STATCON. 4 6. FLORENTINO v. PNB MANILA RAILROAD v. INSULAR COLLECTOR

FLORENTINO v.
PNB
G.R. No. L-8782, April 28, 1956
JUGO, J:
FACTS
The petitioners are indebted to the respondent bank in the amount of P6, 800
plus interest, the same having been incurred on January 2, 1953, which is due
on January 2, 1954. The said loan is secured by a mortgage of real properties.
The petitioner Marcelino B. Florentino is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment
No. 1721 dated October 6, 1954, in the amount of P22, 896.33 by virtue of
Republic Act No. 897 approved on June 20, 1953. And on December 27, 1953,
petitioners offered to pay their loan with the respondent bank with their
backpay certificate, but the respondent bank, on December 29, 1953, refused
to accept petitioner's offer to pay the said indebtedness with the latter's
backpay certificate.
The legal provision involved is section 2 of Republic Act No. 879, which
provides:
SEC. 2. Section two of the said Act (Republic Act 304) as amended by
Republic Act Numbered Eight hundred, is further amended to read:
SEC. 2. The Treasurer of the Philippines shall, upon application of all

persons specified in section one hereof and within one year from the
approval of this Act, and under such rules and regulations as may be
promulgated by the Secretary of Finance, acknowledge and file requests
for the recognition of the right of the salaries or wages as provided in
section one hereof, and notice of such acknowledgment shall be issued to
the applicant which shall state the total amount of such salaries or
wages due the applicant, and certify that it shall be redeemed by the
Government of the Philippines within ten years from the date of their
issuance without interest: Provided, That upon application and subject
to such rules and regulations as may be approved by the Secretary of
Finance a certificate of indebtedness may be issued by the Treasurer of
the Philippines covering the whole or a part of the total salaries or wages
the right to which has been duly acknowledged and recognized, provided
that the face value of such certificate of indebtedness shall not exceed
the amount that the applicant may need for the payment of (1)
obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this amendatory Act
for which the applicant may directly be liable to the Government or to
any of its branches or instrumentalities, or the corporations owned or
control by the Government, or to any citizen of the Philippines, or to any
association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines,
who may be willing to accept the same for such settlement.
ISSUE
Whether or not the clause “who may be willing to accept the same for
such settlement” refers to all antecedents "the Government, any of its branches
or instrumentalities, the corporations owned or controlled by the Government,
etc.," or only the last antecedent "any citizen of the Philippines, or any
association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines.
HELD
Grammatically, the qualifying clause refers only to the last antecedent;

that is, "any citizen of the Philippines or any association or corporation
organized under the laws of the Philippines." It should be noted that there is a
comma before the words "or to any citizen, etc.," which separates said phrase
from the preceding ones.
But even disregarding the grammatical construction, as done by the

appellee, still there are cogent and powerful reasons why the qualifying clause
should be limited to the last antecedent. In the first place, to make the
acceptance of the backpay certificates obligatory upon any citizen, association,
or corporation, which are not government entities or owned or controlled by the
government, would render section 2 of Republic Act No. 897 unconstitutional,
for it would amount to an impairment of the obligation of contracts by
compelling private creditors to accept a sort of promissory note payable within
ten years with interest at a rate very much lower than the current or even the
legal one.
The respondent was ordered to accept the backpay certificate of the

petitioner.
PRINCIPLE
If the punctuation gives the statute a meaning which is reasonable and

in apparent accord with the legislative will, it may be used as additional
argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words as thus punctuated.
But an argument based on punctuation alone is not persuasive, and the courts
will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary, to give the statute
the effect intended by the legislature, disregarding superfluous or incorrect
punctuation marks and inserting others where necessary.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. YABUT
G.R. No. 39085, September 27, 1933
BUTTE, J.:
FACTS
The defendant is a recidivist who has been convicted twice of the crime
homicide and once of serious physical injuries at the time of the commission of
this offense. While he was serving his sentence, he killed another prisoner and
was consequently charged for murder. The Court of First Instance of Manila
convicted him of the crime for murder and imposed to him the maximum
penalty in accordance with Article 160 of the revised Penal Code.
ISSUE
Whether or not the lower court erred in applying Article 160 of the RPC.
HELD
The appellant places much stress upon the word "another" appearing in the
English translation of the headnote of article 160 and would have us accept his
deduction from the headnote that article 160 is applicable only when the new
crime which is committed by a person already serving sentence is different
from the crime for which he is serving sentence. Inasmuch as the appellant
was serving sentence for the crime of homicide, the appellant contends the
court below erred in applying article 160 in the present case which was a
prosecution for murder (involving homicide). While we do not concede that the
appellant is warranted in drawing the deduction mentioned from the English
translation of the caption of article 160, it is clear that no such deduction
could be drawn from the caption. Apart from this, however, there is no warrant
whatever for such a deduction (and we do not understand the appellant to
assert it) from the text itself of article 160. The language is plain and
unambiguous. There is not the slightest intimation in the text of article 160
that said article applies only in cases where the new offense is different in
character from the former offense for which the defendant is serving the
penalty.
PRINCIPLE
It is familiar law that when the text itself of a statute or a treaty is clear and
unambiguous, there is neither necessity nor propriety in resorting to the
preamble or headings or epigraphs of a section of interpretation of the text,
especially where such epigraphs or headings of sections are mere catchwords
or reference aids indicating the general nature of the text that follows.
Being nothing more than a convenient index to the contents of the articles of
the Code, they cannot, in any event have the effect of modifying or limiting the
unambiguous words of the text. Secondary aids may be consulted to remove,
not to create doubt.
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY v. INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS
G.R. No. L-30264, March 12, 1929
MALCOLM, J.:
FACTS
Dust shields are manufactured of wool and hair mixed. The component
material of chief value is the wool. They are used by the Manila Railroad
Company on all of its railway wagons. The purpose of the dust shield is to
cover the axle box in order to protect from dust the oil deposited therein which
serves to lubricate the bearings of the wheel. Under paragraph 141 of the Tariff
Law of 1909, Manufactures of wool not otherwise provided for, forty per
centum ad valorem while under paragraph 197 of section 8 of the Tariff Law of
1909, vehicles for use on railways and tramways, and detached parts thereof,
ten per centum ad valorem. The Insular Collector of Customs classified dust
shields as "manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for."
ISSUE
Should the dust shield be classified as manufactures of wool or as detached

parts of vehicles?
HELD
The Court conclude that the trial judge was correct in classifying dust shields
under paragraph 197 of section 8 of the Tariff Law of 1909, and in refusing to
classify them under paragraph 141 of the same section of the law. It is the
general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying taxes or duties not to
extend their provisions beyond the clear import of the language used. In every
case of doubt, such statutes are construed most strongly against the
Government and in favor of the citizen, because burdens are not to be imposed,
nor presumed to be imposed, beyond what the statutes expressly and clearly
import. There are present two fundamental considerations which guide the way
out of the legal dilemma. The first is by taking into account the purpose of the
article and then acknowledging that it is in reality used as a detached part or
railways vehicles. The second point is that paragraph 141 is a general provision
while paragraph 197 is a special provision. Where there is in the same statute
a particular enactment and also a general one which is embraced in the
former, the particular enactment must be operative and the general enactment
must be taken to effect only such cases within its general language as are not
within the provisions of the particular enactment.
PRINCIPLE
When there are two or more conflicting provisions, the provisions must be
reconciled and harmonized if possible. In this case, it should be noted that
paragraph 141 is a general provision while paragraph 197 is a special
provision. Where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a
general one which is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be
operative and the general enactment must be taken to effect only such cases
within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular
enactment.

STATCON. 4 6. FLORENTINO v. PNB MANILA RAILROAD v. INSULAR COLLECTOR

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STATCON. 4 6. FLORENTINO v. PNB MANILA RAILROAD v. INSULAR COLLECTOR

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FLORENTINO v.

G.R. No. L-8782, April 28, 1956

SEC. 2. The Treasurer of the Philippines shall, upon application of all

Grammatically, the qualifying clause refers only to the last antecedent;

But even disregarding the grammatical construction, as done by the

The respondent was ordered to accept the backpay certificate of the

If the punctuation gives the statute a meaning which is reasonable and

G.R. No. 39085, September 27, 1933

MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY v. INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS

G.R. No. L-30264, March 12, 1929

Should the dust shield be classified as manufactures of wool or as detached

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