Republic Vs Serrano
Republic Vs Serrano
237428
MAY 11 2018
R E S O L U T I O N
TIJAM, J.:
The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the
Judicial and Bar Council is directed to commence the application and nomination
process.
This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action from the
Court.
SO ORDERED.2
2. Respondent’s Ad Cautelam Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply (to the
Show Cause Order dated 11 May 2018).
Respondent claims denial of due process because her case was allegedly not heard
by an impartial tribunal. She reiterates that the six (6) Justices ought to have
inhibited themselves on the grounds of actual bias, of having personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts, and of having acted as a material witness in the matter
in controversy. Respondent also argues denial of due process when the Court
supposedly took notice of extraneous matters as corroborative evidence and when
the Court based its main Decision on facts without observing the mandatory
procedure for reception of evidence.
She reiterates her arguments that the Court is without jurisdiction to oust an
impeachable officer through quo warranto; that the official acts of the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC) and the President involves political questions that cannot be
annulled absent any allegation of grave abuse of discretion; that the petition
for quo warranto is time-barred; and that respondent was and is a person of proven
integrity.
By way of Comment, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), seeks a denial of respondent's motion for
reconsideration for being proforma. In any case, the OSG argues that
respondent's motion lacks merit as there was no denial of due process and that quo
warranto is the appropriate remedy to oust an ineligible impeachable officer. The
OSG adds that the issue of whether respondent is a person of proven integrity is
justiciable considering that the decision-making powers of the JBC are limited by
judicially discoverable standards. Undeviating from its position, the OSG maintains
that the petition is not time-barred as Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court
does not apply to the State and that the peculiar circumstances of the instant
case preclude the strict application of the prescriptive period.
Respondent also harps on the alleged bias on the part of the six (6) Justices and
that supposedly, their failure to inhibit themselves from deciding the instant
petition amounts to a denial of due process.
Respondent's contentions were merely a rehash of the issues already taken into
consideration and properly resolved by the Court. To reiterate, mere imputation of
bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is
without basis. Acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice has
to be shown.3 Verily, for bias and prejudice to be considered sufficient
justification for the inhibition of a Member of this Court, mere suspicion is not
enough.
For respondent's information, the data were gathered pursuant to the Court En
Bane’s Resolution dated March 20, 2018 wherein the Clerk of Court En Banc and
the JBC, as custodian and repositories of the documents submitted by respondent,
were directed to provide the Court with documents pertinent to respondent's
application and appointment as an Associate Justice in 2010 and as Chief Justice of
the Court in 2012 for the purpose of arriving at a judicious, complete, and efficient
resolution of the instant case. In the same manner, the "corroborative evidence"
referred to by respondent simply refers to respondent's acts and representations
ascertainable through an examination of the documentary evidence appended by
both parties to their respective pleadings as well as their representations during
the Oral Argument. Reference to respondent's subsequent acts committed during
her incumbency as Chief Justice, on the other hand, are plainly matters of public
record and already determined by the House of Representatives as constituting
probable cause for impeachment.
II
The Court reaffirms its authority to decide the instant quo warranto action. This
authority is expressly conferred on the Supreme Court by the Constitution under
Section 5, Article VIII which states that:
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
Section 5 of Article VIII does not limit the Court's quo warranto jurisdiction only
to certain public officials or that excludes impeachable officials therefrom.
In Sarmiento v. Mison, 4 the Court ruled:
The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of relatively clear
provisions in the Constitution. In cases like this, we follow what the Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice (later, Chief Justice) Jose Abad Santos stated in Gold Creek
Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez, that:
As the Court pointed out in its Decision, this is not the first time the Court took
cognizance of a quo warranto petition against an impeachable officer. In the
consolidated cases of Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo7 and Estrada v. Desierto, 8 the
Court assumed jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition that challenged Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo's title to the presidency.
Arguing that the aforesaid cases cannot serve as precedent for the Court to take
cognizance of this case, respondent makes it appear that they involved a totally
different issue, one that concerned Joseph E. Estrada's immunity from suit,
specifically: "Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition
precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and
on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is immune from
criminal prosecution."9
The argument fails to persuade. Estrada was dismissed not because the Court had
no jurisdiction over the quo warranto petition but because Estrada's challenge to
Macapagal-Arroyo's presidency had no merit. In ruling upon the merits of
Estrada's quo warranto petition, the Court has undeniably exercised its
jurisdiction under Section 5(1) of Article VIII. Thus, Estrada clearly demonstrates
that the Court's quo warranto jurisdiction extends to impeachable officers.
Quo warranto and impeachment are two distinct proceedings, although both may
result in the ouster of a public officer. Strictly speaking, quo warranto grants the
relief of "ouster", while impeachment affords "removal."
The OSG 's quo warranto petition challenged respondent's right and title to the
position of Chief Justice. He averred that in failing to regularly disclose her
assets, liabilities and net worth as a member of the career service prior to her
appointment as an Associate Justice of the Court, respondent could not be said to
possess the requirement of proven integrity demanded of every aspiring member
of the Judiciary. The OSG thus prayed that respondent's appointment as Chief
Justice be declared void.
Clearly, the OSG questioned the respondent's eligibility for appointment as Chief
Justice and sought to invalidate such appointment. The OSG's petition, therefore,
is one for quo warranto over which the Court exercises original jurisdiction.
As the Court previously held, "where the dispute is on the eligibility to perform
the duties by the person sought to be ousted or disqualified a quo warranto is the
proper action." 16
Respondent harps on the supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution for
impeachable officers to be removed only through impeachment. 17 However, a
circumspect examination of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission will reveal that the framers presumed that the impeachable officers
had duly qualified for the position. Indeed, the deliberations which respondent
herself cited 18 showed that the framers did not contemplate a situation where the
impeachable officer was unqualified for appointment or election.
The Court is not convinced. The argument, to begin with, acknowledges that the
Constitution in fact allows quo warranto actions against impeachable officers,
albeit respondent limits them to the President and Vice-President. This admission
refutes the very position taken by respondent that all impeachable officials cannot
be sued through quo warranto because they belong to a "privileged class" of
officers who can be removed only through impeachment.25 To be sure, Lecaroz, etc.
did not distinguish between elected and appointed impeachable officers.
Furthermore, that the Constitution does not show a counterpart provision to
paragraph 7 of Section 4, Article VII for members of this Court or the
Constitutional Commissions does not mean that quo warranto cannot extend to non-
elected impeachable officers. The authority to hear quo warranto petitions against
appointive impeachable officers emanates from Section 5(1) of Article VIII which
grants quo warranto jurisdiction to this Court without qualification as to the class
of public officers over whom the same may be exercised.
Respondent argues that Section 5(1) of Article VIII is not a blanket authority,
otherwise paragraph 7 of Section 4, Article VII would be "superfluous."
Superfluity, however, is not the same as inconsistency. Section 4, Article VII is
not repugnant to, and clearly confirms, the Court's quo warranto jurisdiction under
Section 5(1) of Article VIII. Respondent herself has not alleged any
irreconcilability in these provisions.
Respondent's insistence that she could not be removed from office except through
impeachment is predicated on Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution. It reads:
Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed
from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or
betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed
from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. (Emphasis ours)
By its plain language, however, Section 2 of Article XI does not preclude a quo
warranto action questioning an impeachable officer's qualifications to assume
office. These qualifications include age, citizenship and professional experience -
matters which are manifestly outside the purview of impeachment under the
above-cited provision.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in
favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one
which may make the words idle and nugatory. 36 (Citations omitted)
This construction allows all three provisions to stand together and to give effect
to the clear intent of the Constitution to address not only the impeachable
offenses but also the issue of qualifications of public officers, including
impeachable officers.
To illustrate this, the Court cited the requirement that the impeachable officer
must be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. We explained that if it turns out
that the impeachable officer is in fact of foreign nationality, respondent's
argument will prevent this Court from inquiring into this important qualification
that directly affects the officer's ability to protect the interests of the State.
Unless convicted of an impeachable offense, the officer will continue in office
despite being clearly disqualified from holding it. We stressed that this could not
have been the intent of the framers of the Constitution.
Respondent, however, contends that the above-cited defect will actually constitute
a ground for impeachment because the appointee's continued exercise of public
functions despite knowledge of his foreign nationality amounts to a culpable
violation of the Constitution.
The argument is untenable. Citizenship is a qualification issue which this Court has
the authority to resolve. Thus, in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Exec. Sec.
Ermita,37 where the appointment of Sandiganbayan Justice Gregory S. Ong (Ong)
to this Court was sought to be annulled for the latter's supposed failure to comply
with the citizenship requirement under the Constitution, We stated that:
Third, as to the proper forum for litigating the issue of respondent Ong's
qualification for membership of this Court. This case is a matter of primordial
importance involving compliance with a Constitutional mandate. As the body
tasked with the determination of the merits of conflicting claims under the
Constitution, the Court is the proper forum for resolving the issue, even as
the JBC has the initial competence to do so.38 (Citation omitted and emphasis
ours)
The title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by quo
warranto proceedings; and it cannot be assailed collaterally, even
through mandamus or a motion to annul or set aside order. In Nacionalista Party v.
De Vera, the Court ruled that prohibition does not lie to inquire into the validity of
the appointment of a public officer.
It thus bears to reiterate that even the PET Rules expressly provide for the
remedy of election protest. Following respondent's theory that an impeachable
officer can be removed only through impeachment means that a President or Vice-
President against whom an election protest has been filed can demand for the
dismissal of the protest on the ground that it can potentially cause his/her removal
from office through a mode other than by impeachment. To sustain respondent's
position is to render election protests under the PET Rules nugatory. The
Constitution could not have intended such absurdity since fraud and irregularities
in elections cannot be countenanced, and the will of the people as reflected in their
votes must be determined and respected.
III
Much noise and hysteria have been made that a sitting Chief Justice can only be
removed by impeachment and that quo warranto is an improper remedy not
sanctioned by the Constitution. The wind of disinformation was further fanned by
respondent who claimed that her ouster was orchestrated by the President. This
campaign of misinformation attempted to conceal and obfuscate the fact that the
main issue in the petition which the Court is tasked to resolve is the qualification
of respondent.
The Senate Resolution also appears to have been drafted, signed by some
Senators, and interpellated on while respondent's motion for reconsideration is
still pending consideration by the Court. While the concerned Members of the
Senate insist on non-encroachment of powers, the Senate Resolution itself tends
to influence, if not exert undue pressure on, the Court on how it should resolve the
pending motion for reconsideration. The importance and high regard for the
institution that is the Senate is undisputed. But the Court, in the discharge of its
Constitutional duty, is also entitled to the same degree of respect and deference.
At any rate, and with due regard to the Members of the Senate, We emphasize
that the judicial determination of actual controversies presented before the
courts is within the exclusive domain of the Judiciary. "The separation of powers
doctrine is the backbone of our tripartite system of government. It is implicit in
the manner that our Constitution lays out in separate and distinct Articles the
powers and prerogatives of each co-equal branch of government." 51 Thus, the act of
some of the Senators questioning the Court's judicial action is clearly an
unwarranted intrusion to the Court's powers and mandate.
To disabuse wandering minds, there is nothing violative or intrusive of the Senate's
power to remove impeachable officials in the main Decision. In fact, in the said
assailed Decision, We recognized that the Senate has the sole power to try and
decide all cases of impeachment. We have extensively discussed therein that the
Court merely exercised its Constitutional duty to resolve a legal question referring
to respondent's qualification as a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. We also
emphasized that this Court's action never intends to deprive the Congress of its
mandate to make a determination on impeachable officials' culpability for acts
committed while in office. We even explained that impeachment and quo
warranto may proceed independently and simultaneously, albeit a ruling of removal
or ouster of the respondent in one case will preclude the same ruling in the other
due to legal impossibility and mootness.
IV
The plain issue in the instant case is whether respondent is eligible to occupy the
position of Chief Justice. To determine whether or not respondent is eligible, the
primordial consideration is whether respondent met the requisite Constitutional
requirements for the position. Questions on eligibility therefore present a
justiciable issue, which can be resolved by juxtaposing the facts with the
Constitution, as well as pertinent laws and jurisprudence. In Kilosbayan
Foundation,54 the Court affirmed its jurisdiction to resolve the issue on the
qualification for membership of this Court as the body tasked with the
determination of the merits of conflicting claims under the Constitution, even when
the JBC has the initial competence to do so. 55
True enough, constitutionally committed to the JBC is the principal function of
recommending appointees to the Judiciary. The function to recommend appointees
carries with it the concomitant duty to screen applicants therefor. The JBC's
exercise of its recommendatory function must nevertheless conform with the basic
premise that the appointee possesses the non-negotiable qualifications prescribed
by the Constitution. While the JBC enjoys a certain leeway in screening aspiring
magistrates, such remains to be tightly circumscribed by the Constitutional
qualifications for aspiring members of the Judiciary. 56 These Constitutional
prerequisites are therefore deemed written into the rules and standards which the
JBC may prescribe in the discharge of its primary function. The JBC cannot go
beyond or less than what the Constitution prescribes.
The surrender to the JBC of the details as to how these qualifications are to be
determined is rendered necessary and in keeping with its recommendatory function
which is nevertheless made expressly subject to the Court's exercise of
supervision.
As an incident of its power of supervision over the JBC, the Court has the
authority to insure that the JBC performs its duties under the Constitution and
complies with its own rules and standards. Indeed, supervision is an active power
and implies the authority to inquire into facts and conditions that renders the
power of supervision real and effective. 57 Under its power of supervision, the
Court has ample authority to look into the processes leading to respondent's
nomination for the position of Chief Justice on the face of the Republic's
contention that respondent was ineligible to be a candidate to the position to begin
with.
To re-align the issue in this petition, the Republic charges respondent of unlawfully
holding or exercising the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The
contents of the petition pose an attack to respondent's authority to hold or
exercise the position. Unmoving is the rule that title to a public office may not be
contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. 58 As it cannot be assailed
collaterally, certiorari is an infirm remedy for this purpose. It is for this reason
that the Court previously denied a certiorari and prohibition petition which sought
to annul appointment to the Judiciary of an alleged naturalized citizen. 59
Tellingly also, the rules on quo warranto do not require that the recommending or
appointing authority be impleaded as a necessary party, much less makes the
nullification of the act of the recommending authority a condition precedent
before the remedy of quo warranto can be availed of. The JBC itself did not
bother to intervene in the instant petition.
Under Section 6, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, when the action is against a person
for usurping a public office, position or franchise, it is only required that, if there
be a person who claims to be entitled thereto, his or her name should be set forth
in the petition with an averment of his or her right to the office, position or
franchise and that the respondent is unlawfully in possession thereof. All persons
claiming to be entitled to the public office, position or franchise may be made
parties and their respective rights may be determined in the same quo
warranto action. The appointing authority, or in this case the recommending
authority which is the JBC, is therefore not a necessary party in a quo
warranto action.
In any case, the rules on quo warranto vests upon the Court ancillary jurisdiction to
render such further judgment as "justice requires." 63 Indeed, the doctrine of
ancillary jurisdiction implies the grant of necessary and usual incidental powers
essential to effectuate its jurisdiction and subject to existing laws and
constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has power to do all
things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the
scope of its jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its judgments and
mandates. 64 Accordingly, "demands, matters or questions ancillary or incidental to,
or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above principles, may be
taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid
of its authority over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be
called on to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, would
not be within its cognizance."65
V
This Court had likewise amply laid down the legal and factual bases for its ruling
against the dismissal of the instant petition on the ground of prescription. Our
ruling on this matter is anchored upon the very purpose of such prescriptive period
as consistently held by this Court for decades and also upon consideration of the
unique underlying circumstances in this case which cannot be ignored.
In addition to the catena of cases cited in the assailed Decision, the Court,
in Madrigal v. Prov. Gov. Lecaroz, 66 exhaustively explained the rationale behind the
prescriptive period:
"x x x[W]e note that in actions of quo warranto involving right to an office, the
action must be instituted within the period of one year. This has been the law in
the island since 1901, the period having been originally fixed in Section 216 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190). We find this provision to be an expression
of policy on the part of the State that persons claiming a right to an
office of which they are illegally dispossessed should immediately take steps
to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a period of one
year, they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by
abandonment. There are weighty reasons of public policy and convenience that
demand the adoption of a similar period for persons claiming rights to positions in
the civil service. There must be stability in the service so that public business
may [not] be unduly retarded; delays in the statement of the right to
positions in the service must be discouraged. The following considerations as to
public officers, by Mr. Justice Bengzon, may well be applicable to employees in the
civil service:
And there is good justification for the limitation period; it is not proper that the
title to public office should be subjected to continued uncertain[t]y, and
the peoples' interest require that such right should be determined as speedily
as practicable.'
The long line of cases decided by this Court since the l 900's, which specifically
explained the spirit behind the rule providing a prescriptive period for the filing of
an action for quo warranto, reveals that such limitation can be applied only against
private individuals claiming rights to a public office, not against the State.
Indeed, there is no proprietary right over a public office. Hence, a claimed right
over a public office may be waived. In fact, even Constitutionally-protected rights
may be waived. Thus, We have consistently held that the inaction of a person
claiming right over a public office to assert the same within the prescriptive period
provided by the rules, may be considered a waiver of such right. This is where the
difference between a quo warranto filed by a private individual as opposed to one
filed by the State through the Solicitor General lies. There is no claim of right
over a public office where it is the State itself, through the Solicitor General,
which files a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the person
holding the public office. As We have emphasized in the assailed Decision, unlike
Constitutionally-protected rights, Constitutionally-required qualifications for a
public office can never be waived either deliberately or by mere passage of time.
While a private individual may, in proper instances, be deemed to have waived his or
her right over title to public office and/or to have acquiesced or consented to the
loss of such right, no organized society would allow, much more a prudent court
would consider, the State to have waived by mere lapse of time, its right to uphold
and ensure compliance with the requirements for such office, fixed by no less than
the Constitution, the fundamental law upon which the foundations of a State stand,
especially so when the government cannot be faulted for such lapse.
On another point, the one-year prescriptive period was necessary for the
government to be immediately informed if any person claims title to an office so
that the government may not be faced with the predicament of having to pay two
salaries, one for the person actually holding it albeit illegally, and another to the
person not rendering service although entitled to do so. It would thus be absurd to
require the filing of a petition for quo warranto within the one-year period for
such purpose when it is the State itself which files the same not for the purpose
of determining who among two private individuals are entitled to the office. Stated
in a different manner, the purpose of the instant petition is not to inform the
government that it is facing a predicament of having to pay two salaries; rather,
the government, having learned of the predicament that it might be paying an
unqualified person, is acting upon it head-on.
Most importantly, urgency to resolve the controversy on the title to a public office
to prevent a hiatus or disruption in the delivery of public service is the ultimate
consideration in prescribing a limitation on when an action for quo warranto may be
instituted. However, it is this very same concern that precludes the application of
the prescriptive period when it is the State which questions the eligibility of the
person holding a public office and not merely the personal interest of a private
individual claiming title thereto. Again, as We have stated in the assailed Decision,
when the government is the real party in interest and asserts its rights, there can
be no defense on the ground of laches or limitation, 68 otherwise, it would be
injurious to public interest if this Court will not act upon the case presented
before it by the Republic and merely allow the uncertainty and controversy
surrounding the Chief Justice position to continue.
Worthy to mention is the fact that this is not the first time that this Court
precluded the application of the prescriptive period in filing a petition for quo
warranto. In Cristobal v. Melchor,69 the Court considered certain exceptional
circumstances attending the case, which took it out of the rule on the one-year
prescriptive period. Also, in Agcaoili v. Suguitan, 70 the Court considered, among
others, therein petitioner's good faith and the injustice that he suffered due to
his forcible ouster from office in ruling that he is not bound by the provision on
the prescriptive period in filing his action for quo warranto to assert his right to
the public office. When the Court in several cases exercised liberality in the
application of the statute of limitations in favor of private individuals so as not to
defeat their personal interests on a public position, is it not but proper, just,
reasonable, and more in accord with the spirit of the rule for this Court to decide
against the application of the prescriptive period considering the public interest
involved? Certainly, it is every citizen's interest to have qualified individuals to
hold public office, especially which of the highest position in the Judiciary.
From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that this Court's ruling on the issue of
prescription is not grounded upon provisions of the Civil Code, specifically Article
1108(4)71 thereof. Instead, the mention thereof was intended merely to convey
that if the principle that "prescription does not lie against the State" can be
applied with regard to property disputes, what more if the underlying
consideration is public interest.
To be clear, this Court is not abolishing the limitation set by the rules in instituting
a petition for quo warranto. The one-year prescriptive period under Section 11,
Rule 66 of the Rules of Court still stands. However, for reasons explained above
and in the main Decision, this Court made distinctions as to when such prescriptive
period applies, to wit: (1) when filed by the State at its own instance, through the
Solicitor General, 72 prescription shall not apply. This, of course, does not equate to
a blanket authority given to the Solicitor General to indiscriminately file
baseless quo warranto actions in disregard of the constitutionally-protected rights
of individuals; (2) when filed by the Solicitor General or public prosecutor at the
request and upon relation of another person, with leave of court, 73 prescription
shall apply except when established jurisprudential exceptions 74 are present; and
(3) when filed by an individual in his or her own name, 75 prescription shall apply,
except when established jurisprudential exceptions are present. In fine, Our
pronouncement in the assailed Decision as to this matter explained that certain
circumstances preclude the absolute and strict application of the prescriptive
period provided under the rules in filing a petition for quo warranto.
Thus, this Court finds no reason to reverse its ruling that an action for quo
warranto is imprescriptible if brought by the State at its own instance, as in the
instant case.
In any case, and as aptly discussed in the main Decision, the peculiarities of the
instant case preclude strict application of the one-year prescriptive period against
the State. As observed by Justice Perlas-Bernabe in her Separate Opinion, "x x x
if there is one thing that is glaringly apparent from these proceedings, it is
actually the lack of respondent's candor and forthrightness in the submission of
her SALNs."76 Respondent's actions prevented the State from discovering her
disqualification within the prescriptive period. Most certainly, thus the instant
case is one of those proper cases where the one-year prescriptive period set under
Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court should not apply.
VI
Respondent reiterates her argument that her case should be treated similarly as
in Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada Jr. 77
As extensively discussed in the main Decision, respondent, unlike Doblada, did not
present contrary proof to rebut the Certifications from U.P. HRDO that
respondent's SALNs for 1986, 1987, 1988, 1992, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004,
2005 and 2006 are not in its possession and from the Ombudsman that based on
its records, there is no SALN filed by respondent except that for 1998. Being
uncontroverted, these documents suffice to support this Court's conclusion that
respondent failed to file her SALNs in accordance with law.
As what this Court has stated in its May 11, 2018 Decision, while government
employees cannot be required to keep their SALNs for more than 10 years based
from the provisions of Section 8, paragraph C(4) of Republic Act No. 6713, 79 the
same cannot substitute for respondent's manifest ineligibility at the time of her
application. Verily, even her more recent SALNs, such as those in the years of
2002 to 2006, which in the ordinary course of things would have been easier to
retrieve, were not presented nor accounted for by respondent.
Respondent attempts to strike a parallelism with Doblada by claiming that she, too,
religiously filed her SALNs. The similarity however, ends there. Unlike
in Doblada, respondent failed to present contrary proof to rebut the evidence of
non-filing. If, indeed, she never missed filing her SALNs and the same were merely
lost, or missing in the records of the repository agency, this Court sees nothing
that would prevent respondent from securing a Certification which would provide a
valid or legal reason for the copies' non-production.
VII
Respondent insists that the filing of SALNs bears no relation to the Constitutional
qualification of integrity.1âwphi1 For her, the measure of integrity should be as
what the JBC sets it to be and that in any case, the SALN laws, being malum
prohibitum, do not concern adherence to moral and ethical principles.
Integrity, as what this Court has defined in the assailed Decision, in relation to a
judge's qualifications, should not be viewed separately from the institution he or
she represents. Integrity contemplates both adherence to the highest moral
standards and obedience to laws and legislations. Integrity, at its minimum, entails
compliance with the law.
In sum, respondent has not presented any convincing ground that would merit a
modification or reversal of Our May 11, 2018 Decision. Respondent, at the time of
her application, lacked proven integrity on account of her failure to file a
substantial number of SALNs and also, her failure to submit the required SALNs
to the JBC during her application for the position. Although deviating from the
majority opinion as to the proper remedy, Justice Antonio T. Carpio shares the
same finding:
Since respondent took her oath and assumed her posit10n as Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court on 16 August 2010, she was required to file under oath her
SALN within thirty (30) days after assumption of office, or until 15 September
2010, and the statements must be reckoned as of her first day of service,
pursuant to the relevant provisions on SALN filing.
xxxx
The Constitution, law, and rules clearly require that the sworn entry SALN "must
be reckoned as of his/her first day of service" and must be filed "within thirty
(30) days after assumption of office." Evidently, respondent failed to file under
oath a SALN reckoned as of her first day of service, or as of 16 August 2010,
within the prescribed period of thirty (30) days after her assumption of office. In
other words, respondent failed to file the required SALN upon her assumption
of office, which is a clear violation of Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution.
In light of her previous failure to file her SALNs for several years while she was a
UP College of Law Professor, her failure to file her SALN upon assuming office in
2010 as Associate Justice of this Court constitutes culpable violation of the
Constitution, a violation committed while she was already serving as an impeachable
office.82 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)
Having settled respondent's ineligibility and ouster from the position, the Court
reiterates its directive to the JBC to immediately commence the application,
nomination and recommendation process for the position of Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court.
The Court REITERATES its order to the Judicial and Bar Council to commence the
application and nomination process for the position of the Chief Justice without
delay. The ninety-day (90) period83 for filling the vacancy shall be reckoned from
the date of the promulgation of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
I maintain my Dissent
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
I maintain my dissent
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
I maintain my dissent
Please See Concurring Opinion
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S.
SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
CAGUIOA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 6230-6382.
2
Id. at 6380.
3
Barnes v. Reyes, et al., 614 Phil. 299, 304 (2009).
4
No. L-79974, December 17, 1987, 156 SCRA549.
5
Id. at 552.
6
Section I of Article VIII states:
Sec. I. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law.
7
406 Phil. I (2001).
8
Supra.
9
Respondent's Ad Cautelam Motion for Rec0nsideration, pp. 68-69.
10
Respondent's Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration, p. 69.
Sen. Defensor Santiago v. Sen. Guingona, Jr., 359 Phil. 276, 302 (1998).
11
12
Fortuna v. Judge Palma, 240 Phil. 656, 664 ( 1987).
14
1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XI, Section 2.
15
1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XI. Sections 2 and 3(7).
16
Fortuna v. Judge Palma, supra at 664.
17
Respondent's Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration, p. 58.
18
Respondent's Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 58-61.
19
213 Phil. 288 (1984).
20
241 Phil. 162 (1988).
21
243 Phil. 167 (1988).
22
En Banc Resolution dated December 5, l 995 in A.C. No. 5409.
21
601 Phil. 470 (2009).
24
Respondent's Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 67-68.
25
Respondent's Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration, p. 59.
26
Atty. Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, 650 Phil. 326, 359
(2010).
27
Sen. Dejensor Santiago v. Sen. Guingona, Jr., supra note 11, at 302.
28
112 Phil. 619 (1961).
29
662 Phil. 331 (2011).
30
362 Phil. 238 ( 1999).
32
Sen. Defens or Santiago v. Sen Guingona, Jr., supra note 11, at 302.
33
J/Sr. Supt. Engano v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13, at 299.
34
1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XI, Sections 2 and 3.
35
272 Phil. 147 (1991).
36
Id. at 162.
37
553 Phil. 331 (2007).
38
Id. at 340.
39
595 Phil. 491 (2008).
40
Id. at 503.
Chief Justice Corona v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., 691 Phil. 156, 170
41
(2012).
42
Id.
Gonzales Ill v. Office of the President q/the Philippines, et al., 694 Phil.
43
52, I 02 (2012).
46
Separate Opinion of Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe in G.R. No. 237428
dated May 11, 2018, rollo, pp. 6578-6579.
47
1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XI, Section 1.
Re: Request of National Committee on legal Aid to Exempt legal Aid
48
Clients from Paying Filing, Docket and Other Fees, A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC,
August 28, 2009.
49
RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE TO UPHOLD
THE CONSTITUTION ON THE MATTER OF REMOVING A CHIEF
JUSTICE FROM OFFICE.
50
<http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/05/31/18/senate-fails-to-adopt-
resolution-challenging-sereno-ouster>(visited on June 1, 2018).
52
1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII. Section 5.
53
Scalia and Gamer, READING THE LAW: THE INTERNATIONAL OF
LEGAL TEXTS, pp. 4-6(2012).
54
Supra note 37.
55
Id. at 340.
56
Villanueva v. .Judicial and Bar Council, 757 Phil. 534 (2015).
57
Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62, 77 (1939).
Topacio v. Assoc. Justice Gregory Santos Ong, et al., supra note 39, at
58
59
Id.
60
G.R. No. 224302. November 29. 2016.
Supra note 39.
61
62
Aguinaldo, et al. v. Aquino, et al.. supra.
63
Section 9. Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
64
The City of Manila, et al. v. .Judge Grecia-Cuerdo. el al. 726 Phil. 9. 27
(2014).
65
Id. at 27-28.
66
269 Phil. 20 (1990).
67
Id. at 25-26.
68
Republic of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, 253 Phil. 698, 713 (1989)
citing Government of the U.S. v. Judge of the First Instance of
Pampanga, 49 Phil. 495, 500 (1965).
69
168 Phil. 328 (1977).
70
48 Phil. 676 (1929)
71
Article 1108. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, runs against:
xxxx
72
Section 2, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
73
Section 3, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
74
(1) there was no acquiescence to or inaction on the part of the petitioner,
amounting to the abandonment of his right to the position; (2) it was an act
of the government through its responsible officials which contributed to the
delay in the filing of the action; and (3) the petition was grounded upon the
assertion that petitioner's removal from the questioned position was
contrary to law. [Cristobal v. Melchor and Arcala, 168 Phil. 328 (l977)]
75
Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
76
Rollo, p. 6584.
77
498 Phil. 395 (2005).
78
See Alcantara v. Alcantara, 558 Phil. 192 (2007).
79
AN ACT ESTABLISHING A CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL
STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, TO UPHOLD
THE TIME-HONORED PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC OFFICE BEING A PUBLIC
TRUST, GRANTING INCENTIVES AND REWARDS FOR EXEMPLARY
SERVICE, ENUMERATING PROHIBITED ACTS AND TRANSACTIONS
AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES. Approved on February 20, 1989.
80
1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XII, Section 17.
81
1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XII, Section 18.
82
Dissenting Opinion of Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO in G.R. No. 237428
dated May 11, 2018, pp. 6401-6404.
83
1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 4