exhibits 15
15 and 16.)
16 30. In early August, 1983, Mr. Frankot received a letter

17 from his prior attorney in this paternity matter, informing him
18 that a motion to compel answers to interrogatories had been
19 brought by the plaintiff. (Frankot testimony.)

20 31. Mr. Frankot then communicated with Respondent about this
21 and also about some advice the prior lawyer had given about taking
22 a blood test; Respondent told him not worry about the motion and
23 that he need not take any blood test. (Frankot testimony.)

24 32. On October 3, 1983, Mr. Frankot wrote to Respondent
25 about his case, noting that he had no complaints "so far" and that
26 he felt "very secure" in Respondent’s hands. (Frankot testimony;
27 Exhibit 17, being that letter.)
28 33. In early-November, 1983, Mr. Frankot received a notice

1 of entry of judgment in the paternity matter. (Frankot
2 testimony.)
3 34. He learned from the plaintiff (the District Attorney’s

4 Office) that he had been ordered to pay $340 per month support and
5 that~this was because the motion to compel answers to
6 interrogatories had been granted, no answers were served and Mr.

7 Frankot’s default had been entered. (Frankot testimony.)
8 35. On November 23, 1983, Mr. Frankot wrote to Respondent,

9 asking for help on this, even suggesting that a motion to set
10 aside the default be brought and that time was running to do so;
11 Mr. Frankot also noted that he had~called Respondent’s office
12 several times, without success. (Frankot testimony; Exhibit 18,
13 that letter.)
14 36. Thereafter, Mr. Frankot spoke to Respondent’s staff, who

15 told him that there was nothing to worry about. (Frankot
16 testimony.)
17 37. However, in December 1983, a wage assignment was levied
18 on Mr. Frankot’s earnings and this caused him more concern,
19 specifically that his employment could be in jeopardy; he
2O discussed this with Respondent, who assured him that everything
21 was in order. (Frankot testimony.)
22 38. Mr. Frankot became more and more frustrated and spoke to
23 the attorney who had originally referred Mr. Frankot to Respondent
24 and a meeting was arranged with Respondent. (Frankot testimony.)
25 39. At this meeting, Respondent suggested to Mr. Frankot

26 that perhaps he was the father, the inference being that there was
27 no ground to complain about the judgment. (Frankot testimony;
28 Exhibit 19, being a January 4, 1984 letter to Respondent.)
-7-
1 40. Mr. Frankot asked for his file, but did not receive it.
2 (Frankot testimony.)
3 41. On January 12, 1984, Mr. Frankot drove from Sacramento
4 to Los Angeles and reviewed the court file. (Frankot testimony.)
5 ~42. He saw therein a motion to set aside default and

6 thereupon spoke to an attorney in Respondent’s office, Mr. Price,
7 who told him that the hearing was continued to February 6, 1984.
9 43. The motion to set aside the default was denied.
10 (Frankot testimony; Exhibit 23, Superior Court file.)
11 44. Mr. Frankot retained a new attorney. (Frankot
12 testimony.)
13 45. Mr. Frankot met with Respondent on February i0, 1984, at

14 which time Respondent promised to help defray some of the
15 additional costs caused by Respondent’s improper handling of the
16 case, which amounted to $2,000 fees for the new attorney and
17 $1,400 in support. (Frankot testimony; Exhibit 20, letter to
18 Respondent.)
19 46. That letter (Exhibit 20) also requested a refund of the
20 $1,500 Mr. Frankot had paid Respondent.
21 47. In April 1984, a motion to set aside the default, filed

22 by Mr. Frankot’s new lawyer, was granted, conditional on, among
23 other things, a blood test. (Frankot testimony; Exhibit 20.)
24 48. Ultimately, Mr. Frankot agreed that he was the father of
25 the child. (Frankot testimony.)
26 49. No refund of the fees paid by Mr. Frankot was ever made
27 by Respondent, nor did Respondent pay any of the additional
28 expense and the support he promised to defray in February, 1984.
-8-
2 Count Five
3 (Costello)
4 50. Ella Costello, a supervisor of mails for the United
5 States Postal Service in West Covina, engaged Respondent to
6 represent her in marital dissolution proceedings on or about
7 February 14, 1983, at which time she paid him $630 in cash as
8 advance fees. (Costello testimony; Exhibit 30, being receipts for

9 the $630.)
10 51. She met with Respondent on this first occasion, and he
11 agreed to represent her and an engagement agreement was signed.
12 (Costello testimony.)
13 52. They discussed the nature of the circumstances for which
14 she came to retain Respondent, that is, that her husband had filed
15 for marital dissolution and that she had been served with legal
16 process approximately one week earlier, for which a response was
17 due. (Costello testimony; also, Exhibit 31, Superior Court file,
18 showing the pleadings involved which were served on her.)
19 53. Respondent told her that he would take care of filing a
20 timely pleading, although an extension would probably be obtained
21 to see if the case could be resolved. (Costello testimony;
22 Exhibit 32, February 24, 1983 letter from Respondent to the
23 attorney for the husband, confirming an open extension to plead on
24 behalf of Ms. Costello.)
25 54. Negotiations then ensued between Respondent and the
26 husband’s lawyer, on behalf of their respective clients, which
27 proved to be unsuccessful. (Costello testimony; Exhibit 33,
28 letter dated Apri~ 25, 1983 from Respondent to opposing counsel,

1 also acknowledging that a responsive pleading on behalf of Ms.
2 Costello was due on May 3, 1983.)
3 55. No responsive pleading was filed and no agreement was
4 entered into by Respondent on behalf of Ms. Costello; Ms.
5 Costello’s default was entered. (Costello testimony; Exhibit I.)
6 56. Ms. Costello attempted several times to contact
7 Respondent, even making an appointment to see him about the
8 situation and the default she came to learn had been entered.
10 57. After waiting almost 3 hours to see him, she was finally
11 able to speak with Respondent, who. said that he would take care of
12 the default. (Costello testimony.)
13 58. Nothing was done by Respondent, to Ms. Costello’s
14 knowledge, and she made several appointments to meet with him; he
15 was never there when she came to the appointments; and on one
16 occasion, she came without an appointment and was told that he had
17 just left. (Costello testimony.)
18 59. Thereupon, she had to fend for herself and engaged in
19 negotiations with her husband’s lawyer herself. (Costello
20 testimony.)
21 60. She actually went to the default prove-up hearing with
22 her husband, at which time the settlement agreement was presented
23 to the Court. (Costello testimony; Exhibit i.)
24 61. On September 15, 1983, Ms. Costello wrote a letter to
25 Respondent and delivered it to his office; the receptionist took

26 the letter and threw it on the floor. (Costello testimony;
27 Exhibit 34.)
28 62. In that letter, she requested a refund of the money she
-i0-
1 had paid to Respondent, which refund never came. (Costello
2 testimony; Exhibit 34.)
3 63. The actual settlement negotiated by Ms. Costello was not

4 favorable, and she estimates that she lost in excess of $21,000
5 because she was not able to have proper representation in the
6 settlement negotiations. (Costello testimony.)

7
Count Six
8 (Quesada)
9 64. Catalina Alvarez de Quesada met with Respondent in April
10 1981 at his office concerning obtaining a dissolution of her
11 marriage. (Quesada testimony.) ,.
12 65. Ms. Quesada is not fluent in English as she speaks in
13 Spanish, and Respondent was known to be fluent in Spanish.
14 (Quesada testimony; Respondent testimony.)
15 66. At this meeting, financial arrangements were discussed.
16 (Quesada testimony.)
17 67. Ms. Quesada testified that she was told that the entire
18 process would cost $350; Respondent testified that this was never
19 represented to be a maximum or flat rate.

20 68. Ms. Quesada brought in two checks, one for $200 on or
21 about April 14, 1981 and one one for $150 on or about May 13,
22 1981. (Quesada testimony; Exhibits 3 and 4, respective copies of
23 those checks.)
24 69. Thereafter, arrangements were made for her to sign
25 necessary papers and Respondent gave her a court date. (Quesada
26 testimony.)
27 70. The first hearing was attended by Respondent and Ms.
28 Quesada. (Quesada testimony.)
-ii-
1 71. Although she testified at the State Bar hearing (through
2 an interpreter) that she did not speak English, she also testified
3 that Respondent had lied to the judge (in English), but did not
4 recall what the lie was. (Quesada testimony.)
5 .72. Respondent, through cross-examination, brought out that

6 there were difficulties in serving her husband and that she did
7 not cooperate in assisting Respondent in that regard by providing
8 adequate information about her husband’s whereabouts and refused
9 to pay any additional costs relating thereto, i.e., to serve the
10 husband by publication.
11 73. She never followed through on a divorce from her

12 husband. (Quesada testimony.)
13 Count Seven
14 (Hernandez)
15 74. Rebecca Hernandez (also known as Rebecca Amaya) hired
16 Respondent in April 1984 to represent her with respect to a
17 modification of a child support order being requested by her
18 former husband. (Hernandeztestimony.)
19 75. She was paying $75 per month and her husband was seeking
20 $400 per month. (Hernandez testimony.)
21 76. She met with Respondent in April 1984 and discussed her
22 case; no written retainer agreement was entered into, but he told
23 her that he wanted $1,500 to take the case. (Hernandez
24 !testimony.)
25 77. Approximately one week later, she borrowed the money
26 from her mother and met with Respondent, this time also signing a
27 Financial Declaration he had prepared for her. (Hernandez
28 testimony; Exhibit i, copy of check; Exhibit 2, Superior Court
-12-
1 file.)
2 78. The first hearing on the modification request was set
3 for April 24, 1984; Respondent told her that she did not have to
4 appear because it would be continued. (Hernandez testimony;
5 Exhibit 2.)
6 79. Thereafter, she called Respondent on various occasions,

7 and was told by him that the hearing on the modification request
8 was continued to June 7, 1984. (Hernandez testimony.)
9 80. Respondent never sent anything to her in writing about

10 this or any of the other continuances he told her about, and it
11 was always Ms. Hernandez who had to initiate the inquiries about
12 the status of her case. (Hernandez testimony.)
13 81. However, there had been a hearing on April 24, 1984, at

14 which time the child support was raised to $400 per month and Ms.
15 Hernandez was ordered to pay her ex-husband’s attorneys fees of
16 $1,500. (Exhibit 2.) Respondent did not appear at that hearing,
17 as she knew nothing about it. (Exhibit 2, minute order of that
18 date, and Hernandez testimony.)
19 82. In late-May or early-June, 1984, Ms. Hernandez received

2O a letter from her ex-husband’s attorney informing her that child
21 support had been increased. (Hernandez testimony.)
22 83. She immediately contacted Respondent,who told her that

23 he would take care of it and that she should not do anything.
24 (Hernandez testimony.)
25 84. He also told her that the hearing date had been
26 continued to September 13, 1984; later, he told her the date was
27 continued to September 21, 1984. (Hernandez testimony.) She
28 actually appeared on September 21, 1984, but nothing was on
-13-
1 calendar. (Hernandez testimony; Exhibit 2.)
2 85. She then went to Respondent’s office some 8-10 times to
3 speak with him, but he was never there. (Hernandez testimony.)
4 86. In 1985, her wages were garnished as a result of the

5 order modifying the support that had been entered in April 1984.
6 (Hernandez testimony; Exhibit 2.)
7 87. Ms. Hernandez filed a Small Claims Court action for the
8 $1,500 she had paid to Respondent. (Hernandez testimony.)
9 88. He did not appear and she obtained judgment against him
10 in that sum. (Hernandez testimony.)
11 90. However, he filed bankruptcy and she never recovered the

12 $1,500.
13 EVIDENCE IN MITIGATION
14 91. None was offered by Respondent, except that some of the
15 matters occurred within less than four years from when he was
16 admitted to practice.
17 92. There was no prior record of discipline.

18 EVIDENCE IN AGGRAVATION
19 93. As to all counts other than the dismissed Count Three
20 and Count Six:
21 (a) Respondent’s conduct was surrounded by bad

22 faith, dishonesty, fraud and concealment;
23 (b) The clients suffered pecuniary losses never
24 reimbursed by Respondent.
25 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
26 Count One
27 94. Findings of Fact 2 through 11, the evidence on which
28 those findings are based, and the record in general, clearly and
-14-
1 convincingly support the Conclusion of Law that Rule 6-101(A) (2)
2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct was violated, that is, that
3 Respondent failed to use reasonable diligence and his best
4 judgment in the exercise of his skill and in the application of
5 his learning in an effort to accomplish, with reasonable speed,
6 the purpose for which he was employed. He abandoned the client.
7 He also misrepresented what he was going to do. Specifically, the
8 client, Ms. Craig, testified that she needed to recover back child
9 support because she was on disability. Respondent knew this, but
10 did not pursue the matter on her behalf after initially failing to
11 secure service on her former husband.
14 convincingly support the Conclusion of Law that Rule 2-ii1(A)(3)
16 Respondent willfully withdrew from employment without promptly
17 refunding an unearned fee paid in advance. After failing to do

18 anything following the first hearing which could not go forward
19 due to lack of service on the former husband, Respondent did
20 nothing further to pursue the matter and never refunded any of the
21 $750 paid as advance fee by Ms. Craig.

24 convincingly support the Conclusion of Law that the provisions of
25 Business and Professions Code §6103 were violated, that is,
26 Respondent violated his duties as an attorney.

-15-
2 Business and Professions Code §6068(a) were violated, that is,
3 Respondent did not support the laws of this State, and
4 specifically the provisions of Business and Professions Code
5 §6103.
9 Rule 2-III(A)(2) of the Rules of Professional conduct, that is, he
10 willfully withdrew from employment without taking reasonable steps
11 to avoid prejudice to his client...

12 Count Two
15 convincingly support the Conclusion of Law that Rule 6-I01(A)(2)
20 the purpose for which he was employed. Respondent failed to
21 communicate with his clients, he misrepresented the status of
22 their case, he failed to inform them that attorneys’ fees and
23 costs had been awarded against them due to the improvident and
24 baseless recordation of a lis pendens and did not even appear at
25 the hearing at which that lis pendens was expunged. Again, he
26 abandoned his clients.
27 i00o Findings of Fact 13 through 25, the evidence on which
(-
1 convincingly support the Conclusion of Law that Rule 2-III(A)(3)
4 refunding an unearned fee paid in advance. While Respondent did

5 file .a lawsuit for his clients, and even took a deposition, he
6 billed for effort which was not expended, i.e., as to the lis
7 pendens, so that a portion of the advance fee paid by the clients
8 was not earned and not returned.
9 i01. Findings of Fact 13 through 25, the evidence on which

20 §6103.
24 Rule 2-111(A) (2) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, that is, he

26 to avoid prejudice to his clients.
27 Count Three
28 104. At the request of the State Bar, this count was
-17-
1 dismissed.
2 Coumt Four
5 convincingly support the Conclusion of Law that Rule 6-I01(A)(2)

10 the purpose for which he was employed. Respondent failed to
11 communicate with his client, he misrepresented the status of his

12 case, he failed to take steps to defend the motion to compel
13 answers to interrogatories, which ultimately led to Mr. Frankot’s
14 default being entered, he actually sought to justify his actions
15 by inferring to Mr. Frankot that he should not complain about the
16 default judgment, and he failed to make a timely motion to set
17 aside that default. .Once again, Respondent abandoned his clients.
18 106. Findings of Fact27 through 49, the evidence on which

23 refunding an unearned fee paid in advance. Respondent actually
24 promised to do so, as well as to defray the additional expense and
25 the support Mr. Frankot was held liable for due to the entry of
26 default.
-18-

3 Respondent willfully withdrew from employment without delivering
4 to his client all papers and property to which the client was
5 entitled. Specifically, Mr. Frankot asked for his file when he

6 realized that Respondent was not representing his interests, but
7 Respondent failed to deliver that file.

19 §6103.
20 Count Five
21 ii0. Findings of Fact 50 through 61 and 63, the evidence on
22 which those findings are based, and the record in general, clearly
23 and convincingly support the Conclusion of Law that Rule
24 6-101(A)(2) of the Rules of Professional Conduct was violated,
25 that is, that Respondent failed to use reasonable diligence and
26 his best judgment in the exercise of his skill and in the
27 application of his learning in an effort to accomplish, with
28 reasonable speed, the purpose for which he was employed.

1 Respondent failed to communicate with his client, he
2 misrepresented the status of her case, he failed to respond to the
3 petition to dissolve the marriage served on Ms. Costello by reason

4 of which her default was entered and he failed to represent her
5 interests at all in the settlement negotiations. Respondent

6 abandoned this client as well.
7 iii. Findings of Fact 50 through 63, the evidence on which
9 convincingly support the Conclusion of Law that Rule 2-111(A)(3)
11 Respondent willfully withdrew from. employment without promptly
12 refunding an unearned fee paid in advance.
24 §6103.
-20-
I willfully withdrew from employment without taking reasonable steps
2 to avoid prejudice to his client.
3 Count Six
4 115. Ms. Quesada’s testimony was not credible as to her
5 claims that Respondent had failed to perform further services for
6 her. The credible evidence was that she did not cooperate and did
7 not advance the costs necessary to serve her husband.
8 116. Accordingly, the State Bar did not prove this count by
9 clear and convincing evidence.
10 Count Seven
13 convincingly support the Conclusion of Law that Rule 6-I01(A) (2)
18 the purpose for which he was.employed. Respondent failed to
19 communicate with his client, he misrepresented the status of her
20 case, he failed to respond to the request for increased child
21 support filed against Ms. Hernandez by reason of which it

22 proceeded unopposed and additional support was ordered against
23 her, and he failed to represent her interests at a11 with respect

24 thereto. Respondent abandoned Ms. Hernandez.

-21-
2 refunding an unearned fee paid in advance.



14 §6103.

20 to avoid prejudice to his client.
21 CONCLUSIONS AS TO APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF DISCIPLINE

22 122. The presumptively appropriate level of discipline for
23 violations of Rules 6-101 and 2-111 is reproval or suspension,
24 depending on the circumstances of the case. See, Stds. 2.4(b),
25 2110, Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct
26 (hereinafter "Standards").
27 123. However, when a pattern of willfully failing to perform
28 services demonstrating the member’s abandonment of the causes in
-22-
1 which he or she was retained has been shown, the standards require
2
disbarment. Std. 2.4(a) of Standards.
3 124. Whenever a member is culpable of fraud or intentional
4 dishonesty towards a client or is culpable of concealment of a
5 material fact from a client, actual suspension or disbarment is
6 the presumptive discipline, depending upon the extent to which the

7 victim of the misconduct is harmed or misled and depending upon
8 the magnitude of the act of misconduct and the degree to which it

9 related to the member’s acts within the practice of law. Std. 2.3
10 of Standards. See, also, Std. 1.2(b) (iii) of Standards.
11 125. Violations of Business and Professions Code §§ 6068 and

12 6103 also shall result in disbarment or suspension, depending one.
13 the gravity of the offense or the harm, if any, to the victim,
14 with due regard to the purpose of imposing discipline set forth in
15 Standard 1.3.
16 126. Standard 1.3 states that the primary purposes of

17 disciplinary proceedings and sanctions imposed upon a finding of
18 professional misconduct are the protection of the public, the
19 courts and the legal profession, the maintenance of high
20 professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public
21 confidence in the legal profession. The same standard considers

22 rehabilitation to be a permissible object, but only consistent
23 with these primary purposes.
24 127. In all of the counts in which culpability has been

25 found, Respondent abandoned his clients and their causes. In all
26 of those counts, the clients suffered pecuniary harm, all by way
27 of not receiving what they were told they would get for the
28 advance attorneys’ fees they paid, and some by actually suffering

1 monetary losses.
3 found, Respondent misrepresented the status of the cases and
4 concealed the true status of the particular matters for which he
5 was hired.
6 129. Respondent, rather than representing his clients, took
7 their money and simply abandoned them and demonstrated a pattern
8 of willfully doing this.
9 130. The various individuals went to Respondent and trusted
10 him to perform services. In all cases he betrayed that trust.
11 131. The only possible mitigating factor is that Respondent

12 was practicing law for only a few years when the misconduct
13 occurred. However, in no case did Respondent refund any of the
14 fees or contribute~anything to defray the pecuniary harm he had

15 caused, and his misrepresentation and concealment show a basic and
16 fundamental flaw, indicating that he cannot be trusted. No
17 evidence was presented that rehabilitation would be beneficial.
18 132. In essence, the presumptive discipline of Standard

19 2.4(a), disbarment, has not been shown to be inappropriate.
20 Moreover, with (a) no evidence of mitigation other than the short
21 amount of time he was a lawyer when these matters arose, (b)

22 coupled with the aggravating circumstances of the amount of
23 pecuniary harm his clients suffered and that Respondent made no
24 effort to refund unearned fees, and (c) considering that no
25 evidence relating to rehabilitation and no facts from which
26 benefits, if any, of rehabilitation could be considered, the
27 presumptive discipline of disbarment under standard 2.3 has also
28 not been shown to be inappropriate. Disbarment is the only

1 discipline appropriate herein to achieve the primary purposes of
2 Standard 1.3.
3 RECOMMENDATION
4 133. The undersigned Referee recommends that Respondent be
5 disbarred.
6 134. It is also recommended that Respondent be ordered to
7 inform his clients and the courts of his disbarment by complying
8 with Rule 955 of the Rules of Court ..... J-~/, ~ -- ~

9 DATED: June /~’~, 1988
P~,fhcipal" a~d Sole Referee
10 /
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
THE ST rE BAR
~OFFICE OF STATE BAR COURT
0FCALIF0RNIA ~i,~c,o,, STUART A. FORSYTH
COURT CLERK’S OFFICE, 818 WEST SEVENTH STREET, SUITE 201, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-3432 (213) 689-6200
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
NOTICE ACCOMPANYING SERVICE OF
HEARING PANEL DECISION IN
CASE NUMBER 83-0-11213 IN TI{E MATTER OF John Phillip Angles
(86-0-180LA) (84-I-570LA) (84-I-630LA) (87-I-011SR) *Correction
A copy of Rules 450-452 and 562 are enclosed for reference. Rule 562 permits
after service of the enclosed Decision (Rule 450(a)).
Please consult the text of the enclosed Rules of Procedure for the exact
Please note that if review is not requested~ an ex-parte review will be

Bar Court.
The Court Clerk’s Office of the State Bar-Court can provide the dates upon
which the Review Department is likely to act on this matter. Formal
Effectuation of Decision section of the Court Clerk’s Office. Time limits
notification.
I, the undersigned, over the age of 18 years, whose business and place of
Angeles, on the date shown below, I deposited a.,true copy of the above Notice,
Hearing Panel Decision and Rule of Procedure 450-452 and 562; in a sealed

John Phillip Angles, Esq. Erica Tabachnick, A/L Robert O. Deering, Esq.
303 West Mission Blvd. State Bar of California State Bar of California
Pomona, CA 91766 818 West Seventh Street 1230 West Third Street
Los Angeles, CA 90017 Los Angeles, CA 90017
In an inter-office mail facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of ,~

foregoing is true and correct. Dated, this 28 flay of ,,April ,
Angela (~wens, Deputy Court Clerk

Copy of this Notice to: Hearing Panel
Bran Bassios
THE S]( I’E BAR
OF CALIFORNIA Director, STUART A. FORSYTH
COURT CLERK’S OFFICE, 818 WEST SEVENTH STREET, SUITE 201, LOS ANGELES; CALIFORNIA 90017-3432 (213) 689-6200

NOTICE ACCOMPANYING SEKVICE OF
HEARING PANEL DECISION IN
CASE NUMBER 83-0-11213 IN TI{E MATTER OF John Phillip Angles
(86-0-180LA) (84-I-570LA) ( 84-I-630LA ) (87-I-011LA)
A copy of Rules 450-452 and 562 are enclosed for reference. Rule 562 permits
after service of the enclosed Decision (Rule 450(a)).
Please consult the text of the enclosed Rules of Procedure for the exact
Please note that if review is not requested; an ex-parte review will be

Bar Court.
The Court Clerk’s Office of the State Bar. Court can provide the dates upon
which the Review Department is likely to act on this matter. Formal
Effectuation of Decision section of the Court Clerk’s Office. Time limits
notification.
DECLARATION OP SERVICE
I, the undersigned, over the age of 18 years, whose business and place of
Angeles, on the date shown below, I deposited a,true copy of the above Notice,
Hearing Panel Decision and Rule of Procedure 450-452 and 562; in a sealed

John Phillip Angles, Esq. Erica Tabachnick, A/L Robert O. Deering, Esq.
303 West Mission Blvd. State~Bar~oflCalifornia State Bar of California
Pomona, CA 91766 818 West Seventh Street 1230 West Third Street
Los Angeles, CA 90017 Los Angeles, CA 90017
In an inter-~ffice mail ~facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of

foregoing is true and correct. Dated, this __2-7--- day of hnrJ
Angela O~ens, D’eputy C~urt Clerk

Copy of this Notice to: Hearing Panel
Fran Basslos
¯*
I dBLIC MATTER
1
2
4
3~ATE BAR COURT
CLERK’S OFFICE
5 L OS ANGELES
STATE BAR COURT
6
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
7
DISTRICT 7
8 86-0-180 LA (83-0-11213)
IN THE MATTER OF ) S~-~-~2~ LA 84-I-570 LA JE
9 ) 84-I-630 LA
JOHN PHILLIPANGLES, ) 87-I-011 ~*SR
10 )
A MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR ) DECISION
11 )
12 The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on
13 June 24, 1987, September 28, 1987, November 18, 1987 and March 7,
14 1988. Present at all the hearings were John F. Busetti, Principal
15 and sole Referee and Robert Deering, Examiner for the State Bar.
16 John Phillip Angles, Respondent in this proceeding, was present
17 only on June 24 and September 28, 1987.
18 All matters (84-I-570 LA, 84-I-630 LA, 86-0-180 LA and 87-I-
19 ii SR) were consolidated by stipulation.
20 The hearings on June 24, 1987 and March 7, 1988 were reported
21 by Alida Vazquez; the hearing on September 28, 1987 was reported
22 by Virginia Peteraetis; and the hearing on November 18, 1987 was
23 reported by Judy B. Elmore.
24 At the hearing on November 18, 1987, the parties were ordered
25 to submit briefs on culpability issues. The State Bar filed its
26 brief, but Respondent did not.
27 The matter was thereafter set for hearing on February 19,
28 1988, but Respondent requested and was granted a continuance due
-i-
1 to his being required to appear as a witness in an out-of-state
2 matter. Upon that request for a continuance, the parties selected
3 March 7, 1988 as the next hearing date. Respondent failed to
4 appear at that hearing, with no explanation.
5 .At the March 7, 1988 hearing, the Referee ordered that
6 Respondent had ten days to petition to reopen the matter upon a
7 proper showing, and that if no such petition were filed and
8 granted, the matter would stand submitted.
9 On March 17, 1988, the Referee was presented with
10 Respondent’s Petition to Re-Open. That Petition addressed solely
11 purported reasons for Respondent’s ~failure to appear on November
12 18, 1987. That Petition was denied, without prejudice, by Order
13 dated March 18, 1988. No renewed request to reopen the matter was
14 thereafter presented.
15 The undersigned Principal and sole Referee makes the
16 following findings of fact as to which the main, but not
17 exclusive, evidentiary basis for each finding is cited in
18 parenthesis after said finding:
19 FINDINGS OF FACT
2O As specifically alleged in the Notice to Show Cause filed
21 herein:
22 i. The Respondent, John Phillip Angles, was admitted to the
23 practice of law in the State of California on December 13, 1978.
24 (Oral stipulation.)
25 Count One ~
26 (Craig)
27 2. Jennie Craig (Bruccheri) hired respondent on or about
28 December 23, 1983 to collect back child support from her ex-
-2-
1 husband. (Craig testimony.)
2 3. She paid him $750 as and for advance attorneys" fees to
3 institute the requisite proceedings. (Craig testimony.)
4 4. She particularly needed the back support because she was
5 on disability, and Respondent knew this. (Craig testimony.)
6 5. On or about April 4, 1984, Respondent filed an Order to
7 Show Cause and related papers with the Los Angeles County Superior
8 Court on behalf of Ms. Craig, which he had prepared. (Exhibit 26,
9 Superior Court file.)
10 6. One of the filed documents was Ms. Craig’s financial
11 declaration, which showed her financial situation and needs.
12 (Exhibit 26.)
13 7. However, service was not effected on the former husband
14 and the hearing set for May i, 1984 was taken off calendar.
15 (Exhibit 26, containing minute order of that date.)
16 8. Thereupon, Respondent told Ms. Craig that a new hearing
17 would be arranged and that, if necessary, he would personally
18 serve her ex-husband. (Craig testimony.)
19 9. She never heard from Respondent thereafter (with the
20 exception hereinafter noted), trying some 15-20 times to reach him
21 by telephone, without success. (Craig testimony; Exhibit 27,
22 telephone bills.)
23 i0. By letter dated December 18, 1984 from Respondent’s
24 secretary, Ms. Craig received another financial declaration, which
25 she signed and returned. (Craig testimony; Exhibit 29 (cover
26 letter) and Exhibit 28 (declaration).)
27 ii. Nothing more was ever done by Respondent. (Craig
28 testimony.)
-3-
1 12. Respondent never refunded the fees Ms. Craig paid to
2 him. (Craig testimony.)
3 Count Two
4 (Villani)
5 ~13. Darlene Villani and her ex-husband had entered into an
6 agreement to purchase a home, making a $5,000 deposit, but the
7 sellers (the Turners) refused to make certain repairs prior to the
8 close of the transaction. (Villani testimony.)
9 14. Ms. Villani knew Respondent from having done work for
10 him as a court reporter and from a referral from another lawyer.
11 On or about April 20, 1982, she retained Respondent to recover the
12 $5,000 deposit, on which occasion a $i,000 advance attorney fee
13 was paid to Respondent. (Villani testimony; Exhibit 11, a copy of
14 the retainer check.)

15 15. On that day, she met with Respondent, who told her that
16 since escrow had not been started, there was no problem in
17 retrieving the $5,000 deposit. (Villani testimony.)

18 16. He then filed a lawsuit on their behalf and also had a
19 lis pendens recorded on May 20, 1982. (Villani testimony; Exhibit
20 12, Superior Court case file.)
21 17. Respondent took the depositions of the sellers in or

22 about October 1982; Ms. Villani said these were a waste of time.
23 (Villani testimony.)
24 18. The lis pendens was also expunged on or about September
25 14, 1982, by motion of the Turners, because the suit involved
26 return of a deposit, that is, not to enforce an interest in real
27 property, so that no legal basis existed for recording a lis
28 9endens. (Villani testimony; Exhibit 12; Exhibit 13, Respondent’s
-4-
1 billing statement dated January 4, 1983.)
2 19. There was no reference on the January 4, 1983 billing

3 that the lis pendens had been expunged on or about September 14,
4 1982. (Exhibit 13.)

5 .20. When she received this billing, Ms. Villani was not
6 aware that there had been a motion to expunge the lis pendens or
7 that it was granted. (Villani testimony.)

8 21. After receiving the billing, Ms. Villani and her husband
9 heard nothing more from Respondent. (Villani testimony.)
10 22. She even wrote to Respondent on August 15, 1983,

11 documenting all of the unsuccessful attempts to reach him,
12 including cancelled appointments in June 1983. (Villani

13 testimony; Exhibit 14, a copy of that letter.)
14 23. She never received a response to that letter and
15 reviewed the court file herself, realizing for the first time that
16 the lis pendens had been expunged and that Respondent did not even
17 appear at the hearing on the motion to expunge. (Villani

18 testimony; Exhibit 12; Exhibit 13.)
19 24. In addition, because Respondent filed a baseless li__~s
20 pendens, a judgment for attorneys’ fees and costs was awarded
21~ against the Villanis and in favor of the Turners in the sum of
22 $764. (Exhibit 12.)

23 25. The Villanis never recovered the $5,000 deposit and were
24 never refunded any of the fees they had paid to Respondent.
25
26 Count Three
27 (Ray)
28 26. The State Bar requested that this count be dismissed.
-5-
1 Count Four
2 (Frankot)
3 27. John Frankot is an auditor for the State Board of
4 Equalization, resides in Sacramento, California, and is typically
5 on the road two-to-three times a month. (Frankot testimony.)
6 28. He hired Respondent in June 1983 to represent him in a
7 paternity matter. (Frankot testimony.)
8 29. On or about June 8, 1983, Mr. Frankot sent Respondent a
9 letter enclosing a check for $500; Respondent thereafter requested
10 an addition $i,000 as advance fees, and on July 2, 1983, Mr.
11 Frankot sent that additional sum. (Frankot testimony; Exhibits 15
12 and 16.)
13 30. In early August, 1983, Mr. Frankot received a letter

14 from his prior attorney in this paternity matter, informing him
15 that a motion to compel answers to interrogatories had been
16 brought by the plaintiff. (Frankot testimony.)
17 31. Mr. Frankot then communicated with Respondent about this
18 and also about some advice the prior lawyer had given about taking
19 a blood test; Respondent told him not worry about the motion and
20 that he need not take any blood test. (Frankot testimony.)
21 32. On October 3, 1983, Mr. Frankot wrote to Respondent
22 about his case, noting that he had no complaints "so far" and that
23 he felt "very secure" in Respondent’s hands. (Frankot testimony;

24 Exhibit 17, being that letter.)
25 33. In early-November, 1983, Mr. Frankot received a notice
26 of entry of judgment in the paternity matter. (Frankot
27 testimony.)
28 34. He learned from the plaintiff (the District Attorney’s
-6-
1 Office) that he had been ordered to pay $340 per month support and
2 that this was because the motion to compel answers to
3 interrogatories had been granted, no answers were served and Mr.
4 Frankot’s default had been entered. (Frankot testimony.)
5 ¯ 35. On November 23, 1983, Mr. Frankot wrote to Respondent,
6 asking for help on this, even suggesting that a motion to set
7 aside the default be brought and that time was running to do so;
8 Mr. Frankot also noted that he had called Respondent’s office
9 several times, without success. (Frankot testimony; Exhibit 18,
10 that letter.)
11 36. Thereafter, Mr. Frankot spoke to Respondent’s staff, who
12 told him that there was nothing to worry about. (Frankot
13 testimony.)
14 37. However, in December 1983, a wage assignment was levied
15 on Mr. Frankot’s earnings and this caused him more concern,
16 specifically that his employment could be in jeopardy; he
17 discussed this with Respondent, who assured him that everything
18 was in order. (Frankot testimony.)
19 38. Mr. Frankot became more and more frustrated and spoke to
20 the attorney who had originally referred Mr. Frankot to Respondent
21 and a meeting was arranged with Respondent. (Frankot testimony.)
22 39. At this meeting, Respondent suggested to Mr. Frankot
23 that perhaps he was the father, the inference being that there was
24 no ground to complain about the judgment. (Frankot testimony;
25 Exhibit 19, being a January 4, 1984 letter to Respondent.)
26 40. Mr. Frankot asked for his file, but did not receive it.
28 41. On January 12, 1984, Mr. Frankot drove from Sacramento
-7-
1 to Los Angeles and reviewed the court file. (Frankot testimony.)
2 42. He saw therein a motion to set aside default and

3 thereupon spoke to an attorney in Respondent’s office, Mr. Price,
4 who told him that the hearing was continued to February 6, 1984.
6 43. The motion to set aside the default was denied.
7 (Frankot testimony; Exhibit 23, Superior Court file.)
8 44. Mr. Frankot retained a new attorney. (Frankot
9 testimony.)
10 45. Mr. Frankot met with Respondent on February i0, 1984, at

11 which time Respondent promised to help defray some of the
12 additional costs caused by Respondent’s improper handling of the
13 case, which amounted to $2,000 fees for the new attorney and
14 $1,400 in support. (Frankot testimony; Exhibit 20, letter to
15 Respondent.)
16 46. That letter (Exhibit 20) also requested a refund of the
17 $1,500 Mr. Frankot had paid Respondent.
18 47. In April 1984, a motion to set aside the default, filed
19 by Mr. Frankot’s new lawyer, was granted, conditional on, among
20 other things, a blood test. (Frankot testimony; Exhibit 20.)
21 48. Ultimately, Mr. Frankot agreed that he was the father of
22 the child. (Frankot testimony.)
23 49. No refund of the fees paid by Mr. Frankot was ever made
24 by Respondent, nor did Respondent pay any of the additional
25 expense and the support he promised to defray in February, 1984.
27 //
28 //
-8-
1 Count Five
2 (Costello)
3 50. Ella Costello, a supervisor of mails for the United
4 States Postal Service in West Covina, engaged Respondent to
5 represent her in marital dissolution proceedings on or about
6 February 14, 1983, at which time she paid him $630 in cash as
7 advance fees. (Costello testimony; Exhibit 30, being receipts for

8 the $630.)
9 51. She met with Respondent on this first occasion, and he
10 agreed to represent her and an engagement agreement was signed.

12 52. They discussed the nature of the circumstances for which
13 she came to retain Respondent, that is, that her husband had filed
14 for marital dissolution and that she had been served with legal
15 process approximately one week earlier, for which a response was

16 due. (Costello testimony; also, Exhibit 31, Superior Court file,
17 showing the pleadings involved which were served on her.)
18 53. Respondent told her that he would take care of filing a
19 timely pleading, although an extension would probably be obtained
20 to see if the case could be resolved. (Costello testimony;

21 Exhibit 32, February 24, 1983 letter from Respondent to the
22 attorney for the husband, confirming an open extension to plead on
23 behalf of Ms. Costello.)
24 54. Negotiations then ensued between Respondent and the
25 husband’s lawyer, on behalf of their respective clients, which
26 proved to be unsuccessful. (Costello testimony; Exhibit 33,

27 letter dated April 25, 1983 from Respondent to opposing counsel,
28 also acknowledging that a responsive pleading on behalf of Ms.
-9-
1 Costello was due on May 3, 1983.)
2 55. No responsive pleading was filed and no agreement was

3 entered into by Respondent on behalf of Ms. Costello; Ms.
4 Costello’s default was entered. (Costello testimony; Exhibit i.)
5 ~56. Ms. Costello attempted several times to contact
6 Respondent, even making an appointment to see him about the
7 situation and the default she came to learn had been entered.
9 57. After waiting almost 3 hours to see him, she was finally
10 able to speak with Respondent, who said that he would take care of
11 the default. (Costello testimony.)
12 58. Nothing was done by Respondent, to Ms. Costello’s
13 knowledge, and she made several appointments to meet with him; he

14 was never there when she came to the appointments; and on one
15 occasion, she came without an appointment and was told that he had
16 just left. (Costello testimony.)
17 59. Thereupon, she had to fend for herself and engaged in

18 negotiations with her husband’s lawyer herself. (Costello
19 testimony.)
20 60. She actually went to the default prove-up hearing with
21 her husband, at which time the settlement agreement was presented
22 to the Court. (Costello testimony; Exhibit i.)

23 61. On September 15, 1983, Ms. Costello wrote a letter to
24 Respondent and delivered it to his office; the receptionist took
25 the letter and threw it on the floor. (Costello testimony;
26 Exhibit 34.)
27 62. In that letter, she requested a refund of the money she
28 had paid to Respondent, which refund never came. (Costello
-i0-
1 testimony; Exhibit 34.)
2 63. The actual settlement negotiated by Ms. Costello was not

3 favorable, and she estimates that she lost in excess of $21,000
4 because she was not able to have proper representation in the
5 settlement negotiations. (Costello testimony.)
6 Count Six
7 (Quesada)
8 64. Catalina Alvarez de Quesada met with Respondent in April
9 1981 at his office concerning obtaining a dissolution of her

10 marriage. (Quesada testimony.)
11 65. Ms. Quesada is not fluent in English as she speaks in
12 Spanish, and Respondent was known to be fluent in Spanish.
13 (Quesadatestimony; Respondent testimony.)

14 66. At this meeting, financial arrangements were discussed.
15 (Quesada testimony.)
16 67. Ms. Quesada testified that she was told that the entire
17 process would cost $350; Respondent testified~that this was never
18 represented to be a maximum or flat rate.

19 68. Ms. Quesada brought in two checks, one for $200 on or
2O about April 14, 1981 and one one for $150 on or about May 13,
21 1981. (Quesada testimony; Exhibits 3 and 4, respective copies of
22 those checks.)
23 69. Thereafter, arrangements were made for her to sign
24 necessary papers and Respondent gave her a court date. (Quesada
25 testimony.)
26 70. The first hearing was attended by Respondent and Ms.
27 Quesada. (Quesada testimony.)
28 71. Although she testified at the State Bar hearing (through
-ii-
1 an interpreter) that she did not speak English, she also testified
2 that Respondent had lied to the judge (in English), but did not
3 recall what the lie was. (Quesada testimony.)
4 72. Respondent, through cross-examination, brought out that
5 there were difficulties in serving her husband and that she did
6 not cooperate in assisting Respondent in that regard by providing

7 adequate information about her husband’s whereabouts and refused
8 to pay any additional costs relating thereto, i.e., to serve the
9 husband by publication.
10 73. She never followed through on a divorce from her
11 husband. (Quesada testimony.)
12 Count Seven
13 (Hernandez)
14 74. Rebecca Hernandez (also known as Rebecca Amaya) hired
15 Respondent in April 1984 to represent her with respect to a
16 modification of a child support order being requested by her
17 former husband. (Hernandez testimony.)
18 75. She was paying $75 per month and her husband was seeking
19 $400 per month. (Hernandez testimony.)
20 76. She met with Respondent in April 1984 and discussed her
21 case; no written retainer agreement was entered into, but he told
22 her that he wanted $1,500 to take the case. (Hernandez

23 testimony.)
24 77. Approximately one week later, she borrowed the money
25 from her mother and met with Respondent, this time also signing a
26 Financial Declaration he had prepared for her. (Hernandez
27 testimony; Exhibit 1, copy of check; Exhibit 2, Superior Court
28 file.)
-12-
1 78. The first hearing on the modification request was set
2 for April 24, 1984; Respondent told her that she did not have to
3 appear because it would be continued. (Hernandez testimony;
4 Exhibit 2.)
5 .79. Thereafter, she called Respondent on various occasions,
6 and was told by him that the hearing on the modification request
7 was continued to June 7, 1984. (Hernandez testimony.)
8 80. Respondent never sent anything to her in writing about
9 this or any of the other continuances he told her about, and it
10 was always Ms. Hernandez who had to initiate the inquiries about
11 the status of her case. (Hernandez testimony.)
12 81. However, there had been a hearing on April 24, 1984, at
13 which time the child support was raised to $400 per month and Ms.
14 Hernandez was ordered to pay her ex-husband’s attorneys fees of
15 $1,500. (Exhibit 2.) Respondent did not appear at that hearing,
16 as she knew nothing about it. (Exhibit 2, minute order of that
17 date, and Hernandez testimony.)
18 82. In late-May or early-June, 1984, Ms. Hernandez received
19 a letter from her ex-husband’s attorney informing her that child
20 support had been increased. (Hernandez testimony.)
21 83. She immediately contacted Respondent, who told her that
22 he would take care of it and that she should not do anything.
23 (Hernandez testimony.)
24 84. He also told her that the hearing date had been
25 continued to September 13, 1984; later, he told her the date was
26 continued to September 21, 1984. (Hernandez testimony.) She

27 actually appeared on September 21, 1984, but nothing was on
28 calendar. (Hernandez testimony; Exhibit 2.)
-13-
1 85. She then went to Respondent’s office some 8-10 times to
2 speak with him, but he was never there. (Hernandez testimony.)
3 86. In 1985, her wages were garnished as a result of the

4 order modifying the support that had been entered in April 1984.
5 (Hernandez testimony; Exhibit 2.)
6 87. Ms. Hernandez filed a Small Claims Court action for the
7 $1,500 she had paid to Respondent. (Hernandez testimony.)
8 88. He did not appear and she obtained judgment against him
9 in that sum. (Hernandez testimony.)

10 90. However, he filed bankruptcy and she never recovered the
11 $1,500.
12 EVIDENCE IN MITIGATION
13 91. None was offered by Respondent, except that some of the
14 matters occurred within less than four years from when he was
15 admitted to practice.
16 92. There was no prior record of discipline.

17 EVIDENCE IN AGGRAVATION
18 93. Other than as contained in the Findings of Fact above,
19 none was offered by the State Bar.
20 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
21 Count One
24 convincingly support the Conclusion of Law that Rule 6-101 was
25 violated, that is, that Respondent failed to use reasonable
26 diligence and his best judgment in the exercise of his skill and
27 in the application of his learning in an effort to accomplish,
28 with reasonable speed, the purpose for which he was employed. He
-14-
1 abandoned the client. He also misrepresented what he was going to
2 do. Specifically, the client, Ms. Craig, testified that she

3 needed to recover back child support because she was on
4 disability. Respondent knew this, but did not pursue the matter
5 on her behalf after initially failing to secure service on her
6 former husband.

1,0 was violated, that is, that Respondent willfully withdrew from
11 employment without promptly refunding an unearned fee paid in
12 advance. After failing to do anything following the first hearing
13 which could not go forward due to lack of service on the former
14 husband, Respondent did nothing further to pursue the matter and
15 never refunded any of the $750 paid as advance fee by Ms. Craig.

27 §6103.
28 98. The State Bar did not discharge its burden by clear and
1 convincing evidence that Respondent willfully violated Rule 2-111
2 (A) (2), that is, wilful withdrawal from employment without

3 delivering to the client all papers and property to which the
4 client was entitled.
5 Count ’l’wo

12 with reasonable speed, the purpose for which he was employed.
13 Respondent failed to communicate with his clients, he
14 misrepresented the status of their case, he failed to inform them

15 that attorneys" fees and costs had been awarded against them due
16 to the improvident and baseless recordation of a lis pendens and
17 did not even appear at the hearing at which that li~ pendens was
18 expunged. Again, he abandoned his clients.

22 was violated, that is, that Respondent willfully withdrew from
24 advance. While Respondent did file a lawsuit for his clients, and
25 even took a deposition, he billed for effort which was not
26 expended, i.e., as to the li~s pendens, so that a portion of the
27 advance fee paid by the clients was not earned and not returned.
-16-
-1 those findings are based, and the record in general, clearly and

5 ~i02. Findings of Fact 13 through 25, the evidence on which
11 §6103.
13 convincing evidence that Respondent willfully violated Rule 2-
14 Ill(A) (2), that is, wilful withdrawal from employment without

17 Count Three
18 104. At the request of the State Bar, this count was
19 dismissed.
20 Count Four
-17-
¯1 misrepresented the status of his case, he failed to take steps to
2 defend the motion to compel answers to interrogatories, which
3 ultimately led to Mr. Frankot’s default being entered, he actually
4 sought to justify his actions by inferring to Mr. Frankot that he
5 should not complain about the default judgment, and he failed to
6 make a timely motion to set aside that default. Once again,
7 Respondent abandoned his clients.
10 6onvincingly support the Conclusion of Law that Rule 2-III(A)(3)
13 advance. Respondent actually promised to do so, as well as to
14 defray the additional expense and the support Mr. Frankot was held
15 liable for due to the entry of default.

20 employment without delivering to his client all papers and
21 property to which the client was entitled. Specifically, Mr.
22 Frankot asked for his file when he realized that Respondent was
23 not representing his interests, but Respondent failed to deliver
24 that file.
-18-
8 §6103.
9 Count Five
10 ii0. Findings of Fact 50 through 61 and 63, the evidence on
11 which those findings are based, and the record in general, clearly
12 and convincingly support the Conclusion of Law that Rule 6-101 was
19 petition to dissolve the marriage served on Ms. Costello by reason
20 of which her default was entered and he failed to represent her
21 interests at ali in the settlement negotiations. Respondent
22 abandoned this client as well.
23 iii. Findings of Fact 50 through 63, the evidence on which
28 advance.
-19-
12 §6103.
15 Ill(A)(2), that is, wilful withdrawal from employment without
18
Count Six
19 115. Ms. Quesada’s testimony was not credible as to her
20 claims that Respondent had failed to perform further services for
21 her. The credible evidence was that she did not cooperate and did
22 not advance the costs necessary to serve her husband.
23 116. Accordingly, the State Bar did not prove this count by
24 clear and convincing evidence.
25 Count Seven
-20-
¯1 violated, that is, that Respondent failed to use reasonable

7 request for increased child support filed against Ms. Hernandez by
8 reason of which it proceeded unopposed and additional support was
9 ordered against her, and he failed to represent her interests at

10 all with respect thereto. Respondent abandoned Ms. Hernandez.

16 advance.

28 §6103.
-21-
¯1 121. The State Bar did not discharge its burden by clear and
3 Ill(A)(2), that is, wilful withdrawal from employment without
6 CONCLUSIONS AS TO APPROPRIATE LRVEL OF DISCIPLINE
7 122. The presumptively appropriate level of discipline for
8 violations of Rules 6-101 and 2-111 is reproval or suspension,
9 depending on the circumstances of the case. See, Stds. 2.4(b),
10 2110, Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct
11 (hereinafter "Standards").
12 123. However, when a pattern of willfully failing to perform
13 services demonstrating the member’s abandonment of the causes in
14 which he or she was retained has been shown, the standards require
15 disbarment. Std. 2.4(a) of Standards.
16 124. Whenever a member is culpable of fraud or intentional
17 dishonesty towards a client or is culpable of concealment of a
18 material fact from a client, actual suspension or disbarment is
19 the presumptive discipline, depending upon the extent to which the
20 victim of the misconduct is harmed or misled and depending upon
21 the magnitude of the act of misconduct and the degree to which it
22 related to the member’s acts within the practice of law. Std. 2.3
23 of Standards.
24 125. Violations of Business and Professions Code §§ 6068 and
25 6103 also shall result in disbarment or suspension, depending on
26 the gravity of the offense or the harm, if any, to the victim,
27 with due regard to the purpose of imposing discipline set forth in
28 Standard 1.3.
-22-
¯1 126. Standard 1.3 states that the primary purposes of
2 disciplinary proceedings and sanctions imposed upon a finding of

3 professional misconduct are the protection of the public, the
4 courts and the legal profession, the maintenance of high
5 professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public
6 confidence in the legal profession. The same standard considers
7 rehabilitation to be a permissible object, but only consistent
8 with these primary purposes.

10 found, Respondent abandoned his clients and their causes. In all
11 of those counts, the clients suffered pecuniary harm, all by way

12 of not receiving what they were told they would get for the
13 advance attorneys’ fees they paid, and some by actually suffering
14 monetary losses.

16 found, Respondent misrepresented the status of the cases and
17 concealed the true status of the particular matters for which he
18 was hired.
19 129. Respondent, rather than representing his clients, took

20 their money and simply abandoned them and demonstrated a pattern
21 of willfully doing this.
22 130. The various individuals went to Respondent and trusted

23 him to perform services. In all cases he betrayed that trust.
24 131. The only possible mitigating factor is that Respondent
25 was practicing law for only a few years when the misconduct
26 occurred. However, in no case did Respondent refund any of the
27 fees or contribute anything to defray the pecuniary harm he had

28 caused, and his misrepresentation and concealment show a basic and
-23-
*1 fundamental flaw, indicating that he cannot be trusted. No
2 evidence was presented that rehabilitation would be beneficial.
3 132. In essence, the presumptive discipline of Standard

4 2.4(a), disbarment, has not been shown to be inappropriate.
5 Moreover, with (a) no evidence of mitigation other than the short

6 amount of time he was a lawyer when these matters arose, (b)
7 coupled with the aggravating circumstances of the amount of
8 pecuniary harm his clients suffered and that Respondent made no
9 effort to refund unearned fees, and (c) considering that no
10 evidence relating to rehabilitation and no facts from which
11 benefits, if any, of rehabilitation could be considered, the

12 presumptive discipline of disbarment under standard 2.3 has also
13 not been shown to be inappropriate¯ Disbarment is the only
14 discipline appropriate herein to achieve the primary purposes of
15 Standard 1.3.
16 RECOMMENDATION
17 133. The undersigned Referee recommends that Respondent be
18
19 DATED- April )R 1988

Pr±nc+~al and Sole Referee
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-24-
1
2
STATE BAR COURT
3 CLERK’S OFFICE
LOS ANGELES
4
7
STATE BAR COURT
8
9
10
11 In the Matter of 86-0-180LA

LA 4187
12 JOHN P. ANGLES DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY
MAIL OF NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE
13 A Member of the State Bar
14
15
I, the undersigned, declare that I am over the age of 18 years
16
and not a party to the within action; that my business address and
17
place of employment is:
18
[X] 1230 West Third Street, Los Angeles, CA;
19
[ ] 555 Franklin Street, San Francisco, CA;
2O
that on December 16, 1986 I served a true copy of the Notice
21
to Show Cause herein by certified mail, return receipt requested,
22
in a sealed envelope, postage fully prepaid, depositing same in a
23
facility regularly maintained by the United States Postal Service,
24
addressed to the member at the latest address shown on the
25
official membership records of the State Bar of California,
26
27 ///
28 / /
as follows:
1
2 In a sealed envelope by certified mail, with a return receipt
3 requested, to the member or former member at the latest address
4 shown on the official membership records of the State Bar.
6
and addressed to:
7
8 John P. Angles
303 WEST MISSION BLVD.
9 POMONA, CA. 91766
10
11
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and
12
correct and that this declaration was executed at
13
IX] Los Angeles
14
[ ] San Francisco
15
on the date shown below.
16
17
DECEMBER 16, 1986
18
19 Date ~ ---Signature
20
21
22 Yolanda Gloria
23 PRINT OR TYPE NAME
24
25
26
27
28
5966t: 09/17/86 - 2 -
(
1 ERICA TABACHNICK
Attorney at Law
2 1230 West Third Street
Los Angeles, California 90017 STATE BAR COURT
CLERK’S OFFICE
3 LOS ANGELES
213/482-8220
4
Examiner for
5 THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
9 STATE BAR COURT
11 HEARING DEPARTMENT - LOS ANGELES
12
13 In the Matter of
LA 4187
14 JOHN PHILLIP ANGLES
NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE
16
17 TO: JOHN PHILLIP ANGLES, Respondent herein:
18 You were admitted to the practice of law in the State of
19 California on December 13, 1978. Pursuant to Rule 501, Rules of
20 Procedure of the State Bar of California, reasonable cause has been
21 found to conduct a formal disciplinary bearing, commencinq at a
22 time and place to be fixed by the State Bar Court (NOTICE OF TIME
23 AND PLACE OF HEARING WILL BE MAILED TO YOU BY THE STATE BAR COURT
24 CLERK’S OFFICE) , by reason of the following:
25 ///
26 ///
27 ///
28 ///
1 COUNT I
3 On or about December 23, 1983, you were
4 retained by Jennie Craig to collect child and
5 spousal support payments from her former
6 husband. Ms. Craig paid you $750.00 as
7 advanced attorney’s fees. On or about
8 April 4, 1983, you filed an Order to Show
9 Cause and Declaration of Contempt.
10 Thereafter, you wilfully failed to respond to
11 Ms. Craig’s numerous attempts to reach you bv
12 telephone and correspondence. On or about
13 May i, 1984, you represented Ms. Craig at a
14 hearing. Subsequently, you wilfully failed to
15 perform the services for which you were
16 retained. You wilfully failed to return any
17 part of your unearned fee.
18 You committed the above-described acts in wilful violation

19 of your oath and duties as an attorney and in particular,
20 California Business and Professions Code Sections 6068, 6103 and
21 of Rules of Professional Conduct 6-101(A) (2), 2-111(A) (2) and
22 2-111(A) (3).
23
COUNT II
24
25 On or about April 20, 1982, you were retained

26 Dy Darlene Villani to represent her in a real
27 property matter. Ms. Villani paid you
28
$i,000.00 as advanced attorney’s fees. On or
6025t: 10/31/86 - 2 -
1 about May 2, 1982, you filed a complaint on
2 Ms. Villani’s behalf and a subsequent motion
3 on or about May 20, 1982. Thereafter,
4 Ms. Villani attempted to reach you by
5 telephone and correspondence on numerous
6 occasions, however, you wilfully failed to
7 communicate with her. On or about September
8 21, 1982, you wilfully failed to appear at a
9 hearing on your client’s behalf or to perform
10 any further legal services for which you were
retained. You wilfully failed to return anv
12 portion of your unearned fee.
15 California Business and Professions Code Sections 6068, 6103 and of
16 Rules of Professional Conduct 6-101(A) (2), 2-111(A) (2) and
17 2-111(A) (3).
18 COUNT III
19
2O On or about March 10, 1983, you were retained
21 by Aileen Rae to represent her in a

22 dissolution of marriage and child custody
23 matter. She paid you $1,500.00 as advanced
24 attorney’s fees. On or about March 19, 1984,
25 you wilfully failed to appear at a bearing on
26 your client’s behalf or to perform any further
27 legal services for which you were retained.
28
From August 1983 to January 1984, Ms. Rae
6025t: i0/31/86 - 3 -
1 attempted to reach you by telephone, however,
2 you wilfully failed to communicate with her.
3 You wilfully failed to return any part of your
4 unearned fee.
7 California Business and Professions Code Sections 6068, 6103 and of
8 Rules of Professional Conduct 6-101(A)(2), 2-111(A)(2) and
9 2-111(A) (3).
10 COUNT IV
11
12 In or about June, 1983, you were retained by
13 John Frankot to represent him in a paternity
14 matter. He paid you $1,500.00 as advanced
15 attorney’s fees. Thereafter, Mr. Frankot
16 attempted to reach you by telephone, however,
17 you wilfully failed to communicate with him.
18 You wilfully failed to perform the services

19 for which you were retained, and as a result,
20 a default judgment was obtained by opposing
21 counsel on or about December, ig83. You
22 wilfully failed to return any part of your
23 unearned fee.
26 California Business and Professions Code Sections 6068, 6103 and
27 of Rule(s) of Professional Conduct 2-111(A) (2), 2-111(A) (3) and
28
6-i01 (A)(2).
6025t: 10/31/86 - 4 -
1 WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS after service of this Notice to Show
2 Cause, you shall file a written answer as provided in Rule 552,
3 Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California.
5 OFFICE OF TRIAL COUNSEL

THE STATE BAR OF_CALIFORNIA
6
7
DATED
8 ~RANCIS P. BASSI~S
Acting Chief Trial Counsel
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
6025t: 10/31/86 - 5 -
FEB 1 0 1987
STATE BAR COURT STATE BAR COURT
CLERK’S OFFICE
LO.~ ANGELES
REVI EW DEPARTHENT
PU 3LIC MATTER
85-0-210 LA - In the Hatter of John P. Angles
I, Judy Duffield, hereby certify that I am Clerk of the State Bar Court,
and that as such, I am the custodian of records of all.files of the State Bar
Court, and that the following Is a full, true and correct copy of a resolution
or resolutions proposed at the meeting of the Review Department held in San
Francisco, California on December 11-12, 1986, and adopted as the decision
of the Review Department on January 29, 1987 insofar as it relates to the
above-enti tl ed proceeding:
After discussion and consideration by the Review Department of the record

in the above-entitled proceeding and upon motion made, seconded and
adopted it was
}~,.,~_OJL~.~)_ that the decision of the Hearing Panel filed October

23, 1986i in the above-entitled matter is hereby adopted.
Dated::~~~/’~f/~X~
,~y Dufrie~, Clerk"//
of the State Bar Court
kwiktag ® 018 035 250

I, the undersigned, over the age of 18 years, whose business address and place of
employment is 1230 West Third Street, Los Angeles, California, declare that I am not
a party to the within action; that in the City and County of Los Angeles, on the date
shown below, I deposited a true copy of the within
MINUTES OF REVIEW DEPARTMENT MEETING HELD ON DECEMBER 11-12, 1986
In a facility regularly maintained by the United States Postal Service with postage
thereon fully prepaid addressed to:
John Philip An~les, Esq.

303 W. Mission Blvd.
Pomona, CA 91766
in an inter-office mail facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California

addressed to:
Erica Tabachnick, Att’y at Law

Joel Meese, Esq.
Dated: February 24, 1987
I declare under penalty of perjury at Los

Angeles, California, on the date shown above,
q~. that the foregoing is./r.~ a}~d correct.
-~
" "
~./~_//,/~.,..~/~’ ~~J
~~borah Hat,son
Deputy Court Clerk, Effectuations
Office of State Bar Court
2925c/0174E
THE STATE BAR OFFICE OF STATE BAR COURT
OF CALIFORNIA Director, STUART A. FORSYTH
COURT CLERK’S OFFICE, 818 WEST SEVENTH STREET, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-3432 (213) 689-6200
NOTICE ACCOMPANYING SERVICE OF

ORDER OF HEARING PANEL
GRANTING MOTION TO DISM/SS IN
CASE NUMBER 85-0-210 LA
In the Matter of: John Phillip Angles
Enclosed is a copy of the Order of Hearing Panel Granting Motion to Dismiss, filed in the
above-numbered matter pursuant to Rule 410-411 of the Rules of Proeedure of the State Bar.
Also enclosed is a copy of Rules 410-411 and 450-452, Rules of Procedure of the State Bar.
The Order of Hearing Panel Granting Motion to Dismiss is subject to review by the Review
Department of the State Bar Court in accordance with Rules 410-411 and 450(b); and will only
become effective upon adoption by the Review Department. Unless a request for review is
timely filed as provided for in Rule 450(a), the matter will come before the Review Department
on its ex parte calendar and no appearances are contemplated. You will be advised by the
Court Clerk’s Office of the action taken.
The Court Clerk’s Office of the State Bar Court can provide the dates upon which the Review
Department is likely to act on this matter. Formal notification of the action in this matter will
be forthcoming from the Effectuation of Decision Section of the Court Clerk’s Office. Time
limits required by the applicable rules will commence from the date of the final
notification.
DECLARATION O F SERVICE
I, the undersigned, over the age of 18 years, whose business and place of employment is 818
West Seventh Street, Los Angeles, California, declare that I am not a party to the within
action; that in the City and County of Los Angeles, on the date shown below, I deposited a true
copy of the above Notice, Order of the Hearing Panel Granting Motion to Dismiss and Rules of
Procedure 410-411 and 450-452; in a sealed envelope as follows:
In a facility regularly maintained by the United States PostalService with postage thereon
fully prepaid addressedto:
John Phillip Angles
303 W. Mission Boulevard
Pomona, CA 91766
In an inter-office mail facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California

addressedto:
Erica Tabachnick, Attorney at Law
Joel Meese, Esq.
I declare under penalty of perjury at Los Angeles, California, that the foregoing is true and
correct. Dated, this 5th day of_~, 1
~’a~rlcla ~lores~_ .
CODV of this Notice to: Hearing Panel

1682c
~ uty Court Clerk
MATTER
i
3
CLERK’S OFFICE:
4 LOS ANGELES
8 STATE BAR COURT
DISTRICT 8
ii
In the Matter of ) Case NO. 85-0-210LA
12 )
JOHN PHILLIP ANGLES ) DECISION
13 )
A Member of the State Bar )
14
15 STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
16 r~’te within matter duly came on for hearing on
17 October 15, 1986 in the State Bar Court.
18 Richard D. Burstein, Esq., presided as Principal
19 Referee, the State Bar was represented by its examiners
2O Erica Tabachnick, Esq. and Joel Meese, Esq., and
21 Respondent John Phillip Angles appeared and represented
22 himself. The Principal Referee received the evidence, both
23 oral and documentary, of the parties, heard and considered
24 their arguments and the pleadings in the matter. The
25 Principal Referee hereinbelow sets forth his review of the
26 evidence and consequent recommendation of dismissal.
27
28
-i-
RDBI3.16
1
REVIEW OF EVIDENCE
2
Hereinbelow, the Principal Referee will summarize
the evidence and point out areas of agreement and dispute.

4
I. Respondent, John Phillip Angles, was admitted
5
to the practice of law in the State of California on
6
December 13, 1978.
7
2. In or about May of 1983, he met with Mehdi
8
LaJevardi ("client") concerning a possible claim for
9
wrongful discharge from employment that the client wished to
-i0
pursue. On or about May 16, 1983, the client entered into a
ii
retainer agreement whereby he paid a $500.00 deposit on a
12
$1,500.00 retainer, the balance to be paid at the rate of
13
$200.00 per month . Areceipt was provided. Mr. Angles
14
testified further that he told the client that his hourly
15
rate for services, against which the retainer would be
16
applied, was $I00.00 per hour. The client denied this.
17
3. Thereafter, several meetings were had between
18
Mr. Angles and the client. Mr. Angles claimed that he
19
conducted informal legal research, reviewed the facts of the
2O
client’s claim with other attorneys with whom he was
21
acquainted and in whom he reposed confidence in their
22
knowledge of civil matters of the nature of the client’s
23
claim.
24
4. As a result of these conversations Mr. Angles
25
claimed that he came to the conclusion that the client’s
26
claim was not of sufficient weight or merit for him to
27
pursue and he so advised Mr. Mehdi in a meeting. He
28
-2-
RDBI3.16
i
testified he told the client that his research and
2
consultation had exhausted the $500.00 deposit against the
3
retainer, and elected not to pursue any further compensation
4
from the client. By contrast, the client denied being told
5
his claim would not be pursued and asserted that he
6
repeatedly, and largely unsuccessfully, sought to reach his
7
attorney by phone and in the office. Mr. Angles conceded he
8
never confirmed his opinion in writing, but testified that
9
when he told the client of his opinion, it produced great
i0
anger and the client just kept coming around.
ii
5. The client made subsequent efforts to recover
12
his $500.00 deposit, but such was not repaid. There was
13
uncertainty as to whether these efforts were by way of
14
arbitration, small claims or otherwise. Mr. Angles testified
15
to having filed a bankruptcy proceeding and that he had
16
notified the client of such.
17
6. Some time in 1984, the client sought the
18
assistance of a new attorney, who in or about April, 1984,
19
filed an action on the client~ behalf in the Orange County
20
Superior Court on the wrongful termination claim. No
21
activity in the court file appears beyond the filing of the
22
complaint and the issuance of the summons, both in April,
23
1984.
24
25
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
26
The Notice to Show Cause charges the attorney,
27
Mr. Angles, with violating his oath and duties as an
28
-3-
RDBI 3.16
1
attorney as contained in various provisions of the Business
2
and Professions Code, and with specifically violating Rule
6-101(2) and Rule 2-III(A)(3).

4
The burden of proof on the State Bar was to’show
by "clear and convincing evidence" that the elements of the

6
violations are proven. Based on the evidence and its
7
weight, the Principal Referee feels that this proceeding
8
should be resolved on the basis of a failure by the State
9
Bar to meet that level of proof. Rile the evidence was in
~10
conflict, as shown above, on the evidence presented the
1]
Principal Referee could not find clear and convincing proof
12
of culpability and therefore reco~ends a dismissal of the
13
proceedings.
14
Dated: October 20, 1986
16
17 BY~
RIC~RD D. BURSTEIN
18 Principal Referee
19
20
21
22
23
24
2~
26
27
28
-4-
RDBI 3.16
(
1
2
3 DISTRICT 8
STATE BAR COURT
4 LOS ANGELES
S In the Matter of
JOHN PHILLIP ANGLES L~ ~102

A Member of the State Bar
8
NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE
I0 TO: JOHN PHILLIP ANGLES:
ii It appearing that you were admitted to the practice of law
12 in the State of California on December 13, 1978, that an
13 investigation was conducted pursuant to Rules 501 and
14 following, Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California,
IB and that the Office of Trial Counsel has concluded, as a result
iB of such investigation, that a formal proceeding should be
instituted, a formal hearing held, and other proceedings had,
18 as provided in such Rules of Procedure;
IS NOW, THEREFORE, you are hereby notified to appear in
2O person or by counsel, or both, before a hearing panel of the
21 State Bar Court of the State Bar of California at the time and
22 place specified in the Notice attached to this Notice to Show
Cause, then and there to show cause why you should not be
24 disciplined for professional misconduct, to wit:

2B Violating your oath and duties as an attorney and
28 counselor at law within the meaning of Section 6103 of Article
6 of the Business and Professions Code of the State of

28 California, as the same are prescribed by Sections 6067 and
1 6068 of Article 4 of the Business and Professions Code of the
2 State of California; wilfully violating Rule(s) 6-101(2) and
3 2-III(A)(3) of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State
4 Bar of California; and in particular as follows:
5 I
6 On or about May 16, 1983 you were retained by Mehdi
7 LaJevardi (hereinafter (LaJevardi’) to represent him in a
8 dispute regarding the termination of his employment. On or
9 about that date, LaJevardi paid you $500.00 as an advance fee
10 for such representation.
11 II
12 During the period from May 16, 1983 to in or about January
13 1985, you did not file a lawsuit on LaJevardi’s behalf, nor did
14 you negotiate a settlement with the adverse party on his behalf.
15 III
16 During the period from May 16, 1983 to in or about April
17 1984, LaJevardi made repeated attempts to contact you by
18 telephone and in person to ascertain the status of his matter.
You wilfully failed and refused to communicate with him during

20 that period for unreasonable periods of time.
21 IV
22 By your conduct aforesaid, you wilfully failed to use
23 reasonable diligence and your best judgment in the exercise of
24 your skill and in the application of your learning in an effort
25 to accomplish, with reasonable speed, the purpose for which you
26 were employed by LaJevardi.
27
///
28
///
7890T: 09/24/85 - 2 - ~...

1 V
By your your aforesaid, you failed to earn the advance fee
of $500.00 which LaJevardi had paid you, and you wilfully
4 failed to refund to him said fee, or any portion thereof.
B WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS after service of this Notice,
8 you shall file a written answer as provided by Rule 552, Rules
of Procedure of the State Bar of California.
, 1985 OFFICE OF TRIAL COUNSEL

THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORN.IA
i0
ii
SUSAN MAHONY-ST. CLAIR

Chief Trial Counsel
14
IB
18
i~’
18
20
21
24
2B
28
28
7890T: 09/24/85 - 3 -
NOTICE OF HEARING
(MANDATORY SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE)
In re: 85-0-210 LA (LA 4102) In the Matter of: John Phillip Angles
The parties to this proceeding are:
H. F. Kissane, Examiner John Phillip Angles, Respondent

1230 West Third Street 303 West Mission Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90017 Pomona, CA 91766
(213) 482-8220
NOTICE
This matter is subject to rules E.l and E.2, Rules of Practice of the State Bar Court providing
for a mandatory settlement conference.
The time and place of the mandatory settlement conference is: Thursday, March 13, 1986 at
1:30 p.m. at the offices of the State Bar, 1230 West Third Street, Los Angeles, California.
The settlement conference referee assigned to the matter is: C. Edward Simpson, Esq., 800
Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 580, Los Angeles, California 90017; (213) 485-1555.
The Deputy Court Clerk assigned to handle this case during the pendency of this proceeding is
Rosa M. Arballo.
Please read carefully: Rules E.1 and E.2 in the enclosed Rules of Practice; especially as to the
duties of the parties to meet or confer at least ten days before the settlement conference to
discuss the prospects for settlement and factual and legal issues in dispute; and, to attend the
settlement conference; Rules 315-324 (Discovery) in the enclosed Rules of Procedure, time period
for discovery is set forth in Rule 316, conditions precedent to formal discovery in Rule 317~ The
Court expects the parties to complete all discovery and be fully prepared at the time of the
Mandatory Settlement Conference.
MOTIONS TO CONTINUE the settlement conference date for thirty (30) days or less, based on
good cause, are directed to the Referee named above. Motions for continuance of the Settlement
Conference greater than thirty (30) days must be supported by a showing of good cause and
directed as set forth below.
Upon an adequate showing of indigency, counsel may be appointed to represent you. Applications
for appointment of counsel should be submitted within thirty days of receipt of this Notice and
may be obtained from the Court Clerk’s Office of the State Bar of California, 1230 West Third
Street, Los Angeles, California 90017. The application should be accompanied by a Declaration of
Service indicating service on the Examiner for the State Bar of California.
If a stipulation as to facts and disposition is not reached as a result of the mandatory settlement
conference, the parties, immediately following the settlement conference, shall meet with the
master calendar clerk to set the pre-trial conference (if required) and, if not required, the first
date of formal hearing.
Your attention is directed to the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, particularly:
Rule 225(a)(i) amended effective September 16, 1985, the hearings in this matter shall be
public; Rule 558 re size of hearing panel, election to request a three member panel, creation
of a master calendar hearing system, and motion to have very complex matters heard by a
compensated referee; Rule 555 re consequences of failure to appear at the formal hearing;
I096F
Attention is also called to the Rules of Practice, particularly:
Rule C.3 (Pre-trial Conference), Rule F.2 (Calendar Assistance), parties must give prompt
notice of various motions or intentions to make such motions including motion for
continuances; l~ule F.3 (Postponement of Trial Date), continuances on motion of a party are
not favored and applications therefore must be supported by verified statement of reasons
showing good cause; all applications for continuances must be directed only to the Assistant
Presiding Referee, Hearii~g Department, or his designee, and the original paper to State Bar
Court, 1230 West Third Street, Los Angeles, California 90017 (please contact the Court
Clerk’s Office, (213) 482-8220, for name, address and phone number of the referee ruling on
continuances); if facts relied on are not ascertained until less than 5 days before trial they
must be brought to his attention by telephone.
I096F
THE STATE BAR
0FCALIF0RNIA ~i,ec,o~, S~’UART
COURT CLERK’S OFFICE, 818 WEST SEVENTH STREET, SUITE 201, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-3432 (213)689-6200
September 28, 1988
John Philip Angles, Esq.

303 West Mission Blvd.
Pomona, Ca. 91766
In re: 88-TE-13019 In the Matter of the Transfer To Inactive

Membership of John Philip Angles
Dear Mr. Angles:
Please be advised that the State Bar Court has ordered that you
be enrolled as an inactive member of the State Bar of California
pursuant to section 6007 (c) of the Business and Professions Code.
Enclosed herewith is a copy of the Decision of the State Bar Court
filed on September 28, 1988, evidencing the order of your inactive
enrollment.
Accordingly, you are hereby enrolled as an inactive member of the

State Bar effective September 30,1988.
Under the Business and Professions Code, inactive members may not
practice law or hold themselves out as entitled to practice law
while enrolled inactive (see sections 6125-6127 of that code).
A peti’tion to review this order of the State Bar Court enrolling

you as an inactive member under section 6007 (c) may be filed
with the Supreme Court within sixty (60) days from the date of
this letter.
Very truly yours,
Charles Nettles
CN:cn
Enclosures
cc: Dominique Snyder, Attorney at Law
kwiktag ¯ 018 035 248

THE STATE BAR OFFICE OF STATE BAR COURT
0FCALIF0RNIA ~i,.,o,, STUART A. FORSYT.
COURT CLERK’S OFFICE, 818 WEST SEVENTH STREET, SUITE 201, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-3432 (213) 68~-6200
September 28, 1988
Laurence P. Gill
Clerk of the Supreme Court
4250 State Building
San Francisco, CA. 94102
In re: 88-TE-13019 In the Matter of the Inactive Enrollment of

John Philip Angles
Dear Mr. Gill:
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 6081 of the Business and

Professions Code, this is to advise you that effective September
30, 1988, John Philip Angles, a member of the State Bar of Cali-
fornia, has been enrolled by the State Bar Court as an inactive
member under Section 6007 (c) (1985 Cal. Stats Ch. 453).
This inactive enrollment is based on a finding by the State Bar

Court that John. Philip Angles posed an imminent threat of harm
to his clients or the public.
Very truly yours,
Charles Nettles
CN:cn
cc: John Philip Angles, Esq.
1
S EP 2 8 1988
5
6
7
8 STATE BAR COURT
9 STATE OF CALIFORNIA
11 In the Matter of ....

Case ##88-TE-13019
19. JOHN PHILIP ANGLES
DECISION
15
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS
16 ORDER
17
18
19
~0
21
C. Thorne Corse
Principal Referee
351 California Street - Suite 450
San Francisco, California 94104
(415) 781-0300
September 21, 1988
~5
9,6
27
28
1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 PAGE
3
I FINDINGS OF FACT ..................
4
Ao General .......................
5
Bo Disciplinary Hearing ................
6
Co Matured Investigations ...............
7
Do Pending Investigations ...............
8
II CONCLUSIONS OF LAW .................
9
III ORDER ........................
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
1
6
7
8 STATE BAR COURT
9 STATE OF CALIFORNIA
11 In the Matter of ~-
Case ##88-TE-13019
19. JOHN PHILIP ANGLES
DECISION
15
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS
16 ~ ORDER
17 The above-entitled matter, being an application by the
18 State Bar, pursuant to Business and Professions Code (hereinafter

19 called "B&P") §6007(c), for the involuntary enrollment of Respon-
~0 dent JOHN PHILIP ANGLES (hereinafter called "Respondent") as an
21 inactive member of the State Bar of California, came on for hear-
ing at the Office of the State Bar, 818 South Seventh Street,
Los Angeles, California, on September 21, 1988.
Present at the Hearing were the Principal Referee, C.
25 THORNE CORSE, Esq., and the Examiner for the State Bar, DOMINIQUE
26 SNYDER, Esq. Respondent did not appear, in person or by counsel,
27 nor has he filed any response to the Notice of Hearing. /
28 The Hearing was reported by ~-’~,~ ~ ~’~.~7~ ,
1 Certified Shorthand Reporter.
2 The matter having been submitted, the Referee, having
3 heard the State Bar’s presentation, and having read the file,
4 makes the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
5 Order.
6
7 ~ FINDINGS OF FACT
8
9 A. General
10 I. Respondent was duly admitted to the State Bar of Cali-
11 fornia on December,.-13, 1978, and has been a Member from that
12 date until now.

13
14 B. Disciplinary Hearin9
15 2. On June 20, 1987, this Court (John F. Busetti, Refe-
16 ree), in Matters ##86-0-180 LA, 84-I-570 LA, 84-I-630 LA and
17 87-I-011 SR (which had been consolidated by Stipulation of Res-
I pondent and the State Bar, and, as consolidated, renumbered #83-

18
19 O~i1213), after Hearings held on June 24, September 28, and Novem-
20 ber 18, 1987, and March 7, 1988, found that Respondent had viola-
21 ted B&P §§6068 and 6103 and Rules of Professional Conduct (here-
22 inafter "Rules" and, individually, "Rule"), Rules 2-111(A) (2),
23~ 2-111(A) (3) and 6-101(A) (2), in connection with the following
transactions:
25 .a. In 1983 and 1984, Respondent abandoned his
client, Jennie Craig, and failed to return to her un-
27 earned fees in the amount of $750; (Count One)
28 b. In 1982 and 1983, Respondent abandoned his
- 2 -
client, Darlene Villani, failed to use diligence and
skill in his representation of her, misrepresented to
her the status of her case and failed to return to her
unearned fees in an amount not determined; (Count Two)
c. In 1983 and 1984, Respondent abandoned his
6 client, John Frankot, failed to communicate with him,
7 failed to deliver to him papers to which he was entit-
led and failed to return unearned fees in the amount
9 of $1500; (Count Four)I
lO d. In 1983, Respondent abandoned his client,
Ella Costello, ,failed to communicate with her, misrep-
resented to her the status of her case and failed to
13 return to her unearned fees in an amount not determi-
ned; (Count Five)
15 e. In 1984, Respondent abandoned his client,
16 Rebecca Hernandez, failed to communicate with her,
17 misrepresented to her the status of her case and failed
to return to her unearned fees in the amount of $1500.
~9 (Count Seven)2
~0 3. Based on his Findings and Conclusions, as summarized
above, Mr. Busetti recommended that Respondent be disbarred and
be ordered to comply with Rule 955 of the California Rules of
~3 Court.
4. Mr. Busetti’s Decision in Case #83-0-11213 is now pend-
~5 ing in the Review Department of this Court.
~6 ///
~7
Count Three was dismissed.
Count Six was dismissed.
- 3 -
1 C. Matured Investigations
2 5. In addition, there are eight matters pending against
3 Respondent in this Court, which have progressed far enough to be
4 assigned numbers, but in which Notices to Show Cause have not
5 yet been filed, to wit:3
6 a. In 1981, Respondent abandoned his client,
7 Sharon Burnett, in two cases and failed to return to
8 her her files or his unearned fees in the amount of
9 $1500; (#87-0-11301)
10 b. In 1986, Respondent agreed to represent Wil-
11 liam J. Shipto~, and Mr. Shipton paid him, on account
12 of fees, $2583; in December of that year, Mr. Shipton
13 retained substitute counsel and requested delivery of
14 his files and return of the unearned fees; Respondent
15 failed to return either the files or the fees and whol-
16 ly failed to respond to inquiries from the State Bar
17 in connection therewith; (#87-0-11685)
18 c. In 1987, Linda Carson retained Respondent to
19
20 3 The facts found in this Finding are based solely on a Decla-
ration executed and filed herein by Dominique Snyder, Esq., the
21 Examiner. I have before suggested (se___~e Matter of Ginocchio and
Cornwall (1987) ##87-TE-16973, 87-TE-16974) that the practice of
filing such Declarations in B&P §6007(c) matters is highly unde-
sirable, since, if the matter is contested, it exposes the Exami-
ner to cross-examination by the Respondent. (See Rule 2-111(A))
If it is to be done, as a summary of pending matters for the
convenience of the Court, it should, when possible, be supported
by Declarations from the Complaining Witnesses or, at least,
from theinvestigator(s) who interviewed them and others. A
hearsay objection of course, will not lie (Rule of Procedure
796), but what is the equivalent of an indefinite suspension
from the practice of law requires at least a modicum of due pro-
cess. A summary of a summary, if contested, raises due process
problems in my mind.
Since this matter was not contested, the question is acade-
mic here.
- 4 -
I represent Robert W. Zoellner in a criminal matter and
paid him $300 on account of fees; In October of that
3 year, Mr. Zoellner complained to the State Bar of Res-
pondent’s failure properly to represent him, his aban-
5 donment by Respondent and of his mispresentation to
6 Ms. Carson; the State Bar requested an explanation
7 from Respondent; to date, Respondent has not replied;
8 (#87-0-11854)
9 d. In 1986 and 1987, Respondent abandoned his
10 client, James L. Vaughan, and failed to return to him
11 unearned fees; to date, he has not replied to two inqui-
12 ry made by the State Bar in 1987; (#87-0-13172)
13 e. In 1987, Respondent abandoned his client,
Paul R. Kerpsie, and has failed to return to him any
15 part of the $500 which he paid on account of fees (some
16 of it was apparently earned); (#87-0-15910)
17 f. In 1987 and 1988, Respondent abandoned his
18 client, Ahmad Ai-Khatib, failed to return unearned
19 fees and misappropriated from Mr. Ai-Khatib at least
9.0 $600; (#88-0-10504)
9.1 g. In 1988, Respondent drew check #1185 on his
9.2 Attorney Client Trust account in the amount of $200,
9.3 payable to his secretary, Leslie Allen; Ms. Allen
cashed the check at Mission Market, to whom it was
9.5 returned for insufficient funds; Mission Market re-
26 tained John D. Lueck, Esq., to collect the check; Res-
27 pondent promised Mr. Lueck that he would make the check
28 good, but, to date, has not done so; (#88-0-11054)
- 5 -
1 h. In 1987 and 1988, Respondent abandoned his
2 client, John L. Farr, and failed to return to him unear-
3 ned fees. (#88-0-11209)
4
5 D. Pendin~ Investigations
6 6. In addition, there have been filed with the State Bar
7 three additional complaints against Respondent, in which the
8 following allegations under penalty of perjury have been made by
9 the Complaining Witnesses:
10 a. In 1985, Respondent was retained by Alice
11 Northrup to represent her in a criminal matter, and
12 paid him a total of $5000 on account of fees; Respondent
13 failed to appear on scheduled court dates on three sepa-
14 rate occasions and failed to communicate with Ms. North-

15 rup until just before the matter went to trial; on that
16 occasion, she expressed a desire to plea bargain; Respon-

17 dent refused to do so on her behalf; the matter went to
18 trial and Ms. Northrup was convicted; Respondent wholly
19 failed to advise her of her rights at the sentencing
20 hearing and withdrew as her counsel without her consent,
21 although it does appear that he obtained the consent of
22 the Court; (Northrup Declaration)
23 b. In 1986, Chris Allen retained Respondent to
24 represent him in a criminal matter in Federal Court
25 and paid him $4500 to represent him through pre-trial;
26 following his bail hearing, Mr. Allen discharged Respon-
27 dent; Respondent offered to return $1000 of the $4500;
28 Mr. Allen refused and the matter went to arbitration
- 6 -
1 tive enrollment.
2
3 III ORDER
4 It is, therefore, ORDERED that:
5 i. The State Bar’s Application for Involuntary Inactive
6 Enrollment be, and it hereby is, GRANTED;
7 2. Effective immediately, Respondent JOHN PHILIP ANGLES
8 be, and he hereby is, TRANSFERRED INVOLUNTARILY to the INACTIVE
9 LIST of Members of the State Bar of California.
10 DATED:
September 21, 1988. /~
~
11
12
13 ¯ orne Corse
Referee
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
- 8 -
’I, the undersigned, over the age of 18 years, whose business address
and place of employment is 818 West Seventh Street, Los Angeles,
California, declare that I am not a party to the within action; that
in the City and County of Los Angeles, on the date shown below, I
deposited a true copy of the within
Decision Filed September 28, 1988
In a facility regularly maintained by the United States Postal

Service with postage thereon fully prepaid addressed to:
John Philip Angles, Esq.

303 West Mission Blvd.
Pomona, Ca. 91766 ~
In an inter-office mail facility regularly maintained by the

State Bar of California addressed to:
Dominique Snyder, Attorney at Law
Dated: September 28, 1988
I declare under penalty of

perjury at Los Angeles,
California, on the date
shown above, that the
foregoing is true and
correct.
Charles Nettles

Angles John Phillip 84774 Binder3

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Angles John Phillip 84774 Binder3

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Angles John Phillip 84774 Binder3

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Bar Misc.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA R0b~,"t ~J.F.~a-i’u~’~ Clerk

IN THE MATTER OF JOHN PHILLIP ANGLES

MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA

It is hereby ordered that John Phillip Angles be disbarred from

attorneys. It is further ordered that he comply with rule 955,

California Rules of Court, and that he perform the acts specified in

subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 days,

respectively, after the effective date of this order.* This order is

effective April 14, 1989.

*See Business and Professions Code section 6126, subdivision

,< d/C/ c-’’: .....

After discussion and consideration by the Review Department of the record

BEJ&O~J6FJ~ that the decision of the Hearing Panel after

Voting Yes: Referees Boyle, Carlin, Dean, Katsky, Kirkham, Lawson,

I, the undersigned, over the age of 18 years, whose business

MINUTES OF THE REVIEW DEPARTMENT

in a sealed envelope as follows:

In a facility regularly maintained by the United States

John Phillip Angles, Esq.

In an inter-office mail facility regularly maintained by the

Erica Tavachnick, Attorney at Law

Dated: December ~, 1988

I declare under penalty of

PEI~SONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosed is the Hearing Panel Decision filed in the above-numbered matter.

Please note that if review is not requested, an ex-parte review will be

In a facility regularly maintained by the United States Postal Service

I declare under penalty of perjury at Los Angeles, California, that the

Lydia’ ~o~s,~eXpu~Y~ Co-ur~ Clerk

14 1988. Present at all the hearings were John F. Busetti, Principal

16 John Phillip Angles, Respondent in this proceeding, was present

17 only on June 24 and September 28, 1987.

18 All matters (84-I-570 LA, 84-I-630 LA, 86-0-180 LA and 87-I-

19 Ii SR) were consolidated by stipulation.

21 by Alida Vazquez; the hearing on September 28, 1987 was reported

22 by Virginia Peteraetis; and the hearing on November 18, 1987 was

23 reported by Judy B. Elmore.

25 to submit briefs on culpability issues. The State Bar filed its

26 brief, but Respondent did not.

27 The matter was thereafter set for hearing on February 19,

28 1988, but Respondent requested and was granted a continuance due

3 March 7, 1988 as the next hearing date. Respondent failed to

4 appear at that hearing, with no explanation.

5 .At the March 7, 1988 hearing, the Referee ordered that

7 proper showing, and that if no such petition were filed and

8 granted, the matter would stand submitted.

9 On March 17, 1988, the Referee was presented with

11 purported reasons for Respondent’s failure to appear on November

12 18, 1987. That Petition was denied, without prejudice, by Order

15 On or about May 17, 1988, the Office of Trial Counsel filed a

17 Request. The Request was granted.

18 The undersigned Principal and sole Referee makes the

19 following findings of fact as to which the main, but not

20 exclusive, evidentiary basis for each finding is cited in

21 parenthesis after said finding:

25 i. The Respondent, John Phillip Angles, was admitted to the

26 practice of law in the State of California on December 13, 1978.

5 husband. (Craig testimony.)

6 3. She paid him $750 as and for advance attorneys’ fees to