2015 IPB Handbook

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
STAFF HANDBOOK
Determine Define the

Threat Courses Operational
of Action Intelligence Environment
Preparation
of the
Battlefield (IPB)
Evaluate Describe
the Environmental
Threat Effects on Operations
Revised
FY 2015
Edition
This Handbook is a Product of the:

Training Analysis Feedback Team (TAFT)
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-2346 May 2015
Table of Contents
Introduction ……………………………………………….…. 2 Describe How Civil Considerations Can Affect Friendly

Unified Land Operations …………………………………..... 3 and Threat Operations ……………………………………………………. 69
Decisive Action ………………………………………………. 3 Civil Consideration Products ……………………………………… …….77
The Operational Environment (OE) ……………………….. 5 IPB Step 3: Evaluate the Threat …………………………..…. 84
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) Getting Started ………………………………………………….…………. 84
and The OE …………………………………………….…….. 6 Who are the Bad Guys (Enemy, Threat, Adversary, OPFOR)? …..… 84
Getting Started ………………………………………………………...….. 6 How to Evaluate the Threat? ………………………..……………….….. 86
Staff Roles …………………………………………………………...…….. 7 Identify Threat Characteristics ……………………………………..…… 86
Create or Refine Threat Models ………………………………...………. 98
IPB Step 1: Define the Operational Environment ………… 9 Convert Threat Doctrine or Patterns of Operations
Defining the Operational Environment ………………………..………. 9 to Graphics ……………………………………………………….…….. 99
Identifying the Significant Characteristics of the Environment ….... 11 Identify Threat Capabilities ……………………………………..….. 112
Identifying the Limits of the Command’s Area of Operations (AO).. 12 Describe the Threat’s Tactics and Options …………………….…. 114
Identifying the Limits of the Command’s Area of Interest (AOI) ….. 13 Identify High-Value Targets (HVTs) …………………………….… 115
Identifying the Significant Characteristics Within the AO and AOI
for Further Analysis …………………………………………………….. 18 IPB Step 4: Determine Threat Courses of Action …………. 118
Initiate Processes Necessary to Acquire the Information Needed to Getting Started ……………………………………………………..….…. 118
Complete IPB ………………………………………………………..…… 21 Develop Threat Courses of Action ………………………………….…. 118
Defining the Operational Environment Products ……………..…….. 23 Identify Likely Objectives and End State ……………………..…… 119
Identify the Full Set of COAs Available to the Threat ……….….. 120
IPB Step 2: Describing the Environmental Effects on Evaluate and Prioritize each Threat COA …………………….….. 123
Operations ………………………………………...……...… 35 Develop Each COA in the Amount of Detail Time Allows ……… 123
Getting Started ………………………………………………...………… 35 Situation Templates …………………………………………………….……. 124
The Players ……………………………………………………………..... 35 Threat COA Statements …………………………………………….……….. 129
How It’s Done ………………………………………………..………….. 35 HVTs and HVTL for the Threat COA …………………………………..…. 130
Identify Initial Collection Requirements for Each COA ………………… 131
Describe How the Threat can Affect Friendly Operations …...….. 36
The Information Collection Plan …………………………………...…. 135
Describe How Terrain can Affect Friendly
Focusing IPB ………………………………………………..…………… 135
and Threat Operations ………………………………………………….. 38
Terrain Products ……………………………………………………...…. 53 IPB Tools ………………………………………………..……. 139
Terrain Effect Products ……………………………………………...…. 58
Describe How Weather can Affect Friendly Glossary ………………………………………….…………… 150
and Threat Operations …………………………………………..……… 62
Weather Effect Products ………………………………………………... 66
Training Analysis Feedback Team 1 IPB Staff Handbook

INTRODUCTION The IPB Staff Handbook has been designed as This analysis is broken down into five areas:
a convenient, pocket-size reference and is  Lack of commander involvement / focus.
intended to provide unit commanders, staffs, and trainers a ready  Under-resourced intelligence (S-2) sections.
reference for IPB and broaden understanding of the requirements  Incomplete / inadequate Receipt of Mission (by the entire staff) due to
inherent in developing the common operational picture (COP) in unified failure to ensure all portions of the higher headquarters (HHQ)
land operations and the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE). operation order (OPORD) have been assigned to someone to read and
The information presented is primarily from the newly released Army integrate into the MDMP.
Techniques Publication (ATP) 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the  Executive Officer (XO) failure to articulate the format and medium for
Battlefield / Battlespace (November 2014). This publication is intended staff products prior to the start of the MDMP.
as an IPB primer and should not replace a unit’s standard operating  Lack of doctrinal background / familiarity and management of the
procedures (SOP) or doctrine. It is not an all-encompassing reference or process.
a replacement for current Army doctrinal manuals, nor is it designed to
replace or augment current instruction materials. The observations, The first two steps of IPB are somewhat easier and, in the larger scope of
insights, and lessons (OIL) presented in this publication were collected IPB, less important than the final two steps, but trends have shown that
over the past twelve years by numerous training teams staffs tend to devote a much larger percentage of time to
during more than four-hundred, on-site multiple unit them. Steps 3 and 4 are difficult to do and, generally, the S-2
training assemblies (MUTA)-5 / -6 periods while is working in a vacuum attempting to create these products
conducting Military Decisionmaking Process (MDMP)- as the remainder of the staff continues producing their
focused STAFFEXes / workshops, and simulation- portion of “see yourself” products. When there is no input
supported, full spectrum / unified land operations from the staff, the capabilities of the enemy cannot be
scenario training. completely articulated.
The graphic on this page serves to remind us that IPB is a The commander or XO must allocate the time to conduct
four-step process that can only be conceived through the IPB. . . all of IPB . . . and must ensure the staff provides
careful examination of the environment, the threat, and input to all products. The most important products in moving
the possible effects that both have on a commander’s forward to COA Development come from Steps 3 and 4 of
operation. IPB. If time is short . . . weather and terrain can wait. These
are necessary to fully develop a set of threat COAs, but COA Development
The commander has the most important role in IPB by detailing to the will continue if the wind arrow is not created and posted on the fusion map.
staff the information he needs in order to make decisions and complete It will not continue without a well-thought-out set of threat COAs and
his situational understanding / visualization. This defines how the staff situation templates (SITTEMPs).
will adjudicate its time and becomes important in time-constrained
mission planning. Trends analysis has identified several factors as to While not a doctrinal acronym, this publication will use the abbreviation
why IPB is consistently done poorly. WFF for warfighting function as a method to condense text.

Unified Land Operations
UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS
The goal of unified land operations (ULO) is to apply landpower as part of unified
action to defeat the enemy on land and establish conditions that achieve the joint
force commander’s end state. Today’s operational environments require
commanders to demonstrate the core competencies of combined arms
maneuver (CAM) and wide-area security (WAS) conducted through offensive,
defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) tasks to
reach this goal.
Decisive Action
DECISIVE ACTION
Army forces demonstrate the Army’s core competencies through decisive
action — the continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive,
and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks. In unified land
operations, commanders seek to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative while
synchronizing their actions to achieve the best effects possible. Operations
conducted outside the United States and its territories simultaneously
combine three elements — offense, defense, and stability. Within the United
States and its territories, decisive action combines the elements of defense
support of civil authorities and, as required, offense and defense to support
homeland defense.
As a single, unifying idea, decisive action provides direction for the entire
operation. Based on a specific idea of how to accomplish the mission,
Tasks of Decisive Action
commanders and staffs refine the concept of operations during planning.

UnifiedLand
Operations
In order to conduct IPB, we must lose our myopic idea of the one-
dimensionality of warfare and focus our IPB efforts proportionately
on all of the aspects of ULO. The graphic below depicts the
relationship between the type of operation and the amount of IPB
dedicated to each sub-part. In a primarily offensive-based operation,
the lion’s share of IPB will be dedicated to offensive operations, but
defensive and stability (civil support) IPB must not be overlooked.
During IPB, units must address each of the elements of offense,

defense, and either stability operations or DSCA, as necessary.
Remember, you will not be tasked to conduct unified land
operations.
Offense Defense IPB MIRROR
Stability Some examples to consider:
Consider an offensive operation such as a As DSCA or stability tasks are conducted, there are
movement to contact. While the primary concern certain operations that must be undertaken to
Offense is offensive (defeating the enemy), your unit successfully accomplish them. Offensively, a
might be tasked to conduct a screening mission to subordinate element might be tasked with a Cordon
Stability protect vulnerable flanks. Unless the operation is and Search / Knock mission or combat patrols.
Defense being conducted in the frozen tundra of Defensively, considerations must be made
Antarctica, there will probably be civil concerning the security of forward operating bases
considerations. (FOBs), as well as the security of all friendly forces
operating in the area of operations (AO).
Combining the Tasks of Decisive Action

Unified Land
The Operational Operations
Environment
THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (OE)
Any discussion of IPB requires a basic understanding of the OE, and knowing how the OE will impact operations is key. Army Doctrine Reference Publication
(ADRP) 1-02, Operational Terms and Military Symbols, defines the operational environment as “a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences
that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.”
Analysis of the OE is based on the operational variables – political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment , and time
(PMESII-PT). This analysis gives commanders the relevant information required to understand, visualize, and describe the OE.
Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0 states, "No two operational environments are identical, even within the same theater of operations, and every operational
environment changes over time. Because of this, Army leaders consider how evolving relevant operational or mission variables affect force employment concepts
and tactical actions that contribute to the strategic purpose.”.”
Political Mission
Time
Military Civil
MISSION Enemy
Considerations
OPERATIONAL
Physical Environment VARIABLES VARIABLES
Economic
Terrain and
Weather
Infrastructure Time
Available
Information Social
Troops and
Support Available

The Operational Environment
TIP At the onset of IPB, a determination, based on the echelon

and situation, must be made to understand the degree to
which each operational variable provides useful information.
For example, social and economic variables may receive close
analysis as part of enemy and civil considerations at brigade and
higher echelons. And while they may affect the training and
preparation of subordinate elements, they are generally not
going to be relevant to the small-unit leader’s analysis of the
mission / troop leading procedures (TLPs).
IPB AND
Linkage THE O
Between PERATIONAL
Operational ENVIRONMENT
– Mission Variables (OE)
Getting Started
As the commander, S-2, S-3, and other staff members attend the OPORD brief, the remainder of the staff is busy preparing the command post (CP) to begin the
MDMP. Time is at a premium, and the first order of business following Receipt of Mission is conducting Mission Analysis, with IPB consuming a major portion
of the staff’s planning time. In order to streamline IPB, the commander and his key staff officers should focus the staff based on the type of mission they have
been tasked with and what specific information the commander and staff require to complete the MDMP. A simple checklist like the one pictured on the next
page can help identify where the staff should commit their time during IPB.
While not doctrinal, this publication has used the acronyms WFF for warfighting
function and COO for combined obstacle overlay as a method to condense text.

IPB and the Operational Environment
Getting Started (cont.) This
Commander's IPB Focus Checklist
operation
Stability Defense Support of Civil
can be Offensive Defensive
Operation Authorities
As stated previously in the introduction, IPB, like the remainder of categorized
Mission Analysis and the MDMP, is a staff function. Without the as:
This
expertise of the entire staff and their combined contributions, IPB will operation
be incomplete. takes place
in:
Tropical Moist
Staff Roles The climate
Dry
Moist Mid-latitude (mild winter)
is:
Moist Mid-latitude (cold winter)
The Commander Polar
The commander owns the train and ultimately tells it where it is to go

Nature of disaster / accident
and how much time it has to get there. His primary function is to
Enemy
focus the staff through his continued guidance, and let them know
what products are required in order to make decisions at key times, as My IPB Terrain Considerations
focus is
well as what is needed to gain and maintain situational (rank) Terrain
understanding. While the commander may not be present during Forecasted weather / effects
Mission Analysis, his presence is felt through his guidance, which Civil Considerations
allows the XO to drive the train. Civil Considerations
Regular
The Executive Officer (XO) The threat
Irregular Accident
is:
Hybrid Natural disaster
(Choose all
Other____________________________ Deliberate attack
The XO drives the train. Using tools such as the one third - two thirds that apply)
Other____________________________
planning rule, he is responsible for determining and calculating how
long each step of the MDMP should take, how much time should be
allocated to Mission Analysis and further, how much time within
Mission Analysis can be sub-allocated to IPB. Along with this, he Other things (Note: this list is not all-inclusive and should be
must develop a set of azimuth checks and benchmarks to ensure the to consider: modified per your unit Plans / Tactical SOP)
staff stays true to its schedule. He is the enforcer of the commander’s
guidance and ensures the tools required by the commander are
produced in a timely manner.
Commander’s IPB Focus Checklist

IPB and the Operational Environment
Staff Roles (cont.)
The S-2
The S-2 has the responsibility for synchronizing information from the staff sections / elements in order to complete IPB. According to ATP 2-01.3, the S-2 does
not perform IPB in a vacuum … “Staff sections bring their own areas of expertise to IPB. Collaborative analysis among the staff facilitates a greater degree of
situational understanding for the commander.” Besides controlling and collating the information from the other staff sections / elements, the S-2 has the
responsibility, during IPB, to produce the following products: the combined obstacle overlay (COO), the modified COO (MCOO), situation templates
(SITTEMPs), the event template (EVENTEMP), weather and terrain effects products, enemy COA narratives with consolidated HVT lists (HVTLs), and the
intelligence estimate, which consolidates all input from each staff section / element into a document which highlights the enemy information pertinent to his
echelon and that of his subordinate commanders.
The Staff
During IPB, the staff has the responsibility to review their respective annexes / appendices from the HHQ OPORD and select the pertinent information for their
subordinate commanders. This pertains not only to the friendly information, but also the terrain and enemy information. The S-2 is NOT RESPONSIBLE for
developing the entire picture. The staff, with their subject matter expertise, refines the enemy situation and terrain pertinent to its respective WFFs and delivers
this product to the S-2. With the refined products from each staff section / element, the S-2 can create his COO and comprehensive threat models. The refined
terrain information from each staff section / element becomes Paragraph 1. b. (1) (Terrain) of their respective annexes and the refined threat products become the
paragraph 1c (Enemy Forces). In order to work well, this system requires complete staff synchronization, a plan (the Planning SOP / Tactical SOP), an enforcer
(the XO or S-3 Sergeant Major (SGM)), and a willingness to create the best products possible for subordinate commanders.
TIP The staff sections / elements review and refine the HHQ products (to include the OPORD) and pass the refined enemy situation to
the S-2 for inclusion in the Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) of Annex B (Intelligence). They do not wait for the S-2 to write
Paragraph 1.c. in the base OPORD and copy it into their respective annex.
The product on the following page is a WFF / staff section worksheet. It is a simple and effective method to consolidate terrain, weather, and enemy
information, as well as other pertinent intelligence information from each WFF or staff section / element to be provided to the S-2. With a set of these from each
section / WFF, the S-2 can create an accurate depiction of how the terrain, weather, and enemy affect each of the staff sections / elements.

Sub-task 1 Unified Land Operations
Define the Operational Environment
Warfighting Function / Staff Section Worksheet
Warfighting Function / Staff Section Addressed?
Staff Roles (cont.) CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT AFFECTING YOUR WARFIGHTING FUNCTION /
STAFF SECTION
Tools only work if their importance is articulated to the staff. This can not be a
“maybe” thing. It must be a requirement, established by the commander, SPECIFIC WEATHER OR TERRAIN CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING YOUR WARFIGHTING
annotated in the Planning SOP / Tactical SOP, and placed as a benchmark on FUNCTION / STAFF SECTION
the MDMP or Mission Analysis timeline. It must be further enforced by the

XO, and demanded by the S-2. Without timely input from each staff section /
element, products will not be created, or else will be created in a vacuum and INPUT TO MCOO OR SITTEMP
the staff will be ill-prepared to continue to COA Development.
ENEMY HIGHER CONCEPT (Paragraph 1 your Annex)
IPB Sub-task 1: Defining the Operational Environment ENEMY MISSION (Paragraph 1 your Annex)
Defining the Operational Environment

MOST LIKELY ENEMY COA (Your WARFIGHTING FUNCTION / STAFF SECTION )
The environment in which the unit will be operating must be defined in order to ENEMY FORCES AVAILABLE (Your WARFIGHTING FUNCTION / STAFF SECTION)
ensure all of the features which may require additional analysis are identified.
These features, as well as the area itself, may have profound impact on both ENEMY EQUIPMENT & CAPABILITIES (Your WARFIGHTING FUNCTION / STAFF SECTION)
friendly and threat COAs. IPB efforts are focused on those aspects of the AO, as
well as specific characteristics of the environment, that will affect mission
command. ENEMY CONSTRAINTS (Your WARFIGHTING FUNCTION / STAFF SECTION)
By identifying characteristics of the area that will affect the command’s mission, CRITICAL FACTS & ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT ENEMY (Your WARFIGHTING FUNCTION / STAFF
SECTION)
proper emphasis can be placed where needed, and superfluous analysis can be
avoided. This will allow all staff sections / elements and WFF areas to allocate
time wisely and focus their IPB efforts properly. Failure to identify all relevant HVTs AND WHY IMPORTANT TO ENEMY (Your WARFIGHTING FUNCTION / STAFF SECTION)
characteristics may result in the unit being surprised by factors not addressed or
ENEMY CCIRS & POTENTIAL DECISIONS
inadequately addressed during IPB.
Commander’s IPB Focus Checklist

Sub-task 1 Define the Operational Environment
Defining the Operational Environment (cont.)
Step 1 of the IPB Process identifies the significant characteristics of

the OE for further analysis that may influence friendly COAs and
command decisions. Within an OE, an Army leader may be faced
with major combat, military engagements, and humanitarian
assistance simultaneously in the same AO.
The intelligence staff acquires the intelligence needed to complete

IPB in the degree of detail required to support the Decisionmaking
Process. The primary outputs associated with Step 1 of the IPB
Process may include developing the:
 Determination of the AO and area of interest (AOI).
 Determination of the are of influence.
 Determination of the area of intelligence responsibility.
 Identification of general characteristics of the AO that may
influence the unit’s mission.
 Identification of gaps in current intelligence holdings, translating
them into requirements for collection (requests for information,
requests for collection) in order to complete IPB.
The “so what” in this step is clearly defining for the commanders
what the relevant characteristics of their AOIs are.
 Success results in saving time and effort by focusing only on Sub-steps of Step 1 of the IPB Process
those characteristics that will influence friendly COAs and
command decisions. TIP Throughout this publication, reference is made
 Consequences of failure: to the lack of available time to consider all of
 Failure to focus on only the significant characteristics leads to the elements or factors requiring additional analysis.
wasted time and effort collecting and evaluating intelligence Through the use of national, allied, joint, and higher
on characteristics of the OE that will not influence the echelon databases available, this can be partially
operation. mitigated.

 Failure to identify all the significant characteristics may lead

to the command’s surprise and unpreparedness when some
overlooked feature of the OE has an effect on the operation
for which the commander did not plan. Offensive / Defensive / Stability Operations
Identifying the Significant Characteristics Terrain characteristics and Military Aspects of Terrain:
• The nature of the disaster,
of the Environment accident, or incident.
• Hydrological data
• Elevation data • Terrain of the area.
At the tactical level, the memory aid ASCOPE (areas, structures, • Soil composition • Forecasted weather and effects.
capabilities, organizations, people, and events) has become • Vegetation • Civil considerations to include:
 Population demographics
synonymous with describing civil considerations. At higher levels, (ethnic groups, religious
Weather characteristics that can significantly affect operations:
there is the inclusion of long-term diplomatic, informational, and groups, age distribution,
economic issues. • Visibility. income groups).
• Wind Velocity.  Political or socio-economic
• Precipitation. factors.
There has been some discussion over the years as to the relevance  Infrastructures (transportation
• Cloud cover.
of ASCOPE and that the elements of PMESII-PT cover the same • Temperature. or telecommunications).
information. Arguers against the removal of ASCOPE point out the • Humidity.  Rules of Engagement (ROE) or
better focus at lower levels that ASCOPE brings in terms of • Atmospheric pressure (as required). other legal considerations
(curfews, martial law
defining civil considerations. PMESII-PT may work at the mandates).
Civil considerations
operational level, but it is less effective at the tactical level.  Police structure and military
ASCOPE provides a more extensive, specific, and immediate When identifying significant characteristics of the environment support role.
Collection Plan than PMESII-PT, and can be used in a wide range ensure civilian aspects are being considered (this applies to more  Criminal organizations and
than stability operations). The memory aid ASCOPE is used in activities.
of operations from day-to-day contact, negotiations, and route  Political parties.
describing the civil consideration portion of the mission
selection of patrols, to site selection for combat outposts, variables (METT-TC) and refers to the six civil considerations
prioritizing clear-hold-build operations, and detecting underground of:
and auxiliary insurgent infrastructure. • Areas.
• Structures.
• Capabilities.
During this sub-task of identifying significant characteristics of the • Organizations.
environment, your unit is attempting to get their hands conceptually • People.
around those things in the environment that can create effects which • Events.
may impact operations. The specific determination of those effects,
as well as the possible impacts, will be discussed in Sub-task 2 of
IPB. Significant Characteristics of the OE by Operation Type

Identifying the Limits of the Command’s Area of Operation (AO)

TIP Identification of the AO / AOI helps
When identifying the command’s AO, there are three questions to ask: prioritize research and collection in
 In what is the area my unit is allowed to operate (AO)? order to better support Sub-task 2 of IPB.
 What is the area that my unit can influence by its operations (area of
influence)?
 What is / are the area (s) that are a concern to my unit and can possibly
influence my operations (area of interest (AOI))?
In offensive, defensive, stability, and DSCA operations, the AO is designated

by boundaries imposed by HHQ. The AO falls into two distinct categories:
contiguous areas of operations (the entire HHQ AO is subdivided into smaller
subordinate AOs with no unassigned areas remaining), and noncontiguous
areas of operations (the AO is subdivided into subordinate AOs but certain
areas are unassigned and remain the responsibility of the HHQ (referred to as
“deep” areas). Historically, in offensive and defensive operations, commanders
tend to opt for contiguous areas of operations to mitigate risk and eliminate the
opportunity for the enemy to operate within an unassigned space.
TIP Be mindful of an identified area of

influence that resides in another
KUJ
unit’s AO. In contiguous AOs, this is
KORAM
common. Ensure cross talk with the Example Areas of Operation
other unit is maintained.
WAZIR
AO SHERMAN
AREA OF
KALA
ATP 2-01.3 defines the area of influence as, “a geographical area where a commander is directly capable of
INFLUENCE influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander’s command or
KOTU
control.” This may include terrain both inside and outside the AO and may be determined by either the S-2 or
the S-3.
Area of Influence

Identifying the Limits of the Command’s Area of Interest (AOI)
The AOI is the area, both inside and outside the area of influence and the A O, that presents a
concern to the commander. It may be a concern because of enemy capabilities and their ability to
target inside the commander’s AO from outside of it. In this example, the AOI, due to the lines of
communication available from outside the commander’s AO, allows unrestricted movement into
it. An important factor in determining the AOI is the understanding that it may include a portion
of a country or another AO that the commander may not be allowed to operate or collect
KUJ
information in. Generally, the AOI requires more intelligence assets to monitor.
KORAM
WAZIR
AO SHERMAN
KALA
KOTU
AREA OF INTEREST
Area of Interest (AOI) KUJ
KORAM
WAZIR
AO SHERMAN
KALA
In this example, the improvised explosive device (IED) production lifecycle is KOTU
completely contained within the commander’s AOI, but only one piece, the logistics
hub, is located within his AO. That being said, the isolation or disruption of the
logistics hub can have profound effect on the remainder of the IED operation (see
isolation graphic on the following page). Without the capability to move the raw
materials into the AO, compensate the IED manufacturers and emplacers, or arrange for Raw materials
into AO
IED
Emplacement
IED
Manufacturing Logistics Hub Financier
the flow of money both within and outside his target area, the logistic hub manager’s
loss of effectiveness will cause the entire operation to slow or even stop. IED Production Inside and Outside the AO

Identifying the Limits of the Command’s Area of Interest (AOI) (cont.)
TIP The isolation or disruption of the logistics hub

can have profound effect on the remainder of
the threat operation. As in many tasks with multiple moving parts, it is not necessary to disrupt the tip of the spear
to cause it to lose its total capability. This is just one of the many ways the commander can
influence, not only his AO, but the areas surrounding it.
IED
Manufacturing
Movement of IED
raw materials
into AO
Emplacement By using tools like the association and activities matrices below, the commander can begin to see
how, through the use of associations, he can further influence activities and people, both inside
and outside his AO.
Logistics
Manager
Movement of
finished product Financier
throughout AO
Paying off
officials to get Reconnaissance
videos on and
news filming
Isolating a Single Element Can

Disrupt Enemy Operations
TIP Do not confuse the tools used with the

analysis required. The tools provide a
format for collection; the analysis tells the story.
Association Matrix Activities Matrix

In DSCA operations, the AOI may be as small as a single city or as large as several states. Based on the size of the AOI during DSCA operations, it may be
necessary to coordinate with state and federal agencies to ensure the correct assets are requested and deployed in support of the disaster, accident, or incident.
In certain operations, the AOI may be defined by the lines of communications (LOCs), such as main and alternate supply routes (MSR / ASR) or infrastructure
pieces such as oil or natural gas pipelines, major electrical lines, or major water lines.
Take, for instance, a response to a major earthquake along the New Madrid Fault line. While
the fault line is relatively centered in the southeast corner of Missouri, where it borders both
Kentucky and Tennessee, the impact of the earthquake would require civil support planning
that would include the states of Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky, Indiana, Illinois,
and Arkansas in their AOI, as well as the state of Missouri.
New Madrid Fault Line
TIP When developing the AOI, take into consideration the possibility of an
area with limited collection capability, such as a neighboring foreign
country. Interagency, coalition, or multinational support may be required
for the collection and dissemination of information.
Earthquake Influence – New Madrid Fault

In the New Madrid earthquake scenario, consider the area that will be affected consists
of four Federal Emergency Management Areas (IV, V, VI, and VII). Each of these
regions is operated independently, but controlled collectively by the Director of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). A commander tasked with this
mission will be in direct contact with local, state, and federal agencies, and may be either
flooded with, or hamstrung by, the information available to him.
FEMA Areas Affected by New Madrid Earthquake
A unit tasked with counter-drug operations along the United States —

Mexican border would find themselves in such a position.
In DSCA operations, a key task is understanding where the databases

are and who controls them. Information sharing is a requirement in all
DSCA operations. There will never be a case where the military will
conduct operations without local or state law enforcement personnel
present.
Cross Border Area of Influence / Interest


When defining the AOI in DSCA operations, it may be necessary to consider multiple AOIs
based on ground, air, and space. Considerations must be addressed to determine what TIP AOIs from different units may overlap
information is relevant in each AOI based on specific geographic or demographic information, and require sharing of information.
needs, or requirements. Political, economic, and religious delineations may affect how we
develop AOIs.
When determining AOIs for your unit, considerations should include identifying:
 Further hazards to the AO, such as severe weather patterns, aftershocks, flowing
water, or armed urban gangs.
 Any damage that will affect operations.
 All military, other government agencies (OGAs), inter-governmental organizations
(IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and indigenous populations and
institutions (IPIs) that may interact with each other and your unit.
 Locations of all federal property with access rights to stage troops and equipment.
 Local ARNG armories and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) centers.
 Locations of public and private schools with names of principles or administrators.
 Location of state and local government seats of power and jurisdiction.
 Location of operational hospitals and clinics.
 Location and status of critical utilities (water, electricity, sewer and sanitation,
telephone, radio, and television).
 Public service organizations and structures that are damaged. (These must be repaired
first to allow follow-on services to be provided. These facilities must be identified
early.)
Social Aspects Help Delineate AOI
 Capacity of key roads and hospitals; planners primarily need to know when each will reach
capacity.
 Location and capacity of area and regional municipal facilities.
 Condition of air traffic control systems to identify if emergency aviation assets can be used.
 Soldiers and civilians expert on the area, to includes Soldiers from the area or from similar environments.

Identify the Significant Characteristics within the Area of Interest for Further Analysis
In order to focus IPB and what is important to the commander, the staff identifies and defines the aspects of the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil
considerations of the OE to determine the significance of each in relation to the mission; essentially building an environmental model as the framework to
conduct and then present analysis to the commander. This prevents unnecessary analysis and allows the staff to maximize resources on critical areas. The
initial analysis that occurs in this sub-step determines the amount of time and resources the intelligence staff commits to the detailed analysis that occurs
in Step 2 of the IPB Process.
The Enemy
An enemy is a party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized (ADRP 3-0). Analysis of
the enemy includes not only the known enemy, but also other threats to mission success. Such threats might
include multiple adversaries posing with a wide array of political, economic, religious, and personal
motivations. Additionally, threats may wear uniforms and be easily identifiable, or, they may not wear
uniforms and blend into the population. To understand threat capabilities and vulnerabilities, commanders and
staffs require detailed, timely, and accurate intelligence produced as a result of IPB.
Terrain and Weather
Terrain and weather are natural conditions that profoundly influence operations. Terrain and weather favor neither friendly nor enemy forces unless one is more
familiar with —or better prepared to operate in — the physical environment. Terrain includes natural features (such as rivers and mountains) and manmade
features (such as cities, airfields, and bridges). Terrain directly affects how commanders select objectives and locate, move, and control forces. Terrain also
influences protective measures and the effectiveness of weapons and other systems.
Effective use of terrain reduces the effects of enemy fires, increases the effects of friendly fires, and facilitates surprise. Terrain appreciation — the ability to
predict its impact on operations — is an important skill for every leader. For tactical operations, commanders analyze terrain using the five military aspects of
terrain, expressed in the Army memory aid OAKOC (Obstacles, Avenues of approach, Key terrain, Observation and fields of fire, and Cover and concealment).
(See ATP 3-34.80 and Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.3 for more information on analyzing the military aspects of terrain.)

Identify the Significant Characteristics within the Area of Interest for Further Analysis (cont.)
Terrain and Weather (cont.)
Climate refers to the average weather conditions for a location, area, or region for a specific time of
the year as recorded for a period of years. Operational climatology is used to assess effects on
weapon systems, collection systems, ground forces, tactics and procedures, enemy tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and other capabilities based on specific weather sensitivity TIP CLIMATE IS WHAT YOU EXPECT …
thresholds when operational planning occurs more than ten days prior to operational execution. WEATHER IS WHAT YOU GET!
Climatological data is important at both the operational and tactical levels. Actual weather
forecasts and/or predictions, using weather models and other tools, are used to assess weather
effects on weapon systems, collection systems, ground forces, TTPs, and other capabilities when
operations occur within ten days of operational planning.
Civil Considerations
Civil considerations reflect the influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes
and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within the OE on the conduct of
military operations. Commanders and staffs analyze civil considerations in terms of the categories
expressed in the memory aid ASCOPE.
Civil considerations help commanders understand the social, political, and cultural variables within the
AO and their effect on the mission. Understanding the relationship between military operations and
civilians, culture, and society is critical to conducting operations and is essential in developing effective
plans. Operations often involve stabilizing the situation, securing the peace, building host-nation
capacity, and transitioning authority to civilian control. Combat operations directly affect the populace,
infrastructure, and the force’s ability to transition to host-nation authority. The degree to which the
populace is expected to support or resist U.S. and friendly forces also affects offensive and defensive
operational design.
(See Field Manual (FM) 4-02, Army Health System, for more extensive information on the medical
aspects of IPB that relate mainly to civil considerations in the AO.)

Evaluate Current Operations and Intelligence Holdings to
Determine Additional Information Needed to Complete IPB
CAUTION It is never the same as it was before. Any analyst or Soldier trying to compare the operational environment in the present to how it
was in the past WILL fail. “This is the way we did it in Iraq” will not work in Afghanistan. “This is the way we did it last time in
Afghanistan” will not work this time in Afghanistan. One natural disaster is different than another and the same type of disaster in the same area
will require different and additional IPB and analysis. Nothing ever stays the same nor reacts the same way. Use the knowledge you gained from past
experience as a baseline to begin developing and refining new data.
Each staff section / element should endeavor not to recreate the wheel, but rather to smooth out the flat spots. There are few times when a unit arrives in a
“new” environment void of any previous collection. Strive to find the sources and data your predecessors have left you, and determine what is still viable and
what must be discarded. When you are done with this, you will have identified the “gaps” that must be answered. Each staff section / element must identify the
missing pieces from their WFF or staff section / element point of view. This is required to adequately perform IPB.
Many databases at the national, allied, joint, and higher echelon are available and should be used to ensure duplicate work is not being done. By identifying
gaps early, they can be prioritized, have requests for information (RFIs) sent to HHQ, identify open sources where missing information may be found, or apply
collection assets to find answers and close identified gaps.
Sometimes gaps cannot be filled in a timely manner or at all. When this happens, assumptions need to be
made per Sub-task 6 (Identify critical facts and develop assumptions) from Mission Analysis (MDMP).
There is a balance that must be achieved when defining how much information we can get
based on how much time we have versus how much data we really need to be effective in our
mission. As Napoleon said, " Strategy is the art of making use of time and space. I am less
concerned about the latter than the former. Space we can recover, lost time never.” The key to
effectively evaluating existing databases is to know where the databases are and where to find
additional information. Absent commander’s guidance, focus first on the AO, then the area of
influence, and finally on the AOI.

Evaluate Current Operations and Intelligence Holdings to
Determine Additional Information Needed to Complete IPB (cont.)
Databases may already exist for your AO. In DSCA operations, FEMA, as well as local city or county agencies, will be able to provide you with critical
information. Historically, these types of agencies will provide a liaison to work with Department of Defense (DOD) assets.
Internal and External Databases Computer Integration Helps Manage Databases
Initiate Processes Necessary to Acquire the Information Needed to Complete IPB
In the last sub-task, the gaps in information were identified. Those gaps will be closed through either RFIs to the HHQ, through unit or HHQ / adjacent unit
information collection activities, or through open-source mining.

Initiate Processes Necessary to Acquire the Information Needed to Complete IPB (cont.)
During the identification of intelligence gaps, it may have become necessary to
INFORMATION
develop assumptions to allow for continued planning. During the collection
phase, ensure that any assumptions made are quickly confirmed as viable or, if
found false, the evaluations and determinations made based on these
assumptions are reexamined.
+
TIP As stated before, time is a precious commodity. Commanders should

let their staff know, through their guidance, what is important to
INFORMATION
RFI IC RFI Open Source
them. Much like the commander’s initial collection guidance, the staff wants
to know what “right” looks like. This will help focus the staff and let them
=
=
know how to prioritize their time.
INFORMATION
As reality is constantly changing, so is IPB constantly being updated and annotated
on individual staff section / element running estimates. No staff will ever get 100%
resolution of the OE. This is why branches and sequel COAs must be developed to
answer the “what-if’s.” Once all the gaps have been filled, the staff must develop or
refine existing databases and products in order to have the information on the
enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations available. By thoroughly
understanding the environment, fewer RFIs will be required, and staff members TIP The point of intelligence gathering efforts, either through
will become a source of information to higher and lateral organizations. information collection activities, RFIs, or open-source
mining, is to present to the commander and staff a
“perception” of the OE that most closely matches the actual
situation on the ground.

Defining the Operational Environment Products

PRODUCTS
Offensive/ Stability
DSCA Offensive/
INFRASTRUCTURE Defensive Operations Stability DSCA
Operations PRODUCT Defensive
As soon as the operation is identified, or at OVERLAYS Operations Operations Operations
Operations
the onset of DSCA operations, collection LOCs X X
TERRAIN
and/or preparation of new products should Traffic X X X OVERLAYS
begin. Take everything available, but Public service utilities X X Cross-country mobility X X X
understand, based on when the products Communications (internet,
X X X Lines of communication (LOC) X X X
cellular, fiber)
were prepared and how the OE has Vegetation types and distribution X X X
Electrical power X X
changed, their viability may be impacted. Surface drainage and configuration X X X
Electrical power grids X
Additionally, the echelon where the Surface materials X X X
Water supply X X X
products were prepared may require Crop type and distribution X X X
Fire and rescue X X
substantial refinement in order to be used Fire and rescue areas of re-
Subsurface (bedrock) materials X X
at subordinate levels. X Obstacles X X X
sponsibility
Health services X X Infrastructure X X X
The accompanying products list shows the Health services capabilities X Flood Zones X X X
“big picture.” The tools and products Fuel X X Terrain X
needed at the tactical level will be more Fuel points and main OPERATIONAL
X OVERLAYS
defined and of a narrower scope. distribution lines
Transportation (planes, trains, Boundary lines for AO X X
Generally, products are broken down into X X X
automobiles) Objective X X
six categories:
X X
 Terrain overlays. Media infrastructure, types X X X Phase Lines
(television, radio, newspaper) Battlefield symbology X X
 Operational overlays.
Sewage treatment facilities X DEMOGRAPHIC
 Demographic overlays. OVERLAYS
Hazardous materials
 Infrastructure overlays. Ethnicity X X
ECONOMICS X X
 Economic overlays. X X Religion X X
POLITICAL
 Political overlays. OTHER PRODUCTS
Tribal affiliations X X
Languages X X
X
The charts on the right list some of the Demographic studies Population X X
more common overlay requirements for Infrastructure reports X Age of population X X
offensive / defensive operations, stability Law enforcement reports and
criminal gang studies
X Products for Defining the OE
operations, and DSCA operations. X
Blueprints
Regional and local maps X

Defining the Operational Environment Products (cont.)
Following are examples of some of these products:
Terrain Overlays
Logistics Planning Map of Afghanistan

Flood Affected Map of New Orleans

Terrain Overlays (cont.)
Slope Map
Stream Surface Runoff Map

Terrain Overlays (cont.)
Vegetation Map of Afghanistan
Flood Affected Map of Afghanistan

Operational Overlays
Unit Boundaries
ANNEX C (Operations Overlay) to OPORD 09-02

(OPERATION DESERT FORTITUDE)
Stability Operations Overlay

LEACH
LEACHSPRINGS
SPRINGS
10 20 30 40 Cachar 50 60
.
.
X
CHALLENGER CAVE SPRINGS
30
1st BCT
I
McLEAN
McLEAN
21 ID DRINKWATER LAKE .
LIMAVILLE
LAKE
LAKE
.
DRINKWATER SPRINGS
.
EL NORBO KARAMU
KAPISA Province KHEYL
X ZARA
1071
1071
MSR STARR
KALA II
1064
1064 981 NO NAME LAKE
1003 985
985
NELSON
NELSONLAKE
LAKE
FOB AO
20 .
NELSON LAKE MINING CAMP
X
GOW DARREH
KALA SHAH
ZINC .
AO COPPER
.
EL CENTRO
PIONEER KORAM
TUT FOB JOROBAY
910
910 KUJ 800
800
EAST RANGE RD
GOLDSTONE
GOLDSTONE
LAKE
LAKE
X
1489
1489
AO BRONZE 876
876
780
780
701
701
699
WAZIR 760
1478
1478 FOB 720
720
10 MSR WARNER
1214
1214
899
899 781W
781W
GOLDSTONE
GOLDSTONE
KARA
LOGAR Province AO STEEL .

EL GRAZIO
BLAAF
BICYCLE LAKE TIEFORT
TIEFORTMTN
MTN
RED PASS LAKE

GOLDSTONE RD IRWIN
SHANTY
NO MANEUVER TOWN FOB
22nd Chesire MSR ALLEN
X KOTU
00 RGT (UK)
BAGRAMI SOMAMZI
Kabul 50 km X
Offensive Operations Overlay
FIELD PAKTYA Province
ASP LANGFORD LAKE
957
957
909N 4th BCTNO MANEUVER
Hosaynkhel
938
938
909S
909S
21 ID Mollayan
90 729
729
837
837
NO MANEUVER

Infrastructure Overlays
North East Power Sector

New Orleans Levee System Corridor Map of Afghanistan
Louisiana Power Outage from Previous Hurricane

Infrastructure Overlays (cont.)
Population Density Overlay
Road Infrastructure Overlay

Civil Consideration Products Area Structures Capabilities Organizations People Events
In addition to the products mentioned previously Tribe Cemeteries Waste Water / Sewage Tribal Cell Phones Weddings
that deal with the macro look at the terrain Families/Clans Religious Shrines Potable Water Families / Clans Political Speeches Birthdays
(including population), the staff must begin to gather Ethnic Enclaves Houses of Worship Electrical Religious Organizations Meetings Religious Gatherings
the specific tools that will help define the AO at the Trash Collection and
Religious Enclaves Bars/Tea Shops Disposal Ethnic Organizations Media / TV / Radio Funerals
micro-level. As stated earlier, the acronym ASCOPE
Social Gathering Newspaper /
helps define, at the tactical and operational levels, Economic Districts Places Medical Services Unions Magazines Major Religious Events
the “Civil Considerations” factor of METT-TC.
ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process, states, “Civil Smuggling Routes Print Shops Police Public Safety Community Organizations Visual, Graffiti / Signs Anniversaries
considerations are the influence of manmade Markets and Consumer Rallies /
National Boundaries Internet Cafes Goods Militia Units Demonstrations Holidays
infrastructure, civilian institutions, and activities of
Employment and
the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations Social Classes Television Commerce Illicit Organizations Restaurants Harvests
within an area of operations on the conduct of Town or Provincial
military operations.” Political Districts Radio Stations Crime and Justice Gangs Door to Door Government Meetings
Military Districts Hospitals Basic Needs Insurgent Groups Internet Elections
During this sub-task of IPB, your unit is identifying School Districts Banks Public Health Business Organizations Markets Sporting Events
the areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, Road System Dams Jobs and Employment Police Organizations Sports
people, and events in order to get an understanding Water Sources Bridges Religion Nomads Religious Gatherings
Refugees and Displaced Refugees and Displaced
of what the civil considerations are. During the next Water Coverage Police Stations Persons Persons Parks / Town Squares
IPB sub-task (Describe Environmental Effects on Water Districts Gas Stations Political Voice Government Agencies Family Gatherings
Operations), civil considerations will be analyzed Military / Police Civil Rights and Lines for Purchasing
with an eye toward the tasked mission to determine Construction Sites Barracks Individual Rights Volunteer Groups Gasoline
the impact they may have on the operation. Center Intergovernmental
Gang Territory Courthouses/Jails Agencies (IGA) Bars / Tea Shops
for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Publication
Safe Areas/
number 10-41, Assessment and Measures of Sanctuaries Oil and Gas Pipelines Political Organizations Food Lines
Effectiveness in Stability Operations, provides a Water Pumping
detailed and comprehensive list of possible sub- Trade Routes Stations Contractors Job Lines
elements of ASCOPE that may be used to detail the Nongovernmental
Power Grids Water Lines Organizations (NGO)
civil considerations portion of METT-TC.
Power Lines
Power Plants
ASCOPE Considerations

Assessing the Civil Infrastructure with SWEAT-MSO
ADRP 3-07, Stability Operations, Chapter 4 Province

states “at the brigade level and below, the
primary stability tasks and corresponding
stability sectors are often too broad to focus Districts
effort appropriately. At lower tactical
echelons, lines of effort are best designed
using core or directed mission-essential task Sub-Districts
lists (METL). Lines of effort (LOE) may focus
on specific aspects of the local situation, such Village
as the activities of host-nation security forces, Assessments
local development projects, and essential The state of the populace, determined at the village or
services restoration. For example, efforts to neighborhood level, can be averaged to reflect the
restore those services are often shaped using state of the sub-district. district or province.
lines of effort based on sewage, water,

electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, LEGEND
The status wheel displays the current
and other considerations (known as SWEAT- status of the sub-districts.
MSO) while addressing the need to provide

emergency food aid and shelter.” As the staff
continues to gather and refine products in order
to continue IPB, the civil infrastructure must
be assessed to determine both the status of What do the colors mean?
basic services and how a change to that status = Working, sufficient
may help the commander complete his mission

successfully. By the use of infrastructure = Moderate, some issues
assessments and surveys, the unit can gather = Many problems,
the basic infrastructure information needed. insufficient
= Completely broken,
non-existent
Defining the AO Using SWEAT-MSO

ZONE _3_ AMBER
ZONE _4_ AMBER
Sub-task 1 ZONE _5_ AMBER Define the Operational Environment
Defining the Operational Environment Products
LINE (cont.)EFFECTS ASSESSMENT OF AO:
6: OVERALL
Examples of SWEAT-MSO Assessments
GREEN (IMPROVE) AMBER(NO CHANGE) RED(NEGATIVE)
LINE 7: SWEAT ASSESSMENT BY DISTRICT: (G/A/R)

ZONE_1_ ZONE_2_ ZONE_3_ ZONE_4_ ZONE_5_
This simple chart format, with 7A: SEWER: AMBER AMBER RED RED GREEN
assessments, is done by zone, 7B: WATER: GREEN GREEN AMBER RED AMBER
followed by an overall assessment 7C: ELECTRICITY: AMBER AMBER GREEN GREEN GREEN
of the AO. 7D: ACADEMICS: AMBER AMBER GREEN GREEN AMBER
7E: TRASH: RED RED RED AMBER GREEN
LINE 8: OVERALL SWEAT ASSESSMENT OF AO:

8A: SEWER: RED
8B: WATER: GREEN
8C: ELECTRICITY: AMBER
8D: ACADEMICS: AMBER
8E: TRASH: RED
SWEAT Assessment
LINE 9: RECOMMENDED ACTIONS NEXT 24-96 HRS: RECOMMEND ENGINEER ASSISTANCE IN
ZONE 3 FOR SEWER AND WATER LINE REPAIR
When IPB Sub-task 1 is complete, the following objectives will have been met:
 The AO, area of influence, AOI, and area of intelligence responsibility have been identified and either marked on the map based on unit SOP or
presented in some other graphic format.
 The characteristics of the AO that may impact the unit mission have been identified.
 Information regarding the AO is collected or will be collected.
 Intelligence gaps have been identified and analysts have begun filling the gaps through collection efforts, RFIs, or open-source mining.

Notes

Notes

Describe the Environmental Effects
IPB Sub-task 2: Describe the Environmental Effects on Operations
Getting Started
During IPB Sub-task 1, the OE was defined. Now the commander and staff have an understanding of the significant characteristics of the environment, the
limit of the commander’s influence, and a grasp on what information still needs to be collected, either through information collection activities, RFIs, or open-
source mining. From here, the characteristics of the environment must be evaluated based on the upcoming mission to determine the effects they may have on
both friendly and enemy operations.
The Players
As stated in the introduction “led by the intelligence officer, the entire staff participates in IPB
to develop and maintain an understanding of the enemy, terrain and weather, and key civil
considerations.” What the introduction doesn’t say is, “ intelligence personnel perform IPB
while the remainder of the staff develops estimates and builds products for the Mission
Analysis Briefing.” Each member of the sta ff brings his or her WFF experience to the IPB
table. While each staff section / element may not contribute physical products to the IPB
effort, they have the responsibility of detailing how the environment affects their specific
section / WFF. Without this input, the IPB will be incomplete and the commander and staff
will make decisions based on an incomplete data set.
How It’s Done
Describing the environmental effects on operations is a four-part process

consisting of determining how:
 The threat can affect friendly operations.
 Terrain can affect both friendly and threat operations.
 Weather can affect both friendly and threat operations.
 Civil considerations can affect both friendly and threat operations.
Describing the Environmental Effects on Operations

Describe How the Threat Can Affect Friendly Operations

TIP When facing a regular threat in major operations,
ATP 2-01.3 reminds us that the threat is part of the OE and must be evaluated, as regardless of where the engagement occurs, that force is
well as weather, terrain, and civil considerations. Additionally, it reminds us that the most likely the most important characteristic in that OE.
threat(s) both inside and outside the commander’s AO and must be evaluated.
A unique change in IPB doctrine is the statement, “They may face one unified threat
force or several disparate threat forces that must be engaged in order to accomplish CAUTION When facing an irregular threat conducting
the mission.” operations as part of an insurgency in a failing
nation-state, the state of governance and other civil
Later, we will discuss what this means. considerations may be more significant than the threat posed by
those irregular threats.
Although detailed analysis of enemy forces occurs during Steps 3 and 4 of the
IPB Process, the type of enemy forces and their general capabilities must be
defined during Step 2. This is done to place the existence of these forces in context
with other variables to understand their relative importance as a characteristic of the
OE.
The Threat Overlay
The threat overlay is a depiction of the current physical location of all potential threats
in the AO and the area of interest. This graphic includes the identity, size, location,
strength, and AO for each potential threat.
The threat overlay does not deal with alliances, end states, support structure, training,
or any other aspect of the threat other than what type threat (if known), capabilities (if
known), disposition (if known) and locations (if known). At this early stage of IPB,
much information may be based solely on early assessments and historical data.
Again, detaining threat capabilities is the function of IPB Step 3, while identifying
possible threat COAs based on these capabilities is the function of Step 4.
The Threat Overlay

DISRUPTION ZONE FORCES
Describe How the Threat Can Affect Friendly Operations (cont.) TYPE UNIT SIZE LOCATION KNOWN/TEMPLATED
SPF FORCES
The Threat Description Table Dsmnt Tm 1/992nd SPF BDE Tm TD691811 T
Dsmnt Tm 2/992nd SPF BDE Tm TD700804 T
Dsmnt Tm 3/992nd SPF BDE Tm TD806789 T
The threat description table supports the threat overlay by classifying the type of threats Dsmnt
Dsmnt
Tm
Tm
4/992nd SPF
5/992nd SPF
BDE
BDE
Tm
Tm
TD840782
TD879783
T
T
identified on the overlay and describing the broad capabilities of each threat.
COMMANDO FORCES
Dsmnt 1 Sec/1 Plt/A Co/996 CMDO BDE Section TD852766 T

The threat overlay and description table should be done for all threat types (regular, irregular, Dsmnt 2 Sec/1 Plt/A Co/996 CMDO BDE Section TD884709 T
and hybrid) within the unit’s AO.

DTG RECON
Sensor Plt 3 Plt, 19th DTG Rec Co PLT TD645760 T

High Mobility Plt 4 Plt, 19th DTG Rec Co PLT TD716753 Screening (T)
LRR Plt LRR Plt, 19th Rec Co PLT TD696924 Screening (T)
Rec Plt 1 Plt, 19th DTG Rec Co PLT TD851779 T
BTG RECON
High Mobility Plt 4 Plt, 191st BTG Rec Co PLT TD919760 Screening (T)
LRR Plt LRR Plt, 191st Rec Co PLT TD761789 Screening (T)
Rec Plt 1 Plt, 191st DTG Rec Co PLT TD756693 T
COUNTER RECONNAISSANCE DETACHMENT
Mounted A Co, 2/191st Bn Reinforced Co TD889702 3 x BMP, 1 x Tank Plt
DISRUPTION FORCE
BMP-2 1 Plt, 1 Co, 2/191 Bn Plt TD794588 T

BTG Troops in Disruption Zone
9P148 1 PLT, 2 Co,191st AT Bn PLT TD778641 T

MT-12 w/MTLB 1 PLT, 1 Co,191st AT Bn PLT TD888655 T
2S6 1 PLT, 1 Co,196th ADA Bn PLT TD833613 T
BATTLE ZONE
BMP/T-72 1 CO, 1st Bn, 191st Inf CO TD810520 K (OBJ AUDI)

BMP/T-72 2 Co, 1st Bn, 191st Inf CO TD876548 K (OBJ YUGO)
BMP/T-72 3 Co, 1st Bn, 191st Inf CO TD849438 K (OBJ PORSCHE)
Bn HQ 1st Bn, 191st Inf HQ TD835419 T
SUPPORT ZONE
Example Threat Description Table
2S1 1 BTY, 191st ARTY Bn BTY TD845481 T
2S1 (Regular
2 BTY, 191st ARTY Bn BTY Threats)
TD871483 T
Example Threat Description Table (Irregular Threats) BM-21

CAR (BMPs and T-72s)
1 BTY,3/19th ARTY BDE
1 Co, 2-191st In Bn
BTY
CO
TD832479
TD918334
T
T

Sub-task 2 Describe the Environmental Effects
Describe How Terrain Can Affect Friendly and Threat Operations
ATP 2-01.3 states, “Terrain analysis is the evaluation of geographic information on the natural and manmade features of the terrain, combined with other
relevant factors, to predict the effect of the terrain on friendly and enemy operations. It involves the study and interpretation of natural and manmade features of
an area, their effects on military operations, and the effects of weather and climate on these features. Terrain analysis is a continuous process as changes in the
operational environment may alter the analysis of its effect on operations.”
A doctrinal change came about in the 2009 edition of FM 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. The memory aid formally used to describe the
military aspects of terrain changed from OCOKA (observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach) to
OAKOC. Only the order changed, not the elements.
When looking at OCOKA, it was a logical approach to the military analysis of terrain, but sequentially, it was incorrect. Cover and concealment and observation
and fields of fire can only be analyzed after terrain has been identified as restrictive or unrestrictive. In order to determine where friendly forces can see and
engage enemy forces or where friendly forces, as well as enemy forces, can use terrain to mask their location, first, identification of maneuverable terrain must
be made. It is an impossibility to determine cover and concealment, as well as observation and fields of fire, for the entire battlefield.
The change from OCOKA to OAKOC sequenced the analysis of terrain logically. The only issue left was which “O” was “obstacles” and which was
“observation and fields of fire.” Clearly, the doctrine writers understood how OCOKA affected the sequencing of terrain analysis. To change OCOKA to
OAKOC and let the first “O” stand for observation and fields of fire would have been contrary to a logical approach.
This approach has been taught for years. First, identify the obstacles (O), this leads to the determination of avenues of approach (A) and key terrain (K) relevant
to the avenues of approach. Finally, analyze the observation and fields of fire (O) and cover and concealment (C) relevant to those avenues of approach.
This forms a logical flow in terms of product development, from the COO to the MCOO, and finally determining the cover and concealment, as well as
observation and fields of fire based on the identification of maneuverable terrain.

Describe How Terrain Can Affect Friendly and Threat Operations (cont.)
Consider all aspects of OAKOC when analyzing the terrain,
however, focus on the most significant factors that support mission
Military Aspects of the Terrain (OAKOC) accomplishment and the needs of the commander. Evaluate the
factors in any order that will best support analysis.
There are two types of terrain in which a command may operate — natural and ATP 2-01.3
urban. Both of these terrain types are analyzed based on military aspects using
the OAKOC considerations.
As stated earlier, when doing analysis on the terrain, there are five aspects which can affect the mission. These factors are:
 Obstacles
 Avenues of approach
 Key and decisive terr ain
 Obser vation and fields of fire CAUTION Do not rely solely on HHQ products for your
 Cover and concealment IPB. Analysis should be based on your unit, its
mission, and specific information needs.
Obstacles
ADRP 1-02, Terms and Military Symbols, defines obstacles as, “Any natural or man-made obstruction designed or employed to disrupt, fix, turn, or block the
movement of an opposing force, and to impose additional losses in personnel, time, and equipment on the opposing force.” Some examples include buildings,
cities, mountains, rivers, forests, minefields, cultural sites, and certain wire obstacles.
There are two tools used to depict terrain. The combined obstacle overlay and the modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO). The combined obstacle
overlay is a product constructed by layering multiple obstacle overlays of different types into a single product . These single over lays might include
structures and population centers, mobility or lines of communication, vegetation, hydrology, and terrain classification. By looking at the obstacles to movement
(where the unit cannot or does not want to go), the remaining terrain represents where the unit can or would like to go. These individual overlays are derived
from the map. Once layered, they show all of the obstacles to movement in an AO. This forms the basis for developing mobility corridors, avenues of approach,
and finally, the terrain within the AO that may be considered key or decisive. Analysis must be used to build the MCOO.

Describe How Terrain Can Affect Friendly and Threat
Operations (cont.)
Identify pertinent obstacles
Obstacles (cont.)
in the AO Vegetation
Different obstacle types affect movement in different ways. The Obstructive terrain
same obstacle might impact the movement of different WFFs in
different ways as well. Because of this, it is incumbent on each
staff section / element to look at the terrain from his perspective Water features
and be prepared to provide that information to the Intelligence or
Topographic Section to be included in the combined obstacle Surface drainage
overlay.
Population centers
Obstacles can be found on the map or other digital terrain
products. Some are easier to identify than others. Some are
present all year round and some require meteorological and
oceanographic (METOC) analysis to determine if the effects of
the obstacle are present based on the time of year and/or weather Determine the effect of each No restriction to
in the area. obstacle on the mobility of movement
the evaluated force
Moderately restricts
Basically speaking, anything that is not flat and paved will affect
movement
some unit, vehicle, or piece of equipment detrimentally.
Severely restricts
As stated earlier, the terrain will affect each staff section / movement
element or WFF differently. An obstacle to one may have no
affect on another. There is no hard and fast rule as to what
constitutes unrestricted, restricted, or severely restricted terrain. Combine the effects of
individual obstacles into an
integrated product, such as
the COO
Defining Obstacles

Obstacles (cont.) Restricted Terrain Severely Restricted Terrain

Armor moderate to steep slopes steep slopes
Unrestricted Terrain – ATP 2-01.3 defines unrestricted terrain as “. . . moderate to densely wide, densely spaced obstacles
free of any restriction to movement. Nothing needs to be done to spaced obstacles no or few supporting roads
enhance mobility.”
Restricted Terrain – “. . . hinders movement to some degree. Little Light Infantry swamps or rugged
effort is needed to enhance mobility, but units may have difficulty terrain
maintaining preferred speeds, moving in combat formations, or forests or jungles
transitioning from one formation to another.” urban areas or villages
Severely Restricted Terrain – “. . . severely hinders or slows Airborne Infantry swamps or rugged mountainous areas
movement in combat formations unless some effort is made to enhance (LZ emplacement) terrain severe hydrology (lakes)
mobility. This could take the form of committing engineer assets to Artillery areas where mounted areas with slope ≥ 90 mils
improving mobility or of deviating from doctrinal tactics, such as forces plan to maneuver areas with sight to crest issues
moving in columns instead of line formations or at speeds much lower
Sustainment any terrain without deep defiles or waterways
than those preferred.”
hard-packed (or packed without bridges
gravel) roads
TIP Not all terrain is classified as “less than optimal” based Signal defiles and areas of low areas of terrain which will
on the effects. Artillery personnel prefer not to establish ground along the FM severely impact line of sight to
artillery firing points (AFPs) or Paladin Zones in areas where path FM communications
follow-on forces are preparing to maneuver. What Makes Terrain Restrictive?
The severity of obstacle effects on different types of maneuvering forces and equipment is directly proportional to the mobility capability they possess. The
terrain has less effect on tracked vehicles and high-mobility multi-wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs). Wheeled vehicles, especially support and logistics vehicles,
require improved surfaces to move about the terrain. Specialty equipment and equipment susceptible to damage fall into the same category.

Obstacles (cont.)
When evaluating the terrain for obstacles, look for manmade obstacles tied into natural
obstacles. These will generally be more effective when covered by observation,
indirect fire (IDF) or direct fire (DF). Even undefended obstacles can be effective if
they force the maneuvering element to change their course or canalize their formation.
While not addressed yet, as analysis is done on the terrain, ensure the effects of
weather are taken into account. A dry river bed, which has been labeled as restrictive
during map reconnaissance, may become severely restrictive if it fills during a flash
flood. Likewise, intermittent streams on maps may become impassable for many
months following spring thaws.
Not all maneuver elements prefer unrestricted terrain. While swamps, rugged terrain,
forests, and jungles may be categorized as restrictive terrain for light infantry Soldiers, it
is the terrain they prefer to move in due to the increased cover and concealment.
Remember, terrain classifications are not absolute. There are many examples of forces
achieving surprise and victory based on the enemy’s determination that they are protected
by the terrain.
Avenues of Approach Obstacles in Natural and Urban Terrain
ATP 2-01.3 defines an avenue of approach (AA) as, “... air or ground routes of an attacking force leading to its objective or to key terrain in its path.”
Understanding and being able to define AAs is important because any operation which involves maneuver depends on AAs. The unit’s ability to identify,
categorize, and group smaller corridors capable of maneuver into AAs will lead to the recommendation of the most efficient route toward an objective or the
identification of where the enemy will likely be moving through the unit’s AO.
To this point, obstacles, such as cities and towns, vegetation, hydrology, and terrain which can hinder movement have been identified and annotated on an
analog or digital map.

Describe How Terrain Can Affect
Friendly and Threat Operations (cont.)
Avenues of Approach (cont.)

Identify obstacles to Identify unrestricted,
The areas of the map which have not movement
terrain
been noted as having an impact on
movement and/or maneuver are
considered unrestricted terrain. Identify mobility Identify restricted terrain
Generally, during planning, units corridors
attempt to take advantage of these
areas as they provide the greatest
Identify severely
speed to the objective. Remember, the restricted terrain
speed you gain has a price . . . less Categorize mobility
cover and concealment. From here, corridors
mobility corridors must be identified,
categorized, grouped, and formed into Access to key terrain
avenues of approach. Group mobility and adjacent AAs
corridors to form
avenues of approach
Degree of canalization
Evaluate avenues of
Sustainability
approach
Access to the objective
Building Avenues of Approach

Legend
Sub-task 2 Restrictive terrain Describe the Environmental Effects
Severely restrictive
Describe How Terrain Can Affect
Area Friendly
Built and
up area
Threat Operations (cont.) Mobility corridor
Platoon
Company
Avenues of Approach and Mobility Corridors
Battalion
50
50Ave of approach
60 70 80 90 MK NK 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the
Airfield
Operational Environment, defines mobility corridors
as, “areas relatively free of obstacles
China Lake
Playa / sabkha
where a force
40 of mass Key terrain
K
can capitalize on the principles and speed,
but is canalized due to restrictive terrain along both
flanks.” As a stand-alone definition, this sounds like
Standard Mobility Corridor Sizes
a negative thing. Remember what was stated
previously. Mobility corridors30are formed in the
terrain between obstacles. The obstacles are naturally canalizing. The same obstacles which
canalize a unit during movement, may provide cover and/or concealment to the front or flanks.
Quuam Sakhrat
Mobility corridors are categorized

20 by the size of unit that can deploy along them. The chart
above shows the typical size of mobility corridors for selected sized units.
Medina Ma’akl
Medina Wasl
10
Once identification of obstacles in the AO is complete, and restricted and severely restricted Wadi Ra’id
terrain has been annotated on the map, as well as the hydrology and population centers, only
unrestricted terrain remains. This product is called a COO because it represents the Legend Medina Irwin
compilation of single overlaysMKreflecting terrain, population centers, and hydrology all placed
MK NK Severely Mezra’s Mazik Ahmar
on the same overlay. This is where

MJ mobility corridors are annotated based on the size force MJ NJ Restricted
Terrain El Whaleo
capable of passing through them in combat formations. Evaluating the terrain in terms of what Restricted
size maneuver element it supports provides the unit with a set of mobility corridors from Terrain
Airports
which to create avenues of approach. Towns
90
50 60 70 80 90 MJ NJ 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
The combined obstacle overlay is the beginning of the MCOO.
Combined Obstacle Overlay

Avenues of Approach and Mobility Corridors (cont.)
Unfortunately, at this point, we must take a step backward and do some doctrinal “wordsmithing.”
FMI 2-01.301, Specific Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures and Applications for Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, stated in paragraph 1-80, “To
construct a MCOO, begin with a COO and add the following:
 Mobility corridors.
 AAs (air and ground).
 Key terrain.”
When FM 2-01.3 and FMI 2-01.301 were combined and updated into ATP 2-01.3, this simple statement failed to make the direct transition. What was brought
forward were the following:
Paragraph 4-54: “The combined obstacle overlay provides a basis for identifying ground AAs and mobility corridors. Unlike the cross-country mobility, the
combined obstacle overlay integrates all obstacles to vehicular movement, such as built-up areas, slope, soils, vegetation, and hydrology into one overlay. The
overlay depicts areas that impede movement (severely restricted and restricted areas) and areas where friendly and enemy forces can move unimpeded
(unrestricted areas).”
and
Paragraph 4-53: “The MCOO is a graphic product that portrays the effects of natural and urban terrain on military operations. The MCOO normally depicts
military significant aspects of the terrain and other aspects of the terrain that can affect mobility. Though not all inclusive, some of these aspects are:
 AAs.
 Mobility corridors.
 Natural and manmade obstacles.
 Terrain mobility classifications.
 Key terrain.”
This basically says the same thing as FMI 2-01.301 … If we take away the mobility corridors, AAs (air and ground), and key terrain (elements of the MCOO),
we are left with the natural and man-made obstacles and the terrain mobility classifications of the terrain in the AO (the COO). So … the difference between the
COO and the MCOO is the analysis which allows us to develop the mobility corridors and AAs, and from that, allows us to determine key terrain.

Legend
Restrictive terrain
Sub-task 2 Area
Built up area Describe the Environmental Effects
Mobility corridor
Describe How Terrain Can Affect Friendly and ThreatPlatoon
Operations (cont.)
Company
Battalion
50
Avenues of Approach and Mobility Corridors (cont.)
50Ave of approach
60 70 80 90 MK NK 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Airfield
At this point, the AAs must be evaluated as to their Playa
relative
China Lake
/ sabkha
worth. The AA in the center (AA2),
K Key terrain
would support movement of up to a brigade-size 40 element. This movement would generally be across
Legend open terrain with little cover or concealment. The AA in the south (AA3), would support up to a I
strictive terrain
battalion-size element with relatively little obstacle interference, yet still provide cover from both the
everely restrictive
ilt up area front and northern flank. The AA in the north (AA1), is constricted at the entrance and at the far
bility corridor 30
latoon
eastern edge. While this avenue of approach would only support a company-size element, the terrain II
I
ompany offers good cover and concealment
attalion II
e of approach
60 and
70 could be used to stealthily
80 90 MK NK 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
I
50
Quuam Sakhrat
field maneuver a smaller element into a 20 X

ya / sabkha flanking position.
y terrain 40
Medina Ma’akl
I
X
X Medina Wasl
10
Wadi Ra’id
I
II
30
AA1 I X
II
Quuam Sakhrat
Legend Medina Irwin
MK I MK NK Severely Mezra’s Mazik Ahmar
MJ MJ NJ Restricted
20 El Whaleo
X
Terrain
Restricted
Medina Ma’akl
Terrain
AA2 X
Airports II
Medina Wasl
X
Towns 10
90
Wadi Ra’id
I
50 60 70 80 90 MJ NJ 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
X
Legend Medina Irwin
MK NK
MJ NJ
Severely
Restricted
El Whaleo
Mezra’s Mazik Ahmar
The
NJ Mobility Corridors
NK
Terrain
Restricted
Terrain
Airports II AA3
Towns
90
60 70 80 90 MJ NJ 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Avenues of Approach
Grouping together the mobility corridors produces
three distinct avenues of approach.

EXAMPLES OF KEY TERRAIN
Describe How Terrain Can Affect Friendly and Threat Operations (cont.) Terrain Reason it is "Key"
Offensive and Defensive Operations

Avenues of Approach in Stability and DSCA Operations
Bridges Mobility
Road Networks Mobility, Logistics
Based on the nature of stability operations and the movement involved, templated AAs are High Ground Observation, Communications
not always applicable. The movement of single persons or small groups will not be Deep Defiles Ambush sites
restricted to large mobility corridors and, because of the ability to blend in with the local Flat area in otherwise rough terrain airborne operations, aerial resupply
populace, insurgent movement is generally done during the daylight hours and along Road Intersections Mobility
civilian transportation lines. Insurgents have discovered that movement of any kind during Gaps in severely restricted terrain Mobility
limited visibility or along sub-optimal avenues of approach attracts the attention of friendly
Stability Operations
forces.
Bridges Mobility
Road Networks Mobility
In DSCA operations, AAs are used more to determine routes for convoy operations and Buildings Cover, Observation
emergency evacuation routes. In some cases, AAs may be used to determine how criminals
Military Logistic Facilities Logistics
might infiltrate the area. Choke Points Mobility, Logistics
Telephone Exchange Communications, Influence

Key Terrain Power Lines Infrastructure Support, Influence
HN Government Offices Infrastructure Support
JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, defines key Key Personnel Communications, Leadership
Road intersections Mobility
terrain as, “any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked
advantage to either combatant.” DSCA Operations
The definition of “key terrain” has different meanings to different staff sections / elements Bridges Mobility, Evacuation, Logistics
and WFFs. For the S-4 or forward support company (FSC) commander, a single bridge into, Road Networks Mobility, Evacuation, Logistics
out of, or through the AO may be “key” in order to provide sustainment to the force. For the Military Logistic Facilities Logistics
S-6, the only piece of high ground in the AO may be “key” because of the limitations of
Choke Points Mobility, Evacuation, Logistics
frequency modulation (FM) communications that require retransmission. Like defining Telephone Exchange Communications
obstacles in an AO, all of the staff section / element recommendations for key terrain must Power Lines Infrastructure Support
be analyzed for their benefit to friendly and enemy forces. Government Offices Infrastructure Support
Key Personnel Communications, Leadership

Harbors Logistic Support
Examples of Key Terrain

Key Terrain (cont.)
TIP JP 2-01.3 instructs that the four other aspects of terrain should be evaluated prior to
the evaluation of key terrain. Once the other four aspects of terrain have been
evaluated, use these results to identify and assess key terrain.
As with other aspects of Mission Analysis, individual staff sections / elements need to understand that their assessment of what is, or is not, key terrain might
not match the unit’s overall assessment of what is, or is not, key terrain. Like risk, once an area has been designated “key,” it requires additional analysis, even
if the friendly unit’s plan does not include it. Analysis might indicate that assets may be required to deny that terrain to enemy forces for the successful
completion of the friendly mission.
A commander might determine that a piece of terrain is so critical that failure to gain and retain it would cause mission failure. In that case, he has identified
“decisive terrain.” Decisive terrain has an extraordinary impact on the mission. Keep in mind that decisive terrain is rare and is not present in every situation.
Observation and Fields of Fire
Observation is the condition of weather and terrain that allows a force to see friendly, enemy, and neutral personnel, systems, and key aspects of the
terrain. Fields of fire are areas which a weapon system or group of weapon systems may effectively cover with fire from a given position . Fields of fir e
are directly tied to observation, and through careful analysis of each, the commander and staff will be able to identify potential engagement areas, defensible
terrain, vulnerabilities from threat observation and fires, and visual and weapons dead space.

Observation and Fields of Fire (cont.)
Effects of Elevation on Observation

Soldier standing on 2 story structure (25.5 ft)
Never underestimate the importance of
Soldier standing on 1 story structure (15.5 ft)
elevation on the distance you or your
enemy can see. The graphic to the right Soldier standing in HMMWV (8 ft)
shows the increased distances the eye can
30 Soldier standing on ground (5.5 ft)
see based on curvature of the Earth, and
represents the ability to see an object on
eye elevation in feet (E)

25
the ground. Every two meters an object is (6.6 miles)
elevated off the surface increases the 20
distance the observer can see by 15 (5.2 miles)
approximately three miles. Therefore, a
Soldier can see the top of a Soldier’s head 10
at six miles, but can see him entirely at (3.73 miles)
three miles. 5 (3.09 miles)
2 3 4 5 6 7
visibility distance in miles (D)

using formula
D ≈ 1.32 x (E)
Effects of Elevation on Observation

Effects of Elevation on Observation (cont.)
Line of Sight Analysis


In a linear shape, the Line of Sight (LOS) is blocked uniformly across the
As you can see from the previous diagram, elevation front. While there may be intervisibility inside of the individual contour
lines, it is blocked when viewed at the perpendicular or oblique.
creates increased observation and enhances the line-of-
sight (LOS) of DF weapon systems. Because of this,
areas of elevation tend to draw the attention of the LINEAR SHAPE
enemy and can be seen as advantageous to whomever
controls them.
In a sloped shape, the LOS is blocked more on one side than another. In this
Of course, the best fields of fire will be on flat terrain example, the observer in the tank is able to see down the slope on the left
side, but not perpendicular or oblique to the front or right.
with no cover or concealment for the enemy. The
enemy knows this too, and by doing his own LOS and SLOPE SHAPE
fields-of-fire analysis, will determine where he can
affect you.
In a point shape, the LOS is blocked directly ahead but visibility is not
hindered to the sides. As the observer moves closer to the point, his view
Intervisibility Lines (IVLs) will become more obstructed and his field of view will narrow.
IVLs, contrary to popular belief, are not another terrain POINT SHAPE
feature such as a hilltop, valley, saddle, ridge, or
depression. Rather, they are an effect caused by subtle
changes in elevation. These changes in elevations tend In a pass shape, the LOS is clear to the front but blocked to the obliques.
to block LOS in a general direction. While the examples Once he passes the two points which create the pass, his LOS and field of
view will increase.
to the right look like terrain features, keep in mind, an
IVL is NOT a terrain feature.
PASS SHAPE
Intervisibility lines tend to fall into four basic shapes:

linear, sloped, pointed, or pass. Shapes Associated with Intervisibility Lines

Cover and Concealment
In one sense, concealment, which, according to Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, is protection from observation or surveillance, is the other side of the “Observation
and Fields of Fire” coin. If you look at the terrain in terms of the dead space from observation, you have identified areas that can provide concealment for you
and the enemy. There are many things that provide concealment from observation, including subtle changes in the terrain, certain vegetation such as trees, tall
grasses and cultivated vegetation, (orchards, cornfields), and obscuring weather conditions, which might include rain, fog, and snow. In and of themselves,
concealment and man-made camouflage do not necessarily provide cover.
Cover, the protection from the effects of fire, is created by

placing either man-made or natural barriers between you and
bullets, fragments from exploding rounds, flames, nuclear
effects, and biological or chemical effects. While certain types
of cover, such as ditches, riverbanks, and folds in the ground,
also provide concealment, above ground bunkers, buildings,
and other protective structures in plain sight do not.
Effects of Elevation on Cover and Concealment
Not all cover and concealment is good cover and concealment.

In the example to the right, the Soldier in the defile has good
cover and concealment from observers on the ground. The
change in elevation from the observer on the ground to the
observer on the hill negates both the cover and the
concealment of the Soldier in the ditch. Elevation greatly
increases observation capability, as it reduces your enemy’s
capability to use some of the available cover and concealment.
Because of this, elevation which provides improved Elevation and Observation
observation capability can provide a marked advantage to
whoever possesses it.

Effective Use of Cover and Concealment in Stability Operations

Camouflage is an effective method of concealment. The ability to
blend in with one’s surroundings can help avoid detection while hiding
in plain sight. Insurgents, understanding the friendly force’s aversion
Creating the COO and MCOO
to collateral damage, have placed weapons, their homes, and meeting
places in or near schools, hospitals, markets, or other places where
their destruction could wound or kill many innocent people.
Terrain Products
Building the COO and MCOO
While there are five military aspects of terrain that are

evaluated during the IPB Process – observation and fields of
fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover
and concealment (OAKOC) – only two of them are derived
from the map – obstacles and avenues of approach. The other
three, observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment,
and key terrain, are derived from analysis of the terrain when
matched against mission requirements. ATP 2-01.3 states,
“the combined obstacle overlay integrates all obstacles to
vehicular movement, such as built-up areas, slope, soils,
vegetation, and hydrology into one overlay.”
TIP To build the COO, separate
When building the COO and MCOO, begin with overlays of population centers,
the unit’s assigned AO. Ensure you include hydrology, terrain, vegetation, and
enough terrain outside the AO to account for any other obstacles are layered into a
obstacles that may influence actions within your single COO.
AO, as well as obstacles that can affect
movement into your AO.
Beginning of the COO (AO)

Terrain Products (cont.)
Building the COO and MCOO (cont.)
Here, the restricted terrain is addressed. While not a significant set of Hydrology is added here. Hydrology must be addressed to determine if the
obstacles in this AO, restricted terrain to maneuver elements may be viewed water features are easily fordable, or require engineering assets to cross.
as severely restricted terrain to artillery units (due to sight-to-crest issues) or Many water features, like this one running completely through the AO, serve
sustainment elements (due to lack of available hard-packed roads). as informal boundaries and must be evaluated as to how intelligence will be
Creating the COO and MCOO gathered and where enemy forces might attempt to cross.
Restricted Terrain (Obstacles) Added to the COO Hydrology (Obstacles) Added to the COO

The areas not hindered by obstacles are considered unrestricted terrain.
Building the COO and MCOO (cont.) Because the obstacles canalize movement, these obstacle-free areas must
be evaluated as to the size of the combat formation that can maneuver
By adding severely restricted terrain, the canalization effects are beginning along them. In stability operations, there is no need to evaluate the size
to appear. There is canalization both inside and outside the AO. This of the mobility corridors due to the uniqueness of the force travelling
becomes key as mobility corridors are addressed. through them. The true purpose of identifying mobility corridors is the
understanding of where the friendly and enemy forces can freely
At this point, barring any additional overlays such as road networks or maneuver.
vegetation, the COO is ready to be analyzed and the final four military
aspects of terrain can be addressed.
TIP The MCOO is derived from the COO by adding

the mobility corridors, avenues of approach, and
key terrain.
Severely Restricted Terrain (Obstacles) Added to the COO Unrestricted Terrain on the COO

Building the COO and MCOO (cont.) By grouping together the mobility corridors, AAs are created. AAs are ground
or air routes of an attacking force of a given size leading to its objective or key
terrain in its path. In this example, due to the severely restricted hydrological
In this example, historical smuggling routes have been added to the terrain which bisects the AO, there are two AAs through the AO. These two
mobility corridors derived through evaluation of unrestricted terrain to avenues of approach originate on either side of the water feature.
further clarify the natural lines of drift, as well as the historical use of
terrain as it applies to movement through the AO. Creating the COO and MCOO
Historical Routes Added to the COO Avenues of Approach Identified on the COO

Terrain Products (cont.) Creating the COO and MCOO
Building the COO and MCOO (cont.)
The final action in developing the

MCOO from the COO is to identify the
terrain that provides its holder with a
marked advantage. In this example, there
are five pieces of key terrain. Three of
these pieces involve small passes
between severely restricted terrain. The
piece of key terrain in the south is the
only major intersection tying the major
LOC with the towns in the AO. The final
piece of key terrain is the only bridge
across the water feature that divides the
northern portion of the AO from the
southern.
The MCOO is the key visual tool that

describes the terrain in terms of
movement capability. It is required to
continue with the final sub-task of IPB
(Determine Threat Courses of Action). A
commander and staff with good terrain
visualization skills can “see” the terrain
through the MCOO, but the MCOO isn’t
truly finished until it is evaluated with
respect to terrain effects. Following are
additional products which illustrate how
to “see” the effects of the terrain.
Completed MCOO

Terrain Effects Products
This simple chart below shows the effects of terrain based on the military In this example, the effects of terrain are broken down based on
aspects of terrain. As with all intelligence products, the producer should WFFs rather than military aspects of terrain, and encompass
strive to develop a comprehensive intelligence estimate . . . the “so what” multiple areas of the battlefield. While it is good to know that
of the product. While this product begins to show the effects of terrain conditions are favorable throughout much of the AO based on
from phase line to phase line, and in both offensive and defensive these WFFs, it is more important to know why some of the
operations, it still lacks the refinement necessary to show the staff the true WFFs are showing marginal or unfavorable effects of terrain in
terrain effects. some areas. This will become very important when attempting
to develop friendly COAs, as well as depicting the threat COAs
throughout the AO the unit has been assigned.
TERRAIN EFFECTS
TERRAIN PL BRONZE TO PL GOLD

FACTORS OFFENSE DEFENSE TERRAIN EFFECTS
30 BDE 48 BDE 1/24 30 BDE 48 BDE 1/24CAV
OBS & FIELDS OF FIRE CAV
PL BRONZE TO PL GOLD TO
COVER & CONCEAL
AIR AIR AIR AIR AIR AIR Warfighting
PL GOLD PL TIN
GROUND GROUND GROUND GROUND GROUND GROUND
Functions
OBSTACLES
Movement and Maneuver
KEY TERRAIN
Intelligence
AVENUES OF APPROACH
Sustainment
Mission Command
Fires
Protection
FAVORABLE MARGINAL UNFAVORABLE
FAVORABLE MARGINAL UNFAVORABLE
Sample Terrain Effects Product Sample Terrain Effects Product

Terrain Effects Products (cont.)
This sample product

gives the commander and TERRAIN EFFECTS
staff the complete picture
of the terrain. It was not PL BRONZE TO PL GOLD TO
produced solely by the Warfighting
PL GOLD PL TIN
Intelligence Section, but Functions
rather through the Movement and Maneuver
collaborative efforts of
the entire staff. It shows Intelligence
both the terrain’s effects
Sustainment
on each respective WFF,
a corresponding map for Mission Command
ease of identification, and
a comprehensive estimate Fires
of why the terrain is Protection
favorable, marginal, or
unfavorable for each FAVORABLE MARGINAL UNFAVORABLE
WFF. From this product,
the commander and staff
gain a greater From PL BRONZE to PL GOLD, terrain is generally flat and allows easy movement. Numerous small roads dominate the terrain and
appreciation of the sustainment assets will be able to move freely. Both air and ground sensors will be able to pick up movement due to flat nature of terrain.
terrain, it’s effects, and LOS is good for FM comms. No issues for artillery or mortar fire. Reports of numerous dismounted enemy patrols in rear area able to blend
where they can be in with civilians accounts for the marginal terrain with regards to Protection.
mitigated.
From PL GOLD to PL TIN, Terrain gets rougher. Expect the need for minor engineer support to breach stream bed south of PL GOLD.
Intelligence effort still viable. Road network thins out as units move south. Lack of roads in open terrain may hinder ROM for mechanized
forces. As ground becomes rougher, numerous ridges coming from restricted terrain in the west interfere with FM comms. Need to establish
retrans on hilltop 475. Same hills and ridges cause site to crest issues for artillery. May need to use more mortar fires through theterrain
north of PL TIN. Less areas for enemy to hide in and greater fields of fire allow for greater engagement distances.
Sample Terrain Effects Product

One of the most prolific users of terrain effects products is the signal officer, As the S-6 continues to identify communications dead space, he emplaces
or S-6. His FM communications are completely based on LOS. In this more retransmission sites to fill out his FM coverage.
example, the S-6 has used terrain software with digital terrain elevation data
(DTED) to identify the FM footprint in his AO. Based on his LOS
capabilities, the S-6 can recommend where, or if, retransmission nodes must
be emplaced in order to provide FM support to the commander and troops.
FROM FOB COPPER RT 1 from NV482148

FM Coverage
FM Coverage
No FM Coverage
No FM Coverage
Suitable Terrain for Retransmission Nodes (From FOB COPPER) Suitable Terrain for Retransmission Nodes (From Retrans 1)

As the S-6 emplaces his final organic assets, he must make recommendations The commander takes the recommendations of the S-6 and either requests
to the commander as to how the “gaps” in communications might be additional assets from HHQ (based on a thorough war-game), adjusts assets
mitigated. as necessary to provide coverage where his forces are, or accepts risk based
on the inability to provide FM communications. In some cases, the lack of
FM communications can be mitigated with non-LOS communications
systems.
FOB tower plus 2 retrans

RT2 from NV615179
FM Coverage FM Coverage
No FM Coverage No FM Coverage
Communications
Deadspace
Suitable Terrain for Retransmission Nodes (From Retrans 2) Suitable Terrain for Retransmission Nodes (From
FOB tower plus two retrans locations)

Describe How Weather Can Affect Friendly and Threat Operations
All the climate information in the world will not prepare you for the
multitude of faces the weather can conjure during operations. The best
weather predictions are no good for more than 48 -72 hours out. This is
why it is incumbent on each staff section / element to have a thorough
understanding of how weather, and changes in weather patterns, can
affect their respective WFF and equipment.
Military Aspects of Weather
In defining the impact weather can have on operations and the OE, there
are several military aspects that must be considered. These are visibility,
wind, precipitation, cloud cover, temperature, humidity, and sometimes
atmospheric pressure. While the military aspects of weather in DSCA
operations do not differ greatly from offensive or defensive operations,
take into consideration how additional precipitation would affect DSCA
operations stemming from a flooded river.
Position of Sun and Moon Relative to the Horizon
Visibility
Visibility, according to ATP 2-01.3, is “. . . the greatest distance that prominent objects can be seen and identified by the unaided, normal eye.” Important to
note, unlike the other military aspects of weather, visibility is not a “stand alone” aspect of weather, rather it is a result of other weather conditions. Visibility
relies on the ability of light to illuminate an object and reflect that light to an observer. Visibility can be reduced by the reduction of ambient light due to the
rotation of the Earth, atmospheric interference, such as rain, snow, fog, or other cloud effects, or the presence of atmospheric particles, such as smoke, dust, or
haze.
Both the sun and moon affect ambient light reaching the Earth, and, as the diagram above shows, at different times during the day, the amount of light increases
and decreases based on the curvature of the Earth, as well as the relationship of the sun or moon to both the object viewed and the observer.
The effects of loss of visibility may not affect specific systems but may diminish the system capability. The inability of an observer to adequately identify a
target will hinder indirect fire operations even though the weapon systems are unaffected by lack of visibility.

Describe How Weather Can Affect Friendly and Threat Operations (cont.)
Wind Considerations
The effects of wind can reduce the combat effectiveness by limiting or eliminating visibility caused by blowing sand, dust, smoke, or precipitation. The effects
of wind must be considered when factoring both friendly and enemy chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) operations. The effects of smoke
may be nearly negated based on how, and from what direction, the wind is blowing. Wind turbulence, coupled with wind speed at the ground, can limit aircraft
performance and reconnaissance capability.
The ability to use aviation assets, either fixed, rotary, or unmanned, requires analysis of wind conditions, not only at ground level, but also at different air
levels. This will generally be done by HHQ, but their “go” or “no-go” evaluation could affect planned operations. Strong winds can hamper the efficiency of a
directional antenna due to antenna wobble. Strong winds can also greatly change the trajectory of non-guided, indirect-fire munitions.
Precipitation
Precipitation occurs at all locations and at all temperatures. Rarely does it provide positive impacts on operations. Precipitation can take the form of rain,
sleet, drizzle, freezing rain, hail, or snow. What type of precipitation a unit receives is generally based on the factors of temperature, wind speed, and weather
patterns. Whatever type of precipitation is received, the only positive effects that can be derived are the enemy’s loss of visibility and the inability to detect
friendly forces. In the negative, precipitation hinders friendly force observation, communications, mobility, sustainment efforts, unit morale, and many
civilian activities. While a little rain might cool off a hot summer day, there is seldom just a little rain.
Cloud Cover
Cloud cover has two significant impacts on ground operations. First, the density of the cloud cover can affect the amount of light that is allowed to
illuminate objects. Referring to what was previously discussed in the section on visibility, a lack of ambient light reduces visibility. However, dense cloud
cover can increase ambient light from ground sources. So, depending on where the light comes from, an increase or decrease in visibility is possible. Another
double-edged effect of cloud cover is fog. While fog is considered a type of cloud, it is distinguished from other clouds by its low-lying nature and because the
moisture is generally derived locally (e.g., a local body of water, or nearby marshes, or moist ground). Fog can be an ally or an enemy depending on the
operation. In defensive operations, fog favors the attacking force because of its ability to conceal. Conversely, in attacking scenarios, fog helps obscure
movement, muffle sound, and distort distances. Based on the density of the cloud cover, certain aviation operations may also be affected. Many information
collection and target acquisition assets are degraded by cloud cover.

Temperature
Temperature affects Soldiers, equipment, and the environment. Extreme temperatures decrease Soldier capabilities, increase injury, and ca use equipment
malfunctions and breakdowns. Tactics that are effective at one temperature, may not work in another. Temperature is a factor which is impacted by other
weather factors. Low temperature taken with wind speed produces wind chill. Temperature taken with humidity affects air density. The “critical” temperature
(wind chill) factor is –25° F (-32°C). This wind chill temperature can be produced with an actual temperature of 10°F and a wind speed of 20 miles per hour
(mph). Conversely, the opposite extreme is 120°F (49°C). The military uses the wet-bulb-globe-temperature (WBGT) of 90°F as critical to personnel operating
in hot weather climates.
Extreme temperatures require an almost constant need for either heating or cooling of Soldiers and equipment, and will cause difficulty in constructing
fortifications, severely increase the dependence on logistical support, and require special clothing, equipment, and training. In extreme temperatures, leader
skills are taxed and every Soldier becomes responsible for his buddy. Work becomes restricted in extreme temperature conditions and certain operations may
have to be postponed or cancelled altogether based on temperature extremes.
Humidity
Humidity, in shor t, is the amount of water vapor in the air. There ar e two measur ements of humidity used in military operations – relative humidity
and absolute humidity. Relative humidity is the ratio of the water content in the air at a given temperature to the amount of water the air is capable of
holding before it condenses into precipitation. Absolute humidity is the total amount of water in a given volume of air . In tr opical ar eas, the absolute
humidity is high and in arctic regions, the absolute humidity is low. The level of humidity affects the formation of clouds and fog, affects the capability of the
human body to cool itself, and can affect automated sensors and “smart” weapons. High humidity decreases the capability of both lift and propulsion in fixed-
wing and rotary-wing aircraft.
Thermal Crossover
While not a military aspect of weather, thermal crossover is a natural phenomenon that occurs when an unheated object loses its thermal contrast with respect
to nearby objects. This generally occurs twice a day as the temperatures move from low-to-high in the morning and high-to-low in the evening. This effect
causes problems for thermal sights and forward-looking infrared (FLIR) sensors. A difference in temperature is required for these types of equipment to “see”
their targets.

Temperature Inversion
Temperature inversions occur when the air closest to the Earth is cooler than
the air above it. This happens when a less dense air mass moves over a more
dense air mass. This phenomenon generally occurs in the presence of warm
fronts or sea coasts. When a temperature inversion occurs, a layer of air is
trapped between the Earth and a low-lying inversion cap. When sufficient
humidity is present, fog forms and stays close to the ground. Until the ambient
temperature of the ground warms, the fog remains. The military aspect of
temperature inversion is the tremendous capability it has to keep
obscurants at ground level. Smoke pots, hand-held AN-M8
hexachloroethane (HC), and AN-M18 colored smoke grenades achieve
greater results when used in conjunction with this weather effect.
Conversely, the effects of chemical agents are also intensified because
their effect is trapped into a smaller layer of air. Soldiers in fighting
positions are further affected because the warmer air tends to drift and find
the lowest, coolest air.
Depicting Weather Effects
Weather effects are harder to depict graphically and are generally
presented in a chart or matrix format. Some examples of these products
will be included at the end of this section. The single most important,
easiest to create, and most often overlooked product, is the wind direction arrow. This simple device should
be placed on the fusion map and annotated with a date-time stamp and wind velocity. By placing the wind
direction arrow on the map, the Fires Support Element (FSE) has the capability of adjusting targets to
achieve desired effects, the effects of smoke can be easily calculated, and chemical downwind predictions
can be easily displayed.
Whatever the means used to display weather, focus should remain on its effects. The commander and staff
do not need to know it is going to rain; they need to know that mobility, observation, and sustainability will
be impaired, and that system functionality may be adversely affected.

Weather Effects Products
The following pages show examples of weather tools and how they
explain the effects of the weather to commanders and their staffs.
The easiest to produce and yet most neglected weather effect product
is the weather arrow. Remember, based on the earlier discussion,
when dealing with wind, there are two factors – direction and A more permanent wind direction and velocity tool can be created using two
velocity. This is an example of a product that can be easily made out pieces of cardboard. The bottom piece is labeled with numbers and the top piece
of scrap cardboard and covered with combat acetate. This can be is unadorned other than a window at an edge. The wind direction arrow is
taped to the fusion map and rotated as necessary. The wind velocity placed on top and all three pieces of cardboard are secured with a rivet or round-
can be changed using an alcohol pen. This provides a great point of headed fastener. This tool can be permanently mounted on the fusion map, does
reference and is a critical factor when using smoke, firing non-LOS not require moving to change wind direction, and only requires turning the outer
weapons, and determining additional weather effects. wheel to change wind velocity.
19 calm 1
18 2
3
17
4
16
5
15
6
14
13 7
12 8
11 9
10
Weather Arrow Wind Direction / Velocity Tool

Weather Effects Products (cont.)
Another tool used both as part of the intelligence running estimate and This is another example of a Light and Weather Chart. This chart
for Mission Analysis Briefings is the Light and Weather Chart. This deals with the military aspects of weather in a timeline format. The
single product displays the military aspects of weather in a single, easy- advantage of this type of product over the previous one is that the
to-read format. Like the terrain products previously discussed, the only mission timeline can be added to the bottom and the effects of the
thing lacking is the comprehensive estimate. While this is a good stand- weather on the operation can be easily seen. In this example, if the
alone product for the running estimate or intelligence wing board, an unit is attacking, they should be in their attack positions prior to
explanation of the effects of the weather on the upcoming and future 0230 hours to take advantage of the lack of ambient lighting. Based
operations would be required. on the commander’s discretion, the unit can attack prior to the fog
forming, as the fog forms, or as the fog lifts.
Light & Weather Forecast

090001SEP13– 090400SEP13– 090800SEP13– 091200SEP13– 091600SEP13– 092000SEP13–
090400SEP13 090800SEP13 091200SEP13 091600SEP13 092000SEP13 092400SEP13
DZHALILABAD, ATROPIA : 9 ~ 13 SEP 13 54--------- 53 77--------- 74

Temperature
60------54
Low 52 53--------- 64 64--------- 77 High 78 74----------- 62
Temperature Hi 66~79 F/ Lo 50~54 F SR 0723 SS 2002
BMNT 0625 EENT 2100
Humidity 50 - 75 % Illumination
MR 0241 MS 1811
Surface Wind 5 ~ 10kt from W 22% illumination
Ceiling > 5000ft, scat/bkn/ some overcast

Precipitation
0.4 “ 0.7 “
Ground Visibility > 3000m (A.M. fog 9 Sep 11)
Cloud
Precipitation Light Rain- 090200 – 090430 (0.4 in) Cover
1200 1800 2400

0912000600
- 092100 (0.71200
in)
Ceiling 5000 ft 1000 ft 4000 ft 5000 ft
MS:1730 SS:2003 MR: 0241 BMNT: SR: 0723
9 SEP EENT:2102 22% 0625
10 SEP broken broken scattered
MS:1811 SS:2002 MR: 0342 BMNT: SR: 0724
10 SEP EENT:2100 14% 0626 11 SEP
MS:1846 SS:2000 MR:0446 BMNT: SR: 0725 Wind W at 7 W at calm W at 10 W at 5
11 SEP EENT:2058 8% 0627 12 SEP
MS:1916 SS:1959 MR: 0550 BMNT: SR: 0726
12 SEP EENT: 2057 4% 0628 13 SEP
Humidity
100% 75% 100% 50%
Light and Weather Chart Light and Weather Chart

Weather Effects Products (cont.)
Light & Weather Effects
111200SEP11
120001SEP11
101200SEP11
110001SEP11
100001SEP11
While not associated with the two previous
091200SEP14
100001SEP14
101200SEP14
110001SEP14
111200SEP14
120001SEP14
91200SEP11
FRIENDLY EFFECTS ON TOP examples, the tool to the left represents the
ENEMY EFFECTS ON BOTTOM depiction of the effects of the weather broken
Dismounted forces down into 6-hour blocks.
Mounted forces Like the examples used in describing the effects

of terrain, this chart is a quick stand-alone chart
Thermal observation for reference, but fails to provide the necessary
clarity for planning.
NVD observation
While the favorable conditions are clear enough
Indirect fires (observers) for planning, the unfavorable or restrictive
CAS aspects of the weather must be clearly addressed
for the commander and staff to plan. These
RW aviation effects must be mitigated, or taken advantage of,
as the operation dictates.
Ground IEW
Aerial IEW
CBRN
Smoke
Favorable Unfavorable
Light and Weather Effects

Describe How Civil Considerations Can Affect Friendly and Threat Operations
The days of offensive or defensive operations without regard to civilian infrastructure and “human terrain” are gone. An appreciation of civil considerations
and their ability to impact missions remain key to successful operations. The analysis of civil infrastructures enhances several aspects of military operations –
the selection of objectives, location, movement and control of forces, use of weapons, and protective measures.
There are six characteristics that comprise civil considerations derived from the mission variables. These are expressed using the memory aid “ASCOPE:”
 Ar eas.
 Str uctur es.
 Capabilities.
 Or ganizations.
 People.
 Events.
Areas
When dealing with areas as a civil consideration understand that they may have no military significance. When looking at civil areas, it must be done from a
civilian standpoint. Commanders and their staffs must analyze civilian areas based on how they will impact military operations and how military operations
will, in turn, affect them. Examples of key civilian areas include:
 Areas defined by political boundaries, such as districts within a city or municipalities within a region.
 Locations of government centers.
 Social, political, religious, or criminal enclaves.
 Agricultural and mining regions.
 Trade / smuggling routes.
 Possible sites for the temporary settlement of dislocated civilians or other civil functions.
These areas need to be annotated on products and are as important as unit boundaries or other operational graphics. The success or failure of a mission could
well hinge on a thorough understanding of where the unit is operating and what the political, religious, and/or sentimental atmosphere is towards friendly
forces.

Describe How Civil Considerations Can Affect Friendly and Threat Operations (cont.)
Structures
Structures are generally broken down into four groups:

 Structures that are generally considered HPTs:
 Bridges.
 Communications structures.
 Electric and gas utility structures.
 Dams and wind farms.
 Sites protected by international law or other agreement:

 Churches, mosques, temples or other religious sites.
 National libraries and other centers of learning.
 Health care facilities.
 Sites with possible military applications:

 Jails.
 Warehouses.
 Media facilities, to include television, radio, and print plants.
 Other aspects of the infrastructure that have the capacity to influence military operations:
 Toxic industrial materials.
 Fertilizer plants.
 Chemical plants.
 Battery production facilities.
Structures must be analyzed based on how their location, function, and capabilities may support the operation. Sometimes there is also a consequence in using
a structure that must be assessed. If the military use of a structure competes with its intended civilian use, the attitude of the public might be swayed away from
cooperation. When possible, commanders should attempt to compensate locals for the use of shared facilities.

Structures (cont.)
Some additional aspects of structure that should be considered are:
 Locations of police stations or other security operation structures.
 Locations of essential services and key logistic and sustainment facilities such as:
 Potable water sources (wells and pumps) and water distribution stations.
 Sewage treatment plants and sewer systems.
 Refineries and fuel oil or propane storage facilities.
 LOCs.
 Communication facilities (phone, internet, cell phone).
 Transportation nodes (air, rail, bus).
 Highways and critical intersections.
 Cultural and religious shrines.
 Centers of learning.
 Media structures (television, radio, and newspaper).
Capabilities
Commanders and staffs analyze capabilities from different aspects. Generally, capabilities are assessed in three areas:
 Existing infrastructure that allows the populace to sustain itself.
 Gaps in infrastructure, such as public works, utilities, public health, or emergency services which are required for the populace to sustain itself.
 Available resources and services that can be contracted to support the military mission (interpreters, laundry services, construction materials, labor).
In order for a staff to truly understand the capabilities of a region, they need to understand what the capabilities were prior to operations, what will be required
after operations to bring the infrastructure back to a level where the populace can sustain itself, and what capabilities are available in the area that can be
leveraged towards successfully completing the mission.
Some key services that must be considered are:

 Public administration, safety, and emergency services.
 Food and water.
 Technology.

Organizations
Organizations ar e nonmilitar y gr oups that may or may not be tied to gover nmental agencies. They influence and interact with the remainder of the
populace, the military force, and each other. Civil organizations provide the commander with a network to share information about present and upcoming
activities in the AO and help influence the populace. Civil organizations also provide the commander with a set of informal leaders who generally garner more
respect within their organizations than do formal leaders.
Organizations are analyzed as either:

 Indigenous organizations.
 External organizations.
Internal or indigenous organizations may include:

 Church groups.
 Fraternal organizations (e.g., Kiwanis, Elks).
 Patriotic or service organizations (e.g., Veterans of Foreign Wars, American Legion, Boy Scouts).
 Labor unions (e.g., Teamsters, United Auto Workers).
 Criminal organizations (e.g., Dai Huen Jai, Sicilian Mafia).
 Community watch groups (e.g., Neighborhood Watch, Guardian Angels).
External organizations may include:

 Multinational corporations.
 Inter-governmental organizations (e.g., United Nations agencies, International Committee of the Red
Cross).
 Other government agencies (e.g., Central Intelligence Agency).
 Non-governmental organizations (e.g., Afghans for Civil Society, Food for the Hungry).

Organizations (cont.)
There is no blanket statement that can be made regarding internal or external organizations … They are not good, they are not bad; they just are. Commanders
must remain familiar with the organizations operating in their areas. They must consider the effect the organizations will have on the population and the
military operation and must consider how the mission may impact the operations of the organization. The organizations in their areas provide a viable link to
the people living in the AO and this link should be examined as to how it can be leveraged to help both the commander in accomplishing the mission, while
repairing and strengthening the infrastructure of an area.
People
People is a br oad ter m used to descr ibe all nonmilitar y for ces that will be encounter ed by military
forces. The term “people” is not limited to the population living inside a commander’s AO. It also includes
all people who may influence or have an influence on people, activities, or military operations within the AO.
The people in an area can have a positive, negative, or neutral impact on operations. It is because of the
possibility of operational influence that a commander must understand the people in his AO, as well as their
beliefs, fears, and possible preconceived resentment.
JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations, states, “Analysts must consider historical, cultural, ethnic,
political, economic, and humanitarian factors when examining a given population. Any affiliations
may have tremendous effect on the local population’s support to an insurgency, including areas where
people and insurgents may transit, retreat, evade, or hide. Populations such as squatters, the
homeless, refugees, displaced persons, and outcast groups can also have an immense impact on the
OE, and can be exploited by insurgents.”
It is useful and necessary to separate the population in an AO into categories based on their
capabilities, needs, and intentions. People should also be examined from the standpoint of historical,
cultural, ethnic, political, economic, and humanitarian factors. The key communicators (which may
not always be the formal leaders) should be identified, as well as the formal and informal processes
used to influence the population.

People (cont.)
The language or languages spoken within an area may vary. It is incumbent on the commander to
understand where he will be operating so specific language training, communications aids, such as
phrase cards, and the requisitioning of translators can begin. Translators are crucial for collecting
information, interacting with the local population, and developing products for military information
support operations (MISO).
As the languages in an area vary, so do the religions. Religion has shaped many conflicts in the past,
and its influence will only grow. When incorporating religion into planning, consider the following:
 When will religious traditions be impacted by the mission and how will they impact the
operation?
 When and who are the religious figures who have, or can influence, social transformation in
either a positive or negative way?
 Even though violent or exclusive, all parties must be considered.
CAUTION Remember, religion is both a catalyst and an accelerant.

For factions on the edge, religion can serve as the
catalyst that starts the reaction. During a conflict, no other factor
ignites more violence, brutality, and lethality than religious ideology.
Religion can motivate a population, or portion of a population, quickly
and inexpensively.
The command must strive to understand the day-to-day lives of the population … not
only what they eat and drink, but also their ideologies and religions, perceptions, their
appreciation of their homeland and how it influences the insurgency, and how the
insurgency influences it.

Describe How Civil Considerations Can Affect Friendly
and Threat Operations (cont.)
People (cont.)
The analyst must not analyze an area or its people with any
sort of preconceived notions. His preconceptions can
severely skew the data required to thoroughly understand
the population. When analyzing cultural factors, the
military studies the following broad categories:
 Social structure.
 Behavioral patterns.
 Perceptions.
 Religious beliefs.
 Tribal relationships.
 Behavioral taboos.
 Centers of authority.
 Lifestyles.
 Social history.
These categories all combine into the culture of an area and

people. It is information gleaned from historical
perspective, as well as a collection and analysis of current
information.

Events
ATP 2-01.3 defines events as, “routine, cyclical, planned, or spontaneous activities that significantly affect organizations, people, and military operations.”
Some examples include:
 National and religious holidays.
 Agricultural, crop, or livestock market cycles:
 Tilling.
 Planting.
 Harvesting.
 Market days.
 Elections.
 Civil disturbances.
 Celebrations.
Other events are disasters that are either manmade, natural, or technological in nature. These events impact the population through civil hardship and
emergency response shortfalls. Combat operations are another type of significant event that cannot be planned for by the populace, but will have great impact
on their lives.
Once all events are identified, it is incumbent on the commander and staff to template them, analyze them, and determine the political, psychological,
economic, environmental, and legal implications.

Civil Considerations Products
Because there is no limit to the amount of information available regarding civil

considerations, there is no limit to the amount or types of products that can capture
this information. Based on the echelon and the way the battlefield is viewed,
acronyms used to define the civil considerations are different. At brigade level and
above, looking at the OE utilizing the operational variables (PMESII-PT) is fine.
There is a certain vagueness, but the refinement will come from lower to higher to
develop the complete picture. At brigade level and below, viewing the civil
considerations through the eyes of the “C” in METT-TC and through the use of
ASCOPE provides some refinement and gives a good overall definition to the Brigade
Combat Team (BCT) AO. At battalion level and below, where the rubber meets the
road, civil considerations are defined by the acronym SWEAT-MSO. This provides an
area-to-area or city-to-city evaluation and provides the building blocks of HHQ civil
consideration products.
LEACH
LEACHSPRINGS
SPRINGS
Understanding the Operational Environment
10 20 30 40 50 60
.
CHALLENGER
.
CAVE SPRINGS
Tribal Areas AL KUT
30 I
McLEAN
McLEAN
DRINKWATER LAKE .
LIMAVILLE
LAKE
LAKE
.
DRINKWATER SPRINGS
IRAQ
IRAN
.
EL NORBO KARAMU
KHINJANI
KHEYL
X ZARA
1071
1071
MSR STARR
KALA II AL AZIZIYAH
AZ
Bani Assad Tribe

TRIBE
1064
1064 NO NAME LAKE
1003 985
985 981 ZUBAYDIYAH
NELSON
NELSONLAKE
LAKE
Al Halif Tribe
Maysan
Wasit
FOB AO
20 .
NELSON LAKE MINING CAMP
X
GOW DARREH
KALA SHAH
ZINC .
AO COPPER
KUT AL
HAYY
The accompanying .
EL CENTRO ALI AL GARBI
PIONEER KORAM
TUT FOB JOROBAY
ALLAL SHARQI
examples show some of KUJ EAST RANGE RD SHAYK SA’D

910
910 800
800 AL HALIFAYAH
GOLDSTONE
GOLDSTONE
KUMAIL
LAKE
LAKE
X
1489
1489
AO BRONZE 876
876
780
780
701
701
699
WAZIR
the diversity in civil
760
FOB GARY OWEN QAL AT SALIH
1478
1478 FOB 720
720
10 MSR WARNER
1214
1214
899
899 781W
781W
consideration products: GOLDSTONE

GOLDSTONE
KARA
.
EL GRAZIO
BLAAF
AO STEEL Al-bu Muhammed Tribe
BICYCLE LAKE TIEFORT
TIEFORTMTN
MTN
SHUYAKH
RED PASS LAKE
GOLDSTONE RD IRWIN
SHANTY
NO MANEUVER
URMURI
FOB
MSR ALLEN
TOWN
X KOTU Al Sari Tribe
00
TRIBE
BAGRAMI SOMAMZI
FIELD X
ASP LANGFORD LAKE
909N
NO MANEUVER AL AMARAH
957
957
938
938 FOB DELTA
909S
909S
90 729
729
837
837
NO MANEUVER
Product Depicting Tribal Areas Product Depicting Tribal Areas

Civil Considerations Products (cont.)
Return to map
A B C D E
1 1
100 101 102 N
Sadik 301
103
104
110 111
120
300
Hadiya
112
113
900 308 130
901 131 140
800 803 304 305
2 302 306 307
132 143 2
801 142
802 303 141
400 401
902 402
805 700 411
707 200
706
804 701 201
702 410
408 403
409 404
3 3
405
705 406 202
704
703 601 407
205
600 500
508 501
507 502
504 503
505
506
4 4
204
203
5 5
A B C D E
100 Carpenter's Shop 120 Shia Mosque 143 Nursery School 302 ISF Barracks 400-408 Residence 601 Propane Sales 900 Bank
101-102 Construction Yard 130 Civil Engineer Res 201-202 Residences 303 Electronics Store 409 Bakery 700 Resort Habib 901 Polling Station
103 Mayor’s Residence 131 Residence 203 al Khuzaai Mukhtar Res 304 JSS 410-411 Residence 701 Mayor’s Office / Town Hall 902 UNK
104 Polling Station 132 El Boracho Burrito 204 DG of Electricity & Public 305 Hospital 500-501 Residences 702-705 Resort Habib
110 Imam’s Residence 140 Theater Affairs Office/Residence 306 Barber Shop 502 JCC Director Res 706 Mayor’s Villa
111 Motorcycle Repair Shop 141 Kamel Dog Café 205 UNK 307 UNK 503-508 Residences 707 Police Chief’s Villa
112-113 UNK 142 UNK 300-301 JSS 308 JSS 600 Shia Mosque 800-805 Residences
Product Depicting Structures and Tribal Areas Medina Jabal (NV 441 100)
Product Depicting Major Ethnic Groups in Afghanistan

Saturday, 3 January 2015, 12 Rabi Ul Awal 1436 Hijrah

Birthday of Prophet Muhammad Saw that is also called Eid Milad un Nabi.
Thursday, 8 January 2015, 17 Rabi Ul Awal 1436 Hijrah

According to the Shia Muslims, Birthday of Prophet Muhammed Saw.
Thursday, 18 June 2015, 1 Ramadan 1436 Hijrah

The holy month of Ramadan starts on 1 Ramadan and continues for thirty days.
Friday, 17 July 2015, 1 Shawwal 1436 Hijrah

Eid Ul Fitr is celebrated on this day after the end of Ramadan.
Wednesday, 23 September 2015, 9 Dhu I-Hidjdja 1436 Hijrah

Eid Al Adha is celebrated on this day by Muslims and sacrifice is also done.
Thursday, 15 October 2015, 1 Muharram 1437 Hijrah

New Islamic year starts on 1 Muharram.
Saturday, 24 October 2015, 10 Muharram 1437 Hijrah

Day of Ashura comes on the 10th of Muharram.
Product Depicting Major Muslim Holidays in 2015
Product Depicting Tribal Areas in Northeast Afghanistan

Civil Considerations Products (cont.) SAYYID
S FO AIF FOB CHICKASAW
SAYYID
AO EAGLE
x S
ALLAH ALI
FO AIF
W NGO ET AL RAWI 1 HABIB AN NAJIR

ll W NGO ET
MSR VOLVO
E GV CR
MIXED SUPPORT E GV CR
A P S/E
ll x A P S/E
T M ll ALLAH ALI T M
2 MED
MED ROUTE FORD
FOB
FOB COLD
COLD HARBOR
HARBORKUMAYSH
HABIB AN NAJIR
AL ANI HADID ll
S FO AIF
MOST SUPPORTIVE
x MSR VOLVO ROUTE CHEVY
W NGO ET
TO US/COALITION SOMAMZI
E GV CR AO GATOR
A
T
P
M
S/E
KUMAYSH HADID SOMAMZI ll FADIL
S FO AIF S FO AIF S FO AIF S FO AIF

MED
W NGO ET W NGO ET W NGO ET AO BADGER W NGO ET
Tribal
E
A
AO REDx ARROW
GV
P
CR
S/E
E
A
GV
P
CR
S/E
E
A
GV
P
CR
S/E
E
A
GV
P
CR
S/E
FOB FADIL T M
T M
Leader
WTTA
T M T M
MED MED
FOB ANTIETAM 5
MED
VICKSBURG
3 x MED
ROUTE KHAN ABU

Clinic DULAYM SATURN
Basic sewer system that LEAST SUPPORTIVE ll S FO AIF

TO US/COALITION ABU NAMI KHAN ABU W NGO ET
controls some rain run off ABU NAMI
S FO AIF
E GV CR
and removes sewage to
MSR OPAL
outskirts of town.
W NGO ET ll A P S/E
SEWER KARAMU KHEYL E GV CR
T M
S FO AIF A P S/E
Water system improved. No W NGO ET T M
MED
shortages. Wells are well E GV CR
x MED
ZARA KALA
positioned with adequate Market A P S/E x S FO AIF
WATER flow rates. T M ll ROUTE TOYOTA
FOB SHILOH ZARA KALA
W NGO ET
MED 4 E GV CR
AZRO
A P S/E
Grid is in poor condition and QIZIBAH KARAMU KHEYL
HISSARAK HISSARAK
T M
provides 8 hours of power Houses MIXED SUPPORT
ELECTRICITY
AO LIGHTHORSE S FO AIF
MED
per day. W NGO ET
AO RED ARROW E GV CR
Electrical A P S/E
Small school in village for Building PMESII OVERVIEW T M
boys. Girls are sent to
ACADEMIC provincial schhool. x MED
Trash is picked up by small ALI AL GHARBI Product Depicting Locations of Villages

crew. Pick up is not EG210938
TRASH consistent. 42 23’ 40” N within the AO and SWEAT Assessments
104 44’28” W
Small clinic in town. Open 8 Population: 35

hours a day. Limited services
MEDICAL beyond emergency care.
Province: Maysan
Limited fire services in town.

Religion: 100% Shia
Police ar limited but appear
SAFETY to be less corrupt than norm. Tribal Affiliation: AL HALIF
Product Depicting Small Village with SWEAT Assessment

CAUTION The memory aid “SWEAT” means different things to different people. While originally developed by the Army,
it was later modified by the Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) for use in civil disasters. The modification
changed the acronym to: security, water, energy, accessibility, and telecommunications. This is not functionally different from
the use of SWEAT-MSO where the “O” can account for any additional factor used in infrastructure assessment.
Sample SWEAT Assessment

Notes

Notes

Sub-task 3 Unified
Evaluate theLand Operations
Threat
IPB Sub-task 3: Evaluate the Threat
Getting Started
When dealing with military operations, it is imperative to understand who you are dealing with. Full spectrum operations, unified land operations, and the
Decisive Action Training Environment have, over the last twenty years, provided the Army with many diverse threats to evaluate. But before a unit is deployed
into an area of hostilities, invariably they conduct local exercises, command post exercises, or full-scale exercises at either the National Training Center (NTC)
or the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). This brings them into contact with a dedicated “training” enemy known as the opposing forces (OPFOR).
The eXportable Combat Training Capability (XCTC) is a National Guard program that represents a fully-instrumented group of field training exercises (FTX)
based on the current OE. The XCTC was developed to provide units in the “ready” phase of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle, a capability to
train on the tactics, techniques, and procedures that are used in joint operational areas while not overtaxing the Army’s combat training centers (CTCs)
burgeoning load. The XCTC is the Army National Guard’s (ARNG) solution for a bridging strategy until other solutions can be found to ensure all deploying
units receive a “dirt” CTC rotation.
Who Are the “Bad” Guys (the Enemy, the Threat, Adversaries, and the OPFOR)?
Training Circular (TC) 7-100 (Hybrid Threat) defines enemy combatant as “in general, a person engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition
partners during an armed conflict”. This means whoever is actually opposing the U.S. in a given conflict. This word is synonymous with adversary or opponent.
The “threat” is defined as a potential adversary. This includes “any specific foreign nation or organization with intentions and military capabilities that suggest it
could become an adversary or challenge the national security interests of the United States or its allies.” Once hostilities begin, the “ threat” becomes the
“enemy” if they are actively participating in hostilities.
More wordsmithing here … It may become necessary, while conducting IPB, to take into account both enemies and threats. An example … your unit is planning
an attack against a nation state’s forces. While planning, you find that your planned route places you in close proximity to a village that has known non state-
sponsored actors. While they may or may not currently be considered hostile to friendly efforts, their capabilities and disposition must be addressed. Failure to
address threats or potential enemies may cause issues you can ill afford to have.
The OPFOR is a training tool created as a virtual sparring partner for training units. It provides a challenging and plausible force that represents any number of
potential opponents that a unit might face on the battlefield. Based on the training scenario, the OPFOR might begin as the threat teetering on the cusp of being
an enemy. But since the OPFOR’s role is one of an actual enemy force, an event or series of events moves them from a threat status to an enemy status. This
may occur prior to the training exercise or during it based on how the scenario is written.

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
Who Are the “Bad” Guys (the Enemy, the Threat, Adversaries, and the OPFOR)? (cont.)
Since its inception in 1976 when outlined in Army Regulation (AR) 350-2 (Opposing Force Program), the OPFOR has operated using doctrine approved by the
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). While not originally detailed to support mission rehearsal exercises (MREs), at the commander’s
request, these assets may be used to provide a realistic atmosphere prior to unit deployment.
Because of the changing dynamics of the OE, a new “contemporary” OPFOR was required. FM 7-100 defines the contemporary OPFOR as “a plausible,
flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces, used in lieu of a specific threat force,
for training and developing US forces.”
But be they enemy, threat, or OPFOR, Sub-tasks 3 and 4 of IPB remain the same and require the same outputs.
TIP Because IPB remains the same for the threat or

enemy, these two terms will be used interchangeably
in this publication.
Soldiers and units must be prepared to evaluate threats and enemies using combinations of technology at varying levels of intensity. While high-intensity
operations may be characterized as purely military in nature, in DSCA operations, as well as stability operations, they may be a combination of military,
paramilitary, or small-cell-oriented forces. How the threat or enemy is defined is crucial to determining both their capabilities and their strategies. No matter
the size, it is important to depict their operations in as much detail as possible based on their past operations in order to accurately predict what they might do
given the current situation. If the staff fails to determine all of the organizations or capabilities, or to understand their doctrine and/or tactics, the following is
likely to occur:
 The threat will surprise friendly forces with capabilities not accounted for.
 The staff will lack the intelligence needed for planning.
 The staff will waste time analyzing capabilities that do not exist.
 The staff will believe the threat is static and not understand that they are thinking and adaptive.

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
How to Evaluate the Threat
There are two sub-steps in evaluating the threat:
 Identify threat characteristics.
 Composition.
 Disposition.
 Strength.
 Combat effectiveness.
 Doctrine and tactics.
 Support and relationships.
 Electronic technical data.
 Capabilities and limitations.
 Current operations.
 Historical data.
 Miscellaneous data.
 Creating or refining threat models:

 Convert threat doctrine or patterns of operation to graphics.
 Describe the threat’s tactics and options.
 Identify high-value targets (HVTs).
One of the ways threat analysis may be conducted is through

functional analysis. This is based on the premise that while every Sub-tasks of Evaluate the Threat
engagement is different, certain functions must be accomplished in
order to be successful.
Identify Threat Characteristics
Understanding that each engagement is different, the staff must endeavor to determine how the threat conducts operations under similar situations. In order to
accomplish this, the staff conducts threat characteristic analysis for each group identified during Sub-task 1 of IPB.

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
Identify Threat Characteristics (cont.)
Some more clarification is needed here.
Threats are generally nation states, organizations, people, groups, or conditions that can damage or
destroy life, vital resources, or institutions. Army doctrine divides these threats into the following
categories: regular, irregular, hybrid, disruptive, catastrophic, and hazards. This publication only
discusses the evaluation of regular, irregular, and hybrid threat forces. Evaluating the threat should
begin with acknowledging that there is a threat, followed by the analysis of the threat’s characteristics,
and ultimately leading to the identification of the threat model (regular, irregular, or hybrid structure).
Regular threats are part of nation states employing recognized military capabilities and forces in
understood forms of military competition and conflict. The Islamic Republic of Iran Army and the
Peoples Liberation Army of China are examples of regular forces. The Regular Threat
Irregular threats are opponents employing unconventional, asymmetric methods and means to
counter U.S. advantages. A weaker enemy often uses unconventional methods to exhaust the U.S.
collective will through protracted conflict. Unconventional methods include such means as terrorism,
insurgency, and guerrilla warfare. Economic, political, informational, and cultural initiatives usually
accompany and may even be the chief means of irregular attacks on U.S. influence. The Revolutionary
Army Forces of Columbia-People’s Army and Al Qaeda are examples of irregular forces.
Hybrid threats are the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces,
terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects.
The Irregular Threat

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
Composition
Composition is the identification of threat forces and their
affiliated organizations. In conventional operations, this
resembles line and block organizational charts and/or unit
equipment charts. In stability operations, this resembles
association charts and link diagrams and follows a “cell”
structure. Hybrid threat forces are comprised of two or
more of the following:
 A nation state regular force.
 A nation state irregular force.
 Insurgent groups.
 Guerilla units.
 Criminal organizations.
Disposition
Disposition is where the threat is located Example Threat Organizational Chart Local Insurgent Organization
and how they are deployed,
or the formations they are
using. In conventional
operations, the tool used for
this is the threat template.
The analyst needs to know
where on the ground these
facilities are located, will be
located, or were located. In
stability operations, the tools
used are incident overlays,
time-event charts, pattern
analysis wheels, association Incident Overlay Time Event Chart Link Diagram
matrices, and link diagrams.

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
Strength
Strength describes a unit in terms of personnel, weapons, and equipment. Information concerning strength provides the commander with an indication of
enemy capabilities and helps determine the probable COAs or options open to threat commanders. A lack of strength or a preponderance of strength has the
effect of lowering or raising the estimate of the capabilities of an enemy force. Likewise, a marked concentration or build-up of units in an area gives the
commander certain indications of enemy objectives and probable COAs. During peacetime, changes in the strength of potential threat forces are important
factors which may indicate changes in the threat’s intention. Strength is determined by comparing how a threat organization is doctrinally staffed and
equipped with what the organization actually has on hand.
Strength for regular forces is described in terms of personnel, weapons, and equipment. The most important aspect of strength when evaluating a regular
force is to determine whether the force has the capability of conducting specific operations. For example, a unit may have adequate weapons systems to
conduct an operation, but may not have a sufficient number of trained personnel or crews to man the systems.
For irregular forces, strength is defined by the capability of direct action teams, political cadre or cells, and, most importantly, popular support. Popular
support can range from sympathizers to assistance in conducting operations, storage or moving, logistics, or just withholding information.
The strength of a hybrid threat is determined by understanding the synergy of regular and irregular forces. The hybrid threat understands that the
environment that would produce the most challenges to U.S. forces is one in which conventional military operations occur in concert with unconventional
warfare. The hybrid threat concept is not just one of making do with what is available, but is primarily one of deliberately created complexity.
Combat Effectiveness
Combat effectiveness describes the abilities and fighting quality of a unit. Numerous tangible and intangible factors affect it.
Determining combat effectiveness for regular threat forces is made by assessing the following factors:
 Personnel strength.
 Amount and condition of weapons and equipment.
 Status of training.
 Efficiency of leadership.

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
Combat Effectiveness (cont.)
 Quality of leadership.
 Length of time a unit is committed in combat.
 Traditions and past performance.
 Personality traits of the unit commanders.
 Geographical area in which committed.
 Morale, spirit, health, nutrition, discipline, and political reliability (or belief in the cause for which they fight).
 Status of technical and logistical support of the unit.
 Adequacy of military schooling at all levels.
 National characteristics of the people.
Combat effectiveness for irregular threat forces is measured differently than combat effectiveness for regular threat forces. The threat is motivated by many
factors, which can be, but are not limited to, a goal of independence, equality, religion or ideology, occupation of a foreign nation, or economical factors.
Combat effectiveness is determined by, but not limited to,:
 External support.
 Fear and intimidation.
 Political change.
 Popular support.
Determining the combat effectiveness for hybrid threat forces is made by considering the tangible and intangible factors associated with determining the
combat effectiveness for regular and irregular threat forces.

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
Doctrine and Tactics
Tactics are broken down into strategy, methods of operation, and

doctrine and describe how the enemy conducts their operations.
Against conventional forces, tactics are very regimented and difficult
to change because they cover a great number of forces and require RCIED
100 meters
synchronization. With paramilitary and other irregular forces, the
RCIED
opposite is true. Because these groups are loosely organized and very
compartmentalized, it is relatively easy to change how they conduct
RCIED
their operations. A good case in point is how Iraqi insurgents learned RCIED
to defeat Coalition forces’ jamming efforts on their radio-detonated

improvised explosive devices (IEDs). By emplacing IEDs at regular
intervals and attempting to detonate them while convoys passed,
insurgents were able to determine the range of Coalition jamming
capabilities. The change made was to emplace the IEDs close to the
road and place the receiver outside the range of the jammers and hard
wire the devices to them. This also demonstrated insurgent
adaptability.
How Insurgents Change Their Tactics
Doctrine and tactics for regular threat refer to the TTPs that guide their operations. Understanding how the threat force prefers to operate aids the commander’s
understanding of potential threat COAs. TTPs for regular threat forces can generally be grouped into the following categories:
 Offensive tasks.  Defensive tasks.
 Movement to contact.  Area defense.
 Attack.  Mobile defense.
 Exploitation.  Retrograde.
 Pursuit.

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
Doctrine and Tactics (cont.)
Tactics and operations for irregular forces include strategy, methods of procedure, and doctrine. Each refers to the threat force’s accepted principles of
organization and employment of forces. Tactics also involve political, military, psychological, and economic considerations. Irregular force tactics and
operations vary in sophistication according to the level of training the individual or organization has received. Irregular forces carefully plan and train for
individual and small-group operations.
Hybrid force doctrine is based on countering a threat’s capabilities. Hybrid forces often study U.S. and allied military forces and their operations and conduct
lessons learned based on their assessments and perceptions. These forces use the following principles for applying their various instruments of diplomatic
political, informational, economic, and military power:
 Access limitation.
 Control tempo.
 Cause politically unacceptable casualties.
 Neutralize technological overmatch.
 Conduct information operations aimed at local population, international opinion, and their adversaries’ domestic population.
 Change the nature of conflict.
 Allow no sanctuary.
 Employ operational exclusion.
 Employ operational shielding.
 Avoid defeat.
Support and Relationships
The threat force’s adoption of a COA generally depends on the ability of its support system to support that action. However, depending on the threat force’s
objectives, possible time constraints, and/or willingness to assume risk — especially as dictated by political leaders or dynamics of political-military
circumstances — this could substantially alter adoption of a COA. With knowledge of these factors, analysts can better evaluate the threat force capabilities,
strength, and combat effectiveness.

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
Support and Relationships (cont.)
The location of a regular threat force’s logistical support structure elements aids intelligence staffs in determining the disposition of maneuver formations.
Logistic information critical for effective intelligence analysis includes:
 Classes and types of supply.
 Lines of communications (LOCs).
 Logistical requirements.
 Procurement methods.
 Distribution priorities and procedures.
 Transportation networks and modes.
 Installations and terminals.
 Damaged equipment evacuation and salvage procedures.
 Maintenance.
The effectiveness of irregular forces depend heavily on support and relationships. This dependency fluctuates horizontally and vertically between the various
groups and levels of operation. The intensity of support activity is based on operations. Critical components of support include, but are not limited to:
 Financing.
 Food.
 Water.
 Weapons and ammunition.
 Bombmaking components.
 MISO materials (paper, ink, printing press).
 Medical.
 Transportation.
 Support of the population.
Hybrid forces will incor porate the types of suppor t ir regular forces use to sustain themselves with the traditional logistical suppor t associated with
conventional military operations.
Because a hybrid force is a composite of many different groups, these groups will often have no standard or readily identifiable organizational relationship.
What brings together the capabilities and intent of the components of the hybrid threat is a common purpose, typically opposition to U.S. goals. This unity of
purpose can even bring together groups that normally would be fighting among themselves.

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
Support and Relationships (cont.)
Affiliated organizations are cooperating toward a common goal despite having no formal command or organizational relationship. Affiliated organizations are
typically nonmilitary or paramilitary groups, such as criminal cartels, insurgencies, terrorist cells, or mercenaries.
Affiliated forces are those irregular forces operating in a military unit’s A O that the unit may be able to sufficiently influence to act in concert with it
for a limited time. No “ command relationship” exists between an affiliated organization and the unit in whose AO it operates. In some cases, affiliated forces
may receive support from the military unit as part of the agreement under which they cooperate.
Electronic Technical Data
Electronic technical data derived from targeting and electronic warfare is required to conduct electronic warfare (EW).
For regular threat forces, this data also includes critical threat communications nodes such as CPs and
logistical control points. This information supports threat templating. With electronic technical data, a more
accurate evaluation of the enemy’s vulnerability to electronic countermeasures and deception is made;
signals intercept and direction finding for the production of signals intelligence is made easier; and support is
given to counter threat electronic warfare by assessing the threat’s electronic warfare capabilities.
When combating irregular threat forces, the lack of an obvious formal organizational structure or architecture
impedes development of an extensive threat communications network diagrams and electronic technical
database. The insurgent has communications equipment available ranging from the most modern to the most
primitive. Insurgent forces can use high frequency, short-wave, ham radio and Citizen band sets; cellular
phones, satellite phones, the Internet, mail, and couriers. While not playing a significant historical role, the
insurgent's potential use of radar cannot be ruled out.
Hybrid enemy for ces will employ a combination of the capabilities used by r egular and irr egular
forces, as well as available commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technology and existing civilian
communications networks.

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
Capabilities and Limitations
Capabilities are the broad COAs and supporting operations that the enemy can take to achieve its goals and objectives. The following four tactical COAs are
generally open to military forces in conventional operations: attack, defend, reinforce, retrograde.
Threat capabilities take the form of statements, such as:

 The threat has the ability to insert up to two infantry battalions in a single lift operation.
 The threat can establish a prepared defense by 14 May.
 The demonstrators can effectively block traffic at up to seven intersections in the AO.
When identifying threat capabilities, intelligence staffs:

 Start with developed threat models.
 Consider the threat ability to conduct each operation based on all factors related to the current situation. (The enemy may be under-strength in equipment or
personnel, short of logistic support, lacking air support, or the enemy’s troops may be inexperienced or poorly trained.)
A regular threat force is designed to attack or defend as necessary to accomplish objectives. Determining capabilities and limitations for a regular threat force
requires an understanding of the art and science of war, as well as an understanding of the threat force itself.
A very challenging capability of an irregular threat is its ability to blend in with the population or to hide in complex terrain. This allows the threat to plan and
prepare for an operation and attack at a time and place of its own choosing without interference from friendly forces.
From a friendly perspective, the most challenging capabilities of a hybrid force are its ability to adapt and transition. The hybrid force emphasizes speed, agility,
versatility, and changeability as the keys to success in a fight against a larger, more powerful opponent.
Adaptation, br oadly defined, is the ability to adjust behaviors based on learning. Adaptation is closely linked to the OE and its variables. Thr eat forces
approach adaptation from two perspectives: natural and directed.
One of the most dangerous aspects of a hybrid force is the ability of its components to transition (change) in and out of various forms. Military forces, for
example, can remove uniforms and insignia and other indicators of status and blend in with the local population. Insurgent forces might abandon weapons and
protest innocence of wrongdoing. Criminals might impersonate local police forces in order to gain access to a key facility.

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
Current Operations
Current operations are those operations in which an enemy force is currently engaged. This includes operations against U.S. military forces or inter ests
or against the military forces or interests of other nation states. Analyzing current operations provides up-to-date information on all other threat characteristics.
The Army’s knowledge of regular threat forces is based on its understanding of these forces prior to 11 September 2001. These forces have evolved as the Army
has evolved. Intelligence staffs at all echelons continuously study these forces to gain a better understanding of them.
The Army gained valuable experience in combating irregular forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. Thus, the Army has
learned how diverse and adaptive these threats can be. It is unlikely that the irregular threats will face in the future will mirror those it fought in Iraq and
Afghanistan. To gain the best understanding of the evolving nature of irregular threats throughout the world, intelligence staffs analyze these threats whenever
and wherever they appear.
Although the Army believes the primary threat it will face in the future will come from hybrid threat forces, little is known about what the character of these
threats will be. While the Army has developed a hybrid threat force model to use in training combined arms teams, this model provides only limited value in
preparing the intelligence staff in understanding this threat. This is because, like the previous contemporary operational environment (COE) threat model, it is a
generic construct that does not reflect the threat characteristics of any particular real-world threat. Because of this, it is incumbent upon intelligence staffs at all
levels to study these types of threats wherever they are operating in order to continually increase understanding of this threat category. The intelligence staff also
studies historical examples of hybrid threat operations. (NOTE: COE is no longer a valid acronym in the Army lexicon.)
Historical Data
Compiling the history of any threat organization involves conducting the research necessary to gather all relevant information regarding the threat and producing
the materials needed to communicate that information to the commander and staff. Information briefings and papers are the two most common methods used for
this purpose. Both of these methods can be used to support intelligence training, officer professional development, and noncommissioned officer professional
development. The history component of the threat data file includes the original sources of information used to compile information briefings and papers. These
sources form part of the professional reading required by all of the unit’s intelligence personnel.
Regular threat forces develop attributes based on how they have been employed over time and on how they conducted themselves during that employment.
While not definitive, understanding a unit’s lineage can provide insight into the extent a unit will go in order to accomplish its objectives. This also provides
insight into what the unit will not do to accomplish its objectives.

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
Historical Data (cont.)
Irregular threat forces also develop attributes based on how they have been employed over time and on how they conducted themselves during that
employment.
The historical record of the operations and activities of hybrid threats will be one of the results of the analysis of current operations. However, history does
provide examples of threat forces using hybrid approaches against a superior force.
Miscellaneous Data
Intelligence staffs use supporting information to develop threat force characteristics and to construct comprehensive intelligence estimates. This information
includes biographic data, personalities, and biometric data, as well as other information important to mission accomplishment. Biographic data contains
information on characteristics and attributes of a threat force’s members. Knowledge of personalities is important in identifying units and, in some cases,

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
Miscellaneous Data (cont.)
predicting a unit’s COA. Personality data is valuable because the tactics and combat efficiency of particular units are closely tied to the commander’s character,
schooling, and personality traits. In counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, supporting data may include tribal, clan, or ethnic group traits and their effects on the
combat capabilities, or limitations, of the threat force, as well as biometric data.
When evaluating regular forces, miscellaneous data includes biographic data on the commander’s and other key leaders in the organization. When combined
with the other threat characteristics, this information may provide insight on how an enemy commander may react in a particular situation or attempt to solve a
particular problem.
When evaluating irregular threat forces, miscellaneous data includes information on personalities, culture, and internal organizational processes.
The miscellaneous data associated with hybrid threat characteristics are a combination of that required for regular and irregular forces.
Create or Refine Threat Models
Getting Started
How well the friendly force understands the threat and how much information they have derived previously determines if they will be able to update existing
threat models or be forced to create new ones. Even if new threat models are required, they will always be initially based on threat doctrine previously
encountered. From this basic start, intelligence analysts must evaluate what they see on a day-to-day basis and refine their models, as required. The capability of
the threat in a stability environment to quickly change tactics and utilize different equipment may seem to indicate that they should always be treated as a new
threat, but analysts will quickly find that there are some recurring elements to their attacks, as well as their sustainment operations. These similarities are the
elements which must be exploited and used to update their models.
In DSCA operations, the threat differs in that it can include gangs, criminal organizations, and looters. Much creation of DSCA threat models require analysis of
previous, similar civil support activities to provide a baseline of information. Again, analysts must analyze information as it emerges and continue to refine their
models.

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
Create or Refine Threat Models (cont.)
Convert Threat Doctrine or Patterns of Operations to Graphics
In DSCA operations, depicting the threat graphically can be as difficult as

determining what the threat is. Many times the analyst is hamstrung attempting to
depict the capabilities of the threat in an ever-changing operation. During
Hurricane Katrina, it was possible to predict that looting would occur. It was
deemed highly unlikely that the looting would be accomplished in broad daylight
and through chest-deep water. In situations like this, the analyst must start with a
baseline acquired from similar operations and be prepared to modify the patterns
of operation based on data as it arrives.
Looters after Katrina
Creating or modifying threat models and creating the associated graphics pose unique
issues for analysts when dealing with stability operations. Due to the relatively small size of threat elements, the decentralization
of both operations and training, different goals, and desired end states of factions, coupled with diversity of threat personalities,
there is no single set pattern of operation that can be used as a baseline. Because of this, historical data must be used to
determine what the threat has done in the past based on patterns of operations. Going into an area “cold” with no historical data
requires extensive research to determine what has been done before in that and adjacent areas. Once data has been collected, the
information must be depicted on graphs, charts, or overlays. It is the analysis of these products that becomes the postulated
doctrine of the threat based on historical data. This is our initial threat template, created in the absence of any other.
An area which has been previously occupied by friendly forces will already have, based again on historical information, threat templates that represent both
what the threat has done in the past, as well as what is predicted to happen in the future. These threat templates illustrate the disposition of the threat based on
their size and available assets and not constrained by the effects of weather, terrain, or civil considerations.
In conventional operations, the threat is examined in detail with doctrine being converted into templates. Due to the rapidly-changing nature of stability
operations, the operating patterns produced by examining historical data can be exploited during threat integration.

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
Convert Threat Doctrine or Patterns of Operations to Graphics (cont.)
In order to update or create threat models in offensive or defensive operations, it is necessary to understand how the threat is organized, what equipment they
bring to the fight, and the tactics they employ. If updating the threat model, analysts may rely on historical data on how they have looked and acted in the past.
As the battle progresses, the threat model should be updated, as required.
If the analyst is forced to create a new threat model, or has little former knowledge of how the threat is organized or fights, he may review threat reports and
studies, current and historical intelligence studies, intelligence and other databases, and message traffic, to include current reports.
To convert threat models to graphics, the analyst must understand the architecture of the battlefield as it relates to the threat. Prior to the current OE, former
Soviet doctrine was generally used as the basis for the threat. With the advent of the contemporary operational environment COE (now changed to OE), analysts
had to redefine how they thought about the threat.
In order to develop products to depict the operational patterns of threat forces, EVALUATE THE THREAT- GRAPHICS
specific events must be identified and examined with respect to when they
occur, where they historically occur, and if the data is consistent, based on size Offensive / Defensive IPB Stability Operations IPB DSCA Operations IPB
of element or system capabilities. What might be observed in one area might
not be observed in a different area because the local support for the insurgent Threat Templates Threat Templates (select uses) Threat Templates (select uses)
may not be as strong. Finally, other effects, such as historical dates and Incident Overlays Criminal patterns
anniversaries, as well as significant effects of weather, must be considered. All Time event charts Gang boundaries
Pattern analysis plot charts Incident Overlays
these things combined create or refine the database used to depict threat
Matrices Time event charts
operational patterns. Once the database is constructed, it will, through analysis, Link diagrams Pattern analysis plot charts
confirm or deny the capabilities the threat has to mount certain operations and Matrices
will lead to construction of threat COAs. Link diagrams
As different as stability operations are from DSCA operations, the products

used to graphically depict the threat and create the threat model for these
operations are remarkably similar. Generally, when dealing with any threat force that is not a formal “military” force, these same type products, as annotated in
the figure to the right, must be used in lieu of threat templates. Different threats may generate different threat templates based on historical information.
Generally, for most military threats in offensive and defensive operations, as well as for the OPFOR, the models used are derived from TC 7-100 (Hybrid
Threat).

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
Talatha (Al-Dukar) Talatha (Sadiq)

Mosalah
Incident overlays are good tools with Jeanne Junction VQ878435
Youngstown Takira
Carnis
one caveat. While they accurately Talatha (Hamadiyah) 50
portray where an incident or group of North Fort

80 5 8
11
38
24
32
25 26
22
49
13
67 4330
10
26
Akbar
1 1 Geronimo
incidents have occurred, and are thus
23
49
56 19 47
16 65 41 8 33 54
78 11 40
Talatha (Rasouri) 5 4 74
represented spatially, they (without Self Airfield
2 1
11
22
12 6
52
12
34 3
13 20 9 4
28
7
additional information) fail to show
33 19
9 3 7 39 5 Jarbar Nahr
10
40 15 6 10 25 5
Huffton
51 28 64 48 18 27 6
any patterns relative to time. The Talatha (Suliyah)

Shughart Gordon
52 37
43 2
57
3 36 42
14
69
37 18
21 Wahadi-Al-Basha
Smith Villa
31
16
14
3
example to the right depicts many 15
66
20
46
45
60
Wadi-Al-Tarif
incidents based on the legend at the Talatha (Hikadiyah)
Word Mil. Compound
79
76
54 8
17 23
Jetertown
4 4
bottom and even goes so far as to 68 45
34 44
35 7 24
1 30 162
break down the AO into three sections 13 50
31 42 35
Talatha (Salmatha) 36 2 71
12 14
1 17 53
while annotating the relationship of Ft. Polk 55 39 47 72

15 9
4
18
48
41
how much activity is occurring in each 6 29
259
9
area. While this example is broken
38
53
down into three equal areas, it could 37

46
58
17 33% 51
63
75
5 70
easily have been broken down into

62 61
45% 73
27
areas based on their tier level of
22%
activity (the amount of activity in a TAIP (Talatha Intl AP)
Ft Polk Army Airfield 8
21
32
specific area over a specific period of 30 Day Analysis
Madelsar
Maddox Homestead
29
77 44
time).
Total Incidents
18 Jun – 17 Jul
IED Detonated (US) Direct Fire Mines FOB

Current US FOB
1
IED Detonated (Civ) Mortar Impact Atks on SWEAT Facs
IED Located SA-7 Firing Demonstrations - Non-Violent 15 Violent 14
Incident Overlay

18
19
20
21
Sub-task 3 22
23
Unified
Threat
24
Create or Refine Threat Models (cont.) 25
26
27
Convert Threat Doctrine or Patterns of Operations to Graphics (cont.) 28
29
30
1
The pattern analysis plot sheet, or wheel, is one of the best tools for defining 2
3
patterns of incidents, especially when paired with the incident overlay. The tool 4
is derived by creating a set of concentric circles (each representing a specific 5 0800
6
day) with intersecting lines running through it representing hours in a day. To 7
use the tool, use the index on the circles to identify the day
1500 and place the 9
8
symbol for the incident on or between the lines corresponding to the time it 10
11 18 Jun – 17 Jul
occurred. The tool to the right depicts an incident which occurred between 12 0900
1000 and 1100 hours on 4 July. 13

14 AO SPARTA
1400 15
16
17
1000
The tool to the right depicts all activity in the AO. Incidents
1300
2400 18 Jun – 17 Jul1100
It is broken down into quadrants that indicate the 2300 0100
by Time 2200
1200
AO SPARTA
distribution of incidents based on the 24-hour
17
2100 55
16
15
14
13
56 0200
Pattern Analysis Wheel
cycle. In this example, 20 % of the incidents in this
12
13 11
10 20% 0300
10 9
52
54 8
7
period occurred between 2100 and 0600 hours

44 39 41 46
6
36 5 39
4
2000 44 3
2
(yellow). Twenty-nine per cent of the incidents

38 33 29
52
38 1 0400
46 30
53 29 19
28
27 14 5
occurred between 0600 and 0900 hours (blue).

47 28 13 26
57 12 35
32 25 18
43 17 24 8
1900 51
23 20 0500
23 22
Twenty-two per cent of the incidents occurred

11 6 21
30
31 7
20
19 3 6
51 49 22 7
37
10 2 18 9 26
4 1
between 0900 and 1200 hours (red). Fifteen per

16 64 48
1 5
25
15 43 5
32 7 8
1800 12
17 16 15 14 131211 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 30 2928 2726252423
33 31
9 212019
22 3 18 26 262728 2930 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1112 1314151617
18 19 20 21 22 232425
6 1
0600
9 1
7
12
27 34 44
4724 6
45 9
40 9 34
6 5 2
cent occurred between 1200 and 1500 hours

25 17 12 14
1 2 4 13 50
4 3 45 21
18 8 35 18 69 76
50 2 42
23 319 46
15
20 10 2 4
15%
8 2
21 3 4
10
36
8 29%
(orange), and 15 % occurred between 1500 and
22 48
22 49
1700 16 13 23 11 5 38
4
1224 48 34
27
32 25 39 0700
2615 37 40 19 24 13
2100 hours (no color). This gives a good overall

45 35 70
21 27 41
43 28 7 28 20
6
29
52 79
15
27 307 29 12 10
1600 37 26 18 25
9 10
assessment as to when activity is occurring in the

11 2 30 60
3
56
36 4
40 5 41 53 0800
6
AO, but is nonspecific as to when particular 22%

7 65 14
8 42
1500 54 11
15% 9
10
1147 17
16
80
0900 29% 0601 – 0900
incidents are occurring. Pattern analysis wheels
12 49
13
1400
14
15
18 78 22% 0901 - 1200
16
15% 1201 - 1500
with specific incidents are required for this
17
1000
1300
1200
1100 15% 1501 - 2100
assessment. 20% 2100 - 0600
Pattern Analysis Wheel - All Activity

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
IED Incidents 2300

2400
0100
18 Jun – 17 Jul
By separating events and depicting them on by Time 2200 17
16 0200
AO SPARTA
their own pattern analysis wheel, specific 15
14
13
2100
patterns emerge. In this example, all of the IEDs
12
11
10
9 0300
identified, as well as those detonated, occurred 8
7
6
during hours of daylight, specifically between 2000

5
4
3
the hours of 0500 and 1500 with 95 % occurring 2

1
30
0400
between 0500 and 1300 hours. The analysis

29
28
27
26
associated with this sends two very distinct 1900
25
24
23 0500
messages. First, the friendly force night 22
21
20
observation capability is such that insurgents 19

18
will not risk emplacement nor detonation during 1800 17 16 15 14 131211 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 30 2928 2726252423 22 212019 18
6
25 43
64
26 262728 2930 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1112 1314151617

18 19 20 21 22 232425 0600
hours of darkness, and, second, the greater
12 47
7
9 27 34 44
12
2 4 13 45
density of vehicles and better IED detection 18 8 35 69 76
15
19 46
20 10
capabilities afforded during daylight hours aids 1700

21
22
23
36
38
49
48
in detection, but also creates a greater number of

24
32 25 39 0700
26 37 40 70
targets for insurgents. The lack of night vision

27 41
28 52 79
29
30
device (NVD) parity is mitigated during 1600 1
2
3
60
57% 0500 - 0900
daylight hours and allows insurgents to operate
56
4
5
6
0800 38% 0900 - 1300
with less signature. 1500
7
8
9
65
5% 1300 - 1500
10
11
12
13
80
0900 0% 1500 - 2100
IED Detonation US Tgt
1400
14
15
16
78
0% 2100 - 2200
0% 2200 - 0500
17
1000
IED Detonation Civ Tgt 1300
1100
1200
IED Located
Pattern Analysis Wheel - IEDs

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
As the threat model is being built in offensive or defensive

operations, there are questions that must be answered.
Many of these can be answered by looking at the HHQ
products, but they must be understood in order for the 65
commander and staff to design a plan to defeat the threat.
The first and foremost question is “why is the threat doing

what it is doing?” In the example to the right (enemy in
II
defense), there are three possible answers: 60
 They are defending to defeat friendly forces. DTG

REC
BTG
REC
 They are defending to deny friendly forces a piece of

terrain.
 They are defending to preserve combat power for future
55
operations or to cover the mobilization and deployment
of other forces. BATTLE
SUPPORT
X
ZONE
DISRUPTION ZONE
ZONE
Each of these possibilities begs additional questions and
will help determine how the threat will fight.
Battlefield Organization (Enemy in Defense)

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
Battlefield Organization
In order to build threat models for offensive or defensive

operations, it is necessary to understand how the threat organizes
the battlefield. In both offensive and defensive operations, the
threat uses the three zones, each with a specific mission and task
organization. These zones are the disruption zone, battle zone,
and support zone.
Disruption Zone (DZ)
The disruption zone (DZ) is used in offensive operations to destroy the SUPPORT BATTLE DISRUPTION
integrity and capabilities of friendly forces through the use of direct and ZONE ZONE ZONE
indirect fires without becoming decisively engaged. This zone is generally
found between the battle line and the limit of responsibility of the threat unit.
In defensive operations, the disruption zone is used to set the conditions for
the defeat of friendly forces in the battle zone. The threat will employ many
different forces to achieve this goal. The DZ is used as a focal point for Battlefield Organization (Enemy in Offense)
reconnaissance and long-range and joint fire strikes. It is in the DZ that the
threat hopes to defeat mobility assets without becoming decisively engaged. Understanding the importance of reconnaissance, the threat uses counter-
reconnaissance assets to defeat friendly reconnaissance in order to blind friendly forces. Finally, through the use of hit-and-run tactics, the threat endeavors to
stall the friendly plan to the point that it becomes desynchronized or a portion of the friendly force becomes so decimated that it can not continue and the
friendly commander must redirect other friendly forces, or the reserve, in order to continue the operation. The DZ is also the area of the battlefield for non-
conventional forces, such as special purpose and other affiliated forces, which could have been operating in enemy-held territory prior to the escalation of
hostilities. There could also be stay-behind forces in areas seized by the enemy. The DZ, in defensive operations, is found forward of the battle zone and can
easily run deep into the friendly rear area.

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
Battlefield Organization (cont.)
Battle Zone
In the offense, the battle zone is the area on

the battlefield where enemy forces seek to fix
or destroy friendly forces through
simultaneous or sequential application of all
elements of their combat power. The battle
zone is separated from the support zone and
disruption zone by the battle line and the
support line. The battle zone exists to control
forces in proximity to the enemy, define
objectives, and to support understanding of
roles and missions.
In threat offensive operations, the attacking

force is organized into three forces according
to their function. The function does not
change regardless of where they are on the
battlefield. Each of these forces has a
commander and operates under the command
of the operational commander. These
functional forces are known as fixing forces,
assault forces, and exploitation forces.
Battle Zone Deployment (Enemy in the Offense)

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
Battle Zone (cont.)
The fixing force is a single unit or an amalgamation of units with the task to fix friendly forces
so they are not free to maneuver. This can be done through loss of effective communications
with HHQ, by increasing the friction on the battlefield so the friendly unit no longer has a clear
idea of the battlefield situation, by becoming decisively engaged with enemy forces, or through
loss of mobility due to complex terrain, obstacles, or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) devices. By fixing a portion of the friendly force, the enemy
retains freedom of maneuver and uses fewer assets than are normally required to defeat friendly
forces.
The assault force creates the conditions that allow the exploitation force the freedom to operate.
This may be done through direct or indirect contact with friendly forces or through a Battle Zone Deployment (Enemy in the Defense)
demonstration or feint that makes contact with the friendly force, but does not force them to become
decisively engaged.
The exploitation force is assigned the task of achieving the objective. As the name implies, the exploitation force exploits a window of opportunity created by
the fixing and assault forces. This does not imply that the exploitation force requires a successful mission of either the fixing or assault force in order to be both
effective and ultimately successful. A mismatch in capabilities or in the friendly and enemy dispositions may cause the enemy force to achieve its objective. The
exploitation force might even be able to achieve its objective through the effective use of fires.
In threat defensive operations, the battle zone is the area in which the main defensive forces use fire and maneuver to exploit successful disruption zone
operations. It is here that enemy forces complete the destruction of friendly combat systems earlier decimated in the DZ. If the enemy is successful, friendly
forces will be forced to culminate or leave the battlefield entirely. The battle zone integrates the Obstacle Plan of the enemy with his Fires Plan to support all of
his available systems. By using complex terrain, friendly forces may easily enter zones, but their exit may become difficult or even impossible. By establishing
kill zones, the enemy commander integrates long-range fires with attack aviation and ground defensive forces. Long-range fires from the battle zone may also
reach kill zones within the DZ, where their actions can be integrated with those of the disruption forces.

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
Support Zone
The support zone, in both offensive and defensive

operations, is an area generally free of significant friendly
action, that allows enemy forces to provide effective
logistic and administrative support to its forces. Security
forces operate in the support zone with the mission to
defeat friendly special operations forces and other threats.
Passive protection includes camouflage, concealment,
cover, and deception (C3D). This is done to decrease the
effects of friendly information collection activities and
precision-guided munitions. Based on movement in the
battle zone, or if it becomes untenable, the support zone
will move accordingly.
On a linear battlefield, the support zone is generally

located to the rear of the battle zone and defined by the
location of the support line. This serves to both protect the
support zone from friendly actions, and also to serve as a
relay point for movement of logistics and personnel.

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
Support Zone (cont.)
On a non-linear battlefield, the support zone can be

found inside the battle zone (as in defense of a city or
town), with the battle zone forces providing
protection, or outside the battle zone, where
dedicated forces would be required to protect it.
In order to define threat models, it is necessary to

determine how the enemy plans to fight based on
how he is arrayed on the battlefield. This is generally
determined by defining why the enemy is fighting
and what he stands to gain from a confrontation on
the battlefield.
Support Zone (Non-Linear Environment)

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
Why the Threat Fights

Roadside IED
The reason the enemy fights has a great impact on how he deploys his
forces and how he fights. In defensive operations, the enemy has
basically three options: (1) defend to destroy friendly forces, (2) defend Roadside IED is hidden at a choke point where target
to preserve key, held components from friendly destruction, or (3) defend vehicle is likely to be forced to stop. Lookout, or insurgent
to deny the friendly forces access to a geographic area or facility that who is to initiate the device placed in line of site of ambush
site. Initiation may be by command wire (more suited to
could enhance friendly operations or provide substantial value for rural areas), or by remote (previous IED’s have used mobile
information related operations. telephones).
I IED
In the offense, the threat also has basically three options: (1) attack to
destroy friendly forces, concentrating on key pieces of equipment or
formations, (2) attack to seize control of a key terrain feature or man-
made facility, or (3) attack to expel a friendly force either through loss of
combat power or loss of resolve (either at the tactical / operational levels
or at the operational / strategic levels). IED’s may be hidden by a variety of methods. Previous
incidents included boxes, bags, drink cans, dead animals,
MRE packs, hollowed out breeze blocks, and broken down
The same reasons, both offensively or defensively, are germane to vehicles.
stability operations when facing an enemy with the resolve to pursue his
goals through armed conflict.
Do not expect your HHQ to do you any favors. As they define the OE South Atropian (fictional) People’s Army TTP
and conduct their own IPB, it is focused on the information necessary to
complete their planning and mission. For this, they generally only depict
enemy forces two levels down. If there are key pieces of equipment or formations the commander is particularly interested in, they will be made
known to the staff during his initial guidance issued prior to Mission Analysis, and it is incumbent on the staff to identify these pieces of equipment or
formations, request information from HHQ or other sources, or dispatch internal collection assets to identify their location.

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
Why the Threat Fights (cont.)

PLANNED EFFECTS BY BDE AND DIV:
1. Div prep on OBJ COMRADE and SIMPSON
Remember, when converting threat doctrine or patterns = reduce by 10%
2. BDE FST x on OBJs = reduce 20% (must be
into graphics, the outputs are generally templates, graphs, ENEMY DEPICTED AT fired by 1-67 and 1-68) x3
(+) x6 BM21 IL-220U x3 S60
or overlays which depict how the enemy uses its 100% STRENGTH x54 D30
x54 SA18 x6 SA18
capabilities to accomplish its objectives. These are done in 1 221

a pristine environment and without the friction that
adverse weather and terrain can add to the picture. When (+)
WPN
(+)
x1 Seeker I
dealing with unconventional operations, they may involve x4
x4 SA18 x3 2B9 x3 AGS17 x3 T80U
graphical depictions on how insurgents emplace and x8 IN Sqd
x8 PKM GPMG
x2 60mm x3 AT7
x3 AT7 x1 Plow
(+) (+) SPF x2 DTG
x2
explode IEDs or how the supply and finance channels x4 RPG16
x4 AGS17 x10 PAX
MO60LP x3 SHEMEL
bring ordinance into an AO. The templates may be very x3 PMR

x2 PZM
x10 T80U
x3 Plow
x2 RPG22
x1 AT7
x1 TMM x1 BAT
generic (as in how insurgents carry out an ambush) or (+) WPN
(+) x2 MI17
very specific (as in how the insurgents carry out an x5 x2 x2 SU27

x3 AGS17 x3 2B9
ambush against combat logistic patrols). This action forms x15 IN Sqd
x15 PKM GPMG
x4 60mm x4 AT7 x5 SA18
x3 AT7 x3 9P148
x2-4 MI24
the basis for building threat COAs which are the x5 RPG16
x5 AGS17 BATTLE ZONE
necessary output of IPB for the staff to continue with the DISRUPTION ZONE LOG
MDMP. As a subset of IPB, threat templating requires SPF CSP
x1
(+) (+) Logistics
constant updates based on new information in order to CL I Resupply
CL V Resupply
* = Depicted (AF) cells are doctrinal estimates.
The current composition of affiliated force
x4-8 PAX
x3 x2-3 POV
accurately depict threat patterns. Threat templates will x9 BTR80A x6 2S12
AT/AP Mines
x1 AT7*
Cells in the BDE AO must still be confirmed.
AK-47
x9 IN Sqd x1 SP2 x1 SA18*
also differ in scope based on the echelon. The way the x3 SA18 x2 MO60LP* DA DEMO R HQ
SPF
commander wishes to attack a problem will also dictate x5
* = The weapons listed
in the Company Supply
Direct Action
x8-10 PAX
Demolition
x4-8 PAX
Recon C2
(+) (+) Points (CSP) are x4-8 PAX x1-2 PAX
how the templates are made. If he wants to influence how DTG BTG
x10 PAX
x2 RPG22 cached weapons only
(no teams) for the other
x2 RPG22
x1 SVD
x1-2 POV
x2 RPG22
x1 SVD x2-3 POV
x1 U/I Laser AK-47 AK-47
IED material is being brought into his AO, the x3 9P148 x3 SA18 x2 BRDM2 x3 BRDM2 Designator
10 SPF teams to draw
and use as the mission
x1 PKM
AK-47
x1 SVD
Demo Equip
commander will focus, primarily, on the enemy’s x1 BRM-1K x2 BRM-1K dictates. AK-47
logistical capabilities and actions. Example of Threat Characteristics Chart

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
Identify Threat Capabilities

Identifying threat capabilities is the last step prior to actually developing threat COAs. Identifying the threat capabilities identifies the capabilities the threat has
rather than what he will do with them. In a defensive operation, the threat may have the capability to deliver persistent chemical contaminants, but because he
may ultimately wish to retain that terrain, it may be considered a capability, but not necessarily a likely COA.
Rather than building a COA to describe the threat capability, capabilities are defined by statements. The following are examples of capability statements:
 “The threat has the capability to attack with one division supported by eight sorties of fixed wing aircraft daily.”
 “The criminal organization has the capability to pay off local radio stations to favorably portray their actions.”
 “The threat has the capability to impact local computer networks by infecting them with viruses from outside the wire.”
 “The threat has the capability to defend within four days and can be 100 % effectively dug in with wire and mine obstacles within eight days.”
 “The insurgents have CBRNE capabilities other than IEDs.”
 “Based on their numbers, insurgents can emplace up to four IEDs per day.”
 “The threat has the capability to use remotely triggered IEDs against our convoys.”
Besides these specific capabilities, other, more generic, types of capabilities should be identified, such as those that could be used to support a chosen COA.
Examples of these type capabilities might include:
 CBRNE operations.
 Intelligence collection.
 Electronic warfare (EW) operations.
 Aviation capability (fixed- and rotary-wing).
 Engineer capability (mobility and counter-mobility).
 Air assault or airborne operations.
 Amphibious operations.
 Propaganda operations.
 Deception operations.
 Car bombings, bomb scares, and suicide bombers.
 Carjacking or hijacking of vehicles to be used in other operations.
 Theft and/or manufacturing of chemicals.

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
Identify Threat Capabilities (cont.)
Not all threat capabilities are available to the threat all the time. It is incumbent upon the analyst to start with a laundry list of capabilities and weed out, based
on operation type, size of element, and terrain or weather restrictions, those capabilities that the threat could not realistically use. The threat strength, logistic
support, or level of training may further limit the capabilities the threat brings to the table.
While it is important to identify all threat capabilities in order to develop a complete set of threat COAs, it is important not to overstate their capabilities. They
must be realistic and analyzed based on factors of METT-TC to be useful. Take into account cultural awareness. This will help identify groups or individual
members who are either pro, neutral, or opposed to operations, which could further impact capabilities.
CAUTION Do not limit defining the capabilities to the threat’s conventional forces.
External influences could become a force the threat may use to influence
or affect operations. Civilians displaced by the threat could hinder friendly movement if
they move on critical roads or obstruct other infrastructure.

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
Describe the Threat’s Tactics and Options
The threat model includes a description of the threat’s preferred tactics. A description is still needed even if the threat has preferred tactics which are depicted in
a graphic form. The description:
 Lists the options available to the threat should the operation fail or succeed.
 Prevents the threat model from becoming more than a “snapshot in time” of the operation being depicted.
 Aids in mentally war-gaming the operation over its duration and during the development of threat COAs and situation templates.
 Addresses typical timelines and phases of operation, points where units transition from one form of maneuver to the next, and how each WFF contributes to
the success of the operation.
The analyst describes the actions of the supporting WFF in enough detail to allow for identification and development of HVTs. The analyst also examines each
phase separately because target values may change from phase to phase.
The analyst describes and makes a determination of what goal or goals the threat is trying to achieve. Threat objectives are often, but not always, what the unit’s
mission is trying to prevent; they are often actions taken by the threat to prevent unit mission accomplishment. Threat objectives will be specific to the type of
threat, the AO, the unit’s composition and mission, and other factors. The analyst also describes the threat objective in terms of purpose and end state. A
number of different functions must be executed each time a threat force attempts to accomplish a mission.
The first line in the above paragraph states that the model includes a description of the “preferred” tactics of the threat. The analyst must also be aware of the
less than optimal tactics and capabilities the threat has and when, and if, he might use them. This becomes very important during the final step of IPB.
The threat always has what we will call the “Captain Kirk Self-Destruct Option” … that is, place his force in a position which will either achieve his end state
or destroy his entire force. Many variables factor into the threat commander’s decision to employ this type of decision. Generally not used by regular forces,
this is often seen with suicide missions or threat operations based on religious ideology.

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
Identify High-value Targets (HVTs) Threat in Offense Threat in Defense Threat in Insurgency Civil Support
Reconnaissance elements Reconnaissance elements IED production facilities Nuclear reactors
Counter-reconnaissance
High-value target – A target the enemy commander requires for the detachment Engineer assets (mobility) IED emplacement teams Sports venues
successful completion of the mission. The loss of high-value targets would Multiple rocket launcher
Systems (MLRS) Indirect fire assets Snipers Convention centers
be expected to seriously degrade important enemy functions throughout the
friendly commander’s area of interest. Also called HVT. (Joint Publication Indirect fire systems MRLS Cell phones Malls / shopping areas
(JP) 3-09) Resupply capabilities CBRNE Local populace Government buildings
Engineer assets (counter-
mobility) Communications systems Tribal leaders Toxic / chemical storage sites
High-payoff target – A target whose loss to the enemy will significantly CBRNE capabilities UAS Informal leaders Utilities
contribute to the success of the friendly course of action. High-payoff Communications systems Mosques Media centers
targets are those high-value targets that must be acquired and successfully Mines and obstacles Transportation centers
attacked for the success of the friendly commander’s mission. Also called Snipers Emergency centers
HPT. (JP 3-09) Unmanned Aerial Systems
(UAS) Hospitals
The concept of high-value and high-payoff targets can sometimes be Examples of HVTs Based on Threat Operations
perplexing. Some look at them as two sides of the same coin. If you have a
target that the enemy requires to be successful (HVT), then the loss of the same target must be favorable to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. While
this, in its simplest form, is true, the commander must understand his capabilities and how (or if) he can affect the target. The identification of HVTs is done as
a precursor to defining HPTs. HPTs are defined by their relationship to the friendly concept of the operation (FM 3-60) and will not be addr essed until COA
Development.
Once HVTs have been identified from existing intelligence studies, database evaluation, patrol debriefs, and Spot Reports which identify size, activity,
location, unit (unifor m), time, and equipment (SALUTE), they must be pr ior itized relative to their wor th to the enemy as par t of the thr eat model.
HVTs will appear over the course of the operation, and it is important to identify their value based on when and where they occur on the battlefield. There are
different methods to prioritize the importance of HVTs to the enemy: historical data, analysis of studies, and numerical methods such as the target analysis
process (special operations forces (SOF) method) of identifying the desirability of attacking a target based on its relative importance to the enemy. This
process, termed “CARVER,” stands for factors of criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability.

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
Notes

Sub-task 3 Unified
Threat
Notes

Sub-task 4 Unified
Determine Threat Land Operations
Courses of Action
IPB Sub-task 4: Determine Threat Courses of Action
Getting Started
The final sub-task in IPB is to determine the various threat COAs. Detailed analysis of the previous three steps of IPB will enable the staff to replicate all of the
COAs the threat is considering, identify the threat COAs that can influence the friendly COA, and identify those areas and activities whose activity or lack of
activity will indicate which COA the threat has chosen. Like everything else in IPB and the MDMP in general, time is a key consideration in determining how
many threat COAs the S-2 Section will be able to create and provide narrative for. Because of this, the S-2 must allocate the lion’s share of time during
Mission Analysis to building threat COAs and refining the threat COAs from the HHQ OPORD.
The staff will use the threat COAs along with facts and assumptions that were developed
during Mission Analysis to drive friendly COA Analysis and develop and refine a set of
friendly COAs to defeat the threat.
Like each of the previous steps, Sub-task 4 of IPB is broken down into sub-steps. In this
case, there are two sub-steps as indicated in the figure to the right:
 Develop threat COAs.
 Develop event template and matrix.
Develop Threat COAs
There are six sub-tasks which fall under Develop Threat COAs. They are:
 Identify likely objectives and end state.
 Identify full set of COAs.
 Evaluate and prioritize each COA.
 Develop each COA in the amount of detail time allows.
 Identify HVTs for each COA.
 Identify initial collection requirements for each COA.
Determine Threat COA Sub-steps

Sub-task 4 Unified
Courses of Action
Identify the Threat’s Likely Objectives and Desired End State
As stated earlier in this publication, it is necessary to determine why the threat is fighting to determine what he is looking to accomplish (end state) and
what benchmarks (likely objectives) he will attempt to achieve. The S-2 depicts the threat based on commander’s guidance (for example echelon or cell).
When looking at a particular echelon, it is important to understand that the goal of a subordinate unit may not be the same as the parent unit. A unit may
have the task of fixing a particular unit in order for the parent unit to defeat a larger element and setting the conditions for an even larger element’s actions.
Generally, when depicting the threat, the unit should start one echelon above the friendly echelon and work downward at least two echelons. For example,
a battalion must understand the end state of the brigade tactical group (BTG), but depict company-level and, finally, platoon-level positions. Special
emphasis should be taken with key pieces of equipment or formations as directed by the commander or HHQ.
For regular forces, objectives can be either terrain or force oriented, and the end state is usually based on effect and time. For example, the objective of a
lead echelon infantry brigade performing an attack may be to neutralize defending forces. The brigade’s end state may be to prevent defending forces from
affecting the movement of second echelon forces. Additionally, the brigade’s operations are synchronized in time with HHQ operations to ensure combat
power is applied where and when needed to ensure success.
For irregular forces, while the end state remains based on effect, objectives are not always linear or time-based. Often, the objectives of irregular forces are
driven by events rather than time. For example, the objective of an extremist group may be to prevent U.S. forces from providing security to the general
population by increasing the amount of time spent on resources. The group’s end state may be to convince the population to rely on security provided by
the extremist group rather than U.S. forces. In this case, the group’s operations are synchronized with the operations of U.S. forces attacking patrols,
convoys, combat outposts, and security forces.
Sometimes it is difficult to understand the intentions of terrorists, criminal organizations, or certain actors inside the AO or involved with the action.
Utilize the tools available, including the MISO. They will help evaluate graffiti, gang symbols, and other propaganda to determine likely end states and/or
targets. Know how and why the threat conducted operations in the past. This can give good insight into possible objectives and end states.

Sub-task 4 Unified
Courses of Action
Identify the Full Set of COAs Available to the Threat
Because the MDMP is a recurring process, and IPB is a continuous process, it is rare to be able to conduct either in a pristine environment with no outside
distracters. It is crucial that the S-2 Section is well trained to meet the contingency that the S-2 proper is forward with the commander executing another mission,
personnel are on pass or leave, or the section is otherwise short-staffed. Time sometimes is the major factor in determining how many threat COAs can be
prepared and how fully they can be flushed out.
The best method, to start, is to refine the HHQ assessment of the threat COAs. These will generally give you what they perceive as the most likely and the most
dangerous threat COAs. After that, there may be some significant capabilities that have been identified during Sub-task 3 of the IPB that may be included in
additional threat COAs.
To ensure the staff has developed the “complete” set of threat COAs, the following should be considered :
 Are the threat COAs identified appropriate to the identification of the threat’s likely objectives and end states?
 Are the threat COAs appropriate based on how the threat perceives the current situation?
 How can the threat change his COAs to significantly influence friendly operations?
 How regimented is the threat? What can it do to exploit capabilities outside of its normal doctrine and tactics?
 What other actions can the threat initiate outside of what has been indicated by recent activities and events?
A regular force has two primary types of operations it can conduct: attack or defend. Based on its objectives, the enemy must select one of these options. Once
selected, the threat generally has multiple options to consider when developing its plan.
An irregular force can conduct an attack or defend on a small scale, for short periods, or in complex terrain, but it is difficult to sustain these types of operations
without degradation of their effectiveness and their operations. The primary types of operations irregular forces can conduct are activities associated with
insurgent or guerilla operations, raids, ambushes, sabotage, and acts of terror.
A hybrid force can combine the capabilities of regular and irregular forces to engage U.S. forces from all points in order to overwhelm U.S. capabilities.
Regardless of the type of force and the type of operation being conducted, enemy forces plan operations based on task, purpose, method, and end state.
Activities within its operations are planned to support that task and purpose. The staff identifies the tasks, purpose, and end state for each COA developed. By
identifying these for each COA, the intelligence staff will be better able to determine the chosen threat COA during the conduct of operations.

Sub-task 4 Unified
Courses of Action
Identify the Full Set of COAs Available to the Threat (cont.)
Regardless of the type of force, when developing a threat COA, the staff determines:
 Current enemy situation.
 Mission (includes task and purpose).
 Threat objectives, methods, and end state.
 Commander’s intent, purpose, and end state.
 Task organization.
 Capabilities.
 Vulnerabilities.
 HVTs.
 Decision points (essential in determining branches and sequels).
 Decisive point (source of strength, power, and resistance).
 Failure options.
 Branches and sequels.
 Intent for:
 Movement and maneuver.
 Reconnaissance and surveillance.
 Fire support.
 Logistics.
 Threat command and control.
 Protection.
 Information activities.
 Denial and deception.

Sub-task 4 Unified
Courses of Action
Identify the Full Set of COAs Available to the Threat (cont.)
CAUTION A common, yet correctable, mistake is the
improper use of the term “Reverse IPB.”
This term was used (doctrinally) as far back as 1994 in
FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, to
 How terrain and weather will affect threat operations.
mean, “...replicating the process that the threat is
 How civil considerations will affect threat operations. employing to discern friendly COAs.” The term and
 How displaced civilians and displaced persons will affect threat operations. definition were virtually unchanged as FM 2-01.3
replaced FM 34-130 in 2009. ATP 2-01.3, in 2014 changed
 How the presence and actions of U.S. forces will affect threat operations (reverse IPB). the definition a small bit by stating Reverse IPB detailed
“...how the presence and actions of U.S. forces will affect
In addition, for enemy offensive tasks, the staff focuses on determining: threat operations.”
 Main, supporting, and reinforcing efforts.
Somewhere along the way, somebody determined that
 Use of reserves. “Reverse IPB” was conducting IPB from a threat point of
 Use of special munitions. view. This is NOT Reverse IPB but merely the other side
of IPB and is necessary to complete IPB.
 Use of air support.
In addition, for enemy defensive tasks, the staff focuses on determining:

 Location of engagement areas and obstacles. TIP It is the job of the S-2 to develop threat COAs, within the
 Location, type, and size of security zone forces. boundaries established by HHQ, that have a high
 Location, type, and size of counterattack forces. probability of defeating the friendly capabilities. These need to be
well-thought-out and complete to enable the staff to plan for all
 Use of special munitions. contingencies. Time is the mitigating factor in developing threat
 Use of air support. COAs. Given an infinite amount of time, the S-2 staff can develop
a plethora of COAs and describe the actions fully. It is incumbent
In addition, for irregular warfare, the staff generally considers: on the commander to determine the amount of time available for
Mission Analysis, and, specifically, IPB (just one sub-task of
 Guerilla and terror attacks on U.S. forces and host-nation governmental, civil, and
eighteen) to determine how many threat COAs the S-2 Section is
security organizations.
capable of developing within the allocated time frame.
 Guerilla and terror attacks on local populations.

Sub-task 4 Unified
Courses of Action
Evaluate and Prioritize Each Threat COA
Once the staff has identified all valid threat COAs, it compares each COA to the others and prioritizes them by number. For example, if four COAs have been
developed, COA 1 is the enemy’s most likely COA and COA 4 is the least likely. Additionally, the staff determines which COA is the most dangerous to U.S.
forces. The most likely COA may also be the most dangerous. Additionally, a COA needs to answer six basic questions:
 Who - the organizational structure of the threat organization, including external organizations providing support.
 What - the type of operation: attack, defend, other.
 When - the earliest time the action can begin.
 Where - the battlefield geometry that frames the COA (boundaries, objectives, routes, other).
 How - the threat will employ its assets to achieve its objectives.
 Why - the threat’s objectives.
The commander approves a plan that is optimized to counter the most likely enemy COA, while allowing for contingency options should the threat choose
another COA. Therefore, the staff evaluates each enemy COA and prioritizes it according to how likely it is that the threat adopts that option. Generally, threat
forces are more likely to use a COA that offers the greatest advantage while minimizing risk. However, based on the situation and its objectives, the threat may
choose to accept risk to achieve a desired end state (as discussed previously). It is impossible to predict what COA the threat will choose. Therefore, the staff
develops and prioritizes as many valid threat COAs as time allows but at a minimum develops the most likely and most dangerous COAs.
Develop Each COA in the Amount of Detail Time Allows
A threat COA consists of the following products:

 SITTEMP for the threat COA.
 Threat COA statement.
 HVTs and HVTL for the threat COA

Sub-task 4 Unified
Courses of Action
Situation Template for the Threat COA
ADRP 1-02 defines the SITTEMP as, “A depiction of assumed adversary dispositions, based on that
adversary's preferred method of operations and the impact of the operational environment if the
adversary should adopt a particular course of action.” In other words, the situation template is a
“snapshot in time” based on the threat’s chosen COA and taking into account the effects of the OE. As
stated earlier, SITTEMPs are logical deductions working inside the parameters directed by the HHQ
and taking into account what the threat has done in the past, the OE, and perceived end state. The
graphic to the right has been produced in many ways but always with the same elements. The threat’s
SOP (determined in Sub-task 3 of IPB) added to the environment (produced in Sub-task 1 and 2)
produces a threat COA. This does not mean it is the only COA based on the threat’s SOP and current
environment because there are many ways the threat has to conduct an operation. This is why there are
differences in threat COAs and why a method must be in place to determine which COA he will
choose.
As another example, take the MCOO to the right. This was developed using terrain from the NTC in Developing the SITTEMP
California, and includes relief, hydrology, and civilian infrastructure combining to produce
mobility corridors, avenues of approach, and key terrain. Legend
Restrictive terrain
Area
Built up area
Building this product provides a graphic representation of where there is maneuverable Mobility corridor
Platoon
terrain and what terrain contains obstacles to movement. We rarely place threat positions 50
Company
Battalion
50
50Ave of approach
60 70 80 90 MK NK 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
within non-maneuverable terrain but they must be considered because this terrain may help Airfield
K
Playa / sabkha
whoever owns it by canalizing forces (with the help of manmade obstacles) into areas where K AA1A
China Lake
40
K Key terrain 40
the threat wishes to defeat friendly forces. This terrain is also preferable for the emplacement AA1
of key weapon systems and observation posts. 30 30
Quuam Sakhrat AA1B

20
K K 20
AA2A
Medina Ma’akl
K
Medina Wasl
10 10
Wadi Ra’id
AA2 Medina Irwin
MK
MJ
MK NK
MJ NJ K El Whaleo
Mezra’s Mazik Ahmar NK
NJ
AA2B
90 90
50 60 70 80 90 MJ NJ 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Sub-task 4 Unified
Courses of Action
Situation Template for the Threat COA (cont.)
Once the MCOO is completed, the threat’s

composition from Sub-task 3 must be
considered. The example to the right shows a
conventional force with the task of defending
from a simple battle position. HHQ provided x
Denotes forces likely in BDE’s AO
the order of battle (OB) expected in the AO
which included one task-organized
Denotes forces that could impact the BDE’s AO
231
mechanized / armor battalion in the battle zone
with a counter-reconnaissance detachment
(CRD) of one company team of BMPs and II (+) II (+) x II (-) II (-)
T-72 tanks supported by one battery of self-
propelled mortars and one anti-tank platoon in 1-231 2-231 3-231 231 1-241
the disruption zone. These elements are DISRPT ZONE .
BATTLE ZONE N.
augmented by a platoon of mechanized 3 X BMP CO
1 X BMP CO
1 X T-72 PLT
2 X BMPCO
1 X T-72 PLT
2 X BMP CO 2 X T-80 CO
reconnaissance assets. The threat has placed in 1 X T-72 CO
1 X TM INF CO
1 X 2S3 BT 1 X 2B9 SEC
1 X T-72 CO
1 X MT 12 BTY
1 X BMP CO
1 X 9P148 PLT 1 X 9P148 PLT
reserve one company of BMPs and one 1 X MT 12 BTY
231 BDE RES .
platoon of T-72 tanks. Additionally, according 1 X BMP CO
1 X T-72 PL
to HHQ COAs, the threat has allocated two
batteries of self-propelled artillery, augmented I (+) II I II I
with one battery of towed artillery. From this
information, it is the job of the analyst to 231 231 231 231
determine the actual pieces that must be placed
on the map as well as their possible locations 1 PLT(+) Only
BM-21BTY (122mm)
3X2S3 BTYs (152mm SP)
to give an accurate picture of a possible COA **ONE BTY IN DISRUPT ZONE**
for the threat in his AO.
Threat Order of Battle (OB)

Sub-task 4 Unified
Courses of Action
The picture to the right shows a possible

COA available to the enemy. The
reconnaissance assets are screening
forward in the disruption zone to provide X
warning to the CRD and battle positions.
The CRD is located in the northern

section of the AO along the northern
avenue of approach with three company-
size battle positions in the southern
portion of the AO. X
-
The reserve is located in a hide position

between two battle positions with the
-
capability of supporting any of the three, -
if needed.
X
The support zone, with the indirect fire
assets and sustainment assets, is to the
rear of the AO.
Threat Model Based on Order of Battle and Mission

Sub-task 4 Unified
Courses of Action
Putting all of this together50on the map, and 50

50 60 70 80 90 MK NK 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
accounting for terrain and weather, produces
the product to the right. This is a SITTEMP X
of the threat defending from three simple
company battle positions.40The analyst 40
completes the SITTEMP by adjusting the

individual positions to account for terrain,
determines where he intends 30 to destroy 30
friendly assets, incorporates man-made and
natural obstacles to canalize friendly forces
into these kill zones, and ensures he has the X Quuam Sakhrat
20 -
necessary protective measures in place to 20
provide warning and protection from flanking Medina Ma’akl
or enveloping attacks.
10 - Medina Wasl
- 10
Wadi Ra’id
Once the S-2 completes emplacing the enemy
equipment two levels down (with more Medina Irwin
refinement if he has time),

MKand pays attention MK NK
X Mezra’s Mazik Ahmar NK
to any key equipment or formations
MJ the MJ NJ
El Whaleo
NJ
commander has stated a particular interest in,

he should have his SITTEMPs reviewed by
the S-3 to ensure they are90doctrinally correct 90
60 70 80 90 MJ NJ 20 50 60 70 80
and accurately portray the probable50 10 30 40
disposition of the enemy, based on terrain,

weather, and other factors.
COA with Threat Model, Adjusted for the Operational Environment

Sub-task 4 Unified
Courses of Action
When building SITTEMPs, it is necessary to think through the threat’s scheme

of maneuver . . . how he will accomplish his mission based on the template the
analyst built for the COA. In offensive and defensive fights, think about the
movement of elements and timing of movements, as well as when the threat may
change from one type of maneuver to another. For instance, when the threat is
attacking, he may appear to be moving in a column formation for ease of control.
At what point will that change to the fixing, attack, and exploitation forces, and
will they continue to be deployed in columns?
Against conventional threats, evaluate time and space factors to develop time-
phase lines (TPLs). These TPLs link doctrinal rates of movement with the OE
and provide the basis of determining timing of threat operations based on
movement across high-speed vice sub-optimal AAs. Developing TPLs become
the starting block of timing threat operations and are found in SITTEMPs,
EVENTEMPs, and decision support templates (DST). While developing TPLs,
consider only the time required to adopt movement patterns, time for the
movement itself, and time for the trail elements to close after arriving at a
selected point. During war-gaming, TPLs are generally modified through the
addition of specific triggers which may be influenced by friendly actions. These Time Phase Lines
triggers become part of the threat DST, which may be included in IPB products
but are necessary in developing the synchronization matrix. These results are
also incorporated in the unit Information Collection Plan and are used to Decision Support Template Showing
determine specific times when collection assets are required to confirm or deny threat Time-Phase Lines
activity in named areas of interest (NAIs). In some instances (specifically when templating
against irregular or hybrid threats), the development of TPLs may be impractical and should instead be portrayed based on activities. These timelines, as
stated in Sub-task 3 of IPB, are derived through analysis of past activities.
When preparing SITTEMPs, use as many graphics as necessary to depict the threat COA in enough detail to support COA Analysis and collection planning.
Use the guidance set forth by the commander to tailor the SITTEMPs to the needs of the unit. Based on echelon, threat templates may focus on culmination
points and centers of gravity rather than specific threat COAs.

Sub-task 4 Unified
Courses of Action
Threat COA Statements
Threat COA statements provide a narrative to the SITTEMPs created. This can be done in many formats and should be done in as much detail as time allows.
The methods for capturing the descriptions of threat COAs range from simple narrative descriptions to detailed synchronization matrices depicting activities of
each unit, WFF, or other activity in detail. They should address time (specifically the earliest time) based on current situation, when the threat could commence
operations, as well as timelines, phasing, and threat commander’s decision points, if developed. The narrative portion of the SITTEMP will be used in COA
Analysis and forms the basis of the threat portion of the OPORD, the EVENTEMP, and the Intelligence Estimate (e.g., Annex B (Intelligence))of the OPORD.
The development of threat COA descriptions should be done in as much detail as time allows and the situation requires. There is no single set of doctrinal rules
required to design the description. Use whatever tools and format work for the commander and staff. The basics formats are generally time-event charts or
simple narrative descriptions. Regardless of which format is used, expect refinement to the threat COA statement to occur during COA Analysis.
When describing threat COAs, keep in mind the following:

 Describe the preferred tactics that go along with the template.
 When doing the mental war-gaming that accompanies developing the threat template, identify when and where to expect the threat to take certain actions or
make certain decisions; this becomes the threat decision support template and helps the staff conduct war-gaming.
 Ensure each event is recorded in the narrative description.
 Where possible, tie each event to a TPL, a point on the timeline, or a specific geographical spot on the template; doing this early helps in the construction of
the event template later.
 As the threat approaches various threat decision points, record the decisions and the timelines in the narrative; this helps the analyst develop threat branches
and/or sequels which help support friendly planning.
 Record the decision criteria or triggers associated with each threat decision.
After identifying the set of potential threat COAs, the next action is determining which one the threat will adopt. This revolves around predictive analysis about
specific activities and areas that, when observed, will reveal which COA the threat has chosen. These areas on the SITTEMP should be nominated as NAIs.
NAIs can depict locations, persons, or actions. The actions within each of these NAIs that reveal the intended COA are called indicators and are part of the
Information Collection Process.

Sub-task 4 Unified
Courses of Action
Threat COA Statements (cont.)
The simple tool to the right serves as an example of what specific information
should be included in the threat COA statement.
HVTs and HVTL for the Threat COA
In Sub-task 3, potential HVTs and HPTs were identified. These were generic and
not specific to a given threat COA. While providing a good start to the Targeting
Process, the initial list doesn’t provide the fidelity required to develop a
collection plan. The HVTs must be important to the threat commander based on
the COA he chooses. If an HVT designated in Sub-task 3 is a particular bridge, and Example Threat COA Statement Outline
during the development of the threat COA, the threat does not use the bridge, the
bridge is not an HVT for that particular threat COA.
As the SITTEMPs are mentally war-gamed, the following techniques will help in developing a list of HVTs to move forward into targeting and friendly COA
Development:
 Note how and where each WFF provides support to the threat COA.
 Begin with the list of HVTs from the threat model developed in IPB Sub-task 3, but don’t limit the input to those alone.
 Determine the effect the loss of each HVT will have on the threat COA by destroying each one and attempting to determine what the threat response will
be; the value of each HVT may differ based on the COA being war-gamed.
 Identify the times, phases, or locations on the battlefield where and when the loss of a specific asset will have the greatest effect on the threat COA.
 Ensure the updated HVT list is transferred to, and included in, the threat COA with the SITTEMP and narrative; note on the threat overlay where specific
HVTs must be employed for the threat commander to be successful; this will become a good tool to focus COA Analysis; understanding where and when
the threat is expected to use his HVTs aids in the development of targeted areas of interest (TAI) and engagement areas (EA).
 Ensure the remainder of the staff participates, as necessary, in the development of threat COAs, particularly where their subject matter expertise of specific
WFF questions would help to fully develop it.
The detailed analysis of HVTs based on threat COAs may lead to a reprioritization of them.

Sub-task 4 Determine Threat Courses of Action
Identify Initial Collection Requirements for Each COA
After identifying the full set of potential threat COAs, the staff develops the tools necessary to determine which COA the threat will implement. Because the
threat has not acted yet, this determination cannot be made during IPB. However, the staff can develop the information requirements and indicators necessary to
support the construction of an Information Collection Plan that can provide the information necessary to confirm or deny threat COAs and locate enemy targets.
Information requirements are those items of information that need to be collected and processed in order to meet the intelligence requirements of the
commander. An indicator is an item of information which reflects the intention or capability of a threat to adopt
or reject a COA. H+1 H+4 H+6 H+8
The two tools used to begin identifying which COA the threat will choose and that form the basis of the
Information Collection Plan are: NAI 3
 The EVENTEMP.
 The event matrix. NAI 4
NAI 2
The Event Template NAI 1

NAI 5
While it is extremely important to identify all of the COAs the threat may adopt, the knowledge is Threat COA 1
useless unless it can be ascertained which one he will choose. This is the function of information
collection planning and execution. One of the tools used to identify which COA the threat will ECOA 1
choose is the EVENTEMP.
H+1 H+4 H+6 H+8
The EVENTEMP attempts to answer which COA the threat will choose based on the observation X
of specific areas of the battlefield and the identification of activity or lack of activity. This is done
by overlapping the threat COAs developed and determining where they are the same or different. NAI 3
An indicator present in all COAs can neither confirm nor deny the adoption of any COA by the
threat. Only where indicators differ between COAs, can an assessment be made. The graphics to
the right indicate the predicted locations of platoon battle positions in two threat COAs. NAI 6
NAI 5
Threat COA 2
ECOA 2

Sub-task 4 Unified
Courses of Action
The Event Template (cont.)

NAI 3 and NAI 5 have been “crossed” out due to
their occurrence in both COAs. Activity noted in
either of these battle positions will neither confirm Same in both COAs
nor deny the threat’s choice of a COA. Activity in
NAIs 1, 2, 4, and 6 could indicate which COA the
threat has chosen. In this case, activity within NAIs NAI 3
NAI 3
1, 2, and 4 indicate the threat has adopted threat
COA 1, while activity in NAI 6 indicates the threat
has adopted COA 2. The other side of the coin also
Threat COA 1
exists . . . lack of activity within expected NAIs may
also be an indicator the threat has chosen another
COA.
The EVENTEMP guides information collection

planning. The NAIs over the areas of the NAI 4
EVENTEMP where activity is expected focus
collection assets in their tasks. This does not mean NAI 2 NAI 6
the other two NAIs are not important. The
commander will still allocate resources to these
NAIs in support of information collection on the NAI 1 NAI
5 5
threat. NAI
Threat COA 2
Developing the EVENTEMP

Sub-task 4 Unified
Courses of Action
The Event Template (cont.)
The completed initial EVENTEMP to the H+1 H+4 H+6 H+8

right serves as the basis for determining
which COA the threat will adopt. As the
MDMP progresses, this graphic will
change with the addition of HVTs and
X
predicted decisions the threat will make
generating branches and sequels in his
plans. Understanding where the threat is
likely to make decisions on the
battlefield enables the friendly
commander to influence the threat
decision cycle.
When developing NAIs, ensure they are

large enough to encompass the entire
activity that serves as the indicator but NAI 4
not so large that collection assets cannot
adequately cover them or compromise NAI 2
themselves. NAI 6
NAI 1
Event Template
The EVENTEMP

Sub-task 4 Unified
Courses of Action
The Event Matrix
The event matrix is a companion to the

EVENTEMP that complements it by
providing details on the type of activity NAI 2 / NV142535 H+1 H+4 H+6 H+8
expected within specific NAIs, when it is
expected to be active, and the relationship of
the activity to other activities within the AO. PIR: Will the Atropians defend X
While the primary use is associated with with a forward platoon IVO hilltop
intelligence collection, it also serves to aid in 132?
situation development. To develop the event
matrix, examine the events associated with
each NAI and restate them in the form of a
Indicators for COA 1: Presence
set of indicators with associated times they of dug-in forces
are likely to be observed. Use the TPLs
established during SITTEMP construction, Indicators for COA 2: Absence
or from the EVENTEMP. Ensure the latest
of dug-in forces.
time information is of value (LTIOV) is NAI 4
included, if identified. Use the information
derived during COA Analysis to update and Earliest: H-12 NAI 2
NAI 6
refine the event matrix and template. Ensure
the S-2 is an active participant in the Latest: Reconnaissance forces NAI 1
development of the friendly DST, which
incorporates NAIs that support commander’s cross LD
decisions and the tracking of HPTs.
EVENTEMPs and matrices should be Remarks: Report on positive
X
disseminated as widely as possible, as they identification
help drive subordinate planning. Finally, Event Template
ensure the EVENTEMP is used as the basis
of intelligence collection strategies and in The Event Matrix
synchronizing intelligence with operations.

Sub-task 4 Unified
Courses of Action
The Information Collection Plan
The unit Information Collection Plan serves many purposes. First and foremost, it helps the commander identify,
through the use of products discussed on the previous pages, which COA the threat has adopted. The Information
Collection Plan also serves as the “detect” portion of the 4-part Targeting Process, that is, Decide, Detect, Deliver, and
Assess (D3A). The Information Collection Plan synchronizes collection with the friendly Maneuver Plan and answers
questions for the commander and the staff. Information collection planning is much more complicated than a single
paragraph can define.
The Training Analysis Feedback Team (TAFT) developed the product shown to the right following the tenets
outlined in FM 3-55, Information Collection (May 2013), and ATTP 2-01, Planning Requirements and Assessing
Collection (April 2012). A revision is scheduled shortly that will update this product to guidance provided in ATP 2-
01, Plan Requirements and Assess Collection (August 2014).
Focusing IPB
"Go sir, gallop, and don't forget that the world was made in six days. You can ask me for anything you like, except time.”
Napoleon Bonaparte
In closing this publication, the question may still linger . . . “What if I don’t have enough time to do all four steps of IPB completely?” The time available for
completion of IPB may not permit the luxury of performing each step in detail. Overcoming time limitations requires a determination on which products need to
be developed, and to what degree of detail, in order to assist the commander and staff in planning, preparing for, and executing the mission.
There is always enough time to do IPB . . . it is a continuous process that permeates the MDMP. What is not addressed during Mission Analysis can be
readdressed during the COA Development Briefing, the COA Analysis Briefing, the COA Comparison Briefing, or in the OPORD. The key is understanding
not what can not be provided in entirety during Mission Analysis, but what must be provided in the greatest detail in order for the staff to continue planning.
The commander and XO must address the planning timeline at the onset of mission planning and determine, while conducting the initial assessment, how much
time can be allocated to Mission Analysis and, subsequently, IPB.
The commander focuses the Planning Process during the initial guidance provided during Receipt of Mission. This should include how the MDMP is to be
abbreviated, if necessary. If there is not enough specificity with regard to IPB, someone (either the S-2 or the Operations Officer (S-3)) needs to ask the
commander what the priority is for the production of IPB products. This may or may not be already addressed in the unit Plans / Tactical SOP.

Sub-task 4 Unified
Courses of Action
Focusing IPB (cont.)
A set of informal “rules” that can assist the staff may include:
 Work ahead as much as possible.
 Establish a set of base products.
 Keep the products updated by periodic review instead of waiting for the next Receipt of Mission.
 Keep threat databases up to date as changes occur.
 Maintain good communications to ensure collaboration with higher, subordinate, and other staff elements.
 Share products in a time-constrained environment and use the available technology.
TIP The commander and staff can look out of the window and see the rain and see the mountains. They
understand the effects of weather and terrain as they apply to their WFFs. Do not spend an inordinate
amount of time on environmental conditions (other than populations). Spend time on the threat . . . who they are,
how they work, and what they will do.

Sub-task 4 Unified
Courses of Action
Notes

Sub-task 4 Unified
Courses of Action
Notes

IPB Tools
Road Categories Description
All-weather, dual /  Waterproof surface with concrete, bituminous surfacing, brick, or

divided highway paving stone.
 Slightly affected by precipitation and temperature changes.
All-weather, hard-  Waterproof surface with concrete, bituminous surfacing, brick, or

surface paving stone.
 Slightly affected by precipitation and temperature changes.
All-weather, loose  Constructed of crushed rock, gravel, or smoothed earth with an oil
surface coating.
 Graded and drained, but not waterproofed.
 Can be considerably affected by rain, frost, or thaw.
 May collapse completely under heavy use during adverse weather
conditions.
Fair-weather, loose-  Constructed of natural or stabilized soil, sand clay, shell, cinders,
surface or disintegrated granite or rock.
 Includes logging road, abandoned roads, and corduroy roads.
 Can become quickly impassable in adverse weather.
Cart track  Natural traveled ways including caravan routes and winter roads.
 Too narrow to accommodate four-wheeled military vehicles.
Description of Road Categories Common Bridge Types

IPB Tools
Route Types and Military Load Classifications
Foot March Factors

IPB Tools
Terrain Analysis Considerations within OAKOC

IPB Tools
Weather Effects Considerations Estimating Wind Speed
Wind Chill Factor Chart

IPB Tools
Beaufort Wind Scale

IPB Tools
Weather Effect Critical Values

IPB Tools
Weapon Weapon Type Caliber Effective Range Sighted Range
AK-47 / AKM Small Arms 7.62-millimeter 300 meters 800 meters
AK-74M Small Arms 5.45-millimeter 500 meters 800 meters
SVD Sniper 7.62-millimeter 1000 meters 800 meters (w/o scope)
RPK Light Machinegun 7.62-millimeter 800 meters 800 meters
RPK-74 Light Machinegun 5.45-millimeter 800 meters 1,000 meters
PKM Machinegun 7.62-millimeter 800 meters 1,000 meters
GP-30 Grenade Launcher 40-millimeter 400 meters 400 meters
AGS-17 Automatic Grenade Launcher 30-millimeter 1,200 meters 1,730 meters
Small Arms Weapons from Worldwide Equipment Guide

IPB Tools
Weapon Weapon Type Caliber Range
Carl Gustaf AT Weapon 84-millimeter 700 meters

RPG-7V RPG 40-millimeter 500 meters
RPG-29 RPG 105-millimeter 500 - 800 meters
AT-4 AT Weapon 84-millimeter 300 meters
RPG-22 RPG 72.5-millimeter 250 meters
RPG-27 RPG 105-millimeter 200 meters
Milan ATGM 125-millimeter 2,000 meters
SPG-9M AT Weapon 73-millimeter 1,000 meters
AT-4/5 ATGM 135-millimeter 4,000 meters
Kornet ATGM 152-millimeter 5,500 meters
2A45M Towed AT Gun 125-millimeter 3,000 - 4,000 meters
9P148 AT Weapon 135-millimeter 4,000 meters
9P149 ATGM 135-millimeter 4,000 meters
MT-12 Towed AT Gun 100-millimeter 2,500 meters
Anti-Tank Weapons and Missiles from Worldwide Equipment Guide
AT — anti-tank RPG — rocket-propelled grenade ATGM — anti-tank guided missile

IPB Tools
Vehicle Vehicle Type Weapons Range
BTR-60PA APC 12.7-mm and 2 x 7.62-mm machinegun 500 kilometers

BTR-60RB APC 14.5-mm and 7.62-mm machinegun 500 kilometers
BTR-80 APC 14.5-mm and 7.62-mm machinegun 600 kilometers
BTR-90 APC 30-mm automatic gun, 30-mm grenade launcher, 7.62-mm coaxial machinegun 800 kilometers
BMP-1 IFV 73-mm gun, AT-3 ATGM, 7.62-mm coaxial machinegun 600 kilometers
BMP-2 IFV 30-mm automatic gun, AT-5 ATGM, 7.62-mm coaxial machinegun 600 kilometers
BMD-1 Airborne Fighting 73-mm gun, AT-3 ATGM, 7.62-mm coaxial mg, 2 x 7.62-mm bow machineguns 500 kilometers
Vehicle
BMD-3/4 Airborne Fighting 30-mm automatic gun, ATGM launcher, 7.62-mm coaxial machinegun, 30-mm grenade 500 kilometers
Vehicle launcher, 5.45-mm light machinegun
BMP-3 IFV 100-mm rifled gun, 30 mm automatic gun, 7.62 mm coaxial machinegun, 2 x 7.62 bow guns 600 kilometers
T-72 Tank 125-mm smoothbore gun, 7.62-mm coaxial machinegun, 12.7-mm AA machinegun 460-700 kilometers
T-72B Tank 125-mm smoothbore gun, 7.62-mm coaxial machinegun, 12.7-mm AA machinegun 500-900 kilometers
T-80B Tank 125-mm smoothbore gun, 7.62-mm coaxial machinegun, 12.7-mm AA machinegun 370-500 kilometers
T-90A Tank 125-mm smoothbore gun, 7.62-mm coaxial machinegun, 12.7-mm AA machinegun 500-650 kilometers
Mechanized and Armored Vehicles from Worldwide Equipment Guide
APC — armored personnel carrier IFV — Infantry fighting vehicle ABN — airborne
AA — anti-aircraft ATGM — anti-tank guided missile mm — millimeter

IPB Tools
Vehicle Vehicle Type Weapons Range

BRDM-2 Scout Car 14.5-millimeter machinegun, 7.62-millimeter coaxial machinegun 750 kilometers
BRM-1K Reconnaissance Command 73-millimeter gun, 7.62-millimeter coaxial machinegun 600 kilometers
BRM-3K Reconnaissance Command 30-millimeter auto gun, 7.62-millimeter coaxial machinegun 600 kilometers
Reconnaissance Vehicles from Worldwide Equipment Guide
System System Type Vehicle Type Capabilities

GMZ-3 Minelayer Tracked Capacity of 208 mines, surface or ground emplaced
PMR-3 Minelayer Towed Controlled straight line minefield 10-12 mines per minute
UMZ Minelayer Wheeled Launches mines 30 meters to 60 meters from vehicles, capable of laying a straight
line anti-personnel minefield 5 kilometer long in a single load
PKM Minelayer Man Portable Can produce 10 x 20 meters, 10 x 40 meters or 20 x 10 meters minefield
instantaneously
BAT-M Route Clearance Tracked Heavy mine clearing machine
MT-55A Bridge Vehicle Launched 50-meter bridge length

TMM Bridge Truck Mounted 42-meter bridge length
Engineer Assets from Worldwide Equipment Guide

IPB Tools
System System Type Caliber Range Vehicle Type Capabilities
PRP-3/4M Radar n/a 600 km Artillery Mobile Recon 20-kilometer detection range,
7-12-kilometer tracking range
IL-219 Radar n/a 500 km Artillery Locating Radar 8-35 kilometers based on type of
system fired
IL-220U Radar n/a Unknown Artillery Locating Radar 20-55 kilometers based on type
of system fired
D-30 Artillery 120-millimeter 21.9 kilometers Towed
D-20 Artillery 152-millimeter 24.4 kilometers Towed
G-5 Artillery 155-millimeter 39 kilometers Towed
2A36 Artillery 152-millimeter 30.5 kilometers Towed
2S1 Artillery 122-millimeter 21.9 kilometers Self-propelled
2S3M Artillery 152-millimeter 24.4 kilometers Self-propelled
2S5 Artillery 155-millimeter 30.5 kilometers Self-propelled
2S19 Artillery 152-millimeter 29 kilometers Self-propelled
G-6 Artillery 155-millimeter 39 kilometers Self-propelled
BM-21 Multiple Rocket Launcher 122-millimeter 32.7 kilometers Self-propelled
2S12 Mortar 120-millimeter 7 kilometers Self-propelled
2S9 Combination Gun 120 -millimeter 12.8 kilometers Self-propelled
Indirect Fire Systems from Worldwide Equipment Guide

Glossary
Acronym Term Definition

AA avenue of approach An air or ground route of an attacking force of a given size leading to its objective or to key terrain in
its path. (ADRP 1-02)
AO area of operation An operational area defined by the Joint Force Commander for land and naval forces. Areas of
operations do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the Joint Force Commander, but
should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their
forces. (ADRP 1-02)
AOI area of interest That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and
extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also
includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission.
(ADRP 1-02)
AR Army regulation A set of laws, rules, or other order prescribed by authority especially to regulate conduct of Army
personnel (internet definition adapted for content).
ARFORGEN Army Force Generation The Army's method for effectively and efficiently generating trained and ready forces for combatant
commanders on a sustainable, rotational basis. As such, it synchronizes the Army's primary Title
systems: manning, equipping, training, resourcing, sustaining, and modernizing — used to generate
forces. (2009 Army Posture Statement)
ASCOPE areas, structures, capabilities, Memory aid to help define civil considerations of the mission variables of METT-TC. (ATP 2-01.3)
organizations, people, and events
BTG brigade tactical group A threat brigade-size organization, which has received augmentation from the Operational Strategic
Command. (FM 7-100.1)
C3 D camouflage, concealment, cover, and Elements of passive protection which protect the force from standoff reconnaissance, intelligence,
deception surveillance, and target acquisition. (FM 7-100.1)

Glossary

CALL Center for Army Lessons Learned Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) collects, analyzes, disseminates, integrates, and archives
Army and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) observations, insights,
lessons (OIL) and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to support unified land operations.
(CALL Website)
CAS close air support Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to
friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement
of those forces. (ADRP 1-02)
CB citizens band (radio) A system of short-distance radio communications between individuals on a selection of forty
channels within the 27-MHz (1-m) band. (Training Circular 21-305)
CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, CBRNE is an acronym for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives.
and high-yield explosives (FM 3-11.21)
CCMRF CBRNE Consequence Management The CCMRF is a Title X task force comprised of both Active and Reserve Component capabilities.
Response Force The CCMRF's primary role when responding to a CBRNE event is to augment the consequence
management efforts of the first responders. (2009 Army Posture Statement)
CERP Commander’s Emergency Response A program designed to provide commanders a capability to effectively respond to urgent
Program humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility by carrying
out programs that will immediately assist the indigenous population.
(CALL Handbook 08-12 CERP)
COA course of action 1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or a unit may follow. 2. A possible plan open to an
individual or a commander that would accomplish or is related to the accomplishment of a mission.
3. The scheme adopted to accomplish a job or mission. (ADRP 1-02)
COE contemporary operating environment Replaced by operational environment (OE).
COO combined obstacle overlay A product created by combining separate overlays depicting vegetation density, surface drainage,
natural and man-made obstacles, transportation infrastructure, known chemical, biological and
radiation dispersion, and the effects of current or projected METOC conditions. (JP 2-01.3)

Glossary

COP common operational picture An operational picture tailored to the user’s requirements, based on common data and information
shared by more than one command. (ADRP 1-02)
COTS commercial-off-the-shelf A term defining a non-developmental item of supply that is both commercial and sold in substantial
quantities in the commercial marketplace, and that can be procured or utilized under government
contract in the same form as available to the general public. ATP 2-01.3)
CP command post A unit headquarters where the commander and staff perform their activities. (FM 6-0)
CTC combat training center The CTC Program provides realistic joint and combined arms training, according to Army and joint
doctrine, approximating actual combat. (AR 350-50)
DF direct fire Gunfire delivered on a target, using the target itself as a point of aim for either the gun or the
director.
DOD Department of Defense A department of the U.S. Government responsible for providing the military forces needed to deter
war and protect the security of our country. (Government Information Library)
DST decision support template A graphic record of war-gaming. The decision support template depicts decision points, timelines
associated with the movement of forces and the flow of the operation, and other key items of
information required to execute a specific friendly course of action. (ADRP 1-02)
DTED digital terrain elevation data A uniform matrix of terrain elevation values which provides basic quantitative data for systems and
applications that require terrain elevation, slope, and/or surface roughness information.
(NGA website - https://www1.nga.mil/ProductsServices/TopographicalTerrestrialDigitalTerrain
Elevation Data/Pages/default.aspx)
DZ disruption zone Location where the OPFOR sets the conditions for successful operations by beginning the attack on
the components of the friendly combat system. (FM 7-100.1)

Glossary
EVENTEMP event template A model against which enemy activity can be recorded and compared. It represents a sequential
projection of events that relate to space and time on the battlefield and indicate the enemy’s ability to
adopt a particular course of action. The event template is a guide for collection and reconnaissance
and surveillance planning. (ADRP 1-02)
EW electronic warfare Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the
electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. The three major subdivisions within electronic
warfare are: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. (ADRP 1-02)
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency Governmental organization with the mission to support citizens and first responders to ensure that,
as a nation, we work together to build, sustain, and improve the capability to prepare for, protect
against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards. (http://www.fema.gov/about/)
FLIR forward looking infrared (sensor) Long- and medium-wave infrared devices designed to see heat sources. (ADRP 1-02)
FOB forward operating base A base, usually located in friendly territory or afloat, that is established to extend command and
control or communications or to provide support for training and tactical operations. (ADRP 1-02)
FSC forward support company An element of a combined arms battalion (CAB) with the mission to execute the sustainment plan in
accordance with the CAB commander’s guidance. (FM 30-90.5)
HF high frequency Radio frequencies between 3- and 30-megahertz. (ADRP 1-02)
HMMWV high-mobility, multi-wheeled vehicle Any of a series of military vehicles manufactured by the AM General company based on the M998
series vehicle. (ADRP 1-02)
HPT high-payoff target A target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of
action. High-payoff targets are those high-value targets that must be acquired and successfully
attacked for the success of the friendly commander’s mission. (ADRP 1-02)
HVT high-value target A target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission. The loss of
high-value targets would be expected to seriously degrade important enemy functions throughout the
friendly commander’s area of interest. (ADRP 1-02)

Glossary

IDF indirect fire Fire delivered on a target that is not itself used as a point of aim for the weapon or the director.
(ADRP 1-02)
IED improvised explosive device A homemade bomb constructed and deployed in ways other than in conventional military action. It
may be constructed of conventional military explosives, such as an artillery round, attached to a
detonating mechanism. (ADRP 1-02)
IGO inter-governmental organization An organization composed primarily of sovereign states (referred to as member states), or of other
intergovernmental organizations. (ADRP 1-02)
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield The systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic
area. (ADRP 1-02)
IPI indigenous populations and institutions A generic term used to describe the civilian construct of an operational area to include its
populations (legal citizens, legal and illegal immigrants, and all categories of dislocated civilians),
governmental, tribal, commercial, and private organizations and entities.
(http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/i/19786.html)
IVL intervisibility line A ridge or horizon beyond which equipment or personnel can be hidden from observation.
(ADRP 1-02)
JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center The JRTC is one of the Army’s three “Dirt” Combat Training Centers resourced to train infantry
brigade task forces and their subordinate elements in the joint operational environment.
(http://www.jrtc-polk.army.mil/AboutJRTC.htm)
LOC line of communication A route, either land, water, and/or air, that connects an operating military force with a base of
operations and along which supplies and military forces move. (ADRP 1-02)
LOS line of sight The unobstructed path from a Soldier, weapon, weapon sight, electronic-sending and -receiving
antennas, or piece of reconnaissance equipment to another point. (ADRP 1-02)

Glossary
LTIOV latest time information is of value The time by which information must be delivered to the requestor in order to provide decision makers
with timely intelligence. (ADRP 1-02)
MCOO modified combined obstacle overlay A tool created through analysis of the combined obstacle overlay, which depicts the operational
environment’s effects on the operation. (ATP 2-01.3)
MDMP Military Decisionmaking Process The Military Decisionmaking Process is an iterative planning methodology that integrates the activities
of the commander, staff, subordinate headquarters, and other partners to understand the situation and
mission; develop and compare courses of action; decide on a course of action that best accomplishes
the mission; and produce an operation plan or order for execution. (FM 6-0)
METOC meteorological and oceanographic Of, or having to do with, weather and littoral conditions and their effects on military operations.
(ATP 2-01.3)
METT-TC mission, enemy, ter rain and weather , A memory aid used in two contexts: (1) in the context of information management, the major subject
tr oops and suppor t available, time categories into which relevant information is grouped for military operations: mission, enemy, terrain
available, and civil considerations and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and (2) in the context of
tactics, the major factors considered during Mission Analysis. (ADRP 1-02)
MRE mission rehearsal exercise An equivalent to the field training exercise but is normally accomplished as part of a battalion's
train-up to the performance of a stability operation mission.
(http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/mre.htm)
MSR main supply route The route or routes designated within an operational area upon which the bulk of traffic flows in
support of military operations. (ADRP 1-02)
NAI named area of interest The geographical area where information that will satisfy a specific information requirement can be
collected. Named areas of interest are usually selected to capture indications of adversary courses of
action, but also may be related to conditions of the operational area. (ADRP 1-02).

Glossary
NGO non-governmental organization Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic
and Social Council of the United Nations. Non-governmental organizations may be professional
associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in
humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). (ADRP 1-02)
NTC National Training Center NTC trains the transformed Army by conducting force-on-force and live-fire training for ground and
aviation brigades in a joint scenario across the spectrum of conflict, using a live-virtual-constructive
training model, as portrayed by a highly lethal and capable Opposing Force and controlled by an
expert and experienced Operations Group.
(http://www.irwin.army.mil/cmd_staff/NTCcommand/Pages/default.aspx)
NVD night vision device An optical instrument that allows images to be produced in levels of light approaching total
darkness. (ADRP 1-02)
OB order of battle The identification, command structure, strength, and disposition of personnel, equipment, and units
of an armed force participating in field operations. (FM 6-0)
OE operational environment A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of
capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (ADP 3-0)
OPFOR opposing force A training tool that should allow the U.S. Army to train against a challenging and plausible sparring
partner that represents the wide range of possible opponents the Army could face in actual conflict.
(FM 7-100.1)
OPORD operation order A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the
coordinated execution of an operation. Also called the 5-paragraph field order. (ADRP 1-02)
PMESII-PT political, militar y, economic, social, Memory aid for operational variables. (ATP 2-01.3)
infr astr uctur e, infor mation - physical
environment, and time
plans standing operating procedures A procedure or set of procedures to perform a given operation or task. In this case, Plans SOP refers
to those tasks regarding planning. (ADRP 1-02)

Glossary

RFI request for information Procedure or form used to gain information from higher or lateral unit. (FM 6-99)
SALUTE size, activity, location, unit (uniform), Memory aid used for SPOT Reports. (FM 6-99)
time, and equipment
SITTEMP situation template A depiction of assumed adversary dispositions, based on adversary doctrine and the effects of the
environment if the adversary should adopt a particular course of action. (ADRP 1-02)
SW short-wave The upper medium frequency (MF) and all of the high frequency (HF) portions of the radio
spectrum, between 1,800–30,000 kHz. (ADRP 1-02)
SWEAT- sewage, water , electricity, academics, A memory aid to describe infrastructure assessment and surveys with each letter describing a major
MSO tr ash - medical, safety, and other area within the assessment. (FM 3-34.170)
considerations
tactical standard operating procedures The Tactical SOP is essentially the "game-plan" that units follow when conducting tactical
operations. (AP 3-90.90)
TAI targeted area of interest The geographical area where high-value targets can be acquired and engaged by friendly forces.
(ADRP 1-02)
TPL time-phase line A doctrinal graphic relating time and space factors used to depict threat movement. (FM 2-01.3)
TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine An Army command of the U.S. Army headquartered at Fort Eustis, Virginia. It is charged with
Command overseeing training of Army Forces, the development of operational doctrine, and the development
and procurement of new weapons systems.

Glossary

WBGT wet-bulb globe temperature A composite temperature used to estimate the effect of temperature, humidity, wind speed (wind
chill), and solar radiation on humans. (ATP 2-01.3)
WFF warfighting function A group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a
common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. (FM 3-0)
XCTC eXportable Combat Training Capability A fully-instrumented series of field training exercises designed for the operational environment.
These exercises provide tough, realistic training for every participating Soldier and the means to
achieve the required company-level certification and battalion staff proficiency for ARNG units
during pre-mobilization training.
( http://www.army.mil/aps/09/information_papersarng_exportable_combat_training_capability.html)

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Determine Define the

This Handbook is a Product of the:

Introduction ……………………………………………….…. 2 Describe How Civil Considerations Can Affect Friendly

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During IPB, units must address each of the elements of offense,

Offense Defense IPB MIRROR

Stability Some examples to consider:

Combining the Tasks of Decisive Action

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TIP At the onset of IPB, a determination, based on the echelon

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The commander owns the train and ultimately tells it where it is to go

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the MDMP or Mission Analysis timeline. It must be further enforced by the

the staff will be ill-prepared to continue to COA Development.

ENEMY HIGHER CONCEPT (Paragraph 1 your Annex)

Defining the Operational Environment

Commander’s IPB Focus Checklist

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Defining the Operational Environment (cont.)

Step 1 of the IPB Process identifies the significant characteristics of

The intelligence staff acquires the intelligence needed to complete

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 Failure to identify all the significant characteristics may lead

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Identifying the Limits of the Command’s Area of Operation (AO)

In offensive, defensive, stability, and DSCA operations, the AO is designated

TIP Be mindful of an identified area of

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Identifying the Limits of the Command’s Area of Interest (AOI)

Area of Interest (AOI) KUJ

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Identifying the Limits of the Command’s Area of Interest (AOI) (cont.)

TIP The isolation or disruption of the logistics hub

Isolating a Single Element Can

TIP Do not confuse the tools used with the

Association Matrix Activities Matrix

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Identifying the Limits of the Command’s Area of Interest (AOI) (cont.)

New Madrid Fault Line

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Identifying the Limits of the Command’s Area of Interest (AOI) (cont.)

FEMA Areas Affected by New Madrid Earthquake

A unit tasked with counter-drug operations along the United States —

In DSCA operations, a key task is understanding where the databases

Cross Border Area of Influence / Interest

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Identifying the Limits of the Command’s Area of Interest (AOI) (cont.)

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Terrain and Weather

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Internal and External Databases Computer Integration Helps Manage Databases

Initiate Processes Necessary to Acquire the Information Needed to Complete IPB

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During the identification of intelligence gaps, it may have become necessary to