[G.R. No. 111426. July 11, 1994.

]
NORMA DIZON-PAMINTUAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.

Since Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 expressly provides that "[m]ere possession of any good,
article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or
thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing," it follows that the petitioner is
presumed to have knowledge of the fact that the items found in her possession were the
proceeds of robbery or theft. The presumption is reasonable for no other natural or logical
inference can arise from the established fact of her possession of the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft. This presumption does not offend the presumption of innocence
enshrined in the fundamental law. 20 In the early case of United States vs. Luling, 21 this
Court held: LexLib
"It has been frequently decided, in case of statutory crimes, that no constitutional
provision is violated by a statute providing that proof by the state of some material fact or
facts shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and that then the burden is shifted to
the defendant for the purpose of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are
committed without unlawful intention. (Commonwealth vs. Minor, 88 Ky., 422.)
In some of the States, as well as in England, there exist what are known as common law
offenses. In the Philippine Islands no act is a crime unless it is made so by statute. The
state having the right to declare what acts are criminal, within certain well defined
limitations, has a right to specify what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what
act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what proof shall constitute prima facie
evidence of guilt, and then to put upon the defendant the burden of showing that such act
or acts are innocent and are not committed with any criminal intent or intention."
In his book on constitutional law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz said:
"Nevertheless, the constitutional presumption of innocence may be overcome by contrary
presumptions based on the experience of human conduct [People vs. Labara, April 20,
1954]. Unexplained flight, for example, may lead to an inference of guilt, as 'the wicked
flee when no man pursueth, but the righteous is as bold as a lion.' Failure on the part of
the accused to explain his possession of stolen property may give rise to the reasonable
presumption that it was he himself who had stolen it [U.S. vs. Espia, 16 Phil. 506]. Under
our Revised Penal Code, the inability of an accountable officer to produce funds or
property entrusted to him will be considered prima facie evidence that he has appropriate
them to his personal use [Art. 217]. According to Cooley, the constitutional presumption
will not apply as long as there is 'some rational connection between the fact proved and
the ultimate fact presumed, and the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not
be so unreasonable as to be purely arbitrary mandate' [1 Cooley, 639]." cdll
The petitioner was unable to rebut the presumption under P.D. No. 1612. She relied
solely on the testimony of her brother which was insufficient to overcome the
presumption, and, on the contrary, even disclosed that the petitioner was engaged in the
purchase and sale of jewelry and that she used to buy from a certain Fredo. 23

20. Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution.

[G.R. No. 164545. November 20, 2006.]

Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the concept of the crime of theft, viz:
ART. 308. Who are liable for theft. — Theft is committed by any person who, with
intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon
things, shall take personal property of another without the latter's consent. . . .
Based on this provision, the elements of the crime of theft may be deduced as follows:
1. That there be taking of personal property;
2. That said property belongs to another;
3. That the taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and
5. That the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things.
Relatively, Article 310 of the same Code states that the crime of theft becomes qualified
when it is, among others, committed with grave abuse of confidence, to wit:
ART. 310. Qualified theft. – The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties
next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article,
if committed . . . with grave abuse of confidence . . . .

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUBEN SISON, accused-

Appellant principally argues that the People did not offer any direct evidence that he stole
and carried away from the cash vault of PCIB Luneta Branch the amount of six million
pesos (P6,000,000.00), but only managed to present circumstantial evidence which did
not allegedly prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In his Brief, appellant principally
contends that there was no evidence of his complicity in the performance of the act
without which the crime could not have been consummated, namely, the changing of the
account name of the depositor, that is, from Solid Electronics Inc. to Solid Realty
Development Corporation.
This Court disagrees with the appellant.
Circumstantial evidence is not a "weaker" form of evidence vis-à-vis direct evidence. 51
The Rules of Court do not distinguish between direct evidence and evidence of
circumstances insofar as their probative value is concerned. No greater degree of
certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct, for in
either case, the trier of fact must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt as to the guilt
of the accused. 52
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which the
inference is derived, are proven, and the combination of all the circumstances produces
moral certainty as to convict beyond a reasonable doubt.
There is no denying that the following facts were proven by the prosecution:
1. that appellant had access and solely controlled the access of Cecil Fante, to the
computer system for changing account names of clients;
2. that appellant solely controlled access to the computerized testing key for
telegraphic fund transfers;
3. that Solid Electronics, Inc. is not the same entity as Solid Realty Development
Corporation;
4. that Solid Electronics, Inc. closed its saving account with PCIB Luneta Branch;
5. that Solid Realty Development Corporation does not exist and never itself opened
a savings account with PCIB Luneta Branch;
6. that appellant made two (2) back office withdrawals in the aggregate amount of
P6,000,000.00 in behalf of Solid Realty Development Corporation;
7. that appellant solely controlled the access to the cash vault;
8. that the (2) telegraphic fund transfers from the PCIB Cabacan Branch in the
aggregate amount of P8,005,000.00 were fictitious, and
9. that appellant disappeared immediately after he tendered his resignation letter
which was to be effective still a month later and without claiming from his employer the
remaining monetary benefits due him.
We infer from these facts, considered together and in relation to each other, that
appellant, not Cecil Fante, changed the account name for Savings Account No. 0193-
37276-2 from Solid Electronics, Inc. to Solid Realty Development Corporation because it
was appellant and not Cecil Fante, who was in a position to clear and approve the two (2)
fictitious telegraphic fund transfers to the account of Solid Realty Development
Corporation purportedly from the PCIB Cabacan Branch; and that it was appellant and
not Cecil Fante, who made the back office withdrawals in behalf of Solid Realty
Development Corporation. As it was admitted by appellant that he did make such back
office withdrawals in behalf of Solid Realty Development Corporation which was proven
to be a non-existent entity, there is no denying that no officer or representative of said
corporation could have instructed him to make such withdrawals. He merely pretended to
be acting upon instruction of Solid Realty Development Corporation in withdrawing
P6,000,000.00 allegedly for said corporation when in truth there was no such corporation.
Ultimately, the combination of all the incriminating facts proven by the prosecution and
the logical inferences derived therefrom leave no doubt in Our mind that appellant, with
grave abuse of confidence, conceived and accomplished the theft of P6,000,000.00 from
the PCIB Luneta Branch. cda
Articles 308 and 310, respectively of the Revised Penal Code provides:
"Who are liable for theft. — Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain
but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take
personal property of another without the latter’s consent."
"Qualified Theft. — The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by
two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed
by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is
motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises
of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the
occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular
accident or civil disturbance.
Under Article 308 of the said Code, the elements of the crime of theft are:
1. that there be taking of personal property;
2. that said property belongs to another;
3. that the taking be done with intent to gain;
4. that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and
5. that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things. 53
Theft becomes qualified when any of the following circumstances is present:
1. the theft is committed by a domestic servant;
2. the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence;
3. the property stolen is a (a) motor vehicle, (b) mail matter or (c) large cattle;
4. the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation;
5. the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and
6. the property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic
eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. 54
The crime perpetuated by appellant against his employer, the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank (PCIB), is qualified theft. Appellant could not have committed the crime
had he not been holding the position of Luneta Branch Operation Officer which gave him
not only sole access to the bank vault but also control of the access of all bank employees
in that branch, except the Branch Manager, to confidential and highly delicate
computerized security systems designed to safeguard, among others, the integrity of
telegraphic fund transfers and account names of bank clients. The management of the
PCIB reposed its trust and confidence in the appellant as its Luneta Branch Operation
Officer, and it was this trust and confidence which he exploited to enrich himself to the
damage and prejudice of PCIB in the amount of P6,000,000.00.

52. Id., p. 199.

[G.R. No. 164545. November 20, 2006.]

While it is true that there was no eyewitness when the petitioner committed the crime of
qualified theft, it does not necessarily follow that her guilt for such act was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt. It should be emphasized that an accused can be convicted even
if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence had been
presented by the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
committed the crime. 32 Circumstantial evidence will be considered sufficient if the
following are shown:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. 33
The above-stated requisites are present in the case at bar. During the trial, all of the
witnesses for the prosecution testified under oath that the understatement of the figures in
the lists were made by the petitioner since they are all very familiar with her handwriting
as they were co-employees for many years. 34 This is bolstered by the records which
show that all of the understated lists are indicated under the name "Bhing" which is
petitioner's nickname. 35 Moreover, as aptly stated by the Solicitor General, a closer
examination of the lists reveals that the handwritten understated figures are uniform and
consistent. The strokes are notably similar and written by one and same person. 36
Petitioner admitted that, as the former cashier of TBOS, she wrote and computed the
understated figures in the lists. Although she claimed that there were
insertions/alterations in the lists, she failed to point out or identify such during the trial.
37 These lists were presented in evidence and were verified during the trial by the
prosecution witnesses and by the petitioner. 38
Furthermore, it should be noted that petitioner, as the trusted cashier of TBOS, had easy
access to the lists of sales as well as to the cash or proceeds thereof. Therefore, it would
not be impossible or difficult for the petitioner to understate the lists and cart away the
missing amount. HCaIDS
Petitioner had denied having committed the crime charged. She, however, had failed to
present sufficient evidence to support her disclaim of any liability. As the defense of
denial is inherently weak for being negative and self-serving, and the petitioner failed to
substantiate the same, the positive and categorical declarations of the prosecution
witnesses must prevail. 39
The foregoing circumstantial evidences, taken together, constitute an unbroken chain
leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion that petitioner had understated the lists and
pocketed the missing amount for her personal benefit. 40

32. People v. Yatar, G.R. No. 150224, 19 May 2004, 428 SCRA 504, 513; People v.
Lagao, Jr., G.R. No. 118457, 8 April 1997, 271 SCRA 51, 64.
33. Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.
34. TSN, 6 March 1997, p. 11; TSN, 19 March 1999, p. 8; TSN, 11 October 1999, p.
15.
35. Folder of Exhibits, Exhibits A-U; RTC records in Criminal Case No. 4625, p.
248, "Exhibit V".
36. Rollo, p. 151.
37. TSN, 18 May 2000, p. 25.
38. Rollo, pp. 102-131.
39. People v. Caparas, G.R. No. 134633, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 286, 297.
40. People v. Yatar, supra note 32 at 517.