Professional Documents
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Criminal Law I - Discussion Outline
Criminal Law I - Discussion Outline
COURSE OUTLINE
I. Fundamental Principles
II. Construction of Penal Laws
III. General Characteristics of Criminal Law
IV. Repeal and Amendment of Penal Laws
V. Limitations on the Power of Congress to Enact Penal Laws
VI. Felonies
VII. Elements of Criminal Liability
VIII. Stages in the Execution of a Felony
IX. Conspiracy/Proposal
X. Circumstances Affecting Criminal Liability
a. Justifying Circumstances
b. Exempting Circumstances
c. Mitigating Circumstances
d. Aggravating Circumstances
e. Alternative Circumstances
XI. Persons Criminally Liable
XII. Penalty
a. Duration and Effects
b. Complex Crime
c. Service of Sentence
d. Application of Penalties
e. Indeterminate Sentence Law
f. Probation Law
g. Pecuniary Liability
XIII. Extinction of Criminal Liability
XIV. Civil Liability
* Read with the Pre-Bar Notes and Review Lectures by Judge Rowena Apao-Adlawan
1
Criminal Law I: Fundamentals of Criminal Law COURSE OUTLINE
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
• Ysidoro v. People, November 14, 2012: Article 220: But criminal intent is not an
element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting public
property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another
public purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not
inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its
commission based on considerations of public policy, order, and convenience. It is the
commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof,
that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Hence, malice or
criminal intent is completely irrelevant.
1. GENERALITY
2. TERRITORIALITY
Exception: Extra-Territorial
➢ Article 2, Revised Penal Code: 1-5
➢ 6. Offense committed in Philippine Embassy, Consulate or Diplomatic Premises
➢ 7. Continuing offense by PH citizen and permanent resident against PH citizen
Illustrative Cases
1. Piracy is a Crime against All Mankind
• People v. Lol-lo and Saraw, February 27, 1922: [Moro pirates in attacked two
boats containing Dutch nationals in the Dutch East Indies. Charged in the Court of First
Instance of Sulu] Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against
any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent
tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be
carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it
is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was
committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits,
though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes.
Acts of violence against women and their children may manifest as transitory or
continuing crimes; meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and
requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur
in another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime's essential and material
acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood
that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person
charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality
or territory where the offense was in part committed.
3. PROSPECTIVITY
Prospectivity Principle: When can the law consider an act as a crime?
Retroactive Application
• People v. Mejares, January 10, 2018: This Court affirms with modification the
conviction of accused- appellant Mejares for the crime of qualified theft. While this
Court finds no reversible error in the ruling that she was guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, this Court finds it necessary to modify the penalty initially imposed upon her.
In light of the recently enacted Republic Act No. 10951,which adjusted the amounts of
property and damage on which penalties are based, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, and considering the prosecution's failure to establish the precise values
of the stolen items, accused-appellant must be ordered released on time served.
Republic Act No. 10951 has since come into effect during the pendency of this case. It
likewise specifically stipulates that its provisions shall have retroactive effect. Section
100 adds that this retroactivity applies not only to persons accused of crimes but have
yet to be meted their final sentence, but also to those already "serving sentence by
final judgment." This is in keeping with Article 22.
Bill of Attainder
Due Process Clause
Equipoise Rule
• People v. Librias, September 14, 2016: When the evidence in a criminal case is
evenly balanced the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scale in favor of
the accused since evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty.
FELONIES
Kinds of Felonies
1. Intentional Felonies (dolo)
a. Requisites: Criminal Intent, Freedom of Action, and Intelligence
Motive, Defined
General Rule: Motive is immaterial
• People v. Buenafe, August 03, 2016: [Motive is imputed by accused to one of the
main witnesses] As a general rule, proof of motive for the commission of the offense
charged does now show guilt and absence of proof of such motive does not establish
the innocence of the accused for the crime charged. Motive is irrelevant when the
accused has been positively identified by an eyewitness. Intent is not synonymous
with motive. Motive alone is not a proof and is hardly ever an essential element of a
crime.
In the case at bar, there is no indication that Fernandez and Garino knew each other
beforehand, and as mentioned, it seems to be a matter of mere convenience that
Garino zeroed in on Fernandez as the culprit only after a conversation with Barcenas.
There was also no plausible reason for Fernandez to risk his safety and life in shooting
Garino, especially with a possible witness in tow. If Fernandez wanted to end Garino's
life, it would also be strange that he would not run after Garino and finish the job, as
Garino would certainly have been hobbled as a result of the wound. [Acquitted].\
Culpable Felonies
Reason for Penalizing Culpa
Mistake of Fact
Requisites [lawful if correct – lawful intent – no fault or carelessness]
• US v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488: When the Chinaman stuck the fatal blow in the firm
belief that the intruder who forced the door open to his room was a thief, from whose
assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property
committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstance, he acted in good faith,
without malice or criminal intent, in the fine belief that he was doing no more than
exercising a legitimate right to self-defense.
• People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257: Unlike in Ah Chong, the person in the room being
then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity
without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any
reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed.
• Intent to Kill: Abello v. People, October 7, 2013: The use of a scythe against the
neck of Benigno’s neck was determinative of the accused’s homicidal intent when the
hacking blow was delivered. It does not require imagination to figure out that a single
hacking blow to the neck with the use of a scythe could be enough to decapitate a
person and leave him dead.
Second, when Jose fell down, Hernando identified himself and shouted, "This is
Hernando!" However, instead of verifying the identities of the victims, the accused
continued to fire at them. One of them even shouted, "Birahi na!" ("Shoot now!").
Third, when the victims fell down, the accused approached their bodies. At that point,
they could no longer claim that they didn't recognize the victims; and still not
contented, they sprayed them with bullets such that Jose suffered 14 gunshot wounds,
Hernando 16 gunshot wounds, and Benito 20 gunshot wounds.
Fourth, contrary to their testimonies during trial to the effect that the victims were the
first to fire their weapons, Brgy. Capt. Balinas testified that when he asked the accused
whether the victims had fired at them, the accused answered him in the negative.
Fifth, the accused would like the Court to believe that the victims knew the safe word
"Amoy" which must be uttered in response to "Simoy" in order to easily determine
whether they were members of the NPA. However, the victims could not have known
the safe words as accused Gervero himself stated in his testimony that only he and
his co-accused were present when their commanding officer briefed them about the
safe words to be used in their operation. All these circumstances negate accused-
appellants' claim of mistake of fact and point instead to a concerted action to eliminate
the victims.
• Garcia v. People, August 28, 2009: Victim was punched but was able to escape but
upon reaching home was found lying on the floor and died due to heart attack. The
accused is liable since the emotional strain form the beating led to his death.
a. Error in Personae
Mistake in the Identity
➢ Liability: Crime actually committed but penalty shall be that what is committed or that
is intended whichever is lower, but in its maximum period.
b. Aberratio Ictus
Mistake in the Blow
c. Praeter Intentionem
Did Not Intend to Commit So Grave a Wrong
➢ Liability: Actual crime committed but entitled to mitigating circumstance
2. IMPOSSIBLE CRIMES
Requisites [PEIN]
Kinds of Impossibility
1. Physical or Factual Impossibility
2. Legal Impossibility
Crime of Last Resort
Cases
• People v. Domasian, March 1, 1993: The act cannot be considered an impossible
crime because there was no inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or the
employment of inadequate or ineffective means. The delivery of the ransom note after
the rescue of the victim did not extinguish the offense, which had already been
consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his liberty.
• People v. Intod, October 21, 1992: Shooting but the intended victim was not
present was deemed an impossible crime. To hold it as attempted murder would render
useless Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act which would have
been an offense against persons or property.
• Gemma Jacinto v. People, July 13, 2009: [Unlawfully took a postdated check but
the check had bounced] Performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified
theft but the check bounced, a fact unknown, and turned out to be useless.
Attempted Felonies
“Directly by overt acts”
• People v. Lamahong, 61 Phil. 707: In order to convict a person for attempt felony,
the overt acts must be directly related to the felony for which he is charged. The mere
act of entering without taking anything is not attempted felony.
Effect of Desistance
Kinds of Desistance
Frustrated Felonies
Attempted vs. Frustrated
1. As to acts of execution
2. As to causes of non-accomplishment
3. As to subjective or objective
• Esqueda v. People, June 18, 2009: [Stabbed at the back, stabbed again upon falling
to the ground.] If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the
crime committed is either consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no
intention to kill the victim, or frustrated or attempted homicide or murder if the
offender intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill was present.
Crimes without Frustrated Stage [Rape, Arson, Corruption, Adultery, Physical Injury, Theft].
No Frustrated Theft
• Jovito Canceran v. People, July 1, 2015: [Hid the Ponds White Beauty Cream in a
box of Magic Flakes, but was discovered and left it in the store – guilty of theft]. There
is no such crime as ‘frustrated theft.’ The element of unlawful taking which produces
theft in its consummated stage, is deemed complete from the moment the offender
gained possession of the thing, even if he had no opportunity to dispose the same. But
since the information charged him of frustrated theft, thus he may be charged of the
lesser crime of attempted theft since an accused cannot be convicted of a crime even
if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the information.
• Valenzuela v. People, June 21, 2007: [Stealing of "Tide” detergent, intercepted by
the security in the taxi and left items in parking space.] Theft is already produced upon
the taking of personal property of another without the latter’s consent.
• People v. Padit, February 1, 2016: The slightest penetration of the female genitals
consummates the crime. In the present case, AAA testified that she felt pain when
accused rubbed his penis against her vagina. Severe pain could not have been felt of
mere superficial rubbing of the sex organ = such pain could be nothing but the result
of penile penetration sufficient to constitute rape.
Consummated Felonies
If not all elements – civil obligation can be established\
Cases that are consummated or nothing (felony by omission, false testimony, slander)
Indeterminate Offense
➢ Purpose is uncertain and nature in relation to objective is ambiguous.
Conspiracy as a Crime
➢ General Rule: Preparatory Acts are not Punished
➢ Exception: When the law provides for a penalty
Conspiracy [Treason, rebellion, insurrection, coup d’etat, sedition]
Proposal [Treason, rebellion or insurrection, coup d’etat]
Special Law [Conspiracy to Commit Terrorism – Anti-Terror Law]
Burden of Proof
• Franco v. People, February 6, 2011: Conspiracy must be proven on the same
quantum of evidence as the evidence of the felony subject of the agreement of the
parties. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words,
or conduct of the alleged conspirators, prior to, during or after the commission of the
felony to achieve a common design. Petitioner’s actions were in relation to the
attainment of a common objective. They had vital roles in the nefarious scheme to sell
a vehicle that they knew would never be delivered, but for which they obtained a
substantial sum of money. Conspiracy may be proved by direct or circumstantial
evidence consisting of acts, words, or conduct of the alleged conspirators, prior to,
during and after the commission of the felony to achieve a common design or purpose.
Degree of Participation
➢ General Rule: Direct participation = Conspirator
➢ Exceptions: [1] mastermind; [2] overt act in relation to the conspiracy (e.g. lookout)
• People v. Hua and Lee, September 29, 2004: [Tourist friends visited and stayed
in a friend’s condo who turned out to be a shabu haven]. Conspiracy cannot be
presumed it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The bare fact that the two were
found with the other suspects does not constitute proof of conspiracy. Hua: Mere
association with the principals or mere knowledge of the conspiracy and without more
does not suffice. Lee: conspirator, was found to have control and possession of the
bedroom where the shabu and paraphernalia are found.
• People v. Valdez, January 18, 2012: One did have to participate in every detail of
the execution; neither did he have to know the exact part performed by his co-
conspirator in the execution of the criminal acts. Both accused shown to have acted in
concert to achieve a common purpose of assaulting the unarmed victims with their
guns. Their acting in concert was manifest not only from their going together aboard
a single motorcycle, but also in joint attack.
• People v. Salga and Namalata, June 23, 2018: [Accused was shown driving green
motorcycle allegedly leaving the locus criminis] To be held guilty as a co-principal by
reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed overt act in
pursuance to the conspiracy. Joan, although present at the scene of the crime, never
identified the accused as one of the group of robbers, and his sighting was after the
robbery when he was driving the green motorcycle. This was not the overt act to make
Ruel part of the conspiracy – the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary
relation to the offense. The act of mere driving the motorcycle did not amount to an
overt act indicating his having conspired in the robbery with homicide.
• People v. Zabala, November 23, 2015: [Friends walking home, one was mauled by
two people, R boxed victim while E held victim’s hands from behind]. Proof of the
actual agreement to commit the crime need not be direct because conspiracy may be
implied or inferred from their acts. It was convincingly shown that both appellants had
acted in concert to achieve a common purpose in assaulting and killing Joseph as the
accused where together when they walked the road and Romeo boxed Joseph while
Edgardo held Joseph’s hands from behind.
• People v. Niegas, November 27, 2013: [From Jollibee, driver did not deliver them
home but picked up unknown men and was held hostage.] Conspiracy may be deduced
from the mode and methods. The acts of Niegas show that he was complicit in the
joint purpose and design of kidnapping the victims. It was himself who drove them to
the place and personally took them to the house and even caught the victim in her
attempt to escape and threatened to kill victim in her attempt to shout.
Overlapping conspiracy
• People v. Sandiganbayan, August 10, 2007: It depicts a picture of a conspirator
in the first level of conspiracy performing acts which implement, or in furtherance
thereof, another conspiracy in the next level of which the actor is not an active party.
Wheel Conspiracy
• Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, February 26, 2002: Wheel or circle conspiracy in which
there is a single person or group (the “hub”) dealing individually with two or more
persons or groups (the “spokes”) and the rim that encloses the spokes is the common
goal in the overall conspiracy. The hub is the former president Estrada while the spokes
are all of the accused and the rim that encloses the spokes is the common goal which
is amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
Chain Conspiracy
• Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (supra): The chain conspiracy, usually involving here the
distribution of narcotics or other contraband in which there is a successive
communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business
operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and
the retailer and consumer.
***
Offenses Not Subject to the Provisions of this Code – Article 10, RPC
1. SELF-DEFENSE
• People v. Fontanilla, January 25, 2012: It is basic that once an accused admitted
his infliction of fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by
clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would
avoid his criminal liability. Having thus admitted being the author of the death of the
victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of proving such. [Hitting stone leading to
fatal injury was not reasonable against the victim’s fistic attack and kicks.]
a. Unlawful Aggression
moves or impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof does not depend on
the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury. The doctrine of
rational equivalence presupposes the consideration not only of the nature and
quality of weapons, but the totality of circumstances. Notwithstanding the fact that
petitioner merely used a scabbard in fending off the unlawful aggression – the totality
of the circumstances shows that after the aggressor was taken to the ground,
“continuous hacking” showed he had intent to harm.
Confrontational Stance
• People v. Almojuela, June 2, 2014: The prosecution proved that it was Almojuela
who first challenged Paz and his group to a fight. Almojuela came prepared to fight
and was in fact armed with a bladed weapon.
2. DEFENSE OF RELATIVES
Medina v. People, January 15, 2014: [Lino was injured in a fight during a basketball
game, he went to the house of the Medinas, he grabbed Randolf and altercation ensued.
Ricardo, the brother of Randolf saw his brother in distress and was able to stab Lino leading
to his death.] In invoking defense of a relative, Ricardo states that his immediate impulse
upon seeing Randolf being attacked by Lino with a knife was to get his own weapon and to
aid in the defense of Randolf. But that theory was inconsistent with his declaration at the trial
that Lino’s fatal wound had been self-inflicted, as it presupposes direct responsibility for
inflicting the mortal wound. Thus, his defense was unworthy of belief due to its incongruity
with human experience.
3. DEFENSE OF STRANGER
Requisites
Defense of Relatives vs. Defense of Strangers
Presence of a Crime
Nature of Exempting Circumstances
Difference between Justifying and Exempting Circumstances
1. Legality of the Act
2. Presence of a Crime
3. Civil Liability
4. Emphasis of the Law
1. INSANITY OR IMBECILITY
Presumption of Sanity (Article 800, New Civil Code); Mere abnormality not sufficient
Quantum of Proof Required
Illustrative Jurisprudence
1. Temporary insanity and state of confusion
o People v. Dagsil, December 13, 2017: [Accused lurking outside the house
and stabbed victim. Accused argued that he was confused and he did not know
what he was doing at that time.] The testimony of the accused of his awareness
as to what happened before and after the stabbing is not an indication of
someone who was insane. His answers to the questions were intelligent,
responsive, and straightforward.
2. Schizophrenia Relapse
o Verdadero v. People, March 02, 2016: [Stabbing; In and out of hospital
from Psychiatric Department; suffered relapse on the day. – Exempted]. It is
true that there is no direct evidence to show Verdadero’s mental state at the
exact moment the crime was committed. This however is not fatal and may still
be shown by the circumstances immediately before and after the incident and
was even found to have suffered a relapse at the time of the stabbing. Thus, it
is reasonable to conclude on the basis of the testimony of the expert witness
that Verdadero was of unsound mind at the time of the commission of crime.
6. Feeling of Remorse
o People v. Villanueva, September 25, 2007: [Killing of niece; venting after
because no dinner was cooked because mother has no money to buy food.]
Villanueva’s recollection of the events prior to the crimes and his emotions
afterwards indicate that he was sane before, during and after commission and
was even apprehensive being in jail for a longer time. A feeling of remorse is
inconsistent with insanity, as it is a clear indication that he was conscious of his
acts, that he acknowledges his guilt and that he was sorry for his acts.
2 & 3. MINORITY
Republic Act No. 9344 (as amended by RA 10630)
Juvenile Justice Welfare Justice System
➢ Is a system that deals with child at risk and children in conflict with the law which
provides child-appropriate proceedings and services for prevention, diversion,
rehabilitation, reintegration, and after-care to ensure normal growth and development.
Determination of Discernment
Child in Conflict with the Law (CICL) (Section 1, A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC)
- Presumption of Minority
o People v. Mantalaba, July 20, 2011: However, this Court has already ruled
in People v. Sarcia that while Section 38 of RA 9344 provides that suspension
of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already
eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her
guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until
the child reaches the maximum age of 21. xxx
Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can
no longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his
suspension of sentence, because such is already moot and academic. xxx The
records show that the appellant filed his notice of appeal at the age of 19
(2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years
old, and the case having been elevated to the CA, the latter should have
suspended the sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to the
provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the suspension of
sentence of minors regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to the
provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603.Nevertheless, the appellant shall be
entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51 of RA No. 9344, which
provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows (SEC. 51.
Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and other Training
Facilities).
documents that would prove the date of birth of the accused; (2) the presence
of testimony from accused and/or a relative on the age and minority of the
accused at the time of the complained incident without any objection on the
part of the prosecution; and (3) lack of any contrary evidence showing that the
accused's and/or his relatives' testimonies are untrue."
Liability of Accused under 18 but more than 15 Years of Age with Discernment
o Jerwin Dorado v. People, October 3, 2016
Elements (L-D-A-F)
• When Reckless Imprudence
• When Simple Imprudence
Illustrative Case
• Pushing door open hitting shotgun causing killing wife in forehead– no credence
o People v. Roy San Gaspar, April 2, 2014: Contrary to what appellant wants
this Court to believe, a .12 gauge shotgun will not go off unless it is loaded,
cocked, and its trigger squeezed. We thus entertain no reasonable doubt as to
appellant’s culpability. The location of the gunshot wound with gunpowder
burns clearly shows that the shooting was not accidental, but rather indicative
of an intentional killing.
Irresistible Force
Elements (P-I-T)
Uncontrollable Fear
Requisites [1] threat is greater; [2] evil of such gravity to succumb to it
Elements (F-R-G)
Mere threat is not enough
The Court finds it hard to believe that a person who accidentally discovers the kidnap
victims would be held at gunpoint by the kidnappers to guard said victims; or that a
mastermind would invite another to the place where he is holding prisoners; or that
Delos Reyes did not find it unusual to see a woman with her hands tied.
Illustrative Cases:
1. Forced to participate crime because he and family where threatened to be killed
o People v. Anticamara, June 8, 2011: For such defense to prosper, the
duress, force, fear, or intimidation must be present, imminent, and impending,
and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or
serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not enough.
There is nothing in the records to substantiate xxx that he was under duress
from his co-accused while participating in the crime that would suffice to
exempt him from incurring criminal liability. The evidence shows that Al was
tasked to act as a lookout xxx. Al was there from 7:30 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. of the
following day, while the rest of the group was waiting in the landing field. Thus,
while all alone, Al had every opportunity to escape since he was no longer
subjected to a real, imminent, or reasonable fear.
2. Forced at gunpoint by companion otherwise harm would befall to him or his family
People v. Labuguen and Zuñiga, February 24, 2020: The malefactors had
a well-hatched plan to commit the crime of robbery with homicide and that
Zuñiga was not only well-aware of every detail thereof but likewise actively
participated in its commission. He had every opportunity to escape while they
were passing through the corn fields on their way to the Padre’s house.
However, he did not avail of the said chance. He did not perform any overt act
to dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and
prevent the commission thereof. While he refused to kill Rachel, he nonetheless
delivered the fatal blow to Manuel's head and stabbed Nenita at her back using
a chopping knife without any prodding or compulsion from his companions.
In the instant case, while the records show that Manansala was apprehensive
in committing a falsity in the preparation of the subject report as she did not
know the repercussions of her actions, nothing would show that Lacanilao, or
any of her superiors at UMC for that matter, threatened her with loss of
employment should she fail to do so. As there was an absence of any real and
imminent threat, intimidation, or coercion would have compelled Manansala to
do what she did, such a circumstance cannot be appreciated in her favor.
Elements (D-F-L)
Exempting Circumstance on Felonies by Omission
Absolutory Causes
1. Spontaneous Desistance (Article 6)
2. Attempted or Frustrated Light Felonies (Article 7)
3. Accessory is Relative of the Principal (Article 20)
4. Legal Grounds for Arbitrary Detention (Article 124)
5. Physical Injuries Inflicted Upon Surprise of Illicit Carnal Knowledge (Article 247)
6. Legal Grounds on Trespass to Dwelling (Article 280)
7. Swindling or Malicious Mischief on Relatives (Article 332)
8. Marriage Extinguishing Criminal Action (Article 344[4], Article 266-C)
9. Mistake of Fact
10. Instigation (US v. Phelps) (May fall under irresistible force)
Principles to Remember
1. Some of the conditions required to justify the deed or to exempt are lacking
2. Majority of such conditions are nonetheless present
3. Indispensable element must be present (e.g. unlawful aggression)
2. MINORITY OR SENILITY
3. PRAETER INTENTIONEM
Not Available if Resulting Felony Could be Expected (There must be evident disproportion)
Not Applicable to Felonies by Negligence
Not Applicable if Offender used Brute Force
Lack of intent to Commit so Grave a Wrong – Not Appreciated
Elements (S-O-I)
Threat Need Not be Offensive and Positively Strong (Otherwise, it is unlawful aggression)
Provocation, Defined [Only Against the Origin of Threat or Provocation]
“Sufficient provocation” in self-defense
Rationale of the Immediacy Requirement (Diminished Self Control)
Elements [C-D-P]
Concerns “Honor”, “good names and reputation”
“Offense”, How Understood
“Grave” How Determined
Lapse of Time and Proximate Cause
o Gregorio Pelonia v. People, April 13, 2007: [Uninvited guest (victim) in the
accused’s house announced that he did not come to eat but to kill the accused,
fired first a warning shot and warned the victim but the victim instead attacked
accused and the accused shot the victim.] Mitigating circumstance of having
acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense was, likewise, properly
appreciated. Petitioner was humiliated in front of his guests and kin in his own
house. It is settled, however, that the mitigating circumstance of sufficient
provocation cannot be considered apart from the circumstance of vindication of
a grave offense. These two circumstances arose from one and the same incident
so that they should be considered as only one mitigating circumstance.
6. PASSION OR OBFUSCATION
Article 12(4), (5) and (6) cannot coexist and pleaded all the same time
➢ Except if they arise from different set of facts
1. As to origin
2. As to time period
3. Effects
Voluntary Surrender
Elements (A-A-V)
Surrender Must be Spontaneous: [1] save them trouble or expenses; [2] show remorse
• People v. Rebamontan, April 13, 1999: It is clear from the above circumstances
that it was the police officer who went looking for the accused appellant immediately
after obtaining information from eyewitnesses as to who had perpetrated the crime.
The mere fact that he did not resist his arrest or deny his criminal act cannot be
equated with voluntary surrender. His arrest was already imminent. Surrender must
be spontaneous.
o Del Castillo v. People, January 30, 2012: By virtue [Section 388 of LGC],
the police officers, as well as the barangay tanods were acting as agents of a
person in authority during the conduct of the search.
Elements (O-S-E)
Rationale
Plea of Guilt and Voluntary Surrender, Different
Not Applicable to Culpable Felonies and Crime under Special Laws
Conditional Plea of Guilty Not Considered
8. PHYSICAL DEFECT
Basis
Requisites [1] diminish willpower; [2] should not deprive consciousness of acts
Feeblemindedness
Significance
Circumstances similar to Article 12 (1) to (9)
• Man 60 years of age and of failing sight
• Outraged feeling of owner of animal taken for ransom
• Outraged feeling of creditor versus debtor
• Impulse of jealous feeling
• Esprit de corps
• Voluntary restitution of the property
• Extreme poverty
• Abandonment of wife convicted of bigamy
• Acting out of embarrassment
• Testifying in favor of prosecution despite but not being discharged from information
General Concepts
Definition of Aggravating Circumstances
Basis
Dwelling
Illustrative Cases
1. Shooting from Outside
o People v. Terso Sibbu, March 29, 2017: Although the triggerman fired the
shot from outside the house, his victim was inside. For this circumstance to be
considered it is not necessary that the accused should have actually entered
the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense; it is enough that the victim
was attacked inside his own house, although the assailant may have devised
means to perpetrate the assault from [the outside.]
Abuse of Confidence
Elements (T-A-F)
Personal Relation
Inherent in Qualified Seduction, Qualified Theft, Estafa by Conversion and Malversation
Obvious Ungratefulness
Elements (T-A-O)
Obvious and Manifest Ingratitude
Nighttime (Nocturnidad)
Period Covered; Commenced and Completed
Illumination (Moonlight, Road Lights)
Rationale; Absorbed in Treachery; Exception
Band (Quadrilla)
Four Armed Malefactors
Intrinsic Nature of Armed Weapons
Applicable Only in Crimes against Property and Persons Not in Chastity
9. Recidivism
10. Reiteracion
Elements (T-P-C)
“Previously Punished”
“The Penalty the Law Attaches”
Effect of Pardon – no reiteracion
Definition [after conviction but before service of sentence or during service of sentence]
Special Aggravating Circumstance
Period Covered
Rules as to Fire
1. Intent was to burn but somebody died - arson
2. Fire as a means to kill - murder
3. Intention kill and fire was used to conceal – arson and murder
Use of Poison
1. In murder cases – considered as inherent
2. In parricide – appreciated as aggravating circumstance
Elements (Determination-Preparation-Time)
Disguise, Defined
Test of Disguise – intended to make identification difficult.
face coverings, some of which fell off.] The introduction of the prosecution of
testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the accused were masked but the masks
fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as an aggravating circumstance.
What is important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there
was the concealment of the identity of the accused.
• People v. Cañaveras, November 27, 2013: [Striking of beer bottle, victim in search
of “Judas”]. Superiority in number does not necessarily amount to the qualifying
circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength. It must be shown that the
aggressors combined forces in order to secure advantage from their superiority in
strength. When appreciating this qualifying circumstance, it must be proven that the
accused simultaneously assaulted the deceased. Indeed, when assailants attack a
victim alternately, they cannot be said to have taken advantage of their superior
strength.
In this case, the unidentified companions of appellant punched Claro first. He was
already about to escape when he was struck by appellant on the head with a beer
bottle. Thus, the attack mounted by the unidentified persons had already ceased when
appellant took over. Also, the fact that Claro would have been able to escape showed
that the initial attack was not that overwhelming, considering that there were three of
them attacking. Clearly, there was no blatant disparity in strength between Claro, on
the one hand, and appellant and his companions on the other.
Illustrative Cases
1. Superiority in Number and Arms
o People v. Melanio Del Castillo, January 18, 2012: A gross disparity of
forces existed between the accused and the victims. Not only did the six
accused outnumber the three victims but the former was armed with bolos
while the latter were unarmed. The accused clearly used their superiority in
number and arms to ensure the killing of the victims. Abuse of superior strength
is attendant if the accused took advantage of their superiority in number and
their being armed with bolos. Accordingly, the crimes committed were three
counts of murder.
o People v. Tamayo, March 12, 2014: Since about 15 men, including Erwin,
pounced on their one helpless victim, relentlessly bludgeoned him on the head,
and stabbed him on the stomach until he was dead, there is no question that
the accused took advantage of their superior strength. Thus, it qualifies that
killing into murder.
Materially Weakened
Absorbed in Treachery
16. Treachery
Treachery (Alevosia), defined
Nature of Treachery
Elements of Treachery
Crimes Against Persons Only
Cannot Exist with Passion or Obfuscation
Appreciation in Error in Personae and Aberratio Ictus
Evident Premeditation can exist with Treachery
Illustrative Cases
• People v. Yolando Libre, August 1, 2016: In this case, the records show that the
attack was well-planned and the series of events that transpired clearly established
conspiracy among them. First, the perpetrators undoubtedly acted in concert as they
went to the house of Ruben together, each with his own firearms; Second, the
perpetrators used Lucy Sabando and her child to trick Ruben and ensure that he will
come out of the house clueless to their presence; Third, after a moment of struggling,
Caman immediately shot Ruben Barte at the back; Fourth, perpetrators simultaneously
strafed Barte's house for a long period to ensure that those inside the house are
likewise killed; Fifth, despite Juanita Barte's plea to stop shooting as there were
children with them, the shooting continued thus manifesting clear intent to kill; and
Sixth, when they ceased firing, they rested at the same time and fled together.
Ruben Barte to come out of the house. Hence, the subsequent shooting was deliberate,
unexpected, swift and sudden which foreclosed any escape, resistance or defense
coming from the victims.
• People v. Celino Nabong, April 04, 2007: [Stabbing of the young female
accountant by construction workers.] Thus, this Court has ruled that even frontal
attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim is
unarmed. Treachery can still be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of
the danger to his/her person. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made
it impossible for the victim to defend himself/herself or to retaliate. In the present
case, the victim did not even have sufficient warning of the danger that was looming,
since the attack against her came from behind and was so sudden and unexpected,
thus giving the victim no time to flee or to prepare her defense or enable her to offer
the least resistance to the sudden assault.
In the present case, the prosecution has established petitioner's intent to kill Ryn Loui.
The Court also finds such intent to be present with respect to Ramil. In this regard, it
is hard to reconcile that there is an intent to kill Ryn Loui while there is none when it
comes to Ramil considering that petitioner commenced the commission of the felony
directly through overt acts by treacherously shooting both the victims while they were
on board the same motorcycle.
In particular, with respect to Ramil, after he was shot by petitioner in the arm, the
latter's intent to consummate the crime was shown by the fact that he continued to
chase Ramil and fire at him. However, the petitioner was not able to perform all the
acts of execution which should produce the crime of murder as the wound inflicted
upon Ramil was not fatal and the latter was able to run away from the petitioner. From
the foregoing, it is evident that petitioner also intended to kill Ramil and that all the
elements of attempted murder are present.
• People v. Moreno, March 2, 2020: Despite being stabbed multiple, the person was
able to kick the accused, so much so the accused fled the scene of the crime – is there
treachery? Yes. Appellant's sudden attack on Mijares while asleep in his own home
amply demonstrates treachery in the commission of the crime. Mijares had no inkling
of the impending attack that night; or any peril to his person as he felt secured in his
home. Mijares was not able to put up an effective defense. Although he kicked and
pushed the appellant out of their room, this did not negate the presence of treachery.
In People v. Baltazar, We ruled that treachery must still be appreciated even if the
victim was able to retaliate as a result of his reflexes, so long as he did not have the
opportunity to repel the initial assault.
17. Ignominy
Ignominy, Defined [moral order which adds disgrace to material injury]
Crimes Applicable; Ignominy v. Cruelty
21. Cruelty
Definition
Requisites [increase injury + unnecessary]
The Victim Must Still be Alive
Not Inherent in Crimes Against Persons
Number of Wounds Per Se Not Proof of Cruelty
• Simangan v. People, July 8, 2004: Moreover, the crime is not aggravated by cruelty
simply because the victim sustained ten stab wounds, three of which were fatal. For
cruelty to be considered aggravating circumstance, there must be proof that, in
inflicting several stab wounds on the victim, the perpetrator intended to exacerbate
the pain and suffering of the victim. The number of wounds inflicted on the victim is
not proof of cruelty.
In Homicide or Murder ✓
➢ Not a separate offense in such case (People v. Avecilla, February 15, 2001)
Rebellion, Insurrection, Attempted Coup – Absorbed as element
Section 25, RA 9165: A positive of finding of the finding use of dangerous drugs shall be a
qualifying aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime by an offender, and the
application of the penalty provided for in the RPC shall be applicable.
➢ Loses its effectivity already
➢ Jaime Dela Cruz v. People, July 23, 2014, Sereno, J.: [Accused was arrested in
the alleged act of extortion, but his urine sample was subjected to testing and yielded
a positive result.] The drug test under RA 9165 does not cover every person who is
apprehended or arrest for any unlawful act, it only covers those under Article II of RA
9165. Note that accused was arrested in the alleged act of extortion. Making the phrase
“a person apprehended or arrested” in Section 15 applicable to all persons arrested or
apprehended for all other crimes is tantamount to a mandatory drug testing. Here
the urine sample is not material to the charge of extortion [N.B. Meaning, other than
RA 9165 offenses, there is no way to apply a positive finding of such use to make it as
a qualifying aggravating circumstance alluded to by Section 25.]
Definition
1. Relationship
Covered Relationships
Under Revised Penal Code
Under Jurisprudence
• People v. Tan, 264 SCRA 425: Step-daughter and step-father included.
• People v. Cabresos, 244 SCRA 362, Uncle and niece is not included.
Rules as to Relationship
1. In Crimes involving Property – relationship is generally aggravating
a. Mitigating: Robbery, Usurpation, Fraudulent Insolvency, Arson
b. Exempting: Theft, Estafa, and Malicious Mischief if Living Together
2. Intoxication
The person pleading intoxication must prove that he took such quantity of alcoholic
beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, as would blur his reason. his, the
appellants failed to do. The records are bereft of any evidence that the quantity of
liquor they had taken was of such quantity as to affect their mental faculties. On the
contrary, the fact that appellants could recall details of what had transpired after their
drinking session is the best proof that they knew what they were doing during that
occasion. The deception, the device, the place and manner of perpetrating the crime
all point to the fact that appellants had complete control of their minds.
General Rule
Exception
1. Crimes against property
2. Crimes against chastity
3. Murder or homicide
4. Rape
5. Treason
o People v. Lansanas: Love of country should be a natural feeling of every
citizen however unlettered or uncultured he may be.
***
Republic Act 10586: An Act Penalizing Persons Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol,
Dangerous Drugs and Similar Substances (2012)
Section 5. Punishable Act. – It shall be unlawful for any person to drive a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol, dangerous drugs, and/or other similar substances.
➢ This is independent from criminal liability under Article 365, RPC
Section 12. Penalties. – A driver found to have been driving a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol, dangerous drugs and/or other similar substances, as provided for under
Section 5 of this Act, shall be penalized as follows:
(a) If the violation of Section 5 did not result in physical injuries or homicide, the penalty of
three (3) months imprisonment, and a fine ranging from Twenty thousand pesos
(Php20,000.00) to Eighty thousand pesos (Php80,000.00) shall be imposed;
(b) If the violation of Section 5 resulted in physical injuries, the penalty provided in Article
263 of the Revised Penal Code or the penalty provided in the next preceding subparagraph,
whichever is higher, and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00)
to Two hundred thousand pesos (Php200,000.00) shall be imposed;
(c) If the violation of Section 5 resulted in homicide, the penalty provided in Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (Php300,000.00)
to Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) shall be imposed; and
(d) The nonprofessional driver’s license of any person found to have violated Section 5 of this
Act shall also be confiscated and suspended for a period of twelve (12) months for the first
conviction and perpetually revoked for the second conviction. The professional driver’s license
of any person found to have violated Section 5 of this Act shall also be confiscated and
perpetually revoked for the first conviction. The perpetual revocation of a driver’s license shall
disqualify the person from being granted any kind of driver’s license thereafter.
The prosecution for any violation of this Act shall be without prejudice to criminal prosecution
for violation of the Revised Penal Code, Republic Act No. 9165 and other special laws and
existing local ordinances, whenever applicable.
NOTE: X was driving and bumps Y, resulting to the latter’s death. What is X’s liability? The
policemen or the prosecution may opt to file
1. Reckless imprudence resulting to homicide under Article 365, RPC
2. Under RA 10586, since prosecution under such law shall be without prejudice
Important Definitions
➢ (b) Breath analyzer refers to the equipment which can determine the blood alcohol
concentration level of a person through testing of his breath.
➢ (c) Chemical tests refer to breath, saliva, urine, or blood tests to determine the blood
alcohol concentration level and/or positive indication of dangerous drugs and similar
substances in a person’s body.
➢ (e) Driving under the influence of alcohol refers to the act of operating a motor vehicle
while the driver’s blood alcohol concentration level has, after being subjected to a
breath analyzer test, reached the level of intoxication, as established jointly by the
Department of Health (DOH), the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).
➢ (f) Driving under the influence of dangerous drugs and other similar substances refers
to the act of operating a motor vehicle while the driver, after being subjected to a
confirmatory test as mandated under Republic Act No. 9165, is found to be positive
for use of any dangerous drug.
***
Entrapment
Not an Absolutory Cause
In Flagrante Delicto
PROBLEM: PDEA had intelligence of drug pushing activities of R, but could not arrest him for
lack of concrete evidence. PDEA Agent approached E approaching him to act as poseur-buyer
to buy from R, E refused citing that he has been rehabilitated and did not want anything to
do with drugs anymore. But he was prevailed to help, when the PDEA agent told him that he
is the only one who can get to R, since E was his former customer. Agent gave E the marked
money, the operation proceeded, after handing the marked money to R. After getting the
signal from E, PDEA team barged in and arrest R & E, who were both charged by RA 9165.
[1] What defense, if any, may E invoke to free himself of criminal liability?
PRINCIPALS
Principal by Inducement
Requisites
1. That the inducement be made directly with the intention of bring about the commission
of the crime; and
2. The inducement be the determining cause of the commission of the crime by the one
induced. [NOTE: The crime must have been committed]
Inducement Should Precede Commission
Ways of Becoming Principal Induction
1. Direct Force [irresistible force and uncontrollable fear]
2. Direct Inducement [price, reward or promise and words of command]
• Guillergan v. People, February 2, 2011: In this case, the Sandiganbayan found
that Guillergan ordered Butcon to sign the "receive" portion of the payrolls as payee
to make it appear that persons whose names appeared on the same had signed the
document when they in fact did not. [Anti-Graft case against AFP Lieutenant].
No. A would not be liable as a principal by inducement because the reward he promised
B is not the sole impelling reason which made B to kill C. To bring about criminal liability of a
co-principal, the inducement made by the inducer must be the sole consideration which
caused the person induced to commit the crime and without which the crime would not have
been committed. The facts of the case indicate that B, the killer supposedly induced by A, had
his own reason to kill C out of a long standing grudge.
People v. Yanson-Dumancas, December 13, 1999: [Swindling via fake gold bar
transaction against Dumancas family, the swindlers were abducted, interrogated and later on
killed.] Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas was indicted as principal by induction, but the Court found
nothing to conclude that Jeanette used irresistible force or caused uncontrollable fear upon
the accused since the plan to abduct was hatched without Jeanette’s involvement or
participation. The only basis relied upon by the trial court is the supposed “commands” or
order given by her but no stretch of imagination such command is considered. The remark of
Jeanette to "take care of the two" does not constitute the command required by law to
justify a finding that she is guilty as a principal by inducement. Furthermore, the utterance
which was supposedly the act of inducement, should precede the commission of the crime
itself. In the case at bar, the abduction, which is an essential element of the crime charged
(kidnapping for ransom with murder) has already taken place when Jeanette allegedly told
accused-appellant Geroche to "take care of the two." Said utterance could, therefore, not
have been the inducement to commit the crime charged in this case.
People v. Janjalani, January 10, 2011: [Sa wakas nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo]
Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second paragraph, or the provision on
"principal by inducement." The instructions and training he had given Asali on how to make
bombs - coupled with their careful planning and persistent attempts to bomb different areas
in Metro Manila and Rohmat's confirmation that Trinidad would be getting TNT from Asali as
part of their mission - prove the finding that Rohmat's co-inducement was the determining
cause of the commission of the crime. Such "command or advice [was] of such nature that,
without it, the crime would not have materialized."
People v. Dulay, September 24, 2012: [Dina brought AAA at the back of the fish port, a
certain “Speed” handed money to Dina, and AAA was raped by Speed.] She is not considered
as a principal by indispensable cooperation. Nothing in the evidence presented by the
prosecution does it show that the acts committed by appellant are indispensable in the
commission of the crime of rape. From the time appellant convinced AAA to go with her until
appellant received money from the man who allegedly raped AAA, are not indispensable in
the crime of rape. Anyone could have accompanied AAA and offered the latter's services in
exchange for money and AAA could still have been raped. Even AAA could have offered her
own services in exchange for monetary consideration and still end up being raped. Thus, this
disproves the indispensable aspect of the appellant in the crime of rape. It must be
remembered that in the Information, as well as in the testimony of AAA, she was delivered
and offered for a fee by appellant, thereafter, she was raped by “Speed.” [But Dina Dulay is
still made guilty for violation Child Abuse Act].
PROBLEM: Despite the massive advertising campaign in media against firecrackers and gun-
firing during the New Year's celebrations, Jonas and Jaja bought ten boxes of super lolo and
pla-pla in Bocaue, Bulacan. Before midnight of December 31, 1999, Jonas and Jaja started
their celebration by having a drinking spree at Jona's place by exploding their high-powered
firecrackers in their neighborhood. In the course of their conversation, Jonas confided to Jaja
that he has been keeping a long-time grudge against his neighbor Jepoy in view of the latter's
refusal to lend him some money. While under the influence of liquor, Jonas started throwing
lighted super lolos inside Jepoy's fence to irritate him and the same exploded inside the latter's
yard. Upon knowing that the throwing of the super lolo was deliberate, Jepoy became furious
and sternly warned Jonas to stop his malicious act or he would get what he wanted. A heated
argument between Jonas and Jepoy ensued but Jaja tried to calm down his friend. At
midnight, Jonas convinced Jaja to lend him his .45 caliber pistol so that he could use it to
knock down Jepoy and to end his arrogance. Jonas thought that after all, explosions were
everywhere and nobody would know who shot Jepoy.
After Jaja lent his firearm to Jonas, the latter again started started throwing lighted super
lolos and pla-plas at Jepoy's yard in order to provoke him so that he would come out of his
house. When Jepoy came out, Jonas immediately shot him with Jaja's .45 caliber gun but
missed his target. Instead, the bullet hit Jepoy's five year old son who was following behind
him, killing the boy instantaneously, If you were the Judge, how would you decide the case?
Answer: I would convict Jonas as principal by direct participation and Jaja as co-
principal by Indispensable cooperation for the complex crime of murder with homicide. Jaja
should be held liable as co-principal and not only as an accomplice because he knew of Jonas'
criminal design even before he lent his firearm to Jonas and still he concurred in that criminal
design by providing the firearm. [Note: Criminal resolution was present.]
ACCOMPLICES
Who are Accomplices – Article 18
Requisites [1] concurrence to the criminal design; [2] previous or simultaneous acts but not
indispensable [3] relation between the acts
Accomplice vs. Conspirator
1. Criminal Responsibility (Individual / Collective)
2. Criminal Design (Concurrence / Origin)
3. Penalty (One degree lower / Penalty of a Principal)
PROBLEM: Ponciano borrowed Ruben’s gun, saying that he would use it to kill Freddie. Because
Ruben also resented Freddie, he readily lent his gun, but told Ponciano: "O, pagkabaril mo
kay Freddie, isauli mo kaagad, ha." Later, Ponciano killed Freddie, but used a knife because
he did not want Freddie’s neighbors to hear the gunshot. What, if any, is the liability of Ruben?
Would your answer be the same if, instead of Freddie, it was Manuel, a relative of Ruben, who
was killed by Ponciano using Ruben’s gun?
Answer: No, the answer would not be the same because Ruben lent his gun purposely
for the killing of Freddie only, not for any other killing. Ponciano’s using Ruben’s gun in killing
a person other than Freddie is beyond Ruben’s criminal intent and willing involvement. Only
Ponciano will answer for the crime against Manuel. It has been ruled that when the owner of
the gun knew it would be used to kill a particular person, but the offender used it to kill
another person, the owner of the gun is not an accomplice as to the killing of the other person.
While there was community of design to kill Freddie between Ponciano and Ruben, there was
none with respect to the killing of Manuel.
Rustia v. People, October 5, 2016: The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance
knowingly or intentionally rendered that cannot exist without previous cognizance of the
criminal act intended to be executed. But it cannot be said that Benjamin, Sr. and Faustino
knew that Benjamin, Jr. would shoot the victim. As earlier observed, the fatal shooting was
done in the heat of the moment, not premeditated or preconceived. Their group was making
its way out of the barangay hall when Benjamin, Jr. suddenly grabbed Ambrocio around the
waist, and the two of them started to wrestle with each other. Up to that point, nothing
indicated that Benjamin, Jr. intended to grab Ambrocio's gun and use it against him. From
their point of view, Benjamin, Sr. and Faustino were witnessing their closest of kin suddenly
engaged in the physical struggle with Ambrocio whom they knew was armed with a gun.
Going to the aid of Benjamin, Jr. was but their most natural reaction. That their going to the
latter's aid might have enhanced the changes of Benjamin, Jr. in gaining control of the victim's
firearm, but such did not unavoidably mean that they had themselves intended such outcome.
Nor did they contemplate such outcome in the absence of any clear showing that they
deliberately went to his aid to ensure his seizure of the firearm from Ambrocio. As things
stood, their acts could also mean that they were only trying to stop the grappling from
escalating into violence. Until the time when Benjamin, Jr.'s intention became known to them
that is, when he finally had full control of the gun, he cocked it and pointed it at the victim
nothing in the records established that Benjamin, Sr. and Faustino continued to provide
material and moral aid to Benjamin, Jr. [Doubts in favor of accused, absolved as accomplices]
PROBLEM: Nel learned that Elgar, the owner of the biggest house in the place, would be out
of town for three days with no one left to watch the house. He called his friends Ben, Ardo
and Gorio and they planned to take the valuables in the house while Elgar was away. Nel and
Ben would go inside the house, Ardo would serve as the lookout, while Gorio would stay in
the getaway car. When Elgar left, they carried out their plan to the letter. Nel and Ben went
inside the house through the backdoor which was left unlocked. None of the rooms and
drawers inside were locked. They took the money, jewelry and other valuables therefrom and
immediately left using the getaway car.
After driving for about one kilometer, Nel realized he left his bag and wallet with IDs in the
house and so he instructed Gorio to drive back to the house. Nel just went in thinking that
the house was still empty. But to his surprise, Nel found Fermin seated on a bench with Nel's
bag and wallet beside him and appeared to be texting using his smart phone. Nel took a golf
club near him and hit Fermin with it. Fermin shouted for help, but Nel kept hitting him until
he stopped making noise. The noise alerted the neighbor who called the police. Nel, Ben, Ardo
and Gorio were caught. Fermin died. What is the criminal liability of Nel, Ben, Ardo and Gorio?
Explain. (5%)
Answer: Nel, Ben, Ardo and Gorio are criminally liable as principals for the crime of
theft. They conspired to take Elgar’s personal properties without his knowledge, with intent
to gain, and without violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things (Article
308, RPC). Nel and Ben entered the house through an unlocked back door and took the
valuables from the rooms that were likewise left unlocked. Nel and Ben or liable as principals
by direct participation, while Ardo and Gorio are principals by indispensable cooperation
because they have concurred in the criminal resolution and cooperated by performing another
act look out and driver of a getaway car, respectively, which were indispensable for the
commission of the crime (Article 17, RPC). Nel, however, is also liable for the separate crime
of homicide for the death of Fermin. The killing of Fermin was a separate act and was not
necessary means for committing theft (Article 48, RPC), because the latter crime was already
consummated. Nel killed Fermin for a different reason, perhaps because of his anger that
Fermin was in possession of his bag and wallet, and appeared to be using his smartphone to
contact the police.
PROBLEM: Mr. Red was drinking with his buddies, Mr. White and Mr. Blue when he saw Mr.
Green with his former girlfriend, Ms. Yellow. Already drunk, Mr. Red declared in a loud voice
that if he could not have Ms. Yellow, no one can. He then proceeded to the men’s room but
told Mr. White and Mr. Blue to take care of Mr. Green. Mr. Blue and Mr. White asked Mr. Red
what he meant but Mr. Red simply said, "You already know what I want," and then left. Mr.
Blue and Mr. White proceeded to kill Mr. Green and hurt Ms. Yellow. (4%)
(A) What, if any, are the respective liabilities of Mr. Red, Mr. White and Mr. Blue for the death
of Mr. Green?
(A) Mr. White and Mr. Blue are liable for the death of Mr. Green as principals by direct
participation. They were the ones who directly took part in the killing of the victim. Mr.
Red is not liable as a principal by inducement because his statement that Mr. White
and Mr. Blue were “to take care of Mr. Green” was not made directly with the intent of
procuring the commission of the crime. The words he uttered to Mr. White and Mr.
Blue: “You already know what I want,” may not be considered as powerful and
threatening so as to amount to physical or moral coercion. Likewise, there is no
showing that Mr. Red exercised moral ascendency or influence over them.
(B) What, if any, are the respective liabilities of Mr. Red, Mr. White and Mr. Blue for the
injuries of Ms. Yellow?
(B) Mr. White and Mr. Blue are liable as principals by direct participation for the crime
of physical injuries for hurting Ms. Yellow. Their liability would depend on the extent
of the physical injuries inflicted – either serious, less serious, or slight physical injuries.
Mr. Red has no criminal liability because he did not participate in the act of hurting Ms.
Yellow.
People v. Gambao, October 1, 2013: As reflected in the records, the prosecution was not
able to proffer sufficient evidence to hold her responsible as a principal. Seeing that the only
evidence the prosecution had was the testimony of Chan to the effect that on 13 August 1998
Perpenian entered the room where the victim was detained and conversed with Evad and
Ronas regarding stories unrelated to the kidnapping, this Court opines that Perpenian should
not be held liable as a co-principal, but rather only as an accomplice to the crime. A rational
person would have suspected something was wrong and would have reported such incident
to the police. Perpenian, however, chose to keep quiet; and to add to that, she even spent
the night at the cottage. It has been held before that being present and giving moral
support when a crime is being committed will make a person responsible as an
accomplice in the crime committed. It should be noted that the accused-appellant’s
presence and company were not indispensable and essential to the perpetration of the
kidnapping for ransom; hence, she is only liable as an accomplice.
People v. Bayabos, February 18, 2015: [Indoctrination and Orientation Period for PMMA
students, where Balidoy died. The school authorities was charged as accomplices, the case of
the principals was dismissed, thus authorities argue that the case against accomplice should
also be dismissed]. Whether the prosecution of respondents for the crime of accomplice to
hazing can proceed in spite of the dismissal with finality of the case against the principal
accused. “The corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice, and accessory are
distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly established in
evidence, the determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed
independently of that of the principal.” Accordingly, so long as the commission of the crime
can be duly proven, the trial of those charged as accomplices to determine their criminal
liability can proceed independently of that of the alleged principal.
ACCESSORIES
o Tan v. People, 313 SCRA 254: [Missing spare pants and employee admitted
selling things to Tan, Tan was prosecuted for fencing, but employee who stole
was not charged, but did not report robbery nor thievery in the establishment].
Since there was no proof of unlawful taking as owner did not report the robbery
or theft, thus the first element of fencing is absent. Tan cannot be charged.
o Mel Dimat v. People, January 25, 2012: [Should know] Dimat knew that
the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly documented. He said that
Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and official receipt. But
this certainly could not be true because, the vehicle having been carnapped,
Tolentino had no documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to make good
on his promise to produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that
the Nissan Safari came from an illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia
Delgado who apparently made no effort to check the papers covering her
purchase. That she might herself be liable for fencing is of no moment since
she did not stand accused in the case.
• People v. Valdez [victim jumped out of the vessel due to threat and drowned and
the body was never recovered.] The body of the crime refers to the scolding made by
Valdez; the chasing with the knife, the jumping into the water within the full view of
other laborers. If the witnesses where hid to prevent discovery, whoever brought them
to the far place is an accessory for concealing the corpus delicti.
PROBLEM: Modesto and Abelardo are brothers. Sometime in August 1998 while Abelardo was
in his office, Modesto, together with two other men in police uniform, came with two heavy
bags. Modesto asked Abelardo to keep the two bags in his vault until he comes back to get
them. When Abelardo later examined the two bags, he saw bundles of money that, in his
rough count, could not be less than P5 Million. He kept the money inside the vault and soon
he heard the news that a gang that included Modesto had been engaged in bank robberies.
Abelardo, unsure of what to do under the circumstances, kept quiet about the two bags in his
vault. Soon after, the police captured, and secured a confession from, Modesto who admitted
that their loot had been deposited with Abelardo. What is Abelardo’s liability? (7%)
2. Principal is Guilty of Treason, Parricide, Murder or Attempt Against the Life of Chief
Executive or Habitually Guilty of Some Other Crime
PROBLEM: Manolo revealed to his friend Domeng his desire to kill Cece. He likewise confided
to Domeng his desire to borrow his revolver. Domeng lent it. Manolo shot Cece in Manila with
Domeng's revolver. As his gun was used in the killing, Domeng asked Mayor Tan to help him
escape. The mayor gave Domeng P5,000.00 and told him to proceed to Mindanao to hide.
Domeng went to Mindanao. The mayor was later charged as an accessory to Cece's murder.
Can he be held liable for the charge? Explain.
If Domeng is not the principal to the crime of murder, the Mayor may not be held liable as
accessory since he merely assisted in the escape of an accomplice. Par. 3 of Art. 19, RPC
speaks of harboring or assisting in the escape of a principal. The mayor, however, can be held
liable as principal in the crime of maliciously refraining from instituting or prosecuting an
offender under Art. 208 of the RPC. He may also be held liable for obstruction of justice under
PD 1829. PD 1829 makes no qualification as to the offender, whether he be principal,
accomplice, or accessory.
Rebellion Absorbs Obstruction of Justice Charge (Enrile v. Amin, September 13, 1990)
Accessories Who Are Exempt From Criminal Liability – Article 20, RPC
Basis: Ties of blood; Cleanliness of One’s Name
Relationships Covered
➢ Nephews and Nieces Not Included
➢ Uncles and Aunts Not Included
Exception to the Exemption: Profit or Assisted Principal to Profit [Article 19(1)]
PROBLEM: Immediately after murdering Bob, Jake went to his mother to seek refuge. His
mother told him to hide in the maid’s quarters until she finds a better place for him to hide.
After two days, Jake transferred to his aunt’s house. A week later, Jake was apprehended by
the police. Can Jake’s mother and aunt be made criminally liable as accessories to the crime
of murder? Explain.
Answer: Obviously, Jake’s mother was aware of her son’s having committed a felony,
such that her act of harboring and concealing him renders her liable as an accessory. But
being an ascendant to Jake, she is exempt from criminal liability by express provision of Article
20 of the Revised Penal Code. On the other hand, the criminal liability of Jake’s aunt depends
on her knowledge of his commission of the felony, her act of harboring and concealing Jake
would render her criminally liable as accessory to the crime of murder; otherwise without
knowledge of Jake’s commission of the felony, she would not be liable.
PENALTIES
Penalty, Defined
Purpose of Punishment
Theories Justifying Penalty (Justice, Exemplarity, Reformation, Prevention, Self-Defense)
Three-Fold Purpose of Penalties in the RPC (Retribution, Correction and Social Defense)
RA 9344
RA 9344: Is without discernment equivalent to lack of premeditation?
People v. Cortezano, September 23, 2003: The discernment that constitutes an
exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under 18 years of age but
over 15, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand
the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should
be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by
the records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very
comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission
of the act, but also after and even during trial. [Rape was attended by discernment as
they wetted the vagina, one was a look out, there was threat to kill, among others.]
The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender
committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age. Thus, appellant may
be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in accordance with
Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344 [Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural
Camps and Other Training Facilities].
People v. AAA, February 25, 2015: [Post graduation drinking spree rape]
However, Oporto shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51, R.A.
No. 9344, which extends even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-
one (21) years, so long as he committed the crime when he was still a child. Hence,
in the proper execution of judgment by the lower court, the foregoing provision
should be taken into consideration by the judge in order to accord children in
conflict with the law, who have already gone beyond twenty-one (21) years of age,
the proper treatment envisioned by law.
Am 1d-30d 2m 1y
Pc - 2m 1y
Death Penalty
When Not Imposable: [1] minor at the commission of the crime; [2] more than 70 years of
age; [3] automatic review by SC, majority is not obtained; [4] insanity before execution; [5]
a woman while pregnant and 1 year after delivery.
• RA 9346 prohibits imposition of death penalty.
Amendments by RA 10592
1. Article 29 on Preventive Imprisonment
2. Article 94 now allows good conduct time allowances in preventive imprisonment
3. Article 97 (GCTA) which reduces the actual time the prisoner serves system and it
automatically accrues when person exemplifies good conduct, studying and it now
includes detention prisoners.
4. Article 98 (Special Time Allowance for Loyalty). – 1/5 period deduction if prisoner gives
himself up within 48 hours from passing away of the calamity; and 2/5 if he chose to
stay, The article shall apply to any prisoner whether undergoing preventive
imprisonment of service of sentence.
Kinds of Pardon
1. Conditional Pardon (effect of violation: Crime = evasion of service of sentence)
2. Absolute pardon
Nature of Disqualification
• People v. Coral, January 31, 1936: The presumption is that one rendered infamous
by conviction of felony, or other base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to
exercise the privilege of suffrage or to hold office. The exclusion must for this reason
be adjudged a mere disqualification, imposed for protection and not for punishment,
the withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a personal right.
Office of the President v. Cataquiz, September 14, 2011: Based on the foregoing, it
is clear that the accessory penalties of disqualification from re-employment in public service
and forfeiture of government retirement benefits can still be imposed on the respondent,
notwithstanding the impossibility of effecting the principal penalty of dismissal because of his
removal from office. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions – that of separation
from service – may no longer be imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties which
may be imposed on her if she is later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against
her, namely, the disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.
Formula: Subsidiary Civil Liability / Highest Minimum Wage at Time of Conviction = Number
Days of Subsidiary Imprisonment
Rules as to Applicability
PC, AM, Am and Fine: Not exceeding 1/3 term of sentence and not more than 1 year
Fine only: Not exceeding 6 months for grave/less grave felony; not exceeding 15 days if light
PM above: No subsidiary liability
Not by Confinement with Fixed Duration (Destierro): Same penalty and same rules
Improvement of financial conditions: Payment of fine
Yolanda Luy v. People, October 12, 2016: If the penalty imposed is higher than
prision correccional thus subsidiary liability is not imposable. [Here, 12 years and 1 day and
to pay P300,000 fine, already, reclusion temporal.]
People Thru Britchford v. Alapan, January 10, 2018: [BP 22, MTC imposed fine
instead of imprisonment and acquitted the wife. Writ of execution was unsatisfied. Britchford
file a Motion to Impose Subsidiary Penalty] The penalty of fine and the imposition of subsidiary
imprisonment in case of nonpayment thereof pertain to the criminal aspect of the case. On
the other hand, the indemnification for the face value of the dishonored checks refers to the
civil aspect of the case. Subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency must be expressly
stated in the judgment of conviction. The facts show that there is no judgment sentencing
the accused to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvent to pay the fine imposed
upon him, because the said subsidiary imprisonment is not stated in the judgment finding
him guilty, it is clear that the court could not legally compel him to serve said subsidiary
imprisonment. A contrary holding would be a violation of the laws aforementioned.
***
COMPLEX CRIMES
Less Grave and Light Felony [1] absorbed by less grave (e.g. direct assault and slight physical
injuries) or [2] prosecuted separately
If Indispensable for Other Crime – Doctrine of Absorption = Second Crime is the Offense
• People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515: [Rebellion with Murder] Murder, arson, and
robbery are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion, as a means necessary for the
perpetration of the offense. Such common offenses are absorbed or inherent in the
crime of rebellion. But if a rebel who for some personal motive commits murder is
liable for murder or other common offenses.
Composite Crimes
Definition (The law treats as single crime) (e.g. Robbery with Homicide, Rape with Homicide)
Ordinary Complex Crimes vs. Special Complex Crime
1. Number of crimes and acts
2. Penalty imposable
Continued Crime
Definition (Series of acts in same time and same place for same offense)
Reason: single criminal impulse
Continuing Crime
Define (elements committed in different localities)
Not a Complex Crime
People v. Reynaldo Abayon, September 14, 2016: [The house (containing the
units where Abayon and his neighbors live) started to catch fire. As a result, the house was
completely burned down along with the personal effects of the residents. Three (3) persons
also died because of the fire. Charged with Arson with Multiple Murder. Is there a complex
crime of arson with multiple homicide?] There is no complex crime of arson with homicide
because the crime of arson absorbs the resultant death or is a separate crime altogether.
Accordingly, in cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what
crime/crimes was/were perpetrated - whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder,
it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is
the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson,
the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand,
the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire
is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only;
lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has
already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two
separate and distinct crimes committed — homicide/murder and arson.
From the body of the information filed, Abayon is charged with the crime of arson because
his intent was merely to destroy his family's apartment through the use of fire. The resulting
deaths that occurred, therefore, should be absorbed by the crime of arson and only increases
the imposable penalty to reclusion perpetua to death, pursuant to Section 5 of P.D. No. 1613.
People v. Villanueva, Norada and Seva, December 13, 2017: [Regie tied by trio
hoping for Rey Truck to give ransom for his intimate partner, but Regie woke up and was hit
in the head and was later dumped in a sugar field. RTC – Attempted Kidnapping with Murder]
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty coupled
with the intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment of a person
but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. There
was lack of motive to resort in kidnapping the victim for they were bent to kidnap his friend
Truck.
The fact alone of waiting for the victim to fall asleep and then and there tying his hands and
feet, based on Norada's account, was not determinant of intent to actually detain the victim
or deprive his liberty. As such, the trial court was indulging in speculation when it held that
the victim "will either be taken away or simply be kept in the hotel and thereafter ransom will
be demanded from the Canadian Ray Truck for his release." Courts should not indulge in
speculation no matter how strong the guilt of the accused. Hence since the offense of
kidnapping was not sufficiently established, the trial court erred in holding appellant liable for
attempted kidnapping. [Victim voluntarily went with the trio.]
People v. Jugueta, April 5, 2016: [Charged in one information for Double Murder
for the death of two minors and another information for Multiple Attempted Murder for three
other minors. In one criminal information, the judge sentenced the accused for two Reclusion
Perpetua despite the fact that only one information. For the other information, accused was
sentenced to PC-PM for each of the offended parties despite one information. Whether or not
the accused was properly charged in the Information.] However, the Court must make a
clarification as to the nomenclature used by the trial court to identify the crimes for which
appellant was penalized. There is some confusion caused by the trial court's use of the terms
"Double Murder" and "Multiple Attempted Murder" in convicting appellant, and yet imposing
penalties which nevertheless show that the trial court meant to penalize appellant for two (2)
separate counts of Murder and four (4) counts of Attempted Murder.
The facts, as alleged in the Information, and as proven during trial, show that appellant is
guilty of 2 counts of the crime of Murder and not Double Murder, as the killing of the victims
was not the result of a single act but of several acts of appellant and his cohorts. In the same
vein, appellant is also guilty of 4 counts of the crime of Attempted Murder and not Multiple
Attempted Murder.
Here, the facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that appellant and the two
others, in firing successive and indiscriminate shots at the family of Norberto from their
respective firearms, intended to kill not only Norberto, but his entire family. When several
gunmen, as in this case, indiscriminately fire a series of shots at a group of people, it shows
their intention to kill several individuals. Hence, they are committing not only one crime. What
appellant and his cohorts committed cannot be classified as a complex crime because as held
"each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each
particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot
give rise to a complex crime."
Jason Ivler v. Judge Modesto-San Pedro, November 17, 2010: [Ivler was
charged for (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Slight Physical Injuries and another (2)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide and Damage to Property resulting from vehicular
collision. Ivler pleaded guilty to the first information and was sentenced to public censure.
Ivler sought to quash information for second information would place him in double jeopardy.]
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the
same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses. Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code. A becoming regard of this Court's place in our scheme of government
denying it the power to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction
between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent
to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365.
It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two
or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for
committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor General's
argument that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense could not be joined
with the other charge for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence following
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge
for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not be joined with the
accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies.
People v. Aaron, September 24, 2002: [Accused inserted his penis to the vagina
but withdrew, ordered victim to lie down. For second time, he inserted. He stood again, he
commanded victim to move and for the third time inserted and made pumping motions. How
many charges of rape should you file against him?] Only one count of rape, despite the three
successive insertions, and he was motivated by a single criminal intent. There is no indication
in the records, from which it can be inferred that the appellant decided to commit those
separate and distinct acts of sexual assault other than his lustful desire to change positions
inside the room where the crime was committed.
People v. Lucena, February 26, 2014: [Victim was arrested by accused of violating
curfew on minors. Accused brought victim to a grassy area, ordered AAA to undress on the
point of a gun and inserted his penis on the vagina despite plea not to rape her. After a short
while, about five minutes, once again inserted penis. Thereafter he stopped, he inserted again
his penis, he finally stopped and ordered AAA to dress up with threat of killing her. Charged
with three (3) counts for the three insertions] The appellant likewise avers that he cannot be
convicted of three counts of rape. The intervening period of five (5) minutes between each
penetration does not necessarily prove that he decided to commit three separate acts of rape.
He maintains that what is of prime importance is that he was motivated by a single criminal
intent. Court: It appears from the facts that the [appellant] thrice succeeded in inserting his
penis into the private part of [AAA]. The three (3) penetrations occurred one after the other
at an interval of five (5) minutes wherein the [appellant] would rest after satiating his lust
upon his victim and, after he has regained his strength, he would again rape [AAA]. Hence, it
can be clearly inferred from the foregoing that when the [appellant] decided to commit those
separate and distinct acts of sexual assault upon [AAA], he was not motivated by a single
impulse[,] but rather by several criminal intent. Hence, his conviction for three (3) counts of
rape is indubitable. This Court sustains the findings of both lower courts that, indeed, the
three insertions into AAA were in satiation of successive but distinct criminal carnality.
Therefore, the appellant’s conviction for three counts of rape is proper.
When No Complex Crime: [1] continuing crimes; [2] in concealment; [3] indispensable; [4]
one of the offenses is penalized under special law; [5] special complex crimes; and [6] the
law provides for a two-tiered penalty.
Two-tiered Penalty
➢ Definition – “in addition”
➢ Maltreatment of Prisoners; Direct Bribery; Usurpation of real rights
***
SERVICE OF SENTENCE
Order of Severity
Death – RP – RT – PM – PC – AM -Am – D – PAD – TAD – S - Pc
Note: AM is more severe than Destierro
Three-Fold Rule
➢ Not more than 3 times the length of time of most severe penalty
➢ Applies Only if Convict to Suffer At Least 4 Penalties Successively
➢ Not applicable if simultaneously served
System of Penalties
1. Material Accumulation System – all penalties are imposed without limitations even if
they reach beyond the span of human life.
2. Juridical Accumulation System – not more than the three-fold length of time of the
most serve not more than 40 years.
3. Absorption System – the lesser penalties are absorbed by graver penalties it is
applicable in complex crimes, continuing crime and specific crimes.
***
APPLICATION OF PENALTIES
Minimum: Within the range of the penalty next lower to the prescribed by the code for the
offense
➢ Purpose of the Minimum: Partial Extinction of Criminal Liability
➢ Eligibility for Parole; Qualified to Apply for Parole
Illustration 1:
Illustration 2:
Illustration 3:
Disqualifications
1. Convicted of
a. Indivisible Penalties (Death, RP, LI)
i. NOTE: May become entitled if the imposable penalty becomes divisible
such as effect of a privileged mitigating circumstances making RP to RT
b. Treason, conspiracy, or proposal to commit treason
c. Misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition, espionage
d. Piracy
2. Habitual Delinquents [People v. Jaranilla: Mere recidivists are entitled to ISL]
3. Escaped confinement of evaded sentence
4. Violated terms of conditional pardon by the Chief Executive
5. Imprisonment does not exceed 1 year
6. Destierro or suspension only
7. Those serving final judgment upon approval of the ISL
Parole
Definition: Conditional release of an offender after served minimum of his prison sentence
When Qualified for Parole
1. Served Minimum Penalty
2. Appear to the Board and from report of prisoner’s work or conduct
a. Fitted by training for release;
b. Reasonable probability to live and remain in liberty without violating law;
c. Release will not be incompatible with the welfare of the society
Prisoner on Parole Entitled to Finale Release and Discharge (Final Certification from Board)
➢ [1] show as law abiding citizen; and [2] not violate any law
Yolanda Luy v. People, October 12, 2016: [RTC imposed “12y1d and a fine of P300K with
subsidiary imprisonment”] Finally, the CA affirmed the penalty fixed by the RTC of 12 years
and one day of imprisonment and fine of P300,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of inability to pay the fine. The affirmance was erroneous for two reasons, namely:, the
penalty of imprisonment thus imposed was a straight penalty, which was contrary to Section
1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
Domingo Panganiban v. People, December 9, 2015: On the theory that he was guilty as
charged, petitioner was imposed the "indeterminate penalty of imprisonment [for] ten (10)
years and one day to twelve (12) years, five (5) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor,
as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to eighteen (18)
years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum." While the Indeterminate
Sentence Law mandates the imposition of an indeterminate sentence with minimum and
maximum periods for the benefit of the accused, it goes without saying that the minimum
and maximum penalties to be imposed should, themselves, be determinate. [When is the
minimum? The penalty therein was not decisive.]
Ladines v. People, January 11, 2016: [RTC sentenced accused with Homicide to 10y1d of
Prision Mayor as minimum to 17y4m of RT as maximum] We declare that the lower courts
could not impose 17 years and four months of the medium period of reclusion temporal, which
was the ceiling of the medium period of reclusion temporal, as the maximum of the
indeterminate penalty without specifying the justification for so imposing. They thereby
ignored that although Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, which has set the rules "for the
application of penalties which contain three periods," requires under its first rule that the
courts should impose the penalty prescribed by law in the medium period should there be
neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, its seventh rule expressly demands that
"[w]ithin the limits of each period, the courts shall determine the extent of the penalty
according to the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and.
the greater or lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime." By not specifying the
justification for imposing the ceiling of the period of the imposable penalty, the fixing of the
indeterminate sentence became arbitrary, or whimsical, or capricious. In the absence of the
specification, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence for the petitioner should be the
lowest of the medium period of reclusion temporal, which is 14 years, eight months and one
day of reclusion temporal.
People v. Bacatan, February 2, 2014: Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no other aggravating
circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the CA correctly held that
the proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, the lower of the two indivisible penalties.
"It must be emphasized, however, that [appellant is] not eligible for parole pursuant to
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 which states that ‘persons convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentence will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason
of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended’.
***
Conditions of Probation
1. Mandatory or General: violation cancels probation
a. Present himself to probation officer within 72 hours from receipt of order
b. Reports to probation officer at least once a month
2. Discretionary or Special: those additionally imposed by the court
Nature of Probation:
• Amandy v. People, 161 SCRA 436: It is not automatic or ministerial. It is a privilege
the grant of which is discretionary to the court.
Cabatingan v. Sandiganbayan, January 22, 1981: On the basis of the evidence on record
as well as the issues raised in the petition, it is not clear that the Sandiganbayan acted
correctly in denying the application Mrs. Cabatingan for probation. There is ample evidence
showing that the petitioner is entitled to the benefits of probation. She does not appear to be
a hardened criminal who is beyond correction or redemption. She has shown repentance for
the one offense she had committed in more ways than one. First, she immediately restituted
upon demand the amount she malversed. Second, she had expressed a desire to reform
herself if given the opportunity to do so. And third, she promised to comply with any condition
that may be imposed on her if granted probation. Upon the other hand, respondent court
merely relied on a report of the probation officer which in itself, is mostly hearsay and is
controverted by prominent citizens of Mandaue City including the parish priest, the president
of the Association of Barangay Councils, the President of the Catholic Women's League, the
former city auditor and the former city treasurer of Mandaue, among others.
The remedies of appeal and probation are exclusive. The exercise of one forecloses
the other. Thus, when conviction was appealed, he had waived his tight to apply for
probation. An appeal is simply contrary to the clear and express mandate of the law.
Dimakuta v. People, October 20, 2015: Courts have no authority to invoke “liberal
interpretation” or the “spirit of the law” where the words of the statute themselves and as
illuminated by the history of that statute, leave no room for doubt or interpretation.
o Criticism of the Colinares Ruling: The accused in Colinares should not have been
allowed the benefit of probation. It is not a penal law for it to be liberally
construed in favor of the accused.
In this case, petitioner appealed the trial court’s judgment of conviction before the CA
alleging that it was error on the part of the CA to have found him guilty of RA 7610. He argued
that the testimony were tainted with inconsistencies and the no evidence was shown that the
lascivious acts where committed without consent or through force. It is apparent that appeal
is anchored on a claim of innocence or lack of sufficient evidence which is clearly inconsistent
with the tenor of Probation Law.
Duration of Probation
1. Term of imprison does not exceed 1 year = probation of 2 years
2. Term exceeds 1 year = probation period shall not exceed 6 years
3. Fine w/ subsidiary imprisonment = twice total number of days subsidiary imprisonment
Almero v. People, March 12, 2014: In the present case, Almero cannot make up his mind
whether to question the judgment, or apply for probation, which is necessarily deemed a
waiver of his right to appeal. While he did not file an appeal before applying for probation. He
assailed the validity of the conviction in the guise of a Petition supposedly assailing the denial
of probation. In so doing, he attempted to circumvent Probation Law, which seeks to make
appeal and probation mutually exclusive. The assignment of errors in the Petition before us
reflects the diametrically opposed positions taken by accused petitioner. On the one hand, he
bewails the defects committed by the trial court during the promulgation of the judgment,
thus casting doubt on the judgment itself. Yet in the same breath, he persists in his application
for probation, despite the waiver and admission of guilt implicit in any procedure for probation
– precisely the unhealthy wager the law seeks to prevent.
***
PECUNIARY LIABILITIY
***
1. DEATH OF CONVICT
Effect of Death
1. As to personal penalties – extinguished
2. As to pecuniary penalties – extinguished only when death occurs before final judgment
Bayotas Ruling
1. Death of accused pending appeal extinguishes personal and pecuniary criminal liability
as well as the civil liability ex delicto. Meaning source of the obligations is crime only.
2. The claim for civil liability survives if the same may be predicated on a source of
obligation other than the crime (Article 1157, Civil Code: Law, Contract, Quasi-
Contracts or Quasi-Delict).
3. Where civil liability survives an action for recovery may be pursued by filing a separate
civil action and the claim may be enforced against the executor or administrator of the
estate of the deceased.
4. Statute of limitation does not run as liability is deemed interrupted during pendency
of the criminal case.
People v. Dadao, January 22, 2014: Finally, we observe that the Court of Appeals did not
rule on the effect of the death of Eddie Maliksi during the pendency of this case. Considering
that no final judgment had been rendered against him at the time of his death, whether or
not he was guilty of the crime charged had become irrelevant because even assuming that
he did incur criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto, these were totally extinguished by
his death, following Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and, by analogy, our ruling in
People v. Bayotas. Therefore, the present criminal case should be dismissed with respect only
to the deceased Eddie Malogsi.
People v. Soria, February 24, 2014: Clearly, accused-appellant’s demise on August 16,
2012 transpired before the promulgation of this Court’s Decision on November 14, 2012 or
before its finality on December 20, 2012. Therefore, when accused-appellant died, his appeal
before this Court was still pending resolution. In People v. Amistoso, this Court encountered
a similar situation wherein the accused-appellant died before his appeal could be resolved.
The Court explained the implications of the accused-appellant’s demise as follows:
Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused,
the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.
Undeniably, Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012 preceded the promulgation by the Court
of its Decision on January 9, 2013. When Amistoso died, his appeal before the Court was still
pending and unresolved. The Court ruled upon Amistoso’s appeal only because it was not
immediately informed of his death. Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012 renders the
Court’s Decision dated January 9, 2013, even though affirming Amistoso’s conviction,
irrelevant and ineffectual. Moreover, said Decision has not yet become final, and the Court
still has the jurisdiction to set it aside.
People v. Henry Go, March 25, 2014: [X, public officer and Y, private person were charged
with RA 3019, but X died prior to filing of information.] Private persons, when acting in
conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the
pertinent offenses. The death of the public officer does not mean that the allegation of
conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already
expunged. The death of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of
the survivor/s.
3. AMNESTY
4. ABSOLUTE PARDON
Definition: Act of grace of chief executive and exempts offender from punishment
Am 1d-30d 2m 1y
Pc - 2m 1y
• Romualdez v. Marcelo, et al., July 28, 2006: Section 2 of Act. No. 3326 is
conspicuously silent as to whether the absence of the offender from the Philippines
bars the running of the prescriptive period. The silence of the law can only be
interpreted to mean that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not intend such an interruption
of the prescription unlike the explicit mandate of Article 91. Even on the assumption
that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an omission, neither could the
Court presume otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a legislative lacuna
cannot be filled by judicial fiat.
6. PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTIES
***
Causes of Partial Extinction (Article 94) [1] conditional pardon; [2] commutation of sentence
[3] good conduct time allowance; [4] parole (ISL); [5] probation; [6] partial repeal of law
Parole
➢ Pendency of another case may be a ground for disqualification of parole
• Lex Adonis v. Tesoro-DAPECOL, June 5, 2013: While it is true that a convict may
be released from prison on parole when he had served the minimum period of his
sentence; the pendency of another criminal case is a ground for the disqualification of
the convict from being released on parole.
CIVIL LIABILITY
Civil Liability Ex Delicto (Article 100) (One source of obligation under Civil Code)
Different Quantum of Proof
Dual Character of a Crime
1. Offense Against the State
2. Offense Against the Offended Party (damages)
Rule: Recovery for Civil Liability is Deemed Instituted with the Criminal Action
Exception: When the Offended Party
1. Waives the civil action
2. Reserves the right to institute it separately [but criminal case must be decided first]
o Not allowed in BP 22
3. When civil action is instituted prior to the criminal action (Rule 111, Section 1(a))
Rule: Dismissal of Criminal Action Does Not Carry Extinction of Civil Action
Prejudicial Question
1. The previously instituted civil case involving an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue in the criminal case;
2. The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
Gloria Dy v. People, August 10, 2016: [Estafa against its manager Dy. Transaction was
one of loan. Thus, RTC acquitted Gloria Dy for failure of prosecution to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt that liability is civil in nature and ordered the payment of civil obligation.]
Can the trial court award damages ex contractu? Where the civil liability is ex contractu, the
court hearing the criminal case has no authority to award damages.
whenever the elements of estafa are not established, and that the delivery of any personal
property was made pursuant to a contract, any civil liability arising from the estafa cannot be
awarded in the criminal case. This is because the civil liability arising from the contract is not
civil liability ex delicto, which arises from the same act or omission constituting the crime.
Civil liability ex delicto is the liability sought to be recovered in a civil action deemed instituted
with the criminal case.
When the court finds that the source of obligation is in fact, a contract, as in a contract of
loan, it takes a position completely inconsistent with the presence of estafa. In estafa, a
person parts with his money because of abuse of confidence or deceit. In a contract, a person
willingly binds himself or herself to give something or to render some service. In estafa, the
accused's failure to account for the property received amounts to criminal fraud. In a contract,
a party's failure to comply with his obligation is only a contractual breach. Thus, any finding
that the source of obligation is a contract negates estafa. The finding, in turn, means that
there is no civil liability ex delicto. Thus, the rulings in the foregoing cases are consistent with
the concept of fused civil and criminal actions, and the different sources of obligations under
our laws.
The lower courts erred when they ordered petitioner to pay her civil obligation arising from a
contract of loan in the same criminal case where she was acquitted on the ground that there
was no crime. Any contractual obligation she may have must be litigated in a separate civil
action involving the contract of loan.We clarify that in cases where the accused is acquitted
on the ground that there is no crime, the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal case
cannot prosper precisely because there is no delict from which any civil obligation may be
sourced. The peculiarity of this case is the finding that petitioner, in fact, has an obligation
arising from a contract. This civil action arising from the contract is not necessarily
extinguished. It can be instituted in the proper court through the proper civil action.
[NOTE: Judge Adlawan does not subscribe fully to this ruling because this will encourage
multiplicity of suits and will clog the courts.]
1. Justifying Circumstances
a. General Rule: No civil liability
b. Exception: State of Necessity
i. Those who benefited in proportion to what they received;
ii. Court shall determine
iii. Special laws or regulation
2. Exempting Circumstances
a. Imbecility or Insanity
i. Persons with Legal Authority if with Fault or Negligence
ii. If no fault or negligence – own property not exempt from execution
b. Minors (with or without discernment)
i. Article 221, Family Code: Parents and other persons exercising
parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages
caused by the acts of their unemancipated children living in their
company and under their parental authority.
ii. Libi v. IAC: Parents are principally liable for the delicts and quasi-delicts
of their unemancipated children unless it is proven that the parents had
acted with the diligence of a good father of a family.
c. Irresistible Force or Uncontrollable Fear
i. Primarily: Persons using violence or causing fears
ii. Secondarily: Person doing the act
Elements
1. Employer, teacher, person, or corporation is engaged in any kind of industry
2. Any of their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees commits a felony
while in the discharge of their duties
3. The said employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability
Article 102 and 103 of the RPC deemed written into judgments
Awardable Damages
1. Civil Liability Ex Delicto
2. Actual Damages (must be substantiated)
3. Death indemnity is P75,000 (People v. Jugueta, 2015)
4. Loss of earning capacity of deceased (Article 2202, par. 1, Civil Code)
5. Moral damages in favor of spouse, ascendants, descendants, ascendants of deceased
6. Temperate damages
o Ladines v. People, 2016: Article 2224 of the Civil Code authorizes temperate
damages to be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot be proved with certainty. There is no longer any doubt that
when actual damages for burial and related expenses are not substantiated
with receipts, temperate damages of at least P25,000.00 are warranted, for it
is certainly unfair to deny to the surviving heirs of the victim the compensation
for such expenses as actual damages. This pronouncement proceeds from the
sound reasoning that it would be anomalous that the heirs of the victim who
tried and succeeded in proving actual damages of less than P25,000.00 would
only be put in a worse situation than others who might have presented no
receipts at all but would still be entitled to P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
7. Exemplary damages
a. Awarded when there are aggravating circumstances
b. To deter others from committing similar acts or for correction of the public
▪ Guelos et al. v. People, June 19, 2017: Nevertheless, by reason of
the fact that the presence of the aggravating circumstance of acts
committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended
party on account of his rank was proven in the course of the trial,
exemplary damages should be awarded in each case in addition to such
other damages that were already awarded by the courts below.
Several and Subsidiary Liability of Principals, Accomplices and Accessories (Article 110)
1. Severally liable: Each within their respective class
2. Subsidiarily liable: For the quotas of the other person liable
Enforced first against the property of principals, then accomplices then accessories.