EN BANC

March 6, 2018

G.R. No. 231737

HEIRS OF TUNGED namely: ROSITA YARIS-LIWAN, VIRGIE S. ATIN-AN,

BELTRAN P. SAINGAN, MABEL P. DALING, MONICA Y. DOMINGO, and
ELIZABETH Q. PINONO, Petitioners
vs.
STA. LUCIA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT, INC. and BAGUIO PROPERTIES,
INC., Respondents

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners
assail the Order2 dated March 2, 201 7 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio
City, Branch V, which dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction in Environmental Case
No. 8548-R. Its Order3 dated April 3, 2017, denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration4 is likewise impugned herein.

The Antecedents

Petitioners are recognized Indigenous People (IP), being members of the Ibaloi tribe,

who are the original settlers in Baguio City and Benguet Province. Respondent Sta.
Lucia Realty is a real estate developer, while respondent Baguio Properties, Inc.
claims to be the lot owner managing the properties of Manila Newtown Development
Corporation, which covers portions of the subject land.5

Environmental Case No. 8548-R entitled "Enforcement/Violations of the Provisions of

the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) (Republic Act No. 8371);6 Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1586;7 and Other Pertinent Laws with Prayer for the Issuance of
Environmental Protection Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Mandatory/Prohibitory
Injunction, and Writ of Mandamus" was filed by the petitioners against respondents.8

In the Complaint, petitioners averred that the subject property is an ancestral land that
they have been occupying in the concept of an owner since time immemorial through
their ancestors; that such ownership was recognized under the IPRA, which includes
the right to sustainable traditional resource, the right against unlawful or unauthorized
intrusion, and the right against usurpation;9 and that their applications for the issuance
of Certificate of Ancestral Land Titles (CALTs) over their properties, including the
subject land, are now pending before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP).10
Petitioners argued that respondents' acts of demolishing and bulldozing the subject
land, which caused the destruction of small and full grown trees and sayote plants and
other resources of the petitioners, violated their rights pursuant to the IPRA; violated
environmental laws, specifically PD 1586, as respondents' project poses grave and/or
irreparable danger to environment, life, and property, and also violated the
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued to them.11

For its part, Baguio Properties, Inc. invoked ownership over the subject land and as
such, they argued that petitioners' complaint is a collateral attack to its Torrens Titles.12

On March 2, 2017, the RTC, sitting as an environmental court, dismissed the

Complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC held that the recognition of the petitioners'
rights as IPs is not the proper subject of an environmental case, as such, it should be
threshed out in an appropriate proceeding governed by the very law relied upon by the
petitioners, i.e., the IPRA. The RTC cited Section 1113 of the IPRA stating that the
rights of IPs to their ancestral domains by virtue of native title shall be recognized and
respected. The said formal recognition, when solicited, shall be embodied in a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), and the power to issue the same is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the NCIP.14

The RTC also held that assuming arguendo that the case falls within the coverage of
Administrative Matter (AM) No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases, Sec. 4,15 Rule 2 thereof requires that an action under said Rules must be filed
by a real party-in-interest for the enforcement or violation of any environmental law.
The RTC found that as the main relief prayed for by the petitioners is the recognition of
their right of ownership over the subject property, it is in effect an admission that their
asserted right over the same, if any, is yet to be established. According to the RTC,
without the confirmation of their rights as IP to the property, the filing of this case is
premature. As such, the petitioners do not have the legal personality to initiate the
same.16 The RTC disposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction, the above-captioned case is hereby

DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.17

In its motion for reconsideration, the petitioners argued that NCIP has no jurisdiction
over their complaint as its jurisdiction covers only claims and disputes involving rights
of Indigenous Cultural Communities (IC Cs) and IPs only.18 Respondents are not
ICC/IP members, hence, the RTC, not the NCIP, has jurisdiction. Further, petitioners
pointed out that they are not praying for the issuance of CAL Ts/CADTs in their favor
but merely for the recognition of rights under the IPRA to their ancestral land by virtue
of their native title.19

Their motion for reconsideration, however, suffered the same fate. The RTC ruled that
the such arguments do not put the case within the operation of AM No. 09-6-8-SC.
Also, petitioners' cause of action based on alleged violations of the ECC issued to the
respondents in relation to the provisions of PD 1586 will not prosper as petitioners are
not real parties-in-interest under the contemplation of the Rules as explained in its
assailed Order. Thus:

WHEREFORE, the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION dated March 3, 2017 filed by

the petitioners is DENIED.20
Hence, this petition ..

The Issue

Was the court a quo's outright dismissal of the case proper?

The Court’s Ruling

We answer in the negative.

In precis, the R TC dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, finding that
petitioners' case is grounded upon their claim of being members of the IPs and their
assertion of ownership as such over their ancestral land. In ruling that it has no
jurisdiction over the case, the RTC discussed the exclusive jurisdiction of the NCIP to
issue CAL Ts/CADTs to formally recognize the rights of indigenous peoples to their
ancestral lands/domains by virtue of native title. Further, the RTC ruled that even if the
case is covered by A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, the same is still dismissible considering that
petitioners' right over the subject property is yet to be established as can be gleaned
from their prayer for the recognition of ownership rights as IPs over the subject land.

We do not agree.

In determining which body or court has jurisdiction in this case, Our pronouncement in
the recent case of Unduran, et al. v. Aberasturi, et al.,21 is instructive, viz:

[J]urisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by
the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate
facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as
which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the
allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or
not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the
ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction
also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. 22 (emphasis supplied)

The jurisdiction of the NCIP is stated under Section 66 of the IPRA, to wit:

Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs; Provided,
however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have
exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a
certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the
attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification
shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.

On the other hand, Administrative Order (AO) No. 23-2008,23 in relation to Batas
Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129,24 designated the court a quo as a special court to hear, try,
and decide violations of environmental laws committed within its territorial jurisdiction.

Having stated the jurisdiction of the NCIP and the RTC sitting as a special
environmental court, We proceed to examine the pertinent allegations in the
Complaint25 constituting petitioners' cause of action.
To reiterate, petitioners alleged in their Complaint that they are members of
the Ibaloi Tribesmen and that their rightful ownership and possession over the subject
property had already been established by testimonial and documentary evidence as far
back as 1924.26 They averred that after their ancestor's death, they continued to
possess and exercise ownership over their ancestral land. Respondents' intrusion and
usurpation was also alleged, and that respondents' earthmoving activities therein
caused destruction of small and full grown trees and sayote plants in their ancestral
land. Further, a violation of the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued in
favor of the respondents was likewise alleged.

Petitioners, therefore, prayed for the following reliefs, to wit: (1) issuance of an ex
parte 72-hour Environmental Protection Order to immediately stop respondents from
their earthmoving activities not only because they violate petitioners' rights under the
IPRA above-cited, but also because they failed to comply with the ECC and/or
because they operate without such ECC, violative of PD 1586 for posing grave and/or
irreparable danger to the environment, life and property; (2) after trial, make the
Environmental Protection Order and/or writ of preliminary injunction permanent; (3)
recognize the rights of the petitioners as IPs to their ancestral land subject of this case;
and (4) compel respondents to restore the denuded areas within the subject land to
maintain ecological balance and to compensate petitioners of their damaged
resources, among others.27

Guided by the foregoing, We find that the outright dismissal of the case was not proper.

First. The court a quo patently erred in ruling that the NCIP has jurisdiction over the
case.

Foremost, in Unduran, 28 this Court had already delimited the jurisdiction of the NCIP
as provided under Section 66 of the IPRA, viz.:

A careful review of Section 66 shows that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or
among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. This can be gathered from the
qualifying provision that "no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the
parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this
purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who
participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved,
which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the
NCIP.

The qualifying provision requires two conditions before such disputes may be brought
before the NCIP, namely: (1) exhaustion of remedies under customary laws of the
parties, and (2) compliance with condition precedent through the said certification by
the Council of Elders/Leaders. This is in recognition of the rights of ICCs/IPs to use
their own commonly accepted justice systems, conflict resolution institutions, peace
building processes or mechanisms and other customary laws and practices within their
respective communities, as may be compatible with the national legal system and with
internationally recognized human rights.

Section 3(f) of the IPRA defines customary laws as a body of written and/or unwritten
rules, usages, customs and practices traditionally and continually recognized, accepted
and observed by respective ICCs/IPs. From this restrictive definition, it can be gleaned
that it is only when both parties to a case belong to the same ICC/IP that the above-
said two conditions can be complied with. If the parties to a case belong to different
ICCs/IPs which are recognized to have their own separate and distinct customary laws
and Council of Elders/Leaders, they will fail. to meet the above-said two
conditions. The same holds true if one of such parties was a non-ICC/IP member
who is neither bound by customary laws as contemplated by the IPRA nor
governed by such council. Indeed, it would be violative of the principles of fair play
and due process for those parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP to be
subjected to its customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders.

Therefore, pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction
over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise
between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. When such claims and
disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same
ICC/IP, i.e., parties belonging to different ICC/IPs or where one of the parties is a
non-ICC/ IP, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the proper Courts of
Justice, instead of the NCIP. In this case, while most of the petitioners belong to
Talaandig Tribe, respondents do not belong to the same ICC/IP. Thus, even if the real
issue involves a dispute over land which appear to be located within the ancestral
domain of the Talaandig Tribe, it is not the NCIP but the RTC which shall have the
power to hear, try and decide this case.29 (emphasis supplied)

Indeed, non-ICCs/IPs cannot be subjected to the special and limited jurisdiction of the
NCIP even if the dispute involves rights of ICCs/IPs since the NCIP has no power and
authority to decide on a controversy involving rights of non-ICCs/IPs which should be
brought before the courts of general jurisdiction within the legal bounds of rights and
remedies.30 Plainly, contrary to the court a quo's conclusion, this case cannot be
subjected to the NCIP's jurisdiction as respondents are clearly non-ICCs/IPs.

Second. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action
pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint.1âwphi1 The averments
therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.31

As can be gleaned from the aforecited allegations in the Complaint, the case at bar is
not an action for the claim of ownership, much less, an application for the issuance of
CAL Ts/CADTs, contrary to the court a quo's findings. In fact, petitioners categorically
stated in the said Complaint that their Petition for the Identification, Delineation and
Recognition of Ancestral Claim and Issuance of CAL Ts is already pending before the
NCIP.32

Ultimately, petitioners' cause of action is grounded upon the alleged earthmoving

activities and operations of the respondents within petitioners' ancestral land, which
violated and continue to violate petitioners' environmental rights under the IPRA and
PD 1586 as the said activities were averred to have grave and or irreparable danger to
the environment, life, and property. Clearly, such cause of action is within the
jurisdiction of the RTC, sitting as a special environmental court, pursuant to AO No. 23-
2008 in relation to BP 129 and A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC. Whether or not petitioners are
entitled to their claim is irrelevant in the preliminary issue of jurisdiction. Again, once
jurisdiction is vested by the allegations in the complaint, it remains vested regardless of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein.33

Third. The court a quo erred in finding that the petitioners have no legal personality to
file the complaint. It is noteworthy that petitioners supported their allegations with
pertinent documents such as the report and recommendation34 of the NCIP on
petitioners' Petition for the Identification, Delineation and Recognition of Ancestral
Claim and Issuance of CAL Ts pending before the said Commission. In the said
document, the NCIP concluded that, among others, the petitioners have established
themselves as the heirs of Tunged and that the subject land was proven to be part of
the vast tract of land that Tunged and his successors possessed and
occupied.35 Hence, petitioners' averments in their Complaint taken together with such
supporting documents are sufficient to establish petitioners' locus standi in instituting
this action, as well as to bring petitioners' case within the purview of the court a quo's
jurisdiction as conferred by the law.

Fourth. At any rate, assuming arguendo that the case is not within the jurisdiction of
the R TC, sitting as an environmental court, the outright dismissal of the case was still
not proper, especially considering that We have already established that it is the
regular courts and not the NCIP, which has jurisdiction over the same. Section
3,36 Rule 2 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC explicitly states that if the complaint is not an
environmental complaint, the presiding judge shall refer it to the executive judge for re-
raffle to the regular court.

With this, it is not only proper but also necessary that the other issues obtaining in this
case should be addressed in the proceedings before the trial court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed

Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch V, dated March 2, 2017 and
April 3, 2017 are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Environmental
Case No. 8548-R is REINSTATED for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

Associate Justice