Legal Knowledge
Legal Knowledge
2002
Legal Knowledge
James Boyd White
University of Michigan Law School, [email protected]
Part of the Law and Philosophy Commons, and the Legal Profession Commons
Recommended Citation
White, James Boyd. "Legal Knowledge." Harv. L. Rev. 115, no. 5 (2002): 1396-431.
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LEGAL KNOWLEDGE
* Hart Wright Professor of Law, Professor of English, and Adjunct Professor of Classical
Studies, The University of Michigan. I want to thank Don Herzog, Jefferson Powell, Terrance
Sandalow, Joseph Vining, and Peter Westen for very helpful comments on earlier drafts.
I In Ever Since Sinai, Jakob Petuchowski makes an additional point: that one must came to
see the law not simply as "legislation," that is as an impersonal and abstract system of obligations,
but as "command," from one Person to another, both building upon and shaping the relationship
between them. JAKOB PETUCHOWSKI, EVER SINCE SINAI 78-8o (196i). One might compare
Zechariah Chafee's interesting observation that a constitutional provision like the First Amend-
ment "is much more than an order to Congress not to cross the boundary which marks the ex-
treme limits of unlawful suppression. It is also an exhortation and a guide for the action of Con-
gress inside that boundary." Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L.
REV. 932, 934 (i919). For a work giving striking content to the idea that the law is a gift, see
ABRAHAM JOSHUA HESCHEL, THE SABBATH (195 i).
1396
2002] LEGAL KNOWLEDGE 1397
But such an image will not work for legal knowledge, which is
something of a puzzle. Contrary to the stereotype nonlawyers often
have about it, the law cannot be reduced to a set of rules or other
propositions. Every law student who has turned to a commercial out-
line of one of his courses comes to recognize this, sometimes painfully,
when he takes the exam and sees that the knowledge of the law on
which he is being tested is not simply the capacity to repeat the rules,
but something else, including at the least the ability to think about
them, to interpret them separately and in relation to each other, to
bring them to bear - whatever that metaphor obscures - upon real
and imagined events, and to do so both analytically and argumenta-
tively. As I have often found myself arguing, knowledge of the law is
like knowledge of a language: you never know all of it, you never
know it perfectly, you cannot reduce your knowledge of it to a set of
directions or descriptions or rules; rather, your competence consists of
being able to use it more or less well, in one set of situations or an-
other.2 You learn the law in order to use it - in order to achieve a set
of objectives, to establish and maintain a set of relations, to move
yourself and others in a direction you wish to go, even to discover that
direction. You never achieve perfect mutuality of understanding with
other lawyers, with the court, or with your client, for that is always
beyond us; rather, you use your ability to reduce, to define, to make
more manageable the uncertainties that are present in every human
situation. Legal knowledge is knowledge, but it is not an object, not
restateable. It is a way of claiming meaning for experience.
2 See, e.g., JAMES B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF
LEGAL THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION ('973) [hereinafter WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAG-
INATION]; JAMES BOYD WHITE, FROM EXPECTATION TO EXPERIENCE 1-7, 73-80 (iggg).
1398 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. II5:1396
importance. 3 But this fact at once shapes and makes puzzling what
we can mean by legal knowledge. It is not like scientific knowledge:
not propositional, not descriptive, in nature; not primarily conceptual,
or analytic, or empirical; it is not about truth, but justice. Truth has a
place in the law, a crucially important place, but it is hard to see and
explain what this is.
It is especially difficult to understand the place of truth in law in
light of the fact that we structure legal conversations about justice in
part through the form of a contest, or what we call the adversary sys-
tem. It is not the only way to do it, but it is our way, and it has the
implication that what we say is always in principle contestable. Any
claim that the law is this or that, or should be read in this or that way,
must be made with the awareness that someone else, with adverse in-
terests, may challenge it. In a case of sufficient magnitude, anything
that can rationally be contested will be contested. The law is thus a
way of constantly testing the limits of what can be said, what can be
claimed, in our legal language. The effect is to create an odd double
sense: first, that everything is up for grabs, uncertain, unstable in prin-
ciple; and, on the other side, that what is unchallenged - what the
lawyers share - is remarkably firm, for even these bright and asser-
tive people, with every interest in challenging it, find that they cannot
reasonably do so. Disagreement in the law is thus a way of establish-
ing and confirming agreement. This is of course true not only in con-
nection with the formal argument of cases but also in negotiation,
where lawyers regularly come to rough agreement as to what the law
means and requires. To carry on this double-edged conversational
process one must have an important kind of knowledge, knowledge of
what can and cannot be said. It is a kind of cultural knowledge.
But just as disagreement establishes what is agreed upon, one func-
tion of agreement is to define disagreement. I suppose all physicists
agree about perhaps ninety or ninety-five percent of what the field es-
tablishes; one function of that agreement is to define, to make intelligi-
ble and accessible, what they do not know, what they disagree about.
In this way agreement makes disagreement and discovery possible.
The same is true in the law: it is our agreement about almost all the
material available to us as lawyers in a particular case that enables us
to define our disagreement in a useful way, to make it intelligible and
amenable to resolution; and beyond that, it may lead us to the discov-
ery of possibilities we had not contemplated. In both science and law
3 To avoid misunderstanding, perhaps I need to say that I do not mean that the law has no
regard for truth. Obviously it does, not only in the trial of factual issues but in the interpretation
of texts. Rather, my point is that its goal or end, what Aristotle would call its telos, is not to ar-
rive at a true account of the world, as is the case with science, but at a decision or rule that will
be just.
2002] LEGAL KNOWLEDGE 1399
But the lawyer is a special kind of writer, with her own particular
relations both to the language she uses and to the people she addresses.
She is an advocate and an adviser, acting always in the interest of an-
other, and she uses the language of the law, and her ability as a writer,
to advance the welfare of her client. Does this mean that her use of
language is inherently instrumental in nature - as a tool to achieve
4 The image of knowledge as purely objective and wholly shareable that is implicit in much
of our talk about it may of course be wrong not only for the law but for many, perhaps all, other
fields. After all, every attempt to communicate requires language, with all its uncertainties and
pitfalls, and seeks to reach from one mind to another, a gap that can never be entirely bridged.
For me the model of all communication is translation, which is always imperfect and thus always
calls for what I call a writer's art. The particular kind of writing, of translation, that is open to
the lawyer has its own problems, its own possibilities, some of which it is my aim to suggest in
this Essay. For a fuller account of the lawyer as writer, see WHITE, THE LEGAL
IMAGINATION, supra note 2.
1400 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. I 15:1396
objectives she does not state, for motives she does not reveal? Or has
it an essential quality of sincerity or authenticity?
Sometimes, of course, the lawyer's speech and writing look wholly
instrumental: in arguing a close point about jurisdiction or conflicts of
laws, for example, the lawyer is not expressing what the client really
believes or wants or understands. She is using this language to attain
a result. But even here there is a sense in which she has to mean what
she says, or her argument is false, and will likely be seen to be. She
need not mean that she would decide the case the way she is arguing,
if she were the judge; but she must mean that the argument she makes
is a respectable one, the best that can be made on behalf of her client
in fact, and that the judge could decently and honorably rest upon it.
And "best" not only in the sense that it is the argument most likely to
prevail; she is saying that this is the best formulation of her client's
case that can be made in our legal language - the one that best serves
the most fundamental purposes of law, most fully respects the deci-
sions made by others (legislatures, judges, agencies) that bear upon the
case, and most accurately identifies and interprets the texts that gov-
ern it. She is making the best case for her client that the materials of
law permit, and the "best" as seen not only from her client's point of
view but also from that of the law.'
Of course lots of lawyers do not in this sense mean what they say,
but I think this costs them and their clients a great deal, for the people
they address will often at some level recognize this fact and discount
what they hear. The kind of lawyer who will obviously say anything
she thinks will help her client - and there are plenty of them - will
not be listened to by sensible judges. But there are lawyers who regu-
larly command the respect of their audience - their judges actually
want to hear what they have to say - and my impression is that this
mainly happens when the audience is confident that the lawyer is
speaking to them, in the special sense in which I mean the term, sin-
cerely. While there is one sense, then, in which the lawyer's use of
language is instrumental, her motives ulterior, there is another in
which she can and should mean what she says. A crucial part of legal
knowledge is knowing how to mean what you say in the language of
the law.
5 For a fuller statement of this position, see JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' BOW 215-37
(1985).
2002] LEGAL KNOWLEDGE 1401
lawyer would know that a certain case or statute bore upon the case
before him, and that any would make, in a general way, some of the
same arguments - for want of jurisdiction over the person, for exam-
ple, or for the application of Illinois law. But we also know that these
arguments would be made in very different ways by different lawyers,
even - or especially - by very good lawyers, and that it is in these
differences that many of the most important qualities of professional
and intellectual excellence can be discerned. An essential part of legal
knowledge is invention.
And not only invention: criticism, for in using legal language the
lawyer must be ready to subject it to critical judgment, from the out-
side as well as the inside, and to propose, or perform, transformations
of it. A convention that drives this process, really makes it possible, is
our principle of legal argument that the lawyer must show that the re-
sult for which he argues is compelled both by the law, as he defines
and redefines it, and by justice. 6 To admit either that the result for
which you argue is unjust, though compelled by the law, or that it is
not warranted by the law, though it is just, would in our system be fa-
tal - and fatal in a judicial opinion as well as in an argument. Sup-
pose for example that you are trying to enforce a contractual penalty
for nonperformance, which the other side says is too severe to be en-
forced. You will argue not only that the penalty is permissible under
relevant case and statutory law, but that the rule validating it is a just
one: it respects the free choices of the contracting parties; it tends to
produce efficient results because it encourages bargained allocation of
risk; it makes possible certain high risk investment by placing the loss
on the party whose anticipated benefits are typically highest; and so
forth. The lawyer on the other side will maintain not only that a pen-
alty in excess of actual damages is unjust, but that the relevant case
and statutory law, properly interpreted, prohibit it at least in this egre-
gious form. And a judge too will struggle to show not only that the
penalty is valid or invalid under existing law, but that the law as he
reads it is fair and sensible and proper.
Of course there will be argument about what "justice" means in a
particular case, just as there will be about the "law" that bears upon it.
And I do not mean that there is or should be one single conception of
justice to which all lawyers appeal. My point is about the structure of
legal argument, which is in a serious way imperfect or incomplete if it
does not include the topic of justice as well as that of law. In our ar-
6 Of course the terms "law" and "justice" interact and shape each other, for it is often most
just for a judge to uphold a rule or principle with which she disagrees on the merits, in an expres-
sion of what might be called institutional rather than substantive justice. And it is hardly possi-
ble to think about what justice would require, as an abstract matter, without imagining as well a
set of rules, institutions, and procedures to give it content.
1402 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. I 15:J396
guments the result must be justified by law and justice. We are in this
sense both positivists and natural lawyers at the same time. The effect
of this principle is to subject law itself to constant pressure and criti-
cism. The lawyer must always be prepared to ask where the law itself
has gone wrong, what voices or claims or understandings it improperly
excludes or admits. Our law is capable of great evil, and the lawyer
must be ready to see how that is so; ready, that is, to reimagine if nec-
essary both the world and the law.7
Such are the themes that I shall pursue in this Essay. They will, I
assume, for the most part be familiar to the practicing lawyer and law
teacher alike. My aim is to give them specificity by examining two or
three particular legal contexts that seem to me to define legal knowl-
edge in especially interesting ways.
7 This is, I think, the main achievement of feminist legal scholars. See, e.g., Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 321 (1984); ROBIN WEST, CARING
FOR JUSTICE (1997).
20021 LEGAL KNOWLEDGE 1403
since helped shape statutory reform in almost every state, The goal of
the Code was to offer a method of thought, both for the drafters and
for the readers of criminal statutes, that would transform the confused
and contradictory field of criminal law into a coherent system. At its
center is the idea of blameworthiness or culpability, which is used both
to determine criminality itself and to assess its degree. Blameworthi-
ness in turn is conceived of as a function of intentionality or state of
mind, and here the Code made an important advance. Instead of sim-
ply asking the crude question of much of prior law - whether the de-
fendant had a "guilty" or "bad" mind (mens rea) as a kind of raw moral
judgment - the Code engages in a much more refined process. It first
identifies each of the material elements of the offense - in a hypo-
thetical crime of home invasion, say, "breaking and entering" a "home"
in the "nighttime" - then assigns one of four different states of mind
(or degrees of culpability) to each of the elements: purpose, knowledge,
recklessness, or negligence. 9 The legislative assignment of degrees of
culpability to the different elements is to be the product of a reasoned
judgment based upon the fundamental principle that the criminal law
should provide a graduated set of punishments to reflect graduated
levels of blameworthiness. This is the way in which the purposes of
the criminal law can rationally be attained.1 0 Of course, in all of this
8 For interesting background, see Sanford H. Kadish, Codifiers of the Criminal Law:
Wechsler's Predecessors, 78 COLUM. L. REV. xo98 (1978).
9 Thus the Code might in the hypothetical case require "knowledge" that the building is a
dwelling house, but "negligence" with respect to the time, on the ground that the former element
is more important to the assessment of the culpability of the action and actor. If so, a conviction
could only be obtained if the prosecution proved that the defendant actually knew the building
was a dwelling house, but it need show only that the defendant should have known that it was
nighttime. For definitions of the degrees of culpability, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962).
It would of course be possible to assign "strict liability" as the degree of culpability for one
or more elements - for example, "nighttime" in our hypothetical - but the Code explicitly re-
fuses to do that, insisting on one of the four degrees of culpability denominated above for each
material element of an offense. It does permit strict liability with respect to elements that are not
"material," such as those relating to jurisdiction, venue, and periods of limitation. See id. (estab-
lishing purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence as the degrees of culpability for material
elements of an offense); id. § 1.13(10) (listing nonmaterial elements).
The earlier law drew rather rough distinctions with respect to state of mind because it drew
rather rough distinctions in the definition of crimes, and punishments, as well. At common law,
the main question of grading was whether the defendant committed a felony, for which death and
forfeiture were the usual penalties, or only a misdemeanor. For these purposes a rather basic lan-
guage of "guilty mind" (mens rea), "bad motive," "wickedness," and so forth might be thought to
work well enough. The Code's fine elaboration of degrees of culpability is thus directly related to
its effort to grade crimes carefully according to blameworthiness.
10 Traditionally, criminal law is conceived to have four purposes: general deterrence, restraint,
rehabilitation, and retribution. The Model Penal Code rejected retribution as a proper goal and
added several others, among them: to protect conduct that is without fault from condemnation as
criminal; to give fair warning of criminal prohibitions; to safeguard against excessive, dispropor-
tionate, or arbitrary punishment; to coordinate and harmonize the duties of courts and adminis-
trative agencies dealing with crime and offenders; and to advance the use of scientific methods in
1404 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1153I396
the Code is not writing on a clean slate, as a total innovation, but try-
ing to draw on the best of the preexisting tradition.
As I suggest above, the Code implicitly provides a method not only
for the drafting of statutes but also for their interpretation; one can
take a statute drafted in the old days, in much cruder terms - speak-
ing say of "willfulness" or "unlawfulness" or "wantonness" - and say
that the real question to be asked by lawyers and judges is what de-
gree of culpability (as defined by the Code) the statute should be con-
strued to require with respect to each of its material elements. Its
method is thus in important respects transformational, for it provides a
language of greater refinement and complexity into which conversa-
tions traditionally couched in other terms can usefully be translated.
For example, consider the standard common law doctrine that a "mis-
take of fact" is no defense to a "general intent" crime, but may be a de-
fense to a "special intent" crime, while "mistake of law" is never a de-
fense. In the textbook case of State v. Woods1 - where a woman
charged with sleeping with "another woman's husband" raised as a de-
fense that she (as it turns out erroneously) believed the man to have
had a valid divorce - the Vermont court approached the question by
asking whether the concededly good faith mistake was one of "law" or
"fact."1 2 But in this context these words are virtually empty terms of
conclusion; what should shape the conversation is the question
whether it is a wise reading of this language to punish this woman,
and people similarly situated, under this statute, given the language
and purpose of the statute and the purposes of the criminal law more
generally. This is exactly the consequence of the Code's method,
which asks what degree of culpability this statute should be read to
require with respect to the central element, "another woman's hus-
band." Should she be punished only if she actually knew she was
sleeping with someone validly married to another, or should it be
enough that she was reckless or negligent with respect to this circum-
stance? Or should it be the case, as the Vermont court actually held,
that she should be punished even if she was wholly innocent of the
the sentencing and treatment of offenders. See id. § 1.02. The Code has of course been criticized,
especially for its attempted elimination of retribution, which some consider the foundation of
criminal law, especially since its central concept of culpability seems to suggest a measure of re-
sponsibility based upon desert. For a helpful summary treatment of the purposes of punishment,
see Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1336 (San-
ford H. Kadish ed., 1983), as well as the collection of materials in SANFORD H. KADISH &
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 113-85 (5th ed. 1989).
11 179 A. I (Vt. 1935).
12 See id. at 2-3.
20021 LEGAL KNOWLEDGE 1405
fact that he was still married to another? 13 To frame the question this
way directs attention away from an empty clash of conclusions to the
language and policy of the statute and to the purposes of criminal pun-
14
ishment itself.
Or consider a statute that defines rape as "sexual intercourse by a
man with a woman against her will." The defendant admits sexual in-
tercourse, but claims he believed that the woman was consenting; she
says that she was not, and that his contrary belief was unreasonable.
Under prior law, it was usual to ask whether the statute should be
read to imply an unstated requirement of mens rea, or a "guilty mind,"
with respect to her nonconsent; if so, it would require for conviction
that he actually knew that she was not consenting; if not, he would be
guilty of rape even if his belief in her consent was honest and reason-
able. The Model Penal Code offers two intermediate alternatives,
"negligence" and "recklessness": under the first, the defendant can be
guilty of rape if his good faith belief is unreasonable; under the second,
he can be guilty if he recognizes and consciously disregards the risk
that she is not consenting.
The Code is thus telling legislatures to choose the degree of culpa-
bility explicitly, for each of the elements, and to assign punishments
that are proportional to the blameworthiness so defined. Although it
does not say so outright, in effect it also tells the court (and lawyers)
facing a statute that does not in plain terms assign degrees of culpabil-
ity in the way the Code contemplates that the question of culpability is
still present, for each of the elements, and should be decided on a prin-
cipled basis. In every case the issue is what degree of culpability the
statute in question should be read to require with respect to each of its
material elements. This all adds up to what might be called a dis-
course, a rhetoric, or, as I prefer to say, a language: a set of topics and
materials for thought and argument. The lawyer now has something
to say about the cases that come to him that he would not have to say
if the Code did not exist. It is an effort to make the whole of criminal
law coherent.
A subsidiary purpose (or at least effect) of this effort is to reduce
the role and function of the jury, which is asked to decide questions
that are much more precise and factual under the Code, less open-
ended and value-laden, than was generally true under earlier law.
13 See id. at 3. On the merits of this question, the Code would preclude the last possibility -
that she should be punished even if she were without fault as to this material element of the of-
fense - under the principles of section 2.02(t). See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(j).
14 For the Model Penal Code approach to mistakes, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04. Note
that the Code never distinguishes between questions of law and fact, although section 2.02(9) pro-
vides that mistakes regarding either the existence of an offense or the meaning of legal terms are
not defenses.
14o6 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1396
Under the old regime of "willful" and "wanton" and "malicious," the
jury was almost of necessity making its own judgments of blamewor-
thiness, which were in the nature of things not rendered explicit, nor
could they be made consistent with other judgments by other juries, a
situation the Code seems designed to alter.
B.
If this or something like it will do as a sketch of the aims and struc-
ture of the Model Penal Code, we can now ask: what would it be like
to try to use this language as lawyer or judge, to try to put it to work
as the material of thought? Or, to speak in terms of my title: what
kind of legal knowledge does it create, require, and make possible in
those who use it?
The first step in learning this language would not be to try to mas-
ter its particular rules (though at a certain stage that would be neces-
sary) but to try to understand the purposes the Code is trying to serve
and its basic method for doing so, as I have described them above.
What we need most to understand, that is, is the way the Code imag-
ines itself, the world, and what it is trying to do.
The Code's self-conception is reflected not only in its statements of
purpose and method, but also in a story of a certain kind: the world of
the criminal law before the Code is a morass of confusion and contra-
diction, disorganization, and ignorance, all amounting to serious injus-
tice unworthy of an enlightened state. The Code applies careful, sus-
tained, and collective thought to render this body of law coherent,
orderly, and just - and just not only in the sense that the law is pre-
dictable, that results in like cases are similar, and so forth, but just in a
more substantive sense, for all this is achieved in the name of a coher-
ent and sensible set of purposes that are themselves shaped by a ruling
conception of justice. Like all legislation, the Code is in a sense in-
complete, for it is not self-executing; but it gives directions to its own
use, in its purposes and methods, which should enable lawyers and
judges to use it rationally and coherently. Unlike the law of which the
rabbi spoke, the Code is not a gift to the people upon their becoming
free, but it is deeply related to human freedom nonetheless, for it is an
exercise of freedom and reason, an effort to function wisely and well.
Such is the promise of the Code, and it is to a remarkable extent real-
ized.
But it is not surprising for a lawyer to learn that in practice things
do not entirely work out in this orderly and coherent way. To start
with, the lawyer would quickly see that she had to master not just one
discourse, that of the Code, but two others with which it is often in
tension: the prior criminal law, which the Code was intended to reform
(both for the points at which the Code differs from it and for the con-
tinuing assumptions that connect the two bodies of thought); and a
2002] LEGAL KNOWLEDGE 1407
15 In our system this conversation has occasionally taken on the character of law, for our Con-
stitution has been read to address such questions - what kind of "notice" a statute must give a
person to whom it is addressed, for example, whether a state may punish a "status" or "disease,"
and what procedures, including procedures of proof, the state must follow if it is not to violate the
Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (deciding whether the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit a state from convicting an alcoholic for violating a statute
that forbids being drunk in public); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (i962) (holding that a
California statute that criminalizes the status of being "addicted to the use of narcotics" violates
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (striking
down a Los Angeles criminal registration ordinance as applied to a person who had no actual
knowledge of the duty to register).
14o8 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 115:1396
16 For an elaboration of the incoherence this conflict creates, see WHITE, supra note 3, at 192-
214.
17 See supra note IO.
18 The Code's central conception that punishment should be allocated solely according to the
defendant's moral blameworthiness also runs counter to a basic human instinct, one that will in-
evitably find expression in the working of the law: that the consequences of conduct, and not only
its blameworthiness, are relevant to criminal responsibility. At least on a certain conception of
morality, consequences are really irrelevant: the question is what the defendant himself did and
with what degree of culpability. It is often fortuitous whether his conduct happens to produce a
harmful result or not, and he ought to be punished according to his blameworthiness, not accord-
ing to the outcome. This kind of morality teaches us that the drunk driver who happens to make
it home without incident is just as guilty as the driver, perhaps less inebriated, who causes a fatal
accident. But the facts of human nature, in our culture at least, seem to prevent the law from
working this way, perhaps on the view that we are each entitled to our good luck.
When the degree of culpability is high, as in attempt cases, the Code largely disregards the
upshot and punishes the defendant for what he tried to do, even if he failed, pretty much as
though he had succeeded. When, however, the degree of culpability is lower, as in recklessness or
negligence crimes, the Code, like prior law, treats the defendant whose conduct actually caused
damage, especially death or bodily injury, more severely than one equally negligent or reckless -
or more so - whose behavior had no such consequences. The Code does have a crime of "reck-
less endangerment," but it is punished much less seriously than reckless homicide. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 211.2.
20021 LEGAL KNOWLEDGE 1409
19 Consider also the tension inherent in the claim that the criminal trial should focus exclu-
sively on what the defendant did, leaving the larger question, who the defendant is, for determi-
nation at the sentencing hearing. This is an artificial distinction: jury members naturally want to
know as much as they can about the defendant's character and history, and the lawyers, when it
is to their advantage to do so, struggle to tell them. Sometimes - as in deciding whether a killing
is "provoked" and therefore manslaughter, with "malice" and therefore murder, or "premeditated"
and therefore murder in the first degree - it is virtually impossible to separate the two kinds of
question.
Similarly, the basic conception of the human actor at work in the criminal law is not wholly
coherent, and the Code cannot make it so. Most of the time the law assumes that the individual is
a free and autonomous actor, responsible for his conduct and its consequences. Defenses are fash-
ioned to remove from liability those who are thought not to be in control of their lives - the in-
sane, the sleepwalking, and the like. But the truth is much more muddy than this suggests: we
are all the products of circumstance; no one is entirely free; yet almost all of us have a residue of
autonomy and hence responsibility. Neither of the two extreme images of human freedom is en-
tirely valid, but the law has great difficulty reflecting this fact. What this means for the user of
this language, whether lawyer or judge, is that he tends to vacillate uncomfortably between two
incompatible and impossible positions, without any way of saying what he believes to be true
about human freedom and determinism.
20 Rehabilitation is not, as far as I can see, in any real sense the object of our penitentiaries;
restraint is, but it. is usually temporary, and the convicts are often treated in ways that make it
more likely, not less, that they will commit crimes in the future. Retribution is perhaps achieved,
but it is often brutal, uncivilized, and costly; deterrence may or may not be much achieved by this
system - one certainly doubts whether it is achieved to a higher degree than it would be by a
humane or civilized system of penology. We have both an astonishingly high percentage of our
population in prison and an astonishingly high rate of crime and recidivism. On the other hand,
it is important to say that the idealism of the Code can be seen as essential to its achievement,
which is to refine and elevate our discourse by holding out a higher standard of rationality and
decency than we can normally attain and thus to make possible an effective criticism of what we
do.
141O HARVARD LAW REVIEW [VOL. 1,5:1396
tenses of the law and its reality is of course even worse when race and
class are taken into account.
When you try to understand the motives and premises of the Code,
what it is trying to do with prior law, its conception of culpability or
blameworthiness, its effort to render a mass of contradictory and con-
fusing material coherent, all so that you can read with intelligence the
provisions of the Code itself and use them sensibly in thought and
argument - so that you can become, that is, a speaker as well as a
reader of this language - you discover that the Code falls very far
short of the coherence at which it aims. It is riven with unavoidable
and unresolvable tensions and contradictions, which go to the very
center of its way of imagining the defendant, the trier of fact, and the
process of punishment itself - and I am sure there are more than I
have listed. One who wishes to master this language, then, and to use
it effectively, must understand it not simply as a logical system but
must learn how to live with its particular incoherencies, its splits and
breakdowns. One kind of legal knowledge it thus requires is a capac-
ity to face and manage internal contradiction and tension.
Although I cannot prove it, I think that what is true of the Model
Penal Code would be true, in different ways and degrees, of any at-
tempt to produce a comprehensive and coherent code regulating a field
of law. To the extent I am right, the capacity that I say the Code calls
upon in its user - a capacity to use a language despite its incoheren-
cies, to recognize what it omits or distorts - is an essential part of le-
gal knowledge more generally.
What attitude should we take towards these tensions and fissures
within the Code? One possibility is to deplore them as proofs of fail-
ure, even to give up on it all as a sham or faqade. But this I think is to
yield too readily to disappointment and frustration; one can see these
aspects of the Code more benignly, as defining over and over again,
and thus making available to argument and thought, the most pro-
found and disturbing questions about the nature of punishment and
the structure of our society. It is far better that these tensions and con-
tradictions be recognized, made overt, and thus become the object of
concern and distress, than the most obvious alternatives, which are to
bury them in language too opaque to work in this way, or to insist
against the facts upon the fairness and rationality of our system of
criminal law. There are good reasons why the Code is marked by ten-
sion and contradiction, namely that the questions it addresses simply
cannot be rationalized into a perfect system or order. The conflicts ex-
ist in the material and in our minds, not just in the language of the
Code. In a real sense, the failures of the Code are noble ones; like
other efforts at producing knowledge, a central part of the achieve-
ment of the Code lies in its definitions of what we do not "know" -
and "know" not in a purely conceptual or factual or analytic way, but
in the far more important sense in which I have been using "knowl-
20021 LEGAL KNOWLEDGE 1411
initially saw them, in terms of the criminal law. I also mean to suggest
something more general by the juxtaposition of Code and opinion,
namely that the kind of striking accomplishment achieved by Holmes,
and later by Brandeis, can mark possibilities for the imaginative law-
yer that may exist elsewhere in the law, perhaps even in the most ordi-
nary cases.
A.
The provision of the Espionage Act of 1917 at issue in Schenck
made it criminal "willfully ... to obstruct the recruiting and enlistment
service of the United States," or to conspire to do so. 24 The defendants
in that case sent circulars to men who had been called for the draft,
denouncing the draft itself as a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment
and the war as a design to enrich the capitalist class, but containing
little if any language that could be construed as explicit advice or en-
couragement to refuse the draft.
Today we would see this case as presenting serious First Amend-
ment issues, but in 1918, when there was little or no First Amendment
jurisprudence to rely on, it was natural for the Court to see it simply
as a criminal law matter. If we looked at it that way, and in pre-Code
terms, the two main statutory questions would be whether the aim of
the conspiracy amounted to "obstruction" and whether the defendants
could be found to have the quality of intention (or guilty mind) indi-
cated by the word "willfully."
On the first point, it is true that the defendants did not plan to in-
terfere physically with the draft - for example by blocking the door of
the receiving station with a truck - but if the recruits read and were
persuaded by the defendants' publications, and refused the draft, that
would certainly seem to be an interference that might well fall under
the term "obstruction." Should it matter that such an obstruction
would depend upon an act of will by another person, the recruit who
decided to refuse? The prosecution would say surely not; one who
persuades or encourages another to commit a crime is under ordinary
principles of law responsible as an accessory. There is no notion in the
criminal law that such a voluntary act by one party excuses another
who encourages the crime. It was therefore consistent with common
understandings for the Court to classify what the defendants were try-
ing to achieve as a form of "obstruction" within the meaning of the
statute.
Writing for the Court, Holmes does not explicitly define the quality
of mind or intention required by the word "willfully," but he under-
24 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49 (citing the Espionage Act of June I5, 1917, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217,
219).
2002] LEGAL KNOWLEDGE 1413
standably has rather little difficulty finding the requirement met in this
case: "Of course the document would not have been sent unless it had
been intended to have some effect, and we do not see what effect it
could be expected to have upon persons subject'25 to the draft except to
influence them to obstruct the carrying of it out.
Once the Justices started thinking of the case in such criminal law
terms, it was natural for them simply not to regard the First Amend-
ment as fairly present at all, on the obvious ground that the First
Amendment does not protect criminal speech, which this so plainly
seemed to be. Criminal ends can be obtained by verbal as well as
nonverbal means, and it would be an odd reading indeed of the First
Amendment that saw such conduct as protected against punishment
simply because words were chosen as the instruments of crime. Per-
haps refusing induction should not be a crime; but, so long as it is, it
should be criminal for one person to persuade another to commit that
crime, just as it would be if the crime were murder, say of a foreign
dignitary or a commercial rival. This would all seem obvious.
For Holmes, then, and the rest of the Court, the case was easy
enough. The criminal law seemed to say all that needed to be said,
and the defendants' invocation of the First Amendment was under-
standably unsuccessful. On the other hand, Holmes did respond to the
First Amendment argument raised by counsel and in doing so took the
first steps, almost without knowing it, in the direction of an enor-
mously influential way of thinking about the central puzzle presented
by this and similar cases: Ought the First Amendment protect conduct,
otherwise criminal, simply because it takes the form of speech? Why?
And, whatever the rule is, should it protect some forms of speech more
than others - the kind of political speech involved here, for example,
but not the speech necessary to maintain a numbers racket or an extor-
tion ring?
To begin with the last point, Holmes does not address the question
explicitly, but he does seem to see this kind of speech as somehow dif-
ferent from speech of other kinds - he says that some of the strongest
expressions came from "well-known public men" and that in peacetime
circumstances the defendants might well have been within their "con-
stitutional rights." 26 That he cannot fully articulate the difference is
hardly surprising, since his opinion is something of a first effort to
think about the kind of speech the First Amendment should be read to
protect.
The more fundamental question is whether speech, or some forms
of speech, should enjoy a protection under the First Amendment that
25 Id. at 51
26 Id. at 51-52.
1414 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 115:1396
27 Id. at 52.
28 Id. Although Schenck is formally a conspiracy case, of which the gravamen is agreement,
Holmes seems to be thinking about it as an attempt case, where the question is "how close" the
conduct came to inflicting the harm the defendant intended. Or he may be asking whether the
means chosen to attain the goals of the conspiracy were so ill-adapted to the purpose that they
presented no danger to the public. Standard classroom examples include things like conspiring to
murder a foreign dignitary through magic charms or attempting to shoot down a passenger plane
with a child's bow and arrow.
29 250 U.S. 66 (igig).
20021 LEGAL KNOWLEDGE 1415
30 For a full statement of the facts and background, see RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING
FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND FREE SPEECH 43-8I (1987).
31 Act of May i6, i918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553, 553. Unlike the "obstruction" statute, this statute
overtly punishes a speech act and could therefore be thought to present its own First Amendment
problems. But neither the Court nor Holmes saw it this way.
32 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 621.
33 Id. at 623.
1416 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 115:1396
34 Act of May x6, 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. at 553. The Court's position on "intention," odd
though it is to one trained in the Model Penal Code, is not eccentric but seems to reflect the
criminal law thinking of the time. Here is Wharton, for example: "When there is a general intent
to do evil ...of which evil the wrong actually done may be looked upon as a probable incident,
then the party having such general intent is to be regarded as having intended the particular
wrong." i FRANCIS WHARTON WITH JAMES M. KERR, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW 202
(i ith ed. 1912). And even today the felony murder rule rests on something like this analytic basis.
35 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 624 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2002] LEGAL KNOWLEDGE 1417
satisfy the general principle of civil and criminal liability. A man may
have to pay damages, may be sent to prison, at common law might be
hanged, if at the time of his act he knew facts from which common experi-
ence showed that the consequences
36
would follow, whether he individually
could foresee them or not.
Like the Court, Holmes here elides the distinction between intent
and negligence, as he also did programmatically in The Common
Law.37 What makes this case different for him is that it is not a com-
mon law case but a statutory one. And "this statute must be taken to
use its words in a strict and accurate sense," 38 not only because it is a
statute, but because otherwise it would be absurd. For it would pun-
ish a patriot who argued successfully against what he thought were
wasteful war expenditures, say on airplanes, which later came to be
seen as essential to the prosecution of the war.39 The statute should
therefore require what the Model Penal Code would call a true pur-
pose to cripple or hinder the war effort, and that cannot be established
by this record.
Notice how the way of reading established by the Model Penal
Code would have clarified the issues. It would have repudiated as an
analytic mishmash the view of the Court that "men must be held to
have intended, and to be accountable for, the effects which their acts
were likely to produce," 40 saying that of course people can be punished
for negligently (or recklessly) producing a socially harmful result, but
that they should be so punished only under a statute, or other rule,
that articulates those degrees of culpability, certainly not under a stat-
ute that requires "intent." What is more, they should be punished
much less severely than one who intends the harm, or knows that it
will flow from his conduct. Once true "intent" is required, the ques-
tion, as Holmes says, is whether the record will support such a finding,
which may in turn depend upon the difference, perhaps assumed but
4
not articulated by the Court, between intent and motive. '
36 Id. at 626-27.
37 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 49-51, 1o8-o9 (Dover
Publ'ns '99x) (188r).
38 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
39 Id.
40 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 621.
41 Holmes's response to the argument that the defendants' ultimate "motive" is irrelevant if
they actually intended to curtail production is to say:
It may be obvious, and obvious to the actor, that the consequence will follow, and he
may be liable for it even if he regrets it, but he does not do the act with intent to produce
it unless the aim to produce it is the proximate motive of the specific act, although there
may be some deeper motive behind.
Id. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting). This language leaves open the argument that the defendants'
"proximate motive" was in fact to curtail production and that this would constitute "intent" as
Holmes defines it. Holmes may nonetheless be justified in his position here, on the grounds that
1418 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1 15:I3g6
This, then, is what happens here: without fully seeing the challenge
to his own established views about the objective basis for criminal as
well as civil liability, Holmes seizes upon the standard of intention in
the statute to move him, and us, in the direction ultimately taken by
the Code. In doing so he exemplifies the kind of legal knowledge that
consists of an art of language and imagination, the capacity to trans-
form his own inherited materials of thought and to do so in a disci-
plined and persuasive way. And more than that: by what seems like
an accident, his insistence on one criminal law rule over another -
requiring real proximity, and a true intention to bring about the harm
in question - has the effect of protecting a certain kind of speech,
speech that expresses general ideas or values, or advocates or criticizes
policies. Out of this shift in criminal law doctrine emerges the begin-
ning of First Amendment thought on the Court. Holmes here makes
something out of almost nothing, and what he makes is of enormous
interest and importance.
It is significant that Holmes's intention requirement is based upon
the language of the statute, not the Constitution. As a constitutional
matter he explicitly reaffirms the "clear and present danger" language
of Schenck:
I do not doubt for a moment that by the same reasoning that would justify
punishing persuasion to murder, the United States constitutionally may
punish speech that produces or is intended to produce a clear and immi-
nent danger that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive
42 evils
that the United States constitutionally may seek to prevent.
Holmes here makes plain that Congress could, if it wanted to, punish
speech that actually "produces" harm by a standard less protective
than intention or purpose - for example under a statute that prohib-
ited the reckless curtailment of war production. But Congress must
make such a choice explicitly, and here it has made the opposite
choice, to require "intent."
Holmes's proposed constitutional rule would thus require intention
only in uncompleted crimes, such as attempt or conspiracy, not in
completed crimes, which the legislature is free to punish under a lower
standard. If you look at this case with the eyes of the criminal lawyer,
then, Holmes is arguing that the First Amendment requires a small
shift in a rule (requiring purpose not negligence or recklessness) gov-
erning a small piece of the universe of criminal statutes (attempt and
conspiracy), and then only when speech, or speech of a certain kind, is
involved. From the point of view of the First Amendment lawyer,
however, this minor shift in the degree of culpability in this small class
the jury was not properly charged and it is therefore irrelevant that there is evidence from which
they could find for the government on what Holmes calls "proximate motive."
42 Id. (emphasis added).
2002] LEGAL KNOWLEDGE 1419
43 Id. at 629.
44 Id. at 629-3o.
1420 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 115:1396
45 Id. at 630.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 As is well known, Judge Learned Hand, in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535
(S.D.N.Y. 1917), had struggled with the question, and took the view that speech that fell short of
"counselling] or advis[ing] others to violate the law" should be protected. Id. at 540. In this opin-
ion he defines the key terms thus: "To counsel or advise a man to an act is to urge upon him either
that it is his interest or his duty to do it." Id. at 540.
Instead of asking the jury a question of "proximity," as Holmes did in Schenck, Hand sees
the central issue as the character or quality of the speech, or what we might call the nature of the
speech act. During the interval between Schenck and Abrams, he urged these views on Holmes in
correspondence, but Holmes saw very little difference between the two formulations. See
SHELDON M. NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
473 n.87 (1989); POLENBERG, supra note 3o, at 218-19. Zechariah Chafee published an article,
Freedom of Speech in War Time, supra note i, in which he argued that Holmes's clear and present
20021 LEGAL KNOWLEDGE 1421
First Amendment was then thought to be, the Court had established
no way of thinking that would make it relevant to a criminal conspir-
acy plainly within the zone of congressional power, as this one was. In
the terms I suggested earlier, Holmes finds a way to give meaning to
the text by imagining the world in which it occurs, including himself
and others within it, in a coherent way; it is this act of imagination
that is the center of this famous paragraph. He no longer sees this
case as like one in which the state punishes persuasion to murder.
What is at stake here, rather, is what he calls a "creed," consisting of
"ideas" and "thoughts." He thus separates out from the world of stan-
dard criminal law cases what he sees to be the material of a First
Amendment case. For without quite realizing it, he found in Schenck
a point of criminal law analysis with which to begin thinking about
the First Amendment. His clear and present danger test is in its ori-
gins simply a statement of an intention and proximity requirement for
attempt and conspiracy liability. But he and others will now and later
give it enormous resonance in speech cases. Having made the begin-
ning he did in Schenck, he moves in this paragraph to a statement that
will begin to explain and justify his instincts.
What he says here can be criticized, of course. The exchange of
ideas, or their competition, is not really a market, in which people are
paying more or less for what they value;4 9 what he has in mind is
closer to what may be his deepest image of human life, the process of
evolution by the survival of the fittest. But survival is a test of power,
not of truth, and we all know that false, despicable, and dangerous
ideologies or ideas can thrive for a long time. Particularly in the field
of ethics and justice, there is no reason to think that we always move
danger test could be construed as meaning something very close to Hand's formulation and that
this would provide the beginning of a rational principle upon which First Amendment jurispru-
dence could be founded. The standard view is that Holmes was influenced by Chafee, with
whom he conversed, as well as by Hand, and that this explains the sea change between the two
cases. Novick is doubtful, not sure that there is such a sea change: Holmes reaffirms Schenck in
explicit terms in Abrams, and rests his opinion in Abrams on a ground not available in Schenck,
namely the statutory provision requiring an intention to curtail production. See NOVICK, supra,
at 473 n.87. My own interest here is less in explaining why the shift in Holmes's position oc-
curred than in trying to understand what he made his language mean.
49 And to say that speech is like a market is not to say that it should be unregulated, for our
tradition is that the government has broad powers to regulate actual markets of a commercial
kind, powers broader by far than it has to interfere with what we think of as individual rights
specifically guaranteed by the Constitution. And there are real questions about the freedom and
efficiency of our own "market in ideas," if one uses such language, for it can be seen to be domi-
nated by some voices and to exclude others. But Holmes was not really arguing for the system-
atic extension of market thought into this field; rather he was trying to find a way to express,
through a metaphor, the importance of freedom of speech to society as a whole, building perhaps
on Chafee's insistence - well chosen, if his idea was indeed to influence Holmes - that there is a
"social interest" in freedom of speech, as well as an "individual" one, a social interest that Chafee,
like Holmes here, characterizes in terms of "truth." See Chafee, supra note i, at 956-59.
1422 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Voi. 115:1396
53 Id. at 631.
14 274 U.S. 357 (I927).
55 Brandeis says that a necessity that would justify a restriction of speech "does not exist
unless [the] speech would produce, or is intended to produce, a clear and imminent danger of
2002] LEGAL KNOWLEDGE 1425
some substantive evil which the State constitutionally may seek to prevent." Id. at 373 (Brandeis,
J., concurring) (citing Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)).
56 The California Criminal Syndicalism Act made it criminal "knowingly [to become] a mem-
ber of any organization ... organized or assembled to advocate, teach or aid and abet criminal
syndicalism," which was defined as doctrine advocating that "the commission of crime, sabotage
•.. I or unlawful acts of force and violence" were appropriate "means of accomplishing" changes
in industrial ownership or political "change." Whitney, 274 U.S. at 359-60 (quoting the California
Criminal Syndicalism Act). The theory of the statute seems to have been that membership in an
organization, with knowledge of its aims, is in traditional terms a species of aiding and abetting.
Or perhaps that it is a kind of conspiracy, not on the rationale that conspiracy is a kind of incho-
ate crime, like attempt, to be punished by reason of the "proximity" to harm created by the
agreement itself, but on the traditional alternative rationale, that the existence of an organization
with criminal purposes is an evil independent of crimes it is on the verge of committing, as a fer-
tile ground for as yet undesignated, perhaps unthought of, crimes. See generally Developments in
the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920 (1959).
57 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 371.
S8 Id.
59 Id. at 374 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
1426 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 115:1396
lieved that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that
without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with
them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dis-
semination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an
inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should
be a fundamental principle of the American government. They recognized
the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that
order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infrac-
tion; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination;
that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces
stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss
freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting
remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as
applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law
- the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional
tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended 60
the Constitution so that
free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.
Brandeis here invokes the Framers nearly as demigods, confidently
asserting what they thought and meant by the First Amendment itself.
From one point of view this is a kind of fantasy, for we all know that
the Framers were not superhuman beings, that they were not united
but divided in their attitudes, and that in any event the society out of
which they functioned was unjust, and so on. From another point of
view, however, this act of imagination or something like it really is es-
sential to the task of lawmaking that is the Court's responsibility. For
the words of the text alone do not mean much, nor do they carry much
force even if understood; the kind of knowledge we need includes a
way of imagining the author of the text, and ourselves, in such a way
as to make possible an intelligent reading of the text itself, and this is
an act of creation. To understand the law we must understand the
character of the lawmakers, and of our relation with them, and we
must have a grasp of the story that unites our people over time. This
includes, for the modern American lawyer, as well as for one who con-
sults the rabbi, knowledge of past injustices, places where we have
gone deeply wrong and perhaps paid a price for it, and knowledge of
silences as well; and it is in a sense a silence that Brandeis is address-
ing here, as Holmes did in Abrams - a failure on the part of the Court
to pay serious attention to the crucial language of the First Amend-
ment.
Brandeis's two long sentences are structured as a string of clauses
connected by semicolons, a style that gives a sense of connectedness
and sequence among different thoughts, or different aspects of the
61 For a fine article on the significance of the way Brandeis composes this opinion, see Vincent
Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v.
California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 653 (1988).
1428 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11I5:1396
an intuition that I think most lawyers also have, that the life of the law
is full of opportunities and occasions, never perfectly realized, for
imagination, for invention, for creation in language, or for what I call
"writing." I will only add that I think this fact should be closer to the
center of our attention as teachers and scholars, in law schools and law
firms alike, than perhaps it has been. What the writers examined here
achieve is not merely a literary excellence, after all, but a legal excel-
lence, and we all need to think about what that is, or can be.
And how hard it is, too. Just imagine that you were called upon to
write those paragraphs in Abrams and Whitney, or the key provisions
of the Model Penal Code: how confident are you that you could do
anything like what is achieved there? Yet each of us in the law is
called upon to exercise just that art, in other cases and situations.
Several times in this Essay I have spoken of the imagination, and
for me that is the root and nerve of my subject. As I have recently
maintained in The Edge of Meaning,63 I think that the deepest specifi-
cally human need is the need to claim meaning for experience, and
that our ability to do this is dependent upon our capacity to imagine
the world, and ourselves and others within it, in a sufficiently coherent
way to make such claims possible. 64 This is not something that can be
done easily, or done once and for always. We necessarily meet im-
pediments, in our nature, our culture, our language, in the limits and
corruptions of our own minds; and the art of making meaning is an art
of coming to terms with these conditions of our lives, in the law and
out of it. Holmes and Brandeis and the Model Penal Code show us
how to do something, but it is up to us to do it afresh, for ourselves
and our contemporaries, in our own language and in our own situa-
tion. Like them, we - as teachers and writers both - should be pre-
pared to make new versions of our inheritance, good for our time and
for our minds, recognizing that what we say too will need to be revised
in turn, as we join those who have come before and will come after,
each of us using as writers the materials of law to try to make sense of
our experience in a continuing and collective effort to imagine justice
into reality.