G.R. No. 205951, July 04, 2016 - UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v.

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 205951, July 04, 2016
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
An ejectment case is not limited to lease agreements or deprivations of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth,
It is as well an available remedy against one who withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right of possession
under an express or implied contract, such as a contract to sell

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the July 31, 2012 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing the Petition for
Review3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 102065, and its January 25, 2013 Resolution4 denying reconsideration of the assailed Decision.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines is the owner of two parcels of land totaling 1,181 square meters, with improvements
(subject property), in Poblacion, Alaminos, Pangasinan, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 21895 and 21896. 5
Respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. was the former owner of the lots but it lost the same by foreclosure to petitioner;
nonetheless, respondent continued to occupy the same.

On November 8, 2001, petitioner and respondent executed a Contract to Sell 6 covering the subject property for P12,208,633.57,
payable within seven years in quarterly installments (principal and interest) of P824,757,97. The contract to sell stipulated, among
others, that "[a]ll payments required under this Contract to Sell shall be made by the [buyer] without need of notice, demand, or any
other act or deed, at the principal office address of the [seller];" 7 and that should respondent fail to fully comply with the agreement
or in case the contract is canceled or rescinded, all its installment payments "shall also be forfeited by way of penalty and liquidated
damages"8 and "applied as rentals for [its] use and possession of the property without need for any judicial action or notice to or
demand upon the [buyer] and without prejudice to such other rights as may be available to and at the option of the [seller] such as,
but not limited to bringing an action in court to enforce payment of the Purchase Price or the balance thereof and/or for damages, or
for any causes of action allowed by law."9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Respondent failed to fully pay the stipulated price in the contract to sell. Petitioner thus sent a December 10, 2003 notarized demand
letter entitled "Demand to Pay with Rescission of Three (3) Contracts to Sell dated November 8, 2001," 10 which stated among others
that -

Our records show that you have failed to pay your past due quarterly installment payments for August 31, 2003 and November 30,
2003 as per attached Statement of Account as of December 16, 2003 in the total amount of PESOS: NINE MILLION NINE
HUNDRED FORTY THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN & 36/100 (59,940,197.36) x x x:

xxxx

Correspondingly, you are hereby given a period of thirty (30) days from receipt hereof within which to pay your aforesaid past due
installment payments, otherwise, your three (3) Contracts to Sell with UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES over the properties x
x x are deemed automatically rescinded effective thirty (30) days from the expiration of the 30-day period to update your past due
installment payments without further notice.11

Petitioner sent another letter-demand to vacate12 dated May 24, 2004 to respondent, stating as follows:

We write in connection with your proposal to purchase back the properties that are the subject of the three (3) Contracts to Sell
executed on November 8, 200313 and were rescinded effective February 28, 2004. x x x

As you are aware, we deferred the sending of the Demand to Vacate over the said properties because of the three (3) postdated
checks (PDC's) with an aggregate amount of P1.5 Million which you have tendered to the bank, as well as your proposal to purchase
again the said properties after the Rescission of the Contracts to Sell last February 28, 2004. Unfortunately, out of the three (3)
PDC's submitted to the bank, only one (1) check had cleared amounting to P500,000.00 which shall be applied as rental payment as
mentioned in our letter dated March 17,2004.

Moreover, we wish to inform you that your proposal to purchase again the said properties as contained in your letter dated April 16,
2004 was never finalized nor presented for approval given that you failed to make good your promised payment of P1.5 Million. We
have given you more than enough time but there is still no relief in sight.
For this reason, the bank has decided to exercise its right to take physical possession of the above-mentioned properties. As such, we
are giving you fifteen (15) days upon receipt of this letter within which to vacate the said properties and surrender possession of the
premises to the bank, otherwise, we will be constrained to refer your account for proper legal action.14

Thus, it appears that after petitioner sent its December 10, 2003 letter-demand to pay the amount of P9,940,197.36, respondent was
unable to pay and petitioner rescinded the contract to sell on February 28,2004. Despite the fact that the contract to sell has been
rescinded, respondent proposed to continue with the same and issued and tendered to the petitioner three postdated checks in the
amount of PI.5 million as payment. However, only one check in the amount of P500,000.00 cleared. Petitioner thus sent another
March 17, 2004 letter to respondent stating that the said P500,000.00 has been applied as rental payment; respondent replied in an
April 16, 2004 letter proposing to proceed with the sale. Petitioner thereafter sent the above May 24, 2004 letter-demand to vacate,
which respondent received on May 26, 2004.

Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)

On May 26, 2005, petitioner filed an ejectment case against respondent before the MTCC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 2171. The Complaint 15 for "Ejectment with Prayer for Fixation of Rentals" prayed that respondent be
evicted from the subject property, and that it be ordered to pay petitioner rental in arrears in the amount of P1.5 million, P125,000.00
monthly rent from May 27, 2004 until respondent completely vacates the premises, attorney's fees, and costs.

In its Answer16 and Supplemental Answer,17 respondent prayed for dismissal, claiming that petitioner had no cause of action for
ejectment and the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the case because it involved breach of contract and rescission of the contract to
sell, which are cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts (RTC); that since the case is one for rescission, there should be mutual
restitution, but the amounts involved - payments, interests and penalties - should be properly computed; that the demand to vacate
was not unequivocal and was improperly served; and that the verification and certification on non-forum shopping in the Complaint
were defective for lack of proper authority.

After proceedings in due course, the MTCC issued on October 25, 2006 a Decision 18 dismissing Civil Case No. 2171 for lack of
jurisdiction. It held that petitioner's case is one for rescission and enforcement of the stipulations in the contract to sell; that the
demand to vacate and fixing of rentals prayed for are consequences of petitioner's unilateral cancellation of the contract and are thus
inextricably connected with rescission; and that there is "no definite expiration or termination of the [respondent's] right to possess" 19
the subject property, and such right depended "upon its fulfillment of the stipulations in the contract." 20ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Petitioner appealed before the RTC,21 which rendered a Decision22 on August 6,2007, stating as follows:

The demand required and contemplated in Sec. 2 of Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court is a demand for the defendant to pay the
rentals due or to comply with the conditions of the lease and not only a demand to vacate the premises; and where the defendant
does not comply with the said demand within the period provided by Sec. 2 then his possession becomes unlawful. Consequently,
both demands to pay and to vacate are necessary to make the defendant a deforciant in order that Ejectment suit may be filed and the
fact of such demands must be alleged in the complaint, otherwise the Inferior Court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the case.

Analyzing the above letter of demand sent by the plaintiff-appellant to the defendant-appellee, the same did not demand for the
payment of the defendant-appellee's obligation. It was merely a demand to vacate without the demand to pay.

Hence, the Court is of the considered opinion that such demand is not sufficient compliance with Sec. 2 of Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court. Furthermore, a Notice of Demand giving the lessee the alternative whether to pay the rental or vacate the premises does not
comply with the above rule (Vda. de Murga vs. Chan, L-24-680, October 7, 1968). In the said letter of demand itself, it says: "As
such, we are giving you fifteen (15) days upon receipt of this letter within which to vacate the said properties and surrender
possession of the premises to the bank, otherwise we will be constrained to refer your account for proper legal action." To the mind
of the Court, this is not the final demand contemplated under the same rule, because should the defendant fail to vacate, the plaintiff-
appellant will still refer defendant-appellee's account for proper legal action which does not comply with the requirements of said
Sec. 2 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

Moreover, it was ruled in the case of Penas Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. 12734, July 7, 1994, that an alternative demand on either
to renew the expired lease contract or vacate is not a definite demand to vacate and would be insufficient basis for the filing of an
action for unlawful detainer. Hence, the Court rules that the demand letter x x x is not a definite demand to vacate because if it fails
to vacate, the defendant-appellee's account would still be referred for proper legal action hence, insufficient basis for filing an action
for unlawful detainer.

In such case, the jurisdictional requisite of demand to pay and to vacate was not complied with and the lower court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case, hence, it was properly dismissed.

There is no more need to discuss the other issues raised as they are now moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is dismissed. Without cost.

SO ORDERED.23cralawred
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 24 claiming that there was a previous demand to pay, that is, its December 10, 2003
letter entitled "Demand to Pay with Rescission of Three (3) Contract to Sell dated November 8, 2001;" that even then, demand to
pay was not necessary because its cause of action for ejectment was not based on non-payment of rent, but rescission of the contract
to sell for violation of its terms; and that the final and executory ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 115438 - which involved the same parties
but a different contract to sell over different properties, and where it was held that the inferior court has jurisdiction over the
ejectment case notwithstanding respondent's claim that the case is one for rescission - should guide the trial court in resolving the
case. However, the RTC denied the motion in a November 29, 2007 Order.25ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Review, 26 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 102065, advancing the same arguments in its
Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Decision, adding that its demand to vacate was unequivocal as it contained a threat that if
respondent does not heed the demand, appropriate legal action will be taken; and that all the requisite allegations in a complaint for
ejectment were complied with. It prayed that the RTC's August 6, 2007 Decision be set aside, and that a new one be issued granting
the reliefs prayed for in its Complaint.

On July 31, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision denying the Petition. It held that petitioner had a cause of action for ejectment based
on non-payment of rentals and refusal to vacate since respondent's right to occupy the subject property terminated when it failed to
honor the contract to sell by not paying the agreed amortizations, and thereafter their agreement was converted into a lease, but
respondent failed to pay rent and did not vacate the premises; however, it failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirement of
demand to pay and vacate under Section 2, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure 27 (1997 Rules). It found, as the RTC did,
that while there was a demand to vacate upon respondent, there was no prior demand to pay made on the latter; that since both
requisites - demand to pay and vacate - must concur, the absence of one strips the lower court of jurisdiction over petitioner's
Complaint for ejectment.

Petitioner moved to reconsider, but in its January 25, 2013 Resolution, the CA held its ground. Hence, the present Petition.

Issues

Petitioner submits that -

SINCE THE CONTRACT TO SELL BETWEEN PETITIONER UBP AND RESPONDENT PRBL WAS ALREADY CANCELED
DUE TO PRBL'S FAILURE TO PAY THE PURCHASE PRICE, IS IT STILL REQUIRED FOR THE PETITIONER UBP TO
ISSUE A DEMAND TO PAY PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE EJECTMENT CASE?

IF SUCH DEMAND TO PAY IS REQUIRED, WAS THE PETITIONER UBP ABLE TO COMPLY WITH THE SAME WHEN IT
PREVIOUSLY MADE A DEMAND FOR THE RESPONDENT TO PAY THE AMOUNT DUE (EXHIBIT "B") BEFORE
ISSUING THE DEMAND TO VACATE (EXHIBIT "C")?

ASSUMING EX-GRATIA ARGUMENT! THAT NO DEMAND TO PAY WAS ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER PRIOR TO
THE FILING OF THIS CASE, WAS IT CORRECT FOR THE HONORABLE COURT TO HAVE CONSIDERED SUCH ISSUE
EVEN IF THE SAME WAS NOT RAISED BY THE PARTIES DURING THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE AND WAS NEVER
TOUCHED BY THE PARTIES IN THEIR PLEADINGS?

SINCE THE ISSUE REGARDING UBP'S RIGHT TO EJECT PRBL FROM THE PREMISES HAD BEEN SETTLED WITH
FINALITY IN ANOTHER CASE DECIDED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CAN THE SAID COURT
IGNORE THE FINAL DECISION AND THEN RULE IN A CONTRARY MANNER?28cralawred

Petitioner's Arguments

Petitioner essentially argues in its Petition and Reply 29 that since the contract to sell was already rescinded, it was no longer required
to make a demand for payment prior to filing an ejectment suit; that in Union Bank of the Philippines v. Maunlad Homes, Inc.,30
which involved a similar Contract to Sell executed by it, this Court declared that in a contract to sell, the non-payment of the
purchase price renders the agreement without force and effect, and the buyer's act of withholding installment payments deprived it of
the right to continue possessing the property subject matter of the agreement; that since its ejectment case is anchored not on failure
to pay rent, but on violation of the contract to sell, no demand for payment was required; and that, just the same, a demand to pay
was made on December 10, 2003. Petitioner thus prays for reversal of the assailed dispositions and the granting of the reliefs prayed
for in its Complaint.

Respondent's Arguments

In its Comment,31 respondent finds no cogent or compelling reason to reverse the CA Decision, arguing that since there was no
demand to pay, the MTCC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner's ejectment case.

Our Ruling
The Petition must be granted.

It must have escaped the attention of the MTCC, the RTC, and the CA that an ejectment case is not limited to lease agreements or
deprivations of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. It is as well available against one who withholds
possession after the expiration or termination of his right of possession under an express or implied contract, such as a contract to
sell. Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules, "a x x x vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land
or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract,
express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time
within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court
against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for
the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs." In such cases, it is sufficient to allege in the plaintiffs complaint
that -

1. The defendant originally had lawful possession of the property, either by virtue of a contract or by tolerance of the plaintiff;

2. Eventually, the defendant's possession of the property became illegal or unlawful upon notice by the plaintiff to defendant of the
expiration or the termination of the defendant's right of possession;

3. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff the enjoyment thereof; and

4. Within one year from the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. 32

Upon an examination of the Complaint and evidence in Civil Case No. 2171, it appears that petitioner complied with the above
requirements. It alleged that respondent acquired the right to occupy the subject property by virtue of the November 8, 2001
Contract to Sell; that respondent failed to pay the required amortizations and thus was in violation of the stipulations of the
agreement; that petitioner made a written "Demand to Pay with Rescission of Three (3) Contracts to Sell dated November 8, 2001,"
but respondent was unable to heed the demand; that respondent lost its right to retain possession of the subject property, and it was
illegally occupying the premises; that petitioner made another demand, this time a written demand to vacate on May 24, 2004, which
respondent received on May 26, 2004; that respondent refused to vacate the premises; that on May 26, 2005, or within the one-year
period required by the Rules, the ejectment case was filed; and that there is a need to determine the rents and damages owing to
petitioner.

It was plainly erroneous for the lower courts to require a demand to pay prior to filing of the ejectment case. This is not one of the
requisites in an ejectment case based on petitioner's contract to sell with respondent. As correctly argued by petitioner, the full
payment of the purchase price in a contract to sell is a positive suspensive condition whose non-fulfillment is not a breach of
contract, but merely an event that prevents the seller from conveying title to the purchaser; in other words, the non-payment of the
purchase price renders the contract to sell ineffective and without force and effect. 33 Respondent's failure and refusal to pay the
monthly amortizations as agreed rendered the contract to sell without force and effect; it therefore lost its right to continue
occupying the subject property, and should vacate the same.

Having arrived at the foregoing conclusions, the Court finds no need to discuss the other points raised in the Petition.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed July 31, 2012 Decision and January 25,2013 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 102065 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. is ORDERED TO: 1) IMMEDIATELY VACATE the subject property upon the
finality of this Decision, and 2) PAY petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines all rentals-in-arrears and accruing rentals until it
vacates the property.

The case is REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Alaminos, Pangasinan, or to any branch thereof or court
handling Civil Case No. 2171, for the determination of the amount of rentals; attorney's fees and costs, if any; and interest, which are
all due to petitioner.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Carpio, (Acting C.J.* & Chairperson), Brion, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J,., on official leave.

Endnotes:
*
Per Special Order No. 2357 dated June 28,2016.
1
Rollo, pp. 9-35.
2
Id. at 177-191; penned by Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias and concurred in by Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Nina
G, Antonio-Valesizuela.
3
Id. at 150-175.
4
Id. at 193-194.
5
Id. at 47-50.
6
Id. at 51-54.
7
Id. at 51.
8
Id. at 52.
9
Id. at 51-52.
10
Id. at 56.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 58.
13
Should be "2001."
14
Rollo, p. 58.
15
Id. at 39-46.
16
Id. at 61-62.
17
Id. at 64-66.
18
Id. at 100-110; penned by Judge Borromeo R. Bustamante.
19
Id. at 109.
20
Id.
21
Branch 55.
22
Rollo, pp. 111-115; Decision in Civil Case No. A-3115 penned by Judge Elpidio N. Abella.
23
Id. at 114-115.
24
Id. at 116-124.chanrobleslaw
25
Id. at 147-149.
26
Id. at 150-175.
27
Rule 70, Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer.

Sec. 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. - Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the lessor shall be
commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving
written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if no person be
found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of
buildings.
28
Rollo, pp. 21-22.
29
Id. at 256-261.
30
692 Phil. 667 (2012).
31
Rollo, pp. 242-245.
32
Piedad v. Gurieza, G.R. No. 207525, June 18, 2014, 727 SCRA 71, 77; Union Bank of the Philippines v. Maunlad Homes, Inc.,
supra note 23 at 676.
33
Union Bank of the Philippines v. Maimlad Homes, Inc., supra note 23; Nabus v. Spouses Pacson, 620 Phil. 344 (2009); Almocera
v. Ong, 569 Phil. 497 (2008); Ayala Life Assurance, Inc. v. Ray Burton Development Corporation, 515 Phil. 431 (2006).
Unlawful detainer; how to count 1-year demand G.R. No. 194880
G.R. No. 194880

"x x x.

Whether or not petitioners’ action for unlawful detainer was brought within one year after the
unlawful withholding of possession will determine whether it was properly filed with the MeTC. If, as
petitioners argue, the one-year period should be counted from respondent Sunvar’s receipt on 03 February
2009 of the Final Notice to Vacate, then their Complaint was timely filed within the one-year period and
appropriately taken cognizance of by the MeTC. However, if the reckoning period is pegged from the
expiration of the main lease contract and/or sublease agreement, then petitioners’ proper remedy should
have been an accion publiciana to be filed with the RTC.
The Court finds that petitioners correctly availed themselves of an action for unlawful detainer
and, hence, reverses the ruling of the RTC.
Under the Rules of Court, lessors against whom possession of any land is unlawfully withheld
after the expiration of the right to hold possession may – by virtue of any express or implied contract, and
within one year after the unlawful deprivation – bring an action in the municipal trial court against the
person unlawfully withholding possession, for restitution of possession with damages and costs. [60]Unless
otherwise stipulated, the action of the lessor shall commence only after a demand to pay or to comply with
the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee; or after a written notice of that demand is
served upon the person found on the premises, and the lessee fails to comply therewith within 15 days in
the case of land or 5 days in the case of buildings.[61]
In Delos Reyes v. Spouses Odenes,[62] the Court recently defined the nature and scope of an
unlawful detainer suit, as follows:
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract,
express or implied. The possession by the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became
illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. The proceeding is summary in nature,
jurisdiction over which lies with the proper MTC or metropolitan trial court. The action must be brought
up within one year from the date of last demand, and the issue in the case must be the right to
physical possession. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the
following elements:
1.       Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff.

2.       Eventually, the possession became illegal upon the plaintiff’s notice to the defendant of the
termination of the latter’s right of possession.

3.       Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff
of the latter’s enjoyment.

4.       Within one year from the making of the last demand on the defendant to vacate the property,
the plaintiff instituted the Complaint for ejectment.[63]
“On the other hand, accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession
which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one
year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of
title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint, more than one year had elapsed since
defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become illegal, the
action will be, not one of forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana.”[64]
There are no substantial disagreements with respect to the first three requisites for an action for
unlawful detainer. Respondent Sunvar initially derived its right to possess the subject property from its
sublease agreements with TRCFI and later on with PDAF. However, with the expiration of the lease
agreements on 31 December 2002, respondent lost possessory rights over the subject property.
Nevertheless, it continued occupying the property for almost seven years thereafter. It was only on 03
February 2009 that petitioners made a final demand upon respondent Sunvar to turn over the property.
What is disputed, however, is the fourth requisite of an unlawful detainer suit.
The Court rules that the final requisite is likewise availing in this case, and that the one-year
period should be counted from the final demand made on 03 February 2009.
Contrary to the reasoning of the RTC,[65] the one-year period to file an unlawful detainer case is
not counted from the expiration of the lease contract on 31 December 2002. Indeed, the last demand for
petitioners to vacate is the reckoning period for determining the one-year period in an action for unlawful
detainer. “Such one year period should be counted from the date of plaintiff’s last demand on defendant to
vacate the real property, because only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become
unlawful.”[66]
In case several demands to vacate are made, the period is          reckoned from the date of the last
demand.  In Leonin v. Court of                  Appeals,[68] the Court, speaking through Justice Conchita
[67]

Carpio Morales, reckoned the one-year period to file the unlawful detainer Complaint – filed on 25
February 1997 – from the latest demand letter dated 24 October 1996, and not from the earlier demand
letter dated 03 July 1995:
Prospero Leonin (Prospero) and five others were co-owners of a 400-square meter property
located at K-J Street, East Kamias, Quezon City whereon was constructed a two-storey house and a three-
door apartment identified as No. 1-A, B, and C.  

Prospero and his co-owners allowed his siblings, herein petitioners, to occupy Apartment C
without paying any rentals.

x x x                            x x x                            x x x

Petitioners further contend that respondent’s remedy is accion publiciana because their possession
is not de facto, they having been authorized by the true and lawful owners of the property; and that one
year had elapsed from respondent’s demand given on “July 3, 1995” when the unlawful detainer
complaint was filed.

The petition fails.

Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the allegations in the complaint make out a case for unlawful
detainer. Thus, respondent alleged, inter alia, that she is the registered owner of the property and that
petitioners, who are tenants by tolerance, refused to vacate the premises despite the notice to vacate sent to
them.  

Likewise, contrary to petitioners’ contention, the one-year period for filing a complaint for
unlawful detainer is reckoned from the date of the last demand, in this case October 24, 1996, the reason
being that the lessor has the right to waive his right of action based on previous demands and let the lessee
remain meanwhile in the premises. Thus, the filing of the complaint on February 25, 1997 was well
within the one year reglementary period.[69] (Emphasis supplied.)
From the time that the main lease contract and sublease agreements expired (01 January 2003),
respondent Sunvar no longer had any possessory right over the subject property. Absent any express
contractual renewal of the sublease agreement or any separate lease contract, it illegally occupied the land
or, at best, was allowed to do so by mere tolerance of the registered owners – petitioners herein. Thus,
respondent Sunvar’s possession became unlawful upon service of the final notice on 03 February 2009.
Hence, as an unlawful occupant of the land of petitioners, and without any contract between them,
respondent is “necessarily bound by an implied promise” that it “will vacate upon demand, failing which
a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.” [70] Upon service of the final notice of
demand, respondent Sunvar should have vacated the property and, consequently, petitioners had one year
or until 02 February 2010 in which to resort to the summary action for unlawful detainer. In the instant
case, their Complaint was filed with the MeTC on 23 July 2009, which was well within the one-year
period.
 The Court is aware that petitioners had earlier served a Notice to Vacate on 22 February 2008,
which could have possibly tolled the one-year period for filing an unlawful detainer suit. Nevertheless, they
can be deemed to have waived their right of action against respondent Sunvar and continued to tolerate its
occupation of the subject property. That they sent a final Notice to Vacate almost a year later gave
respondent another opportunity to comply with their implied promise as occupants by mere tolerance.
Consequently, the one-year period for filing a summary action for unlawful detainer with the MeTC must
be reckoned from the latest demand to vacate.
In the past, the Court ruled that subsequent demands that are merely in the nature of reminders of
the original demand do not operate to renew the one-year period within which to commence an ejectment
suit, considering that the period will still be reckoned from the date of the original demand. [71] If the
subsequent demands were merely in the nature of reminders of the original demand, the one-year period to
commence an ejectment suit would be counted from the first demand. [72] However, respondent failed to
raise in any of the proceedings below this question of fact as to the nature of the second demand issued by
the OSG. It is now too late in the proceedings for them to argue that the 2009 Notice to Vacate was a mere
reiteration or reminder of the 2008 Notice to Vacate. In any event, this factual determination is beyond the
scope of the present Rule 45 Petition, which is limited to resolving questions of law.
The Court notes that respondent Sunvar has continued to occupy the subject property since the
expiration of its sublease on 31 December 2002. The factual issue of whether respondent has paid rentals to
petitioners from the expiration of the sublease to the present was never raised or sufficiently argued before
this Court. Nevertheless, it has not escaped the Court’s attention that almost a decade has passed without
any resolution of this controversy regarding respondent’s possession of the subject property, contrary to the
aim of expeditious proceedings under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. With the grant of the
instant Petition and the remand of the case to the MeTC for continued hearing, the Court emphasizes the
duty of the lower court to speedily resolve this matter once and for all, especially since this case involves a
prime property of the government located in the country’s business district and the various opportunities for
petitioners to gain public revenues from the property.
x xx."