CAMPAIGN PLANNING

HANDBOOK

Academic Year 2020

Editor: COL Mark Haseman
United States Army War College
Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013-5242
 Middle States Accreditation

The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Middle States Commission
on Higher Education (MSCHE), 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, 19104, (267) 284-5000. MSCHE is an institutional accrediting
agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for
Higher Education Accreditation. Initial accreditation was granted in 2004.
 Table of Contents

Page

INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………….…..1
CHAPTER 1: National Strategic Direction and Guidance..............................................3
 Strategic Direction………………………………………………………………………..3
 National Level Strategic Documents…………………………………………………...5
 DoD/Joint Staff Level Documents .......................................................................... 7
 Theater Level Documents .................................................................................... 16
 CCDR dialogue with National Leaders (Military Options, COAs and Planning) .... 18
 FDOs/FROs ......................................................................................................... 24
CHAPTER 2: Joint Planning ...................................................................................... 27
 Integrated Context ............................................................................................. 27
 Multi-National Planning ...................................................................................... 28
 Unified Action .................................................................................................... 29
 Joint Planning .................................................................................................... 29
 JPEC ................................................................................................................. 30
 Strategic and Contingency Planning .................................................................. 32
 Conceptual to Detailed Planning ....................................................................... 34
 Campaigning ..................................................................................................... 37
 Detailed Planning .............................................................................................. 38
 Risk ................................................................................................................... 39
CHAPTER 3: Operational Design .............................................................................. 43
 Purpose ............................................................................................................... 43
 The Spectrum of Design ..................................................................................... 43
 Joint and Army Design......................................................................................... 43
 Elements of Operational Design .......................................................................... 45
 Divergence and Convergence ............................................................................. 46
 Frames ............................................................................................................... 47
 Conducting Operational Design – Methodology ................................................... 48
o Understand and Frame Strategic Guidance ............................................ 49
o Understand and Frame the Environment ............................................ 51
o Understand and Frame the problem ................................................... 57
o Develop an Operational Approach ...................................................... 61
 Organizing for Operational Design Work ............................................................. 69
 Link between Operational Design, Planning, Execution and Assessment ........... 73
 Reframing ............................................................................................................ 75
CHAPTER 4: Joint Planning Process ........................................................................ 77
 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 77
 Initiate Planning ................................................................................................... 79
 Conduct Mission Analysis .................................................................................... 80
 Develop Courses of Action .................................................................................. 93
 Analyze Courses of Action ................................................................................. 107
 Courses of Action Comparison .......................................................................... 114

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  Approve a Course of Action ............................................................................... 117
 Develop the Plan ............................................................................................... 122
CHAPTER 5: Development of Theater Strategy and Campaign Plans ...................... 133
 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 133
 Sources of Guidance and Direction for Theater Strategy ................................... 135
 Components of Theater Strategy ................................................................... 136
 Using Operational Design for Building a Theater Strategy ........................... 139
 The Combatant Command Campaign Plan ....................................................... 145
 Components of a Combatant Command Campaign Plan .................................. 147
Appendix A – Management and Review of campaign and Contingency Plans ................ A-1
Appendix B – Combined / Joint Task Force Headquarters .......................................... B-1
Appendix C – PMESII Systems Construct ................................................................... C-1
Appendix D – OPORD Format with Staff Estimate Information .................................... D-1
Appendix E – Commander’s Estimate Format ............................................................. E-1
Appendix F – Reference Times ................................................................................... F-1
Appendix G – Operation Assessment .......................................................................... G-1

The most current doctrinal publications and CJCS guidance can be found at The CJCS
Directives Library at http://www.jcs.mil/Library/ and the Joint Electronic Library at
http://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/

Throughout this publication, Joint Doctrine and official

instructions are printed in Courier New / Purple text.
Emerging concepts, draft guidance (e.g. the draft JSCP), and
USAWC best practices are in Arial/black text.

On charts, USAWC “best practice” additives are in blue /

italics. Reconciling between formats (e.g. a JP 5-0 chart is
missing something found in JP 5-0 text) is in Green /
Underline.

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 List of Figures

1-1 Strategic Direction ........................................................................................... 4

1-2 National Defense Strategy Strategic Approach ............................................... 7
1-3 National Military Strategy Framework .............................................................. 8
1-4 Global Force Management ............................................................................ 10
1-5 Assignment, Apportionment, and Allocation .................................................. 11
1-6 Joint Strategic Planning System .................................................................... 12
1-7 Coordinating Authority ................................................................................... 14
1-8 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan ...................................................................... 15
1-9 Combatant Command Planning…………………………………………………..17
1-10 Options and Courses of Action (COAs) ......................................................... 19
1-11 Elements of Military Options .......................................................................... 20
1-12 Planning in the Strategic Arena…………………………………………………..21
2-1 Integrated Planning ....................................................................................... 27
2-2 Joint Planning and Execution Community ..................................................... 31
2-3 Joint Planning Activities, Functions and Products ......................................... 32
2-4 Strategic and Contingency Planning.............................................................. 33
2-5 Joint Design and Planning (Conceptual-Detailed) ......................................... 34
2-6 Joint Planning Process and Operational Design............................................ 35
2-7 Joint Risk Framework .................................................................................... 41
3-1 Joint Design and Planning (Conceptual-Detailed) ......................................... 45
3-2 Divergence and Convergence in Planning and Execution ............................. 46
3-3 Operational Design Framework ..................................................................... 47
3-4 Holistic View of the Operational Environment (OE) ....................................... 54
3-5 Tensions that Describe the Problem.............................................................. 59
3-6 Endstate – Objectives – Effects – Tasks ....................................................... 64
3-7 Sample Line of Operation .............................................................................. 66
3-8 Sample Lines of Effort ................................................................................... 66
3-9 Brainstorming ................................................................................................ 72
3-10 Mind mapping ................................................................................................ 72
4-1 The Joint Planning Process (JPP) ................................................................. 77
4-2 Joint Planning Overview ................................................................................ 78
4-3 JPP Step 1: Initiate Planning ......................................................................... 79
4-4 JPP Step 2: Conduct Mission Analysis .......................................................... 81
4-5 Sample Mission Analysis Brief Agenda ......................................................... 89
4-6 JPP Step 3: Develop Courses of Action ....................................................... 94
4-7 Relationship between End State, Objectives, Effects, and Tasks.................. 97
4-8 COA Development Element for the Narrative/Sketch .................................. 104
4-9 COA DEV Brief Example Format ................................................................. 106
4-10 JPP Step 4: Analyze Courses of Action ....................................................... 108
4-11 Sample Wargaming Steps ........................................................................... 111
4-12 JPP Step 5: Compare Courses of Action ..................................................... 115
4-13 Sample COA Comparison Matrix (Weighted Numerical) ............................. 117
4-14 Sample COA Comparison Matrix (Descriptive)............................................ 117
4-15 JPP Step 6: Course of Action Approval ....................................................... 118

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 List of Figures (continued)
4-16 Sample COA Decision Brief Agenda ........................................................... 119
4-17 Sample Commander’s Estimate .................................................................. 121
4-18 JPP Step 7: Develop the Plan ..................................................................... 122
5-1 Example Theater Strategy Depiction .......................................................... 145
5-2 Campaign and Contingency Planning ........................................................ 147

A-1 Plan Organization and Approval .................................................................. A-3

B-1 Potential JTF HQ ......................................................................................... B-3
G-1 Campaign Plan Assessments ...................................................................... G-2
G-2 Operation Assessment Steps ...................................................................... G-4
G-3 Linking End State, Objs, Tasks, Conditions and Mission to Tasks .............. G-5
G-4 Linking End State, Objs, Tasks, Conditions and Mission to Indicators ........ G-7
G-5 MOP and MOE Effectiveness Indicator Development ................................. G-9

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 Introduction

The purpose of this document is to assist United States Army War College students
during the Military Strategy and Campaigning (MSC) course. It also serves to assist
commanders, planners, and other staff officers in combatant commands (CCMD), joint
task forces (JTF), and service component commands. It supplements joint doctrine and
contains elements of emerging doctrine as practiced globally by joint force commanders
(JFCs). It portrays a way to apply published doctrine and emerging doctrine at the
higher levels of joint command, with a primary emphasis at the combatant command
level.

Throughout history, leaders have developed military strategy and planned

campaigns to synchronize efforts and sequence several related operations to achieve
national security objectives. General George Washington planned the Campaign of
1781 to coordinate the actions of a French fleet, a French expeditionary army, and his
"main army" to defeat the British forces at Yorktown. Lieutenant General Ulysses S.
Grant planned simultaneous offensives by his subordinate commands against the
Confederacy for the 1864 Campaign. During World War II, campaign planning became
essential to coordinate the actions of joint and combined forces in all Allied theaters. In
the Pacific Theater of War, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur issued his Strategic
Plan for Operations in the Japanese Archipelago, DOWNFALL, in May 1945. In this 25-
page document, MacArthur explained how the plan "…visualizes attainment of the
assigned objectives by two (2) successive operations (OLYMPIC and CORONET)." The
cover letter described this plan as a "general guide covering the larger phases of
allocation of means and of coordination, both operational and logistic. It is not designed
to restrict executing agencies in detailed development of their final plans of operation."

In the wake of the publication of the National Defense Strategy and National Military
Strategy, campaign planning has received renewed attention within the Department of
Defense. As directed by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, combatant commanders and subordinate commanders develop a
comprehensive set of nested strategies and plans that must address global priorities
while incorporating regional or functional strategies and campaign objectives which are
supported by other specific plans like theater security cooperation, contingency, and
posture plans. All of these are developed in a dynamic strategic environment
characterized by ongoing operations and variable national guidance.

While joint and Service doctrine remain authoritative sources for planning, this
handbook provides ideas and insights for those charged with developing theater
strategies and campaign plans, whether as a coordinating authority or as a collaborator.
This handbook focuses at the combatant command and subordinate joint force
command levels. In some cases, where there are apparent differences between joint
and Service doctrine, the handbook reconciles the differences where possible and
focuses on "best practices" for theater commanders.

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 CHAPTER 1: NATIONAL STRATEGIC DIRECTION AND GUIDANCE

1. Strategic Direction. Strategic direction is covered in Chapter II of JP 5-0. This

chapter will summarize some elements of JP 5-0, make corrections (changes that have
occurred since JP 5-0 was published), and attempt to explain some complicated
structures.

Strategic Direction. The President, Secretary of Defense

(SecDef), and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)
provide broad goals and issue-specific guidance to the armed
forces and supporting agencies. These provide the purpose and
vision that integrates and synchronizes planning and operations
of the JS, CCMDs, Services, joint forces, combat support
agencies (CSAs), and other DOD agencies. Ideally, strategic
direction identifies a desired military objective or end state,
national-level planning assumptions, and national-level
constraints, limitations, and restrictions. In every case,
commanders and staffs will take general guidance and through
iterative planning processes develop plans and orders to execute
military operations and activities. (JP 5-0, p. II-6)

National civilian leadership generally communicates strategic

direction to the military through written documents, but it may
be communicated by any means available. Strategic direction is
contained in key documents, generally referred to as strategic
guidance. Strategic direction may change rapidly in response to
changing situations, whereas strategic guidance documents are
typically updated cyclically and may not reflect the most
current strategic direction. (JP 5-0, p. II-1)

Figure 1-1 describes the hierarchy of Strategic Guidance Documents. It is similar to

Figure II-1 within JP 5-0, but removes some of the documents that are less important to
a CCDR and reorders the documents to show a “highest-to-lowest” structure (Y axis)
and Conceptual [Goals] to Detailed [Specific plans] flow (X Axis).

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 Figure 1-1: Strategic Direction

Note 1 – For information on the “Global Integrator,” “Coordinating Authority,” and

“Collaborator,” see Chapter 2.

CCDR – Combatant Commander

CCMD Theater Strategy – Combatant Commander Theater Strategy (written by Geographic CCDRs)
CCMD Functional Strategy – Combatant Commander Functional Strategy (written by Functional CCDRs)
CCMD Campaign Plan – Combatant Campaign Plan (Classified document)
CDCS – Country Development Cooperation Strategy [USAID]
CJCS – Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CPG – Contingency Planning Guidance (includes former GEF) (Classified document)
CSCS – Country Specific Security Cooperation Sections (Classified document)
CSPs – Campaign Support Plans
DPG – Defense Planning Guidance (Classified document)
EXORD – Execution Order
FCP – Functional Campaign Plans (developed by Coordinating Authorities) (Classified document)
GCP – Global Campaign Plans (Enclosure C of JSCP) (Classified document)
GDP – Global Defense Posture (Classified)
GFMAP – Global Force Management Allocation Plan (Classified document)
GFMIG – Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (Classified document)
GIBP – Globally Integrated Base Plan
ICP – Integrated Contingency Plan (Classified document)
ICS – Integrated Country Strategy [Dept of State]
JSCP – Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (Classified document)
JSP – Joint Strategic Plan [Dept of State and USAID]

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 JRS – Joint Regional Strategies [Dept of State and USAID]
JFS – Joint Functional Strategies [Dept of State]
NDS – National Defense Strategy (Classified document)
NMS – National Military Strategy (Classified document)
NSS – National Security Strategy
MRRs – Mission Resource Requests [Dept of State]
PDs – Presidential Directives [currently titled National Security Presidential Memorandums]
POTUS – President of the United States
PlanOrd – Planning Order
RCP – Regional Campaign Plans (developed by Coordinating Authorities) (Classified document)
SECSTATE – Secretary of State
SOCs – Summary of Conclusions [from NSC meetings]
Subordinate Campaign Plans (Classified document)
TDP – Theater Distribution Plan (Classified document)
TPP – Theater Posture Plan (Classified document)
UCP – Unified Command Plan

2. National-Level Strategic Guidance Documents. Listed per Figure 1-1 (left to

right, top to bottom)

a. National Security Strategy (NSS) - The NSS is required annually by

Title 50, USC, Section 3043. It is prepared by the Executive
Branch of the USG for Congress and outlines the major national
security concerns of the US and how the administration plans to
address them using all instruments of national power. The
document is often purposely general in content, and its
implementation by DOD relies on elaborating direction provided
in supporting documents. (JP 5-0, p. II-2)

b. Unified Command Plan (UCP) - The UCP, signed by the President,

establishes CCMD missions and CCDR responsibilities, addresses
assignment of forces, delineates geographic AORs for GCCs, and
specifies responsibilities for FCCs. The unified command
structure identified in the UCP is flexible and changes as
required to accommodate evolving US national security needs.
Title 10, USC, Section 161, tasks CJCS to conduct a review of
the UCP “not less often than every two years” and submit
recommended changes to the President through SecDef. This
document provides broad guidance that CCDRs and planners can use
to derive tasks and missions during the development and
modification of CCMD plans. (JP 5-0, p. II-4)

c. Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) – The CPG contains detailed planning

guidance from POTUS on specific contingency plans that CCDRs must fully develop.
The CPG will include direction formerly issued in the Guidance for the Employment of
the Force (GEF).

d. Presidential Directives (PD) – Presidents often issue formal guidance on various

security topics between NSSs. For example, each administration typically publishes an
early directive on how the National Security Council will be organized to support their

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decision-making style. These directives have been labeled by different names under
different administrations: National Security Directives (NSDs) under G. W. Bush;
Presidential Policy Directives (PPDs) under Barack Obama; and National Security
Presidential Memorandums by President Donald Trump.

e. Summary of Conclusions (NSC SOC) (Classified except on rare occasions) –

Following National Security Council meetings (when POTUS is present), the NSC often
produces a SOC which reviews the meeting and publishes any conclusions reached.
This document is often used as guidance by CCDRs. Similarly, Principals Committees
(PCs) and Deputies Committees (DCs) often publish Read Outs after their meetings.
On occasion, those read outs are considered authoritative and included in the strategic
direction that CCDRs use to formulate strategies and plans.

f. Joint Strategic Plan (JSP) [Dept of State and USAID] - This DOS-USAID
plan is a blueprint for investing in America’s future and
achieving the goals the President laid out in the NSS. It lays
out strategic goals and objectives for four years and includes
key performance goals for each objective. (JP 5-0, p. II-3)

g. Joint Regional Strategies (JRS) [Dept of State and USAID] – A joint

regional strategy is a three-year regional strategy developed
jointly by the regional bureaus of DOS and USAID. It identifies
the priorities, goals, and areas of strategic focus within the
region. Joint regional strategies provide a forward-looking and
flexible framework within which bureaus and missions prioritize
desired end states, supporting resources, and response to
unanticipated events. (JP 5-0, p. II-3)

h. Joint Functional Strategies [Dept of State] - A joint functional strategy is a

three-year functional (e.g. countering violent extremism) strategy developed by a
functional bureau of DOS (sometimes in conjunction with elements of USAID). It
identifies the priorities, goals, and areas of strategic focus within a function or problem
set. Joint functional strategies provide a forward-looking and flexible framework within
which bureaus and missions prioritize desired end states, supporting resources, and
response to unanticipated events within world-wide issues.

i. Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) [Dept of State] - A three year

strategy developed by a DOS country team for a particular
country. It articulates a common set of USG priorities and goals
by setting the mission goals and objectives through a
coordinated and collaborative planning effort. It provides the
basis for the development of the annual mission resource
requests. The chief of mission leads the development process and
has final approval authority. (JP 5-0, p. II-3)

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 j. Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) [USAID] - The country
development cooperation strategy is a five-year country-level
strategy that focuses on USAID implemented assistance, including
nonemergency humanitarian and transition assistance and related
USG non-assistance tools. (JP 5-0, p. II-3)

k. Mission Resourcing Request (MRR) – This document is an Ambassador’s

request for Department of State resources. It “operationalizes” all preceding DOS
strategies by requesting the money and people needed to turn the Integrated Country
Strategy (ICS) into reality.

3. DoD/Joint Staff Level Documents.

a. National Defense Strategy (NDS) – Congress mandated that the SECDEF write
a NDS every four years. Although a classified document, an unclassified summary
provides the essence of the strategy.

Figure 1-2: National Defense Strategy Strategic Approach

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 b. Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) (classified document) – This document is
focused on force development. It provides direction to the Services on what capabilities
to prioritize, guidance to the CCMDs on which Services will “own” which bases within
their AOR, and guidance to the planning community on resource prioritization (e.g.
budget, personnel, etc.). This document informs the GFMIG, GFMAP, TPPs, and TDPs.

c. National Military Strategy (NMS) (classified document) - The NMS, derived

from the NSS and NDS, prioritizes and focuses the efforts of the
Armed Forces of the United States while conveying the CJCS’s
direction with regard to the OE and the necessary military
actions to protect national security interests. The NMS defines
the national military objectives (ends), how to accomplish these
objectives (ways), and addresses the military capabilities
required to execute the strategy (means). The NMS provides focus
for military activities by defining a set of interrelated
military objectives and joint operating concepts from which the
Service Chiefs and CCDRs identify desired capabilities and
against which the CJCS assesses risk. (JP 5-0, p. II-6)

Figure 1-3: National Military Strategy Framework

The 2018 NMS (Figure 1-3), consistent with the Joint Strategic Planning System
(page 12), is the way CJCS executes the NDS. It describes new trends in the strategic
environment, including: the return of great power competition with others having global
reach, the homeland no longer being a sanctuary, and every domain (land, air, sea,

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space, cyberspace) being contested by capable potential adversaries are the most
important. The NMS calls for increased joint capabilities, integrated globally, and
capable across all domains.

The document directs the joint force to be capable across five mission areas:
 Respond to threats
 Deter strategic attack (and proliferation of WMD)
 Deter conventional attack
 Assure allies and partners
 Compete below the level of armed conflict (with a military dimension)

The Joint Force will be employed using a concept of Dynamic Force Employment
(DFE) which is intended to create and maintain a sufficient readiness level across the
joint force for contingency operations including large scale combat, while providing the
required day-to-day operations, activities, and investments necessary to shape the
strategic environment. The NMS highlights the key role of allies and partners in
contributing to world-wide common goals. Another facet of force employment is the
exercise program that serves to sharpen U.S. joint and multinational force capability and
capacities across all domains.

Force development and force design are directed by the Capstone Concept for Joint
Operations (CCJO). This is the overarching framework that will ultimately drive the
required investment in material and personnel to achieve and maintain competitive
military advantage over time across the globe and across all domains.

d. Force Employment. A key element of the NDS is the resourcing that will provide
for “lethal, agile, and resilient force posture and employment.” The NDS posits a Global
Operating Model philosophy that directs a Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) concept.
The CJCS executes DFE via a Force Management Framework that will use the Global
Force Management process.

The Global Operating Model broadly describes the types of forces that will execute
the day-to-day operations and activities around the globe and surge forward in crisis to
control escalation or fight and win. At any particular time the armed forces will sit in one
of four layers. Contact forces will compete below the level of armed conflict. Blunt forces
will delay, degrade, and deny adversary aggression. Surge forces will deploy into
theater to manage conflict escalation and win in the case of open hostilities. Homeland
forces ensure the territorial integrity of the United States and the safety of the American
people. DFE balances the requirement for an actively employed joint force that operates
around the world with the necessity for a credible and capable surge capability. This is
“top down” driven by national leadership rather than “bottom up” where combatant
commanders’ perceived needs had the effect of reducing overall force readiness to
unacceptable levels. The Global Force Management process will be discussed below.

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 Figure 1-4: Global Force Management

(1) Global Force Management (GFM) is the process the SECDEF (advised by
the CJCS) uses to identify service specific forces and establishes how they flow to
combatant commanders for employment. The GFM process allows SecDef to
strategically manage US Armed Forces to accomplish priority
missions assigned to the CCDRs, enabling the DOD to meet the
intent of the strategic guidance contained in the [NDS], NMS,
UCP, CPG, and Defense Planning Guidance. This is accomplished
via three related processes: assignment, allocation, and
apportionment. The assignment and allocation processes allow
SecDef to distribute forces to the CCDRs in a resource-informed
manner while assessing the risks to current operations and
missions; potential future contingencies; and the health,
readiness, and availability of the current and future force. (JP
5-0, p. E-1)

Within the GFM process:

• SecDef assigns forces to CCDRs to meet UCP missions and other

responsibilities.
• SecDef allocates forces to CCDRs to meet current operational requirements.
• CJCS apportions forces to CCDRs for planning.

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 Figure 1-5: Assignment, Apportionment, and Allocation

(a) Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) (classified

document) - The GFMIG provides SECDEF’s direction for global force
management (GFM) to manage forces from a global perspective. It
provides the specific direction for force assignment,
apportionment, and allocation processes enabling SECDEF to make
risk informed decisions regarding the distribution of US Armed
Forces among the CCDRs. The CPG; GFMIG; and CJCSM 3130.06,
Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures,
guide the GFM allocation process in support of CCMD force
requirements. The assignment tables in the GFMIG and Forces for
Unified Commands Memorandum serve as the record of force
assignments. (JP 5-0, p. II-5)

(b) Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) (classified document)

- SecDef’s decision to allocate forces is ordered in the Global
Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP). (JP 5-0, p. II-8). The
GFMAP is a global [deployment Order] (DEPORD) for all allocated
forces. [Force Providers] deploy or prepare forces to deploy on
a specified timeframe as directed in the GFMAP.
Note 1 – For more on GFM, see JP 5-0, Appendix E (Global Force Management)

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 e. The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) – The 2017 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) directed the CJCS to perform six statutory functions:

 Providing strategic direction of the Armed Forces

 Conducting Strategic and Contingency Planning
 Assessing Comprehensive Joint Readiness
 Managing Joint Force Development
 Fostering Joint capability Development
 Advising on global military integration

As stated in the CJCSI 3100.01D, the JSPS is the primary method by

which the Chairman fulfills his Title 10, U.S.C.
responsibilities, maintains a global perspective, and provides
military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President.
(See Figure 1-6)

Figure 1-6: The Joint Strategic Planning System

The enclosures to the JSPS align the process to the six functions. The strategic
direction function is largely accomplished by the National Military Strategy described
above. The force employment part of global military integration is also described above.
The strategic and contingency planning function is described below.

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 (1) Strategic and Contingency Planning:

(a) Global Integrator – The CJCS is tasked by Title 10,

Section 153, of US Code with preparing and reviewing strategic
campaign and contingency plans. The Chairman is responsible for
operationalizing the national strategies and other policy
guidance, aligning the actions of the Joint Force, balancing
risk, assigning problems, and providing military advice to the
SECDEF for adjudicating competing priorities. The CJCS
determines which sets of global challenges require Global
Campaign Plans (GCPs) that look across geographic and functional
seams. (CJCSI 3100.01D, Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)).

(b) Global Campaign Plans (GCPs) (classified documents) –

GCPs globally integrate the activities of the Joint Force to
campaign against the priority challenges. GCPs contain linkages
to key contingency plans, identify responsibilities, define
objectives, and assign tasks. The CCDR with the preponderance of
responsibility for a GCP generally serves as the coordinating
Authority (CA). (CJCSI 3100.01D, JSPS.)

(c) Globally Integrated Base Plan (GIBP) (classified

documents) - A GIBP recommends adjustments to the day-to-day
priorities for all CCMDs in the event of a crisis or
contingency. GIBPs are developed from the Global Readiness
Review of the state-based priority challenges and make
recommendations on the reassignment or reallocation of
capabilities to the conflict. The GIBP also identifies
presidential or Secretary-level decisions for execution of the
plan. These decisions include activation of the plan,
reallocation of strategic assets, and retrograde options for
capabilities no longer essential to the conflict response.
(CJCSI 3141.01F, Management and Review of Campaign and
Contingency Plans.)

(d) Coordinating Authority (CA) – To integrate CCMD

planning and day-to-day campaigning, the CJCS, in the role of
Global Integrator, assigns a CA. A CA performs the key functions
of planning, assessing, and recommending and will establish
collaborative forums to develop integrated plans. A CA is
generally a CCDR with the preponderance of responsibility
aligned to a problems set and does not receive additional
command authority beyond that already assigned in the UCP or
other foundational documents. A CA does not have authority to
compel agreement or direct resource allocation between combatant
commands or Services. (CJCSI 3100.01D, JSPS) See Figure 1-7.

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 Figure 1-7: Coordinating Authority

(e) Cross-Functional Teams - Global integration requires

information from across functions, domains, regions, and
processes. To assist in the execution of the NMS and JSCP, the
Chairman employs cross-functional teams (CFTs) to facilitate
shared understanding and support the development of military
advice. CFTs consist of Joint Staff functional and regional
experts as well as representatives from Combatant Commands, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and other U.S.
government departments and agencies. CFTs support globally
integrated planning by contributing to NMS annexes on priority
challenges and by maintaining the GCPs (in coordination with
Combatant Commands). During a crisis or contingency, the CFTs
may assist in developing a shared understanding of the strategic
environment. (CJCSI 3100.01D, Joint Strategic Planning System)

(f) Collaborator – A Joint Force organization assigned

formally in the JSCP to support integrated planning for a GCP.
The collaborator works with the CA to develop and assess the
viability of globally integrated plans. A Collaborator is also
responsible for providing Support Plans to the CA. (CJCSI
3100.01D, Joint Strategic Planning System)

e. Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) (classified document) - The JSCP is

the primary document in which the CJCS carries out his statutory
responsibility for providing unified strategic direction to the
Armed Forces. The JSCP provides military strategic and
operational guidance to CCDRs, Service Chiefs, CSAs, and

14
applicable DOD agencies for preparation of plans based on
current military capabilities. The JSCP operationalizes the NMS
and nests with the strategic direction delineated by the NSS,
NDS, and the DOD’s planning and resourcing guidance provided in
the CPG. The JSCP also provides integrated planning guidance and
direction for planners. (JP 5-0, p. II-7)

The JSCP is a five-year global strategic plan (reviewed

every two years). The JSCP establishes a common set of
processes, products, priorities, roles and responsibilities to
integrate the Joint Force’s global operations, activities, and
investments from day-to-day campaigning to contingencies. It
directs campaign, contingency, and support plans. The JSCP
provides the Global Campaign Plans (GCPs) and directs Regional
Campaign Plans (RCPs), Functional Campaign Plans (FCPs), and
Combatant Command Campaign Plans (CCPs). (CJCSI 3100.01D, Joint
Strategic Planning System)

Figure 1-8: Joint Strategic Campaign Plan

f. Global Defense Posture - A key consideration of GCP and plan

reviews is global defense posture. Foreign posture is the
fundamental enabler of Joint Force activities. GCPs foster an
integrated approach to requirements, trade-offs, and risk across
three interdependent posture elements: forces, footprints, and

15
agreements. The Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy, J-5,
is the lead directorate for posture issues. In that role, the
directorate coordinates closely with the J-3, J-4, and J-8 on
global defense posture issues, such as force management and
prepositioned equipment, and introduces posture recommendations
to the Department of Defense’s senior body overseeing global
defense posture, the Global Posture Executive Council. The
primary Joint Staff forum for reviewing posture issues and
recommendations is the Operations Deputies Tank. As required,
posture issues and recommendations are elevated for
consideration in a Joint Chiefs of Staff Tank. (CJCSI 3100.01D,
Joint Strategic Planning System)

4. Theater Level Documents.

The JSCP provides Global Campaign Plans (GCPs), Globally Integrated Base Plan
(GIBP), and directs three other types of campaign plans:
a. Regional Campaign Plans (RCPs)
b. Functional Campaign Plans (FCPs)
c. Combatant Command Campaign Plans (CCPs)

a. Regional Campaign Plans (RCPs) (classified document) – RCPs are plans

written for regional challenges that do not rise to the interest/threat level of GCPs. RCPs
are assigned to a Coordinating Authority (CA) and employ Collaborators to deal with
cross-AOR elements of the challenge and/or solution.

b. Functional Campaign Plans (FCPs) (classified document) - FCPs are plans

written for global challenges that do not rise to the interest/threat level of GCPs, and
deal primarily with a function instead of a region. FCPs are also assigned to a
Coordinating Authority (CA) and employ Collaborators to deal with cross-AOR elements
of the challenge or solution. Cyber might be one area where an FCP would be
produced.

c. Combatant Command Campaign Plan (CCP) (legacy TCP/FCP) (classified

document) - The JSCP expands the role of the [legacy] theater/function campaign plan
(TCP/FCP) from a regional or functional strategy to integrating globally focused
requirements by reformatting the TCP/FCP into a CCMD campaign plan. It becomes the
method of execution for all assigned tasks in problem-focused plans (GCP, FCP, and
RCP) to provide a comprehensive plan that fully integrates Operations, Activities and
Investments (OAIs) spanning the command’s assigned responsibilities. CCMD
campaign plans are the centerpiece of the CCMDs’ planning construct, and executes
JSCP direction and CCMD strategies. CCMD campaign plans align the
command’s day-to-day activities (which include ongoing
operations, military engagement, security cooperation,
deterrence, and other shaping or preventive activities) with

16
resources to achieve the CCMD’s objectives. A CCP has a five
year planning horizon. (From JP 5-0, p. II-4)

Figure 1-9: Combatant Command Planning

d. Integrated Contingency Plans (ICP) (classified document) - The JSCP

directs contingency planning consistent with the CPG. It expands
on the CPG with specific objectives, tasks and linkages between
campaign and contingency plans (CJCSI 3100.01D, Joint Strategic
Planning System). Individual contingency plans (numbered plans
developed as branches to campaign plans that are planned for
potential threats, catastrophic events, and contingent
missions). Note - See Chapter 5 of this document for more details on problem sets
that are grouped together into an Integrated Contingency Plan (ICP). ICPs are directly
related to GCPs, RCPs, and FCPs. When threats emerge, crises occur, or escalation
warrants, a GCP, RCP, or FCP will transition into a contingency plan for execution.

e. CCMD (Theater or Functional) Strategy - A strategy is a broad

statement of the commander’s long-term vision. It is the bridge
between national strategic guidance and the joint planning
required to achieve national and command objectives and attain
end states. Specifically, it links CCMD activities, operations,

17
and resources to USG policy and strategic guidance. A strategy
should describe the ends as directed in strategic guidance and
the ways and means to attain them. A strategy should begin with
the strategic estimate. Although there is no prescribed format
for a strategy, it may include the commander’s vision, mission,
challenges, trends, assumptions, objectives, and resources.
CCDRs employ strategies to align and focus efforts and resources
to mitigate and prepare for conflict and contingencies, and
support and advance US interests. To support this, strategies
normally emphasize security cooperation activities, force
posture, and preparation for contingencies. Strategies typically
employ military engagement, close cooperation with DOS,
embassies, and other USG departments and agencies. A strategy
should be informed by the means or resources available to
support the attainment of designated end states and may include
military resources, programs, policies, and available funding.
CCDRs publish strategies to provide guidance to subordinates and
supporting commands/agencies and improve coordination with other
USG departments and agencies and regional partners. A CCDR
operationalizes a strategy through a campaign plan. (JP 5-0,
p. II-9)

Combatant commanders develop theater/functional strategies. Unlike their CCMD

campaign plans, these strategies are not tasked by national leadership. Rather, they are
descriptions of theater or function area challenges and opportunities with aspirational
descriptions of how the combatant command intends to respond. CCMD strategies are
a valuable tool for the CCDR to provide vision, purpose, and priorities to a wide
audience. These strategies can be classified or unclassified. If classified, an
unclassified version is desirable as a strategic communication vehicle. See Chapter 5 of
this document for more details.

5. CCDR Dialogue with National Leaders (Military Options, COAs, and Planning).

a. A major responsibility of the CCDR is to assist the CJCS in advising the President
and SecDef on the use of military power to achieve national objectives. Civilian leaders
often ask for military options to help them visualize “the art of the possible” during the
development of policy objectives, and CCDRs often discuss military options to help map
out the policy boundaries that inform planning. These dialogues play out along a
spectrum from the conceptual to the detailed. Civilian and military actors use various
terms to describe similar types of advice, and terms are often used dissimilarly by
different actors. The United States Army War College attempts to align its lexicon with
concepts found in JP 5-0, such that:
 Conceptual discussions most often lead to “Military Options,” while
detailed discussions most often lead to “Courses of Action (COAs).”
(Figure 1-10)
 “Options” often produce multiple potential mission statements, while
COAs all develop from one mission statement.

18
 Figure 1-10: Options and COAs

Flexible Deterrent Options and Flexible Response Options (as defined by joint doctrine)
are subordinate to, or equal to, COAs for the reasons articulated below.

The phrase “military options” first appeared in doctrine in the 16 June 2017 edition of
Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning. Although the phrase is not explicitly defined, it is
explained on page I-1 as follows. “Joint planning identifies military
options the President can integrate with other instruments of
military power (diplomatic, economic, informational) to achieve
those national objectives.” Two sentences later the publication indicates that
the minimum essential elements of a military option are objectives and military end
states.

To provide the proper political context, it is reasonable to add the policy goals (or
outcomes) that the military options would achieve. In addition, stating termination
criteria implies more than just the military end state desired, and leads to wider political,
societal, regional, or developmental conditions. Importantly, a complete military option is
a product of essential dialogue between policy makers, military commanders, and the
political leadership. The creators of military options can validate policy goal assumptions
and political leaders can communicate expectations of military actions or activities.

19
 Figure 1-11: Elements of Military Options

The most common tension between civilian and military leaders is in the risks
associated with Adequacy (focused on ends), Acceptability (focused on ways), and
Feasibility (focused on means). Low fidelity options/COAs make for quicker and more
robust civ-mil discussions, but may equate to higher risk to force and policy/mission.
Higher fidelity options/COAs lower the risk in some areas, but increase the risk that
proposed solutions are too late and retard the civ-mil dialogue. Strategic planners must
quickly determine where best to place risk in order to ensure robust, but effective,
dialogue between the CCDR and civilian leaders during strategy development and
planning development.

The plans-centric construct for developing options is appealing to military leaders

operating within their familiar decision-making process, with efforts to ensure their
options/COAs pass the FAA-DC (Feasible, Acceptable, Adequate, Distinguishable, and
Complete) test. However, this is often not helpful for civilian leaders who are unfamiliar
with the military process and who use a different model for making decisions. Civilian
leaders are often frustrated by military options that they view as overly difficult or time
consuming, that inadequately address their broader political considerations, or that are
merely variations of a single concept that do not offer a real choice.

20
 Although not prescribed in joint doctrine, military planners should anticipate that
political leaders want to discuss military options early in the decision-making process
before they issue clear policy and planning guidance and before planners have been
able to conduct detailed FAA-DC analysis. This turns out to be like answering the
question “which came first, the chicken or the egg?” Determining “which comes first,
policy or options?” can lead to friction and miscommunication between civilian and
military leaders. Strategic planners must be able to describe a range of possible actions
and outcomes before policy makers have committed to the objective they seek. (See
Figure 1-12)

Figure 1-12: Planning in the Strategic Arena

Most importantly, the friction between civilian and military leaders can be reduced by
adjusting the military’s development of options to better accommodate civilian
expectations. Every civ-mil dialogue is unique and is shaped by the participants’ past
experiences and engrained heuristics and by the context of the particular national
security issue at hand. Strategic planners must develop an appreciation for these
realities and provide military options which can meet civilian policy-makers’ unique
requirements. Developing military options to address national security requirements is
the ultimate expression of military judgment and therefore no process, procedure, or
template is guaranteed to be successful in every context.

The purpose of initial military options is to inform policy decision-making by

increasing civilian leaders' understanding about which objectives the military could
enable. On a continuum of actions from “do nothing” on one end, to “do everything” on

21
the other, civilian leaders might start with a general idea of what policy responses they
are comfortable with. Conversely, they may initially approach a problem with a range of
possible objectives to pursue. Ultimately, the best approach should be informed by an
understanding of the objectives each instrument of national power can enable.
Therefore, military options should initially include a range of military activity that
supports a broad range of potential policy objectives that provide civilian leaders
understanding of where there is alignment between acceptable objectives and those the
military can enable at acceptable risk.

The task for military leaders is to explain the complexity of the military instrument in a
manner such that civilian leaders can be comfortable with their decision to use it. An
iterative dialogue allows civilians to achieve a working knowledge of how a military
operation will unfold, on what timeline, with which forces, and the associated level and
nature of risk. This level of understanding is facilitated by helping civilian leaders
understand the logic behind the military’s theory of victory, or how each option’s
outcome is viewed as a success by the military in light of the problem each option
addresses. Although civilians may not agree with the logic, they will ideally understand
the military perspective which will allow them to make informed decisions about the
utility of the military instrument.

The multitude of military options desired by civilian leaders cannot be provided on

the timeline they desire if those options are developed within the current framework of
military planning and traditional requirement for detailed feasibility. Adapting and
planning are intrinsically at odds; planning seeks to constrain the future within a desired
path while adaptability seeks the best path as the future unfolds. Binding detail, though
desired for feasibility, is the graveyard of adaptability.

Options should rely less on a staff-centric, excessively detailed decision-making

process and more on a conceptual design methodology fueled by senior military
leaders’ operational art and experience. Military options provided to civilian decision
makers during policy development should be similar to the conceptual operational
approach produced by the design methodology than the detailed COAs produced by in-
depth joint planning and analysis.

Senior military leaders must communicate options in a format and language that is
easily understood by civilian leaders and policy makers. Though there is no standard
format for an option, each one should contain the following elements:
 Scenario and assumptions upon which the option is based
 Desired outcomes and associated policy aims
 A description of the concept with emphasis on the use of military actions in
the context of the use of other instruments of power
 A general description of the resources required
 A general timeline for how the option would play out
 An explanation of the causal logic that links the recommended actions to
the desired outcomes
 The strategic and operational risks entailed in this option

22
 b. Example.

Problem: Hurricane Ellis is bearing down on Haiti.

Strategic Options: 1) Do nothing, 2) Prevent catastrophe, 3) Mitigate consequences

and assist recovery, 4) Prevent catastrophe and rebuild the country.

Military Options:

 Option 1 - Do Nothing
o Assumptions – Do nothing does not equal abandon U.S. Military
personnel, Does equal Non-Mil AMCITs are on their own, U.S. will
not support International efforts
o End states – no U.S. end states (other than protect U.S. military)
o Ways available:
 Pull all U.S. military forces from the area (3 days to finish)
 COA 1 – Airlift focus
 COA 2 – Sea-based focus
 COA 3 – Use commercial transport
o Ties into Whole-of-Government Plan – prepared to support
evacuating DOS personnel if necessary.
o Risks - AMCIT casualties. International response forces respond
late and we are caught on our heels.

 Option 2 - Prevent Catastrophe

o Assumptions – Haitian government can handle many of the
expected challenges. Policy focus is to prevent catastrophe vice
mitigate disaster.
o End states – Haitian government fully capable of protecting critical
infrastructure and lives.
o Ways available:
 Shoring up critical infrastructure
 COA 1 - Send an engineer organization to support
(low end – takes 48 hours)
 COA 2 – Contract LOGCAP from local bases (TBD
timeline)
 Guide local leaders, shore up infrastructure, and assist in
recovery with a CA and Eng focused Org (high end – IOC in
24 hours, FOC in 1 week)
 COA 1 – Engage early & heavily by deploying a JTF
 COA 2 – Engage slowly. VTC w/ leaders from
USACE, contract infrastructure prep work and send in
CA Army Unit from ARFORSOUTH after event
o Ties into WOG Plan – U.S. Mil is in support of USAID DART.

23
 o Risks – Small risk to force. Expectation that U.S. will “save” Haiti
forces mission creep later. If Haitian government fails, the response
force would enable follow on forces, but would have to transition to
consequence management vice prevention.

 Option 3 - Mitigate consequences and assist recovery. Since Haiti is

extremely fragile, due to repeated hurricanes over the past few years, we
assume it is ripe for significant damage from Hurricane Ellis. We could
also assume that they will not want help up front due to national pride and
a poor understanding, by senior Haitian leadership, of how vulnerable they
truly are. If we believe those assumptions, then we may want to aim for
post-event support – which has been our traditional response in the past.
A quick response could mitigate consequences (save lives and reduce
suffering) and assist a quicker, more robust recovery. We could do this by
our traditional naval/air focused response packages (ESGs, CSGs, C-5/C-
17 flow, etc.) in support of USAID or, if we act fast enough, we could pre-
stage ground assets via commercial and MPF ships in a temporary ground
base. The ground staging idea risks damage to force, but can respond
quicker (as soon as the winds die down). The ship/aviation focused
choices respond slower but have lower risk to force…and we know how to
do it. We, DOD, will support USAID’s DARTs no matter what we decide
and we recommend clearance to start planning with them now in order to
ensure feasibility and acceptability of our potential COAs. We think we
need to act within the next 48 hours to flow a viable ground force package.
The ship/air flow decision can wait for 96 hours (or more). If you chose
Option 3 and the ground force, we may have to come back to you and
discuss a reinforcing navy/air element (after the hurricane) depending on
how much we can flow before the hurricane hits.

 Option 4….

6. Flexible Deterrent Options & Flexible Response Options – FDOs and FROs are
the hybrid of the OptionCOA discussion. FDOs and FROs are pre-planned actions
and thus fall at the detailed end of the planning spectrum; however, they are designed
to provide adaptable responses to the President during a crisis. For more information on
FROs and FDOs, see JP 5-0, Appendix F.

FDO – [Flexible Deterrence Options are] preplanned, deterrence-oriented

actions tailored to signal to and influence an adversary’s
actions. They are established to deter actions before or during
a crisis. If necessary, FDOs may be used to prepare for future
operations, recognizing they may well create a deterrent effect.
FDOs are developed for each instrument of national
power―diplomatic, informational, military, and economic―but they
are most effective when combined across the instruments of
national power. FDOs facilitate early strategic decision making,

24
rapid de-escalation, and crisis resolution by laying out a wide
range of interrelated response paths. (JP 5-0, p. F-1)

FRO - [Flexible Response Options are] an operational- to strategic-

level concept of operation that is easily scalable, provides
military options, and facilitates rapid decision making by
national leaders in response to heightened threats or attacks
against the US homeland or US interests. They are usually used
for response to terrorist actions or threats…. FROs are
operations that are first and foremost designed to preempt enemy
attacks, but also provide DOD the necessary planning framework
to fast-track requisite authorities and approvals necessary to
address dynamic and evolving threats. (JP 5-0, p. F-5)

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26
 CHAPTER 2: JOINT PLANNING
1. Joint Planning in an Integrated Context. Integrated planning is used by the Joint
Force to address complex strategic challenges that span multiple geographic CCMD
AORs and functional CCMD responsibilities. Integrated planning synchronizes
resources and integrates timelines, decision matrices, and authorities across CCMDs,
the rest of the interagency, and multinational partners to achieve directed strategic
objectives. (JP 5-0, p. I-6)

Figure 2-1: Integrated Planning

The integrated context (see Figure 2-1) includes all of the relevant actors in the national
security environment (including, but not limited to, the ones below). Unified Action
synchronizes, coordinates, and integrates joint, single-Service, and multinational
operations with the operations of other USG departments and agencies,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) (e.g.,
the United Nations), and the private sector to achieve unity of effort. Each layer of
planning has a somewhat distinctive title to enable planners to understand which layer
of planning they are working in.
 The joint community [JOINT PLANNING]
 Whole of Government [OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES]

27
  Multinational partners [COALITION, ALLIED, or MULTI-NATIONAL]
 International Organizations (e.g. the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, the Organization of American States) [NATO Planning, or UN Planning,
etc. – planning and operations usually assumes the name of the organization leading
the effort.]
 Non-Governmental Organizations (e.g. Oxfam, Médicins Sans Frontières
[Doctors without Borders], the Afghan Women’s Network) [No specific title exists]
 Relevant non-state actors (e.g. financial institutions, shadow governments,
multinational corporations, terrorist organizations, empowered academics and
consultants) [No specific title exists]

Complicating the planning endeavor is the fact that different actors have different
outcomes, different timelines, different processes, and different decision structures.
Some examples are:
 DOS may have different priorities in Nation X that affect the ways and means
DOD may use to accomplish tasks in adjacent Nation Y.
 A classified DOD plan may not be shared with other U.S. governmental
organizations until late in planning.
 A coalition nation may be unable to discuss a sensitive topic until its elections
are complete.
 Nation 1 may not want Nation 2 to know that it is participating in some
activities and operations. This would warrant bilateral planning that is synchronized
outside the normal coalition planning channels.
 NGO A may wish to synchronize with some elements of the plan, but not wish
to know about other elements of the plan.

2. Multi-National Planning. As it is unlikely that the United States will operate alone in
future conflicts, comprehensive planning must be conducted with a multinational
perspective, rather than as an add-on to U.S. planning. U.S. forces may operate as part
of a coalition or an alliance, work through unity of effort between nations of similar aim,
or work toward an end state that supports U.S. partner nations’ objectives as well as
U.S. national objectives. Commanders and staffs must consider interests, equities,
contributions, and limitations posed by the multinational environment. Some
considerations for planners and operators during multinational operations:
 National objectives of the various partners
 Building and maintaining a multinational force
 Differences in language, culture, and national sovereignty
 Legal considerations by the participants (international law and law of war)
 Doctrine, training, and resources
 Differences in force protection and rules of engagement (ROE)
 Limits to sharing intelligence and information
 Communications and spectrum management
 Logistics and host nation support
 Differing standards for health service support
 Nuanced perspectives on media relations

28
3. Unified Action - Whereas the term joint operation focuses on the
integrated actions of the Armed Forces of the United States, the
term unified action has a broader connotation. Unified action
refers to the synchronization, coordination, and integration of
the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities to
achieve unity of effort. (JP 3-0, p. I-8)

To prevent internal conflicts and assist with Unified Action, DOS, USAID, and DOD (as
the three foundational pillars for promoting and protecting U.S. interests abroad) have
established “Diplomacy, Development, and Defense (3D) Planning.” 3D Planning is an
ongoing initiative to build understanding and synchronize plans to improve collaboration,
coordination, and unity of effort among these organizations.

Generally, interagency dialogue and coordination occurs through

the IPR process and the Promote Cooperation process, led by
OUSD(P) and Joint Staff J-5 [Strategic Plans and Policy], with
SecDef receiving an update on the scope, scale, and substance of
planning exchanges with civilian and multinational counterparts.
The Promote Cooperation process specifically focuses on
interagency partner input and socialization of DOD plan
development. This cooperation provides valuable opportunities
for the command to coordinate on key issues such as overflight
rights and access agreements. Coordination with NGOs should
normally be done through the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) senior development advisor
assigned to each geographic CCMD or through the lead federal
agency for contingencies in the U.S. (JP 5-0, p. I-16 Underlined
added) Note: For more information on Promote Cooperation events, see CJCSM
3130.01, Campaign Planning Procedures and Responsibilities.

4. Joint Planning - Joint planning is the deliberate process of

determining how (the ways) to use military capabilities (the
means) in time and space to achieve objectives (the ends) while
considering the associated risks. Ideally, planning begins with
specified national strategic objectives and military end states
to provide a unifying purpose around which actions and resources
are focused. The joint planning and execution community (JPEC)
conducts joint planning to understand the strategic and
operational environment (OE) and determines the best method for
employing the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) existing
capabilities to achieve national objectives. (JP 5-0 p. I-1,
(emphasis added via underlining))

At the CCMD level, joint planning serves two critical purposes.

a. At the strategic level, joint planning provides the

President and SECDEF options, based on military advice, on use

29
of the military in addressing national interests and achieving
the objectives in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and
[National Defense Strategy].

b. At the operational level, once strategic guidance is given,

planning translates this guidance into specific activities aimed
at achieving strategic and operational-level objectives and
attaining the military end state. This level of planning ties
the training, mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment,
redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces to the
achievement of military objectives that contribute to the
achievement of national security objectives in the service of
enduring national interests. (JP 5-0, p. I-1, with correction
[DSR to NDS], and emphasis added via underlining)

5. Management and Review of Plans. Strategy and joint planning occur

within the department-level enterprise of policies, processes,
procedures, and reporting structures supported by communications
and information technology used by the joint planning and
execution community (JPEC) to plan and execute joint operations.
This process focuses on the interaction between senior DOD
civilian leadership, CCDRs, and CJCS, which helps the President
and SecDef decide when, where, and how to employ US military
forces and resources. (JP 5-0, p. xiii). The Adaptive Planning and
Execution (APEX) process has been superseded by the Management and Review of
Campaign and Contingency Plans (CJCSI 3141.01F), which provides a dynamic,
ongoing dialogue on plans.

a. JPEC. SECDEF, with the advice and assistance of the CJCS,

organizes the JPEC [See stakeholders in Figure 2-2] for joint
planning by establishing appropriate command relationships among
the CCDRs and by establishing appropriate support relationships
between the CCDRs and the CSAs for that portion of their
missions involving support for operating forces. A supported
commander is identified for specific planning tasks, and other
JPEC stakeholders are designated as appropriate. This process
provides for increased unity of command in the planning and
execution of joint operations and facilitates unity of effort
within the JPEC. (JP 5-0, p. II-11) See Figure 2-2.

30
 Figure 2-2: Joint Planning and Execution Community
(Figure II-3 in JP 5-0)

b. This process is intended to coordinate integrated, flexible plans with fully

integrated databases to enable rapid build of executable joint plans. This flexible
planning system is intended to facilitate the adaptive planning principles:
 Clear strategic guidance and iterative dialogue
 Early interagency and coalition coordination and planning
 Integrated intelligence planning
 Embedded options
 “Living” plans
 Parallel planning in a network-centric, collaborative environment

This process encompasses four operational activities, four

planning functions, seven execution functions, and a number of
related products. (JP 5-0, p. II-13). (See Figure 2-3)

31
 Figure 2-3: Joint Planning Activities, Functions and Products
(Figure II-4 in JP 5-0)

6. Strategic and Contingency Planning. The JSCP directs the number and types of
documents that CCDRs produce as they turn strategic challenges into actionable
operations and activities. The Joint Strategic Planning System provides the planning
construct to bring a global perspective to threats that were previously stove-piped within
Combat Command structures.

JSCP directed strategic and contingency planning consists of all planning efforts,
relationships, authorities, roles, and responsibilities designed to integrate the planning
of problem sets requiring coordinated action by CCMDs, CSAs, Services, other
government agencies, and foreign partners. This planning seeks to increase
collaboration across the whole of government and increase unity of effort to address
transregional, all-domain, and multi-functional (TRAM) national security problems within
available resources.

32
The Strategic and Contingency Planning construct organizes planning as follows:
 Global Campaign Plans (GCPs) and Globally Integrated Base Plans (GIBP)
 Regional Campaign Plans (RCPs)
 Functional Campaign Plans (FCPs)
 CCMD Campaign plans (CCPs) (legacy Theater Campaign Plans)
 Contingency Plans (CPs)
 Integrated Contingency Plans (ICPs) when related CPs are grouped together
for execution and resourcing.
[See Figure 2-4. These are explained in detail in Chapter 1.]

Figure 2-4: Strategic and Contingency Planning

a. The CJCS is tasked by Title 10, Section 153, of US Code with preparing and
reviewing strategic campaign and contingency plans. The Chairman is responsible for
operationalizing the national strategies and other policy guidance, aligning the actions of
the Joint Force, balancing risk, assigning problems, and providing military advice to the
SecDef for adjudicating competing priorities.

b. Coordinating Authority (CA) – In order to integrate CCMD planning and day-to-day

campaigning, the CJCS, in the role of Global Integrator, assigns a Coordinating
Authority to develop integrated plans. (See Chapter 1 for more on the CA.)

33
 c. Cross-Functional Teams – A cross-functional team (CFT), comprised of members
of the Joint Staff, develops guidance for the Global Integrator and supports globally
integrated planning. (See Chapter 1 for more on CFTs.)

d. Collaborator – A Joint Force organization assigned by the CJCS (via the JSCP) to
support integrated planning for a problem. (See Chapter 1 for more on collaborators.)

The CJCS will assign GCPs, RCPs, and FCPs to Coordinating Authorities. Those
CAs will work with collaborators to develop campaign plans (written and updated by the
CA) and supporting plans (written by collaborators).

Combatant Commands will reformat their legacy TCPs/FCPs to integrate relevant

elements of the GCP/RCPs/FCPs and their own CSPs. These “CCMD Campaign Plans”
will serve as 5-year focused plans that support day-to-day operations, actions, and
activities.

Cross-Functional Teams will monitor problem sets and work with the CJCS to
recommend guidance, advise senior leaders, and organize IMOs, tasks and
assessments across problem sets. The relationship between CFTs and CCMDs has yet
to be determined beyond “support.”

7. Conceptual to Detailed Planning. Joint Planning integrates four functions and two
interconnected processes. The first process is oriented toward the conceptual and
artistic side of ‘planning’ and is titled “Operational Design.” Its counterpart is oriented
more towards the detailed and scientific sides of planning and is titled the “Joint
Planning Process.” Both processes support Strategic Guidance, Concept Development,
Plan Development, Plan Assessment – the difference is in the degree to which each is
used. While listed as two distinct processes, they are better described as sides of a
continuum from conceptual to detailed planning. (See Figure 2-5 and 2-6)

Figure 2-5: Joint Design and Planning (Conceptual-Detailed)

34
Planning has a conceptual component and a detailed component.
Conceptual planning involves understanding operational
environments and problems, determining the operation’s end
state, and visualizing an operational approach to attain that
end state. Conceptual planning corresponds to the art of command
and is the focus of the commander with staff support. Detailed
planning translates the commander’s operational approach into a
complete and practical plan. Generally, detailed planning is
associated with the science of control including synchronizing
forces in time, space, and purpose to accomplish missions.
Detailed planning works out the scheduling, coordination, or
technical problems involved with moving, sustaining, and
synchronizing the actions of the force toward the desired end
state. (ATP 5-0.1)

Figure 2-6: Joint Planning Process and Operational Design

a. Strategic art is the ability to understand the strategic

variable (relative to the operational area [OA]) and to
conceptualize how the desired objectives set forth in strategic-
level guidance can be reached through the employment of military
capabilities. … The ability to visualize and conceptualize how
strategic-level success can be achieved or supported by military
means is a key foundation for the application of operational art
and operational design. (JP 5-0, p. I-5)

b. Operational art is the application of intuition and creative

imagination by commanders and staffs. Supported by their skill,
knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment, commanders seek

35
to understand the OE, visualize and describe the desired end
state, and employ assigned resources to achieve objectives. (JP
5-0, p. I-5)

c. Operational design is the conception and construction of the

framework that underpins a campaign or operation and its
subsequent execution. The framework is built upon an iterative
process that creates a shared understanding of the OE;
identifies and frames problems within that OE; and develops
approaches, through the application of operational art, to
resolving those problems, consistent with strategic guidance
and/or policy. The operational approach, a primary product of
operational design, allows the commander to continue JPP,
translating broad strategic and operational concepts into
specific missions and tasks to produce an executable plan.
(JP 5-0, p. IV-1)

d. Operational planning translates the commander’s concepts into

executable activities, operations, and campaigns, within
resource, policy, and national limitations to achieve
objectives. (JP 5-0, p. I-5 and 6)

(1) Vision. The CCDR develops a long-range vision that is

consistent with the national strategy and US policy and policy
objectives. The vision is usually not constrained by time or
resources, but is bounded by national policy. (JP 5-0, p. III-1)

 Fed by: All Strategic Guidance documents, other Strategic Direction from
HHQ, the CCDR’s strategic estimate of his theater, problems, and
opportunities.
 Feeds: CCMD Strategy

(2) Strategy. Strategy is a broad statement of the CCDR’s long-

term vision guided by and prepared in the context of SecDef’s
priorities and within projected resources. Strategy links
national strategic guidance to joint planning.

(a) The CCDR’s strategy prioritizes the ends, ways, and means
within the limitations established by the budget, GFM processes,
and strategic guidance/direction. The strategy must address risk
and highlight where and what level risk will be accepted and
where it will not be accepted. The strategy’s objectives are
directly linked to the achievement of national objectives.

(b) Strategy includes a description of the factors and trends

in the OE key to achieving the CCMD’s objectives, the CCDR’s

36
approach to applying military power in concert with the other
instruments of national power in pursuit of the objectives and
the risks inherent in implementation.

(c) Strategy must be flexible to respond to changes in the

OE, policy, and resources. Commanders and their staff assess the
OE, as well as available ways, means, and risk, then update the
strategy as needed. It also recognizes when ends need updating
either because the original ones have been attained or they are
no longer applicable. (JP 5-0, p. 1)

 Fed by: All Strategic Guidance documents, other Strategic Direction from
HHQ, the CCDR’s Vision.
 Feeds: CCMD Campaigns and Global Campaign Plans

(3) CCDRs’ Campaign Plans (CCPs). The CCDRs’ campaigns

operationalize the CCDRs’ strategies by organizing and aligning
operations, activities, and investments with resources to
achieve the CCDRs’ objectives, and incorporate intermediate
objectives and tasks from GCPs, RCPs, and FCPs assigned and/or
supported. CCDRs translate the strategy into executable actions
to accomplish identifiable and measurable progress toward
achieving the CCDRs’ objectives, and thus the national
objectives.

 CCMD campaign plans integrate posture, resources,

requirements, subordinate campaigns, operations,
activities, and investments that prepare for, deter,
or mitigate identified contingencies into a unified
plan of action.
 The purpose of CCMD campaigns is to shape the OE,
deter aggressors, mitigate the effects of a
contingency, and/or execute combat operations in
support of the overarching national strategy.
(JP 5-0, pp. III-1 and 2)
 A CCDR may have multiple Campaign Plans oriented on different areas
and or problems.
 Fed by: CCMD Strategy, JSCP directed Plans (GCPs, RCPs, FCPs),
Integrated Contingency Plans (ICPs)
 Feeds: Day-to-Day activities, Campaign Support Plans (CSPs), ICPs.

8. Campaigning. A campaign is a series of related military

operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational
objective within a given time and space (JP 1-02). Campaigns may link

37
multiple operations over time to achieve a strategic objective, but may also link multiple
operations over space to achieve the objective.

a. Campaigning has traditionally reflected the operational level of war; that is, the
linkage of tactical operations to achieve strategic objectives. In many cases, the Joint
Force will be in a situation which is complex enough that it cannot achieve the desired
ends through the execution of a single operation. There are various reasons that this
may be the case. Insufficient forces may be available to defeat the enemy in a single
operation (consider the U.S. Civil War in 1861-65). Physical, mobility, or political
limitations may force sequential operations (consider DESERT SHIELD/DESERT
STORM, the defeat of Japan in WWII, or Cuba, 1898). The enemy’s center of gravity
may be so well protected that it must be attacked indirectly (consider the defeat of Nazi
Germany).

b. Among other responsibilities, Joint Force Commanders plan and execute

campaigns. Generally, Service forces not assigned as a joint force conduct operations
rather than campaigns, but they may have a supporting plan to the joint campaign plan
that links multiple operations to accomplish their specific mission.

c. Not all military objectives require campaigning. A non-combatant evacuation

operation (NEO), for example, may be executable in a single operation. A punitive strike
may also achieve the strategic objective in a single operation. However, the theater
commander must usually achieve strategic objectives in a more complex environment,
requiring multiple operations and the synchronization of those multiple operations to
achieve military objectives and support achievement of the national objectives.

9. Detailed Planning. Plans are developed to different levels of detail depending on

risk, need, troop-to-task, etc.

The JSCP directs that CCDRs develop assigned plans to a specified level. Similarly, the
CCDR may direct preparation of internally-directed plans to a particular level of detail.

 Level 1 (Commander’s Estimate): This level of planning

involves the least amount of detail and focuses on
producing multiple COAs to address a contingency. The
product for this level can be a COA briefing, command
directive, commander’s estimate, or a memorandum with
a required force list. The commander’s estimate
provides SecDef with military COAs to meet a potential
contingency. The estimate reflects the commander’s
analysis of the various COAs available to accomplish
an assigned mission and contains a recommended COA.
(JP 5-0, p. II-23)
 Level 2 (Base Plan): A Base Plan (BPLAN) describes the
[Concept of Operations] (CONOPS), major forces,
concepts of support, and anticipated timelines for
completing the mission. It normally does not include

38
 annexes [or a Time Phased Force Deployment Data
(TPFDD)]. A BPLAN may contain alternatives, including
FDOs, to provide flexibility in addressing a
contingency as it develops or to aid in developing the
situation. (JP 5-0, p. II-23)
 Level 3 (Concept Plan): CONPLAN is an [Operation Plan]
OPLAN in an abbreviated format that may require
considerable expansion or alteration to convert it
into a complete and detailed Level 4 OPLAN or an
[Operations Order] OPORD. It includes a plan summary,
a BPLAN, and usually includes the following annexes: A
(Task Organization), B (Intelligence), C (Operations),
D (Logistics), J (Command Relations), K
(Communications), S (Special Technical Operations), V
(Interagency Coordination), and Z (Distribution).
o If the development of a TPFDD is directed for the
CONPLAN, the planning level is designated as 3T.
A troop list and TPFDD would also require that an
Annex E (Personnel) and Annex W (Operational
Contract Support) be prepared. (JP 5-0, p. II-23)
 Level 4 (Operations Plan): An OPLAN is a complete and
detailed plan containing a full description of the
CONOPS, all applicable annexes to the plan including a
time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL), and a
transportation feasible notional TPFDD. The notional
TPFDD phases unit requirements in the theater of
operations at the times/places required to support the
CONOPS. The OPLAN identifies the force requirements,
functional support, and resources required to execute
the plan and provide closure estimates for their flow
into the theater. (JP 5-0, p. II-25)

10. Risk. Central to planning and execution at any level is the concept of risk. Merriam-
Webster’s dictionary defines risk as “the possibility that something bad or unpleasant
(such as injury or loss) will happen.” The DOD dictionary (JP 1-02) defines risk as
“probability and consequence of loss linked to hazards.” In most cases, military
professionals first experience the concept of risk with the operational risk management
process when risks are identified and controlled by educating subordinates and
establishing measures to avoid or reduce the probability of negative outcomes. At the
lowest level, the holiday safety briefing to subordinates is perhaps the most well-known.
Range safety briefings are other examples. The definitions above and the operational
risk management process are necessary but not sufficient to advise senior leaders on
conducting strategic and operational planning.

There are several considerations for examining strategic and operational risk. The
general strategy model of ends, ways, and means, risk results from the imbalance of
these three components. The concept of risk resides firmly in the realm of decision

39
making. Risk has meaning when leaders weigh options to achieve desired objectives
and assess the likelihood and magnitude of adverse outcomes. Those who write about
risk often reside in academia or the business world where risks must be quantified to be
useful. The discipline holds that risks can be accepted, avoided, transferred, or offset.
A whole industry – insurance – deals with offsetting (or transferring) risk.

The two types of risk are Strategic Risk (risk to national interests) and Military Risk
(risk to military objectives and to the Joint Force).

• Strategic Risk is the potential impact upon the United States - including the U.S.
population, territory, civil society, critical infrastructure, and interests - of current
and contingency events given their estimated consequences and probabilities
(e.g. the security of the United States and its citizens).

• Military Risk is the estimated probability and consequence of the Joint Force’s
projected inability to achieve current or future military objectives (risk-to-mission),
while providing and sustaining sufficient military resources (risk-to-force). In the
context of the CRA, military objectives come from the NMS.
o Risk to Mission - operational risk and future challenges risk.
• Operational Risk (Risk-to-Mission) reflects the current force’s ability
to attain current military objectives called for by the current NMS,
within acceptable human, material, and financial costs. A function
of the probability and consequence of failure to achieve mission
objectives while protecting the force from unacceptable losses. The
time horizon is 0-2 years.
• Future Challenges Risk (Risk-to-Mission) reflects the future force’s
ability to achieve future mission objectives over the near and mid-
term (0-7 years) and considers the future force’s capabilities and
capacity to deter or defeat emerging or anticipated threats.
o Risk-to-Force - force management risk and institutional risk.
• Force Management Risk (Risk-to-Force) reflects a Service and/or
Joint Force Provider’s ability to generate trained and ready forces
within established rotation ratios and surge capacities to meet
current campaign and contingency mission requirements; force
management risk is a function of the probability and consequence
of not maintaining the appropriate force generation balance
(“breaking the force”). Near-to mid-term (0-7 years).
• Institutional Risk (Risk-to-Force) reflects the ability of organization,
command, management, and force development processes and
infrastructure to plan for, enable, and improve national defense. All
three time horizons.
o Time Horizons: Near Term (0-2 yrs), Mid-term (3-7 yrs), and Far Term (8-
20 yrs)

At the strategic level, senior national security professionals must have the ability to
articulate risk to senior decision makers at the national level who may not have a
military or national security background. Therefore, campaign planners must expand the

40
conventional categories of risk to encompass others that are relevant to people making
strategic decisions. The risk categories below are not intended to be prescriptive, since
each planning situation is unique; there may be others not listed that should be
considered and assessed.
 Mission – achieving campaign objectives
 Forces – joint and coalition forces assigned, allocated, or apportioned
 Time – expected duration of the campaign
 Coalition – maintaining external political and material support
 Commitment – maintaining domestic political and popular support
 Escalation – adversary reactions that may require more resources
 Resources – money, time, and interagency and intergovernmental
participation
 Inaction – likely or foreseeable trends that may lead to undesirable
developments
Once the staff develops categories of risk that are relevant to the campaign, risks can
be assessed and managed using a logical framework, such as in Figure 2-7. The Joint

Figure 2-7: Joint Risk Framework

(Figure 3 in CJCSM 3105.01, Joint Risk Analysis)

Risk Analysis Methodology (JRAM), represented by the Joint Risk Framework, seeks
first to increase an individual's understanding of risk and then to implement and monitor
risk-based decisions. It provides a consistent, standardized way to assess risk and

41
recommend risk mitigation measures. Joint doctrine mandates a risk assessment
(specifically, risk-to-mission) as part of the mission analysis phase of the Joint
Operation Planning Process. It also directs that risk be addressed during in-progress
reviews (IPR). In addition to the probability and consequences of any particular source
of risk, another dimension that should be considered is the immediacy of the risk, or
how rapidly the risk may arise and impact operations. Another variable here is the ability
of any organization to recognize the risk or its precursors. Immediacy affects the
leader’s ability to take timely mitigating activities to address the risk.

Another important source of guidance regarding risk is in the commander’s intent for the
campaign or operation. Purpose, end state, and operational risk are the essential
elements of intent. An explicit statement of where, when, and what kinds of risk will be
accepted or rejected provides a way to prioritize effort in the absence of resources and
allows subordinate commanders to better execute mission command.

42
 CHAPTER 3: OPERATIONAL DESIGN

1. Purpose. Operational design is the conception and construction

of the framework that underpins a campaign or operation and its
subsequent execution. The framework is built upon an iterative
process that creates a shared understanding of the OE;
identifies and frames problems within that OE; and develops
approaches, through the application of operational art, to
resolving those problems, consistent with strategic guidance
and/or policy. The operational approach, a primary product of
operational design, allows the commander to continue JPP,
translating broad strategic and operational concepts into
specific missions and tasks to produce an executable plan.
(JP 5-0, p. IV-1)

Operational design is one of several tools available to help the

JFC and staff understand the broad solutions for mission
accomplishment and to understand the uncertainty in a complex
OE. Additionally, it supports a recursive and ongoing dialogue
concerning the nature of the problem and an operational approach
to achieve the desired objectives. (JP 5-0, p. IV-6)

2. Spectrum of Design. All decision making involves a blend of art (envisioning

something new) and science (creating something real). Each decision making tool, by
design, leans toward enabling creativity (art) or enabling efficiency (science).
Operational Design was introduced to overcome perceived weaknesses in other
planning tools – namely, that they were not creative or adaptive enough to deal with
strategic and operational complexity. Of course, there are strengths and weaknesses in
each decision making tool and any can be used incorrectly if misapplied to the situation
at hand. The argument over what tool(s) (Op Design, JPP, MDMP, MCPP, etc.) provide
the correct mix continues among planners, planning communities, Services, and U.S.
Government departments. There are even camps among those that use Op Design –
those that lean towards less process in an effort to boost creativity, and those that lean
towards more process to ensure the time used produces an effective and efficient
product.

Joint Planning uses two processes that attempt to span the spectrum of art/creativity
and science/efficiency: Operational Design (Op Design) and the Joint Planning Process
(JPP). This chapter will describe Op Design and Chapter 4 will describe the JPP, but
they should not be viewed as two separate and disconnected processes. They are
symbiotic and interconnected.

3. Joint and Army Design. Note that there are some differences in terminology
between the Army’s description of the "Army Design Methodology” in ADRP 5-0, The
Operations Process, and ATP 5-0.1, Army Design Methodology, and the joint
description of "Operational Design" in Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation

43
Planning. Though most of the differences are superficial, they are explainable largely by
the purposes of the publications. ADRP 5-0 is intended to provide an approach to deal
with any complex situation not just joint operations; from that perspective it has broader
applicability. In slight contrast, JP 5-0 is intended for situations in which joint warfighters
may find themselves; it is more narrowly focused on the requirements of joint
operations. Thus, "operational design" can be thought of as a subset of the "Army
design methodology.” Both methods use the same logic and seek similar outcomes.
While this campaign planning handbook remains consistent with joint doctrine in that it
uses operational design terminology and logic, it incorporates some of the underlying
thinking behind the Army design methodology so that operational design can be applied
beyond the realm of joint warfare.

The two definitions highlight these distinctions: Army design methodology is a

methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and
describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them (ADP 5-0). In Joint
doctrine, operational design is defined as the conception and
construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or major
operation plan and its subsequent execution. (JP 5-0).

The critical and creative thinking that underpin operational design are not new. The
great captains of history, from Sun Tzu to General U.S. Grant to Field Marshall
Rommel, have all used this thinking. Hence, operational design is not a discovery, but
instead is a reminder within a methodology for use by contemporary military and
national security professionals to deal with an incredibly nuanced and complex global
environment. The goal of operational design is deeper and broader understanding,
not closure. The JPP works with operational design to provide the needed
closure that will drive orders and action.

Overarching these two processes, and demonstrating their interconnected nature, is

Operational Art. (See Figure 3-1)

Commanders, skilled in the use of operational art, provide the

vision that links strategic objectives to tactical tasks through
their understanding of the strategic and OEs during both the
planning and execution phases of an operation or campaign. More
specifically, the interaction of operational art and operational
design provides a bridge between strategy and tactics, linking
national strategic aims to operations that must be executed to
accomplish these aims and identifying how to assess the impact
of the operations in achieving the strategic objectives.
Likewise, operational art promotes unified action by helping
JFCs and staffs understand how to facilitate the integration of
other agencies and multinational partners toward achieving
strategic and operational objectives. (JP 5-0, p. IV-4)

44
 Figure 3-1: Joint Design and Planning (Conceptual-Detailed)

4. Elements of Operational Design. The elements of Operational Design provide

some structure to Operational Design. JP 5-0 lists them all under “design” tools; ATP 5-
0.1 (Army Design) puts them all within Operational Art. The distinction is not important if
planners use them at the right time to promote efficiency, while ensuring they don’t
inhibit the creativity that Operational Design is aiming for. The elements are:
 Termination
 Military end state
 Objectives
 Effects
 Center of Gravity
 Decisive Points
 Lines of Operation and lines of effort
 Direct and indirect approach
 Anticipation
 Operational reach
 Culmination
 Arranging Operations
 Forces and functions

45
 Note: For a detailed discussion of the Elements of Operational Design – see JP
5-0, Chapter IV (Op Art and Op Design), Section C (Elements of Op Design).

5. Divergence and Convergence. Another way to describe the ebb and flow of
Operational Design and JPP is the idea of ‘Divergence’ and ‘Convergence’. Figure 3-2
shows a way to graphically represent an operational design approach to strategy
formulation and campaigning. Note that this figure shows that taking action (via
convergent thinking, coming to closure, and issuing orders that drive this action) will
likely change the operational environment, recursively requiring divergent thinking and
possibly reframing of the environment.

Figure 3-2: Divergence and Convergence in Planning and Execution

Operational Design enables a staff to diverge its thinking, gaining a broader

understanding of context before beginning to creatively converge on a conceptual
operational approach to a problem. The JPP then analyzes that conceptual approach,
diverges from the identified mission to find multiple Courses of Action (COAs), and then
converges again to settle on one Concept of Operation (CONOP). As the situation
develops, the commander and staff then diverge their thinking again to understand and
adapt. Deciding between divergence and convergence is one of the first challenges
designers/planners face.

46
Some questions you may ask to determine if you should spend time developing the
conceptual framework through the use of operational design might be:
 Do we know enough about the situation to move forward in a meaningful
way? Is a course of action clear and evident?
 Are actions we are taking having unexpected and/or surprising effects?
 Is the problem so familiar and solution so obvious that we already know
what to do (a heuristic, or standard operating procedure)?
 Do we know what end state conditions we are trying to achieve, or are the
desired end state conditions unclear?
 Are actions and techniques that were originally effective now falling short
of achieving the desired impact?

6. Frames. There are four major components [i.e. frames] to

operational design. The components have characteristics that
exist outside of each other and are not necessarily sequential.
An understanding of the OE and problem must be established prior
to developing operational approaches. (JP 5-0, p. IV-6) (See Figure
3-3).

Figure 3-3: Operational Design Framework

(Adapted from Figure IV-3 in JP 5-0)

47
The real power of operational design comes from the synthesis of all four frames.
They really are not separate activities, but four areas of thinking in the same
methodology. They are totally iterative and a better understanding of one frame will lead
to a deeper understanding of the other frames. To frame the environment, you cannot
help but see the competing trends emerge which will help to better define the problem.
As you see a potential operational approach emerging, you may discover new problems
or need to modify existing ones and ask more questions about the environment. As you
analyze the operational approach and look for ways to avoid or mitigate undesired
effects, you will likely redefine the problem and see aspects of the environment that you
had not previously understood. As you work with operational design, you will get more
comfortable working the frames iteratively, so it will feel less and less like four separate
frames and more like a single, synthetic, cognitive approach.

7. Conducting Operational Design. The details of the methodology described below

combine elements of the Army design methodology (as described in ADRP 5-0),
operational design (as described in JP 5-0), and some of the techniques for conducting
the Army design methodology from the Army Techniques Publication 5-0.1 into one that
works for the JFC.

The commander and his operational planning team should use a set of interconnected
cognitive activities to help build their understanding of the situation and visualization of
the campaign. These iterative activities constitute a methodology for the commander
and his team to learn about the answers to four broad questions:
 What do our national leaders want to solve?
 What is the context in which the campaign will be conducted?
 What problem is the campaign intended to solve?
 What broad, general approach for the campaign could solve the problem?

The deliberation on these four questions is iterative and recursive--that is, as one
question is answered, new questions will be generated, and questions already asked
may be asked again to gain deeper understanding. The purpose of the dialogue is to
develop an operational approach that can be turned into an executable campaign plan,
or into modifications to an existing plan, and can be continued throughout the campaign
to help determine when adaptation to the plan is appropriate.

Those conducting operational design collaborate extensively with all parties who are
interested in the problem or have knowledge about the problem that may help enlighten
the operational approach. Inclusion of interagency and coalition partners, as well as the
whole range of those with unique expertise or broadening perspectives, is absolutely
critical. Not only will the analysis be richer, but such collaboration might also enable
broader "buy-in" by other agencies early on, and then continuously. Dialogue between
echelons of command is also critical to gain the best understanding possible.

a. Methodology. JP 5-0 lays out a general methodology for conducting design. Laid
out sequentially in written form, they are better viewed as interconnected. Since work in

48
one will lead to changes in others, prudent designers will attempt to work them
synthetically and iteratively, vice step-by-step.

(1) Understand and Frame Strategic Guidance

 Understand the strategic direction and guidance.
 Understand the strategic environment (policies,
diplomacy, and politics).

(2) Understand and Frame the Operational Environment

 Understand the OE.

(3) Understand and Frame the Problem

 Define the problem.
 Identify assumptions needed to continue planning
(strategic and operational assumptions).

(4) Develop an Operational Approach

 Develop options (the operational approach).
 Identify decisions and decision points (external to
the organization).
 Refine the operational approach(es).
 Develop planning guidance. (JP 5-0, pp. IV-6-7)

b. Understand and Frame Strategic Guidance. Aiming to frame the challenges

and boundaries of what national leaders are seeking, this frame asks “What are we
trying to accomplish? What does the guidance we’re receiving mean in the context of
previous guidance? What objectives do the various leaders envision?” Strategic
direction from strategic guidance documents can be vague, incomplete, outdated, or
conflicting. Add to that the complexity of layering on verbal guidance, implied (or
specified) ideas provided in public speeches, intermediaries interpretations, and things
“not said.” Some of the guidance may be contradictory or ambiguous and should be
questioned for the sake of clarity. Part of the design approach is to enable collaborative
dialogue up and down levels of command to discern a common view of ongoing events
and of what the intended guidance means.

(1) Understand and Frame the strategic direction and guidance.

(a) The commander and staff must analyze all available

sources of guidance. These sources include written documents,
such as the CPG and JSCP, written directives, oral instructions
from higher headquarters, domestic and international laws,
policies of other organizations that are interested in the
situation, communication synchronization guidance, and higher
headquarters’ orders or estimates. Strategic direction from
strategic guidance documents can be vague, incomplete, outdated,

49
or conflicting. This is due to the different times at which they
may have been produced, changes in personnel that result in
differing opinions or policies, and the staffing process where
compromises are made to achieve agreement within the documents.
(JP 5-0, p. IV-7)

(b) During planning, commanders and staff must read the

directives and synthesize the contents into a concise
statement…the JFC and staff should obtain clear, updated
direction through routine and sustained civilian-military
dialogue throughout the planning process. When clarification
does not occur, planners and commanders identify those areas as
elements of risk. (JP 5-0, p. IV-7)

(c) While policy and strategic guidance clarify planning, it

is equally true that planning informs policy
formulation….Subordinate commanders should be aggressive in
sharing their perspective with their higher headquarters, and
both should resolve differences at the earliest opportunity.
(JP 5-0, p. IV-8)

(d) Commanders maintain dialogue with leadership at all

levels to resolve differences of interpretation of higher-level
objectives and the ways and means to accomplish these
objectives. (JP 5-0, p. IV-8)

(e) The President and SecDef may establish a set of

operational objectives. However, in the absence of coherent
guidance or direction, the CCDR/JFC may need to collaborate with
policymakers in the development of these objectives. Achievement
of these objectives should result in contributing to the
strategic objective—the broadly expressed conditions that should
exist after the conclusion of a campaign or operation. Based on
the ongoing civilian-military dialogue, the CCDR will determine
the military end state and military objectives, which define the
role of military forces. These objectives are the basis for
operational design. (JP 5-0, p. IV-9)

(f) Eventually the commander and staff must decide what they will work with and
what is outside the scope of the current challenge. Deciding what fits within the frame of
relevant strategic guidance does not negate other guidance, it simply determines what
is relevant at the time (think “Area of Operation”) and what is just outside the frame but
matters (think Area of Influence) and what is outside the frame and still of interest (think
Area of Interest). Determining and communicating the CCMD’s “Strategic Guidance
Frame” ensures all relevant actors know which parts of the systems of systems the
CCMD will focus on.

50
 (2) Understand the strategic environment (policies, diplomacy, and politics).

(a) Commanders and planners build an understanding of the

strategic environment. This forms boundaries within which the
operational approach must fit. Some considerations are:

 What actions or planning assumptions will be

acceptable given the current US policies and the
diplomatic and political environment?
 What impact will US activities have on third parties
(focus on military impacts but identify possible
political fallout)?
 What are the current national strategic objectives of
the USG? Are the objectives expected to be long
lasting or short-term only? Could they result in
unintended consequences (e.g., if you provide weapons
to a nation, is there sufficient time to develop
strong controls so the weapons will not be used for
unintended purposes)? (JP 5-0, p. IV-9)

(b) Strategic-level considerations of the OE are analyzed in

terms of geopolitical regions, nations, and climate rather than
local geography and weather. Nonmilitary aspects of the OE
assume increased importance at the strategic level. (JP 5-0, p.
IV-9)

(c) The JIPOE (Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment)

assists in the process.

c. Understand and Frame the Environment. The environmental frame describes

the context of the situation. It describes how the environment has been formed in its
current state and how it may trend to the future. The commander and his operational
planning team analyze the current environmental conditions and determine what the
desired future environment should look like. The environmental frame should also
describe the alternative future environments that other relevant actors may desire (or
that which might exist if the team takes no action at all), so they can consider this in
developing an operational approach that will not only meet our end state, but also
preclude the undesirable aspects of opposing end states. The team will compare the
current environment to the friendly desired end state and identify those conditions that
need to be different to enable end state achievement, while also considering the natural
tendency of those conditions to move to a particular state in the absence of our activity.
This natural tendency is critical, as it is the basis on which the team must act to achieve
their desired conditions.

In framing the OE, commanders can ask questions such as:

 What’s going on?

51
  Why has this situation developed?
 What is causing conflict among the actors?
 What are the strengths and weaknesses of the relevant actors?
 What does it mean?
 Why is the situation (or the projected future situation) undesirable?
 What’s the real story?
 What conditions need to exist for success?
 What are indicators that we are on the path to success?
 What are indicators that we are going in the wrong direction?

As with Strategic Guidance, there is more information available than any team can
handle. The commander and staff must attempt to understand the environment well
enough to decide what parts of the environmental system they will work with and what is
outside the scope of the current challenge. Deciding what fits within the “Environmental
Frame” scopes the challenge, the relevant actors, etc. It does not negate other parts of
a CCDR’s environment; it simply determines what is relevant at the time (again, think
logical “Area of Operation”), what is just outside the frame but matters (think logical
Area of Influence) and what is outside the frame, and while interesting, is not relevant
(think logical Area of Interest). Determining and communicating the CCMD’s
“Environmental Frame” ensures all relevant actors know which parts of the systems of
systems the CCMD will focus on. For example, if a CCDR decides to frame the planning
team’s environment to Korea, it doesn’t negate the South China Sea challenges and
how they might impact Korea…but it does put it out of the planning team’s focused
efforts.

(1) Understand the OE.

(a) The OE is the composite of the conditions, circumstances,

and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and
bear on the decisions of the commander. It encompasses physical
areas and factors of the air, land, maritime, and space domains;
the electromagnetic spectrum; and the information environment
(which includes cyberspace). Included within these areas are the
adversary, friendly, and neutral actors that are relevant to a
specific joint operation. (JP 5-0, p. IV-10)

One way of viewing these interrelated challenges for most military operational
situations is from a systems perspective. In doing so, it is critical to consider the
relationships between key elements of the system in order to understand causation.
That is, an understanding of what is causing the environment to trend in an unfavorable
direction and what would be required to cause it to trend in a more favorable one.
Understanding causation requires an understanding of the adversarial, environmental,
and friendly systems. The initial task is to develop a baseline of information on the
adversaries, on ourselves, and on relevant neutral or other interested parties by
collecting and analyzing a wide array of data.

52
 (b) The JIPOE process is a comprehensive analytic tool to
describe all aspects of the OE relevant to the operation or
campaign. (JP 5-0, p. IV-10)

(c) The commander must be able to describe both the current

state of the OE and the desired state of the OE when operations
conclude (desired military end state) to visualize an approach
to solving the problem. Planners can compare the current
conditions of the OE with the desired conditions. Identifying
necessary objective conditions and termination criteria early in
planning will help the commander and staff devise an operational
approach with LOEs/LOOs that link each current condition to a
desired end state condition. (JP 5-0, p. IV-10)

(d)In analyzing the current and future OE, the staff can use
a PMESII analytical framework to determine relationships and
interdependencies relevant to the specific operation or
campaign. (JP 5-0, p. IV-10)

Analysis must ensure that the creation of PMESII lists moves beyond mere
categorization of information and determines the relevant and critical relationships
between the various actors and aspects of the environment in order to understand
causation. PMESII is useful in this process, however, the planning team must be careful
not to stovepipe the analysis – the most important analysis leads to an understanding of
the dynamics of the relationships between the various parts of the environment that are
categorized in the PMESII lists. This analysis produces a holistic view of the relevant
enemy, adversary, neutral, and friendly systems as a complex whole, within a larger
system that includes many external influences. While identifying the nodes and links
within a system may be useful in describing important aspects of the OE, more
important is describing the relevant relationships within and between the various
systems that directly or indirectly affect the problem at hand. Commanders and staffs
must understand that relationships, especially those dealing with human interaction, are
extremely dynamic. These dynamic relationships often make it difficult to determine
clear causality, which makes it difficult to know if actions taken in the context of the
operational approach will ultimately be effective. This reinforces the importance of the
iterative nature of operational design and “learning as you act.”

Note: Appendix C provides some points to consider and questions to ask during
analysis.

53
 Figure: 3-4: Holistic View of the Operational Environment (OE)
(Figure IV-5 in JP 5-0)

(e) Key Inputs –

 Strategic Guidance,
 Nature of the Conflict,
 Relevant history,
 Physical and information factors (air, land, maritime,
and space domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and
the information environment [includes cyberspace]),
(See Figure 3-4)
o Geographical features and meteorological and
oceanographic characteristics.
o Population demographics (ethnic groups, tribes,
ideological factions, religious groups and
sects, language dialects, age distribution,
income groups, public health issues).
o Social and cultural factors of adversaries,
neutrals, and allies in the OE (beliefs, how
and where they get their information, types and
locations of media outlets).
o Political and socioeconomic factors (economic
system, political factions, tribal factions).

54
 o Infrastructure, such as transportation, energy,
and information systems.
o Operational limitations such as rules of
engagement (ROE), rules for the use of force
(RUF), or legal restrictions on military
operations as specified in US law,
international law, or HN agreements.
o All friendly, adversary, and enemy
conventional, irregular, and paramilitary
forces and their general capabilities and
strategic objectives (including all known
and/or suspected chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards).
o Environmental conditions (earthquakes, volcanic
activity, pollution, naturally occurring
diseases).
o Location of toxic industrial materials in the
area of interest that may produce chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear hazards.
o Psychological characteristics of adversary
decision making.
o All locations of foreign embassies,
international organizations, and NGOs.
o Friendly and adversary military and commercial
capabilities provided by assets in space, their
current or potential use, and critical
vulnerabilities.
o Knowledge of the capabilities and intent, COGs,
and critical vulnerabilities of forces,
individuals, or organizations conducting
cyberspace operations.
o Financial networks that could impact the
adversary’s ability to sustain operations.
 Analysis (opposing, neutral, friendly)
o Tendencies and Potentials - Tendencies reflect
the inclination to think or behave in a certain
manner. Tendencies are not considered
deterministic but rather model the thoughts or
behaviors of relevant actors. Tendencies help
identify the range of possibilities that
relevant actors may develop with or without
external influence. Once identified, commanders
and staffs evaluate the potential of these
tendencies to manifest within the OE. Keep in mind
that the OE continues to move forward, so the planning team
needs to project the current OE into the future to be able to
affect it. If no outside actors influence the OE, it will still change

55
 due to inherent tendencies in the system. It is important to
understand the natural tendencies of the system, and project
what the conditions will be through this system inertia. Given the
natural tendencies of the OE, we may be able to better define
our desired end state. The team may also be able to use this
insight to help form their operational approach. The point of time
for the projection in the future depends on the timeframe of the
campaign.
o Describe the key conditions that must exist in
the future OE to achieve the objectives.
Planners should put a temporal aspect to this
set of conditions in order to be able to
conduct feasibility and acceptability analyses.
o Determine the objectives of relevant actors
affecting the OE. These actors will have
different sets of conditions for achieving
their respective objectives.
(f) Key Outputs
 Description of the current operational environment
o Systems perspective of the operational
environment
o Impacts of physical and information factors on
the operational environment
o Friendly/enemy COGs
 Description of the desired operational environment
o Military end state - set of required conditions
that defines achievement of all military
objectives. It normally represents a point in
time and/or circumstances beyond which the
President does not require the military
instrument of national power as the primary
means to achieve remaining national objectives.
(JP 5-0, p. IV-20)
o An example of a national strategic end state:
 An economically-viable and stable Country
X, without the capability to coerce its
neighbors.
o An example of a military end state is:
 Country X is unable to project military
power against its neighbors.
o Termination criteria - the specified standards
approved by the President and/or SecDef that
must be met before military operations can be
concluded. Termination criteria are a key
element in establishing a military end state.
Termination criteria describe the conditions
that must exist in the OE at the cessation of

56
 military operations. The conditions must be
achievable and measurable… (JP 5-0, p. IV-19)
o Some examples of termination criteria are:
 Country Y’s borders are secure.
 Country Y’s national army is sufficient to
repel internal rebellion.
 Country X no longer poses an offensive
capability robust enough to defeat countries
within the region.
 Description of the opposing end states (JP 5-0, p.
IV-11)

d. Understand and Frame the Problem. As the JFC’s understanding of the

environment matures, tensions and problems come into sharper focus. The commander
tries to find the explanation for the conflict through framing the problem. Though the root
causes of the problem may be identifiable, they may not be solvable. In framing, the
planning team is trying to find the problem(s) that can be mitigated or managed which
will ultimately help achieve the conditions of the desired end state. This includes
seeking a clear understanding of which of the resulting tensions must be addressed to
achieve the desired end state, as well as where there are opportunities presented by
the convergence with other actors’ desired conditions. Once again, a decent analogy is
that the problem the CMD decides to address is its logical AO, the problems just outside
the frame that will influence the problem is the logical Area of Influence, and the parts of
the problem that must be monitored but not acted upon is the logical Area of Interest.

Commanders may ask questions like:

 What needs to change?
 What doesn’t need to change?
 What are the opportunities and threats?
 How do we go from the existing conditions to the desired conditions?
 What tensions exist between the current and desired conditions?
 What tensions exist between our desired conditions and our adversaries’
desired conditions?
 What are the risks in going to the desired conditions?

(1) Define the problem.

(a) Defining [or more accurately “Framing”] the problem is

essential to addressing the problem. It involves understanding
and isolating the root causes of the issue at hand—defining the
essence of a complex, ill-defined problem. (JP 5-0, p. IV-14)

(b) Defining the problem begins with a review of the

tendencies and potentials of the relevant actors and identifying
the relationships and interactions among their respective
desired conditions and objectives. (JP 5-0, p. IV-14)

57
 (c) The problem statement articulates how the operational
variables can be expected to resist or facilitate transformation
and how inertia in the OE can be leveraged to ensure the desired
conditions are achieved…The problem statement identifies the
areas for action that will transform existing conditions toward
the desired end state….It identifies areas of tension and
competition—as well as opportunities and challenges—that
commanders must address to transform current conditions to
attain the desired end state. (JP 5-0 IV-14)

(d) Critical to defining the problem is determining what

needs to be acted on to reconcile the differences between
existing and desired conditions. (JP 5-0, p. IV-14)

(e) Identify and articulate:

 Tensions between current conditions and desired
conditions at the end state.
 Elements within the OE which must change or remain the
same to attain desired end states.
o An important part of problem framing is to determine what relevant
factors and relationships in the OE need to be acted on to reconcile
the possible OE condition sets. Some of the conditions are critical
to success while others are less so. In identifying the problem, the
operational planning team restates the tensions and opportunities
between our desired future conditions and the alternative future
conditions, and identifies those areas of tension and opportunity
that merit further consideration as candidates for possible
intervention. (See Figure 3-5)
 Opportunities and threats that either can be exploited
or will impede the JFC from attaining the desired end
state.
 Operational limitations. (JP 5-0, p. IV-14)

58
 Figure 3-5: Tensions that Describe the Problem

(f) Though it is important to understand the root causes of the divergence of the
OE from the desired end state conditions, the planning team may not be able to, or
even need to, address the root causes to achieve the desired conditions. Instead, they
should be interested in identifying their problem(s) – and what they must do to achieve
their desired conditions. For example, if the planning team is in a combatant command,
the operational approach will be to apply military power in coordination with other
instruments of national power to achieve desired military conditions. Operational design
might reveal several problems well beyond the remit of the JFC. In these cases,
multinational partners, other governmental, or non-governmental agencies should take
the lead to resolve or manage them.

(g) Center of Gravity Analysis. Connected to the tensions explored in

understanding the problem is understanding the Center of Gravity of the
enemy/problem(s) faced, and your own. While JP 5-0 puts COG analysis within the
Environmental Frame, the USAWC believes it is better placed in the Problem Frame
since COGs exist in an adversarial context involving a clash of
moral wills and/or physical strengths. (JP 5-0, p. IV-23). Until the
tensions and adversaries that create a “problem” are considered, there really isn’t a set
of COGs (friendly and adversary).

A Center of Gravity is a source of power that provides moral or

physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act…An
objective is always linked to a COG. There may also be different

59
COGs at different levels, but they should be nested. At the
strategic level, a COG could be a military force, an alliance,
political or military leaders, a set of critical capabilities or
functions, or national will. At the operational level, a COG
often is associated with the adversary’s military capabilities—
such as a powerful element of the armed forces—but could include
other capabilities in the OE. The COG construct is useful as an
analytical tool to help JFCs and staffs analyze friendly and
adversary sources of strength as well as weaknesses and
vulnerabilities. COGs are formed out of the relationships
between adversaries, and they do not exist in a strategic or
operational vacuum. (JP 5-0, p. IV-23)
* Planners should analyze COGs within a framework of three
critical factors:
 Critical capabilities - the primary abilities
essential to the accomplishment of the objective.
 Critical requirements - essential conditions,
resources, and means the COG requires to perform the
critical capability.
 Critical vulnerabilities - those aspects or components
of critical requirements that are deficient or
vulnerable to direct or indirect attack in a manner
achieving decisive or significant results. In general,

(h) A concise problem statement is used to clearly define the

problem or problem set to solve. It considers how tension and
competition affect the OE by identifying how to transform the
current conditions to the desired end state—before adversaries
begin to transform current conditions to their desired end
state. The statement broadly describes the requirements for
transformation, anticipating changes in the OE while identifying
critical transitions. (JP 5-0, p. IV-15)

An example problem statement follows:

The inability of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to defeat
insurgent and jihadist forces within Afghanistan, despite access to
external financing and resources, threatens the U.S. objective of
withdrawing its combat formations within the next two years.
Alternatively, a problem narrative may be used:
Insurgent and jihadist forces still hold the security of Afghanistan at
risk. The ANSF is not yet ready to assume full security
responsibilities from the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) and it is not clear that they will be able to sustain security
after transition, even with enough financial and resource support
from outside entities. Within the next two years, the ANSF must

60
 complete the transition of security responsibilities from ISAF and be
capable of providing security within Afghanistan. The ANSF will
need continuing and residual assistance to reach these conditions.

The United States desires a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ where all
states are secure in their sovereignty and territorial integrity, enjoy
freedom, peace, and prosperity, and respect the rights of other
nations, and follow established norms of international behavior. The
People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a malign actor in the region,
and has made extraterritorial claims in the East and South China
Seas, militarized these areas, has used tactics of coercive
gradualism, flaunted the accepted rules of international behavior,
and has developed advanced weapons systems. The U.S. Joint
Force is now in a hypercompetitive security environment where
changes in force capability, presence, posture, international
relations and partnerships, threats to access, and international,
intra-regional, and domestic public opinion are constant.

(2) Identify assumptions needed to continue planning (strategic and operational

assumptions).

(a) Where there is insufficient information or guidance, the

commander and staff identify assumptions to assist in framing
solutions. [They] should be phrased in terms of will or will not
(rather than using “should” or “may”) in order to establish
specific conditions that enable planning to continue. (JP 5-0,
pp. IV-15 and 16)

(b) [Planners should] regularly discuss planning assumptions

with OSD and DOD leadership to see if there are changes in
policy or guidance that affect the planning assumptions
(examples could be basing or access permissions, allied or
multinational contributions, alert and warning decision
timelines, or anticipated threat actions and reactions).
(JP 5-0, p. IV-16)

e. Develop an Operational Approach. The conceptualization of this operational

approach results from a synthesis of the understanding gained up to that point through
the environment and problem frames. The purpose of developing the operational
approach is threefold. First, it provides focus and boundaries to the development of
courses of action. Second, it defines the solution hypothesis that becomes the basis for
execution and assessments through the campaign. Third, it enables continued
synthesis by looking at the strategic guidance, environment frame, and problem frames
through the lens of the operational approach.

61
 (1) Develop the operational approach.

(a) The operational approach will underpin the operation and

the detailed planning that follows. (JP 5-0, p. IV-17)

(b) The operational approach is a commander’s description of

the broad actions the force can take to achieve an objective in
support of the national objective or attain a military end
state. It is the commander’s visualization of how the operation
should transform current conditions into the desired conditions—
the way the commander envisions the OE at the conclusion of
operations to support national objectives. (JP 5-0, p. IV-16)

(c) While the elements of Operational Design are considered throughout, it is

during this stage of the Op Design methodology where the elements stand out the most.
They help frame the operational approach in terms that planners can later use to
continue into the JPP.

(d) Termination - Termination criteria are the specified

standards approved by the President and/or SecDef that must be
met before military operations can be concluded. Termination
criteria are a key element in establishing a military end state.
Termination criteria describe the conditions that must exist in
the OE at the cessation of military operations. The conditions
must be achievable and measurable… (JP 5-0, p. IV-19)

(e) Military end state - Military end state is the set of

required conditions that defines achievement of all military
objectives. It normally represents a point in time and/or
circumstances beyond which the President does not require the
military instrument of national power as the primary means to
achieve remaining national objectives. As such, the military end
state is often closely tied to termination. While it may mirror
many of the conditions of the national strategic end state, the
military end state typically will be more specific and contain
other supporting conditions. (JP 5-0, p. IV-20) (See Figure 3-6 to
understand how these end states nest with other types of ends.)

(f) Objectives - Once the military end state is understood and

termination criteria are established, operational design
continues with development of strategic and operational military
objectives. An objective is clearly defined, decisive, and
attainable. There are four primary considerations:
 An objective establishes a single desired result
(a goal).

62
  An objective should link directly or indirectly
to higher level objectives or to the end state.
 An objective is specific and unambiguous.
 An objective does not infer ways and/or means—it
is not written as a task.

Examples of military objectives might be:

Pre-hostility borders between Country X and Country Y restored.
Country X’s offensive military capabilities reduced to a level that prevents
it from attacking neighboring countries.
Country X no longer supports regional insurgent and/or terrorist groups
that threaten stability in neighboring countries.
Country X possesses only defensive capabilities and is integrated into
regional cooperative defense arrangements.

(g) Effects - a physical and/or behavioral state of a system

that results from an action, a set of actions, or another
effect. A desired effect can also be thought of as a condition
that can support achieving an associated objective, while an
undesired effect is a condition that can inhibit progress toward
an objective. There are four primary considerations for writing
a desired effect statement.
 Each desired effect should link directly to one or
more objective.
 The effect should be measurable.
 The statement should not specify ways and means for
accomplishment.
 The effect should be distinguishable from the
objective it supports as a condition for success,
not as another objective or a task.

63
 Figure 3-6: Endstate – Objectives – Effects – Tasks
(Figure IV-8 in JP 5-0)

(h) Forces and functions - Commanders and planners can plan

campaigns and operations that focus on defeating either enemy
forces, functions, or a combination of both.
(i) Decisive Points - a geographic place, specific key event,
critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows a
commander to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or
contributes materially to achieving success (e.g., creating a
desired effect, achieving an objective). Decisive points can
greatly influence the outcome of an action. Although decisive
points are usually not COGs, they are the keys to attacking or
protecting them.

- DPs may be physical in nature, such as a constricted sea lane, a town, WMD
capabilities, or destruction or neutralization of a key insurgent group. Key events, such
as an election, repair of damaged key infrastructure, control of a population center, or
establishment of a competent local police force, may be DPs. In still other cases, DPs
may be systemic, such as political linkages among key leaders of the regime; trust
among a particular influential social group; or discrediting an adversary leader.

64
 - At times, the planning team may not be able to find a vulnerability associated
with a critical capability, and instead may have to attack its strength to uncover or create
a vulnerability that can be exploited. Exploitation of one vulnerability in one area may
well expose vulnerabilities in other areas. For example, disruption of a cellular phone
network may cause the enemy to increase use of couriers. This traffic could uncover a
key transit route for forces or supplies, which can then be monitored and attacked at the
appropriate times.

- The team must determine and prioritize which vulnerabilities, capabilities, or key
events offer the best opportunity to achieve the effects on the OE that will lead to
accomplishing our objectives. Some potential DPs may be:
In-theater ports, airfields, rail lines, or roads needed for
deployment/operational movement.
Maritime or land choke points at canals, straits, or mountain passes.
Training infrastructure for host-nation security forces.
Country Z begins conducting effective counterinsurgency operations.
Credible national and local elections.

Decisive points can and should often be converted into intermediate

objectives on a LOO or LOE. Using the first example DP above, an intermediate
objective might be secure in-theater ports, airfields, rail lines, and roads needed for
deployment/operational movement. DPs or the resultant intermediate objectives can be
organized and placed into LOOs or LOEs to provide a framework for the commander to
describe his visualization of a campaign. They enable the command to organize the
coordination and synchronization of joint, combined, and interagency action.

(j) Lines of operation (LOO) and lines of effort (LOE) -

Commanders may use both LOOs and LOEs to connect objectives to a
central, unifying purpose.
LOO defines the interior or exterior orientation of the
force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes
and decisive points related in time and space to an objective.
LOOs describe and connect a series of decisive actions that lead
to control of a geographic or force-oriented objective.

LOE links multiple tasks and missions using the logic of

purpose—cause and effect—to focus efforts toward establishing
operational and strategic conditions.
LOEs are essential to operational design when positional
references to an enemy or adversary have little relevance. LOEs
can also link objectives, decisive points, and COGs. (JP 5-0, p.
III-6) (See Figure 3-7 and 3-8 for examples.)

65
 Figure 3-7: Sample Line of Operation (Figure IV-11 in JP 5-0)

Figure 3-8: Sample Lines of Effort (Figure IV-12 in JP 5-0)

(k) Direct and indirect approach - the manner in which a

commander contends with a COG. A direct approach attacks the
enemy’s COG or principal strength by applying combat power
directly against it. An indirect approach attacks the enemy’s
COG by applying combat power against critical vulnerabilities
that lead to the defeat of the COG while avoiding enemy
strength.

(l) Anticipation – Designers/Planners must consider what might

happen and look for the signs that may bring the possible event

66
to pass. During execution, JFCs should remain alert for the
unexpected and for opportunities to exploit the situation.

Operational design is iterative, and the operational planning team should revisit
each frame. Go back to the environment frame to analyze the potential impacts of the
approach on the environment. While the first order effects should be as expected (since
the operational approach was developed to achieve those effects), the team must look
carefully for potential undesired effects. Note any undesired second and third order
effects and either modify the operational approach to mitigate those effects, or transmit
those risks to the operational approach to planners and other interested parties in the
effort. Strategic guidance may have shifted, with new options or constraints. Perhaps
you need to reframe the problem (for instance, an insurgency has morphed into a civil
war). Iterative examinations may yield a significantly different operational approach.

(m) Operational reach - the distance and duration across

which a joint force can successfully employ military
capabilities. The concept of operational reach is inextricably
tied to the concept of LOOs. Basing, in the broadest sense, is
an indispensable part of operational art, since it is tied to
the concept of LOOs and directly affects operational reach.

(n) Culmination - that point in time and/or space at which

the operation can no longer maintain momentum.

(o) Arranging operations - Commanders must determine the best

arrangement of joint force and component operations to conduct
the assigned tasks and joint force mission. Thinking about the
best arrangement helps determine the tempo of activities in
time, space, and purpose. Planners should consider factors such
as simultaneity, depth, timing, and tempo when arranging
operations.

(2) Identify decisions and decision points (external to the organization). During
planning, commanders inform leadership of the decisions that
will need to be made, when they will have to be made, and the
uncertainty and risk accompanying decisions and delay. This
provides leaders, both military and civilian, a template and
warning for the decisions in advance and provides them the
opportunity to look across interagency partners and with allies
to look for alternatives and opportunities short of escalation.
The decision matrix also identifies the expected indicators
needed in support of the intelligence collection plan. (JP 5-0,
p. IV-17)

(3) Refine the operational approach(es). Understanding the situation and visualizing
solutions to the problem are only part of the challenge. This understanding and visualization
must be described to other commanders, leaders, and planners so that they can help implement

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the solution. The synthesis of the four activities can be described through the commander’s
operational approach. The operational approach describes the commander’s understanding and
resultant visualization of the campaign’s parameters. He must clearly transmit his synthesized
approach to his staff and other interested parties who will be involved in planning and executing
the campaign; this transmission can take the form of commander’s initial or updated planning
guidance.

(a) Throughout the planning processes, commanders and

their staffs conduct formal and informal discussions at all
levels of the chain of command. These discussions help refine
assumptions, limitations, and decision points that could affect
the operational approach and ensure the plan remains feasible,
acceptable, and adequate.

(b) The commander adjusts the operational approach based

on feedback from the formal and informal discussions at all
levels of command and other information. (JP 5-0, p. IV-17)

The operational approach can help transmit to the planners and operations team
not only the commander’s planning guidance, but also the logic for the guidance. The
operational approach is a synthesis of the strategic guidance, environment, and
problem frames combined with the development of a conceptual way forward. It should
include graphical representations and narrative descriptions of the logic behind each
frame. Products of the synthesized operational approach could include:

 Text and graphics describing the operational environment.

o Commander’s understanding of higher guidance.
o Systems relationships diagrams that describe the environment.
o Key actor relationship diagrams.
o Description of what might cause key conditions to change.
o Description of the desired end state.
o Description of key aspects of alternative end states.

(4) Develop planning guidance.

(a) At a minimum, the commander issues planning guidance,

either initial or refined, at the conclusion of mission
analysis, and provides refined planning guidance as
understanding of the OE, the problem, and visualization of the
operational approach matures. (JP 5-0 IV-17)

(b) The commander provides a summary of the OE and the

problem, along with a visualization of the operational approach,
to the staff and to other partners through commander’s planning
guidance…. [It] should envision and articulate how military
power and joint operations, integrated with other applicable
instruments of national power, will achieve strategic success,

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and how the command intends to measure the progress and success
of its military actions and activities. (JP 5-0, p. IV-17)

(c) Format varies based on the personality of the commander

and the level of command, but should adequately describe the
logic to the commander’s understanding of the OE, the
methodology for reaching the understanding of the problem, and a
coherent description of the operational approach. It may include
the following elements:

- Describe the OE. Some combination of graphics

showing key relationships and tensions and a
narrative describing the OE will help convey the
commander’s understanding to the staff and other
partners.
- Define the problem to be solved. A narrative problem
statement that includes a timeframe to solve the
problem will best convey the commander’s
understanding of the problem.
- Describe the operational approach. A combination of
a narrative describing objectives, decisive points,
and potential LOEs and LOOs, with a summary of
limitations (constraints and restraints) and risk
(what can be accepted and what cannot be accepted)
will help describe the operational approach.
- Provide the commander’s initial intent. The
commander’s initial intent describes the purpose of
the operations, desired strategic end state,
military end state, and operational risks associated
with the campaign or operation. It also includes
where the commander will and will not accept risk
during the operation. It organizes (prioritizes)
desired conditions and the combinations of potential
actions in time, space, and purpose….[It] may also
include operational objectives, method, and effects
guidance. (JP 5-0, p. IV-18)

8. Organizing for Operational Design Work. Key to success in using an operational

design approach is a climate that encourages open dialogue and exchange of ideas.
This exchange is not only internal to the organization, but also vertically with higher and
lower echelons and horizontally with other relevant partners. It is through such
interchange that a shared understanding and common vision can be achieved. While
leaders and staffs at higher echelons may have a clear strategic understanding of the
problem, those at lower levels are likely to have a better understanding of the realities of
the local circumstances. Merging these perspectives is crucial to achieving a

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common vision or synthesis, which can enable unity of effort. For this reason,
operational design is especially appealing in interagency and coalition efforts.

There are many ways to organize to do operational design work. The way that works for
your organization depends on several aspects: the organizational climate; the degree to
which the commander will be involved in the operational design work; the size,
experience, and training of the staff; the amount of time available; and the degree of
complexity of the problem. The team should be large enough to enable a range of
diversity of perspective, but not so large as to preclude achieving some consensus on
issues to keep the process moving forward. The team should seek diversity of
perspective and should solicit subject matter expertise as needed to inform and broaden
the discourse. Generally, higher level headquarters will have more staff and more time
available, and will deal with greater levels of complexity than lower level headquarters.
This suggests a larger team with more diverse representation.

While “Designers” and “Planners” are closely linked (and may even be the same
people), their roles are very different. “Designers” focus on broadening their aperture,
better understanding the context, making causal connections, and seeking new
paradigms if necessary. They are focused on exploring and the art of decision making.
“Planners” are focused on building the plan and the science of decision making. Both
roles are required, but planners can solve the wrong problems if designers fail, and
great solutions won’t be implemented if planners fail.

a. Designer Roles. To enable the proper balance between broad discourse and
progress (after all, the goal is to produce a usable concept), the planning team leader
may assign roles to team members:
 Someone to record the discussion and key results.
 Someone to capture ideas in graphical form (pens and whiteboards work
well for this, especially when framing the environment).
 Someone to think about and develop metrics to test insights.
 Someone to facilitate the team discussion.
 Someone to play devil’s advocate to question assumptions (though all
members must keep this in mind).
 Someone who ensures the feasibility of concepts discussed (again, this is
the responsibility of all planning team members).

b. Challenges. An operational planning team will face several innate challenges,

some of which will lessen as the team works together:
 Getting the dialog going and moving in a meaningful direction.
 Developing effective open-ended questions to stimulate thinking.
 Ensuring all planners contribute their thinking despite the differences in
rank among the team members.
 Helping people "break free" of their conceptual anchors and preconceived
ideas.
 Guiding the dialog without limiting it; avoiding rambling but still staying
open to new perspectives.

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  Recognizing when the team is unnecessarily “in the weeds” (worried about
details) and getting out of those weeds.
 Managing team members who are disruptive, dismissive, or domineering.
 Balancing input across the team.
 Helping the team to converge eventually to a decision.

c. Some tips for leaders of operational design groups:

 The commander should be directly involved.
 Dedicate time and limit interruptions.
 Avoid jumping directly to the solutions without exploring the environment
and problem frames.
 Just dialogue for a while before you write anything down.
 Carefully manage your own information/ideas to encourage participation.
 Refrain from advocating a position if you are the group leader.
 Ask open-ended and probing questions that elicit assessment/reasoning.
 The leader can initially play the role of devil’s advocate to encourage a
climate of productive/respectful openness (but then pass on this role).

d. Tools and Techniques. The following are tools and techniques from ATP 5-0.1,
Army Design Methodology, 1 July 2015, and represent ways in which commanders,
planners, and other leaders can actually use operational design.

(1) Brainstorming and mind mapping. (See Figures 3-9, 3-10). Brainstorming is a
group creative thinking technique that uses the different perspectives of individuals in a
group to develop and build on ideas. Used effectively, it will generate a large quantity of
ideas while avoiding the immediate judgment of the relative value of each. A technique
for brainstorming involves a divergent thinking phase where the planning team attempt
to answer key “focal questions” about the environment or problem followed by a
convergent phase where the group then culls the different answers or thoughts into
categories which can then generate further dialog and/or mind mapping. Outliers are
carefully considered by the group for much greater investigation or are possibly
irrelevant and discarded. The use of sticky notes and a white board are ideal for this.

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 Figure 3-9: Brainstorming
Mind mapping is a technique for discerning and depicting the relationships of
relevant phenomena, variables, and actors in an operational environment or complex
problem. A technique for mind mapping begins with a single idea, actor, or topic
represented in the center of a white board or paper (for example insurgent recruitment).
The planning team then writes out secondary and connected ideas, phenomena, actors,
or words associated with insurgent recruitment using lines, symbols, pictures, and
colors to show relationships. As the planning team builds and expands the mind map on
the white board, it continues dialog to broaden and deepen the members’ understanding
of the growing mind map. At some point, the team should refine the “map” and develop
an accompanying narrative that captures the members’ synthesized understanding of
the environment and/or problems. This synthesized understanding will help shape the
operational approach portion of operational design. (See Figure 3-10).

Figure 3-10: Mind mapping

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 (2) Meta-questioning and four ways of seeing. These techniques are individual
and group thinking techniques that can be used by the planning team while conducting
mind-mapping or other operational design activities. Meta-questioning is a critical
thinking skill that enables a more complete understanding of a topic by asking higher
order questions. A way to understand the concept of meta-questioning is by thinking of
the different views one gets from different levels of a ladder. An individual’s view is
somewhat restricted when standing next to a ladder. However, as the individual takes a
few steps up the rungs of the ladder, the view becomes broader. This is true of meta-
questions. As individuals or groups ask and answer successively higher order
questions, their understanding should become broader and more comprehensive.

Examples of meta-questions include:

 Why did it happen?
 Why was it true?
 How does X relate to Y?
 All reasoning depends on the idea that X is the source of conflict. Why is
reasoning based on X instead of Y?
 Are there other possibilities?

In the four ways of seeing technique, the planning team seeks to broaden and
deepen its understanding of the environment or problem specifically by looking at them
through the eyes of the adversary (ies) or other actors. For example, the planning team
can answer the following about actors X and Y:
 How does X view itself?
 How does Y view itself?
 How does X view Y?
 How does Y view X?

Of course, there are many more possible questions about how X and Y above
relate to the environment and/or problem that the planning team should ask when
conducting operational design. These four are just a start. Finally, the techniques above
are not necessarily stand-alone events that must be chosen at the exclusion of others.
Indeed, the planning team should conduct many of them simultaneously or nearly so. It
is ultimately up to the planning team and its leadership to determine which are used, for
how long, and for what part of the design methodology. Ultimately, and when used in an
iterative manner, they will contribute to a deeper and broader understanding of the
environment and help shape a sound operational approach.

9. Link Between Operational Design, Planning, Execution, and Assessment.

a. Operational design is done before planning, throughout planning, during

preparation, and throughout execution—the operational design effort never ceases in a
dynamic environment. The commander and staff may begin operational design before
planning is initiated to provide the staff, subordinates, and other associated partners
some initial planning guidance based on understanding of the situation. In peacetime
deliberate planning, this is likely the result of an ongoing analysis by the combatant

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command of its AOR, with greater emphasis given to those situations or locations
designated as areas of potential crisis and instability within the theater campaign plan.

b. It is important to note the complementary nature of operational design and the

planning process. By necessity, the planning process must be convergent, in order to
yield executable plans and orders. Operational design enables a balance between this
required convergence and the divergence needed to remain open to numerous stimuli
to better understand the operational environment and better define unfamiliar or ill-
structured problems. While the continuous dialogue of operational design enables the
command to keep its “thinking aperture” as wide as possible to always question the
mission’s continuing relevance and suitability, the structured process of the JPP allows
us to quickly build a plan that will enable the organization to execute the commander’s
current vision. By integrating both of these approaches, the friendly force can maintain
the greatest possible flexibility and do so in a proactive (instead of reactive) manner.
c. Operational design provides the vision and logic of the campaign, which can then
be turned into flexible, adaptable courses of action. Through detailed analysis and
planning, those courses of action are developed into plans for future synchronized
execution.

d. The commander’s operational approach is a hypothesis for action. In a complex

situation it is difficult to know up front how the environment will react to any given action,
but it is possible to know more about the environment as planning teams assess its
reaction to an action; thus, learning becomes the driver for operational initiative.
While those working to execute the plan may see one reaction, those looking outside
the plan may see an altogether-different reaction, possibly one that causes the
commander to reframe the problem. The commander must know when his
understanding of the problem and potentially his visualization of the campaign have
changed to such an extent that he must redirect the command’s campaign approach.
Thus, through execution, operational design must be challenged and validated to
ensure it yields the desired objectives and end state, and most critically, that the
objectives and end state that drive the campaign are the right ones. This does not
suggest that during execution the staff should not be keen to changes in the
environment, the problem, or the operational approach. It does suggest, however, that
the commander may be in a better position to "see" and "synthesize" the components of
operational design as the environment changes during execution.

e. Assessments are a critical part of the design approach to campaigning and

operations. Assessment at the operational and strategic levels typically has a wider
scope than at the tactical level and focuses on broader tasks, effects, objectives, and
progress toward the end state. Continuous assessment using Measures of
Effectiveness (MOE) help the JFC and his component commanders determine if the
joint force is "doing the right things" to achieve its objectives. Tactical-level assessment
typically uses Measures of Performance (MOP) to evaluate task accomplishment.
These measures let commanders determine if their force is "doing things right."
[See also Appendix G, Operation Assessments.]

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10. Reframing is the iterative or recurring conduct of operational design in the event
that the commander’s understanding of the operational environment (OE) or of the
problem have changed to such a degree that a different operational approach is
warranted. Essentially, reframing is required when the hypothesis of the current problem
and/or operational approach may no longer be valid. As he updates his understanding
and visualization of the environment and its tensions, the commander may determine
that changes to the operational approach could range from minor modifications to a
completely new campaign plan. Reframing may cause the commander to direct the
command to shift the campaign’s approach.

Reframing may be as important in the wake of success as in the case of apparent

failure. Success transforms the environment and affects its tendencies, potentials, and
tensions. Any action in or on the environment could cause changes that generate
new problems. Organizations are strongly motivated to reflect and reframe following
failure, but they tend to neglect reflection and reframing following successful actions.

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 CHAPTER 4: JOINT PLANNING PROCESS

1. Introduction. Commanders and their staffs develop plans for campaigns through a
combination of art and science. The art of operational design enables us to continuously
understand the environment of the campaign, visualize the problem that the campaign
must address, and develop a "running hypothesis" for an operational approach to solve
the problem. Commanders must transmit their vision, to include their view of the
operational approach, to their staff, subordinates, partner commands, agencies, and
multinational/non-governmental entities so that their vision can be translated into
executable plans. The science of planning facilitates this translation by applying the
rigor of coordination and synchronization of all aspects of a concept to produce a
workable plan.

JPP is an orderly, analytical set of logical steps to frame a

problem; examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare
alternative COAs; select the best COA; and produce a plan or
order. The application of operational design provides the
conceptual basis for structuring campaigns and operations. JPP
provides a proven process to organize the work of the commander,
staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners, to develop
plans that will appropriately address the problem. It focuses on
defining the military mission and development and
synchronization of detailed plans to accomplish that mission.
(JP 5-0, p. V-1). (See Figure 4-1.)

Figure 4-1: The Joint Planning Process

(Figure V-1 in JP 5-0)

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Operational Design does not end with the beginning of the JPP. Instead JPP feeds
refinement to the four frames. (See Figure 4-2). It prepares the commander and staff for
potential reframing and/or continued assessment of the environment, problem,
approach and the strategic guidance that underpins both processes.

Figure 4-2: Joint Planning Overview

(Figure V-2 in JP 5-0)

Campaign planning is conducted as part of a comprehensive national effort. This means

that in some cases military activity will be a supporting effort to other instruments of
national power, while in other cases military activity will be the supported effort. In both
cases, the commander is responsible to build a military campaign plan that he
integrates with the other instruments of power. If the military is the supported effort, the
joint force commander will normally lead the coordinated efforts. If the military is the
supporting effort, the JFC must closely coordinate with the designated lead organization

78
to ensure that the military plan is nested with the supported plan. This will require
collaboration with many other actors to assist them in developing their plans (while
enriching our own), to include when the military is the supporting organization.

2. Initiate Planning. Joint planning begins when an appropriate

authority recognizes potential for military capability to be
employed in support of national objectives or in response to a
potential or actual crisis. (JP 5-0, p. V-4). This authority may be
higher headquarters or the CCDR.

The commander will likely form a Joint Planning Group (called an Operational Planning
Group or Operational Planning Team in some commands) to focus on the mission.

Figure 4-3: JPP Step 1 – Initiate Planning

The staff must conduct some preliminary actions before they can begin planning. (See
Figure 4-3). They must determine:

 What do they know? – Pull together staff products (including intelligence)

that already exist that provide information necessary for planning. Staff
Estimates are a likely source of this information.

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  What do they NOT know? – Holes in information must be identified quickly
so that the staff can determine how best to deal with unknowns.
 Who else needs to know? – Building the planning roster is one of the first
steps in “Planning to Plan.” The staff must think through what agencies,
organizations, and staff sections should be present for planning and how
best to incorporate them (VTC, invitations to planning meetings, etc.).
Some organizations are key to planning, some important but not vital, and
others must at least achieve buy-in.
 What timeline are we on? – The second most important document in the
“Plan to Plan” is the timeline. Commander availability, required updates to
HHQ, subordinate planner considerations, and potential enemy timelines
must all be considered and built into a realistic schedule.

Operational design, if not already done by the commander and his staff, may occur
at the start of step 1 of the JPP.

3. Conduct Mission Analysis. The staff analyzes the mission to: 1) provide a
recommended mission statement to the commander, and 2) to better inform the
commander’s initial analysis of the environment and the problem. This helps him refine
his operational approach. As the staff presents analysis on both the requirements and
potential points of focus for the campaign, they enable the commander to develop his
vision further to use synchronized, integrated military operations as a part of unified
action. He can then provide detailed planning guidance to his staff and share his vision
with his counterparts to enable unity of effort in application of all of the instruments of
power across the U.S. government and our international partners. Concurrently, the J-2
leads the initial steps of the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational
Environment (JIPOE) to describe the potential effects of the OE on operations, analyze
the strengths of the enemy/adversary, and describe his potential courses of action. See
Figure 4-4 for the inputs, outputs, and potential steps involved.

Mission analysis is used to study the assigned tasks and to

identify all other tasks necessary to accomplish the mission.
Mission analysis is critical because it provides direction to
the commander and the staff, enabling them to focus effectively
on the problem at hand. When the commander receives a mission
tasking, analysis begins with the following questions:

(1) What is the purpose of the mission received? (What

problem is the commander being asked to solve or what
change to the OE is desired?)
(2) What tasks must my command do for the mission to be
accomplished?
(3) Will the mission achieve the desired results?
(4) What limitations have been placed on my own forces’
actions?
(5) What forces/assets are needed to support my operation?

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 (6) How will I know when the mission is accomplished
successfully? (JP 5-0, p. V-4)

Figure 4-4: JPP Step 2 – Conduct Mission Analysis

a. Update staff estimates. Each staff section develops a staff estimate that is a
running assessment of current and future operations to determine if the current
operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if future operations
are supportable from the perspective of that staff section’s function. The estimate
focuses on supportability of the potential mission from that staff section’s functional
view. This estimate helps the staff provide recommendations to the commander on the
best COA to accomplish the mission. The staff estimate also provides continuity among
the various members of the staff section. If the staff has not already begun a staff
estimate by this point, it should do so now.

Note: See Annex D for a staff estimate template (based on JP 5-0, Annex B)

The estimates are also valuable to planners in subordinate and supporting

commands as they prepare supporting plans. Although the staff can delay documenting
the estimates until after the preparation of the commander’s estimate, they should send

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them to subordinate and supporting commanders in time to help them prepare annexes
for their supporting plans.

b. Analyze higher headquarters planning directives and strategic guidance. Much of

the work of this step is done in the commander’s framing work as he looks at the
operational design of the campaign. The staff must start with the commander’s
understanding of the environment and the framing of the problem, while reviewing
guidance received from higher headquarters and other relevant actors. The staff will first
focus on the end state and objectives. The end state gets to the "why" of a campaign
plan and seeks to answer the question, "How does the U.S. strategic leadership want
the OE to function at the conclusion of the campaign?" Objectives normally answer the
question, “What needs to be done to achieve the end state?” The commander and staff
must also understand the desired conditions and objectives described in strategic
guidance so that they can understand what their campaign must achieve. See a
description of the relationship between end state, termination criteria, and objectives in
Chapter 3.

Answering the "why" and "how" questions of the higher headquarters is different at the
strategic level when compared to the operational and tactical levels. Often, there is no
clear, definitive guidance collected in one location. There is no "higher order" from
which a planner can simply "cut and paste" the pieces into the emerging plan’s OPORD.
Instead, much of the CCDR's strategic guidance is less clearly defined.

Since partners within integrated planning may have different guidance, if time permits
the staff should look for overlaps, gaps, and friction points that may exist between U.S.
Government strategic guidance and that of other nations/organizations who are also
interested in the problem.

c. Review the commander’s initial planning guidance. The commander should

develop his initial understanding of the environment and of the problem, and an initial
vision of the campaign or operation by using operational design as early as possible in
campaign development. The staff should recognize that this is initial guidance, which
will mature as the staff provides detailed analysis to the commander to inform his
operational design.

d. Determine facts and assumptions. Facts are the major pieces of information
known to be true and that are pertinent to the planning effort. First, understand and
summarize the geostrategic factors derived from analysis of the OE that will influence
the strategic end state. This synopsis is no mere laundry list of factors, but a synthesis
of the key factors in the OE that will enhance mission analysis. To answer this question,
consider the long- and short-term political causes of conflict, domestic influences
(including public will), competing demands for resources, economic realities, legal and
moral implications, international interests, positions of international organizations, and
the impact of information.

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 The JPG should leverage the strategic estimate as a useful means to organize and
consider geostrategic factors in an attempt to gain a better understanding of their impact
and interrelationships. This analysis includes not only the PMESII analysis, but also the
physical characteristics (topography, hydrography, climate, weather, and demographics)
and temporal characteristics (the effect of timing aspects on the OE and on the
campaign). The key is to determine potential effects of these physical and temporal
aspects on possible operations of friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy military forces
and other instruments of power. Additionally, the planners should assess factors such
as adversary organization, communications, technology, industrial base, manpower and
mobilization capacity, and transportation.

The staff develops assumptions to continue the planning process in the absence of
facts. Assumptions are placeholders to fill knowledge gaps, but they play a crucial role
in planning and must be held to a minimum throughout planning. These assumptions
require constant revalidation and reassessment. Facts should replace them as more
information becomes available.

Plans may contain assumptions that cannot be resolved until a

potential crisis develops. As a crisis develops, assumptions
should be replaced with facts as soon as possible. The staff
accomplishes this by identifying the information needed to
validate assumptions and submitting an information request to an
appropriate agency as an information requirement. If the
commander needs the information to make a key decision, the
information requirement can be designated a CCIR. Although there
may be exceptions, the staff should strive to resolve all
assumptions before issuing the OPORD. (JP 5-0, p. V-9)

All assumptions should be identified in the plan or decision

matrix to ensure they are reviewed and validated prior to
execution. (JP 5-0, p. V-9)

A planning assumption must be logical, realistic, and essential to continuing the

analysis and planning. It is logical and realistic if there is sufficient evidence to suggest
that it will become a fact. It is essential if required for planning to continue. Assumptions
should also be clear and precise. Normally, the higher the command echelon, the more
initial assumptions exist. Incorrect or risky assumptions may partially or completely
invalidate the entire plan. The JPG should develop branches for assumptions to the
basic plan that, if untrue, would derail the plan. Examples of theater-level assumptions
are:

 Political:
o Countries A & B will allow over-flight, basing and host nation support.
o Countries C & D will remain neutral.
o Country E will support Country X with air and naval forces only.

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  Forces:
o APS 3 and MPS 1 & 2 will be available for employment at C+10.
o A CSG and a MEU/ARG are forward deployed in theater.
 Timeline:
o Major deployments begin upon unambiguous warning of enemy attack.
o There will be X days unambiguous warning prior to enemy attack.

 Enemy:
o Country X’s forces can sustain an offensive for seven days before
culmination.
o Country X will use chemical weapons once coalition forces cross the
border.

e. Determine and analyze operational limitations. Limitations are the restrictions

placed on the commander’s freedom of action. They may be part of strategic direction
or stem from regional or international considerations or relationships. Limiting factors
are generally categorized as constraints or restraints.

Constraints: a requirement, “must do,” placed on the command by a

higher command that dictates an action, thus restricting freedom
of action (JP 5-0, p. V-10), e.g., defend a specific site, include Country Y in
the coalition with its caveats, meet a time suspense, or eliminate a specific enemy force.

Restraints: a requirement, “cannot do,” placed on the command by

a higher command that prohibits an action, thus restricting
freedom of action. (JP 5-0, p. V-10), e.g., do not conduct preemptive or
cross-border operations before declared hostilities, do not approach the enemy coast
closer than 30 nautical miles, or do not decisively commit forces. Restraints are "must
not do" actions.

Many operational limitations are commonly expressed as ROE. …

Other operational limitations may arise from laws or
authorities, such as the use of specific types of funds or
training events. Commanders are responsible for ensuring they
have the authority to execute operations and activities. (JP 5-
0, p. V-10)

f. Determine specified and implied tasks and develop essential tasks. Analyze
strategic direction to determine the strategic tasks specified or implied as a part of the
given strategic end state and objectives. Examples of specified tasks to a combatant
command might be:
 Deter Country X from coercing its neighbors.
 Stop Country X’s aggression against its neighbors.
 Reduce Country X’s WMD inventory, production, & delivery means.
 Remove Country X’s regime.

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 These tasks focus on achieving the end state and are extracted from guidance from
higher echelons. They are broad tasks that may require integrating many instruments of
national power and the action of several elements of the joint force. Finally, they do not
specify actions by components or forces.

After identifying specified tasks, the staff identifies additional, major tasks necessary
to accomplish the assigned mission. These additional, major tasks are implied tasks –
those the joint force must do to accomplish specified tasks. Tasks that are inherent
responsibilities, such as deploy, conduct reconnaissance, sustain, are not implied tasks
unless successful execution requires coordination with or support of other commanders.
Examples of implied tasks are:

 Build and maintain a coalition.

 Conduct Non-combatant Evacuation Operations.
 Destroy Country X’s armored corps.
 Provide military government in the wake of regime removal.

Essential tasks are those that the command must execute

successfully to attain the desired end state defined in the
planning directive. The commander and staff determine essential
tasks from the lists of both specified and implied tasks.
Depending on the scope of the operation and its purpose, the
commander may synthesize certain specified and implied task
statements into an essential task statement. (JP 5-0, p. V-11)

g. Develop the initial mission statement. After identifying the essential tasks, and with
the context of the relationship of those tasks to the achievement of the national end
state and military end state, the staff normally develops a derived mission statement
using the format of who, what, when, where, and why. This statement should be a
direct, brief, and effective articulation of the essential tasks and purpose for military
operations.

Since mission statements are primarily intended to focus the staff, military
subordinates, and supporting commands, translation of the wording of tasks into
doctrinal terms for completion is important. Mission statement refinement during the
entire plan development process, and, in fact, throughout execution of the campaign, is
important to ensure that it meets the needs of the commander and the national
leadership. A mission statement might look like this:

When directed, USORANGECOM employs joint forces in

concert with coalition partners to deter Country X from coercing
its neighbors and proliferating WMD. If deterrence fails, the
coalition will defeat X’s Armed Forces; destroy known WMD
production, storage, and delivery capabilities; destroy its ability
to project offensive force across its borders; stabilize the
theater, and transition monitoring to a UN peacekeeping force.

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 h. Conduct initial force and resource analysis.

(1) The SecDef issues the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance
(GFMIG). For campaign and contingency planning, planners must review the GFMIG
and GFMAP. In a crisis, assigned and allocated forces currently
deployed to the geographic CCMD’s AOR may be the most responsive
during the early stages of an emergent crisis. Planners may
consider assigned forces as likely to be available to conduct
activities unless allocated to a higher priority. Re-missioning
previously allocated forces may require SecDef approval and
should be coordinated through the JS. (JP 5-0, p. V-12)

It is important to note shortfalls in forces that were apportioned for planning but
may not actually be available for execution due to readiness issues or previous
commitments. Determine if the forces available are sufficient to accomplish the mission
and the specified and implied tasks. This is a preliminary look, recognizing that detailed
force requirements cannot be determined until a concept of operations is developed.
However, it is necessary to enable the command to identify significant force and
capability shortfalls early in the planning process to 1) alert higher headquarters that
additional forces and capabilities will be required; and 2) develop feasible COAs.

(2) In many types of operations, the commander (and planners) may have access
to non-force resources, such as commander’s initiative funds, other funding sources
(such as train and equip funding, support to foreign security forces funding, etc.), or can
work with other security assistance programs (foreign military sales, excess defense
article transfers, etc.). Planners and commanders can weave together resources and
authorities from several different programs to create successful operations. (JP 5-0, p.
V-12)

i. Develop mission success criteria. These criteria describe the standards

for determining mission accomplishment. …. Specific success
criteria can be utilized for development of supporting
objectives, effects, and tasks and therefore become the basis
for operation assessment. These also help the JFC determine if
and when to move to the next phase. The initial set of criteria
determined during mission analysis becomes the basis for
operation assessment. (JP 5-0, p. V-12). For example, if the mission is to
conduct a NEO, the mission success criteria might be: 1) all U.S. personnel evacuated
safely; and 2) no violations of the rules of engagement (ROE) (JP 5-0).

Mission success criteria should be set not only for the overall campaign, but also for
each subordinate phase or operation. Since these success criteria should be echeloned
and nested, they will necessarily be different for each level of command, focused on
accomplishment of that command’s mission.

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 j. Develop COA Evaluation Criteria. These criteria are standards the
commander and staff will later use to measure the relative
effectiveness and efficiency of one COA relative to other COAs.
Developing these criteria during mission analysis or as part of
commander’s planning guidance helps to eliminate a source of
bias prior to COA analysis and comparison. Evaluation criteria
address factors that affect success and those that can cause
failure. (JP 5-0, p. V-13)

k. Conduct preliminary Risk Assessment. Determining military risk is

more an art than a science…Identify the obstacles or actions
that may preclude mission accomplishment and then assess the
impact of these impediments to the mission. Once planners
identify the obstacles or actions, they assess the probability
of achieving objectives and severity of loss linked to an
obstacle or action, and characterize the military risk. Based on
judgment, military risk assessment is an integration of
probability and consequence of an identified impediment.

Planners and commanders need to be able to explain military

risk to civilian leadership who may not be as familiar with
military operations as they are. Additionally, since military
risk is often a matter of perspective and personal experience,
they must be able to help decision makers understand how they
evaluated the probability of accomplishing objectives, how they
characterized the resultant military risk, and the sources or
causes of that risk.

During decision briefs, risks must be explained using standard

terms that support the decision-making process, such as mission
success (which missions will and which will not be
accomplished), time (how much longer will a mission take to
achieve success), and forces (casualties, future readiness,
etc.), and political implications. (JP 5-0, p. V-14)

Some examples:
 The viability of the coalition will be threatened by a prolonged
campaign.
 Pressure from Country M may cause Country Z to limit the use of
its seaports by the U.S. military in the campaign.
 If friendly military operations in Country X cause collateral
damage to infrastructure and personnel from Country M who are
working in Country X, then Country M may deploy protective
military forces to Country X, risking escalation of the conflict.

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 l. Identify initial Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR). CCIRs are
elements of information the commander identifies as being
critical to timely decision making. CCIRs help focus information
management and help the commander assess the OE, validate (or
refute) assumptions, identify accomplishment of intermediate
objectives, and identify decision points during operations.
CCIRs belong exclusively to the commander. They are situation-
dependent, focused on predictable events or activities, time-
sensitive, and always established by an order or plan. The CCIR
list is normally short so that the staff can focus its efforts
and allocate scarce resources. (JP 5-0, p. V-14)

Doctrine lists two types of CCIR:

Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR). PIRs focus on the adversary

and the OE and are tied to commander’s decision points. (JP 5-0,
p. V-15)

Friendly Force Information Requirement (FFIR). FFIRs focus on

information the JFC must have to assess the status of the
friendly force and supporting capabilities. (JP 5-0, p. V-15)

PIRs are often expressed in terms of the elements of PMESII

while FFIRs are often expressed in terms of the diplomatic,
informational, military, and economic instruments of national
power. All are developed to support specific decisions the
commander must make. (JP 5-0, p. V-15)

m. Update staff estimates. Staff officers should update their estimates with their
analysis of the mission now that they have a better idea of what the functional
requirements may be.

n. Prepare and deliver the mission analysis brief. The purpose of the mission
analysis brief is to provide to the commander and the staff, as well as other key
partners, the results of the staff’s analysis. See Figure 4-5 for a possible briefing
agenda. The commander has likely been continuing his own analysis in parallel so this
brief should be an opportunity to dialogue about the mission. At the conclusion of the
brief, the commander should not only approve or modify the command’s mission, but
also provide his understanding and vision of the campaign or operation through
commander’s intent and planning guidance. Depending on how much time the
commander has had to think about the situation, he may update his initial intent and
guidance that he discerned through his operational design.

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 Figure 4-5: Sample Mission Analysis Brief Agenda

o. Develop and issue the refined commander’s intent and planning guidance. The
commander now uses the understanding he has gained through his operational design,
informed additionally through the mission analysis process, along with his experience,
education, and wisdom, to update his vision for the campaign. This vision is the
commander’s personal insight on how he will employ military operations, in conjunction
with interagency and multinational efforts to apply all instruments of power, to achieve
success. This vision, provided through commander’s intent and planning guidance, will
facilitate military course of action development, as well as proposed actions among the
interagency that he believes will accomplish the desired national strategic end state and
objectives.

(1) The commander’s intent is a concise narrative describing the key aspects of
his understanding of the environment and the problem and his visualization (Purpose,
Method, End state) of how the campaign must progress to achieve the desired end
state. He uses operational design to build his intent, enriching both his understanding
and visualization through interaction with the staff as it progresses through the planning
process. The purpose of commander’s intent is to focus the staff and assist
subordinates and supporting commanders in taking actions to achieve the desired end
state, even when operations do not unfold as planned. Given the complexities of the OE

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at any joint level, the commander must empower subordinates to make decisions within
an overall vision for success in the campaign. Using mission command, the commander
leaves much of the detailed planning and execution of joint warfighting to his
subordinate commanders and requires them to use initiative and judgment to
accomplish the mission.

At the strategic level, commander’s intent will be much broader than at the tactical
level. It must provide an overall vision for the campaign that helps the staff and
subordinate commanders, as well as other non-U.S. and non-military partners, to
understand the intent to integrate all instruments of national power and achieve unified
action. The commander must envision and articulate how joint operations will dominate
the adversary and support or reinforce other actions by interagency partners and our
allies to achieve strategic success. Through his intent, the commander identifies the
major unifying efforts during the campaign, the points and events where operations
must dominate the enemy and control conditions in the OE, and where other
instruments of national power will play a central role. He links national strategic
objectives to military objectives, and lays the foundation for the desired conditions of the
military/theater end state. Essential elements of commander’s intent follow:

 Purpose clearly answers the question, "Why are we conducting this

campaign?" This explanation may look a lot like the national strategic end state.
However, it must state to subordinate and supporting commanders why the use of the
military instrument of national power is essential to achieve U.S. policy and the strategic
end state. This articulation is essential not only to achieve a unity of purpose among
subordinate commands, but is also crucial to provide a purpose around which military
commanders may build consensus with interagency and multinational partners. Thus,
this statement is vital to build the unity of purpose amongst key shareholders that
precedes unity of effort in planning and execution.
 End state specifies the desired military end state. Along with higher
guidance, the commander uses the military end state developed during his operational
design and mission analysis as a basis to articulate this statement of military success.
Additionally, since military forces may have to support other instruments of national
power, the commander also explains how and when these supporting efforts will
conclude at the termination of violence.
 Operational Risk focuses on mission accomplishment. The commander
defines the portions of the campaign in which he will accept risk in slower or partial
mission accomplishment, including a range of acceptable risk and how assuming risk in
these areas may or may not impact overall outcome of the mission.

Commander’s intent may also include other items, which assist the staff,
subordinate commands, and coalition partners to share more fully the commander’s
vision for unified action. Other possible elements of commander’s intent are:
 Objectives provide clear statements of goals of the campaign that, in
combination, will lead to achievement of the military end state. The commander may
also relate the campaign objectives to the national strategic objectives to enable the

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staff to better develop COAs that will ensure proper nesting, and better enable planning
interaction of all instruments of power.
 Effects Guidance provides a vision of the conditions and behaviors in the OE
that must be in place at the successful conclusion of the campaign. This guidance
enables the staff to better link the objectives as visualized by the commander with
concepts of operation that may result in tasks to achieve those objectives.
 Method provides a visualization for subordinates on arrangement and
synchronization of the major operations to develop future options for action. While
method will focus on how the commander envisions operations to achieve the military
end state, it should also explain how to support policy aims as the command becomes a
supporting effort to the final achievement of the U.S. strategic ends at conflict
termination. Method does not describe the specific conduct of these operations; it
enhances concept of operation development and understanding by others, but does not
describe those details. The commander generally should not give detailed guidance on
the method so as to allow maximum flexibility to the JPG in developing COAs.

(2) Once the commander has given his intent for the upcoming campaign, he will
normally provide the JPG/staff and subordinate commanders with updated planning
guidance that provides additional clarity and detail essential to facilitate timely and
effective COA development. The commander will have built this planning guidance
through his own operational design approach, as enriched by the staff’s analysis.
Planning guidance should enable the staff and components to understand the major
themes and guiding principles for the campaign and develop detailed COAs for action.
However, guidance should not be so specific as to limit the staff from investigating a full
range of options for the commander. Planning guidance will provide a framework, the
"left and right limits," to develop options to integrate the use of military and non-military
power. The content of planning guidance is at the discretion of the commander and
depends on the situation and time available. No format for the planning guidance is
prescribed. This refined planning guidance should include the
following elements:
 (a)An approved mission statement.
 (b)Key elements of the OE.
 (c)A clear statement of the problem.
 (d)Key assumptions.
 (e)Key operational limitations.
 (f)National strategic objectives with a description of
how the operation will support them.
 (g)Termination criteria (if appropriate, CCMD-level
campaign plans will not have termination criteria and
many operations will have transitions rather than
termination).
 (h)Military objectives or end state and their relation
to the national strategic end state.

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  (i) The JFC’s initial thoughts on the conditions
necessary to achieve objectives.
 (j)Acceptable or unacceptable levels of risk in key
areas.
 (k)The JFCs visualization of the operational approach
to achieve the objectives in broad terms. This
operational approach sets the basis for development of
COAs. The commander should provide as much detail as
appropriate to provide the right level of freedom to
the staff in developing COAs. Planning guidance should
also address the role of interorganizational and
multinational partners in the pending operation and
any related special considerations as required.(JP 5-
0, p. V-19)

The commander may provide guidance in a variety of ways and formats, based
on his preference. He may provide it to the entire staff and/or subordinate commanders,
or meet each staff officer or subordinate unit commander individually as dictated by
geography, security, and type and volume of information. Additionally, the commander
can give guidance in written or verbal form. The key challenge is to ensure universal
understanding of this guidance across all elements of the command, a wide range of
supporting commands, and enabling agencies. The commander may issue updated
planning guidance throughout the decision making process. Because the COA
development process will continue to analyze the OE and examine effects on enemy,
neutral, and friendly elements, the commander may participate in the COA development
process as the JPG examines issues, challenges, and limitations. This engagement
may also cause the commander to revisit his operational design for the campaign.
Consequently, there is no limitation as to the number of times the commander may
refine and reissue his planning guidance.

p. In Progress Review. At the theater level and as part of the plans review process,
CCDRs conduct a series of in-progress reviews with the SecDef (or his designated
representative) to keep the orientation of the campaign planning in line with the thinking
of the national leadership. If the combatant command does not identify the correct end
state and corresponding objectives to orient the campaign, further planning is
meaningless. Based on strategic direction, the supported CCDR will participate in this
first of up to three IPRs to ensure the CCDR’s views are in-synch with those of the
SecDef before further planning proceeds. The CCDR will normally present his initial
analysis in the form of a briefing (at most, a few slides) that synopsizes his
understanding of strategic guidance, the linkage of the theater/military end state to the
national end state, the analysis of facts and assumptions, and proposed mission and
intent for the upcoming campaign. These IPRs have evolved to be more about dialogue
between civilian and military leaders than about concrete approval. The national
decision makers always want to keep options open and do not like to be conceptually
“boxed in,” even when the CCDR needs some form of approval to allow continued
planning.

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 The commander considers his operational design as complemented and
supplemented by the staff’s analysis. While the staff has been focused on the planning
aspects, the commander has continued to apply an operational design approach to the
overall situation. Through his dialogue with the national policy makers (President,
SecDef, CJCS), Joint Staff, military service chiefs, other supporting commands and
agencies, allies, subordinate commanders, academia, think tanks, and others, he
continues to enrich his understanding of the environment and the problem, and
continues to extend and refine his visualization of the campaign. Through his
experience and application of operational design, he is able to sense changes in the
environment and refocus his understanding as appropriate. He transmits this increased
understanding and visualization to his staff and subordinates as often as he believes
there is need for updated focus. The CCDR brings his most recent understanding and
visualization to the SecDef IPR.

A result of the first IPR is a common view of the problem and mission analysis and
initial estimate insights. The SecDef will provide further guidance to guide continued
operational design and planning. The CCDR uses these results to refine his vision for
the campaign and provide further guidance to both staff and subordinate commands on
how they should begin developing options for future, unified action. See Annex A for
more on SecDef IPRs.

4. Develop Courses of Action. The commander and staff will work together to refine
and develop the commander’s initial vision and intent for the campaign into a specific,
well-developed concept to accomplish unified action. See Figure 4-5 for the inputs,
outputs, and potential steps involved. The staff supports the commander through in-
depth analysis and presentation of a range of options for future military and non-military
actions that will accomplish the desired strategic and military ends. One way staffs help
commanders refine their visualization is to develop alternative Courses of Action (COA)
to execute the commander’s envisioned operational approach and achieve the
objectives.

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 Figure 4-6: JPP Step 3 – Develop Courses of Action

a. A COA is a potential way (solution, method) to accomplish

the assigned mission. The staff develops COAs to provide unique
[alternatives] to the commander, all oriented on accomplishing
the military end state. A good COA accomplishes the mission
within the commander’s guidance, provides flexibility to meet
unforeseen events during execution, and positions the joint
force for future operations. It also gives components the
maximum latitude for initiative. JP 5-0, p. V-20). (Alternatives
was substituted to remove some ambiguity and confusion.)

Each COA will expand [on the Operational Approach] with the
additional details that describe who will take the action, what
type of military action will occur, when the action will begin,
where the action will occur, why the action is required
(purpose), and how the action will occur (method of employment
of forces). (JP 5-0, p. V-20). Each COA also describes, in broad
but clear terms, the size of forces deemed necessary, time in
which joint force capabilities need to be brought to bear, and
the risks associated with the COA. These COAs will undergo

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additional validity testing, analysis, wargaming, and
comparison, and they could be eliminated at any point during
this process. (JP 5-0, pp. V-20, 21).

For each COA, the staff must enable the commander to envision the holistic
employment of friendly forces and assets, taking into account externally-imposed
limitations, the factual situation in the area of operations, and the conclusions from
mission analysis. Equally important, the commander must envision how military force
will work in conjunction with the other instruments of national power to achieve military
and strategic ends. The LOOs/LOEs, objectives, and decisive points developed during
operational design should drive and shape COA development.

(b) COA Development Techniques and Procedures

(1) Review information – ensure understanding of the mission, tasks, and

commander’s intent among the staff.

(2) Determine opposing courses of action. Before developing possible COAs, the
staff must gain an appreciation of what other actors may do to shape the future
environment to their desired end state. They can use the JIPOE process to help them
gain such an appreciation, though they must consider not only enemy and adversary
actions, but also neutral and friendly actions that may (unintentionally) impede
achievement of their desired end state.

The staff determines how other relevant actors will attempt to accomplish their
strategic goals by identifying their likely objectives and desired end states, potential
strategic and military capabilities, and estimate how the opposition leader may apply his
instruments of power in the future – the opposing courses of action (OCOAs). They
must also consider aspects of other adversarial and even neutral actors’ courses of
action as they may either support or limit achievement of our desired end state.

The staff’s analysis should identify all known factors affecting the opposition’s
actions, including time, space, weather, terrain, and the strength and disposition of
military forces, as well as other key factors that may oppose achievement of our desired
conditions. The analysis of military capabilities should look across the air, space,
maritime, land, and cyberspace domains. [Cyberspace planning tips can be found in
https://csl.armywarcollege.edu/USACSL/Publications/Strategic_Cyberspace_Operations
_Guide.pdf ]

(3) Developing OCOAs requires the commander and his staff to think as the
opponent thinks. From that perspective, they postulate possible adversary objectives
first and then visualize specific actions within the capabilities of adversary forces to
achieve these objectives. Potential adversary actions relating to specific, physical
objectives normally must be combined to form course of action statements. Below are
the key elements of an OCOA, which may be in the form of a sketch, or a narrative, or a
combination:

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  Adversary objectives.
 Adversary force posture at the outset of the conflict.
 How the adversary will employ his instruments of power to accomplish
objectives.
 Adversary posture when the conflict is over.
 Aspects of the desired OE opposed by neutral or friendly actors.
 Posture of relevant neutral actors at the outset of conflict.
 Likely actions taken by neutral or friendly actors that may impede, or assist,
achievement of our desired conditions.

The staff will identify for the commander both the most-dangerous OCOA, as
well as the most-likely OCOA, based upon the situation anticipated and/or at hand.
Often, the most-likely and most-dangerous OCOAs are not the same, so there must be
a conscious decision for the baseline assumption OCOA for friendly planning. Usually,
commanders consider the most-likely OCOA as their baseline for friendly action unless
the consequences of not focusing on the most-dangerous OCOA preclude doing
otherwise.

A thinking and adaptive adversary will change perspectives and OCOAs to

maximize his chances for success based on how his opponent (the American JFC)
succeeds in changing the OE. Regardless of which OCOA supports the baseline
planning effort, staffs must develop branches for the others, as time permits. After
OCOA selection to support baseline planning, the staff develops a listing of associated
adversary vulnerabilities for friendly-force exploitation and neutral/friendly potential
actions that need to be mitigated. This list will aid in analysis of friendly COAs against
the selected baseline OCOA, and assist with determination of the advantages and
disadvantages of friendly COAs during JPP Step 5 COA comparison.

Finally, this analysis will not only influence the JPG’s development of COAs, but
will also form the basis to focus and develop PIR and those FFIR related to potentially
unhelpful friendly and neutral actions. Based upon the commander’s guidance, PIR
serve as the focus to develop collection-and-analysis efforts and forwarding requests for
information (RFI) to supporting agencies. The staff can focus efforts to collect, process,
produce, and disseminate the required intelligence and other information.

(4) Determine the COA Development Technique – a critical

first decision in COA development is whether to conduct
simultaneous or sequential development of the COAs. Each
approach has distinct advantages and disadvantages. The
advantage of simultaneous development of COAs is potential time
savings. Separate groups are simultaneously working on different
COAs. The disadvantage of this approach is that the synergy of
the JPG may be disrupted by breaking up the team. (JP 5-0, p. V-
23).

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 (5) Review operational objectives and tasks and develop ways
to accomplish tasks.

The JPG will analyze the commander’s guidance to develop a more detailed
framework of nested objectives and effects (see Figure 4-7) for accomplishment during
the campaign to achieve the military end state. In refining the commander’s operational
design, the staff analyzes how the broad, overarching guidance for the campaign will
break down into more detailed and achievable blocks as the campaign unfolds. This
analysis of nested objectives and effects provides a framework for the logical
development of tasks by components and functions that will achieve the desired
conditions in the OE. With this framework, the staff then identifies the key tasks that
must be performed to achieve the commander’s visualization.

Figure 4-7: Relationship Between End State,

Objectives, Effects, and Tasks

(a) The national strategic end state describes the conditions that must be met
from a unified action point of view in order to achieve or preserve U.S. national
interests. These conditions will often be similar to the termination criteria for the
campaign or major operation.

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 (b) The military end state describes the conditions that the military must
achieve, through the accomplishment of its assigned objectives, in support of the
national strategic end state. It is also the point beyond which the President does not
need the military to serve as primary instrument of national power to achieve the
remaining national objectives or interests. However, this does not indicate the cessation
of all military activity. The military might still conduct transition activities, force
protection, reconstitution, and redeployment after the military end state has been
achieved.

(c) Objectives are the clearly-defined, decisive, and attainable goals toward which
joint capability is focused to accomplish the military end state. Military objectives are
one of the most important considerations in operational design and campaign or major
operation planning. They define the role of military forces in the larger context of – and
nested within – national strategic objectives. They specify what to accomplish and
provide the basis to describe campaign effects. Although the commander describes his
visualization of the campaign’s objectives in his intent and guidance, his staff should
verify and refine them.

(d) An effect is a physical and/or behavioral state of a

system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another
effect (JP 3-0, p. GL-8). Effects bridge the gap between objectives and tasks
by describing the conditions that need to be established through performance of tasks
to accomplish objectives. This helps commanders and staffs visualize achievement of
objectives, so they can develop the required tasks. From subordinate headquarters
receiving tasks, effects can be seen as providing the "purpose" to tasks. Effects may be
expressed in two ways:
 Desired Effects: "How do we want the environment to
behave when we reach end state, or at particular points of
the campaign en route to the end state?"
 Undesired Effects: "What are the behaviors and conditions in
the OE that we must avoid during the campaign?"

Other agencies and partners can use the desired effects to help them visualize
their activities to support the military activity if it is the primary means of achieving
objectives, or how they will be supported by military activity if they provide the key
means to achieve national strategic objectives. Thus, effects may be a prime means to
bridge military and interagency understanding by describing how the OE should behave
to show policy achievement.

Joint doctrine has no specific convention for writing effects, but there are four
primary considerations according to JP 5-0:
 They should link directly to one or more objectives.
 They should be stated as conditions of the environment, not as another
objective or task.
 They should be measurable.
 They should not specify ways and means for accomplishment.

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 Once the commander and staff understand the objectives and effects that define
the campaign, they then develop appropriate tasks to create the desired effects, and
preclude undesired effects. Not all tasks are connected to effects, e.g., support tasks
related to logistics and communications. However, the commander emphasizes the
development of effects-related tasks early in the planning process because of the
obvious importance of these tasks to objective accomplishment. The following is an
example of the nesting of these components:

(e) Endstate: Regional stability, territorial integrity, and trade are restored to pre-
conflict levels. Newland no longer threatens Oldland or the region through the use of
insurgency or state-sponsored terrorism.

(f) Objective 1: Restore and protect Oldland’s (our key partner and neighbor of
Newland) western border with Newland IAW the 1956 agreement.

 Effect 1: Oldland’s Armed Forces and police are capable of providing for
internal defense against insurgency and terrorism.
 Effect 2: Oldland’s military is an active participant in regional security
structures.
o Task 1: Build and implement a robust security cooperation program
with Oldland.
o Task 2: Enable Oldland military participation in annual exercises
Assured Resolve, Python Quest, and Iron Fist.

(5) Synchronize actions. - Once the staff has begun to visualize

COA alternatives, it should see how it can best synchronize
(arrange in terms of time, space, and purpose) the actions of
all the elements of the force. (JP 5-0, p. V-24). There are four
traditional methods to organize and synchronize actions: Phasing, Lines of Effort, Joint
Functions, and Components.

Because COAs are meant to be initial concepts, designating phases at this point
may not be useful. One possible method of visualizing the sequence during COA
development is to organize tasks and lines of operation/effort into Pre-hostilities,
Hostilities, and Post-hostilities periods vice more detailed phases.

Develop an initial concept graphic and narrative. Based upon the initial framework,
the JPG visualizes how to accomplish these objectives/effects over time. The staff
develops an initial concept narrative and, if appropriate, a graphic that describes the
major actions of the campaign as a useful reference.

(6) COGs and decisive points (or areas of influence for CCMD-
level campaigns). The commander and the staff review and refine
their COG analysis begun during [operational design] based on
updated intelligence, JIPOE products, and initial staff
estimates. The refined enemy and friendly COG analysis,

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particularly the critical vulnerabilities, is considered in the
development of the initial COAs. The COG analysis helps the
commander become oriented to the enemy and compare friendly
strengths and weaknesses. (JP 5-0, p. V-25). (Operational Design
inserted to remove some inconsistencies within JP 5-0)

Review the operational centers of gravity (COG) as the point of focus for the
operations and post the major physical and logical decisive points that will be relevant to
the COA. These might include ports, population centers, critical infrastructure, major
events such as elections, support of key actors, etc. During COA development, these
serve as points where friendly actions can, and probably will, come in contact with the
enemy, and serve to orient planners on where major tasks/actions must focus.

(7) Identify the sequencing (simultaneous, sequential, or a

combination) of the actions for each COA. Understand when and
what resources become available during the operation or
campaign. (JP 5-0, p. V-25).

 Array Forces at Military End state. Position forces geographically where they
are needed in the theater at the end of the campaign and determine what those forces
will do. Use the sketch to help visualize the forces and their locations.
 Identify Initial Entry Points. Based on initial guidance and knowledge of theater
access and facilities, display where the forces can enter the theater from land, air, and
sea deployments, and show the initial bases/staging areas available to support this
deployment. Also portray the initial lines of communication that will connect forces back
to in-theater (intermediate staging bases) and strategic (CONUS or forward-deployed)
bases of operations.
 Maneuver the Forces Forward to Military End State. Looking at the sketch with
the end state and objectives/effects by period (or phase) in mind, determine the best
way to get the forces into theater from bases in friendly territory to their ultimate
locations at the end of the campaign. This activity will help formulate the desired basing
plan for the beginning, middle, and end of the campaign.
 Array Forces at Pre-Hostilities. Visualize force positioning in Pre-hostilities
after they enter the theater at these potential entry points, and formulate the initial
concept for a basing plan and Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and
Integration (JRSOI).

(8) Identify main and supporting efforts by phase, the purposes

of these efforts, and key supporting/supported relationships
within phases. (JP 5-0, p. V-25). At this point in initial concept
development, there is no need to specify who the main effort is, but identifying what is
the main effort is important.

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 (9) Identify a Reserve that can exploit success or prevent disaster. Identify
decision points and assessment process. The commander will need
to know when a critical decision has to be made and how to know
specific objectives have been achieved. (JP 5-0, p. V-25).

(10) Identify component-level missions/tasks (who, what, and

where) that will accomplish the stated purposes of main and
supporting efforts. Think of component and joint function tasks
such as movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, protection,
sustainment, C2, and information. Display them with graphic
control measures as much as possible. A designated LOO will help
identify these tasks. (JP 5-0, p. V-25).

During each of the periods, analyze how military and non-military actions will
accomplish the required changes in the operational environment. It is not important yet
to identify which subordinate organization will accomplish each of the actions, which are
the tasks. It is, however, important to identify suitable tasks for or requests to our
interagency partners (DOS, Dept. of Treasury, etc.), coalition and international
organizations (UN, NATO, regional organizations like the European Union, etc.), and
other non-governmental partners (International Committee of the Red Cross, etc.).

Focus on the effects to achieve or to avoid, and consider how to employ joint forces
(via the joint functions) in conjunction with other instruments of power. Considerations
for tasks include:
 Tasks required by the main effort.
 Tasks required by the supporting efforts.
 Initial entry into theater: basing, access, and overflight.
 Deployment and reception of the force (JRSOI).
 Protection of forces and host-nation points of entry.
 Building and maintaining a coalition force.
 C2 with joint, host-nation, and coalition forces.
 Achieving the desired effects.
 Preventing undesired effects/events, such as a humanitarian crisis, loss of
local support, etc.
 Tasks required to support the use of other instruments of power.
 Tasks to protect the force from cyber-attack or exploit the use of cyber-
attack.
 Sustaining the joint force, and additional support required to enable and
maintain host-nation and coalition participation.
 Post-hostilities conditions, and how the joint force will maintain military
gains and transform them into long-term strategic success.

Determine if the forces and capabilities allocated and/or are sufficient to meet the
task requirements. Note any deficiencies. Sketch a troop-to-task analysis to help with
determining the appropriate command structure.

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 (11) Integrate Information-Related Capabilities (IRCs). Some
IRCs help to create effects and influence adversary decision
making. Planners should consider how IRCs can influence
positioning of adversary units, disrupt adversary C2, and
decrease adversary morale when developing COAs. (JP 5-0, p. V-
26)

(12) Task Organization.

(a) The staff should develop an outline task organization to

execute the COA. The commander and staff determine appropriate
command relationships and appropriate missions and tasks.

(b) Determine command relationships and organizational

options - determine the types of subordinate commands and the
degree of authority to be delegated to each. Clear definition of
command relationships further clarifies the intent of the
commander and contributes to decentralized execution and unity
of effort. (JP 5-0, p. V-26)

At this point, identify the basics of how you will organize, by components any
JTFs requirements, and how the joint force will control or coordinate its efforts with the
host nation, multinational forces, and interagency elements as necessary. Again, this
structure is an initial organization around which to continue COA development, and may
change when tested in wargaming. Some considerations:
 Geometry – how to allocate the battle space (e.g. joint operations area,
joint special operations area, or joint security area).
 Organization (functional components, service components).
 Interagency considerations (coordination mechanisms).
 Multinational considerations (initial coalition command/coordinating
structure).

(13) Sustainment Concept - The sustainment concept … entails

identifying the requirements for all classes of supply, creating
distribution, transportation, OCS, and disposition plans to
support the commander’s execution, and organizing capabilities
and resources into an overall theater campaign or operation
sustainment concept. It concentrates forces and material
resources strategically so the right force is available at the
designated times and places to conduct decisive operations. (JP
5-0, p. V-26).

(14) Deployment Concept - describe the general flow of forces

into theater. There is no way to determine the feasibility of
the COA without including the deployment concept. While the

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detailed deployment concept will be developed during plan
synchronization, enough of the concept must be described in the
COA to visualize force buildup, sustainment requirements, and
military-political considerations. (JP 5-0, p. V-27).

(15) Define the Operational Area (OA).

 OAs include, but are not limited to, such descriptors

as AOR, theater of war, theater of operations, JOA,
amphibious objective area, joint special operations
area, and area of operations. Except for AOR, which is
assigned in the UCP, GCCs and their subordinate JFCs
designate smaller OAs on a temporary basis.
 The OA must be precisely defined because the specific
geographic area will impact planning factors such as
basing, overflight, and sustainment. (JP 5-0, p. V-27)

(16) Develop Initial COA Sketches and Statements. Each COA

should answer the following questions:

(a) Who (type of forces) will execute the tasks?

(b) What are the tasks?
(c) Where will the tasks occur? (Start adding graphic control
measures, e.g., areas of operation, amphibious objective
areas).
(d) When will the tasks begin?
(e) What are key/critical decision points?
(f) How (but do not usurp the components’ prerogatives) the
commander should provide “operational direction” so the
components can accomplish “tactical actions.”
(g) Why (for what purpose) will each force conduct its part
of the operation?
(h) How will the commander identify successful accomplishment
of the mission?
(i) Develop an initial intelligence support concept. (JP 5-0,
p. V-27)

See Figure 4-8 for elements that should be included.

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 Figure 4-8: COA Development Element for the Narrative/Sketch

(17) Test the Validity of Each COA. All COAs selected for
analysis must be valid, and the staff should reject COA
alternatives that do not meet all five of the following validity
criteria:

(a) Adequate — Can accomplish the mission within the

commander’s guidance. This test focuses on ends. Preliminary tests
include:

 Does it accomplish the mission?

 Does it meet the commander’s intent?
 Does it accomplish all the essential tasks?
 Does it meet the conditions for the end state?
 Does it take into consideration the enemy and friendly
COGs?

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 (b) Feasible — Can accomplish the mission within the
established time, space, and resource limitations. This test focuses
on means and risk.

 Does the commander have the force structure and lift

assets (means) to execute it?
 Although this process occurs during COA analysis and
the test at this time is preliminary, it may be
possible to declare a COA infeasible (for example,
resources are obviously insufficient). However, it may
be possible to fill shortfalls by requesting support
from the commander or other means.

(c) Acceptable — Must balance cost and risk with the

advantage gained. This test focuses on ways and risk.

 Does it contain unacceptable risks? (Is it worth the

possible cost?)
 A COA is considered acceptable if the estimated
results justify the risks. The basis of this test
consists of an estimation of friendly losses in
forces, time, position, and opportunity.
 Does it take into account the limitations placed on
the commander (must do, cannot do, other physical or
authority limitations)?
 Acceptability is considered from the perspective of
the commander by reviewing the strategic objectives.
 Are COAs reconciled with external constraints,
particularly ROE? This requires visualization of
execution of the COA against each enemy capability.
 Although this process occurs during COA analysis and
the test at this time is preliminary, it may be
possible to declare a COA unacceptable if it violates
the commander’s definition of acceptable risk.

(d) Distinguishable — Must be sufficiently different from

other COAs in the following:

 The focus or direction of main effort.

 The scheme of maneuver.
 Sequential versus simultaneous maneuvers.
 The primary mechanism for mission accomplishment.
 Task organization.
 The use of reserves.

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 (e) Complete — Does it answer the questions who, what, where,
when, how, and why? The COA must incorporate:

 Objectives, desired effects to be created, and tasks

to be performed.
 Major forces required.
 Concepts for deployment, employment, and sustainment.
 Time estimates for achieving objectives.
 Military end state and mission success criteria
(including the assessment: how the commander will know
they have achieved success). (JP 5-0, p. V-28)

(18) Conduct COA Development Brief to Commander.

Figure 4-9: COA DEV Brief Example Format

(19) JFC Provides Guidance on COAs.

(a) Review and approve COA(s) for further analysis.

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 (b) Direct revisions to COA(s), combinations of COAs, or
development of additional COA(s).

(c) Direct priority for which enemy COA(s) will be used

during wargaming of friendly COA(s). (JP 5-0, p. V-29)

(20) Continue the Staff Estimate Process. The staff must

continue to conduct their staff estimates of supportability for
each COA. (JP 5-0, p. V-30)

Staff directorates analyze and refine each COA to determine its supportability. A
purpose of the staff estimate is to determine whether the mission can be accomplished
and to determine which COA can best be supported. This, together with the supporting
discussion, gives the commander the best possible information from which to select a
COA. Each staff section analyzes each COA, its supportability, and which COA is most
supportable from their particular, functional perspective.

(21) Conduct Vertical and Horizontal Parallel Planning.

(a) Discuss the planning status of staff counterparts with

both commander’s and JFC components’ staffs.

(b) Coordinate planning with staff counterparts from other

functional areas.

(c) Permit adjustments in planning as additional details are

learned from higher and adjacent echelons, and permit lower
echelons to begin planning efforts and generate questions (e.g.,
requests for information). (JP 5-0, p. V-31)

5. Analyze Courses of Action. The JPG analyzes in detail each COA that survived
Step 3. The objective of this step is to analyze each COA critically, independently, and
according to the commander’s guidance in an effort to determine the advantages and
disadvantages associated with each COA. COA analysis is the process of
closely examining potential COAs to reveal details that will
allow the commander and staff to tentatively identify COAs that
are valid and identify the advantages and disadvantages of each
proposed friendly COA. (JP 5-0, p. V-31). See Figure 4-10 for the inputs,
outputs, and potential steps involved. Wargaming is a “Garbage in – Garbage out”
phenomenon. A poorly developed COA will produce wargame(s) that waste time and do
not satisfyingly uncover the information necessary to improve COA Alternatives.

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 Figure 4-10: JPP Step 4 ― Analyze Courses of Action

It also helps the commander and staff to:

 Determine how to maximize combat power against the enemy
while protecting the friendly forces and minimizing
collateral damage in combat or maximize the effect of
available resources toward achieving CCMD and national
objectives in noncombat operations and campaigns.
 Have as near an identical visualization of the operation
as possible.
 Anticipate events in the OE and potential reaction
options.
 Determine conditions and resources required for success
while also identifying gaps and seams.
 Determine when and where to apply the force’s
capabilities.
 Plan for and coordinate authorities to integrate IRCs
early.
 Focus intelligence collection requirements.
 Determine the most flexible COA.

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  Identify potential decision points.
 Determine task organization options.
 Develop data for use in a synchronization matrix or
related tool.
 Identify potential plan branches and sequels.
 Identify high-value targets.
 Assess risk.
 Determine COA advantages and disadvantages.
 Recommend CCIRs.
 Validate end states and objectives.
 Identify contradictions between friendly COAs and
expected enemy end states.(JP 5-0, p. V-33)

It is critical that the analysis first looks at each COA independently from the other COAs;
a comparison will come later. At this point, the staff is looking for best answers to the
following questions (not inclusive):
 Will the tasks identified achieve the desired effects in a way that will
achieve the desired conditions, and avoid generating unintended effects?
 How will military operations change the adversary and the operational
environment over the course of the campaign?
 What are the points at which COAs don’t offer enough flexibility to oppose
adversary actions, and where might branches/sequels be required?
 What are the strengths and weaknesses of each COA, and how well does
each COA meet the commander’s vision for success? How well do they
hold up under the rigor of a realistic opposing force or situation (for an HA
mission, the enemy might not be an armed force).
 What are potential decision points where the commander must make a
key decision, and the critical information requirements (CCIR) for the
commander to make such a decision?
 Which aspects of the COA may introduce strategic challenges that must
be resolved?

Wargaming is a primary means to conduct this analysis. Wargames

are representations of conflict or competition in a synthetic
environment, in which people make decisions and respond to the
consequences of those decisions. COA wargaming is a conscious
attempt to visualize the flow of the operation, given joint
force strengths and dispositions, adversary capabilities and
possible COAs, the OA, and other aspects of the OE. (JP 5-0, p.
V-31). It is "a simulation of a military operation involving two
or more opposing forces, using rules, data and procedures
designed to depict an actual or assumed real-life situation" (JP
1-02). It is a conscious effort to visualize the flow of a plan, within an OE, using joint
forces, while integrating the other instruments of power as appropriate, and confronting
a realistic, thinking, and adaptive adversary. Wargaming assists joint-force planners to

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identify the strengths and weaknesses, associated risks, and asset shortfalls for each
friendly COA. While joint doctrine refers to visualizing the flow of a military operation as
the key element in wargaming, the commander and staff must also consider the
application of all instruments of national power (DIME).

a. COA Analysis Considerations. Evaluation criteria and known

critical events are two of the many important considerations as
COA analysis begins. (JP 5-0, p. V-35)

(1) Develop evaluation criteria. Determining the initial evaluation criteria is a

critical requirement that begins before COA analysis. The commander may specify
some of these criteria, but the JPG normally develops most of them. The commander is
the final approval authority for the criteria, regardless of who develops them. The
insights available from Mission Analysis, and from the commander’s intent and planning
guidance, may suggest appropriate evaluation criteria. Through the wargaming process,
some additional evaluation criteria may emerge for use later in COA comparison.

(2) List Known Critical Events. These are essential tasks, or

a series of critical tasks, conducted over a period of time that
require detailed analysis (such as the series of component tasks
to be performed on D-day). … decision points are most likely
linked to a critical event (e.g., commitment of the reserve
force). (JP 5-0, p. V-36)

b. Wargaming Analysis Decisions - two key decisions to make before

COA analysis begins.

(1) The first decision is to decide what type of wargame will

be used. This decision should be based on commander’s guidance,
time and resources available, staff expertise, and availability
of simulation models.

Methods include:
 Major periods construct with Pre-Hostilities, Hostilities, and
Post-Hostilities.
 Phasing model articulated in joint doctrine or another
phasing model developed for the campaign.
 Critical events sequencing, decisive points, or major tasks.
 Computer assisted.

(2) The second decision involves deciding in what order you will wargame. The
JPG prioritizes to ensure key concerns are addressed before available time runs out.
For example, it may decide to prioritize war gaming against the enemy’s most
dangerous COA before the most likely COA, or vice versa. Similarly it may decide to
wargame a specific COA early in the process because there is concern over partner
capabilities that needs to be looked at closely.

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 (3) War game each COA independently. The COAs must be evaluated through
the other actors’ eyes, given their political and cultural perspectives and biases, to
determine if the proposed actions will change the intended behaviors in the manner that
friendly planners believe -- a key aspect to achieve desired, rather than undesired,
effects. Keep in mind that, in addition to actions by adversaries, actions by neutral or
even friendly actors may need to be considered as "opposing" actions, as the goal is to
achieve our desired operational environment. While the main effort is on applying the
use of military power, consider all available instruments of power. While the
commander may not be able to control the D, I, and E actions, he can coordinate these
instruments with other actors who may be able to influence their application.

c. Conduct the war game. The JPG will conduct the war game by assembling
information, marshalling and assembling the proper tools and teams for analysis, and
following a well-ordered process for systemic analysis of the proposed COAs. See
Figure 4-11 for sample steps that can be conducted.

Figure 4-11: Sample Wargaming Steps

A simple manual war game method employs an action-reaction-counteraction

format between "Blue" and "Red" teams. A possible framework to guide the flow is to

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use the Lines of Operation or Lines of Effort sequentially to work through the campaign.
The supervisor of the war game directs the questioning and ensures that war game time
is not wasted. Blue, Red, and, if appropriate, Green (neutral actors) teams who THINK
and speak for their forces when directed by the supervisor are critical to the process.
The supervisor should identify a separate recorder to document the results in a useful
format and to record any issues that cannot be resolved quickly.

As the JPG conducts the war game, they interpret the results of analysis to
ensure each COA remains valid. If a COA is inadequate, infeasible, or unacceptable,
they must discard or modify that COA. The JPG may also find that it needs to combine
aspects of COAs to develop new ones. Throughout the analysis and wargaming
process, the JPG must remain focused on the following areas:

 Objectives.
 Balance between creativity and the realities of the OE.
 The elements of operational design.
 Joint functions (JP 3-0).

d. Record the war game. Proceedings of the war game can be recorded by a variety
of means:
 Narrative describing the action, probable reaction, counteraction, assets,
and time used.
 Sketch-note which uses a narrative but adds operational sketches to paint
a clear picture.
 Synchronization matrix organized by time or major events as columns,
with functional and other major activity areas as rows. If used as a
recording tool, this would form the beginning of the synchronization matrix
that will provide the commander and staff a visualization tool for the
campaign. It can be refined throughout planning, and should be updated
throughout the campaign. The synchronization matrix helps staff officers
build the detailed functional plans that support the campaign plan.

Synchronization Matrix Key results that should be recorded

include:
 Decision points, potential evaluation criteria, CCIRs,
COA adjustments, branches, and sequels.
 Refined event template.
 Initial Decision Support Template (DST).
 Decision Points and associated CCIRs. (JP 5-0, p. V-
40)

Whichever method of recording the war game is used, it is important to capture

the decision points, CCIRs, COA adjustments, potential branches and sequels, and
potential undesired effects.

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 e. Evaluate the Results. he analysis of the COA as a result of the war game should
include the following areas.

 Propensity to achieve the desired operational environment. Will the COA

achieve the objectives? How long will it take?
 Advantages and disadvantages. What are the major elements of this COA
that may present distinct advantages or disadvantages to the command?
 Critical events, decision points, and CCIR. What are the critical events that
will determine whether objectives are achieved? What may happen that
will require a commander decision to change the plan? What information
does the commander need to make that decision? What elements of
assessment must be added to the plan?
 Potential branches and sequels. What branches to the plan may be
required to deal with possible deviations from the expected campaign?
What branches or sequels may be required in the event of more rapid than
expected success?
 Risks of undesirable effects. What are the potential second order effects
of our actions (or of other actors’ actions) that may have to be mitigated?
 Strategic challenges that must be resolved. What strategic issues
emerged that must be brought to the attention of higher commands or civil
authorities or partners? What are some possible mitigation strategies to
these challenges?

After the war game is complete, there should be sufficient visualization of the
campaign to solidify the tasks required. Some of these tasks will be related directly to
achieving effects that will enable objectives to be met, while others will be supporting
tasks (such as building bases, establishing logistics stocks and resupply routes,
conducting JRSOI). Visualization and decision making tools that should come out of the
evaluation include:

f. Prepare Products. Primary outputs are:

 Wargamed COAs with graphic and narrative. Branches and
sequels identified.
 Information on commander’s evaluation criteria.
 Initial task organization.
 Critical events and decision points.
 Newly identified resource shortfalls.
 Refined/new CCIRs and event template/matrix.
 Initial DST/DSM.
 Refined synchronization matrix.
 Refined staff estimates.
 Assessment plan and criteria. (JP 5-0, p. V-41)

g. Adjust the COA to mitigate risk and enable it to better achieve objectives. After
analysis of the COA through wargaming, the staff can refine the COA to improve its

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likelihood of achieving the objectives in the time desired (given other limitations noted)
and reduce the elements of risk. If the COA becomes significantly different, then it
should be re-briefed to the commander. Care must be taken not to "morph" the COA so
that it is no longer distinguishable from the other COAs.

h. Update staff estimate. Record observations about the COAs in the staff estimate,
to include functional requirements, relevant challenges to the functional area, and
mitigation measures relevant to the staff section’s function.

6. Course of Action Comparison. COA comparison is a subjective process

whereby COAs are considered independently and evaluated/compared
against a set of criteria that are established by the staff and
commander. The objective is to identify and recommend the COA
that has the highest probability of accomplishing the mission.
(JP 5-0, p. V-42). After rigorous independent analysis of each COA, the JPG
compares the COAs using a common set of criteria.

COA comparison facilitates the commander’s decision making

process by balancing the ends, means, ways, and risk of each
COA. … COA comparison helps the commander answer the following
questions:
 What are the differences between each COA?
 What are the advantages and disadvantages?
 What are the risks? (JP 5-0, p. V-42)

During the comparison process (See Figure 4-12 for the inputs, outputs, and potential
steps involved), the JPG focuses on evaluating the value of each COA through the
commander’s eyes -- using his visualization of the campaign as the standard. The
purpose of the comparison is to determine which COA is the best fit for his intent, with
least cost and risk, and greatest chance of success. Using evaluation criteria derived
mostly from his intent and guidance, the staff evaluates the COAs against the
evaluation criteria ― not against one another ― to identify the one that best
meets the commander’s needs.

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 Figure 4-12: JPP Step 5 ― Compare Courses of Action

a. Determine/define evaluation criteria.

 Criteria are based on the particular circumstances and should be relative
to the situation.
 Review commander’s guidance for relevant criteria.
 Identify implicit significant factors relating to the operation.
 Each staff identifies criteria relating to that staff function.
 Other criteria might include:
o Political, social, and safety constraints;
requirements for coordination with
embassy/interagency personnel.
o Fundamentals of joint warfare.
o Elements of operational design.
o Doctrinal fundamentals for the type of operation
being conducted.
o Mission accomplishment.
o Risks.
o Implicit significant factors relating to the
operation (e.g., need for speed, security).
o Costs.

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 o Time. (JP 5-0, p. V-36 and 44 combined)
o Force protection.
o Casualties or collateral damage.
o Use of Flexible Deterrent Options.
o Impact on coalition interests.

b. Define and determine the standards for each Criteria.

Establish standard definitions for each evaluation criterion.
Define the criteria in precise terms to reduce subjectivity and
ensure the interpretation of each evaluation criterion remains
constant between the various COAs. (JP 5-0, p. V-44)

c. Compare COAs using evaluation criteria. The COAs are compared using the
evaluation criteria that was established prior to the wargaming (and probably
augmented as a result of wargaming). The inputs to COA comparison are the
independent staff estimates and war game results. The chief of staff or JPG leader
directs the comparison discussion. Staff planners normally conduct the comparison in
isolation from the commander, and may include the subordinate component staffs.

The staff should remain as objective as possible when comparing the COAs and
avoid manipulating criteria to promote a "favorite COA." Weighting evaluation criteria is
a frequent and often helpful technique to identify the most-critical criteria. Weighting, like
evaluation criteria selection, should come prior to formal COA comparison to avoid
assigned weight manipulation.

d. Select the "best" staff-recommended COA. After the comparison analysis, the staff
must select the COA that they will recommend to the commander. This selection must
consider not only the JPG analysis, but also each staff section’s functional analysis of
the COAs. COA comparison is ultimately a subjective process that uses collective staff
judgment and should not become a purely mathematical exercise, though using “+, -, 0”
or 1, 2, 3 as expressions of relative value may be appropriate. The key element in this
process is the ability to articulate to the commander why one COA is preferred over
another in terms of how well the COA meets the evaluation criteria. Using some type of
decision matrix may help, but be careful to keep it as objective as possible. In essence,
the staff is trying to use a measure of objectivity to evaluate and differentiate
subjectivity. See Figure 4-13 and F-14 for examples.

One type of COA comparison matrix uses weighted numerical comparisons. In this
method, each criterion is given a comparative weight based on its importance. This
weight likely would be derived from commander’s intent and guidance. Because the
COAs are compared to the evaluation criteria, rather than to each other, there is no
need to identify the 1st, 2nd, 3rd "place" COAs for each criterion. If "+, -, 0" is used, "+"
means it does well in meeting the criteria, "-" means it does not do as well, and "0"
means it is balanced. If 1-3 is used as a scale, lower is better, so 1 means that the COA
meets the evaluation criteria well, 3 means not well, and 2 is in the middle.

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 Figure 4-13: Sample COA Comparison Matrix (Weighted Numerical)

Some commanders are less comfortable with numerical ways to present the
comparison. Another type of comparison matrix is below. Each COA is described in
terms of advantage or disadvantage against the evaluation criteria.

Figure 4-14: Sample COA Comparison Matrix (Descriptive)

7. Approve a Course of Action. In this JPP step, the staff briefs the
commander on the COA comparison and the analysis and wargaming
results, including a review of important supporting information.
The staff determines the preferred COA to recommend to the
Commander. (JP 5-0, p. V-45). See Figure 4-15 for the inputs, outputs, and
potential steps involved in COA Approval. The aim is to obtain his decision on which
COA to develop into the concept of operations (CONOPS) of the campaign. This

117
enables the commander to refine his visualization of the campaign and provide further
guidance to the staff on how to proceed with CONOPS development.

Figure 4-15: JPP Step 6 ― Course of Action Approval

a. Present the COA Decision Briefing. The staff briefs the

commander on the COA comparison, COA analysis, and wargaming
results. The briefing should include a review of important
supporting information such as the current status of the joint
force, the current JIPOE, and assumptions used in COA
development. (JP 5-0, p. V-46)

b. Recommend COA to the commander. During the brief (see Figure 4-16 for an
example agenda), it is important that dissenting views be heard so that the commander
can understand all aspects of the analysis. Staff officers should be encouraged to
expound on issues in their functional areas if needed. Subordinate commands should
be present, or linked via video-teleconference. Other partners also should be invited to
the brief, to include other government agencies and key multinational partners, to the
extent possible or appropriate. Staff officers from those organizations are probably part
of the JPG, so there should be no surprises.

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 Figure 4-16: Sample COA Decision Brief Agenda

c. Commander Selects/Modifies the COA. The commander, upon

receiving the staff’s recommendation, combines personal analysis
with the staff recommendation, resulting in a selected COA. It
gives the staff a concise statement of how the commander intends
to accomplish the mission, and provides the necessary focus for
planning and plan development. The commander may:
 Concur with staff/component recommendations, as
presented.
 Concur with recommended COAs, but with modifications.
 Select a different COA from the staff/component
recommendation.
 Combine COAs to create a new COA.
 Reject all and start over with COA development or
mission analysis.
 Defer the decision and consult with selected
staff/commanders prior to making a final decision. (JP
5-0, p. V-46)

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 d. Receive commander’s guidance for concept development. As part of the COA
decision brief, or following it, the commander will likely provide additional guidance that
will guide the development of the approved COA into the concept of operations
(CONOPS).

e. Confirm updated commander’s intent. Upon hearing the analysis of the COAs, the
commander is likely to understand the environment and the problem(s) better. This may
cause him to adapt his intent and/or guidance. This is an opportunity for the commander
to transmit any updates to the staff and other relevant planning parties.

f. Refine the Selected COA. Once the commander selects a COA,

the staff will begin the refinement process of that COA into a
clear decision statement to be used in the commander’s estimate.
At the same time, the staff will apply a final “acceptability”
check.
 Staff refines commander’s COA selection into clear
decision statement.
o Develop a brief statement that clearly and
concisely sets forth the COA selected and
provides whatever info is necessary to develop
a plan for the operation (no defined format).
o Describe what the force is to do as a whole,
and as much of the elements of when, where, and
how as may be appropriate.
o Express decision in terms of what is to be
accomplished, if possible.
o Use simple language so the meaning is
unmistakable.
o Include statement of what is acceptable risk.
 Apply final “acceptability” check.
o Apply experience and an understanding of
situation.
o Consider factors of acceptable risk versus
desired objectives consistent (JP 5-0, p. V-47)

g. Update staff estimates. Once the commander makes a decision on a COA,

provides any additional guidance, and updates his intent, staff officers record this new
information and refine their estimates of the campaign’s supportability from their
functional viewpoint.

h. Prepare the Commander’s Estimate. The commander’s estimate provides

a concise narrative statement of how the commander intends to
accomplish the mission and provides the necessary focus for
campaign planning and contingency plan development. Further, it
responds to the establishing authority’s requirement to develop
a plan for execution. The commander’s estimate provides a

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continuously updated source of information from the perspective
of the commander. (JP 5-0, p. V-48). It also provides the necessary focus
for continued campaign planning and for developing an OPLAN/ OPORD. (See Figure
4-17 for a potential outline for this estimate).

With appropriate horizontal and vertical coordination, the

commander’s COA selection may be briefed to and approved by
SecDef. The commander’s estimate then becomes a matter of formal
record keeping and guidance for component and supporting forces.
(JP 5-0, p. V-48)

Figure 4-17: Commander’s Estimate Outline (Example format is in Appendix E)

i. Conduct CJCS Estimate Review and possible IPR. During this Review and IPR,
the CJCS and SecDef (or his representative) will consider the CCDR’s analysis and
approve (or modify) the CONOPS for further development. The estimate review
determines whether the scope and concept of planned operations
satisfy the tasking and will accomplish the mission, determines
whether the assigned tasks can be accomplished using available
resources in the timeframes contemplated by the plan, and
ensures the plan is proportional and worth the expected costs.
As planning is approved by SecDef (or designated representative)
during an IPR, the commander’s estimate informs the refinement
of the initial CONOPS for the plan. (JP 5-0, p. V-49)

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8. Develop the Plan. After the commander has approved a course of action and
provided additional guidance to the staff for development of the CONOPS and the full
plan (with updates as required after any IPRs for combatant commands), the staff
develops the CONOPS into an operations plan or operations order. See Figure 4-18 for
the inputs, outputs, and potential steps involved. The CONOPS must be developed to
provide the detail required for the staff to build the base plan and prepare supporting
annexes, and supporting and subordinate organizations to build supporting functional
plans. The CONOPs is the centerpiece of the plan/OPORD (JP 5-0, p. V-50)

Figure 4-18: JPP Step 7 ― Develop the Plan

a. The CONOPS:
 States the commander’s intent.
 Describes the central approach the JFC intends to take
to accomplish the mission.
 Provides for the application, sequencing,
synchronization, and integration of forces and
capabilities in time, space, and purpose (including
those of multinational and interagency organizations
as appropriate).

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  Describes when, where, and under what conditions the
supported commander intends to conduct operations and
give or refuse battle, if required.
 Focuses on friendly, allied, partner, and adversary
COGs and their associated critical vulnerabilities.
 Provides for controlling the tempo of the operation.
 Visualizes the campaign in terms of the forces and
functions involved.
 Relates the joint force’s objectives and desired
effects to those of the next higher command and other
organizations as necessary. This enables assignment of
tasks to subordinate and supporting commanders. (JP 5-
0, p. V-49)

If the scope, complexity, and duration of the military action

contemplated to accomplish the assigned mission warrants
execution via a series of related operations, then the staff
outlines the CONOPS as a campaign. They develop the preliminary
part of the operational campaign in sufficient detail to impart
a clear understanding of the commander’s concept of how the
assigned mission will be accomplished. (JP 5-0, p. V-50)

b. There are 10+/- planning activities conducted during this step.

 Refinement
 Support Planning
 Force Planning
 Nuclear strike planning
 Supporting Plan Development
 Deployment and Redeployment Planning
 Shortfall Identification
 Feasibility Analysis
 Plan Review and Approval
 Documentation

c. The potential steps below lay out a way to conduct these activities. While it makes
sense to conduct them sequentially, in reality many occur simultaneously and are
adjusted as necessary when significant changes happen within other activities (e.g. the
Force Planners will begin building the TPFDD and make adjustments as the support
planning adjusts what and when units are needed).
(1) Review planning guidance. The staff should review the commander’s
guidance as updated throughout the planning process and as modified as a result of the
IPR and associated discussions by the commander.
(2) Update the commander’s intent. The commander should republish his intent,
with any changes to it that may result from his increased understanding of the OE and
the problem, and his vision for the campaign.

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 (3) Phase the concept. Refine the phasing of the operation or campaign. Each
phase is designed to nest with the intent for the overall campaign and sequenced to
achieve an end state that will set conditions for commencement of the next phase. The
commander will declare his intent for each phase that supports his overall intent for the
operation or campaign. Each phase must have a specified set of conditions for both the
beginning and intended end state. Leaders should recognize that lines of operation or
effort are likely to run throughout the phases to provide the logical framework for the
entire operation or campaign. Each operation or campaign is unique and the
phasing must make sense for the campaign. While phases should ideally be flexibly
event-oriented, the staff must also consider the time-oriented resourcing requirements
for the activities of each phase.

While phasing has traditionally been described in a six phase model, this model
has been problematic in describing operations that are not predominately military. While
it works well for operations such as Desert Storm, it breaks down in describing some of
the operations, activities and actions associated with long term campaigns and
competition activities that occur below the level of armed conflict (e.g. U.S. actions
toward Russia in Ukraine). JP 3-0 models several phasing constructs that may apply.
The bottom line is that the phases should be adapted to the environment, the problem,
and the operational approach – not vice versa.

For each phase, the campaign’s CONOPS should describe the following
elements.
 Intent and schemes of movement and maneuver. The commander’s intent
for the phase must be clear. Describe the purpose, end state, and the operational risk to
the campaign during this phase. The schemes of movement and maneuver may be
narratives of the various lines of operation and effort as they are executed during this
particular phase. The flow of forces and capability into theater are broadly described as
are subsequent joint force maneuver schemes to achieve the various operational
objectives. In campaigns where LOEs are used (as opposed to LOOs) and/or where
positional advantage may not be consistently critical to success, the scheme of
maneuver uses the logic of purpose and may describe how and when certain objectives
within each LOE must be achieved, especially in relation to the objectives on the other
LOEs of the campaign.
 Objectives and effects (desired and undesired). Describe the objectives for
each phase, and the major effects that must be achieved to realize those objectives.
Describe how the force’s objectives are related to those of the next higher organization
and to other organizations (especially if the military is a supporting effort).
 Tasks to subordinate and supporting commands and agencies. The
commander assigns tasks to subordinate commanders, along with the capabilities and
support necessary to achieve them. Area tasks and responsibilities focus on that
specific area to control or conduct operations. Functional tasks and responsibilities
focus on the performance of continuing efforts that involve the forces of two or more
Military Departments operating in the same domain (air, land, sea, or space) or where

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there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. Include
identification of requests for support to organizations outside of DOD.
 Command and control organization and geometry of the area of
operations. Note any changes to the command and control structure or to the geometry
of the area of responsibility (for combatant commands) or joint operations area (for
subordinate joint forces) or area of operations (for subordinate non-joint forces).
 Assessment methodology. Identify the basic methodology for assessing
accomplishment of objectives. Include assessments to help gauge if the objectives
actually support achievement of the end state.
 Risk mitigation. Identify the areas of risk concern to the commander and
outline how the risk may be mitigated.
 CCIR and associated decision points.
 Transition to the next phase. Describe how the joint force will move to the
next phase. Describe the end state conditions for the phase, which should tie directly to
the initiation conditions for the next phase. Include a description of transition of control
from the joint force to other parties for aspects of the overall campaign.

(4) Develop supporting functional concepts. Once the general CONOPS is built,
supporting concepts are built to ensure supportability and coordination among all of the
functions. Some of the key functional concepts are for logistics support, force projection,
information operations, joint fires, force protection, and command, control, and
communications. The staff will review the functional concepts to ensure coordination.

Synchronization of the plan takes place once all of the supporting concepts have
been developed. Synchronization is the art of arranging all activities (military and
otherwise) in the right sequence and place, with the right purpose, to produce
maximum effect at the decisive points. Synchronization will continue after
development of the plan, through brief-backs, rehearsals, and execution. A
synchronized and fully integrated CONOPS becomes the Base Plan. For Level 2 plans,
this is the end of plan development, other than coordination.

(5) Expand the CONOPS into a Base Plan with annexes. “Management and Review
of campaign and Contingency Plans” (CJCSI 3141.01F) provides specific guidance and
procedures on the activities for organizations to prepare required plans and concepts. It
directs the typical activities that other organizations will accomplish as they plan for joint
operations. For example, a combatant command which is preparing a crisis-related
OPORD at the President’s direction will follow specific procedures and milestones in
force planning, TPFDD development, and shortfall identification.

The staff and supporting commands focus on developing a cohesive and detailed
plan for how to employ forces and capabilities throughout the campaign to realize the
commander’s vision. As the CONOPS develops into a fully-detailed plan, a number of
activities coincide in a parallel, collaborative, and iterative fashion rather than in a
sequential and time-consuming manner. Time is always a factor; conducting

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simultaneous, synchronized development activities at all levels will be critical to shorten
the planning cycle and make best use of the limited time available.

(a) Support planning. Support planning is conducted concurrently

with force planning to determine and sequence logistics and
personnel support in accordance with the plan CONOPS. Support
planning includes all core logistics functions: deployment and
distribution, supply, maintenance, logistic services, OCS,
health services, and engineering. (JP 5-0, p. V-55). It encompasses
such essential factors as:
 Concept of Logistics Support
o Directive Authority for Logistics (DAFL)
o Lead Service (if necessary)
o Base Operating Support-Integrator
o Partner Nation Support and HNS
 Responsibilities
 Logistics Support Analysis (LSAs)
 Transportation Refinement
 Airfield operations
 Management of non-unit replacements
 Health service support
 Personnel management
 Financial management
 Handling of prisoners of war and detainees
 Theater civil engineering policy
 Logistics-related environmental considerations
 Support of noncombatant evacuation operations and other retrograde
operations
 Executive agent identification

Support planning is primarily the responsibility of the Service Component

Commanders who identify and update support requirements in coordination with the
Services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and USTRANSCOM. They initiate the
procurement of critical and low-density inventory items, determine host-nation support
(HNS) availability, develop plans for total asset visibility, and establish phased delivery
plans for sustainment in line with the phases and priorities of the concept. They develop
battle damage repair programs, reparable retrograde plans, container management
plans, force and line-of-communications protection plans, supporting phased
transportation and support plans aligned to the strategic concept, and report movement
support requirements. Service Component Commanders continue to refine their
sustainment and transportation requirements as the force providers identify and source
force requirements. The requirements and transportation planning must be integrated
and coordinated by the CCDR to ensure synchronization with the concept of operations,
to reduce redundancies and manage risk, and to integrate transportation requirements
with the force flow.

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 (b) Force planning. During CONOPS development, the commander
determines the best arrangement of simultaneous and sequential
actions and activities to accomplish the assigned mission
consistent with the approved COA, and resources and authorities
available. This arrangement of actions dictates the sequencing
of activities or forces into the OA, providing the link between
the CONOPS and force planning. The link between the CONOPS and
force planning is preserved and perpetuated through the
sequencing of forces into the OA via a TPFDD. (JP 5-0, p. V-50)

Force planning begins early during concept development but must be refined and
finalized during detailed planning. There must be a balance between the flexibility
provided by the plan and the requirements to identify forces, recalling that inclusion in a
plan implies a level of preparation requirement for units. The commander determines
force requirements, develops a letter of instruction for time phasing and force
planning, and designs force modules to align and time-phase the forces in
accordance with the concept under development. Major forces and elements initially
come from those apportioned or allocated for planning by operational phase, mission,
and mission priority. Service components then collaboratively make tentative
assessments of the specific combat and supporting capabilities required. The
commands should not be constrained by the apportioned forces, but must be able to
provide clear rationale for capabilities required that are not apportioned. The
commander typically describes force requirements in the form of broad capability
descriptions or unit type codes, depending on the circumstances.

After sourcing the actual forces, the CCDR’s staff refines the force plan to ensure
it supports the concept, provides force visibility, and enables flexibility. The commander
identifies and resolves shortfalls, or reports shortfalls with a risk assessment during his
review. The supported CCDR submits the required force packages through the Joint
Staff to the force providers for sourcing as described in Appendix B.

(c) Nuclear strike planning. Commanders must assess the military as well as
political impact a nuclear strike would have on their operations. Nuclear-planning
guidance issued at the combatant-commander level depends upon national-level
political considerations and the military mission. Although USSTRATCOM conducts
nuclear planning in coordination with the supported GCC and certain allied
commanders, the supported commander does not control the decision to use nuclear
weapons. Due to the strategic and diplomatic consequences
associated with nuclear operations and plans, only the President
has the authority to employ nuclear weapons. (JP 5-0, p. V-57)

(d) Supporting Plan Development. At the combatant command level, the CJCS
issues a planning order or alert order to direct preparation of supporting plans after
receipt and approval of the commander’s COA as transmitted in the commander’s
estimate. Similarly, the combatant command issues a planning order to subordinates.
Subordinate commands generally will build their supporting campaign CONOPS upon
receipt of the command’s CONOPS, but have almost certainly been working in parallel

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with their higher headquarters. Other organizations will also develop supporting
concepts. The command informally coordinates with organizations outside of DOD to
build mutually supporting concepts and plans. The command will integrate subordinate,
partner, and interagency concepts and plans into the campaign plan (in the base plan
as appropriate and in the annexes) where appropriate.

(e) Deployment and redeployment planning. The anticipated operational

environment dictates the type of entry operations, deployment concept, mobility options,
pre-deployment training, and force integration requirements. The CCDR is responsible
for developing the deployment concept and identifying predeployment requirements.
The combatant command is also responsible for movement planning, manifested
through the TPFDD file, assisted by the force providers and USTRANSCOM. In
particular, USTRANSCOM robustly assists with current analysis and assessment of
movement C2 structures and systems, available organic, strategic and theater lift
assets, transportation infrastructure, and competing demands and restrictions. All
parties recognize that operational requirements may change, resulting in changes to the
movement plan. Planners must understand and anticipate the physical limitations of
movement assets and infrastructure, and the impact of change, since any change will
have an effect on the rest of the TPFDD. Finally, the supported command is responsible
for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI) planning.
JRSOI planning ensures an integrated joint force arrives and becomes operational in
the area of operations as required.

The supported command, in coordination with the Joint Staff, USTRANSCOM,

force providers, and supporting commands, conducts a refinement conference for
deployment and JRSOI. The purpose of this conference is to ensure the force
deployment plan maintains force mobility throughout any movements, continuous force
visibility and tracking, effective force preparation, and full integration of forces into a joint
operation while enabling unity of effort. This refinement conference examines planned
missions, the priority of the missions within the operational phases, and the forces
assigned to those missions.

(f) Shortfall identification. Along with hazard and threat analysis,

shortfall ID is conducted throughout the plan development
process. The supported commander continuously identifies
limiting factors, capability shortfalls, and associated risks as
plan development progresses. Where possible, the supported
commander resolves the shortfalls and required controls and
countermeasures through planning adjustments and coordination
with supporting and subordinate commanders. If the shortfalls
and necessary controls and countermeasures cannot be reconciled
or the resources provided are inadequate to perform the assigned
task, the supported commander reports these limiting factors and
assessment of the associated risk to the CJCS. The CJCS and the
JCS consider shortfalls and limiting factors reported by the
supported commander and coordinate resolution. However, the

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completion of plan development is not delayed pending the
resolution of shortfalls. (JP 5-0, p. V-59)

(g) Feasibility analysis. The focus in this activity is to ensure assigned mission
accomplishment using available resources within the plan’s contemplated time frame.
The results of force planning, support planning, deployment planning, and shortfall
identification will affect OPLAN or OPORD feasibility. The primary factors
analyzed for feasibility include forces, resources, and
transportation. (JP 5-0, p. V-59). The goal is to determine whether the
apportioned or allocated resources can deploy to the joint operational area when
required, be sustained throughout the operation, and be employed effectively, or
whether the scope of the plan exceeds the apportioned resources and supporting
capabilities. Measures to enhance feasibility include adjusting the CONOPS, ensuring
sufficiency of resources and capabilities, and maintaining options and reserves.

(h) Synchronization refinement. Planners frequently adjust the plan or order

based on results of force planning, support planning, deployment planning, shortfall
identification, revised JIPOE, changes to strategic guidance, or changes to the
commander’s guidance resulting from his continuous operational design of the
campaign. Refinement continues even after execution begins, with changes typically
transmitted in the form of fragmentary orders (FRAGO) rather than revised copies of the
plan or order.

(6) Complete coordination of the plan. The planning requirements described above
enable good coordination of the plan. The supported command’s CONOPS drives the
supporting concepts, but not until the supported command completes coordination of all
of the annexes to the plan can the supporting commands and agencies ensure that they
have addressed all of the requirements adequately. Supported commands review all of
the supporting plans once they are prepared to ensure that the plan is fully coordinated.

Planning for multinational operations is coordinated through various means.

Individual treaty or alliance procedures set the stage for collective-security goals,
strategies, and combined OPLANs, in accordance with U.S. doctrine and procedures.
Thus, much guidance for joint operations is conceptually applicable to alliance and
coalition planning; the fundamental issues are much the same. Host-nation support and
mutual support agreements facilitate combined operations. Coordination of planning is
through established, coalition bodies, and at the theater and operational levels by
CCDRs or other subordinate U.S. joint commands who are charged with operational
planning matters. This coordination should be continuous throughout the operational
design and planning of the campaign, but there must also be a formal coordination step
to validate that all of the coordination has been completed and accepted by all parties.

In a similar vein, coordination of the plan with interagency partners is conducted

both informally and formally. CCDRs and JFCs should encourage and solicit maximum
participation of appropriate interagency planners in the operational design of campaigns
and operations. Their participation throughout planning is extremely beneficial to
expand the perspectives and expertise provided in operational design and in achieving

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unity of purpose and then unity of effort in the campaign or operation. However, formal
coordination of OPLANs is done at the Department level, once an OPLAN is approved
by the SecDef.

(7) Review and Brief the plan for approval. Once completely coordinated, the plan
should be briefed through to the commander for his validation, as well as to prepare him
to brief the plan to the national leadership.

(a) Final in progress review (IPR). Once the plan is completed, the CCDR submits
it with the associated TPFDD file to the Joint Staff for review. The Joint Planning and
Execution Community (JPEC) reviews the plan for adequacy (does the plan satisfy the
mission and comply with guidance provided?); feasibility (are the required resources
available in the timeframes anticipated?); acceptability (are the anticipated operations
proportional and worth the anticipated costs? Is it politically supportable?);
completeness (does the plan include all required components and answer the 5Ws
plus how?); and compliance (does the plan comply with joint doctrine?).

(b) In conjunction with the CCDR’s final IPR brief, the CJCS and Undersecretary
of Defense for Policy (USD-P) will also offer their advice. This advice includes
identification of national strategic issues arising from, or resolved during, plan review,
such as key strategic risks and national-level decision points. The result of the final IPR
is SecDef approval of the Base Plan and required annexes, the resolution of any
remaining key issues, and approval to proceed with plan assessment, as applicable,
with any amplifying guidance or direction.

(8) Issue the OPLAN or OPORD. The approved plan is distributed to all subordinate
commands and supporting commands, agencies, and other appropriate organizations.
The command will maintain the plan, that is, distribute all changes to stakeholders and
to solicit reviews of the plan.

(a) Documentation. To ensure future planners can understand the history of

decisions made (who, when, why, etc.), the planning products should be organized and
put into proper documentation so that they can be stored and referenced when
necessary. This step is difficult to manage because planners are quickly pulled away to
work on other plans. However, if this step is not conducted, planners may find
themselves “re-inventing” the wheel, disconnecting future actions from a planned
campaign, or scrambling to find information during investigations or Congressional
inquiries.

(b) Transition. Effective transition of the plan from the planners who have been
intimately involved in developing all of the details of the plan, to the operators, who will
not be as familiar with the intricate details of the plan, is critical. Transition is an
orderly turnover of a plan or order as it is passed to those
tasked with execution of the operation. It provides information,
direction, and guidance relative to the plan or order that will
help to facilitate situational awareness. Additionally, it
provides an understanding of the rationale for key decisions

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necessary to ensure there is a coherent shift from planning to
execution. These factors coupled together are intended to
maintain the intent of the CONOPS, promote unity of effort, and
generate tempo. … Transition may be internal or external in the
form of briefs or drills. Internally, transition occurs between
future plans and future/current operations. Externally,
transition occurs between the commander and subordinate
commands. (JP 5-0, p. V-60)

(c) Transition Brief. At higher levels of command, transition

may include a formal transition brief to subordinate or adjacent
commanders and to the staff supervising execution of the order.
The transition brief provides an overview of the mission,
commander’s intent, task organization, and enemy and friendly
situation. It is given to ensure all actions necessary to
implement the order are known and understood by those executing
the order. The brief may include items from the order or plan
such as:
 Higher headquarters’ mission and commander’s intent.
 Mission.
 Commander’s intent.
 CCIRs.
 Task organization.
 Situation (friendly and enemy).
 CONOPS.
 Execution (including branches and potential sequels).
 Planning support tools (such as a synchronization
matrix). (JP 5-0, p. V-60)

(d) Confirmation Brief. A confirmation brief is given by a

subordinate commander after receiving the order or plan.
Subordinate commanders brief the higher commander on their
understanding of commander’s intent, their specific tasks and
purpose, and the relationship between their unit’s missions and
the other units in the operation. The confirmation brief allows
the higher commander to identify potential gaps in the plan, as
well as discrepancies with subordinate plans. It also gives the
commander insights into how subordinate commanders intend to
accomplish their missions. (JP 5-0, p. V-61)

(e) Transition Drills. Transition drills increase the

situational awareness of subordinate commanders and the staff
and instill confidence and familiarity with the plan. (JP 5-0,
p. V-61)

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 (9) Review the Plan Periodically. Following final approval, the command
maintains and updates the plan as required by changing conditions in the operational
environment, strategic guidance, and resource levels, so that it remains current and
readily executable during future crisis action as the President and SecDef may require.
In most cases, the plan is reviewed regularly (up to every 18 months, annually for CMD
Campaign Plans), but should be reviewed as the commander’s assessment of his AOR
changes through his continual operational design approach. For the highest priority
JSCP-directed OPLANs, the SecDef may require more frequent reviews.

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 CHAPTER 5: DEVELOPMENT OF THEATER (CCMD) STRATEGY
AND THE COMBATANT COMMAND CAMPAIGN PLAN (CCP)

1. Introduction. The National Security Strategy (NSS) describes the

worldwide interests and objectives of the United States; the
national means necessary to deter aggression and the adequacy of
the national resources to pursue national interests.
Historically, the NSS does not address specific ways to achieve
the stated objectives. SecDef and the CJCS develop separate
defense and military strategy documents that describe the ways
military forces will be used in coordination with the other
instruments of national power to pursue national interests
described in the NSS. Geographic combatant commanders (GCCs)
develop a theater strategy that addresses the specific
application of military resources in coordination with other
instruments of national power in their geographic region.
Functional combatant commanders (FCCs) develop functional
strategies in support of national and GCCs’ theater strategies.
(JP 5-0, I-5 emphasis added)

a. The President, aided by the NSC, establishes policy and

national strategic objectives. SecDef translates these
objectives into strategic military objectives that facilitate
theater strategic planning. CCDRs usually participate in
strategic discussions with the President and SecDef through the
CJCS. CCDRs also participate in strategic discussions with
allies and multinational partners. Thus, the CCDR’s strategy
relates to both US national strategy and operational-level
activities within the theater. Military strategy, derived from
national policy and strategy and informed by doctrine, provides
a framework for conducting operations. (JP 3-0, I-13)

b. [Combatant Command Strategy] is a broad statement of the

commander’s long-term vision. It is the bridge between national
strategic guidance and the joint planning required to achieve
national and theater objectives and attain end states.
Specifically, it links CCMD activities, operations, and
resources to USG policy and strategic guidance. A strategy
should describe the ends as directed in strategic guidance and
the ways and means to attain them. A strategy should begin with
the strategic estimate. Although there is no prescribed format
for a strategy, it may include the commander’s vision, mission,
challenges, trends, assumptions, lines of effort, objectives,
and resources. CCDRs employ strategies to align and focus
efforts to prepare for conflict and contingencies, and advance
U.S. interests. To support this, strategies normally emphasize

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security cooperation activities, military-to-military
engagements, force posture, and preparation for contingencies.
Strategies typically employ close cooperation with DOS,
embassies, and other USG departments and agencies. A strategy
should be informed by the means or resources available to
support the attainment of designated end states and may include
military resources, programs, policies, and available funding.
CCDRs publish strategies to provide guidance to subordinates and
supporting commands and improve coordination with other USG
departments and agencies and regional partners. A CCDR
operationalizes a strategy through a campaign plan. (JP 5-0 II-
9).

c. Commanders and their staffs employ Strategic Art and Operational Art to develop
a Strategic Estimate (Frames the Environment and the Problem) and their CCMD
Strategy (Frames Strategic Guidance and the Strategic Approach).

Strategic art is the ability to understand the strategic

variable (relative to the operational area [OA]) and to
conceptualize how the desired objectives set forth in strategic-
level guidance can be reached through the employment of military
capabilities. This also includes understanding the major
international diplomatic/political and security challenges
impacting on US/partner success, the potential ways that the US
might employ its national means to attain desired ends, and
visualizing how military operations can support and/or enable
our national success. … The ability to visualize and
conceptualize how strategic-level success can be achieved or
supported by military means is a key foundation for the
application of operational art and operational design. (JP 5-0
I-5)

Operational art is the application of intuition and creative

imagination by commanders and staffs. Supported by their skill,
knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment, commanders seek
to understand the OE, visualize and describe the desired end
state, and employ assigned resources to achieve objectives. (JP
5-0 I-5)

Strategic estimate. CCDRs use strategic estimates developed in

peacetime to facilitate the employment of military forces across
the range of military operations. The strategic estimate is
more comprehensive in scope than estimates of subordinate
commanders, encompasses all aspects of the CCDR’s OE, and is the
basis for the development of the GCC’s theater strategy. The
CCDR and staff, with input from subordinate commands and
supporting commands and agencies, prepare a strategic estimate

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by analyzing and describing political, military, economic,
social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) factors and
trends, and the threats and opportunities that facilitate or
hinder achievement of the objectives over the timeframe of the
strategy. (JP 5-0, II-8 & 9 Emphasis Added)
Note: For more on the “Strategic Estimate” see Appendix B of JP 5-0.

The purpose of CCMD strategy is to clarify and exert influence over the environment of
today to create strategic effects favorable to achievement of the desired environment of
tomorrow. CCMD strategy must be framed in terms that allow adaptability and flexibility
to react to the changing environment, to seize opportunities, and to hedge against
setbacks. CCDRs develop a CCMD strategy focused mainly on the desired end state
(described by a set of desired conditions at the end of the considered timeframe) for
their area of responsibility that will further national interests.

In time of war, the President or SecDef may designate a theater of war, in which case a
CCDR, or an assigned subordinate commander, may develop a theater strategy for the
accomplishment of national or coalition aims within that theater of war. However, for the
purposes of this chapter, our point of reference for developing a theater strategy is the
CCDR’s assigned AOR in the Unified Command Plan. Note that the thought process
for developing a strategy for a theater of war would be very similar.

d. The policy-strategy interaction. Strategy is always subordinate to policy.

However, there is a two-way dependent relationship between policy and strategy.
Though many in the military would like to be given clear policy aims and then be left
alone to apply military power to achieve them, in reality, it does not work that way―nor
should military strategists want it to work that way. In fact, there is a dynamic between
policy aims and strategy (use of the instruments of power to achieve the aims). Strategy
must be clear and flexible to react to changing policy aims. Political aims may evolve
even as the strategy is being implemented and the effects of that strategy are seen.
Policy may change in reaction to unanticipated opportunities or challenges. The CCDR
must keep national policy makers informed of changes to the environment that affect
such policy decisions and to provide advice on the potential outcomes of changing
policy aims. Senior military commanders must be completely frank about the limits of
what military power can achieve, with what risk, in what time frame, and at what cost.
The CCDR must bridge the inevitable friction that policy and politics create when
developing strategy.

2. Sources of Guidance and Direction for Theater/Functional (CCMD) Strategies.

a. The combatant command translates national policy and strategy into military
operations, actions, and activities. The guidance to the CCDR formulating the theater
strategy comes from a variety of formal and informal sources. Very often, the national
policy and corresponding guidance is not explicit. This places a premium on the
CCDR’s ability to interpret, analyze, and synthesize the many sources of national intent,
and then communicate this synthesis back to the national policy makers to ensure that
he/she is in sync with their vision (in fact, the CCDR may actually shape their vision).

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Chapter 1 describes the CPG, NDS, NMS, and JSCP, as sources of formal guidance.
However, in a dynamic strategic environment, policy may evolve and the CCDR must
stay attuned to evolving descriptions and applications of national interests as described
by the President, SecDef, and other senior government officials through less formal
means such as speeches, social media, and verbal guidance. Though not directive in
nature, guidance contained in various U.S. interagency and even international
directives, such as UN Security Council Resolutions, will also impact campaign end
states and objectives. Perhaps most importantly, the CCDR must continually analyze
the dynamic relationships within the theater to describe the desired end state and
present limitations on ways to achieve that end state.

b. Identifying and collaborating with stakeholders. CCDRs must coordinate and

synchronize their strategies and implementation activities with other stakeholders, to
include non-DOD government agencies and other nations. One critical partner is the
Department of State (DOS), which provides some guidance and many of the resources
for the CCDR’s theater security cooperation program, which is vital to the
implementation of the Theater strategy. Similarly, other agencies, such as the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), routinely conduct developmental
activities in countries of the region, requiring the CCDR to ensure compatibility between
military activities and USAID activities. The CCDR and staff may have to find ways to
work through some policy interpretations that might inhibit formal coordination with non-
DOD executive branch agencies. The CCDR should coordinate closely with
international partners, to include nations, international organizations, and non-
governmental and private organizations. Though it is not always realistic to align goals
and activities among all stakeholders, it is important to understand the purpose of the
other activities, and to work towards mutual benefit when possible. On the other hand,
the CCDR should be aware of competing agendas and activities by other non-U.S.
organizations (and, in rare cases, U.S. organizations) that may present obstacles to
achievement of the theater strategy objectives. Formally, the CCDR works through
OSD to reconcile and synchronize activities with other organizations, but an informal
coordination network is also crucial to success. It is important to consider that non-
military and international actors have legitimate agendas and will be active (sometimes
the lead) players to a greater or lesser extent across the full spectrum of conflict.

3. Components of Theater Strategy. A recommended theater strategy consists at a

minimum of:
 A Strategic Estimate – the key characteristics of the environment that
provide context for the strategy and affect the achievement of the desired
ends in the theater. (See JP 5-0 Appendix B for more on the Strategic
estimate.)
 The Commander’s Vision
 A long-range vision that is consistent with national
strategy and policy objectives. The vision is
usually not constrained by time or resources, but is
bounded by the national policy. (JP 5-0 III-1)

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  The Command’s Mission
 Assumptions
 Ends
o Description of the desired strategic goals or outcomes
o As directed in strategic guidance and/or policy
o Achievable with projected resources
 Ways
o Strategic approach to apply military power
o In concert with the other instruments of power
o Achievable with projected resources
 Means
o Resources needed to source the operational approach
 Risks in implementing the strategy

There is no prescribed format or method for developing a CCMD Strategy.

a. Environment. The CCDR must describe the current environment of the theater,
as well as the desired environment that meets national policy aims. This provides the
context for the strategy. While strategy is always subordinate to policy, to be effective it
is also subordinate to the environment; that is, as the environment changes, the
strategy may have to change. The CCDR and staff conduct a strategic estimate,
which provides the commander’s perspective of the strategic and
operational levels of the OE, threats and opportunities that
could facilitate or hinder the achievement of [CPG or JSCP}-
directed objectives, desired changes to meet specified regional
or functional objectives, and the commander’s visualization of
how those objectives might be achieved. (JP 5-0 B-1). This continually
updated estimate should address the following:
 Strategic Direction
o U.S. Policy Goals
o Non-US/Multinational Goals
o Opposition [competitor] Policy Goals and Desired End
State
o Endstate(s)
 Command Mission
 Operational Environment
o Area of Responsibility
o Area of Interest
o Adversary Forces - States or non-state actors in the theater (or
outside of the theater) that may challenge the command’s ability to
secure U.S. interests in the theater.
o Friendly Forces
o Neutral Forces
 Assessment of the Major Strategic and Operational
Challenges
o Significant geo-political considerations

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 o Potential for spillover, with other CCDRs’ AORs or
functional areas(JP 5-0, B-1)
 Potential Opportunities
 Capabilities available to and limitations facing the command
 Assessment of Risk

b. Ends. “Ends” is a word that may cause some friction with interagency partners.
Military efforts are almost by definition bounded in time, space, and effect. At some
point, military operations and activities cease when required conditions have been
achieved that will place the environment into a favorable and sustainable state.
However, senior civilian and military leaders know that the environment will continue to
change based on forces acting on the system. An effective military campaign or
operation should be planned and executed with a view towards positive sustainable
outcomes. Sustainable (with favorable trends) without the presence of military forces
and eventually sustainable with little or no requirement for U.S. resources. In a planning
context, (and to be consistent with doctrine) the ends for the theater describe system
conditions required to achieve the national aims as derived from various sources of
strategic guidance. The comprehensive aims will likely not be clearly and completely
laid out in directive guidance to the CCDR, so he/she must combine guidance with an
understanding of the environment to clearly describe the set of conditions in the theater
environment that will further national interests. Theater Strategies typically look 5-10
years into the future. This set of desired conditions (with time horizons) describes the
desired end state, which provides the context for understanding what aspects of the
current environment must change or must remain the same.

c. Ways. The strategy’s ways describe the strategic approach to achieving the end
state. This strategic approach should describe in general how resources (means) will
be applied over time to achieve the desired conditions. It describes the general activities
needed to accomplish the objectives (which, in turn, achieve the desired theater
conditions). (In some interagency circles, the word “objective” may sound too military-
oriented. Interagency planners should feel free to substitute another word like “outcome”
to overcome semantic differences.) The strategic approach should be explicit enough to
provide sufficient guidance to planners, but not so detailed as to inhibit their creativity.
One way to lay out the strategic approach is to develop lines of effort that lead to
accomplishment of the objectives. LOEs should also consider potential second and
third order effects that will cascade towards achievement of other strategic effects. The
strategist must also anticipate potential undesired effects and work to avoid or mitigate
them. The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) is a useful source in
describing some typical ways in which military power can be applied to accomplish
objectives. Since some military objectives support other actors’ objectives, it is critical
that the objective and its supporting line of effort be closely coordinated with them.

d. Means. Means are the resources necessary to support the strategic approach
(Ways). Resources may be tangible (such as military forces, foreign military financing,
or seats in U.S. schools), or intangible (such as processes, cultural appeal, goodwill
from previous activities, or fear of invasion by another country). Closely associated with

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means are the authorities required to use them and the permissions required to use that
authority. The CCDR should consider the authority they have to use the necessary
means and the permission required to use that authority in support of a theater strategy.
The theater strategy focuses on how military power can be employed in concert with the
other instruments of national power. The CCDR should consider all instruments that
are available or may be made available from U.S. and partner sources. Insufficient
means require adjusted ways or ends. After adjusting the theater objectives, if there is
still no alternative approach that can achieve the desired conditions, then the CCDR
must go back to the national policy makers and show how the national aims cannot be
met, to reassess the national policy.

e. Risk. The strategist must weigh the potential advantages and disadvantages of
the strategy in terms of risk and ensure a proper balance between ends, ways, and
means, as discussed above. Part of the purpose of building the strategy is to identify
shortfalls in required resources. On the other hand, if there is no reasonable expectation
that a gapped resource may become available, then an infeasible strategic approach
results, causing an unbalanced and hence risk-prone strategy. At that point where
constraints on the strategic approach or on the means available to execute that concept
risk achievement of the end state, the strategy is in jeopardy.

4. Using operational design to create a theater strategy. Developing a theater-level

strategy requires an approach that allows the JFC and staff to gain an understanding of
the complexity of the environment, translate national level aims into desired conditions
in the theater, and build flexible, adaptable approaches that will enable military means
to work in concert with other instruments of power to achieve the desired conditions. As
discussed above, the dynamic between policy and strategy demands that strategy be
built to provide flexibility both to react to changes in policy and to advise policy makers
as to the feasibility and potential effects of the policy.

Current joint doctrine does not provide a definitive method for developing theater
strategy. The Joint Planning Process (JPP), described in JP 5-0 and earlier in this
handbook, provides a systematic process to develop a plan, but focuses on
development of courses of action to accomplish a specified mission. Planners can use
a process such as JPP to guide development of the theater campaign plan, but the
strategy that underpins that campaign plan should be clearly understood and
communicated first. Operational design as described in Chapter 3 provides a way to
think through the complexity to build the strategy. While operational design can help
planners work the conceptual aspects of any plan, to include a campaign plan, it is
especially suited to the development of theater strategy, which must inherently deal with
complexity and a multitude of unfamiliar and ill-structured problems.

The methodology described below adapts operational design as described in Chapter 3

to work for the development of the theater strategy. Though some of the words are
different, the principles are the same. The following paragraphs describe one way of
developing a Theater (aka CCMD) Strategy. These paragraphs are meant to provide a
guide, not to prescribe any method. Operational design must continue well beyond the

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initial development of the strategy to constantly assess impact on the environment, to
reframe the strategy as needed during execution.

a. Understand the Theater Environment. The CCDR analyzes the current

environmental conditions, to include existing guidance, and determines what the desired
future environment should look like. The CCDR also considers what adversaries may
desire as end state conditions. Other interested parties should be invited to participate
in the dialogue to frame the environment in order to gain as wide an understanding as
possible. A secondary benefit of this inclusion is to gain potential buy-in for the eventual
strategy by other relevant actors. Some questions pursued during this framing are:
 What are the key actors, relationships, factors, and trends in the theater?
 What is causing conflict among the actors in the theater and from outside
the theater?
 What are the key historical and cultural aspects of the environment?
 How can national interests be affected in the theater?
 What specific guidance has been given? Implied guidance? Is there any
conflicting guidance?
 What aspects of the current and projected situation in theater are
desirable and undesirable?
 What do we want the theater to look like (conditions) in one/five/ten years?
What is “strategic horizon?”
 What other actors have interests in the region that may present
opportunities or challenges? What do other actors want the theater to
look like?
 What conditions are likely to emerge in the region if parties outside the
region take no action?
 What conditions are not acceptable to us that others may want to see?
 Whom can we count on for support?
 What limitations/opportunities might there be in garnering applicable
instruments of power (DIME)?
 Who may potentially oppose our desired end state and why?

(1) Describe the current environment. This effort is described in the previous
chapter. At the theater level, it is critically important to consider the impact of history
and culture on aspects of the environment. To understand the essence of the
environment that will affect the strategy, the analysis should enable a dialogue on how
the various systems interrelate. Identification of the relevance and impact of key
relationships between the many state and non-state actors are extremely important in
this analysis and synthesis. Finally, there must be a clear understanding of how U.S.,
allies, and partner national interests are affected by the theater environment.

(2) Determine the tendency of the OE. Based on an understanding of the current
environment, project the environment into the future to determine its tendencies that the
commander needs to affect. This will help describe the desired end state and help the
commander capitalize on opportunities presented by the natural tendencies wherever
possible. Since campaign plans generally organize efforts and actions, the logical

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projection of the environment should be 2-5 years. If there are anticipated major
milestones in the interim, or aspects of the environment that are of longer term
consideration, consider multiple projections of the tendency of the OE.

(3) Analyze guidance. These may be written directives; oral instructions from the
President, SecDef, or CJCS; Presidential or Cabinet-member speeches; domestic and
international laws; policies of other organizations that have interest in the theater; or
existing strategic estimates (ours or other parties). Some of the guidance may be
contradictory and should be clarified and confirmed. It is likely that the CCMD will have
recent perspectives on the theater that will enable a reconciliation of guidance. One
challenge in reconciling the various sources of guidance is in the varying timeliness of
the guidance. It is important to include policy-makers in this dialogue to gain their
insights, and to reconcile the differences in interpretation of the multiple forms of
guidance among both policy-makers and the CCDR.

(4) Analyze available instruments of national power and limitations. Gain an

understanding of what instruments of power that can be brought to bear by the United
States or by other parties that the United States may be able to influence.

(5) Determine the desired future condition (end state) for the theater. Describe
the key conditions that must exist in the future OE to achieve the national aims. Focus
on military conditions, but do not exclude other conditions that may impact the military
conditions or achievement of which military activity may support (or potentially interfere
with). Get a sense for the realistic timing for achievement of these conditions: 1 year, 5
years, sometime far into the future? Review the relationship between national and
theater end states from the previous chapter.

(6) Determine alternative future conditions (end states). Competitors have

interests in the theater and may well have significantly different desired end states.
There may be potential adversaries with opposing desired conditions to ours. There are
likely to be other actors (influential stakeholders), not really adversarial, that have
different aims or objectives that will have second or third order effects which can
complicate our strategy. The CCDR and staff need to understand these, so that they
can either work with or try to influence those other actors.

b. Define the problem set that the theater strategy must solve. This entails
identifying the differences between the desired conditions at end state and those that
others want to see, and also between the desired conditions and those of the natural
tendency of the environment. Think of the natural tendency as another actor, likely the
most powerful actor. These comparisons between the desired conditions and the
alternatives describe the relevant tensions in the environment. The points of
congruence between the desired conditions and others’ desires must also be identified.
Those points of congruence offer opportunities that, if exploited, can help the CCDR
achieve the desired conditions. Some of these opportunities are significant enough that
they should also be part of the problem description.

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 Though identifying the root causes of problems in the theater is certainly important, it
is not the end of the problem framing. The CCDR may find that the military cannot
solve the root causes, and can only mitigate the effects of the root causes on the
theater strategy.

The commander may see that the tensions are too great and the opportunities too
few to be able to achieve a particular desired condition or set of conditions. In that
case, the commander may see a need to adjust the desired end state. In this case,
they are obligated to dialogue with the national policy makers.

Commanders might ask these questions:

 What are natural tendencies of the environment that will pose challenges
to achievement of our desired conditions?
 What are the tensions between our desired conditions and those of other
actors?
 Which tensions will preclude us from achieving our end state conditions?
 What are the similarities between our desired conditions and those of
other actors?
 Which similarities offer opportunities for synergy in achieving our desired
conditions?
 What are strengths and weaknesses of other actors that will affect how we
can reconcile the differences?
 What are natural tendencies of the environment that we can leverage?
 What needs to change?
 What doesn’t need to change?
 What are the opportunities and challenges?
 What are the unintended long-range consequences of achieving our
desired conditions?
 What is the reasonable timing for achieving the desired conditions? Do
we need to have different short- and long-term timelines?

The goal in framing the problem is to describe the problem set concisely and
completely. This problem statement is the one that the operational approach must
answer. An example might be:

Political and economic instability is rising in the ORANGECOM AOR.

Caused by poor governance and black markets in the northern region, this
instability over the next 5-10 years threatens the development and vitality
of market economies, encourages aggressive behavior by country Y, and
precludes influence by country Z, thereby putting U.S. economic and
security interests at risk.

c. Develop the strategic approach. The strategic approach describes how the
problem will be solved or managed. It is detailed enough to provide direction and
boundaries for those implementing and supporting the strategy, but not so much that it
precludes creativity by those implementers. The purpose is to outline the way to

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achieve the desired theater end state. It is important to understand that in the volatile
and complex theater environment, the approach is only a hypothesis to address/solve
the problem. Thus, the approach must include flexibility to adapt to a different approach
if the hypothesis is shown to be incorrect as the strategy influences the environment.

Commanders might ask these questions:

 Is the problem we described solvable? manageable? If not, how can we
reframe it?
 What distinguishable, measurable objectives/outcomes will let us achieve
our desired conditions and prevent the other actors from achieving
competing conditions?
 How might we shape the environment to make our desired conditions
appealing?
 What are key events, activities, or states of the environment along the way
that will either enable us to or preclude us from achieving our desired
conditions?
 What are the lines of effort that we might use to organize our activities?
 What are the unintended consequences of our activities?
 What are the risks of this approach? Can I avoid or mitigate those risks by
adjusting the approach?

(1) Develop objectives that will address the problem set. Determine the set of
objectives that will enable the required conditions by reconciling those aspects of the
environment that may preclude achievement of those conditions, especially those
opposing desired conditions of other actors. The objectives should be focused on the
stated problem, and should consider four areas: key actors, key relationships, managing
tensions between actors, and managing opportunities presented by the convergence of
desired conditions among actors. Some examples of theater objectives are:
 Regional countries, with US assistance, have organized a military
cooperation forum.
 Country R is a “security exporter” vice a “security importer” by 2028.
 The United States has an effective military relationship with Country S by
2022.
 Freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Blue is maintained without
interruption.

(2) Build a strategic approach that will link the objectives together in such a way
as to achieve the desired conditions. An example approach statement might be:

ORANGECOM will support DOS in achieving the necessary political and

economic stability required to prevent conflict (in the northern region) by deterring non-
state, black market violence in the next 2-5 years, building the capacity of Country Z to
become a regional security leader by 2025 (discouraging aggressive behavior by its
neighbors), and reassuring countries in the AOR throughout the next decade (by U.S.
military presence). ORANGECOM will enable the regional security needed to revitalize
commercial markets. We will place the majority of our theater security cooperation

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assets in the western part of the AOR. While we accept risk in the southeastern
countries of our region, I believe we can mitigate it by close coordination with
BLUECOM forces near our boundaries.

(3) Capture the strategic approach in a narrative that forms a hypothesis for
solving the strategic problem. (“Here’s what’s likely to happen in the region and why it
matters so much. Here’s what we have to do about it to achieve a future that looks like
this…”). Supplement the narrative as needed with graphics.

(4) Analyze the strategic approach. Look at FAA-DC (feasibility, adequacy,

acceptability, and distinguishability) and at risk. First, determine if the available and
potentially available resources are sufficient to source the strategic approach. Second,
determine if the strategic approach will accomplish the objectives. Third, determine if
the objectives, when accomplished and if sequenced properly, will achieve the
conditions that describe the desired theater end state. Look for second and third order
effects of applying resources and of accomplishing objectives to find any places where
the strategic approach may produce effects that complicate achievement of the desired
conditions. Where these friction points are identified, look for ways to avoid or mitigate
the undesired effects. Last, identify those remaining elements of strategic risk and
discuss them with the national leadership. Commanders might ask these questions:
 What are the probable consequences of success and failure of the
strategy?
 What assumptions were made in this strategy and what is the effect if one
of them is wrong?
 What effect would a change in certain aspects of the environment have on
the strategy?
 How will other actors react to certain activities of the strategy, and what
happens to the strategy if they take unfavorable actions in reaction?
 What is the balance between intended and unintended consequences
(effects) of our activities on the strategy?
 What mitigating activities will reduce the impact of unintended
consequences of our activities?

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 Figure 5-1 Example Theater Strategy Depiction

5. The Combatant Command Campaign Plan (CCP) (formerly known as the

Theater Campaign Plan). They are the primary plans through which the
Combatant Commands execute day-to-day campaigning. CCPs address
theater objectives as well as objectives directed by GCPs, RCPs,
and FCPs. CCPs are not part of the Joint Strategic Planning
System (CJCSI 3100.01D Joint Strategic Planning System.)

The CCP is the centerpiece of the CCMDs’ planning construct and

operationalizes CCMD strategies over a two to five year horizon
by organizing and aligning available resources. (JP 3-0 V-6).
The CCP focuses the command’s day-to-day activities, which
include ongoing operations, military engagement, security
cooperation, deterrence, and other shaping or preventive
activities. (JP 5-0 pg II-4). The CCMD campaign plan becomes the
execution plan… at the operational level by aggregating all
assigned tasks from problem-focused plans (GCP, FCP, and RCP)…
to provide a campaign plan that fully integrates Operations,
Activities and Investments (OAIs) spanning the command’s
assigned responsibilities. (JSCP)

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The CCP’s long-term and persistent and preventative activities
are intended to identify and deter, counter, or otherwise
mitigate an adversary’s actions before escalation to combat.
Many of these activities are conducted with DOD in support of
the diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts of USG
partners and partner nations. (JP 3-0 V-6)

The CCP flows from the commander’s theater strategy and provides the action plan to
implement the strategy. While each combatant command’s campaign plan may
approach the task of executing the strategy differently, the plan will address the
commander’s AOR in an interconnected and holistic manner and seek to avoid what
can be a myopic focus on one or two stove-piped contingency plans. The current
construct for nesting plans is first to build the GCPs, RCPs and FCPs, then to build a
CCP that implements the activities required to achieve the desired conditions for the
theater while dealing with deviations from the strategy through branch plans. Branch
plans are brought back into a global planning framework by the creation of Integrated
Contingency Plans (ICPs). Supporting activities (to ICPs and to the GCPs/RCPs/FCPs)
are contained in Campaign Support Plans (CSPs).

The CCP should:

 Describe the relevant environment(s).
 Describe the desired military and associated conditions for the
environment in the timeframe covered by the strategy.
o This will include conditions associated with the Global, Regional, and
Functional Campaign Plans that apply to the command.
 Address the use of all instruments of power, but be specific about the role
of the military instrument in the strategy.
 Describe the military objectives that will support achieving the desired
conditions for the relevant environment(s).
 Describe the current and required force posture for the theater, and
identify elements of risk in the gap between current and required forces.
 Prioritize activity among subordinate components.
 Link security cooperation activities to specific objectives.
 Describe branches to the campaign plan that require contingency plans
and describe the connectivity between the day-to-day activities of the plan
and each contingency plan’s shaping activities, such as setting the theater
for successful contingency plan execution should it be required.

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 Figure 5-2 Campaign and Contingency Planning
(based on Figs II-5 & III-2 in JP 5-0)

6. Components of a CCP. The elements of the CCP are currently in flux as the Joint
Staff and planning community sort out what will transition to GCPs, RCPs, FCPs, ICPs
and supporting plans. The draft 2017 JSCP mandate some of the elements that must be
included in the legacy TCP/FCP, but neither prescribed a format. In fact, several of the
GCCs use a slightly different format, and even the substance of the various extant
TCPs differs, though all generally address the key requirements directed by the draft
2017 JSCP.

a. Recent strategic guidance directed that TCPs include the following:

(1) Theater Assessment. Where we are today. Describe threats, challenges,

opportunities, and theater trends. Identify assumptions that will inform further planning
and the risks they bring.

(2) Mission Statement. Outlines the essential tasks and the “who, what, where,
when, and why” to achieve the campaign plan’s main objectives.

(3) Posture Plan. Outlines the forces, footprints, and agreements within each
AOR and how the CCDR intends to synchronize these to achieve their campaign
objectives.

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 (4) Intermediate Military Objectives. Describes the milestones to achieve the
CCP’s objectives. Serves as the basis for tasks to subordinate organizations and
requests to other partners to accomplish tasks.

(5) Country-specific Security Cooperation Sections (CSCS). CCDRs should

produce one of these sections for each country in their AOR depending on the size and
significance of the security cooperation program for that country. CSCSs directly
support the accomplishment of the CCDRs’ IMOs and the U.S. ambassadors’ Integrated
Country Strategies (ICS).

(6) Resources. Describes forces required and funding programs. Describes the
impact of resource shortfalls in terms of strategic and operational risk, and possible
mitigation measures.

b. Relationship of the CCP to GCPs and Integrated Contingency Plans. The JSCP
directs contingency planning consistent with the Contingency
Planning Guidance (CPG). It expands on the CPG with specific
objectives, tasks, and linkages between campaign and contingency
plans. Related contingency plans are further integrated within
an Integrated Contingency Plan (ICP). The JSCP also delineates
support plans to foster Joint Force collaboration and
coordination in time, space, and purpose. The coordinating
authority (CA) assigns a Joint Force organization to be a
collaborator that supports integrated planning. (CJCSI 3100.01D
Joint Strategic Planning System.)

The CCDR may also direct preparation of contingency plans to deal emerging or
potential crises. One example might be a plan to deter the aggression of and, if
necessary, defeat a regional threat in order to ensure stability in a part of the world
important to U.S. and allied interests. Such a plan is likely to be an integrated campaign
plan that would link several major operations together to achieve the military end state
that is essential to a positive and enduring political outcome. Another example of a
contingency plan might be a plan to conduct a noncombatant evacuation operation
(NEO) in the event of instability in a country. Such a plan would probably be a single
operation plan, rather than a campaign plan.

The GCP, RCP, and FCP should identify the likely conditions that might lead to
execution of a contingency plan. Execution of a contingency plan should either bring the
situation back to the CCP desired conditions, or cause a revision of the theater strategy
due to the changed environment.

c. Theater Security Cooperation and the CSCS. Theater security cooperation is an

essential part of any CCP. Extant TCPs have used the CSCS to describe the security
cooperation and assistance activities in detail: who, what, where, when, why, and the
source of the fiscal resources for each activity. This plan is dynamic, as activities and
their purposes must adapt as both conditions and resource availability change. The very
nature of the many security cooperation activities, which often span multiple objectives

148
and outcomes, contributes to the theater campaign plan’s goal of a cohesive framework.
Some of the FCCs may also integrate security cooperation plans into their campaign
plans. FCCs must be very conscious of coordinating their plans with those of the
regional GCCs. Security cooperation activities have included the following focus areas:

(1) Operational Access and Global Freedom of Action. Gain unfettered access to
and freedom of action in all operational domains. Support global defense posture
realignment and U.S. political and commercial freedom of action and access needs.

(2) Operational Capacity and Capability Building. Build usable, relevant, and
enduring partner capabilities while achieving U.S. and partner objectives.

(3) Multinational Operations Capacity, Interoperability, and Standardization.

Develop operational and technical capabilities, doctrine, and tactics with partners to
enable effective combined operations or improve a collective defense capability.

(4) Intelligence and Information Sharing. Gain and share specific kinds of
intelligence or information and develop shared assessments of common threats.

(5) Assurance and Regional Confidence Building. Assure allies and partners,
enhance regional stability and security, reduce the potential for inter/intra-state conflict,
and expand the community of states dedicated to a more secure international order.

(6) Institutional Capacity and Security Sector Reform. Assist allies with
transforming their defense/security establishments to become publicly accountable,
well-managed, and subject to the rule of law.

(7) International Armaments Cooperation. Promote technological collaboration,

foster mutually beneficial exchanges of technology and defense equipment, gain access
to foreign technology, and reduce the overall cost of defense to the U.S. taxpayer.

(8) International Suasion and Cooperation. Build cooperative political-military

relationships with key security influencers and offset counterproductive influence in key
regions and international organizations.

(9) Human Capacity and Human Capital Development. Enable the ability of
partner country civilians and military personnel to understand the proper role of the
military in society, promote human rights, and respect the rule of law.

(10) Support to Institutional Capacity and Civil Sector Capacity Building. Help
develop the ability of partner country civil sector organizations to provide services to
their populations, respond to humanitarian disasters, and improve living conditions.

149
 d. Theater Posture Plan (TPP) (classified document) The Theater Posture Plan
has been an annex to extant TCPs that describes how the theater is currently prepared
to meet the objectives of the various Campaign Plans. GCCs have updated the Theater
Posture Plan on an annual basis and submitted it to the Joint Staff and OSD. The Joint
Staff is now synchronizing Global Defense Posture; CCDRs are required to
submit TPPs every two years (with annual updates) to support
campaign and contingency plans. Posture plans align basing and
forces to ensure theater and global functional security, respond
to contingency scenarios, and provide strategic flexibility (JP
5-0 pg II-5). A key consideration of GCP and plan reviews is
global defense posture. Foreign and overseas posture is the
fundamental enabler of Joint Force activities. From a posture
perspective, GCPs foster an integrated approach to requirements,
trade-offs, and risk across three interdependent posture
elements: forces, footprints, and agreements. The J-5 is the
lead directorate for posture issues. In that role, the
directorate coordinates closely with the J-3, J-4, and J-8 on
global defense posture issues, such as force management and
prepositioned equipment, and introduces posture recommendations
to the DOD’s senior body overseeing global defense posture, the
Global Posture Executive Council. The primary Joint Staff forum
for reviewing posture issues and recommendations is the
Operations Deputies Tank. (CJCSI 3100.01D Joint Strategic
Planning System). This process is still being developed. OSD prepares an annual
global defense posture synchronization report that enables coordination of department-
wide activity across the global lines of effort. Past Theater Posture Plans have included
topics such as:
 Forces – composed of assigned, allocated, and enabling
units, personnel, and assets. It includes rotational and
mobility forces. (JP 5-0 H-2)
 Footprint – includes enduring locations, supporting
infrastructure, and prepositioned equipment. (JP 5-0, H-2)
 Agreements – provides access, basing, lawful mission
execution, protection, and relationships which allow the
footprint to be established and forces to execute their
missions. Examples are access agreements, basic ordering
agreements, transit agreements, status-of-forces agreements, and
treaties. (JP 5-0 H-2)
 Identification of ongoing or new initiatives to further theater objectives.
 Proposed costs to implement any required posture changes.
 Identification of risks to assured access and associated mitigation plans.
 Any required deconfliction with other DOD or other agency activities.
 Supportability of global reach in support of contingency plans (own theater,
other theaters, functional plans).
[For more on TPPs, see Appendix H of JP 5-0 and DoDI 3000.12 Management of
Global Defense Posture (GDP)]

150
 e. Theater Distribution Plans. The Theater Distribution Plan (TDP) has essentially
been a staff estimate that describes how the theater is currently logistically prepared to
meet the objectives of the various campaign plans. TDPs describe the
distribution network within each of the geographic CCMDs’ AOR
(outside the continental US) as directed by the [CPG] and JSCP.
They describe the distribution pipeline from the point of need
to the point of employment. TDPs [also] provide detailed
theater mobility and distribution analysis to assist in planning
current and future operations, inform the TCP/CCP and other
plans, and aids theater distribution decision making.

TDPs ensure sufficient distribution capacity throughout the

theater and synchronization of distribution planning throughout
the global distribution network. This synchronization enables a
GCC’s theater distribution to support the development of CCPs
and OPLANs. (JP 5-0 J-1)

The TDP contains detailed information on the theater

distribution capabilities and their interface with the global
distribution network for a GCC’s AOR. It reflects the theater’s
physical means, processes, people, and systems required for the
receipt, storage, staging, and movement of forces and materiel
from points of origin to points of employment. The TDP provides
theater intelligence, as well as transportation and capacity
specific information on ports, airfield, ground and sea LOCs,
and distribution infrastructure within the AOR. (JP 5-0, J-2)

USTRANSCOM, as the global distribution synchronizer … will

advise and assist the GCCs with the development and improvement
of their TDPs on a biennial cycle. (JP 5-0 J-1)

For more on TDPs, see Appendix J of JP 5-0.

Note: CJCSI 3100.01D Joint Strategic Planning System (dtd 20 July 2018) appears to
eliminate this type of plan.

f. Subordinate Campaign Plans (classified document) - The CCDR or a

subordinate JFC may conduct a subordinate campaign to accomplish
(or contribute to) military strategic or operational objectives
in support of the CCMD’s [CCMD Campaign Plan]. The CCDR or
subordinate JFCs develop subordinate campaign plans if their
assigned missions require military operations of substantial
size, complexity, and duration and cannot be accomplished within
the framework of a single joint operation. These campaigns are
conducted in support of the CCDR’s ongoing CCMD campaign plans.
(JP 5-0 pg II-4).

151
 g. Support Plans. Once the Global Integrator assigns a CA and
issues guidance and direction for a problem set, the CA will
refine the campaign plan or contingency plan with the
collaborators. Collaborators prepare support plans to document
assigned tasks and how to address them. CAs use support plans to
develop the overall concept of operations for the campaign or
contingency, synchronizing the actions of the Joint Force in
time and space. Collaborators work with the CA to ensure their
support plans effectively address the problem set and integrate
with the Operations, Activities, and Investments (OAIs) of other
organizations. Support plans do not change supported/ supporting
command relationships.

An organization must submit a support plan if a specific plan

in the JSCP designates it as a collaborator and the CA requests
a support plan. If the JSCP does not specify that an
organization is a collaborator, the CA may still request one and
negotiate the details with the organization. CAs are not
required to create support plans for the plans they lead, but
planning must capture (at a minimum) all collaborators' force
and logistics resource/capabilities requirements.

Support plans may be modular for use in multiple campaign

plans. (CJCSI 3141.01F Management and Review of Campaign and
Contingency Plans.) (e.g. NORTHCOM might produce a supporting plan regarding
ballistic missile defense for a hypothetical INDOPACOM plan on North Korean threats
to the homeland).

h. Planning Order (PLANORD) (classified document) – A PLANORD is a

planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and
directs the initiation of plan development before the directing
authority approves a military [Course of Action (COA)]. (JP 5-0
pg II-30) For details on the “levels of plans” see CH 2 of this document.

i. Execution Order (EXORD) (classified document) - An EXORD is a

directive to implement an approved military [Concept of
Operations] (CONOPS). Only the President and SecDef have the
authority to approve and direct the initiation of military
operations. The CJCS, by the authority of and at the direction
of the President or SecDef, may subsequently issue an EXORD to
initiate military operations. Supported and supporting
commanders and subordinate JFCs use an EXORD to implement the
approved CONOPS. (JP 5-0 II-32)

j. Assessment. The CCP must include the methodology to assess plan progress in
achieving the desired conditions. Note: For more on Assessment, see CPH Appendix G.

152
 APPENDIX A: MANAGEMENT AND REVIEW OF CAMPAIGN AND
CONTINGENCY PLANS
Pursuant to legislation passed by Congress in the 2017 National Defense
Authorization Act, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) directed globally
integrated planning across the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). CJCSI
3141.01F The Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans was
approved on 31 January 2019 to establish procedures to coordinate the planning and
approval process for those plans requiring senior leadership review. These plans are
Global Campaign Plans (GCPs), Combatant Command Campaign Plans (CCPs),
Integrated Contingency Plans (ICPs), and other plans directed by the Contingency
Planning Guidance (CPG) or the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP). For a detailed
description of this process consult CJCSI 3141.01F and succeeding publications.

This process essentially replaces the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX)
construct that used specific in progress reviews (IPRs) to receive guidance and
approval from senior leadership. In the APEX, the CCDR and the planning staff would
present the plan directly to the Secretary of Defense (or the designated authority) for
approval. The intent of the new process is for plans to be continuously reviewed in order
to provide the most up-to-date advice to the Secretary and President. In addition, the
planning and collaboration has been expanded to provide a true global perspective
which includes the Services. The culminating events are a series of JCS Tank sessions
at the Operations Deputies (OpsDeps) and CJCS level.

As explained in the CJCSI, the plan review process has four purposes:
 To ensure the plans are executable. Of particular concern is the plan’s feasibility,
acceptability, and completeness.
 To make sure plans are up-to-date, provide military advice to civilian leadership
and provide guidance to CCDRs with a global and all-Service perspective.
 To integrate policy guidance from SecDef and the other OSD stakeholders. The
iterative nature of the review process allows civilian department leadership to
refine policy and planning direction.
 To facilitate the integration of plans across CCMDs, defense agencies,
departments and Services.

The review process provides a common understanding of the strategic and operational
environment, and the problem set requiring military planning. It involves the entire Joint
Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) which consists of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, the Services, the CCMDs, the National
Guard Bureau, the DoD combat support agencies, and other defense agencies. As the
Global Integrator, the CJCS is responsible for providing strategic direction, integrating
the planning activities of the JPEC, and establishing the frameworks and processes to
execute those responsibilities that allows input from all affected organizations.

A-1
 The CJCS publishes the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) that directs the
planning activities across the Joint Force. The two basic types of plans are campaign
plans and contingency plans. Campaign plans are most concerned with the day-to-day
Operations, Activities, and Investments (OAIs) that address a problem which requires
coordination across the DoD and most likely the entire U.S. government. Campaign
plans include GCPs, Regional Campaign Plans (RCPs), Functional Campaign Plans
(FCPs), and Combatant Command Campaign Plans (CCPs). Contingency plans are
best described as branches or sequels to campaign plans. Several related contingency
plans may be bundled together as integrated contingency plans (ICPs). A significant
challenge for the JPEC is to align campaign plans and contingency plans in such a way
that campaign plans achieve national outcomes that would not require execution of an
associated branch or sequel contingency plan or ICP. At the same time, campaign
plans must be designed and executed in such a way that, if required, contingency plans
or ICPs could be executed successfully.

After the priority challenge GCPs are created by the Joint Staff they are turned over
to a coordinating authority (CA) to integrate planning and campaigning across the JPEC
(especially with other CCMDs). A CA is the CCDR with the preponderance of
responsibility for plan execution. The CJCS will also designate CAs for RCPs and
FCPs. The CJCS will also create Priority Challenge Cross-Functional Teams (CFT) to
assist CAs with their planning integration responsibilities. The Joint Staff will also create
Globally Integrated Base Plans (GIBPs) that will direct modifications of Operations,
Activities and Investments (OAIs) across the joint force if a contingency plan or ICP is
likely to be executed.

The plan review process is a vehicle intended to provide a conversation among the
JPEC and especially the civilian leadership in OSD. The process has two
complimentary lines of effort:
 To ensure planning supports policy
 To ensure plans are militarily executable and they provide adequate, feasible,
and acceptable options to SecDef and the Commander-in-Chief.
The process is a series of interactions between the CA, OSD, Joint Staff, and other
members of the JPEC.

The planning review process starts when a plan’s CA or originator begins informal
coordination, collaboration or information exchange at the Action Officer (AO) level. As
the plan matures, reviews are conducted at increasingly senior levels. Reviews can be
conducted by paper, by Secure Video Tele-Conference (SVTC), or in person. Paper
reviews will normally be conducted for non-contentious issues.

A-2
 Formal reviews are normally coordinated by the Joint Staff J-5 using Joint Planning
Boards (JPBs). The lowest level JPB will be convened at the O-7/O-8 level with
subsequent reviews conducted as required. Increasing reviews are likely to be held at
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD), OpsDeps, Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy (USD(P)), JCS Tank, and SecDef (for approval) levels. The plan
review process is intended to be flexible enough for planners to raise issues and for the
JPEC to provide input to resolve those issues in a timely manner.

For existing plan updates, plan reviews will be conducted using in-progress reviews
(IPRs). The plan update process is very similar to the previously described priority
challenge plan review process. The lead will be the CCDR (i.e. CA) who will describe
those essential elements of the plan which must be modified. After AO level stakeholder
interaction, CCMD planners should use the JPB process to formally resolve remaining
issues, update, and approve the plan.

The following table lists the plan originator and approval authorities.

Plan Originator CA Approval

GCP CJCS CCDR CJCS (w/ SecDef endorsement)

GIBP CJCS - SecDef

RCP CCDR CCDR CCDR

FCP CCDR CCDR CCDR

CCP CCDR - CCDR

CP (Lvl 4, 3T) CCDR - SecDef

CP (Lvl 3, 2, 1) CCDR - CCDR

Figure A-1: Plan Origination and Approval

CA = Coordinating Authority GCP = Global Campaign Plan

GIBP = Globally Integrated Base Plan RCP = Regional Campaign Plan
FCP = Functional Campaign Plan CCP = CCDR Campaign Plan
CP = Contingency Plan (Levels 4, 3T (with TPFDD), 3, 2, 1)
TPFDD = Time Phased Force Deployment Data

A-3
 Link to CJCSI 3141.01F The Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans:
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/CJCSI%203141.01F.pdf?
ver=2019-03-18-121700-283

A-4
 APPENDIX B: COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS
The demand for joint task forces ready to respond to contingencies is likely to remain
high in the future. Determining the composition of a headquarters and the command
relationships with the forces involved is often influenced as much by commander
personalities and service interests as operational necessities. Some of the most
contentious disagreements between service component, functional, and multinational
commanders can be simplified by the arguments "I do not work for you" and "Do not
touch my stuff." Two imperatives of the authorizing commander during task force
establishment are unambiguous articulation of each subordinate commander's role and
responsibility (to include supporting/supported relationships) as well as each
subordinate commander's control authority over the forces involved (to include OPCON
and TACON designations as a minimum).

Joint Publication 3-30 "Joint Operations" pages IV-7 through IV-14 and Joint
Publication 3-33 "Joint Task Force Headquarters" provide guidance for the selection of
task force commanders, headquarter elements, forces, and operating areas. This
guidance clarifies that a joint force must have the ability to conduct joint functions.
Accordingly, either the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF HQ) on its own, or through
support from a combatant command HQ or a Service component HQs, must have the
ability to conduct the Joint Functions of command and control, intelligence, fires,
movement and maneuver, sustainment, and protection.

Usually JTFs are formed to accomplish missions with specific, limited operational
objectives. The CCDR often looks within his or her CCMD to select a JTF HQ, usually a
Service component HQ or an existing Service component’s subordinate HQ (e.g., Army
corps, numbered air force, numbered fleet and Marine expeditionary force). The
Theater Special Operations Command or a subordinate SOF HQ with the requisite C2
capability can also form the basis for a JTF HQ staff (see Figure E-1).

Joint Pub 3-33 Appendix A, Annex A through M provides detailed considerations for
establishing a Joint or Multinational Task Force HQ. Although not specifically presented
this way in Joint Doctrine, the following are examples of the types of general questions
oriented along the lines of Joint Functions that can facilitate JTF HQ selection:

 Command and Control:

o Does the mission require action in more than one domain?
o Does the mission require action from multiple services in the same
domain?
o What planning capability does the JTF require?
o What is the nature of operations the JTF will be required to execute?
o What authorities will the JTF commander need?
o With whom will the JTF commander need to coordinate?
o Who are the other U.S. agency and/or multinational participants?
o What is the role of multinational and/or interagency partners?
o When does the JTF HQ need to be operational?

B-1
 o Where will the JTF HQ need to operate?
o To what degree will JTF actions need to be integrated with the plans and
operations of other CCMDs or organizations?
o What capacity for the control, coordination, or liaison of air, maritime, land,
space, or cyber forces will the JTF require?
o What are the JTF requirements for a Joint Operations Center?
o What are the JTF communications requirements?
o Do the CCDR's subordinate HQ elements have the capabilities required
by the JTF HQ?

 Intelligence:
o What ability to collect, process, exploit, analyze, and disseminate
information will be required by the JTF?
o What level of connectivity will the JTF have with the CCMD Joint
Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC)?
o What are the intel capabilities of the CCDR's subordinate HQ elements?

 Fires:
oWill fires from multiple services occur in the same physical domain?
oWill fires need to be synchronized to occur simultaneously?
oWill fires need to be deconflicted to occur separately in time or space?
oWill an element of the JTF need to synchronize fires or can this be
accomplished by a CCMD element with liaisons in the JTF?
o What liaison capability will the JTF need with other CCMD and/or service
component fires elements? (CCMD Joint Operations Center, Air
Operations Center, Maritime Operations Center, Marine Air to Ground
Task Force, SOF Operations, etc)
o What type of control authority will the JTF commander need to have over
combat forces?

 Movement / Maneuver:
o Will the JTF use forces already in theater or will additional forces need to
be deployed?
o How will forces arrive in the JTF AO?
o What capability for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and
Integration (JRSOI) of forces will the JTF required?
o What are the JTF requirements for developing logistics plans?
o What are the requirements for the JTF to integrate and synchronize
logistics resources?
o What authorities for logistics will the JTF require?

 Sustainment:
o How long can JTF forces operate on their own without additional
sustainment?
o What level of sustainment, or how much sustainment and of what type, will
JTF forces require?

B-2
 o What sustainment-related authorities will the JTF require?

 Protection:
o What type of protection will JTF air, maritime, land, space, or cyber forces
require?
o What capacity for control, coordination, or liaison of air, maritime, land,
space, or cyber protection forces will the JTF require?

CCDRs normally respond to crisis with in-place HQs (See Figure B-1 for potential HQ)
because of their familiarity with the strategic environment, resident expertise, and
availability. The CCDR and staff must understand the capability of each of the
subordinate HQ elements within the CCMD in order to select one as the core of a JTF
HQ. Although not clearly described in Joint Doctrine, the general capabilities and
service preferences of various HQs are listed in Figure E-1 with the HQ element
preferred by each Service in bold type.

Figure B-1: Potential JTF HQ

Additional references, including the JFLCC Cdr’s Ref Guide, may be found at
https://www.carlisle.army.mil/jflcc/references.cfm

B-3
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

B-4
 APPENDIX C: PMESII SYSTEMS CONSTRUCT

The following is a partial list of the areas that should be considered during an analysis of
each of the PMESII areas. Some may be potential nodes in each of the systems as
well:
Political System
Leadership
Core Leadership
National Leadership
Regional Leadership
Local Leadership
Local Workers Parties
Regime Control of National Resource Systems
Security Apparatus
Secret Police
Detention Camps
Informants
Alliances & External Support
Legal
Symbolic
Domestic Image of Omnipotence, Omnipresence, Infallibility

Military System
Leadership
Command and Control
Intelligence
SIGINT
HUMINT
Electronic Warfare
Logistics
Mobilization
Civil Defense
Training
Underground Facilities
Stockpiles
Power Ventilation Access
Communications
Missile Forces and Missile Defense
Army
Artillery
Long-Range Missile Systems
Infantry
Armor

C-1
 Engineers
Mobility
Mine Clearing
Bridging
Counter Mobility
Obstacles
Survivability
Navy
Surface Capabilities
Subsurface (Submarine)
Remote Control Vehicles
Mine Laying Submarines
SOF Platforms
Patrol Fleet Anti-Ship Missiles
Coastal Defenses
Radar Capabilities
Air Forces
Air-to-Ground
Fixed Wing
Rotary Wing
Air Defense
Radar/Integrated Air Defense System (IADS)
Precision Munitions Capabilities
Bases (Runways, Refuel Capabilities, Ramp Space)
Force Projection
Special Operations
Direct Action, IW, ISR, etc.
Industrial/Technical Base (For Production and Repair of Advanced Equipment)
Communications
EW/Jamming Forces
Cyber Forces (military and non-military)
Information Operation Forces (military and non-military)
Missiles (Theater/Ballistic)
WMD (Research, Production, Storage, Delivery)
Space
Insurgent Groups – sponsored/non-sponsored
Terrorist Groups – sponsored/non-sponsored

Economic System
Industry
Financial
Debt
Distribution of Humanitarian Aid
Currency/Exchange Rates
Arms Exports
Corruption/Linkages

C-2
 Food Markets
Black Market Agriculture
Drug Crops & Trafficking
Fuel/Power Markets
Mining
Natural resource areas/production
Foreign investment
Trade linkages
Remittances
Taxes/Revenue

Social System
Culture/System
Personality
History
Religion
Demography
Ethnicity
Urbanization
Family Ties/Tribal Linkages
Literacy/Education
Life Expectancy
Entertainment, Immigration
Organized Crime
Families: Traditional/Influential Controlling Major Decisions
Impact of Local Traditions

Infrastructure System
Transportation
Railroads
Trains
Bridges
Tunnels
Switches
Roads
Ships/Boats
Dams
Locks
Airports
Communications
Military Networks
Radio Telephone
Teletype Fiber Satellite
Visual
Civilian
Radio Telephone

C-3
 Television Speakers
Signs
Energy/Power
Coal
Oil
Natural Gas
Hydro
Nuclear
Renewable Sources
Water
Fuel Stations
Electricity networks
Food Markets
Courthouses
Hospitals/Clinics
Water Treatment
Sewage/Treatment
Schools
Fiberoptic cables
Network services
Cell phone networks
Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
Social Media Saturation

Information System
Education
Propaganda
Inside Country
Outside Country
Newspapers/Magazines
Information Technologies
Radio
Television
Internet
Social Media
Informal Transmissions (Word of Mouth/Rumor)
Cyberspace

C-4
 TAB A: POLITICAL SYSTEM POINTS OF ANALYSIS
Political analysis of a foreign country begins with an assessment of the basic principles
of government, governmental operations, foreign policy, political parties, pressure
groups, electoral procedures, subversive movements, as well as criminal and terrorist
organizations. It then analyzes the distribution of political power - whether it is a
democracy, an oligarchy, a dictatorship, or has political power devolved to multiple
interest groups such as tribes, clans, or gangs. Analysis must focus on determining how
the political system really operates, not the way it is supposed to operate.

Basic Governmental Principles. The starting point of political analysis is the formal
political structure and procedure of a foreign nation. Analysts must evaluate:
 Constitutional and legal systems.
 Legal position of the legislative, judicial, and executive branches.
 Civil and religious rights of the people.
 People's national devotion to constitutional and legal procedures.

Governmental Operations. Governments are evaluated to determine their efficiency,

integrity, and stability. Information about how the government actually operates and/or
changes its method of operation gives the intelligence user clues about the probable
future of a political system. When assessing governmental operations, analysts should
consider the following:
 Marked inefficiency and corruption, which differs from past patterns, may
indicate an impending change in government.
 Continued inefficiency and corruption may indicate popular apathy or a
populace unable to effect change.
 Increased restrictions on the electoral process and on the basic social and
political rights of the people may mean the government is growing less sure of
its position and survivability.

Foreign Policy. Analysis of a target country's foreign policy addresses the country's
public and private stance toward the United States, foreign policy goals and objectives,
regional role, and alliances. Analysts gather data from various sources, to include:
 Diplomatic and military personnel.
 Technical collection systems.
 Official foreign government statements.
 Press releases.
 Public opinion polls.
 International businessmen and other travelers.
 Academic analyses.

Political Parties. Analysts study special interest parties and groups (e.g., labor,
religious, ethnic, industry) to evaluate their:
 Aims.
 Programs.
 Degree of popular support.

C-5
  Financial backing.
 Leadership.
 Electoral procedures.

Pressure Groups. With few exceptions, most states have some type of formal or
informal pressure groups. Examples include political parties, associations, religious or
ethnic organizations, labor unions, and even illegal organizations (e.g., banned political
party). The analyst must identify these pressure groups and their aims, methods,
relative power, sources of support, and leadership. Pressure groups may have
international connections and, in some cases, may be almost entirely controlled from
outside the country.

Electoral Procedures. Elections range from staged shows of limited intelligence

significance to a means of peaceful, organized, and scheduled revolution. In addition to
the parties, personalities, and policies, the intelligence analyst must consider the
circumstances surrounding the actual balloting process and changes from the historical
norm.

Subversive Movements. In many countries, there are clandestine organizations or

guerrilla groups whose intention is to overthrow or destroy the existing government.
When analysts report on subversive movements, they should address:

 Organizational size.
 Character of membership.
 Power base within the society.
 Doctrine or beliefs system.
 Affiliated organizations.
 Key figures.
 Funding.
 Methods of operation.

Criminal and Terrorist Organizations. Criminal organizations in some countries are so

powerful that they influence or dominate national governments. Analysts must examine
the organization's influence or forceful methods of control. Most terrorist organizations
are small, short-lived, and not attached to any government. Analysts should determine if
external factors or even the area's government assists the terrorist group.

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 Political System Questions

National Political Structure:

 What is the type of governmental system in place?
o Where does it draw its legitimacy from?
o Are the sectors stable or in transition?
o Does the electoral process affect them?
o Where do they draw their power?
o What is the source of their knowledge and intellectual income?
o Who are the leaders? Where do they draw their power from?
o Does a core bureaucracy staff them?
 Governmental Departments or Agencies (D/A)
o Who are the key leaders? How are they linked within the power network?
o Are the D/A stable or in transition?
o Are new departments of agencies being created? If so, what is the cause of
this transition? Societal/Cultural/Educational? Technical? Economic?
o By D/A - What is the source of its workforce?
- Who are the leaders? Is it staffed by a core bureaucracy? What skill level?
o Inter-Agency and Departmental dependencies?
o External dependencies - Societal/Cultural/Educational.

National Political Demographics Structure:

 Ethnic and Religious Groups having political power:
o Are these groups regionalized?
o How do they exercise political power?
o What is their legislative representation?
o Is there a paramilitary structure?
 How do these Ethnic and Religious groups wield power within urban society? Rural
society?
 Political Parties
o What are the political parties? Externally or internally supported?
o Are they associated with ethnic, religious, or cultural groups?
o Who are their leaders? Their allies?
o What is their political opposition? Their allies?
 Political Action Groups
o Where do they draw their power? Societal, cultural, technical, economic?
o Where do they draw their intellectual capital?
o What is the source of their leadership? Knowledge?
o What are their external organs? Expatriate communities?
o What is their relationship with the government?

Regional Political Relationships:

 Regional - Non-adversarial and adversarial? How are relations maintained – through
economics, religion, culture, ideology, common needs?

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 International - Non-adversarial and adversarial? How are relations maintained –
through economics, religion, culture, ideology, common needs?
 Potential Allies during a conflict - National resolve to engage in conflict? Military
resolve to engage in politically motivated action?

Other Considerations:

 Public confidence in government and in society.

 Factionalism or regionalism within the governmental structure. Challenges faced by
the Government.
 Political effects caused by Organized Groups.
 Government Political Response to Group pressures.
 Political effects upon Internal and External Security - relates to Military.
 Government Response to Diplomatic Overtures.
 National Economic Goals affecting the Political structure.
 Police Mechanisms.

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 TAB B: MILITARY SYSTEM POINTS OF ANALYSIS
The analysis of the adversary’s military will focus on its leadership, capabilities,
dispositions, and morale/commitment to its government, to include:
 Key military leadership, including their training and previous experience in senior
leadership.
 Installations and facilities of a military significance (both primary and secondary
purpose).
 Infrastructure in place to support identified installations and force structure.
 Military Units, including personnel and chain of command.
 Assigned equipment.
 Current and projected weapons system capabilities.

Military System Questions

Military Environment:
 Will the national leadership use military means to achieve objectives?
 Does the leadership intend to forge or enhance military ties with another state that
poses a threat to regional security or U.S. interests?
 Does the leadership intend to enhance national military capabilities in a way that
could be regionally destabilizing?
 Are the national leader’s goals a cause for concern?
 Key Leadership – residence, office, wartime command post, telephone, email,
political patronage, religious affiliations, ethnic affiliations, personal assets, non-
military activities, influences.
 Soldiers -- ethnic/religious composition by region of regular forces and elite forces,
pay, training, morale, benefits, gripes/issues.
 Capabilities.
o Equipment imports: what, from whom, where based, points of entry.
o Support (spare parts, maintenance, and operational training).
o Indigenous production and assembly.
o Raw materials, natural resources.
o Supply - production, movement, storage.
o Days of supply on-hand of key supplies (e.g. rations, fuel, ammo, etc…).
 Transportation.
o Road capacity, primary lines of communication (LOC), organic transportation assets.
o Rail (same as roads).
o Water - Inland? Intra-coastal?
o Bridges - classification, construction materials, length, bypass.
o Tunnels - height/width restrictions, bypass.
 Organizations.
o Garrison locations, brigade or larger combat, battalion or larger combat support
(CS) and combat service support (CSS).
o Naval port facilities, home stations.

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 Airfields.
o Fixed fields, home station, associated dispersal/highway strips.
o Number and type aircraft at base.
 Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).
o Assets and capabilities by echelon.
o National level/controlled assets.
o Associated ground stations/downlinks.
o Centralized processing and dissemination facilities.
o Center of excellence/HQ for each intelligence discipline.
o Commercial sources for imagery, dissemination capability, mapping, other.
 Military Communications.
o Fixed facilities.
o Mobile capabilities.
o Relay/retransmission sites Commercial access.
 Integrated Air Defense.
o Early warning.
o Target acquisition and tracking, guidance.
o Fixed launch sites.
o Mobile AD assets.
o Centralized C2.
o Airfields associated with counter-air assets.
o Airborne warning aircraft (e.g., AWACS).
o Electrical power requirements.
 Theater Ballistic Missile/Coastal Defense missiles.
o Fixed launch sites.
o Mobile assets.
o Meteorological stations supporting.
o C2 decision makers.
o Target acquisition.
o Target guidance/terminal guidance.
o Power requirements.
 Weapons of Mass Effects Capabilities.
o Number and type.
o Production, assembly, storage, delivery means.
o Imports required - source and mode of transport.
o C2 decision maker.
 C2.
o Rivalries - personal and inter-service.
o Decision making – dissemination/transmission means, direct or through chain of
command.
 Special Capabilities.
o Special Operations Forces (SOF).
o Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
o TBM.
o Human Intelligence (HUMINT).
o Submarines.

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 o Force Projection
o Cyber
o Propaganda
o EW/Jamming
o BMD
o Insurgents
o Terrorists.

Military Situation: Under what conditions does the military execute its missions?
 Internal Conflict: Is there internal conflict within the military that could destabilize this
country?
o Rivalry/Factionalism: Are there emerging or increasing rivalries or factionalism
within the military?
o Power Struggle: Are there emerging or increasing power struggles within the
military?
o Deteriorating Morale/Increasing Dissention: Is there deteriorating morale or
increasing dissention within the ranks or in the officer corps?
 Civil-Military Relations: How loyal is the military to the current regime? Are there
cultural or religious factors that might cause frictions and dissention? Are there
changes or developments in civil military relations that could destabilize the country?
o Government - Military Relations: Will the senior military leadership support
and defend the government against internal resistance and insurgency? What
factors might cause a loss of confidence and/or support? What factors might
cause a military coup to occur?
o Civil-Military Conflict: Is there increasing conflict between the civilian and
military leaders? Is there a difference in views between junior and senior
leaders toward service to the government? To the peoples/constitution?
o Constitutional/Legal Conflict: Is there increasing civil military conflict over
constitutional/legal matters?
 Socio-Military Conflict: Are there growing tensions/conflicts in socio-military relations
that could destabilize the country?
o Internal Security Role: Is the military assuming a new internal security role or
increasing its involvement in internal security affairs?
o Military Activities: Are military operations/activities having an increasingly
adverse impact on society?
o Criminal Activities: Is the military involved in criminal activity that is contributing
to increased tensions/conflict between the military and the public?
 External Military Threat: Is an external military threat emerging or increasing?
o Limited/Covert Military Action: Is an adversary engaging in or increasing
limited/covert military action?
o Conventional Military Action: Is an adversary preparing to engage in
conventional military action against this country?
o WMD/Advanced Weapons: Is an adversary trying to acquire or is in the
process of deploying WMD or advanced weapons?

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 Operational Status/Capability: Are there changes or developments in the military's
operational status or capabilities that suggest pending military action?
o Activity Levels/Patterns: Is there unusual change or a sudden increase in
activity levels/patterns?
o Personnel Status: Are there changes or developments in personnel status?
o Force Capabilities: Are there significant changes or developments in force
capabilities?

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 TAB C: ECONOMIC SYSTEM POINTS OF ANALYSIS
Analysis focuses on all aspects of the adversary’s economy that have the potential for
exploitation. Among these are industrial production, agriculture, services and armament
production. Concentration will be on those elements of the economy that are factors in
foreign trade and factors on the internal economy that can have an impact on the
political decision making process and popular support for the government. Both the
official and underground (black-market) economies must be examined.

Concentration will be on the adversary and the regional and global countries with which
it has its major trade and exchange linkages. Certain specific nations and regional
economic alliances could be highly dependent upon adversary exports, and the impact
upon these must be considered. The focus will be on critical elements of the trading
partners that may be exploited and not their economy as a whole.

In the economic system, a great deal of information is available from open source. The
initial task is to develop a baseline of information on the adversary’s economy, such as
gross domestic product, growth rates, unemployment rates, money supply, economic
plans, inflation, and national debt. Analysis may include:

Sources of National Wealth:

Natural Resources.
Products (Agriculture & Manufacturing).
Foreign Aid.
Foreign Trade.
Import/Export.
Trading Partners.
Domestic Consumption.
Management of the Economy.
Government Role.
Private Sector Role.
Corruption.
Slush Funds, Leaders' Bank Accounts.
Counterfeiting.

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 Economic System Questions

 What are the key indicators of the economic health of the country(ies) of interest
(COI)?
 Which external factors have the most impact upon the economy? What areas of
the economy are most susceptible to foreign influences and exploitation?
 What is the impact of foreign economic assistance? What would be the impact of
its reduction/removal?
 What percentage of the economy should be classified as "black/gray market"? Are
we able to quantify activities in this sector? Can we influence this sector?
 What are the governmental rules on foreign investment? Who do they favor?
 Which nations have the most to gain or lose from damage to, or a collapse of the
economy? What are the most likely areas of economic growth?
 Will there be growth in the private sector share of the economy? Who would
benefit the most from this change?
 How effective will be steps to diversify the economy?
 What is the inflation rate? To what extent will steps to control inflation be
successful?
 Will government subsidies of selected products for domestic use continue? What
would be the impact of their reduction/removal?
 What is the anticipated trend in demand for foreign (particularly U.S.) currency?
 What is the prognosis for food production? Are they dependent on imports? Will
rationing of essential goods continue? Which items are most likely to be rationed?
 How will demographic factors (e.g., birth rate, adult/child ratio, rural migration to
urban areas, etc.) affect the economy in the future?
 What is the impact of the drug trade on the overall economy? Regional
economies?
 Will imports of military spending/hardware increase? Who are the most likely
suppliers? Will these be cash transactions, or will a barter system be established?
 What is this nation's standing within the International Monetary Fund and World
Bank?
 Is trade with European Union member nations expected to increase? If so, in what
specific areas?
 Have any key members of the economic sector leadership been educated in the
West or China? If so, have they maintained contacts with their former colleagues?
 Are changes to the current system of state-owned monopolies anticipated? If so,
what will be the impact?
 What are the key industries of the state(s)?
 What are the major import/export commodities?
 What is the trade balance? Is this a strength or vulnerability?
 What is the labor situation (e.g., unemployment statistics, labor sources, unions,
etc.)?
 Who/what are the key government economic leaders/agencies?
 Who are the principal business leaders in the country?

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 TAB D: SOCIAL SYSTEM POINTS OF ANALYSIS
Analysis must study the way people, particularly the key leadership and natural leaders,
organize their day-to-day living, including the study of groups within society, their
composition, organization, purposes, and habits, and the role of individuals in society.
For intelligence purposes, analysts study seven sociological factors. The detailed list
should be viewed as a guide for developing the necessary information to develop the
Sociological Systems Summary for the target countries.

Population. Intelligence data derived from censuses and sample surveys describe the
size, distribution, and characteristics of the population, including rate of change. Most
countries now conduct censuses and publish detailed data. Analysts use censuses and
surveys to evaluate an area's population in terms of:
 Location.
 Growth Rates.
 Age and Sex.
 Structure.
 Labor Force.
 Military Manpower.
 Migration.
Characteristics of the People. Analysts study social characteristics to determine their
contribution to national cohesion or national disintegration. Social characteristics
evaluated by analysts include:
 Social Stratification.
 Number and Distribution of Languages.
 Prejudices.
 Formal and Informal Organizations.
 Traditions.
 Taboos.
 Nonpolitical or Religious Groupings and Tribal or Clan Organizations
Idiosyncrasies.
 Social Mobility.
Public Opinion. Key indicators of a society's goals may be found in the attitudes
expressed by significant segments of the population on questions of national interest.
Opinions may vary from near unanimity to a nearly uniform scattering of opinion over a
wide spectrum. Analysts should sample minority opinions, especially of groups capable
of pressuring the government.
Education. Analysts concentrate on the general character of education and on the
quality of elementary through graduate and professional schools. Data collected for
these studies include:
 Education Expenditures.
 Relationship between education and other social and political characteristics
Education levels among the various components of society.

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  Numbers of students studying abroad.
 Extent to which foreign languages are taught.
 Subjects taught in schools.
Religion. Religious beliefs may be a potentially dangerous friction factor for deployed
U.S. personnel. Understanding those friction factors is essential to mission
accomplishment and the protection of friendly forces. Analysts evaluate data collected
on an area's religions, which includes:
 Types.
 Size of Denominations.
 Growth or Decline Rates.
 Cooperative or confrontational relationships between religions or sects, the
people they represent, and the government.
 Ways the government deals with religious organizations.
 Roles religious groups play in the national decision making process.
 Religious traditions and taboos.
Public Welfare. To evaluate the general health of a population, analysts must identify:
 Health delivery systems.
 Governmental and informal welfare systems.
 Social services provided.
 Living conditions.
 Social insurance.
 Social problems that affect national strength and stability (e.g., divorce rate,
slums, drug use, crime) and methods of coping with these problems.

Narcotics and Terrorism Tolerance. A population's level of tolerance for narcotics and
terrorist activities depends on the relations between these organizations and the
population as a whole. Analysts should determine if the tolerance is a result of the huge
sums of money trafficker’s pump into the economy or a result of trafficker's use of force.
Terrorists may be accepted and even supported by the local populace if they are
perceived to be working for the good of the local people. The intelligence analyst must
evaluate the way these organizations operate.

Sources. Due to the nature of the social focus area, the preponderance of information
is envisioned to be open source. The initial task is to develop a baseline of information
on the target nation. Basic data will be collected and analyzed. Numerous studies,
sponsored by the U.S. Government as well as academic treatises, are available. A more
difficult problem will be making the essential linkages within the sociological area and
with other focus areas, particularly political and economic.

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 Social System Questions
 What are the general perceptions of social stability?
 Who are the population’s most respected figures, why are they so respected, and
how do they maintain the public focus?
 What are the government's most effective tools for influencing the masses?
 What dominant areas of society are emerging and causing instability or areas of
conflict? Are any of these areas linked to political factors? Ethnic/racial?
 What are the predominant economic areas that are contributing to, promoting, or
exacerbating social instability?
 How can interrelationships be established between religious and ethnic minorities
in the COI? How can we effectively manipulate these relationships to affect a
desired outcome?
 What are perceptions of public safety primarily attached to? How is the level of
violence defined by society? What elements may make it appear excessive?
 What psychological effects does an increased level of violence have on a
person's notion of safety?
 What are the effects of increased criminal activity: on the family, the town, the
region, and nationally?
 How can the Coalition increase the psychological perception that the global
economy is surpassing the COI?
 How can the Coalition stimulate the notion that the government is failing to
provide for basic elements, or is slow to produce results?
 Examine the adverse effects of increased organized criminal activity upon society
by industrial component. White collar or financial crime. Drugs and drug
smuggling.
 Proliferation of weapons: Note the types of weapons and to whom they are going.
 Gang related activity: Is there a predominant ethnic group asserting themselves in
this arena, and are they utilizing any particularly violent tactics to assert
themselves?
 What are the significant effects of increased public health problems? What public
health issues have increased and how effective is the government response?
 Identify how extensive the division of wealth is between ethnic and religious
groups and their potential for promoting tension or conflict.
 What are the effects of environmental problems having on society?
 Identify the key groups adversely affected by increasing poverty rates.
 Identify primary tools used by the government for influencing the masses. How do
the masses validate information obtained by the government? Do they feel they
need to validate information?
 Who are the key opposition leaders? How do they influence the masses? How
are they funded and by whom are they primarily funded?
 Who are the key opposition groups? How do they influence the masses? How are
they funded and by whom are they primarily funded? Identify any common
themes to unite them, identify areas that may divide them.
 How do opposition groups recruit? Do they target a specific social group? Is there
a hierarchical structure? How are members dismissed from the ranks?

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 How do these groups affect one another? How do they affect similar groups in
neighboring countries? Do they have external support?
 What are each faction’s mechanisms for influencing the others? How do they
communicate officially and unofficially? What factions are armed? Where do they
get their weapons?
 Are acts of civil disobedience increasing? Is the level of violence employed by the
government to quell civil disobedience increasing? Are acts of vigilantism on the
rise? How are disturbances quelled? What tools are brought to bear?
 Identify consumer goods that are most valued by the COI's populace. Who
controls supply? How are they networked? Any increase in a particular product?
 What are the "hot button" issues dividing the various factions of the society?
 What networks and mediums can be used to subvert and confuse each faction?
What are the capabilities of regional allies to polarize these factions?
 How are rumors spread most effectively?
 What is the social perception of the military's ability to meet that threat? The
states’ ability to meet the threat? The state’s ability to provide overall security in a
micro/macro context?
 How are troops conscripted? What are the incentives for service? What unofficial
groups/associations exist within the military? How do they recruit or dismiss
people?
 Is criminal behavior increasing within the military? What types of criminal activity
occur within the military?
 Identify the hierarchal structure of the military. Is there a dominant ethnic group
assuming more leadership roles? What ethnic groups stay the most connected in
the military, which groups are more apt to include outsiders?
 Which ethnic and religious minorities feel the most repressed? How do they
express their discontent? Do any organizations exist to channel their feelings?
How responsive do they feel the government is to their issues?
 How does the population view outside assistance? How likely is the government
to ask for assistance? How is the need for assistance determined?
 How are relief organizations viewed within the country? Are they busy? How
effective are they at solving problems and meeting the needs of those they serve?
 Problems with immigrant flows? How are refugees treated?
 What consumer goods are in short supply? How are those goods brought to
market, and who controls the flow of such goods? Is there a dominant ethnic
group controlling the flow? How effective is the Black Market in producing hard to
obtain goods?
 What goods dominate the Black Market? Who are the primary producers and end
receivers of goods? Is there a particular group emerging as the leader of the
Black Market?
 How are minority laborers networked with minority leaders? What are the links
between labor groups and minority activists? What ethnic group(s) compose the
majority of the skilled labor force? How is skilled labor kept from going abroad?

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 TAB E: INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEM POINTS OF ANALYSIS
Infrastructure analysis focuses on the quality and depth of the physical structures that
support the people and industry of the state. In developed countries, it is the underlying
foundation or basic systems of a nation state; generally physical in nature and
supporting/used by other entities (e.g., roads, telephone systems, and public schools).

Infrastructure System Questions

 Lines of Communications: Where are the key ports, airfields, rail terminals,
roads, railroads, inland waterways, etc. located? Where are key bridges, tunnels,
switching yards, scheduling/control facilities, depots/loading stations, switching
yards, etc.?
 Electrical Power: Where are power plants, transformer stations, and relay and
power transmission lines located? Where are the key substations, switching
stations, and line junctures?
 Potable Water: Where are the water treatment plants, wells, desalination, bottling
plants, and pumping stations? Where are the key pumping stations, control
valves, and distribution line junctures?
 Telecommunications: What are the location and architecture of the domestic
telephone system, cable, fiber-optic, microwave, internet, and cell phone networks
and satellite stations? Where are the key control points and junctures?
 Petroleum and Gas: Where are the gas and petroleum fields, gathering sites,
pumping stations, storage areas, refineries, and distribution lines? Where are the
key pumping stations, control valves, and distribution junctures?
 Broadcast Media: What are the location, frequency, power, and radius of
effective range (coverage) of the am/fm radio and TV stations? Where are the
studios, antenna, and rely towers located? How are they powered? Where are the
key control points and junctures?
 Public Health: What are the location of the hospitals and clinics? Are they
adequately staffed, supplied, and equipped? Is the equipment well maintained? Is
the staff well trained? Do they depend on foreign or domestic sources for their
supplies, medications, and spare equipment parts? Where are the key control
points and junctures?
 Schools: What are the location of the public, private, and religious primary and
secondary schools and universities? Where are the key control points and
junctures?
 Public Transportation: What are the public (bus/streetcar/taxi/etc.) transportation
routes? Where are the key control points and junctures?
 Sewage Collection and Treatment: Where are the collections systems, pumping
stations, treatment facilities, and discharge areas located? Where are the key
control points and junctures?

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 Common Infrastructure Questions

 How are key facilities linked? (Physically, electronically, etc.)

 What are the key nodes? Where are they? Where are the disabling yet non-
lethal/non-destructive infrastructure nodes?
 What are their alternates? What are the alternates for the above and how are they
linked to the key facilities and each other?
 Are there indigenous capabilities? What indigenous capabilities could be used?
How are they linked and organized? What are the critical nodes?
 What is the security surrounding the nodes?
 What is the security posture at these facilities? Who controls the forces? How are
security forces/police/paramilitary networked? What training do they receive?
What is their level of proficiency? Are they augmented as alert status (national or
local) changes? What are the ground/naval/air defense capabilities at/near these
facilities? How are they networked? What groups are likely to conduct industrial
sabotage? How are they tasked, linked, supported?
 Who owns and who controls the infrastructure? Who owns and/or controls all of
the above entities? Is ownership by private, corporate, or governmental entities?
What organizations have regulatory oversight/control?
 What is the capability to repair damage to the system and restore it to service? Is
maintenance and repair an integral part of the organization? What are their
capabilities and limitations? Which contractors are normally used and for what
purpose? Are repair/restore materials readily available or is there a long lead-time
for critical supplies/components? Who are the key engineering contractors for
these facilities? Can/will they share plans, blueprints, schematics, etc.?
 What would be the second-order effects of influencing the infrastructure?

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 TAB F: INFORMATION SYSTEM POINTS OF ANALYSIS
Analysis of Information Systems and Operations includes:
 Telecommunications capabilities and level of sophistication, tele-density rates,
radio and television broadcast coverage including television, landline, cellular,
Internet, radio, etc.
 Interconnectivity of communications via ISDN, fiber optic, satellite, and
microwave.
 Primary nodes and trunks of telecommunications infrastructure including
government, non-government, citizen, and military use of Information Operations.
 Knowledge of COI key leaders' style and decision making habits, advisors'
perception, and cultural influences.
 Understanding governmental use of media influence, public affairs, and civil
affairs interrelationships.
 Knowledge of military, non-governmental organization, and law enforcement
interrelationships.
 Understanding of effects on adversary under psychological, computer network
attack and defense, electronic warfare, and space operations.
 Locations and purpose of physical infrastructure of communications and
broadcast towers, cables, and supporting operations centers are included within
the infrastructure focus.
 Development of and use of computer network operating systems, IT industry skill
sets, and software applications.
 Media affiliations, perceptions, and sympathies to include censorship and self-
censorship in news and entertainment print, and broadcast industries.

Information System Questions

 How effective are the COI’s network defense capabilities? What reactions could
be expected following an incident? What recovery procedures are routinely
exercised?
 What is the organizational structure of the telecommunications industry? How
effective is the COI at managing physical security of infrastructure an
implementing network security practices?
 What interrelationships exist between civil law enforcement, military, commercial
and non-governmental agencies that would enhance the COI's response to an
emergency?
 What redundancies exist within the COI's network to eliminate or reduce network
down time? Cellular, satellite, landline, power back up? How effective is their
exchange, backbone, architecture in providing redundancies?
 What would cause a slow-down of COI's network? In what ways can the effect be
localized? (Geographic, logic, by agency, etc.)
 What bandwidth issues exist within the COI's communications industry? How well,
and in what ways, does the government manage its allocation?

C-21
 What type of OPSEC practices does the COI routinely exhibit to deny
exploitation?
 In what ways have military/civil/corporate operations centers improved their
practices/tactics in keeping with the COI's technological improvements? Do they
rely more heavily on computers/cellular/networks than in the past?
 What are the indicators, if they exist, that the COI has developed a more focused
vision and strategic plan for using technology than it had in the late '90s? What
effect has technology had on productivity, transportation, logistics, etc. in
government, commerce, corporate, private sectors?
 How does the COI perceive their use of technology from a governmental
perspective? From the citizens' perspective? Military? Business? Legal? Law
enforcement? Non-governmental organizations?
 What is known about the COI's assessment of Blue network vulnerabilities and
defense measures?
 Do regional and neighboring countries or satellite broadcasts (television, radio,
and internet) have an audience in the COI's population? Which broadcasts are
popular with citizens and what is the audience's demographic and statistic data?
What programs or broadcasts are popular with minority political parties, resistance
movements, academia, etc.?
 What is the topology design the COI networks utilize? Which exchanges and
trunks are co-located within government-controlled facilities? Are government-
commercial partnerships used to provide network services?
 What is known of current and planned technology projects: fiber optic cabling?
ISDN access expansion? Satellite leases and launches? What is the operational
status and capability of COI's Low-Earth Orbit satellites?
 What Internet domains are accessible to the population? Is reliable language
interpretation software available? What licenses does the government require for
web hosting?
 What governmental directives address network security in supporting national
security objectives?
 What messages might be effective in the COI? What themes are prevalent in the
media?
 What advances in communications technology have enabled improvements in
military hardware employment? Describe the use of telecommunications
technology in law enforcement operations.
 To what degree and direction are telecommunications infrastructure investments
impacting military readiness? Describe the state of international
telecommunications connectivity to the COI.
 Which current telecommunications and Internet security operations have been
exercised? Is there a national crisis action plan?
 What practices and policies does the government use in monitoring information-
related media (TV, radio, Internet, etc.)? What enforcement methods have been
employed?
 Which print media and on-line content do citizens turn to for news?
Entertainment? Social Media? Do censorship policies or self-censorship trends
exist in the COI?

C-22
 Is there a market and distribution pipeline for recorded or intercepted news or
entertainment programs? In what ways does law enforcement interact in this
market?
 What is known about COl's network operating systems? What IT skill sets are
known to be in high demand?
 Is software piracy prevalent? Counterfeiting? Drug smuggling? Organized crime?
Identity theft?

C-23
C-24
APPENDIX D: OPORD FORMAT W/ STAFF ESTIMATE INFORMATION

Underlined and Blue Text = recommended additions to the JP 5-0 Format

Italics and Highlighted = Staff estimate information per JP 5-0,

Copy no. ____ of ____ copies

ISSUING HQ
PLACE OF ISSUE
Date/time group
Message reference number

OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODEWORD) (U)

BASIC ORDER (U)

REFERENCES:

(U) TIME ZONE:

(U) TASK ORGANIZATION: See Annex A (Task Organization).

* Capability Shortfalls / excesses

1. (U) Situation
a. (U) General. See Annex B (Intelligence).
(1) (U) Environment of Conflict
(a) Geostrategic Context
(b) Domestic and International Context
(c) Systems Perspective of the OE
(2) (U) Policy Goals
(a) US/Multinational Policy Goals
(b) End states.
1. Strategic End state & Objectives
2. Termination Criteria (and issues w/ these criteria)
2. Military End states
3. Time Estimates – Mil End states and Termination Criteria.
(3) Non-US National Political Decisions
(4) Operational Limitations
b. (U) Area of Concern
(1) (U) Joint Operations Area/Higher Commander’s Area of Operations.
(2) (U) Area of Interest.
c. (U) Deterrent Options
d. (U) Risk
e. (U) Adversary Forces. See Annex B (Intelligence).
(1) Adversary Centers of Gravity
(a) Strategic
(b) Operational

D-1
 (2) Adversary Critical Factors
(a) Strategic
(b) Operational
(3) Adversary Courses of Action
(a) General (including Strength, weakness, composition, location,
disposition, reinforcements, logistics, time/space factors, utilized and available
bases, efficiency and proficiency in joint ops ---- Capabilities/Limitations)
(b) Adversary’s Political Intentions & End states
(c) Adversary’s Strategic Objectives
(d) Adversary’s Operational Objectives
(e) Adversary CONOPs
(f) External Sources of Support
(4) Adversary Logistics and Sustainment
(5) Other Adversary Forces/Capabilities
(6) Adversary Reserve Mobilization
f. (U) Friendly Forces
(1) (U) Higher.
(2) (U) Adjacent.
(1) Friendly Centers of Gravity
(a) Strategic
(b) Operational
(2) Friendly Critical Factors
(a) Strategic
(b) Operational
(3) Multinational Forces
(3) Supporting Commands and Agencies
g. (U) Facts (Relevant & Key)
h. (U) Assumptions.
(1) Threat Warning/Timeline
(2) Pre-Positioning and Regional Access
(3) In-Place Forces
(4) Strategic Assumptions
(5) Legal Considerations
(a) ROE
(b) International Law, including LOAC
(c) US law
(d) Host-nation and partner nation policies
(e) Status of forces agreements
(f) Other bilateral treaties and agreements including Article 98 agreements
(6) Deductions from Facts/Assumptions

2. (U) Mission.

3. (U) Execution

a. (U) Concept of Operations. See Annex C (Operations)

D-2
 (1) Commander’s Intent
(a) Purpose and End state
(b) Objectives
(c) Effects, if discussed
(2) General
(a) JFC Military Objectives, supporting desired effects and operational
focus
(b) Orientation on the adversary’s strategic and operational COGs
(c) Protection of friendly strategic and operational COGs
(d) Phasing of operations, to include Commander’s intent for each phase.
1. Phase I:
a. JFC’s intent
b. Timing
c. Objectives and desired effects
d. Risk
e. Execution
f. Employment (and/or Deployment)
(1) Land Forces
(2) Air Forces
(3) Maritime Forces
(4) Space Forces
(5) Cyber Forces
(6) SOF Forces
g. Operational Fires
(1) Joint forces policies, procedures, & planning cycles
(2) Joint fire support assets for planning purposes
(3) Priorities for employing target acquisition assets
(4) Areas that require joint fires to support op maneuver
(5) Anticipated joint fire support requirements
(6) Fire Support Coordination Measures (if required)
2. Phase II through XX:
b. (U) Tasks
(1) Specified
(2) Implied
(3) Essential
c. (U) Coordinating Instructions.
d. (U) Commander’s Critical Information Requirements.
(--) COA Evaluation Criteria – Staff recommendations (…then final Cmdr Decision)
(--) COA Comparison w/ respect to Evaluation Criteria. Include staff
recommendation.

4. (U) Administration and Logistics

a. (U) Concept of Sustainment
b. (U) Logistics. See Annex D (Logistics/Combat Service Support).
c. (U) Personnel. See Annex E (Personnel).
d. (U) Public Affairs. See Annex F (Public Affairs).

D-3
 e. (U) Civil Military Operations. See Annex G (Civil Affairs).
f. (U) Meteorological and Oceanographic Services. See Annex H (Meteorological
and Oceanographic Operations).
g. (U) Environmental Considerations. See Annex L
h. (U) Geospatial Information and Services. See Annex M (Geospatial Information
and Services).
i. (U) Health Service Support. See Annex Q (Medical Services).

5. (U) Command and Control

a. (U) Command
(1) Command Relationships. See Annex J (Command Relationships).
(2) Command Posts
(3) Succession to Command.
b. (U) Joint Communications System Support. See Annex K (CIS)

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT
ANNEXES:
A – Task Organization
B – Intelligence
C – Operations
D – Logistics
E – Personnel
F – Public Affairs
G – Civil-Military Affairs
H – Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations
J – Command Relationships
K – Communications Systems
L – Environmental Considerations
M –Not Currently Used (previously - Geospatial Information and Services)
N – Not Currently Used (previously - Space Operations)
P – Host Nation Support
Q – Medical Services
R – Reports
S – Special Technical Operations
T – Consequence Management
U –Notional Counter proliferation Decision Guide
W – Operational Contract Support
X – Execution Checklist
Y – Communications Synchronization
 Previously Communications Synchronization and before that Information Management
Z – Distribution

OFFICIAL:
s/
<Name>
<Rank and Service>
<Title>

D-4
 APPENDIX E: COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE FORMAT

HEADQUARTERS US XXXX
APO xx xxxxx
Date xx xxxxxxx xxxx
Title: Campaign for XXXX

1. Mission Analysis.
a. List relevant facts.

b. List key assumptions.

c. List limitations.

d. List enemy objectives – identify both operational and strategic objectives.

e. List enemy centers of gravity (COG). Identify the critical capabilities supporting each
COG, critical requirements and the critical vulnerabilities within each critical capability

(1) Enemy COG #1

(a) Critical Capability #1

2. Critical Vulnerability #1
3. Critical Vulnerability #2

f. List friendly objectives – identify both operational and strategic objectives.

g. List friendly COG. Identify the critical capabilities supporting each COG and the
critical vulnerabilities within each critical capability.

(1) Friendly COG #1

(2) Critical Capability #1

(a) Critical Vulnerability #1
(b) Critical Vulnerability #2

h. List essential tasks necessary to accomplish the mission.

i. Identify the friendly end state.

j. State the mission.

2. Situation and Courses of Action (COAs). This paragraph is the foundation of the
estimate and may encompass considerable detail.
a. End states specified by the President or Secretary of Defense.

E-1
 b. National strategic objectives specified by the President or Secretary of Defense and
the supporting desired effects developed by the combatant commander.

c. Considerations Affecting the Possible Courses of Action. Include only a brief

summary, if applicable, of the major factors pertaining to the characteristics of the
area and relative combat power that have a significant impact on the alternative
COAs.

d. Enemy Capabilities

(1) Summarize potential enemy capabilities and psychological vulnerabilities that

can seriously affect the accomplishment of the mission.

(2) Describe likely indications and warning that an enemy is preparing for military
operations in the affected area.

(3) Provide other information that will assist the Secretary of Defense and Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in evaluating various COAs.

e. Friendly COAs. List COAs that offer adequate, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable
and complete means of accomplishing the mission. Address the following for each COA:

(1) Combat capability required (e.g., urban combat, air superiority, maritime
interdiction)

(2) Force provider

(3) Potential Destination

(4) Required delivery dates

(5) Coordinated deployment estimate

(6) Employment estimate

(7) Estimated transportation requirements

f. COA Analysis. Summarize results from wargaming friendly and enemy COAs.
Highlight enemy capabilities that may significantly affect friendly COAs.

g. COA Comparison. Identify and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each
COA.

h. Recommended COAs. State the recommended COA(s). Provide an assessment of

which COAs are supportable, an analysis of the risk for each, and a concise statement of the
recommended COA with its requirements.

E-2
 APPENDIX F: REFERENCE TIMES
Plans, reports, orders, and messages often reference dates & times defined as follows:

a. C-day. The unnamed day on which a deployment operation commences or is to

commence. The deployment may be movement of troops, cargo, weapon
systems, or a combination of these elements using any or all types of transport.
The letter "C" will be the only one used to denote the above. The highest
command or headquarters responsible for coordinating the planning will specify
the exact meaning of C-day within the aforementioned definition. The command
or headquarters directly responsible for the execution of the operation, if other
than the one coordinating the planning, will do so in light of the meaning specified
by the highest command or headquarters coordinating the planning.

b. D-day. The unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is to

commence.

c. F-hour. The effective time of announcement by the Secretary of Defense to the

Military Departments of a decision to mobilize Reserve units.

d. H-hour. The specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation commences.

e. H-hour (amphibious operations). For amphibious operations, the time the first
assault elements are scheduled to touch down on the beach, or a landing zone,
and in some cases the commencement of countermine breaching operations.

f. I-day. The day on which the Intelligence Community determines that within a
potential crisis situation, a development occurs that may signal a heightened
threat to U.S. interests. Although the scope and direction of the threat is
ambiguous, the Intelligence Community responds by focusing collection and
other resources to monitor and report on the situation as it evolves.

g. L-hour. The specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation

commences or is to commence.

h. L-hour (amphibious operations). In amphibious operations, the time at which

the first helicopter of the helicopter-borne assault wave touches down in the
landing zone.

i. M-day. The term used to designate the unnamed day on which full mobilization
commences or is due to commence.

j. N-day. The unnamed day an active duty unit is notified for deployment or
redeployment.

k. R-day. Redeployment day. The day on which redeployment of major combat,

combat support, and combat service support forces begins in an operation.

F-1
l. S-day. The day the President authorizes Selective Reserve call-up (not more
than 200,000).

m. T-day. The effective day coincident with Presidential declaration of national

emergency and authorization of partial mobilization (not more than 1,000,000
personnel exclusive of the 200,000 call-up).

n. W-day. Declared by the President, W-day is associated with an adversary

decision to prepare for war (unambiguous strategic warning).

F-2
 APPENDIX G: OPERATION ASSESSMENT
Conducting operation assessment requires a detailed study of the following references:

Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning, “Chapter VI Operation Assessment”,

http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp5_0_20171606.pdf

Lynette M. B. Arnhart and Marvin L. King, “Are We There Yet? Implementing Best
Practices in Assessments,” Military Review (May-June 2018)
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/May-June-
2018/Are-We-There-Yet-Implementing-Best-Practices-in-Assessments/

Definitions:

Assessment: A continuous activity that supports decision making

by ascertaining progress toward accomplishing a task, creating
an effect, achieving an objective, or attaining an end state for
the purpose of developing, adapting, and refining plans and for
making campaigns and operations more effective. (JP 5-0, p. VI-
1)

Operation assessment refers specifically to the process the

Joint Force Commander (JFC) and staff use during planning and
execution to measure progress toward accomplishing tasks,
creating conditions or effects, and achieving objectives.
Commanders continuously observe the OE and the progress of
operations; compare the results to their initial visualization,
understanding, and intent; and adjust planning and operations
based on this analysis. Staffs monitor key factors that can
influence operations and provide the commander information
needed for decisions. Without mistaking level of activity for
progress, commanders devise ways to update their understanding
of the operational environment (OE) and assess their progress
toward mission accomplishment. In operations that do not include
combat, assessments can be more complex. (JP 3-0, p. II-9)

Indicator: In the context of operation assessment, a specific

piece of information that infers the condition, state, or
existence of something, and provides a reliable means to
ascertain performance or effectiveness. (JP 5-0, p. VI-24)

Measure of Effectiveness: An indicator used to measure a current

system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple
observations over time. Also called MOE. See also combat
assessment; mission. (JP 5-0)

G-1
Measure of Performance: An indicator used to measure a friendly
action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. Also
called MOP. (JP 5-0)

The following is from the Executive Summary of Joint Publication 5-0 (2017 pages xxvi
to xxix, with clarifying figures and texts from Chapter VI, “Operation Assessment.”

Operation Assessment
Commanders maintain a personal sense of the progress of the
operation or campaign, shaped by conversations with senior and
subordinate commanders, key leader engagements, and battlefield
circulation. Operation assessment complements the commander’s
awareness by methodically identifying changes in the OE,
identifying and analyzing risks and opportunities, and formally
providing recommendations to improve progress towards mission
accomplishment. Assessment should be integrated into the
organization’s planning (beginning in the plan initiation step)
and operations battle rhythm to best support the commander’s
decision cycle. Assessment analysis and products should identify
where the CCMD’s ways and means are sufficient to attain their
ends, where they are not and why not, and support
recommendations to modify the campaign plan or its components.

Figure G-1: Campaign Plan Assessments (JP 5-0)

G-2
Tenets of Operation Assessment

Commander Centricity. The assessment plan should focus on the

information and intelligence that directly support the
commander’s decision making.

Subordinate Commander Involvement. Assessments are more

effective when used to support conversations between commanders
at different echelons.

Integration. Operation assessment is the responsibility of

commanders, planners, and operators at every level and not the
sole work of an individual advisor, committee, or assessment
entity.

Rhythm. To deliver information at the right time, the operation

assessment should be synchronized with the commander’s decision
cycle.

Integration of External Sources of Information. Operation

assessment should allow the commander and staff to integrate
information that updates the understanding of the OE in order to
plan more effective operations.

Credibility and Transparency. As much as possible, sources and

assessment results should be unbiased. All methods used, and
limitations in the collection of information and any assumptions
used to link evidence to conclusions, should be clearly
described in the assessment report.

Continuous Operation Assessment. While an operation assessment

product may be developed on a specific schedule, assessment is
continuous in any operation.

Operation Assessment Process

Every mission and OE has its unique challenges, thus making

every assessment unique. The following steps can help guide the
development of an effective assessment plan and assessment
performance during execution.
 Step 1—Develop the Operation Assessment Approach
 Step 2—Develop Operation Assessment Plan
 Step 3—Collect Information and Intelligence
 Step 4—Analyze Information and Intelligence
 Step 5—Communicate Feedback and Recommendations
 Step 6—Adapt Plans or Operations/Campaigns

G-3
Figure G-2: Operation Assessment Steps (Figure VI-3 in JP 5-0)

G-4
Linking Effects, Objectives, and End States to Tasks
through Indicators

As the staff plans the desired effects, objectives, and end

states, they should concurrently identify the specific pieces of
information needed to infer changes in the OE supporting them.
These pieces of information are commonly referred to as
indicators.

The most critical indicators of progress or regression

should also be included in CCIRs to guide the collection and
assessment activity. These indicators include measures of
effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs). MOEs
help answer the question, “Are we creating the effect(s) or
conditions in the OE that we desire?” MOPs help answer the
question, “Are we accomplishing tasks to standard?”

Figure G-3: Linking End State, Objectives, Tasks, Conditions and Mission to
Tasks (Figure VI-12 in JP 5-0)

G-5
Guidelines for Indicator Development

Indicators should be relevant, observable or collectable,

responsive, and resourced.

Relevant. Indicators should be relevant to a desired effect,

objective, or end state within the plan or order. A valid
indicator accurately signifies the anticipated or actual status
of something about the effect, objective, or end state that must
be known.

Observable and Collectable. Indicators must be observable (and

therefore collectable) such that changes can be detected and
measured or evaluated. The staff should make note of indicators
that are relevant but not collectable and report them to the
commander.

Responsive. Indicators should signify changes in the OE timely

enough to enable effective response by the staff and timely
decisions by the commander. Assessors must consider an
indicator’s responsiveness to stimulus in the OE.

Resourced. The collection of indicators should be adequately

resourced so the command and subordinate units can obtain the
required information without excessive effort or cost.

Ensuring effects, objectives, and end states are linked to

tasks through carefully selected measures of performance (MOPs)
and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) is essential to the
analytical rigor of an assessment framework. Establishing
strong, cogent links between tasks and effects, objectives, and
end states through MOPs and MOEs facilitates the transparency
and clarity of the assessment approach. Additionally, links
between tasks and effects, objectives, and end states assist in
mapping the plan’s strategy to actual activities and conditions
in the OE and subsequently to desired effects, objectives, and
end states.

G-6
Joint Publication 5-0, Chapter VI, “Operation Assessment” suggests two approaches
and the complete detailed approach found there is briefly summarized here.

Approach 1 — Using Assessment Questions and Information and

Intelligence Requirements. This approach uses the model shown
in Figure VI-14 to guide the development of assessment questions
and information and intelligence requirements in order to
identify indicators.

Figure G-4: Linking End State, Objectives, Effects, Tasks, Conditions, and
Mission to Indicators (Figure VI-14 in JP 5-0)

G-7
(1) Statements about effects, objectives, or end states can
refer to anything that specifies the changes in the OE being
sought. the refinement of a statement into “smaller statements”
refers to any statement that increases the specificity of the
original statement. For example, for a military end state, we
may have several objectives; for an objective, we may have
several effects; or, for a strategic objective, we may have
several termination criteria. Assessors help develop specific
desired effects, objectives, or end states, which may have one
or more associated assessment questions.

(2) Assessment questions are those that, when answered, provide

the commander with direct answers to critical information
pertaining to the OE and progress toward desired effects,
objectives, or end states. Assessment questions take the general
form of “How well are we creating our desired effects?” and
related questions such as, “How can we achieve our objectives
more effectively—more quickly, qualitatively better, at less
cost, or at less risk?”

(3) Information and intelligence requirements should be

developed from the assessment questions. They record the logical
connection between indicators and assessment questions and the
effects, objectives, or end states they support. Within the
context of assessments, intelligence requirements are typically
used to understand conditions within OE while information
requirements are used to determine whether the joint force
properly executed planned actions (Figure VI-15). The staff may
ask questions such as:

(a) Usage. What aspect of the desired effects, objectives, or

endstates does this information/intelligence requirement inform?

(b) Source. How will the required information/intelligence be

collected? What is our confidence level in the reporting?

(c) Measurability. Is the information or intelligence

requirement measurable? If the information or intelligence
requirement is unavailable, are there other information or
intelligence requirements that can serve as proxies?

(d) Impact. What is the impact of knowing the required

information or intelligence? What is the impact of not knowing
it? What is the risk if it is false?

(e) Timeliness. When is the required information or intelligence

no longer valuable?

G-8
Approach 2 — Develop indicators to assess operations. This
approach facilitates the development of MOPs and MOEs (See
Figure G-5).

Figure G-5: MOP and MOE Effectiveness Indicator Development

(Figure VI-20 in JP 5-0)

(1) Planners and assessors determine a hierarchy of increasingly

more refined statements. For example, these may be the
objectives to be achieved, the effects to be created in the OE
to achieve those objectives, and perhaps the tasks intended to
create those effects.

(2) Functional experts, supported by assessors, then develop

potential indicators for each effect. These indicators should
answer the questions “What happened?” and “How do we know we are
creating the desired effects?” The answers to these questions

G-9
are indicators that may inform MOPs and MOEs. Performance-
oriented indicators reflect friendly force actions and
activities and inform MOP. They help answer the question, “Are
we doing things right?” Effectiveness-oriented indicators
reflect a current condition for the state of some part of the OE
and are commonly referred to as MOEs. MOEs help answer the
question, “Are we doing the right things?” The following steps
present a logical process the staff can use to develop measures
and indicators (either MOPs or MOEs) for each desired effect.

(a) Analyze the desired effects and tasks to identify candidate

MOPs and MOEs for subsequent refinement. Consider developing
MOPs, (and MOP indicators, if used) that reflect progress in
achieving key tasks as the approach to performance assessment.

(b) Refine MOEs and MOPs. They should be relevant to the

desired effect (MOEs) or associated task (MOPs), observable,
responsive, and resourced.

(c) Identify collection requirements for MOPs and MOEs.

Requirements should be prioritized for inclusion in the
command’s collection plans. Since MOPs reflect friendly force
actions, most will be available through routine reports and
should not require separate collection efforts for assessment.
Some collection requirements for MOEs may also be available as
part of the command’s JIPOE efforts. However, other MOEs will
require new collection efforts to gather the appropriate
information and must compete for resources with other command
collection requirements. Those indicators informing MOPs and
MOEs that cannot be collected must be included as part of the
data collection plan (DCP) along with the risk associated with
loss of that information.

(d) Incorporate indicators into the DCP and assessment plan.

(e) Monitor and modify indicators as necessary during execution.

G-10