Holmberg v. Holmberg
Holmberg v. Holmberg
Holmberg v. Holmberg
588 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1999)
Decided Jan 28, 1999
Nos. C7-97-926, C8-97-1132, C9-98-33 and C7- Gail Chang Bohr, Children's Law Center of Minn.,
97-1512. St. Paul, for Amicus Curiae Children's Law
Center.
January 28, 1999.
Julie Brunner, Dulth, for Amici Curiae Assn. of
Appeal from the District Courts of Wright County,
Minn. Counties and the Minn. Assn. of County
Gary Meyer and Susan Weisman, JJ., Ramsey
Social Service Administrators.
County, Deborah Kraus, J., and Dakota County,
721 Ann K. Leppanen, J., *721 Jayne Barnard McCoy. Abigail Turner,
Minneapolis, for Amicus Curiae Mid-Minnesota
Susan E. Gaetner, Ramsey county Atty., Theresa J.
Legal Assistance.
Walton, Asst. County Atty., St. Paul, for appellant
Ramsey County. Heard, considered, and decided by the court en
banc.
James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Atty., Jay R.
Stassen, Sandra M. Torgerson, Asst. Dakota
County Attys., Hasting for appellant/intervenor OPINION
State of Minn.
BLATZ, C.J.
Michael A. Hatch, Atty. Gen., Kim Buechel
Mesun, Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for The instant case is the consolidation of three
appellant/intervenor State of Minn. appeals to the court of appeals challenging the
constitutionality of Minnesota's administrative
Lawrence Crosby, Crosby Associates, St. Paul, for child support process. This appeal presents the
respondents Sandra Holmberg and Lee Fuller. issue of whether the administrative process,
Mark A. Olson, Olson Law Office, Burnsville, for Minn.Stat. § 518.5511 (1996), violates the
respondent Steven Carson. separation of powers doctrine by impinging upon
the original jurisdiction of the district court, by
Amy Klobuchar, Hennepin County Atty., Theresa creating a tribunal which is not inferior to the
Farrell-Strauss, Asst. County Atty., Minneapolis, district court, and by permitting child support
for Amicus Curiae Minn. Family Support and officers to engage in the practice of law. The court
Recovery Council. of appeals ruled the administrative process
Robert M.A. Johnson, Anoka County Atty., Janice unconstitutional, relying on the separation of
M. Allen, Asst. Anoka County Atty., Anoka, for powers doctrine. We affirm the court of appeals
Amicus Curiae Minn. County Attys. Ass'n. and hold that the administrative process is
unconstitutional because it violates separation of
powers.
1
Holmberg v. Holmberg 588 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1999)
Timely and equitable distribution of family appeals by certiorari, and were enforceable by the
financial resources is needed to protect our contempt powers of the county or district courts.3
children's well-being. Thus, the efficient The statute's enabling language also authorized
administration of child support cases is a laudable nonattorney Dakota County employees acting
goal, and one that all three branches of under the supervision of the county attorney to
government share. To this end, the legislature has "prepare, sign, serve, and file motions for
created an expedited administrative process to obtaining, modifying, or enforcing child and
adjudicate child support cases involving families medical support orders and maintenance and
receiving certain types of public assistance. While related documents."4 These employees, called
evidence of the administrative child support child support officers (CSOs), could also appear at
process' efficacy is hotly disputed by the parties, prehearing conferences and participate in
there is no controversy about the importance of proceedings before an ALJ.5
streamlining child support mechanisms.
2 Minn.Stat. § 518.551, subd. 10 (Supp.
Nonetheless, the importance of this shared goal
1987).
cannot ignore separation of powers constraints.
722 *722 3 Id.
2
Holmberg v. Holmberg 588 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1999)
elect to bypass, parties are given 30 days to administrative rules in district court courtrooms,
respond to the public authority's written notice and issue warrants for failure to appear.11 In
requesting information to prepare a child support addition, ALJs may modify child support orders,
order. The public authority then prepares a even those granted by district courts.12 While
proposed order for the parties' signatures and the ALJs cannot preside over contested parentage and
ALJ's ratification. If either party contests the contempt proceedings, they can grant stipulated
order, the case moves into the contested hearing contempt orders and uncontested parentage orders
process.8 if custody and visitation are also uncontested.13
8 Minn.Stat. § 518.5511, subd. 2 (1996). 11 Minn.Stat. § 518.5511, subds. 1(e), 4(d),
4(e), 6 (1996).
The contested hearing process is similar to the
pilot program described above. CSOs draw up 12 Minn.Stat. § 518.5511, subds. 1(a), 1(b)
3
Holmberg v. Holmberg 588 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1999)
724 agency actions *724 as `quasi-judicial' or `quasi- Erickson, 212 Minn. 218, 225, 3 N.W.2d
legislative' and mandated stringent standards to 231, 235 (1942)).
check agency activities.21
4
Holmberg v. Holmberg 588 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1999)
Unlike the tax court, the administrative child The statute explicitly grants ALJs "all powers,
support process encompasses an area of the law duties, and responsibilities conferred on judges of
which arises in equity. Family dissolution district court" to handle child support cases.30
remedies, including remedies in child support 725 Arguably, ALJs are *725 even superior in some
decisions, rely on the district court's inherent respects as ALJs are empowered to modify child
equitable powers. Thus, cases involving family support orders granted by district courts.31 Finally,
law fall within the district court's original ALJ child support orders are given the same
jurisdiction.26 The legislature's delegation of an deference as district court orders — they are
area of the district court's original jurisdiction calls appealable by right and reviewed by the court of
for this court's close scrutiny. appeals under an abuse of discretion standard.
26 Cf. Johnston, 280 Minn. at 86, 158 N.W.2d 30 Minn.Stat. § 518.5511, subd. 1(e) (1996).
at 254.
31 In re Lord, 255 Minn. at 372, 97 N.W.2d at
While not binding on this court, we note that the 289 (holding "the executive shall have no
Nebraska Supreme Court has directly addressed power to interfere with the courts in the
the issue of legislative delegation of a court's performance of judicial functions").
equitable powers in Drennen v. Drennen.27 Like Appellants' suggestion that ALJs hear
"different cases" than district court judges
the instant case, Drennen involved a challenge to
in modification hearings because of the
Nebraska's expedited child support system.
changed circumstances has no basis in
Nebraska's expedited child support system
Minnesota's laws, and is contradicted by
mandated that certain child support cases, which
federal law. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1783A (1994)
arise in equity, be channeled into an expedited
administrative process rather than the district Appellants urge us not to follow Drennen and to
court. The Nebraska Supreme Court first stated instead reconsider the separation of powers test set
that the district court has original jurisdiction over forth in Breimhorst v. Beckman. Appellants put
equitable matters, and that the legislature cannot forward a reformulation of the separation of
infringe on the district court's equitable powers test which has as its central principles
jurisdiction.28 It then held that the expedited efficiency, public policy, and the availability of
system was unconstitutional because the system judicial review. We decline to limit Breimhorst as
usurped the district court's original jurisdiction by requested. Such a relaxed test would impinge upon
removing certain child support cases from the the powers conferred upon the judiciary by the
district court's jurisdiction.29 state's constitution. Under appellants' test, it is
hard to discern any limiting principle that would
27 426 N.W.2d 252 (Neb. 1988).
not yield to the legislature's sincere efforts to
28 Id. at 259. address public concerns with a newly designed,
"efficient system" that allows appellate review.
29 Id.
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Holmberg v. Holmberg 588 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1999)
by a duly established court."32 Breimhorst not only (Minn. 1992) (citations omitted);
considered the public policy supporting a Minn.Stat. § 14.64, 14.69 (1998). While
Breimhorst relied on the availability of
comprehensive workers' compensation system in
appellate review by certiorari in upholding
its decision, but also insured adequate judicial
workers' compensation, either route to
oversight of the Workmen's Compensation
review may provide some indication of
Commission's decisions through their
appropriate judicial oversight of an
33
appealability and lack of finality. administrative scheme. However, the
32 Breimhorst, 227 Minn. at 433, 35 N.W.2d availability of judicial review alone will
The indicia that the Breimhorst court utilized in 37 See Meath v. Harmful Substance
determining whether there was adequate judicial Compensation Bd., 550 N.W.2d 275, 284
oversight are neither exclusive nor rigid. Rather, (Minn. 1996) (Anderson, Paul H., J.,
the Breimhorst court's analysis points to the specially concurring); Wulff, 288 N.W.2d at
considering whether a statute violates separation 38 See Minn.Stat. Ch. 176 (1998).
of powers. While supreme court decisions
following Breimhorst have relied, in part, on Under the criteria by which our court has
public policy to affirm legislatively created measured the constitutional validity of specific
administrative schemes,34 they have also been statutory schemes, the administrative child support
shaped by the existence of adequate judicial process raises grave separation of powers
checks on administrative actors, the function concerns. With its creation of the administrative
delegated,35 ALJ decision appealability,36 process, the legislature has delegated to an
726 executive agency the district *726 court's inherent
voluntariness of entry into the administrative
equitable power. This delegation infringes on the
system,37 and whether the legislative delegation is
district court's original jurisdiction. Not only are
comprehensive or piecemeal.38
ALJs given responsibilities and powers
34 See Mack v. City of Minneapolis, 333 comparable to a district court, but ALJs also have
N.W.2d 744, 753 (Minn. 1983). the power to modify district court decisions.
35 See Wulff, 288 N.W.2d at 223.
Finally, although appellants encourage us to rely
on the availability of appellate review to conclude
36 See Mack, 333 N.W.2d at 752; Wulff, 288 that there is adequate judicial supervision of the
N.W.2d at 223. In considering administrative process, the right to appellate
appealability, we consider not only whether review does not provide sufficient judicial
ALJ decisions are appealable, but how they oversight of this mandatory, albeit piecemeal,
are appealable. Appeal to the court of
process. We find their contention particularly
appeals may be granted as a matter of right,
troubling in this instance, as many participants in
using the abuse of discretion standard.
the administrative process lack the resources to
Alternately, appeal of most administrative
mount an appeal.
decisions is taken by writ of certiorari, and
the court determines only whether the Closely aligned with our separation of powers
decision was "arbitrary, oppressive, concerns is our discomfort with the role and
unreasonable, [or] fraudulent." Dietz v.
powers of CSOs in the administrative process.
Dodge County, 487 N.W.2d 237, 239
Courts regulate the practice of law to maintain
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Holmberg v. Holmberg 588 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1999)
discipline over attorneys and to protect the The administrative child support process' current
public.39 "Protection of the public is set at naught structure violates the constitutional constraints on
if laymen who are not subject to court supervision separation of powers for three separate and
are permitted to practice law."40 This court cannot independent reasons. First, the administrative
sacrifice its supervisory powers in the pursuit of process infringes on the district court's original
efficiency. jurisdiction in contravention of Minnesota
Constitution article VI, § 1. Second, ALJ
39 "The power to make the necessary rules
jurisdiction is not inferior to the district court's
and regulations governing the bar was
jurisdiction, as mandated by Minnesota
intended to be vested exclusively in the
Constitution article VI, § 3. Third, the
supreme court, free from the dangers of
administrative process empowers nonattorneys to
encroachment either by the legislative or
executive branches." Sharood v. Hatfield,
engage in the practice of law, infringing on the
296 Minn. 416, 425, 210 N.W.2d 275, 280 court's exclusive power to supervise the practice
(1973). In determining whether a of law. For these three reasons, we hold that the
nonattorney is engaged in the unauthorized administrative process violates separation of
practice of law, the court's abiding concern powers and is unconstitutional. Having reached
is protecting the public interest. Cardinal v. this ruling on separation of powers grounds, we do
Merrill Lynch Realty/Burnet, Inc., 433 not reach the issues of whether the administrative
N.W.2d 864, 868 (Minn. 1988). process violates equal protection and procedural
40 Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 478, due process.
48 N.W.2d 788, 795 (1951).
II.
Under our current statutes, CSOs draft pleadings In nullifying the administrative child support
and appear at hearings to represent the public process, we must turn to the consequences of our
authority without attorney supervision. A review ruling. Prospective application of a ruling is
of the many responsibilities and powers granted to justified in very limited circumstances.42 In
CSOs leads to the inescapable conclusion that determining whether to give our ruling prospective
CSOs are engaging in the practice of law.41 By application, we consider whether the decision
granting the power to practice law to CSOs, over establishes a new principle of law; whether
whom the court does not have disciplinary retroactive application will further or retard the
authority, the legislature has further removed the operation of the holding in question; and whether
administrative process from the judiciary's retroactive application could produce substantial
supervision. 727 inequitable results in individual cases.43 *727
41 In re Discipline of Jorissen, 391 N.W.2d 42 Turner v. IDS Fin. Serv., Inc., 471 N.W.2d
822, 825 (Minn. 1986) (representing party 105, 108 (Minn. 1991).
at workers' compensation hearing and
43 Hoff v. Kempton, 317 N.W.2d 361, 363
drafting court papers without attorney
supervision held to be practice of law). See (Minn. 1982) (relying on Chevron Oil Co.
Cardinal, 433 N.W.2d at 870 (Yetka, J., v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971)).
7
Holmberg v. Holmberg 588 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1999)
also have a negative emotional impact on families brought in good faith, the party from whom fees
whose "final" orders are undone. Such a result are requested has the means to pay the fees, and
would be very disruptive without advancing the the party seeking fees cannot pay the fees.48
separation of powers principle. Therefore, our However, statutes do not apply to the state unless
ruling shall be prospective except as to the parties the state is specifically mentioned or "the words of
before us who shall have their cases decided in the act are so plain, clear, and unmistakable as to
accordance with this opinion.44 leave no doubt as to the intention of the
44 McGuire v. C L Restaurant Inc., 346
legislature."49 As the Marriage Dissolution Award
N.W.2d 605, 614 (Minn. 1984) (new rule of Attorney Fees statute contains no indication
of law applied to parties before court as that the legislature meant it to apply to the state,
well as claims arising after date of we deny respondents' request for attorney fees.
decision). 47 Minn.Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (1998).