G.R. No.

104813 October 21, 1993

HEIRS OF JOSE OLVIGA, NAMELY: PLACIDA S. OLVIGA, VIRGILIO OLVIGA, LOLITA

OLVIGA, CARMENCITA O. ALPUERTO and JEANETTE OLILA, petitioners, 
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELITA R. GLOR, SERILINA G. JAMON, EMELITA G.
MADELA, EMAN G. MANALO, MYRNA GLOR, FELIPE GLOR, GAUDENCIO GLOR and
CORNELIO GLOR, respondents.

Facts: In 1950, Eutiquio Pureza and his father cleared and cultivated a forest Lot at
Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision with an area of 54,406 sq.m. (5.44 hs) and later
introduced improvements. In 1956 the Bureau of Lands surveyed it in Eutiquio Pureza's name.
Godofredo olviga protested the survey but with respect to the half-a-hectare portion
"sa dakong panulukan ng Amihanan- Silanganan" which he claimed that lot belonged to
Eutiquio except for the half-a-hectare portion included in the survey. Eutiquio filed a homestead
application in 1960 for Lot 13, but since no action was done on his application, he transferred
his rights to the lot in 1961 to Cornelio Glor, Sr. However, the latter failed to follow up Eutiquio's
homestead application in the cadastral proceedings and testified that there were not notified
about the outcome of said proceedings. The Olvigas were Glors' neighbors. Jose claimed on
the other hand adjoining lands Lot 12 and 13 in the cadastral proceeding. He falsely omitted that
there were persons claiming possession and adverse interests in Lot 13 and Eutiquio's sale of
rights to Cornelio Sr. in 1961. Thus in 1967, the lands were awarded without contest to Jose
Olviga. Jose requested later in 1971 that the land be splitted into two separate lots with
subsequently issued as Lots 12 and 13, and he later on transferred Lot 13 to his daughter Lolita
and her husband Jaime Olila. Cornelio's widow Angelita filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Calauag, Quezon an action against the heirs of Jose Olviga to reconvey that parcel of land to
her and her heirs. The RTC and C.A rendered judgment in Angelita's favor.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is correct in alleging that the action for quieting of title has
already prescribed.
Held:
Petitioner is incorrect.
The Supreme Court held that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years, the point of reference being the date of
registration of the deed of the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property.
(Vda. de Portugal vs. IAC, 159 SCRA 178). But this rule applies only when the plaintiff is
not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in
actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks
to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe.
G.R. No. 157852               December 15, 2010

HEIRS OF DOMINGO VALIENTES, Petitioners, 

vs.
Hon. REINERIO (Abraham) B. RAMAS, Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 29, 9th
Judicial Region, San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur and Vilma V. Minor, Respondents.

Facts: Petitioners claim that they are the heirs of Domingo Valientes who, before his death, was
the owner of a parcel of land in Gabay, Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur In 1939, Domingo
Valientes mortgaged the subject property to secure his loan to the spouses Belen. In the 1950s,
the Valientes family purportedly attempted, but failed, to retrieve the subject property from the
spouses Belen. Through an allegedly forged document captioned VENTA DEFINITIVA
purporting to be a deed of sale of the subject property between Domingo Valientes and the
spouses Belen, the latter obtained Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-5,427 in their name
(December 22, 1969). On February 28, 1970, legitimate children of the late Domingo Valientes,
had their Affidavit of Adverse Claim duly entered in the Memorandum of Encumbrances at the
back of TCT No. T-5,427. Upon the death of the spouses Belen, their surviving heirs executed
an extra-judicial settlement with partition and sale in favor of private respondent Vilma Valencia-
Minor, the present possessor of the subject property.

On June 20, 1979, private respondent Minor filed with the then Court of First Instance of
Pagadian City a "PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF MEMORANDUM OF ENCUMBRANCE.
RTC granted Minor’s prayer and the title of property was transferred to her name.
Petitioners filed complaint for "CANCELLATION OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO.
T-5,427 at RTC of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, However RTC dismissed the case on the
ground of forum shopping. C.A held that Civil Case No. 98-021 cannot prosper on the grounds
of prescription and laches.

Issue: W/N petitioner’s is correct in alleging that the case is in the nature of an action to quiet
title which does not prescribe citing the case of Heirs of Jose Olviga v. Court of Appeals.

Held: No. Petitioners is INCORRECT

The Court made a clear distinction in Olviga: when the plaintiff in
such action is not in possession of the subject property, the action prescribes in ten years from
the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the
property. When the plaintiff is in possession of the subject property, the action, being in effect
that of quieting of title to the property, does not prescribe. In the case at bar, petitioners (who
are the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 98-021) are not in possession of the subject property. Civil
Case No. 98-021, if it were to be considered as that of enforcing an implied trust, should have
therefore been filed within ten years from the issuance of TCT No. T-5,427 on December
22, 1969. Civil Case No. 98-021 was, however, filed on August 20, 1998, which was way
beyond the prescriptive period.
G.R. No. L-38387 January 29, 1990

HILDA WALSTROM, petitioner-appellant, 
vs.
FERNANDO MAPA, JR., VICTORINO A. MAPA, MARIA C.M. DE GOCO, FERNANDO
MAPA, III, MARIO L. MAPA, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE PROVINCE OF
BENGUET, respondents-appellees.

Facts:

Cacao Dianson, has a free patent application, he filed with the District Land Office in Baguio
City a letter protesting the construction in April, 1956 by Josefa Abaya Mapa of on the parcel of
land (described as "portion A") of one of the parcels of land covered by his Free Patent
Application. The controversy was referred to Bureau of Lands Investigator Antonio Mejia. He
found that Josefa Abaya Mapa has filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application, the same was
awarded to her on May 12, 1934. The purchase price has been paid in full in 1943 evidenced by
an Official Receipt. Cacao Dianson filed a Free Patent Application for the same parcel of land
on June 1, 1956, alleging that the said land was first occupied by his father, Dianson, in 1884.
The regional land officer of Dagupan City decided that Free Patent Application of Cacao
Dianson should exclude Portion "A" which is covered by the Miscellaneous Sales Application of
Josefa Abaya Mapa. Two years after the death of Dianson, Walstrom filed a motion
for reconsideration, claiming that Dianson is her predecessor in interest, the motion
for reconsideration resulted in setting aside the decision of the Regional land officer. Mapa then
appealed to the DANR reinstated the decision of the Regional land officer, then Gabriela
Walstrom filed for motion for reconsideration but was denied. While Walstrom filed for a second
motion for reconsideration of the order of DANR, Mapa filed a motion for execution. DANR
granted the motion for execution. Walstrom then filed a petition for relief with the DANR but then
pending the petition, she died. The heirs of Mapa pursued the case. This petition of Walstrom
remained unresolved, according to petitioner Hilda Walstrom, daughter of Gabriela Walstrom,
she was compelled to file an action in the court because the 1 year prescriptive period provided
for in Sec 38 of Land Registration act was about to lapse.

Issue: W/N Walstrom’s civil complaint against the respondents praying for nullification of the
Mapa’s sales patent and certificates of title issued by the register of deeds under Section 38 of
Act 496 or the Land Registration Act is valid.

Held : SEC. 38 of Act 496 or the Land Registration Act provides that a decree of registration
may be reopened or reviewed by the proper Regional Trial Court upon the concurrence of five
essential requisites, to wit: (a) that the petitioner has a real and a dominical right; (b) that he has
been deprived thereof;(c) through fraud; (d) that the petition is filed within one year from the
issuance of the decree; and (e) that the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent
purchaser for value. An examination of the records of the case shows non-concurrence of the
essential elements enumerated above. The first element is patently not present because the
petitioner cannot allege that she has already a real and dominical right to the piece of property
in controversy since the decision of the regional land officer was upheld by the DANR secretary.
That the petitioner's Free Patent Application shall exclude the disputed portion "A" of Lot No. 1,
which, instead, shall be included in the Mapas' Miscellaneous Sales Application.The second
element is also absent, the petitioner cannot aver that she was deprived of property because
she did not have a real right over portion "A".As to the third element, the records are bereft of
any indication that there was fraud in the issuance of the certificates of title. The court also finds
that the lower court was correct in holding that the case does not fall under any of the
exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. Instead of invoking Section 38,
the petitioner should have pressed for the speedy resolution of her petition with the DANR. The
petitioner’s fear that since the one-year prescriptive period for seeking judicial relief
provided for in Sec. 38 of the Land Registration Act was about to lapse, she was
compelled to file the action to nullify said patent is not correct. The court has ruled before
in Amerol vs. Bagumbaran that notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title already
issued in the name of another person, he can still be compelled under the law to reconvey the
subject property to the rightful owner. After all, the Torrens system was not designed to shield
and protect one who had committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad faith.
In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What
is sought instead is the transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name, to its rightful and legal owner, or
to one with a better right. Yet, the right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust is not absolute nor is it imprescriptible. An action for reconveyance based on
an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years from the issuance of the
Torrens title over the property. The court upheld the decision of the trial court

G.R. No. L-4656            November 18, 1912

RICARDO PARDELL Y CRUZ and 

VICENTA ORTIZ Y FELIN DE PARDELL, plaintiffs-appellees, 
vs.
GASPAR DE BARTOLOME Y ESCRIBANO and 
MATILDE ORTIZ Y FELIN DE BARTOLOME, defendants-appellants.

Facts: Appeal by bill of exceptions.Spouses Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin died in Vigan, Ilocos
Sur, in 1875 and 1882, respectively. Prior to her death, Calixta, executed, on August 17, 1876, a
nuncupative will in Vigan, whereby she made her four children,named Manuel, Francisca,
Vicenta, and Matilde, surnamed Ortiz y Felin, her sole and universal heirs of all her property.
Manuel and Francisca were already deceased, leaving Vicenta and Matilda as heirs.In 1888,
the defendants (Matilde and Gaspar), without judicial authorization, nor friendly or extrajudicial
agreement, took upon themselves the administration and enjoyment of the properties left by
Calixta and collected the rents, fruits, and products thereof, to the serious detriment of Vicenta’s
interest. Despite repeated demands to divide the properties and the fruits accruing therefrom,
Sps Gaspar and Matilde had been delaying the partition and delivery of the said properties by
means of unkempt promises and other excuses. Vicenta filed a petition for partition with
damages in the RTC.RTC decision: absolved Matilde from payment of damages. It held that the
revenues and the expenses were compensated by the residence enjoyed by the defendant
party, that no losses or damages were either caused or suffered, nor likewise any other
expense besides those aforementioned, Counsel for Matilde took an exception to the judgment
and moved for a new trial on the grounds that the evidence presented did not warrant the
judgment rendered and that the latter was contrary to law. That motion was denied by the lower
court. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE:
WON a co-owner is required to pay for rent in exclusively using the co-owned property.
RULING:
Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes: "Each co-owner may use the things owned in common,
provided he uses them in accordance with their object and in such manner as not to injure the
interests of the community nor prevent the co-owners from utilizing them according to their
rights."
Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a dwelling, in the
house of joint ownership; but the record shows no proof that, by so doing, the said Matilde
occasioned any detriment to the interests of the community property, nor that she prevented her
sister Vicenta from utilizing the said upper story according to her rights. It is to be noted that the
stores of the lower floor were rented and an accounting of the rents was duly made to the
plaintiffs.Each co-owner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property
and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the
interests of his co-owners, for the reason that, until a division be made, the respective part of
each holder can not be determined and every one of the co-owners exercises together with his
other co-participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, inaddition to his use and
enjoyment of the same.
As the hereditary properties of the joint ownership of the two sisters, Vicenta Ortiz, plaintiff, and
MatildeOrtiz, defendant, were situated in the Province of Ilocos Sur, and were in the care of the
last named, assisted by her husband, while the plaintiff Vicenta with her husband was residing
outside of the said province the greater part of the time between 1885 and 1905, when she left
these Islands for Spain, it is not at all strange that delays and difficulties should have attended
the efforts made to collect the rents and proceeds from the property held in common and to
obtain a partition of the latter, especially during several years when, owing to the insurrection,
the country was in a turmoil; and for this reason, aside from that founded on the right of co-
ownership of the defendants, who took upon themselves the administration and care of the
property of joint tenancy for purposes of their preservation and improvement,
these latter are not obliged to pay to the plaintiff Vicenta one-half of the rents which might have
been derived from the upper story of the said house on Calle Escolta, and, much less,because
one of the living rooms and the storeroom thereof were used for the storage of some belongings
and effects of common ownership between the litigants.

The defendant Matilde, therefore, in occupying with her husband the upper floor of the said
house, did not injure the interests of her co-owner, her sister Vicenta, nor did she prevent the
latter from living therein, but merely exercised a legitimate right pertaining to her as a co-owner
of the property.

Notwithstanding the above statements relative to the joint-ownership rights which entitled the
defendants to live in the upper story of the said house, yet, in view of the fact that the record
shows it to have been proved that the defendant Matilde's husband,
Gaspar de Bartolome, occupied for four years a room or apart of the lower floor of the same
house on Calle Escolta, using it as an office for the justice of the peace, a position which he
held in the capitol of that province, strict justice requires that he pay his sister-in-law,
theplaintiff, one-half of the monthly rent which the said quarters could have produced,
had they been leased to another person.
This conclusion as to Bartolome's liability results from the fact that, even as the husband of the
defendant co-owner of the property, he had no right to occupy and use gratuitously the said part
of the lower floor of the house in question, where he lived with his wife.