Certiorari

RULE 65
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file
a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

1. Tagle vs. Equitable PCI Bank

FACTS: This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by
petitioner Alfredo Tagle (petitioner Alfredo) stemmed from the following Resolutions
promulgated by the Court of Appeals: (1) the 6 September 2005 Resolution1 dismissing the
Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Alfredo assailing the 4 April 2005 Order of RTC and
two resolution issued by the Court of Appeals. The property of the petitioner alleged that was
constituted as a Family Home. The subject property was foreclosed by the private respondent
bank. respondent E-PCI filed with the RTC a Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession of the
subject property. Petitioner Alfredo, however, filed a Motion to Stop Writ of Possession on the
ground that the subject property is a Family Home which is exempt from execution, forced sale
or attachment. RTC denied that motion of the RTC. Petitioner argued that that from the records
of the mortgage, the same was not constituted before or after the constitution of the family home
by the petitioner and as such the Court of Appeals has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in the proceedings complained of.

ISSUE: Whether or not petition for certiorari shall prosper?

RULING: No. The court held that for a petition for certiorari to prosper, the essential requisites
that have to concur are: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Here, the availability to petitioner Alfredo of the remedy of a petition for
review on certiorari from the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals effectively barred his
right to resort to a petition for certiorari. there is no question that the 6 September 2005
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing petitioner Alfredo’s petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
90461 is already a disposition on the merits. Therefore, said Resolution, as well as the
Resolutions dated 16 February 2006 and 11 April 2006 denying reconsideration thereof, issued
by the Court of Appeals, are in the nature of a final disposition of CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 by the
appellate court, and which, under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, are appealable to this
Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari. The remedy is considered “plain, speedy and
adequate” if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment and
the acts of the lower court or agency. Hence, the petition on certiorari shall not prosper.
2. Almuete vs. People
FACTS: Almuete (petitioner), Ila, and Lloren were charged before the RTC of Nueva Ecija, with
violation of Sec. 68 of PD No. 705, aka “Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines”, as amended
by EO 277, docketed as Crim Case 2672. On the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment,
Almuete’s counsel informed the trial court that Almuete and Lloren were ill while Ila was not
notified of the scheduled promulgation. The RTC, however, found their absence inexcusable and
proceeded to promulgate its Decision as scheduled on Sept 8, 1998 charging them as guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. After, RTC cancelled their bail bonds and issued warrants of arrest
against them.

They moved for reconsideration, questioning the validity of the promulgation, the factual and
legal bases of their conviction, and the correctness of the penalty imposed. The RTC denied said
motion for lack of merit. Instead of filing an appeal, Almuete and his co-accused filed a Petition
for Certiorari to the CA.

The CA granted the Petition and disposed of the case in favor of the acquittal of Almuete. The
acquittal of petitioner prompted the People of the Philippines to elevate the case to this Court via
a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Court reversed
petitioner’s acquittal and reinstated the RTC’s Decision.

Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied by the Court.
Unfazed, petitioner filed a second and a third Motion for Reconsideration, which were also
denied.

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Clarification on whether he could still appeal the RTC’s
September 8, 1998. The court noted that it is without action for clarification. Hence, petitioner
filed with the RTC a Motion for Repromulgation. DENIED. Imputing grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the RTC, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner for certiorari is proper?

RULING: No. The court held that an acquittal via a Petition for Certiorari is not allowed because
“the authority to review perceived errors of the trial court in the exercise of its judgment and
discretion x x x are correctible only by appeal by writ of error.” Thus, in filing a Petition for
Certiorari instead of an appeal, petitioner availed of the wrong remedy

3. Espiritu vs. Tankiansee

FACTS: Petitioner filed a Petition for Issuance of Shares of Stock and/or Return of Management
and Control with the Regional Trial Court of Manila against UOBP Group. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 02-103160 and raffled to Branch 46. Thereafter Respondent
intervened, meanwhile Petitioner filed a Notice to take Depositions of respondent. The RTC-46
denied the deposition. Aggrieved, Petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals which was denied by the CA. From this adverse decision, Petitioner appealed to the SC,
meanwhile, pending resolution before the SC, the trial court rendered a Decision on Feb. 2, 2004,
in the main case, therein, the Petitioners filed an appeal to the CA. Problem arises when the SC
required the CA to elevate the complete records to the SC.
Respondents claim that petitioners are guilty of forum shopping. On February 2, 2004, the trial
court rendered a summary judgment in the main case, i.e., Civil Case No. 02-103160. Petitioners,
except petitioner Westmont Investment Corporation, thereafter filed a notice of appeal. Petitioner
Westmont Investment Corporation chose to file an ex abundanti ad cautelam notice of appeal and
a petition for certiorari and mandamus. All three cases seek to annul the February 2, 2004
Decision of the trial court. According to respondents, the present recourse has the same
objective, that is, to reopen the trial court’s February 2, 2004 Decision which is pending review
before the Court of Appeals. Considering that petitioners have a commonality of interest, the
splitting of the causes of action on the same cause is tantamount to forum shopping.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not petition for certiorari is proper?

2. Whether petitioners are guilty of forum shopping?

RULING: 1. No. The court held that a certiorari petition may only be availed of if “there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Here,
petitioners’ appeal from the February 2, 2004 Decision of the trial court in the main case is the
appropriate and adequate remedy in this case as it challenges the aforesaid interlocutory orders
and the decision in the main case.

2. Yes. The court held that there is forum shopping when two or more actions or proceedings,
founded on the same cause, are instituted by a party on the supposition that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition. Where a party’s petition for certiorari and subsequent
appeal seek to achieve one and the same purpose, there is forum shopping which is a sufficient
ground for the dismissal of the certiorari petition. Here, the appeal and certiorari petition raise
similar arguments and effectively seek to achieve the same purpose of annulling the February 2,
2004 Decision which petitioners perceive to be in gross error. Thus, as in Ley Construction &
Development Corporation, the certiorari petition must perforce be dismissed on the ground of
forum shopping.

FEUD
RULE 70
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. — Subject to the provisions of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the
legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any
time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an
action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding
or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of
such possession, together with damages and costs.

1. Del Rosario vs. Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc.

FACTS: Manuel del Rosario appears to be the registered owner of Lot 3-A of Psd-301974
located in Roxas City which is described in and covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT).Sometime in 1991, the Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc., (GRFI) as a legitimate foundation,
took possession and occupancy of said land by virtue of a memorandum of agreement it entered
with Roxas City. Its possession and occupancy of said land is in the character of being a lessee
thereof. In February and March 2003, the Spouses Manuel and Florentina del Rosario
(Spouses)served notices upon the GRFI to vacate the premises of said land. GRFI, however, did
not heed such notices because it still has the legal right to continue its possession and occupancy
of said land. On July 2003, the spouses filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against GRFI
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities. Said complaint contains Sometime in 1991, without
the consent and authority of the plaintiffs, defendant took full control and possession of the
subject property, developed the same and used it for commercial purposes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the allegations in the Complaint establish a cause of action for forcible
entry and not an unlawful detainer?

RULING: No. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by
means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.” “[W]here the defendant’s possession of
the property is illegal ab initio,” the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) is the
remedy to recover possession while In unlawful detainer, possession was originally lawful but
became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess.
. Here, in their Complaint, petitioners maintained that the respondent took possession and control
of the subject property without any contractual or legal basis. Assuming that these allegations are
true, it hence follows that respondent’s possession was illegal from the very beginning.
Therefore, the foundation of petitioners’ complaint is one for forcible entry—that is “the forcible
exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered without right.

2. Corpuz vs. Agustin

FACTS: Ruben C. Corpuz (Ruben) filed a complaint for ejectment against Spouses Hilarion and
Justa Agustin on the allegation that he is the registered owner of two parcels of land located in
Santa Joaquina, Laoag City covered by TCT No. 12980 issued on October 29, 1976 by the Laoag
City Register of Deeds.

Aforesaid parcels of land were formerly owned by Elias Duldulao in whose name Original
Certificate of Title No. O-1717 was issued. Duldulao sold said properties on August 27, 1951 to
Francisco D. Corpuz, father of Ruben C. Corpuz. The elder Corpuz allowed spouses Agustin to
occupy subject properties, the latter being relatives.

Despite demand to vacate, the Agustins refused to leave the premises.

Ruben alleged further that he has the better right to possess subject property having acquired the
same from his father, Francisco, who executed a Deed of Quitclaim in his favor on March 15,
1971.
Spouses Agustin, in their Answer, interposed the defense that on June 5, 1971 Francisco Corpuz,
Ruben's father, disposed of subject property by executing a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor
for a consideration of Eleven Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,150.00).

The Municipal Trial Court found for the spouses Agustin and dismissed the complaint.

On appeal, Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City affirmed said dismissal.

Petitioner assailed the Decision of the RTC, affirming the earlier dismissal of the case by the
MTC, by instituting an appeal with the CA. On 08 January 2008, the appellate court through its
Fourteenth Division dismissed his appeal. It noted that his father engaged in a double sale when
he conveyed the disputed properties to petitioner and respondents. The Quitclaim executed by
the elder Corpuz in favor of petitioner was dated 15 March 1971, while the Deed of Sale with
respondents was later, on 15 June 1971; both documents were notarized shortly after their
execution. The Quitclaim, which was subsequently inscribed at the back of Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. O-1717 on 29 October 1976, resulted in the issuance of Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. T-12980 in the name of petitioner. The Deed of Sale executed with
respondents was, however, not annotated at the back of OCT No. O-1717 and remained
unregistered.

Based on the above findings, the CA ruled that petitioner had knowledge of the sale of the
disputed real property executed between Francisco Corpuz, petitioner's father, and respondents.
Due to this conveyance by the elder Corpuz to respondents, the latter's possession thereof was in
the nature of ownership. Thus, in the context of an unlawful detainer case instituted by petitioner
against respondents, the appellate court concluded that respondents' possession of the property
was not by mere tolerance of its former owner - petitioner's father - but was in the exercise of
ownership.

The CA noted that petitioner had knowledge of his father's sale of the properties to respondents
as early as 1973. However, despite knowledge of the sale, petitioner failed to initiate any action
to annul it and oust respondents from the subject properties.

ISSUE: Who between the parties has the right to possession of the disputed properties —
petitioner, who is the registered owner under TCT No. T-12980; or respondents, who have a
notarized yet unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale over the same properties?

RULING: The right of possession belongs with Spouses Agustin since their possession has been
established as one in the concept of ownership. CA was correct to dismiss the unlawful detainer
case of Corpuz.

Discussion of the suit filed by Corpuz (unlawful detainer): One of the three kinds of action for
the recovery of possession of real property is "accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding . . .
which may be either that for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which
is a summary action for the recovery of physical possession where the dispossession has not
lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the proper inferior court."
In ejectment proceedings, the courts resolve the basic question of who is entitled to physical
possession of the premises, possession referring to possession de facto, and not possession de
jure. Where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass
upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the better right to possess the property.
However, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication
of the ownership issue is not final and binding, but only for the purpose of resolving the issue of
possession.

Petitioner is correct that as a Torrens title holder over the subject properties, he is the rightful
owner and is entitled to possession thereof. However, the lower courts and the appellate court
consistently found that possession of the disputed properties by respondents was in the nature of
ownership, and not by mere tolerance of the elder Corpuz. In fact, they have been in continuous,
open and notorious possession of the property for more than 30 years up to this day.

Jacinto Co v. Rizal Militar, et al. (cited by Petitioner Corpuz because of similarity to present
case): the principal issue was who between the two parties had the better right to possess the
subject property. This Court resolved the issue by upholding the title holder as the one who had
the better right to possession of the disputed property

In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the parties, it is the petitioner who has a
Torrens Title to the property. Respondents merely showed their unregistered deeds of sale in
support of their claims. The Metropolitan Trial Court correctly relied on the transfer certificate
of title in the name of petitioner

However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the present petitioner has instituted an unlawful
detainer case against respondents. It is an established fact that for more than three decades, the
latter have been in continuous possession of the subject property, which, as such, is in the
concept of ownership and not by mere tolerance of petitioner's father. An ejectment case will not
necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the subject
property (Carbonilla v Abiera)

Canlas v. Tubil enumerated the elements that constitute the sufficiency of a complaint for
unlawful detainer:

In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for
unlawful detainer if it recites the following:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter's right of possession;

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of
the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.

Based on the above, it is obvious that petitioner has not complied with the requirements
sufficient to warrant the success of his unlawful detainer Complaint against respondents. The
lower courts and the CA have consistently upheld the entitlement of respondents to continued
possession of the subject properties, since their possession has been established as one in the
concept of ownership. Thus, the courts correctly dismissed the unlawful detainer case of
petitioner.

We concur in the appellate court's findings that petitioner's father engaged in a double sale of the
disputed properties. The records of the case show that it took petitioner more or less five years
from 1971 when he acquired the property from his father to 1976 when petitioner registered the
conveyance and caused the issuance of the land title registered in his name under the Torrens
system. Respondents, on the other hand, continued their possession of the properties, but without
bothering to register them or to initiate any action to fortify their ownership.

We cannot, however, sustain the appellate court's conclusion that petitioner's failure to initiate
any action to annul the sale to respondents and oust them from the disputed properties had the
effect of registration of respondents' unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale.

In this case, the Quitclaim executed by the elder Corpuz in favor of petitioner was executed
ahead of the Deed of Sale of respondents. Thus, the sale of the subject properties by petitioner's
father to respondents cannot be considered as a prior interest at the time that petitioner came to
know of the transaction.

The Spouses Agustin do not dispute the existence of TCT No. T-12980 registered in the name of
petitioner. They allege, though, that the land title issued to him was an "act of fraud" on his part.
We find this argument to be equivalent to a collateral attack against the Torrens title of petitioner
— an attack we cannot allow in the instant unlawful detainer case.

It is settled in jurisprudence that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral
attack. Such attack must be direct and not by a collateral proceeding. Considering that this is an
unlawful detainer case wherein the sole issue to be decided is possession de facto rather than
possession de jure, a collateral attack by herein respondents on petitioner's title is proscribed.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant Petition for lack of merit.
Dismissal of case AFFIRMED.

3. Barrientos vs. Rapal

FACTS: On April 15, 1998, respondent Mario Rapal acquired a parcel of land at Quezon city via
a notarized Deed of Transfer of Possessory Right. The parcel of land was said to be a portion of
the estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. Thereafter, respondent constructed a
semi-concrete house on the lot and took actual possession of the property by himself and through
his caretaker, Benjamin Tamayo.
In 1993, Petitioner Bienvinido Barrientos and his family were allowed to stay in the subject
property as caretakers with a condition that they shall vacate the premises when the respond
would need it. Upon demand to vacate, petitioner refused to leave the subject property. Thus,
respondent filed a complaint of Unlawful Detainer against the petitioner.

On February 21, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the respondent. It ordered
petitioner to vacate the premises and to pay respondent a compensation for the use of the
structure.
On appeal, (RTC) reversed the Decision of the MeTC and resolved in favor of petitioner,
reasoning that respondent has not shown any prior lawful possession of the property in question.

On April 29, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed Decision reversing the decision of the RTC and
reinstating the decision of the MeTC. The CA found that both parties presented weak evidence of
ownership. In determining who between the parties was first in possession, the CA concluded
that respondent was, indeed, first in possession of the lot. Hence, petitioner elevated the case to
the SC.

ISSUE: Whether the issue of owner can be initially resolved for the purpose of determing the
issue of possession?

RULING: Yes. The court held that in an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is
physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership
by any of the parties. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may
pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The
adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between
the same parties involving title to the property. Here, Both petitioner and respondent presented
weak evidence of ownership.  Respondent on his part based his claim of ownership over the
subject property on the strength of a notarized Deed of Transfer of Possessory Right from a
certain Antonio Natavio. However, respondent could not derive any right therefrom as the
original certificate of title over the land was declared null and void. Petitioner, on the other hand,
anchored his contention that he has a better right to possess the property on the fact the he is in
actual possession of the property. Yet he failed to adduce sufficient evidence on the manner by
which he acquired ownership. Based on the evidences presented, it can be deduced that
petitioner's occupation of the subject lot was by mere tolerance only.  Petitioner was initially
permitted by respondent to occupy the lot as a caretaker. Therefore, he is bound by an implied
promise that he will vacate the same upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment
is the proper remedy.

The Sc stressed that in ejectment suits, the issue is pure physical or de facto possession, and
pronouncements made on questions of ownership are provisional in nature.  The provisional
determination of ownership in the ejectment case cannot be clothed with finality.

4. Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation

FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:

5. Jose vs. Alfuerto

Facts: The dispute involves a parcel of land registered in the name of Rodolfo Chua Sing located
in San Dionisio, Paranaque City. Chua Sing purchased the land in 1991, he then leased the
property to petitioner Fiorello Jose. The Contract of Lease was neither notarized nor registered
with the Paranaque City Registry of Deeds.

The Lease Contract provided that the lessor transfers all its rights and prerogative to evict
occupants in favor of lessee which shall be responsible for all the expenses that may be incurred
without reimbursement from the lessor.

There are however occupants already occupying the property even before the lease
contract was executed. Soon after Chua Sing and petitioner signed the lease contract, petitioner
demanded in writing that the respondents vacate the property within 30 days and that they pay
monthly rental of P1,000.00 until they fully vacate the property.

Respondents refused to vacate and to pay rent. Petitioner then filed an ejectment case
against respondents before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Paranaque. When Petitioner
brought the case to the Barangay for conciliation, the Barangay issued a Certification to File
Action. Petitioner claimed that as lessee of the subject property, he had the right to eject the
respondents who unlawfully occupy the land.

Court of Appeals ruled that the respondent’s possession of the land was not by the petitioner or
his lessor’s tolerance. Having been in possession of the land for more than a year, the
respondents should not be evicted through an ejectment case. CA emphasized that ejectment
cases are summary proceedings where the only issue to be resolved is who has a better right to
the physical possession of a property. Petitioner’s claim is of accion publiciana (for the recovery
of the possession), wherein he asserts his right as a possessor by virtue of a contract of lease. CA
dismissed the ejectment case. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which CA denied.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court can treat an ejectment case as an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria (for the recovery of ownership).

Ruling:

The Court cannot treat an ejectment case as an accion publiciana or accion

reivindicatoria.

Ratio Decidendi:

Petitioner argues that assuming this case should have been filed as an action publiciana or
accion reivindicatoria, the Court should still resolve the case. However, the Court cannot simply
take the evidence presented before the MeTC in an ejectment case and decide it as an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria for these cases are different and not interchangeable.
An action for forcible entry is distinct from accion publiciana. Forcible entry must be
filed within one year after the unlawful dispossession while the latter must be filed a year after
the unlawful dispossession of the real property. Former is concerned with the issue of the right to
the physical possession of the real property while the latter’s subject of litigation is the better
right to possession over the real property. The former is filed in the municipal trial court and
summary action, while the latter is plenary action in the RTC.
The cause of action in the ejectment case is different from accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. The ejectment case is brought before the proper inferior court to recover physical
possession only or possession de facto, not possession de jure. MeTC’s ruling is only to resolve
the issue of the possession and therefore inconclusive. MeTC resolves only possession de facto,
ejectment cases are summary in nature, while accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria are
plenary action. Hence petition is denied; CA’s decision dismissing the ejectment case was
affirmed.