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20 Heirs of Alfredo Bautista VS Lindo
20 Heirs of Alfredo Bautista VS Lindo
Civil Procedure
3G - AY 2021-2022
DOCTRINE:
It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the
relief sought. In this regard, the Court, in Russell v. Vestil, wrote that "in determining whether an action is one the subject
matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of
the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the RTCs would depend on the amount of the
claim." But where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where
the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation.
These cases are cognizable exclusively by RTCs.
FACTS:
Alfredo R. Bautista (Bautista), petitioner’s predecessor, inherited in 1983 a free-patent land located in Poblacion, Lupon,
Davao Oriental and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. (1572) P-6144. A few years later, he subdivided the
property and sold it to several vendees, herein respondents, via a notarized deed of absolute sale dated May 30, 1991.
Three years after the sale, or on August 5, 1994, Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against respondents before the
RTC, Branch 32, Lupon, Davao Oriental. Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, Bautista died and was substituted by
petitioner Epifania G. Bautista (Epifania).
Respondents Francisco and Welhilmina Lindo later entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners, whereby they
agreed to cede to Epifania a three thousand two hundred and thirty square meter (3,230 sq.m.)-portion of the property as
well as to waive, abandon, surrender, and withdraw all claims and counterclaims against each other. The compromise was
approved by the RTC. Other respondents, however, filed a Motion to Dismiss4 dated February 4, 2013, alleging that the
complaint failed to state the value of the property sought to be recovered. Moreover, they asserted that the total selling price
of all the properties is only sixteen thousand five hundred pesos (PhP 16,500), and the selling price or market value of a
property is always higher than its assessed value. Since Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, as amended, grants jurisdiction to
the RTCs over civil actions involving title to or possession of real property or interest therein where the assessed value is
more than PhP 20,000, then the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint in question since the property which Bautista
seeks to repurchase is below the PhP 20,000 jurisdictional ceiling. Acting on the motion, the RTC issued the assailed order
dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court found that Bautista failed to allege in his complaint that the
value of the subject property exceeds 20 thousand pesos.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the RTC of Lupon, Davao Oriental has jurisdiction over the case. YES
HELD:
Jurisdiction of courts is granted by the Constitution and pertinent laws.
Jurisdiction of RTCs, as may be relevant to the instant petition, is provided in Sec. 19 of BP 129, which reads:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.―Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed
value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
On the other hand, jurisdiction of first level courts is prescribed in Sec. 33 of BP 129, which provides:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil
cases.―Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not
declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
The core issue is whether the action filed by petitioners is one involving title to or possession of real property or any interest
therein or one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The course of action embodied in the complaint by the present petitioners’ predecessor, Alfredo R. Bautista, is to enforce his
right to repurchase the lots he formerly owned pursuant to the right of a free-patent holder under Sec. 119 of CA 141 or the
Public Land Act.
The Court rules that the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is a civil action incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the
relief sought. In this regard, the Court, in Russell v. Vestil, wrote that "in determining whether an action is one the subject
matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of
the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the RTCs would depend on the amount of the
claim." But where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where
the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation.
These cases are cognizable exclusively by RTCs.
Settled jurisprudence considers some civil actions as incapable of pecuniary estimation, viz:
1. Actions for specific performance;
2. Actions for support which will require the determination of the civil status;
3. The right to support of the plaintiff;
4. Those for the annulment of decisions of lower courts;
5. Those for the rescission or reformation of contracts;
6. Interpretation of a contractual stipulation.
The Court finds that the instant cause of action to redeem the land is one for specific performance.
The facts are clear that Bautista sold to respondents his lots which were covered by a free patent. While the deeds of sale
do not explicitly contain the stipulation that the sale is subject to repurchase by the applicant within a period of five (5) years
from the date of conveyance pursuant to Sec. 119 of CA 141, still, such legal provision is deemed integrated and made part
of the deed of sale as prescribed by law. It is basic that the law is deemed written into every contract. Although a contract is
the law between the parties, the provisions of positive law which regulate contracts are deemed written therein and shall limit
and govern the relations between the parties. Thus, it is a binding prestation in favor of Bautista which he may seek to
enforce. That is precisely what he did. He filed a complaint to enforce his right granted by law to recover the lot subject of
free patent. Ergo, it is clear that his action is for specific performance. Such being the case, his action for specific
performance is incapable of pecuniary estimation and cognizable by the RTC.
Republic Act No. 769117 amended Sec. 33 of BP 129 and gave Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed twenty
thousand pesos (PhP 20,000) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed fifty thousand
pesos (PhP 50,000) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs.
At first blush, it appears that the action filed by Bautista involves title to or possession of the lots he sold to respondents.
Since the total selling price is less than PhP 20,000, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over the case. This
proposition is incorrect for the re-acquisition of the lots by Bautista or herein successors-in-interests, the present petitioners,
is but incidental to and an offshoot of the exercise of the right by the latter to redeem said lots pursuant to Sec. 119 of CA
141. The reconveyance of the title to petitioners is solely dependent on the exercise of such right to repurchase the lots in
question and is not the principal or main relief or remedy sought. Thus, the action of petitioners is, in reality, incapable of
pecuniary estimation, and the reconveyance of the lot is merely the outcome of the performance of the obligation to return
the property conformably to the express provision of CA 141.