SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 244828. October 12, 2020.]

ERNESTO L. CHING, petitioner, vs. CARMELITA S. BONACHITA-

RICABLANCA, respondent.

DECISION

DELOS SANTOS, J : p

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court filed by Ernesto L. Ching (Ching) assailing both the Amended Decision
1 of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City (CA) dated June 29, 2018 and

the Resolution 2 dated January 28, 2019 in CA-G.R. SP No. 07261-MIN which
reversed the Decision of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao in
OMB-M-A-15-0120 3 dated October 13, 2015 finding Carmelita S. Bonachita-
Ricablanca (Ricablanca) guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service and imposes upon her the penalty of
dismissal from service pursuant to Section 10 of Administrative Order (A.O.)
No. 17, amending Rule III of A.O. No. 7 providing for the Rules of Procedure
of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Facts
The case arose after a fire broke out in the Residential Building in
Barangay Poblacion, Sagay, Camiguin owned by Virgilio Bonachita (Virgilio),
father of Ricablanca, on January 29, 2015. Although the fire was
extinguished, Ching claimed that he was traumatized by the incident
because the building is connected to a "Petron Bulilit Station," a fuel station,
near his residence.
The fire incident led to the discovery that Ricablanca, while she was
still a Barangay Kagawad of Poblacion, Sagay, Camiguin, not only authored
Barangay Resolution No. 16, Series of 2012 (Barangay Resolution No. 16) for
the construction of the Petron Bulilit Station operated by her father Virgilio,
who was then a Member of the Sangguniang Bayan, but likewise participated
in the approval of the same resolution.
During the 2013 Elections, Ricablanca ran for office and won a seat as
a Member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Sagay.
On March 26, 2015, Ching filed a Complaint against Ricablanca and
seven (7) other public officials (Ricablanca, et al.) of Sagay, Camiguin before
the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for Grave Misconduct, Gross
Neglect of Duty, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and
for Violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees).
Ricablanca, et al., contended in their individual Counter-Affidavits that
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 they did not violate any law when they authored and/or approved
Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 25 and/or Barangay Resolution No. 16.
At the time the complaint was filed before the Ombudsman, Ricablanca
was already serving as Member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Sagay,
Camiguin.
The Ombudsman Ruling
In a Decision 4 dated October 13, 2015, the Ombudsman found no
substantial evidence to hold the seven (7) other public officials of Sagay,
Camiguin guilty except for Ricablanca who was found guilty of Grave
Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for
authoring Barangay Resolution No. 16, a resolution approving and endorsing
the construction and operation of the Petron Bulilit Station owned by her
father, and for not inhibiting herself from participating in its deliberation and
approval. By not immediately inhibiting herself from the deliberation of
Barangay Resolution No. 16, and worse, eventually approving the same,
Ricablanca created the impression that she intended to advance her own
interest and ensure that the outcome of the deliberation would be favorable
to her.
The Ombudsman imposed upon her the penalty of dismissal from
service pursuant to Section 10 of A.O. No. 17, amending Rule III of A.O. No. 7
providing for the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. In the
event that the penalty of dismissal can no longer be enforced due to her
separation from service, her penalty shall be converted into a fine in an
amount equivalent to her salary for one (1) year, payable to the
Ombudsman, and may be deductible from her retirement benefits, accrued
leave credits, or any receivable from her office.
The administrative charges filed against the seven (7) other public
officials of Sagay, Camiguin were dismissed.
Ricablanca filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 20,
2015. In its Order 5 dated December 23, 2015, the Ombudsman denied
Ricablanca's Motion for Reconsideration.
The Ombudsman did not agree with Ricablanca's contention that the
case against her should be dismissed for being moot and academic by virtue
of Aguinaldo Doctrine (Doctrine of Condonation), because after she authored
Barangay Resolution No. 16 on April 13, 2012, she subsequently ran for
public office in the 2013 Elections and won.
The Ombudsman ruled that the Doctrine of Condonation finds no place
in this case because Ricablanca was not re-elected as Barangay Kagawad of
Poblacion, Sagay, Camiguin in the 2013 Elections, but was elected as
Sangguniang Bayan Member in the said elections.
Aggrieved, Ricablanca filed an Appeal before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 6 dated June 30, 2017, the CA denied the petition and
affirmed the Decision 7 dated October 13, 2015 of the Ombudsman.
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 Preliminarily, as to the procedural issue, the CA did not find any legal
or factual basis to justify Ricablanca's failure to serve a copy of the petition
to Ching and to provide proof of such service. Considering that the service
and proof thereof is a mandatory requirement under the Rules of Court and
absent any compelling reason to do so, the CA found no cogent reason to
relax the application of the Rules of Court in the instant petition. However,
the CA also noted that even if the petition complied with the requirements
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the same must nevertheless be denied
for lack of merit.
The CA found Ricablanca liable for Gross Misconduct and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service. Ricablanca's act of authoring and
approving Barangay Resolution No. 16, which, she admitted, was aimed at
helping her father's gasoline business, undoubtedly constituted Gross
Misconduct. She need not have direct interest in the establishment and
operation of her father's gasoline business in order to be found
administratively liable. Under Section 7 (a) of RA 6713, she is prohibited
from directly or indirectly having financial or material interest in any
transaction requiring the approval of their office. Her authorship and
approval of Barangay Resolution No. 16, knowing that it is for the benefit of
her father and/or brother, indicates her shortsightedness which is so gross
that it cannot be considered as simple misconduct. Moreover, the CA
rejected Ricablanca's claim that simultaneous finding of gross misconduct
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is judicially
proscribed. In Office of the Ombudsman, Field Investigation Office v. Faller, 8
which upheld the ruling of the Ombudsman finding therein respondent,
Faller, guilty of simple misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, the Supreme Court reiterated that acts may
constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as long as
they tarnish the image and integrity of his/her public office, 9 as in this case.
Furthermore, it did not find merit to Ricablanca's claim that the
doctrine of condonation, as held in the landmark case of Pascual v. Hon.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 10 is applicable to her case. It must be
stressed that the application of the doctrine depends on the public officer
being re-elected to the same office for a new term, 11 which is not the case
here. More importantly, the Supreme Court, in Ombudsman Carpio-Morales
v. Court of Appeals , 12 after conducting a judicious examination of our
current laws, abandoned the application of the doctrine of condonation to
administrative cases filed against public officials.
As to the penalty imposed by the Ombudsman, the CA found that there
was a sufficient basis in upholding the same.
For all the foregoing reasons, the CA sustained the findings of the
Ombudsman, holding Ricablanca liable for Grave Misconduct and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and dismissing her from
service as provided under Section 11 of RA 6713.
Feeling aggrieved, Ricablanca filed a Motion for Reconsideration 13
dated July 27, 2017, assailing the above-cited Decision 14 of the CA dated
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 June 30, 2017. She maintained that apart from the general averments of
Ching, there was no substantial evidence to hold her liable for Grave
Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and
that her act of authoring Barangay Resolution No. 16 was not so grave that
would warrant the imposition of the penalty of dismissal.
In her Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, 15 Ricablanca also
contended that her case is similar to that of Almario-Templonuevo v. Office
of the Ombudsman, 16 where the Supreme Court ruled that despite the
abandonment of the condonation doctrine in the case of Carpio-Morales, the
effect of abandonment was made prospective in application.
In an Amended Decision 17 dated June 29, 2018, the CA resolved to
grant the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Ricablanca, and the Decision
dated June 30, 2017, as well as the Decision dated October 13, 2015 were
reconsidered. Effectively, the Order 18 dated December 23, 2015 of the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao was reversed.
The CA found sufficient grounds to reconsider the assailed Decision
and applied the recently decided case of Almario-Templonuevo , wherein the
Supreme Court ruled that the condonation doctrine will apply despite its
abandonment in the case of Carpio-Morales. Even if it involved a public
officer who was elected to a different position, provided that, it is shown that
the body politic electing the person to another office is the same as held in
the case of Giron v. Hon. Executive Secretary Ochoa. 19 Moreover, the
penalty of dismissal from service, which was converted into a fine in an
amount equivalent to her salary for one (1) year was rendered moot and
academic on the basis of the condonation doctrine. Finally, the CA found it
more in accord with substantial justice to overlook Ricablanca's procedural
lapse in the interest of resolving the case on the merits, considering that
there exists a compelling reason to reconsider its judgment.
Ching filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the Amended
Decision. In a Resolution 20 dated January 28, 2019, the CA denied Ching's
Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
Ching filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari 21 under Rule 45 with the
Court.
Our Ruling
Preliminarily, before we move to resolve the substantive issues raised
by Ching in his petition, we first settle the issue on locus standi raised by
Ricablanca. In her Comment, 22 Ricablanca argues that Ching has no legal
standing or legal personality to file the instant petition to assail the Amended
Decision of the CA, he being a mere witness of the government. The real
party aggrieved of the Amended Decision is the Ombudsman, who has not
filed any motion or appeal to the Supreme Court when the Amended
Decision came out.
We do not agree.
The Court rules that Ching has legal standing to file the instant petition
before the Court.
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 In Association of Flood Victims v. Commission on Elections, 23 the Court
defined legal standing as follows:
[Locus standi or legal standing is defined as] a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged. The term "interest" means a material interest, an
interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The
gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.
Further, in Ifurung v. Carpio-Morales, 24 the Court cited Funa v.
Chairman Villar 25 in showing the liberal stance of the Court in interpreting
locus standi:
To have legal standing, therefore, a suitor must show that he
has sustained or will sustain a "direct injury" as a result of a
government action, or have a "material interest" in the issue affected
by the challenged official act. However, the Court has time and again
acted liberally on the locus standi requirements and has accorded
certain individuals, not otherwise directly injured, or with material
interest affected, by a Government act, standing to sue provided a
constitutional issue of critical significance is at stake. The rule on
locus standi is after all a mere procedural technicality in relation to
which the Court, in a catena of cases involving a subject of
transcendental import, has waived, or relaxed, thus allowing non-
traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or
legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have
been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act. In David, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm
before the so-called "non-traditional suitors" may be extended
standing to sue, thusly:
1.) F o r taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;
2.) For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest
in the validity of the election law in question;
3.) For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the
issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled
early; and
4.) For legislators, there must be a claim that the official
action complained of infringes their prerogatives as legislators. 26
It is important to note that this case arose because of a fire incident
that traumatized Ching as his residence is right beside the building that
caught fire, which is also connected to the fuel station. Both the building and
the fuel station are owned by Ricablanca's father, Virgilio. It is through the
effort of Ching that pieces of evidence were gathered which led to the
discovery of the participation of Ricablanca in the authorship, approval, and
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 passing of Barangay Resolution No. 16 which allowed the construction and
operation of the subject fuel station. It was also Ching who filed the
complaint against Ricablanca before the Ombudsman for Grave Misconduct,
Gross Neglect of Duty, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service,
and for violation of RA 6713. As such, he was one of the respondents when
the case was still pending in the CA. These factual antecedents show that
Ching has a material interest in the issue at hand and, therefore, has a legal
standing to file the Petition for Review before the Court.
Ricablanca's reliance to the case of Office of the Ombudsman v.
Gutierrez 27 is flawed. A careful perusal of the said case would reveal that
such case involved a different issue which is the legal standing of the
Ombudsman to validly intervene on appeal in administrative cases that it
has resolved. Such is not the issue here. Considering that Gutierrez was
decided against an entirely different factual milieu, reliance on that case is
misplaced and unjustified.
Condonation Doctrine, when applicable.
The remaining issue involves the application of the doctrine of
condonation, which is a question of law.
In this regard, Ching submits that the doctrine of condonation had been
abandoned on November 10, 2015 through the ruling in Carpio-Morales.
Hence, the administrative case filed by Ching in the case at bar is still
pending with the Ombudsman when the doctrine of condonation was
abandoned. Specifically, it was only on December 23, 2015 when the
Ombudsman finally disposed of the administrative case of Ricablanca —
about a month after the promulgation of Carpio-Morales. As such, since the
case was still pending before the Ombudsman when the doctrine was
abandoned, Ching argued that Ricablanca could no longer invoke
condonation as a defense as it was already declared unconstitutional.
In contrast, Ricablanca averred that her case is similar to that of
Almario-Templonuevo , and invokes the ruling of the Supreme Court that
despite the abandonment of the condonation doctrine in the case of Carpio-
Morales, the effect of abandonment was made prospective in application.
Therefore, she can still raise condonation as a defense because as far as her
case is concerned, the doctrine remains to be a good law.
We agree with Ricablanca.
In the case of Ricablanca, it is undisputed that her acts which is subject
of the administrative case were committed during her previous term as
Barangay Kagawad of Barangay Poblacion in the Municipality of Sagay,
Province of Camiguin in 2012, for allegedly authoring, not inhibiting from the
deliberation of, and participating in the approval of Barangay Resolution No.
16 which approved and endorsed the construction and operation of Petron
Bulilit Station owned by her father. However, in the elections of 2013,
Ricablanca was elected as a Member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of Sagay. Applying then the condonation doctrine, Ricablanca's
subsequent election in 2013 meant that she could no longer be
administratively charged for the complained acts committed in 2012.
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 The condonation doctrine, first enunciated in Pascual v. Provincial
Board of Nueva Ecija 28 and reiterated in Aguinaldo v. Santos, 29 states that
a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed
during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation
of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefor.
The condonation doctrine was thoroughly discussed in the case of
Carpio-Morales where it defined condonation as "[a] victim's express or
implied forgiveness of an offense, [especially] by treating the offender as if
there had been no offense." 30 It also discussed in length the origin of the
doctrine and reviewed its validity in this jurisdiction. The Court in that case
enunciated that:
The condonation doctrine — which connotes this same sense of
complete extinguishment of liability as will be herein elaborated upon
— is not based on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation that
originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial
Board of Nueva Ecija, (Pascual), which was therefore decided
under the 1935 Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since
the time Pascual was decided, the legal landscape has radically
shifted. Again, Pascual was a 1959 case decided under the 1935
Constitution, which dated provisions do not reflect the experience of
the Filipino People under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore,
the plain difference in setting, including, of course, the sheer impact
of the condonation doctrine on public accountability, calls for
Pascual's judicious re-examination.
xxx xxx xxx
Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited
legal provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion that the
doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.
To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust
and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people
at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly
inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's
administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior
term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second
term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode
of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no
constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the
notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of
any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior
term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative
offenses may be condoned by the President in light of Section
19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in
Llamas v. Orbos to apply to administrative offenses[.]
xxx xxx xxx
[I]t would be a violation of the Court's own duty to uphold and defend
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 the Constitution if it were not to abandon the condonation doctrine
now that its infirmities have become apparent. As extensively
discussed, the continued application of the condonation doctrine is
simply impermissible under the auspices of the present Constitution
which explicitly mandates that public office is a public trust and that
public officials shall be accountable to the people at all times. 31
(Emphases and underscoring in the original; citations omitted)
Despite the abandonment of the condonation doctrine in Carpio-
Morales, it must be stressed, however, that the said doctrine still applies in
this case as the effect of the abandonment was made prospective in
application. In Crebello v. Office of the Ombudsman, 32 the Court clarified
that the ruling promulgated in Carpio-Morales on the abandonment of the
doctrine of condonation had become final only on April 12, 2016, and thus,
the abandonment should be reckoned from April 12, 2016.
The prospective application of the ruling in Carpio-Morales was already
reiterated and applied by the Court in several cases. In Almario-
Templonuevo and Giron, condonation doctrine was applied to a situation
where the complained acts of the elected public official, the filing of
administrative case against him and his re-election took place prior to the
abandonment of the aforementioned doctrine in Carpio-Morales. In
Ombudsman v. Vergara , 33 the Court categorically stated that the
abandonment of condonation doctrine is prospective in application which
means that "the same doctrine is still applicable in cases that transpired
prior to the ruling." In ruling so, the Court took note of Carpio-Morales where
it was pointed out that "judicial decisions assume the same authority as a
statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to
the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the
actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those
duty-bound to enforce obedience to them." 34 Thus, in Vergara, the Court
applied the doctrine — considering that the case was instituted prior to the
finality of the Carpio-Morales ruling.
While it is settled that the doctrine of condonation is applied
prospectively, there is diversity of views with regard to the reckoning point
of the Court's limited application of the condonation doctrine.
As aptly pointed out by Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-
Bernabe in her Concurring Opinion, 35 there are three misguided views as to
when condonation should be reckoned. The first view, as contained in the
Ombudsman's Office Circular No. 17 dated May 11, 2016, considers
condonation doctrine inapplicable to all administrative cases that are open
and pending as of April 12, 2016, to wit:
From the date of finality of the Decision on 12 April 2016 and
onwards, the Office of the Ombudsman will no longer give credence
to the condonation doctrine, regardless of when an administrative
infraction was committed, when the disciplinary complaint was filed,
or when the concerned public official was re-elected. In other words,
for [as] long as the administrative case remains open and pending as
of 12 April 2016 and onwards, the Office of the Ombudsman shall no
longer honor the defense of condonation.
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 A second view suggests the date of filing of the complaint as the
reckoning point. As aforementioned, in Vergara, the condonation doctrine
was applied because the case was "instituted prior to" April 12, 2016; while
i n Dator v. Carpio-Morales, 36 the condonation doctrine was held to be no
longer applicable because the case was instituted after such date even
though the misconduct was committed in 2014.
A third view considers the date of commission of the misconduct as the
reckoning point.
In view of the diversity of precedents, and in order to finally clarify and
provide guidance for the bench, the bar, and the public, this Court has
reexamined the question and, after consideration, has arrived at the
conclusion that the proper interpretation is that the condonation is
manifested through re-election, and therefore, the defense of condonation is
no longer available if the re-election happens after April 12, 2016. To
reiterate, Black's Law Dictionary, as cited in Carpio-Morales, defines
condonation as "[a] victim's express or implied forgiveness of an offense,
[especially] by treating the offender as if there had been no offense." 37
Considering that the electorate's act of forgiving a public officer for a
misconduct is done through re-election, the abandonment of the
condonation doctrine should mean that re-elections conducted after April 12,
2016 should no longer have the effect of condoning the public officer's
misconduct. Simply put, albeit by judicial fiat only, it is the act of re-election
which triggers the legal effect of and, to an extent, vests the right to rely on
the defense of condonation.
In this case, since Ricablanca was re-elected during the 2013 Elections
(specifically on May 13, 2013), the doctrine of condonation applies to her. In
sum, for so long as the elective official had already been re-elected prior to
April 12, 2016, he or she may avail of the doctrine of condonation as a valid
defense to the administrative complaint against him/her, as in this case.
Condonation Doctrine will still apply
even if Ricablanca was not elected by
exactly, identically, and exclusively
the sane body politic.
It is also the contention of Ching that the doctrine of condonation
cannot be applied in this case because Ricablanca was not re-elected by the
same body politic/electorate. On the other hand, the latter maintains that
the electorate that elected her as a Sangguniang Bayan Member is wider
than the electorate that elected her as a Barangay Kagawad and her re-
election operates as forgiveness of her constituents.
In Giron, 38 the Court recognized that the condonation doctrine can be
applied to a public officer who was elected to a different position provided
that it is shown that the body politic electing the person to another office is
the same. Thus, the Court ruled:
On this issue, considering the ratio decidendi behind the
doctrine, the Court agrees with the interpretation of the
administrative tribunals below that the condonation doctrine applies
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 to a public official elected to another office. The underlying theory is
that each term is separate from other terms. Thus, in Carpio-Morales ,
the basic considerations are the following: first, the penalty of
removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public
officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct; second, an
elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous
misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor; and
third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to
have known the life and character of candidates, of their right to elect
officers. In this case, it is a given fact that the body politic,
who elected him to another office, was the same . 39 (Emphasis
supplied)
The same ruling was reiterated in the subsequent cases of Almario-
Templonuevo and Vergara.
It is worthy to note that in Giron, Almario-Templonuevo , and Vergara
(all decided by the Court in Division), the Court fell short in categorically
setting the parameters or elements of the words "same body politic." For
certain, the Court did not rule that the doctrine of condonation cannot be
applied to a public officer who was not subsequently elected by
exactly, identically, and exclusively the same body politic . Obviously,
the Court did not expound on these material points due to the fact that the
aforesaid cases involve a scenario where the electorate involved belongs to
exactly, identically, and exclusively the same political geographical unit —
Barangay Chairman Arnaldo A. Cando of Barangay Capri, Novaliches, Quezon
City having been subsequently elected as Kagawad of the same barangay;
Templonuevo as Sangguniang Bayan Member of the Municipality of
Caramoan, Province of Catanduanes who was elected as Vice-Mayor of the
same municipality; and Mayor Vergara of Cabanatuan City re-elected as
Mayor of the same city, respectively.
Accordingly, the Court is confronted with the issue on whether or not
the condonation doctrine is applicable to a public official who is elected to
another office by not exactly, identically, and exclusively the same body
politic. To be specific, the issue before the Court is whether or not the
doctrine of condonation can be applied to a public official (Ricablanca)
elected to an office (Sangguniang Bayan Member) by the electorate
(Municipality of Sagay) which includes the whole body politic (Barangay
Poblacion, Municipality of Sagay) she has served in her previous term (as
Barangay Kagawad).
It is submitted that the answer to the above-mentioned issue is in the
affirmative.
It is imperative to take a look into the ratio decidendi behind the
condonation doctrine, prior to its abandonment.
As explained in Carpio-Morales and as reiterated in Giron, the ratio
decidendi behind the condonation doctrine, can be dissected into three
parts, to wit:
First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond
the term in which the public officer was elected for each term is
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 separate and distinct:
Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are
generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially
true where the constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings
for removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and
disqualification from holding office for the term for which the officer
was elected or appointed. x x x
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other
terms x x x.
Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a
condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the
right to remove him therefor; and
[T]hat the [re-election] to office operates as a condonation of
the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right
to remove him therefor. x x x
Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are
assumed to have known the life and character of candidates,
of their right to elect officers:
As held in Conant vs. Grogan x x x —
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts
done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise
would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their
officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be
assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character,
and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he
had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such
faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the
people. 40 (Original underscoring deleted; emphases supplied)
The ratio decidendi behind the condonation doctrine as discussed in
Carpio-Morales is taken from the 1959 En Banc ruling in Pascual. In another
En Banc 1996 ruling in Salalima v. Guingona, 41 the Court stated that the
condonation doctrine is not only founded on the theory that an official's
re-election expresses the sovereign will of the electorate to forgive or
condone any act or omission constituting a ground for administrative
discipline which was committed during his previous term. The same is also
justified by "sound public policy." The Court held that to rule otherwise
would open the floodgates to exacerbating endless partisan contests
between the re-elected official and his political enemies, who may not stop
to hound the former during his new term with administrative cases for acts
alleged to have been committed during his previous term. His second term
may, thus, be devoted to defending himself in the said cases to the
detriment of public service. This doctrine of forgiveness or condonation
cannot, however, apply to criminal acts which the re-elected official may
have committed during his previous term.
As can be observed from the foregoing, nowhere in the ratio decidendi
behind the condonation doctrine that it requires that there should be a
geographical and numerical exactness of body politic or that the body politic
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 in the previous term should be exactly, identically, and exclusively the same
with that who elected the public official to a new term. What is clear in the
rationale behind the condonation doctrine is that primary consideration is
given to the right of the electorate to elect officers and for the
courts not to overrule the will of the people, and that a public
officer should never be removed for acts done prior to his present
term of office.
The word "same body politic," therefore, as mentioned in Giron,
Almario-Templonuevo, and Vergara which, to note, are all cases decided
a f t e r Carpio-Morales — should not be applied literally, but should be
construed by taking into account the spirit and intent of the condonation
doctrine prior to its abandonment in Carpio-Morales.
Collorarily, the condonation doctrine is a jurisprudential creation that
originated from the 1959 case of Pascual, which was decided under the 1935
Constitution. 42 Section 1, Article II thereof states that "[t]he Philippines is a
democratic and republican State" and "[s]overeignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them." The same provision is
maintained under the present 1987 Constitution. 43 Republicanism, insofar
as it implies the adoption of a representative type of government,
necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular
sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority. 44 Each
time the enfranchised citizen goes to the polls to assert this sovereign will,
that abiding credo of republicanism is translated into living reality. 45 Indeed,
a truly-functioning democracy owes its existence to the people's collective
sovereign will.
In this case, while it may be true that the body politic who voted for
Ricablanca as Sangguniang Bayan Member is not exactly, identically, and
exclusively the same with that who elected her to the previous term as
Barangay Kagawad, the voters thereof, however, were not entirely different.
The voters of Barangay Poblacion maintained its identity as the body politic,
which previously elected Ricablanca as Barangay Kagawad, when it formed
part of the bigger electorate who elected Ricablanca as Sangguniang Bayan
Member of the Municipality of Sagay during the 2013 Elections, being a
fraction thereof as one of its barangays. Hence, the requirement of "same
body politic" as pronounced by the Court in Giron is still compliant as
regards the voters of Barangay Poblacion who belong to the Municipality of
Sagay to which Ricablanca was elected as Sangguniang Bayan Member. The
Court, in applying the condonation doctrine, should consider that the
electorate for the election of Kagawad of Barangay Poblacion is the same
and part of the electorate who participated and elected Ricablanca as
Sangguniang Bayan Member of Sagay. Otherwise stated, condonation still
applies since the electorate who voted Ricablanca as Sangguniang Bayan
Member of Sagay in 2013 included the same body politic (Barangay
Poblacion) whom she has served in her previous term when the alleged
misconduct was committed.
It might not be amiss to point out that it would be too much to stretch
the meaning of the requirement "same body politic" so as to say that it
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 should be required and proven that the elected public official won in the
exact same political unit (but forming part of a bigger body politic who re-
elected him) he has previously served in the previous term. By being elected
by a bigger body politic, he is effectively re-elected by the same body politic
with that he has previously served. The reason is that the bigger body politic
who voted for him or her still chose and designated him to rule over or
represent them, as the case may be, already subsuming the vote of the
smaller body politic.
To reiterate, the meaning of "the same body politic," as mentioned in
the cases of Vergara, Almario-Templonuevo, and Giron, should not be viewed
or interpreted in a limited and restrictive sense. Rather, the same should be
interpreted in conjunction and in consideration with the ratio decidendi
behind the condonation doctrine, prior to its abandonment, which is
primarily about the protection of and respect for the sovereign will of the
electorate to elect their officers. To do otherwise, is to give a myopic
interpretation of the word "same body politic" resulting into absurdity.
Accordingly, as thoroughly explained, condonation doctrine applies to
Ricablanca.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Amended Decision dated
June 29, 2018 and the Resolution dated January 28, 2019 of the Court of
Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City in CA-G.R. SP No. 07261-MIN are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Hernando and Inting, JJ., concur.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., please see concurring opinion.
Baltazar-Padilla, * J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions
PERLAS-BERNABE, J., concurring:
I concur. Having been re-elected by the same body politic prior to the
abandonment of the condonation doctrine on April 12, 2016, 1 respondent
Carmelita S. Bonachita-Ricablanca (Ricablanca) may validly invoke the same
to absolve her of any administrative liability arising from the alleged
infractions committed during her previous term.
To recount, in Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals 2 (Carpio-Morales),
the Court traced the origin of the condonation doctrine and found that it was
merely a "jurisprudential creation" 3 without any constitutional or
statutory anchor. The doctrine was simply lifted from select United States of
America (US) cases and was adopted hook, line, and sinker in the 1959 case
o f Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija 4 (Pascual), and thereafter,
applied in our jurisprudence. As it appears, the propriety of the condonation
doctrine was never seriously questioned before the Court up until the
institution of the Carpio-Morales case on March 25, 2015. Met with the
opportunity to revisit said doctrine, the Court abandoned the doctrine of
condonation after finding that it is not only bereft of any constitutional or
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 statutory basis in this jurisdiction but is also "out of touch from — and
rendered obsolete by — the current legal regime." 5 In particular, the
Court had pertinently ruled that the existence of the condonation doctrine
runs counter to the public accountability provisions of our present
Constitution, 6 viz.:
The foundation of our entire legal system is the
Constitution. It is the supreme law of the land; thus, the
unbending rule is that every statute should be read in light of the
Constitution. Likewise, the Constitution is a framework of a workable
government; hence, its interpretation must take into account the
complexities, realities, and politics attendant to the operation of the
political branches of government.
As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in
1959. Therefore, it was decided within the context of the 1935
Constitution which was silent with respect to public
accountability, or of the nature of public office being a public
trust. x x x Perhaps owing to the 1935 Constitution's silence on
public accountability, and considering the dearth of jurisprudential
rulings on the matter, as well as the variance in the policy
considerations, there was no glaring objection confronting the
Pascual Court in adopting the condonation doctrine that originated
from select US cases existing at that time.
With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in
dealing with public officers underwent a significant change. The new
charter introduced an entire article on accountability of public
officers, found in Article XIII. Section 1 thereof positively recognized,
acknowledged, and declared that "[p]ublic office is a public trust."
Accordingly, "[p]ublic officers and employees shall serve with the
highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and
shall remain accountable to the people."
After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino
People have framed and adopted the 1987 Constitution, which sets
forth in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies in Article II that
"[t]he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service
and take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption." Learning how unbridled power could corrupt public
servants under the regime of a dictator, the Framers put primacy on
the integrity of the public service by declaring it as a constitutional
principle and a State policy. More significantly, the 1987
Constitution strengthened and solidified what has been first
proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by commanding public
officers to be accountable to the people at all times:
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. — Public
officers and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x [T]he concept of public office is a public trust and
the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at
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 all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly
inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's
administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a
prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to
a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election
i s not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is
simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to
support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully
absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done
during a prior term. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate, when
re-electing a local official, are assumed to have done so with
knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or
forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. Suffice
it to state that no such presumption exists in any statute or
procedural rule. Besides, it is contrary to human experience that the
electorate would have full knowledge of a public official's misdeeds.
The Ombudsman correctly points out the reality that most corrupt
acts by public officers are shrouded in secrecy, and concealed from
the public. Misconduct committed by an elective official is easily
covered up, and is almost always unknown to the electorate when
they cast their votes. At a conceptual level, condonation presupposes
that the condoner has actual knowledge of what is to be condoned.
Thus, there could be no condonation of an act that is unknown. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to
sustain the condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. As can be seen
from this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from one class
of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from —
and now rendered obsolete by — the current legal regime. In
consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the
condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual, and affirmed in
the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo [v. Santos , 287 Phil.
851 (1992)], Salalima [v. Guingona, Jr. , 326 Phil. 847 (1996)], Mayor
Garcia [v. Mojica , 372 Phil. 892 (1999)], and Governor Garcia, Jr. [v.
Court of Appeals, 604 Phil. 677 (2009)] which were all relied upon by
the [Court of Appeals]. 7 (Emphases and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)
Nevertheless, the Court declared the abandonment to be prospective
in application on the basis of Article 8 of the Civil Code, which states that
judicial decisions applying this doctrine became, prior to its abandonment,
"part of the legal system of the Philippines" such that persons were bound to
abide by it, 8 viz.:
It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment
of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in application
for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system
of the Philippines. Unto this Court devolves the sole authority to
interpret what the Constitution means, and all persons are bound to
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 follow its interpretation. As explained in De Castro v. Judicial Bar
Council [632 Phil. 657 (2010)]:
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a
statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned,
necessarily become, to the extent that they are
applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations,
not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of
those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them. 9
(Emphasis supplied)
In order to afford due process to persons who relied on
prevailing jurisprudence at that time in good faith, as well as
recognize the practical implications of acts already done in the
interim based thereon, the Court thus gave "prospective application" to
the abandonment.
One of the two (2) main issues in the present case is the actual
reckoning point of the Court's limited application of the condonation doctrine
in light of its prospective abandonment in Carpio-Morales, which attained
finality on April 12, 2016. 10
As the ponencia correctly holds, the proper point to reckon the
doctrine's limited application is no other than at that time when the
elective official was re-elected to a new term (in this case, during the
May 13, 2013 elections). As consistently evinced by the jurisprudence on the
doctrine of condonation, condonation of prior administrative liability by the
will of people is triggered by the fact of re-election. Thus, the time when
the alleged misconduct was committed (in this case, in 2012) as well as the
time of the filing of the administrative case (in this case, on March 26, 2015)
are not technically material in reckoning condonation. Verily, for as long
as the elective official had already been re-elected prior to April 12,
2016, he/she may avail of the doctrine of condonation as a valid
defense to the administrative complaint against him/her for acts
committed during a prior term.
In this regard, I deem it apt to point out that there are three (3)
misguided views as to when condonation should be reckoned.
The first view, as contained in the Office of the Ombudsman's Office
Circular No. 17 dated May 11, 2016, considers the condonation doctrine
inapplicable to all administrative cases that are open and pending as of April
12, 2016, to wit:
From the date of finality of the Decision on 12 April 2016 and
onwards, the Office of the Ombudsman will no longer give credence
to the condonation doctrine, regardless of when an administrative
infraction was committed, when the disciplinary complaint was filed,
or when the concerned public official was re-elected. In other words,
for [as] long as the administrative case remains open and pending as
of 12 April 2016 and onwards, the Office of the Ombudsman shall no
longer honor the defense of condonation.
A second view suggests the date of filing of the complaint as the
reckoning point. In Ombudsman v. Vergara 11 (Vergara), the condonation
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 doctrine was applied because the case was "instituted prior to" April 12,
2016; while in Dator v. Carpio-Morales, 12 the condonation doctrine was held
to be no longer applicable because the case was instituted after such date
even though the misconduct was committed in 2014.
A third view considers the date of commission of the misconduct as the
reckoning point.
However, as already discussed above, the proper interpretation is that
the condonation is manifested through re-election, and therefore, the
defense of condonation is no longer available if the re-election happens after
April 12, 2016. Black's Law Dictionary, as cited in Carpio-Morales, defines
condonation as "[a] victim's express or implied forgiveness of an offense,
[especially] by treating the offender as if there had been no offense." 13
Thus, albeit by judicial fiat only, it is the act of re-election which triggers the
legal effect of and, to an extent, vests the right to rely on the defense of
condonation. Accordingly, considering that the electorate's act of
forgiving a public officer for a misconduct is done through re-
election, the abandonment of the condonation doctrine should
mean that a re-election conducted after April 12, 2016 should no
longer have the effect of condoning the public officer's misconduct
for a previous term.
Likewise, I express my concurrence with the ponencia's holding that
condonation may apply in favor of Ricablanca despite the fact that she was
not re-elected by exactly the same body politic which previously elected her
as Barangay Kagawad of Barangay Poblacion, Sagay, Camiguin. There is no
gainsaying that Barangay Poblacion forms part of the larger political unit of
the Municipality of Sagay, Camiguin. 14 Thus, since the barangay squarely
falls under the municipality's geographical division, the ponencia correctly
ruled that Ricablanca was effectively elected by the same electorate. Verily,
the expression of the will of Barangay Poblacion's constituents is already
subsumed by Ricablanca's election by the constituents of a political unit that
is not only larger but more importantly, encompasses Barangay Poblacion.
In so ruling, this Court is not adding any new legal nuance to the
abandoned condonation doctrine. In our jurisdiction, condonation, prior to its
abandonment, has always been premised on the theory that an elective
official's re-election cuts off the right to remove him for an administrative
offense committed during a prior term. 15 Accordingly, a public officer should
never be removed for acts done prior to his present term of office because to
do otherwise would deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. 16
The condonation doctrine cases prior to Carpio-Morales never
exclusively restricted the condonation's application to a re-election by
exactly the same body politic.
In this relation, the ponencia aptly highlights the cases of Giron v.
Ochoa 17 (Giron), Templonuevo v. Ombudsman 18 (Templonuevo), and
Vergara 19 where the statement "same body politic" was first uttered.
However, it must be borne in mind that not only were all these cases
decided after Carpio-Morales, but also the main issues raised therein
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 pertained to whether or not the condonation doctrine will apply to a public
official who was re-elected, albeit in a different position. They did not involve
— as in this case — an instance where an official was elected by a larger
body politic comprising a smaller unit which had first voted the public officer.
Giron involved a former Barangay Chairman who was "re-elected" as
Barangay Kagawad of the same barangay. In that case, the Court ruled, inter
alia, that as stated in Carpio-Morales, one of the considerations for the
condonation doctrine is that the "courts may not deprive the electorate who
are assumed to have known the life and character of the candidates, of their
right to elect officers." 20 Proceeding from such consideration, the Court held
that the condonation doctrine would apply to therein subject public official,
as "it is a given fact that the body politic, who elected him to another office,
was the same." 21
Notably, Templonuevo (which involved a former Sangguniang Bayan
Member who was elected as Vice-Mayor of the same municipality), Vergara
(which involved a Mayor who was thereafter elected as Vice-Mayor of the
same city), as well as the 2019 case of Aguilar v. Benlot 22 (which involved
barangay officials who were re-elected to the same positions), appear to
have misquoted Giron as all of them held that condonation would apply to a
public officer who was elected to a different position, "provided that it is
shown that the body politic electing the person to another office is the
same." 23 Again, no such restriction was intended by Giron, and besides, it is
my view that no new substantive qualification should be made to the
condonation doctrine after it had already been abandoned in the Carpio-
Morales case.
If at all, these cases only state a general rule as it is common in
condonation cases that it is the same body politic who re-elects the public
officer. However, this does not — as it should not — foreclose scenarios
where the essence of condonation, as known in our existing case law, is
preserved. To reiterate, what remains significant is that the people
chose to forgive the misdeeds committed by the elective official
during a previous term. This forgiveness is manifested through the
official's re-election for a new term and hence, cuts off the right to
remove him for an administrative offense committed during a prior
term. This is the essence of condonation which was recognized by the Court
prior to Carpio-Morales where the doctrine was prospectively abandoned.
In this case, the recognized essence of condonation is merely
preserved since the same body politic who first re-elected Ricablanca forms
part of the larger body politic who elected her anew. Indeed, through such
re-election, she obtained not only the forgiveness of the people she
supposedly slighted in her previous term as Barangay Kagawad, but also the
confidence of more people in choosing her to serve as Municipal Councilor.
In fine, I vote to DENY the present petition.

Footnotes
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 * On leave.

1. Penned by Associate Justice Perpetua T. Atal-Paño, with Associate Justices

Romulo V. Borja and Oscar V. Badelles, concurring; rollo, pp. 130-135.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Oscar V. Badelles, with Associate Justices Evalyn M.

Arellano-Morales and Florencio M. Mamauag, Jr., concurring; id. at 167-169.

3. Also referred to as "OMB-M-A-15-012" in some parts of the rollo.

4. Penned by Graft and Investigation and Prosecution Officer Randolph C.
Cadiogan, Jr., reviewed by Director for Evaluation and Investigation Bureau-A
Maria Iluminada S. Lapid-Viva and approved by Deputy Ombudsman for
Mindanao Rodolfo M. Elman; rollo, pp. 170-180.
5. Id. at 181-185.

6. Penned by Associate Justice Perpetua T. Atal-Paño, with Associate Justices

Romulo V. Borja and Oscar V. Badelles, concurring; id. at 214-227.
7. Id. at 170-180.

8. 786 Phil. 467 (2016).

9. Id. at 482, citing Avenido v. Civil Service Commission , 576 Phil. 654, 662 (2008).
10. 106 Phil. 466 (1959).

11. Rollo , p. 226.

12. 772 Phil. 672 (2015).

13. Rollo , pp. 228-234.

14. Id. at 214-227.

15. Id. at 235-240.

16. 811 Phil. 686 (2017).

17. Rollo , pp. 130-135.

18. Id. at 181-185.

19. 806 Phil. 624 (2017).

20. Penned by Associate Justice Oscar V. Badelles, with Associate Justices Evalyn
M. Arellano-Morales and Florencio M. Mamauag, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 55-
57.

21. Id. at 61-108.

22. Id. at 244-253.

23. 740 Phil. 472, 481 (2014), citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,
392 Phil. 618, 632-633 (2000).
24. G.R. No. 232131, April 24, 2018, 862 SCRA 684.

25. 686 Phil. 571 (2012).

26. Ifurung v. Carpio-Morales , supra note 24, at 704.

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 27. 811 Phil. 389 (2017).

28. Supra note 10.

29. 287 Phil. 851 (1992).

30. Ombudsman Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, supra note 12, at 754.

31. Id. at 755, 760, 769-770, and 778.

32. G.R. No. 232325, April 10, 2019.

33. 822 Phil. 361 (2017).

34. Ombudsman Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, supra note 12, at 775, citing
De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, n 632 Phil. 657, 686 (2010).
35. See Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe,
pp. 4-5.

36. G.R. No. 237742, October 8, 2018.

37. Ombudsman Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, supra note 12, at 754.

38. Supra note 19.

39. Id. at 634.

40. Ombudsman Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, supra note 12, at 761-762.

41. 326 Phil. 947 (1996).

42. Ombudsman Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, supra note 12, at 755.

43. Art. II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies. —

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. — Sovereignty

resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.
44. Moya v. Del Fierro, 69 Phil. 199, 204 (1939).

45. People v. San Juan , 130 Phil. 515, 522 (1968).

PERLAS-BERNABE, J., concurring:

1. See Crebello v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 232325, April 10, 2019.

2. 772 Phil. 672 (2015).

3. See id. at 755; emphasis supplied.

4. 106 Phil. 466 (1959). See also Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals , id. at 755-
756, to wit:

[T]he controversy [in Pascual] posed a novel issue — that is, whether or not
an elective official may be disciplined for a wrongful act committed by him
during his immediately preceding term of office.

As there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time , the Court,
in Pascual, resorted to American authorities and "found that cases on the
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 matter are conflicting due in part, probably, to differences in statutes and
constitutional provisions, and also, in part, to a divergence of views with
respect to the question of whether the subsequent election or appointment
condones the prior misconduct." Without going into the variables of these
conflicting views and cases, it proceeded to state that:

The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline toward the rule denying the
right to remove one from office because of misconduct during a prior term,
to which we fully subscribe. (Emphasis supplied)
5. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals , id. at 775.

6. See id. at 772.

7. Id. at 765-775; citations omitted.

8. See id. at 775; citations omitted.

9. Id.
10. See Crebello v. Ombudsman, supra note 1.

11. 822 Phil. 361 (2017).

12. G.R. No. 237742, October 8, 2018.

13. Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Ed., p. 315.

14. See ponencia, p. 15.

15. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals , supra note 2, at 764. In Carpio-Morales , the
Court dissected the rationale in Pascual in this wise: (1) the penalty of
removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer
was elected for each term is separate and distinct; (2) an elective official's
re-election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting
the right to remove him therefor; (3) courts may not deprive the electorate,
who are assumed to have known the life and character of candidates, of their
right to elect officers. (See id. at 760-761. See also Aguinaldo v. Santos, 287
Phil. 851, 857-858 [1992].)

16. See Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, supra note 4, at 471-472;
emphases supplied. See also Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., wherein the Court
stated that the condonation prevented the elective official from being
hounded by administrative cases filed by his political rivals "during [a] new
term." (326 Phil. 847, 921 [1996].)

17. 806 Phil. 624 (2017).

18. 811 Phil. 686 (2017).

19. Supra note 11.

20. Giron v. Ochoa, supra note 17, at 634.

21. Id.
22. G.R. No. 232806, January 21, 2019.

23. See Templonuevo v. Ombudsman, supra note 18, at 699; Ombudsman v.

Vergara, supra note 11, at 379; and Aguilar v. Benlot, id.
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 n Note from the Publisher: Written as "prison mayor" in the original document.

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