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Dhanuka, Madhurima. "A New Form of Life Imprisonment for India?.
" Life Imprisonment and

Human Rights. Ed. Dirk van Zyl Smit and Catherine Appleton. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016.
119–140. Oñati International Series in Law and Society. Bloomsbury Collections. Web. 18 Aug.
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5
A New Form of Life Imprisonment
for India?
MADHURIMA DHANUKA
I. INTRODUCTION
O
N 2 NOVEMBER 2015, a five-judge Constitution Bench of the
Supreme Court of India legitimised a new sentence. It is a sentence
where the death penalty can be substituted by imprisonment for
life or a specified period of time and be put beyond remission. By virtue of
this dictum, the courts now have the authority not only to send a person to
prison for the remainder of their natural life, but also to restrict the statu-
tory power of the executive to grant remission, thus prohibiting their early
release from prison (Union of India v Sriharan alias Murugan and others
2015).
This development was preceded by the introduction of a new category
of sentencing in the Indian Penal Code of 1860 (IPC) in 2013, that is, life
imprisonment for the remainder of a person’s natural life. This amend-
ment was brought about in the aftermath of a huge public outcry that
ensued after the Delhi rape case in India (see section III below). This new
‘life means life’ sentencing in India had the legal circles debating the legal-
ity of such sentences as well as the effect of such sentences on the execu-
tive’s inherent power to grant remission. Some even questioned whether
this new form of sentencing will evolve to become a plausible alternative
to the death sentence (Law Commission of India 2014: 26). The recent
pronouncement of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India
has finally laid those questions to rest but, perhaps, raised many more in
its wake.
This chapter assesses life imprisonment in India, from its introduction
into the Penal Code to the various judicial pronouncements that have
sought to explain and interpret its meaning. It also discusses the juris-
prudential basis under which the special category of sentences has been
legalised, and argues that the fundamental premise for sanctioning such
sentences is flawed.
120 Madhurima Dhanuka
II. LIFE IMPRISONMENT: BASICS
Life imprisonment has a history that closely parallels that of prisons (Van
Zyl Smit 2002). With the abolition of the death penalty in a majority of
nations around the world, life imprisonment has taken over the status of
being the ‘gravest’ form of punishment under the existing penal systems.1
Worldwide, life sentences have developed as an indeterminate sentence;
that is, as a term of imprisonment without a prescribed duration at the
time of sentencing (Mauer, King and Young 2004). Although offenders
sentenced to life imprisonment have in principle no absolute right ever
to be released from prison, more often than not life sentences may entitle
prisoners to be considered for release after a minimum period has been
served.
Under the IPC there are more than 50 offences that can attract a sentence
of life imprisonment.2 At the end of 2014, 71,632 persons (including 3,176
women) were serving life imprisonment in prisons across India (National
Crime Records Bureau 2014: i). This constitutes a startling 54.5 per cent
of the total sentenced prison population in the country. Undoubtedly, life
imprisonment as a form of punishment is widely used in India.
Imprisonment for life as a distinct punishment for certain grave offences
was introduced in the IPC in 1956, when the Code of Criminal Procedure
(Amendment) Act 1955 came into force.3 The amendment introduced the
term ‘imprisonment for life’ in section 53 of the IPC, which lays down pun-
ishments. The IPC also defines the meaning of life sentences in section 45,
stating that the word ‘life’ denotes the life of a human being, unless the con-
trary appears from the context. Thus a plain reading of section 45 read with
section 53 of the IPC indicates that life imprisonment entails a sentence for
the remaining life of the offender.
Once the judicial process comes to an end, that is, a sentence becomes
final, the Indian Constitution, as well as statutory law, provides a person
sentenced to life imprisonment (lifer) with certain options to seek early
release from prison. Articles 72 and 161 of the Indian Constitution of 1950
confer the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions upon
the President of India and the Governors of the States, respectively. When
a conviction is upheld by the highest court of appeal, a life sentence or
death row prisoner can thus write to the appropriate head of state seeking
remission.
1 This is true even in international criminal law; see Art 77.1(b) of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court.

2 See the First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973.
3 Prior to this amendment, the Indian Penal Code of 1860 provided for six types of punish-
ments, viz, death, transportation, penal servitude, imprisonment, forfeiture of property and
a fine. Life imprisonment was not a separate punishment, until the 1955 amendment, which
substituted transportation for life with the punishment of imprisonment for life.
A New Form of Life Imprisonment for India? 121
In addition to the constitutional powers to remit, the executive has been

conferred powers of commutation under statutory law as well. Section 55
of the IPC confers powers upon the appropriate government to commute a
sentence of imprisonment for life to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
14 years. Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973 (CrPC)
prescribes the power of the appropriate government to suspend or remit
sentences. Section 433 of the CrPC enumerates the sentences that the
appropriate government has the power to commute: namely, fines, simple
imprisonment, rigorous imprisonment, life imprisonment and the death sen-
tence. Section 433A imposes a restriction on the power of the appropriate
government for remissions or suspensions or commutation of punishments
provided under sections 432 and 433 by specifying the exercise of such
power in relation to the punishment of death or life imprisonment in order
to ensure at least 14 years of imprisonment. In addition, prisoners can also
earn remission under the Prison Rules or other relevant Rules based on their
good behaviour or other stipulated grounds.
However, in case of life imprisonment, unless the sentence is commuted
for a specific period by the government, there is no scope to count the earned
remission:
As a sentence of life imprisonment is indeterminate and of uncertain duration, the
result of subtraction from an uncertain quantity is still an uncertain quantity and
release of the prisoner cannot follow except on some fiction of quantification of a
sentence of uncertain duration. (Maru Ram v Union of India 1981: 1220)
In effect, no matter how much remission is earned, the sentence of life
imprisonment can never be reduced to zero, unless the appropriate govern-
ment commutes it.
In India, the task of reviewing sentences and recommending releases
to the state government has been entrusted to the State Sentence Review
Boards.4 Release of life sentence prisoners after a recommendation by the
State Sentence Review Boards or similar body is termed ‘premature release’,
and can be compared to the concept of early release that is prevalent in
most countries. Once prisoners have been released in this way, they are free
to live their lives in society, back with their family without any conditions
or supervision.
In addition, a life sentence prisoner also has the option to seek leave
or what is commonly known as ‘parole’ or ‘furlough’, the rules of which
are governed by the prison manuals of each state. Parole is the temporary
release of a prisoner from prison for a specified number of days, upon com-
pletion of which the prisoner must return to prison. While the criteria and
4 In some federal states they are termed Advisory Boards or Premature Release Boards. Also
see National Human Rights Commission (2003).

duration of parole varies from state to state, the Model Prison Manual 20035
provides that lifers should be granted parole upon completion of three years
of actual imprisonment for a period of 21 days during the first five years of
confinement, and 28 days in subsequent years. Generally the power to grant
parole vests with the head of the prison department of each state.
Thus, in India, prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment can seek both
permanent and temporary release under various provisions of law. How-
ever, these provisions have often led many lifers to believe that they have a
right to be released after serving 14 years in prison, and they have time and
again petitioned the Indian Supreme Court to seek clarity regarding the true
meaning of a life sentence.
A. Life Means ‘Life’?
Since the introduction of the life sentence in the Indian penal system, the true
meaning of life imprisonment has been subject to much deliberation by the
Indian Supreme Court. This question came up before the Court for the first
time in 1961, in the case of Gopal Vinayak Godse v State of Maharashtra
(1961). After due deliberation, the Court clarified that unless a sentence of
life imprisonment was commuted or remitted by the appropriate authority
under the relevant provisions of the IPC or CrPC, a prisoner sentenced to
life imprisonment was bound in law to serve the life term in prison.
The question was again raised in 1976, in State of Madhya Pradesh v
Ratan Singh (1976), where the Court ruled that a sentence of imprisonment
for life does not automatically expire at the end of 20 years, including remis-
sions. This was because the Administrative Rules framed under the vari-
ous Jail Manuals or under the Prison Act of 1894 could not supersede the
statutory provisions of the IPC. A sentence of imprisonment for life means a
sentence for the entire life of the prisoner unless the appropriate government
chooses to exercise its discretion to remit either the whole or a part of the
sentence. The appropriate government has the discretion to remit or refuse
to remit the sentence. Where it refuses to remit the sentence, no writ can be
issued directing the state government to release the prisoner.
However, a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment has only the right
to be considered for early release on the basis of remission earned, and
has no right to be released after completion of a fixed term of sentence.
This proposition was affirmed in Mohd Munna v Union of India (2005).6
5 For more information on parole, see Bureau for Police Research and Development (2003)
Ch 17.05.
6 Also affirmed in Naskar (Life Convict) v State of WB (2000); Zahid Hussein v State of
West Bengal (2001); Kamalanantha v State of Tamil Nadu (2005); and CA Pious v State of
Kerala (2007).
The petitioner, who had been sentenced to imprisonment for life, con-
tended that, as he had already completed 21 years’ imprisonment, his fur-
ther detention was illegal and sought compensation for his alleged illegal
detention beyond the period of 14 years. Rejecting the contentions made by
the petitioner, the Court held that, in the absence of an order of remission
formally passed by the appropriate government, there was no provision in
the IPC or in the CrPC under which a sentence of life imprisonment could
be treated as for a term of 14 years or 20 years. Furthermore, a prisoner
undergoing imprisonment for life could not claim remission as a matter of
right.
This position has again been reiterated by the constitutional bench of
the Supreme Court in Union of India v Sriharan alias Murugan and others
(2015) (hereinafter referred to as ‘Sriharan’), where the Court discussed
whether imprisonment for life means for the rest of an individual’s life or
whether the prisoner has a right to claim remission. Relying on the ratio of
various earlier judicial pronouncements, the Court settled the legal position,
stating:
[I]mprisonment for life in terms of Section 53 read with Section 45 of the Penal
Code only means imprisonment for rest of the life of the prisoner subject, how-
ever, to the right to claim remission, etc. as provided under Articles 72 and 161
of the Constitution to be exercisable by the President and the Governor of the
State and also as provided under Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
(Sriharan 2015: para 61)
Thus, the settled position in law now is that life imprisonment means a
whole life sentence and that no person has the right to be released after com-
pleting 14 years of the sentence. However, a person may seek release under
the prescribed norms and procedures laid down by state governments for
seeking premature release. Therefore, while there is a right to be considered
for premature release, there is no absolute right of release for lifers after the
completion of 14 years’ imprisonment.
III. ADVENT OF A NEW SENTENCING POLICY—LIFE IMPRISONMENT

WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF REMISSION
While the Supreme Court has consistently maintained that ‘life means life’
and a prisoner has a right to be considered for release after having com-
pleted 14 years of actual imprisonment, the right to claim remission and
be considered for release has, in recent times, been questioned, especially in
cases where the accused was sentenced to death and sought its conversion to
a sentence of life imprisonment. One primary concern that has been voiced
by the Court is the adequacy of a life sentence in such cases, that is, whether
the punishment will be commensurate to the crime committed. In order to
address this concern, in a number of judgments the Court has either fixed
the term that must be served before any consideration of release or sought
to disentitle the lifer from being granted any remission whatsoever.
The justifications for the imposition of such sentences were laid down by
the Court over 35 years ago in Dalbir Singh and others v State of Punjab
(1979), where the Court observed:
[W]e may suggest that life imprisonment which strictly means imprisonment for
the whole of the men’s life but in practice amounts to incarceration for a period
between 10 and 14 years may, at the option of the convicting court, be subject
to the condition that the sentence of imprisonment shall last as long as life lasts,
where there are exceptional indications of murderous recidivism and the commu-
nity cannot run the risk of the convict being at large. This takes care of judicial
apprehensions that unless physically liquidated the culprit may at some remote
time repeat murder.
Based on this premise, there have been a number of instances where the
courts have substituted a sentence of death with whole life imprisonment
or life imprisonment with restrictions on being released before completion
of a specific number of years. A judgment worth considering in this regard
is Subhash Chander v Krishan Lal and others (2001), where based on the
circumstances of the case, the Court held that for the appellant, imprison-
ment for life should mean that he remains in prison for the rest of his life.
He will not be entitled to any commutation or premature release under
section 401 of the CrPC, the Prisoners Act of 1900, a Jail Manual or any
other statute and or rules made for the purposes of grant of commutation
and remission. What makes this judgment peculiar is that the appellant
himself submitted before the Court that, if he were to be sentenced to life
imprisonment, he would never seek early release or commutation of his
sentence on any ground.
Taking its cue from its verdict in Subash Chander, the Court in Aftab
Ahmed Ansari alsas Aftab Ansari v The State of West Bengal (2014) once
again imposed a sentence of life without any possibility of remission. In
addition, in a number of cases the Court imposed sentences where it fixed
the minimum number of years the inmate must spend in prison before being
considered for remission. For instance in Shri Bhagwan v State of Rajasthan
(2001), Prakash Dhawal Khairnar (Patil) v State of Maharashtra (2002),
Ram Anup Singh and others v State of Bihar (2002), the Court directed that
the appellant would not be released from prison until he had served out at
least 20 years of imprisonment. Similarly, in Haru Ghosh v State of West
Bengal (2008), the Court thought it appropriate to pass a sentence where
the accused would have to remain in prison for a minimum of 35 years prior
to any consideration of release.
Against the backdrop of these discussions, the legislature introduced a
similar sentence into the IPC in 2013. These amendments were a response
to the huge public outcry in the wake of the 2012 Delhi rape incident,
which involved the gang rape and fatal assault on a 23-year-old woman
in a private bus (Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law 2013: i).
The death of the rape victim sparked unprecedented demonstrations across
the country demanding stronger anti-rape laws and a change to the widely
entrenched practice of blaming the victim rather than the perpetrator. Public
protests against the government led to the setting up of a judicial committee
to review the law in order to ensure quicker investigation and prosecution
of sex offenders.
After a little deliberation, and almost as a knee-jerk reaction, the Com-
mittee recommended a legislative clarification that life imprisonment must
always mean imprisonment for ‘the entire natural life of the convict’ (Com-
mittee on Amendments to Criminal Law 2013: 239). Based on the recom-
mendations made by the committee, section 376A was added to the IPC in
2013 via the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 2013. It states that a person
committing the offence of sexual assault, who inflicts an injury that causes
the death of the person or causes the person to be in a persistent vegetative
state, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment7 for a term which shall
not be less than 20 years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life,
which shall mean the remainder of that person’s natural life, or with death.
Certain other sections too were amended to include this explanation of
life imprisonment.8 However, no corresponding amendments were made to
the CrPC restraining the power of the executive to grant remission in such
cases. This left the legal position unclear. Did such sentences fall into the
category of life imprisonment without any possibility of release? Or was
this merely an affirmation of the view that life means whole life and that no
person has a right to be released after the completion of 14 years, but that
a person may seek release under the prescribed norms and procedures laid
down by state governments for seeking premature release?
While the creation of this new category of life sentences satisfied the gen-
eral public and women’s rights organisations, the lack of any real or sub-
stantive deliberation regarding an appropriate framework or guidelines to
assist judges in determining the length of sentence (Batra 2010) raised com-
plex questions regarding sentencing policy.
The Supreme Court addressed this issue at length in Swamy Shraddananda v
State of Karnataka (2008), where, after discussing a catena of judgments on
life imprisonment, the Court substituted the sentence of death with ‘impris-
onment for life’ and directed that the convicted person would not be released
7 Under Indian law imprisonment can be of two types, simple and rigorous. Only prisoners
sentenced to rigorous imprisonment can be subjected to prison labour, while those sentenced
to simple imprisonment cannot be. For more see State of Gujarat and another v Hon‘ble High
Court of Gujarat (1998).
8 Sections 370(6), 370(7), 376, 376D and 376E.
from prison for the rest of his life. It opined that a sentence of imprisonment
for a term of 14 years, that goes under the euphemism of life imprisonment
is equally, if not more, unacceptable in certain cases. It argued that there
was a very strong case for making a special category for the very few cases
where the death penalty might be substituted by the punishment of impris-
onment for life or imprisonment for a term in excess of 14 years and to put
that category beyond the application of remission. The following excerpts
of the judgment reflect the reasoning behind the Court’s opinion:
The issue of sentencing has two aspects. A sentence may be excessive and unduly
harsh or it may be highly disproportionately inadequate. When an appellant
comes to this court carrying a death sentence awarded by the trial court and con-
firmed by the High Court, this Court may find…that the case just falls short of the
rarest of the rare category and may feel somewhat reluctant in endorsing the death
sentence. But at the same time, having regard to the nature of the crime, the Court
may strongly feel that a sentence of life imprisonment that subject to remission
normally works out to a term of 14 years would be grossly disproportionate and
inadequate. What then the Court should do? If the Court’s option is limited only
to two punishments, one a sentence of imprisonment, for all intents and purposes,
of not more than 14 years and the other death, the court may feel tempted and
find itself nudged into endorsing the death penalty. Such a course would indeed
be disastrous.
A far more just, reasonable and proper course would be to expand the options
and to take over what, as a matter of fact, lawfully belongs to the court, i.e., the
vast hiatus between 14 years’ imprisonment and death. In light of the discussions
made above we are clearly of the view that there is a good and strong basis for the
Court to substitute a death sentence by life imprisonment or by a term in excess of
fourteen years and further to direct that the convict must not be released from the
prison for the rest of his life or for the actual term as specified in the order, as the
case may be. (Swamy Shraddananda v State of Karnataka 2008: para 66)
However, this line of reasoning was subsequently questioned by a two-judge
bench of the Supreme Court, in Sangeet v State of Haryana (2013: para 58):
A reading of some recent decisions delivered by this Court seems to suggest that
the remission power of the appropriate Government has effectively been nullified
by awarding sentences of 20 years, 25 years and in some cases without any remis-
sion. Is this permissible? Can this Court (or any Court for that matter) restrain
the appropriate Government from granting remission of a sentence to a convict?
What this Court has done in Swamy Shraddananda and several other cases, by
giving a sentence in a capital offence of 20 years or 30 years imprisonment with-
out remission, is to effectively injunct the appropriate Government from exercis-
ing its power of remission for the specified period. In our opinion, this issue needs
further and greater discussion, but as at present advised, we are of the opinion
that this is not permissible. The appropriate Government cannot be told that it
is prohibited from granting remission of a sentence. Similarly, a convict cannot
be told that he cannot apply for a remission in his sentence, whatever the reason.
These conflicting opinions became the subject matter of discussion in Union

of India v V Sriharan alias Murugan and others (2015), which has now
become the leading case on the matter. In it, the Supreme Court was asked
to consider whether the Court has the power to substitute the death penalty
for imprisonment for life and put this category beyond the application of
remission. Because of the divergent views expressed by different benches of
the court, and considering the wider interpretation of the provisions of the
Constitution and the Code, the Court in Union of India v V Sriharan alias
Murugan and others (2014) deemed it fit to refer the matter to the Con-
stitution Bench9 for an authoritative interpretation of law. With regard to
sentencing, the question that the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court
was asked to decide was:
[W]hether a special category of sentence may be made for the very few cases where
the death penalty might be substituted by the punishment of imprisonment for life
or imprisonment for a term in excess of fourteen years and to put that category
beyond application of remission? (Sriharan 2015: para 1)
On 2 November 2015, the Constitution Court delivered its judgment by
answering the question in the affirmative, thereby upholding the ratio in
Swamy and overruling Sangeet. However, the verdict was not unanimous,
with two out of the five judges dissenting on this aspect.
The Court pinned the legitimacy of the imposition of such sentences
on a number of arguments. First and foremost, the legality of such sen-
tences lies within the interpretation of the legal provisions itself. According
to the Court, the IPC does not prescribe any prohibition on the imposi-
tion of imprisonment for any specific period within the prisoner’s life span.
Moreover, section 433A of the CrPC only provides for the minimum term
of imprisonment a prisoner must complete before the state can grant him
remission, thus leaving it open to the courts to impose a maximum term of
imprisonment in heinous cases. The Court opined that when the Constitu-
tion entrusted the task of adjudicating criminal cases to the institution of the
judiciary, then it is well within the power of the court to impose a sentence
of life imprisonment for the entirety of one’s life. This reasoning is high-
lighted in the observation by the Court:
Therefore, when in a case where the judicial mind after weighing the pros and
cons of the crime committed in a golden scale and keeping in mind the paramount
interest of the society and to safeguard it from the unmindful conduct of such
offenders, takes a decision to ensure that such offenders don’t deserve to be let
loose in the society for a certain period, can it be said that such a decision is imper-
missible in law. (Sriharan 2015: para 77)
The Court further claimed that, by legitimising such sentences, it was not
trying to belittle executive action by the state in the exercise of its statutory
9 As per Art 145(3) of the Constitution of India of 1950.

power of remission. The Court was attempting to ensure that when it comes
to the question of equation with a judicial pronouncement, such executive
action should give due weight and respect to the latter in order to achieve
the goals set out in the Constitution. Thus, in cases where, after a detailed
analysis, having regard to the proportionality of the crime committed, a
court had decided that the offender deserved to be punished with a sentence
of life imprisonment until death or for a specific period such a sentence
should survive unscathed. The Court reiterated (at para 78):
Therefore, in order to ensure that such punishment imposed, which is legally pro-
vided for in the Indian Penal Code read along with Criminal Procedure Code
to operate without any interruption, the inherent power of the Court concerned
should empower the Court in public interest as well as in the interest of the society
at large to make it certain that such punishment imposed will operate as imposed
by stating that no remission or other such liberal approach come into effect to
nullify such imposition.
Secondly, legitimacy was also sought by emphasising victims’ rights over
and above those of the accused. The Court opined that, while considering
the principles of penology, one should not overlook the plight of victims and
the sufferings of the people who die or are maimed at the hands of crimi-
nals. The Court considered the reformative aspect of penology, the notion of
giving lifers a ‘ray of hope’, but rejected the idea outright, observing that
… it must be stated that such ray of hope was much more for the victims who were
done to death and whose dependents were to suffer the aftermath with no solace
left. Therefore, when the dreams of such victims in whatever manner and extent
it was planned, with reference to oneself, his or her dependents and everyone sur-
rounding him was demolished in an unmindful and in some cases in a diabolic
manner in total violation of the Rule of Law which is prevailing in an organized
society, they cannot be heard to say only their rays of hope should prevail and
kept intact. … Therefore, we find no scope to apply the concept of ray of hope to
come for the rescue of such hardened, heartless offenders, which if considered in
their favour will only result in misplaced sympathy and again will be not be in the
interest of the society. Therefore, we reject the said argument outright. (Sriharan
2015: para 88)
This emphasis on victims can also be perceived in the Court’s observations
on the compatibility of such sentences with Article 21 of the Constitution.
The Court reiterated the observations made in Maru Ram v Union of India
(1980) and categorically stated (at para 72):
A person who has deprived another person completely of his liberty forever and
has endangered the liberty of his family has no right to ask the court to uphold
his liberty. Liberty is not a one-sided concept, nor does Article 21 of the Consti-
tution contemplate such a concept. If a person commits a criminal offence and
punishment has been given to him by a procedure established by law which is free
and fair and where the accused has been fully heard, no question of violation of
Article 21 arises when the question of punishment is being considered. … Thus, it

seems to me that while considering the problem of penology we should not over-
look the plight of victimology and the sufferings of the people who die, suffer or
are maimed at the hands of criminals.
Having thus established the legitimacy of such sentences, the Court went
on to lay down certain guidelines for their imposition. It made clear that
such sentences could only be imposed in those cases where the death sen-
tence could be awarded, namely in sections 120B(1), 121, 132, 194, 195A,
302, 305, 307(2), 376A, 376E, 396 and 364A of the IPC. In addition, the
power to impose a modified punishment providing for any specific term of
incarceration or till the end of the prisoner’s life as an alternate to the death
penalty can be exercised only by the High Court and the Supreme Court
and not by any other court. Thus, a sentence of life imprisonment without
remission can be imposed only in cases where the sentencing court in the
first instance awarded the death penalty, and which cases have subsequently
come to the High Court for confirmation.10
As the law stands now, India has effectively legitimised sentences that
may run for the remainder of a person’s natural life. Such persons have no
right to claim statutory remission from the executive. They can, however,
invoke the constitutional powers of the executive under Articles 72 and 161
of the Constitution to seek commutation of their sentence.
IV. LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT REMISSION: A STEP BACKWARDS
To lock up a prisoner for the rest of his life, taking away from him any hope
of release and ignoring his capacity for redemption and rehabilitation, is to
the serious detriment of human rights and human dignity. Though public
protection, retribution and deterrence have been identified as raisons d’être
for the imposition of whole life sentences and its grass-root popularity as
an alternative to the death penalty (see Appleton and Grøver 2007), there is
nothing to say that these considerations cannot be found in a sentence of life
imprisonment that allows for a review of the sentence after a certain period.
The approach taken in Sriharan, is retributive, with all arguments on
reformation being rejected outright. There are many flaws in the reason-
ing behind Sriharan. This may be why two of the five judges dissented on
this issue and delivered a separate judgment. In the following sections, the
lacunae in the reasoning adopted by the Court in arriving at its verdict are
discussed in the light of this dissent.
10 As per Chapter XXVIII of the CrPC, when the court of sessions passes a sentence of
death, the proceedings are submitted to the High Court for confirmation.
A. Existence or Lack of Statutory Framework
Even though an attempt has been made to interpret the statutory provisions
to legitimise sentences of life imprisonment without remission, the argu-
ments lack substance on many fronts. First, if one can read a sentence of
life imprisonment without remission into the statute, then why should the
sentencing courts be prohibited from awarding them? The Court contends
that the sentence can be imposed while remaining within the provisions in
the statute itself. If this were true then there should be no prohibition upon
the sentencing courts to impose such a sentence.
Secondly, if the legislature had so intended, it would have accepted the
recommendations made by the Committee on Reforms of the Criminal Jus-
tice System in 2003,11 or there would have been corresponding amendments
to the CrPC after the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 2013 came into
force, following the recommendation of the Committee on Amendments to
Criminal Law (2013).
Thirdly, the interpretation of the hiatus between the death sentence and
life imprisonment is also self-contradictory. On the one hand, the Court
reaffirms that a sentence of life imprisonment means detention until the end
of one’s natural life, on the other hand it talks about the hiatus between the
death sentence and life imprisonment which is equated at 14 years. Either
there is such a gap or there isn’t.
And if there is no statutory framework, how far is it justified for the
courts to impose such a punishment? The court has, in a number of judg-
ments, refrained from treading into this sphere. In Prem Chand Garg and
another v Excise Commissioner, UP and others (1963), the Court observed
that while its powers are no doubt very wide and they are intended to be
and will always be exercised in the interest of justice, any order that the
court makes must not only be consistent with the fundamental rights guar-
anteed by the Constitution, but it also cannot be inconsistent with the sub-
stantive provisions of the relevant statutory laws. More recently in 2015, in
Vikram Singh alias Vicky and another v Union of India and others (2015),
the Court had observed that prescribing punishment is the function of the
legislature and not the courts. By accepting this, courts show deference to
the legislative will and wisdom. They are therefore slow to upset enacted
provisions dealing with the quantum of punishment prescribed for different
offences.
In sum, the interpretation of the statutory framework to include life
imprisonment without remission is unreasonable. It should be reconsidered.
11 See Committee of Reforms on Criminal Justice System (2003) Ch 14.7.

B. Assumption of Early Release in 14 Years: The Reality
While the court has almost always asserted that there is no vested right to be
released after the completion of 14 years, in Sriharan, as in Swamy, we see
that the presumption is that lifers are released upon completion of 14 years.
Interestingly, no reliance has been placed on any statistical data to support
this proposition. The only statistics to which the Court refers in its 174 page
verdict were from the 1970s, and only for the number of murders that took
place against the number of persons hanged.
While the unavailability of detailed national data in this regard only adds
to the lack of clarity,12 the courts have always had the option of seeking
reports from all states if it so required. Prison statistics show that 4,146 lif-
ers13 were released early during 2013. This figure is quite low, amounting
only to 5.86 per cent of all cases (National Crime Records Bureau 2013:
91).
Let us also review data from one state, West Bengal.14 Data from 2011 to
2013 indicates that, of the 590 applications that were made by life prisoners
during this period for premature release, recommendations for release were
made only in 290 cases, and only in 254 was the sentence actually remitted.
Also of the 44 inmates whose sentences were remitted early during 2014:15
— two inmates had completed more than 26 years’ imprisonment;
— eight inmates completed more than 24 years’ imprisonment;
— three inmates completed more than 23 years’ imprisonment;
— two inmates completed more than 22 years’ imprisonment;
— four inmates completed 21 years’ imprisonment;
— five inmates completed more than 20 years’ imprisonment;
— 15 inmates completed more than 19 years’ imprisonment;
— 12 inmates completed more than 18 years’ imprisonment; and
— three inmates completed more than 16 years’ imprisonment.
These data indicate, first, that not all applications that are made for pre-
mature release are accepted by the competent authority. Secondly, none
12 The Prison Statistics India, which is compiled by the National Crime Record Bureau has
information on how many persons are undergoing life imprisonment at the end of each year
and how many persons were released prematurely. It does not, however, provide informa-
tion on the period of detention of life sentence prisoners nor how many lifers were released
prematurely.
13 The data refer to inmates but from the context it is clear that it means life sentence
prisoners.
14 Data provided by personal communications from Directorate of Correctional Services,
West Bengal, India between years 2009 and 2015 (on file with the author).
15 Data provided by personal communications from Directorate of Correctional Services,
West Bengal, India (on file with the author).

of the inmates whose sentences were remitted served only 14 years of

imprisonment. While this represents the situation in only one state, there are
no indications to suggest that the story would be different in other states.
This aspect was also discussed in the Law Commission of India’s report
on the death penalty, which observed in the concluding remarks that life
imprisonment under Indian law means imprisonment until death subject to
just remissions which, in many states in cases of serious crimes, are granted
only after many years of imprisonment, ranging from 30 to 60 years (Law
Commission of India 2015: 213). Therefore, to say that in India a sentence
of life imprisonment equates to a sentence of 14 years is not only a miscon-
ception, but will most likely not be substantiated by any statistics.
Another argument in support of this proposition is that, even though the
grant of remission is statutory, certain checks have been built into it to pre-
vent arbitrary decision- making. To ensure that the checks are adhered to, the
Supreme Court has held in a number of decisions that the power of remission
cannot be exercised arbitrarily, and that the decision to grant remission has
to be well informed, reasonable and fair to all concerned (Mohinder Singh v
State of Punjab 2013 and Sangeet and another v State of Haryana 2013). An
advisory to this effect was also circulated by the Ministry of Home Affairs in
2013, requesting states to scrupulously follow the procedural and substan-
tive checks prescribed under statutory law, while considering whether to
grant remission on a case-by-case basis and not in a wholesale manner.
Thus, it is not possible to conclude that a sentence of life imprisonment
is normally a sentence of 14 years. Reliance upon this notion in Sriharan
only highlights the sense of distrust the courts seem to have for the execu-
tive, in as much as its power to grant remission is concerned. The Court in
Sriharan has discussed at length the lack of uniformity in the granting of
remission, but not once discussed the need to frame guidelines for the grant-
ing of remission by the executive. This argument is also made in the dissent-
ing opinion delivered by Justice UU Lalit, who stated that, if the experience
in practice shows that remissions are granted in an unsound manner, the
matter can be corrected by judicial review. He further stated that, ‘after
completion of the statutory period of 14 years, it is for the executive to
consider and pass appropriate orders. Such orders would inter alia consider
not only the gravity of the crime but also other circumstances, including
whether the prisoner has now been [rehabilitated] and is ready to be assimi-
lated in society. In such circumstances it would not be proper to prohibit
such consideration by the executive’.
This sense of distrust in the decision-making process of the executive in
granting remission, and the belief that the inmate, irrespective of the gravity
and nature of crime committed, will be released after 14 years’ imprison-
ment are ill founded. One should not be swayed by such subjective beliefs
while pronouncing judgments that will have far-reaching consequences for
the criminal justice system of a nation.
C. Practical Implications
Throughout the verdict in Sriharan (2015), there were constant references

to victims and to setting the balance right, but there was no discussion what-
soever of the practical implications of the verdict on lifers and death row
prisoners across India. After this decision, will every death row prisoner
approach the appellate courts with a sense of fear? Would he stand a better
chance of being granted remission under section 433A CrPC, rather than
running the risk of getting his sentence commuted to one of life imprison-
ment without remission? The order leaves death row prisoners in a better
position than lifers, as it gives the former a better chance of early release
from prison than the latter. This aspect was highlighted in the dissenting
opinion (at para 70):
Further, in theory it is possible to say that even in cases where court were to find
that the offence belonged to the category of ‘rarest of rare’ and deserved death
penalty, such death convicts can still be granted benefit under Section 432/433 of
CrPC. In fact, Section 433A contemplates such a situation. On the other hand, if
the court were to find that the case did not belong to the ‘rarest of rare’ category
and were to put the matter beyond any remissions, the prisoner in the latter cat-
egory would stand being denied the benefit which even the prisoner of the level
of a death convict could possibly be granted under Section 432/433 of the CrPC.
The one who in the opinion of the Court deserved death sentence can thus get the
benefit but the one whose case fell short to meet the criteria of ‘rarest of rare’ and
the Court was hesitant to grant death sentence, would languish in Jail for entirety
of his life, without any remission.
Moreover, those prisoners who had their death sentences commuted to life
imprisonment by the High Court and were considering appealing to the
Supreme Court claiming innocence, might not choose to go down that road
anymore. With a high risk of being sentenced to life imprisonment without
remission, they might choose to serve out their sentence of life imprison-
ment with ordinary considerations for remission, lest they lose on appeal
and the Supreme Court commutes the sentence to life without remission.
Also, this verdict might have a trickle-down effect. Sentencing courts
could use the death sentence more liberally, knowing that the High Court
can commute the same into life imprisonment without remission sentences;
thus ensuring that the accused would never be released. This would indi-
rectly increase the number of cases where death sentences are awarded, even
where they might not meet the ‘rarest of rare’ criteria (Bachan Singh v State
of Punjab 1980).
Another aspect of the judgment is its complete disregard for the finer
details of how life sentences are implemented. All the attention has been
on life imprisonment and remission, but there is no discussion of parole or
furlough, and suspension or reprieve from life sentences and whether there
would be any prohibitions on these too. It almost seems as if the judges did
not seem to have working knowledge about the functioning of the system.
And this contributes to making the verdict fundamentally impractical.
D. An Alternative to the Death Sentence
No sentence should be defended just on the basis of it being the next best
alternative to another sentence, without questioning the merits of the sen-
tence itself. This is precisely what has been done in both Sriharan and
Swamy, where this option was explored only on the premise of reducing
the hiatus between the sentence of death and a sentence of life imprison-
ment that is presumably for 14 years. Emphasis was placed on adopting a
course where ‘heartless, hardened, money minded, lecherous, paid assas-
sins’ (Sriharan 2015: para 69) are not awarded the death penalty, but at the
same time may be kept incarcerated in order to protect the common man
and society at large. Thus, at all points the Court was looking to create a
sentence that would affectively replace the death penalty.
While the irreversible nature of a death sentence was considered, no refer-
ence was made to the ill effects of a whole life sentence. The ramifications
of a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of release are many;
however, none of this finds mention in any of the court’s judgments on this
issue. While the court has discussed at length the constitutionality of the
death sentence (Bachan Singh v State of Punjab 1980), no emphasis has
been placed on the impact on the prisoner of a sentence of life imprisonment
without remission.
Moreover, strangely, no reference has been made in the verdict to the Law
Commission of India’s report on the death penalty (Law Commission of
India 2015). The report, while recommending the abolition of death penalty
for all offences apart from terrorism-related offences, did not even discuss
the possibility of replacing it with a sentence of life imprisonment without
remission.
At this juncture, one must discuss the true meaning of a sentence of life
imprisonment without remission. To a large extent such sentences can be
equated to a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
(LWOP), popular in the USA and elsewhere. LWOP entails a sentence of
imprisonment where the sentence cannot be suspended, deferred or com-
muted by any judicial authority or by any board, prison terms, parole or
sentence review, thus confining the person to prison for the rest of his life
(Appleton and Grøver 2007). It has been stated that among the various
forms of life sentences, LWOP can be regarded as the ‘penultimate penalty’
(Wright 1991) or the ‘severest sanction’ (Appleton and Grøver 2007) that a
court can ever pass in the absence of the death penalty. It is a sentence of life
for ‘life’, as persons so sentenced spend the entire remaining span of their
lives in prison, saddled with all the restrictions that flow from incarceration.
LWOP may be perceived as a harsher punishment than death, as the

position of a person sentenced to LWOP can be compared to one on an
indefinite death row,16 where the prisoner is destroyed by the wait for death
long before he really dies. In either case—a death sentence or LWOP—death
comes while under the control of state authority, whereas in the first instance
it is predetermined, in the latter it is a future unknown date (Sheleff 1987).
Thus, a long-term prisoner denied the chance of early release might well be
considered to be in as bad a condition as someone condemned to execution.
Though very few countries around the world have substituted LWOP as
a mandatory penalty to replace capital punishment (Appleton and Grøver
2007), LWOP has gained acceptance in some parts of the world as a severe
penalty that can be imposed in lieu of a sentence of death. This too seems
to be the case in the Indian context as well, as is apparent from the view of
the Court on this issue.
E. Penological Considerations
Major modern international human rights instruments do not deal with

sentencing directly. Punishment finds mention in the negative sense in that
cruel, unusual, inhuman and degrading punishments are outlawed, and in
a positive sense in that they cast a positive duty on the state to structure its
penal systems with the ‘rehabilitation’ of sentenced adult prisoners as an
objective. Important international instruments to which India has acceded,
such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
not only require State Parties to ‘treat all persons deprived of their liberty
with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human per-
son’ but also emphasise their positive duty to structure their penal systems
with the ‘social rehabilitation’ of sentenced prisoners as their primary objec-
tive (Article 10 of the ICCPR).
This notion is also reflected under Indian law. While Article 21 of the
Indian Constitution enshrines the right to live with human dignity,17 the
reformative approach is reflected in the observations made by the Court in
Mohammad Giasuddin v State of Andhra Pradesh (1977: paras 5, 20):
Progressive criminologists across the world will agree that the Gandhian diagnosis
of offenders as patients and his conception of prisons as hospitals—mental and
moral—is the key to the pathology of delinquency and the therapeutic role of
punishment.
16 A survey among death row inmates, found that LWOP is considered a worse sanction
than death (Wright 1991).

17 In Francis Coralie Mullin v Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi (1981), the Court
held that the right to life enshrined in Art 21 cannot be restricted to mere animal existence. It
means something much more than just physical survival. The right to life includes the right to
live with human dignity.
Modern penology regards crime and criminal as equally material when the right
sentence has to be picked out. It turns the focus not only on the crime, but also on
the criminal and seeks to personalise the punishment so that the reformist compo-
nent is as much operative as the deterrent element.
The emphasis on reformation can also be found in the components of a
proper sentence as summed up by the Law Commission of India (1972: 56):
A proper sentence is a composite of many factors, including the nature of the
offence, the circumstances—extenuating or aggravating—of the offence, the prior
criminal record, if any, of the offender, the age of the offender, the professional
and social record of the offender, the background of the offender with reference
to education, home life, sobriety and social adjustment, the emotional and mental
condition of the offender, the prospect for the re-habilitation of the offender, the
possibility of a return of the offender to normal life in the community, the pos-
sibility of treatment or of training of the offender, the possibility that the sentence
may serve as a deterrent to crime by this offender, or by others and the present
community need, if any for such a deterrent in respect to the particular type of
offence involved.
In addition to numerous judicial pronouncements of the Supreme Court,18
the recent Law Commission of India (2015) report on the death penalty has
emphasised that offenders are capable of change, and that once the circum-
stances that led to the commission of the crime are removed, they can lead
normal lives.
However, none of these ideological or humane considerations have found
their way into the judgment in Sriharan, with the Court refusing to accept
the possibility of reformation of a prisoner. This can be construed from the
following rhetorical question:
[S]hould the country take the risk of innocent lives being lost at the hands of
criminals committing heinous crimes in the holy hope or wishful thinking that one
day or the other, a criminal, however dangerous or callous he may be, will reform
himself? (Sriharan 2015: para 72)
Additionally, emphasis was placed on the lack of necessary facilities, educa-
tion and climate for ensuring reformation of an offender. Regrettably, this
was based an observation made by the Court in 1980, in Maru Ram (at
1251):
It is true that there appears to be a modern trend of giving punishment a colour
of reformation so that stress may be laid on the reformation of the criminal rather
than his confinement in jail which is an ideal objective. At the same time, it cannot
be gainsaid that such an objective cannot be achieved without mustering the nec-
essary facilities, the requisite education and the appropriate climate which must
18 For detail see Sunil Batra v Delhi Admn (1978); Bachan Singh v State of Punjab (1980);
Maru Ram v Union of India (1980); Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v State of
Maharashtra (2009).
be created to foster a sense of repentance and penitence in a criminal so that he

may undergo such a mental or psychological revolution that he realizes the conse-
quences of playing with human lives. In the world of today and particularly in our
country, this ideal is yet to be achieved and, in fact, with all our efforts it will take
us a long time to reach this sacred goal.
It is peculiar that the Court relied on an observation made 35 years ago,
instead of considering the facilities available for reformation in the present
day. A close examination of the statistics (National Crime Records Bureau
2014: 164) would have revealed that the expenditure incurred by all federal
states during the year 2014–2015 on vocational/educational training and
welfare activities was 219.75 million rupees (approximately US$3.3 million).
This is in contrast to the statistics for 1995,19 where the total expenditure on
both counts was merely 6.6 million rupees (approximately US$0.99 million)
(National Crime Records Bureau 1995: 81). If in 1995 the amount was so
frugal, then one can only assume that in the 1980s, when the Maru Ram
verdict was delivered, the expenditure incurred by states towards rehabilita-
tive facilities would have been negligible, if not nil. To base an opinion on
such dated observations, without properly verifying the subsequent devel-
opments, is unacceptable. The approach of the Court appears to have been
anachronistic.
Another important aspect that is missing is that of ensuring uniformity
and consistency in imposing sentences of life imprisonment without remis-
sion. While the Court admitted that there has been lack of uniformity when
imposing death sentences in India,20 no framework or guidelines were dis-
cussed that would ensure consistency when imposing life sentences without
remission. Unless the Court also reviews this aspect, it will result in prison-
ers being sentenced to varied lengths of imprisonment in a highly inconsist-
ent manner.
V. CONCLUSION
At a time when the punishment of life imprisonment per se is being chal-

lenged, the debate in India regarding life imprisonment without remission
as an acceptable alternative to the death penalty is anachronistic. It appears
to be a step backwards towards the retributive theory of criminal justice.
While the Supreme Court has supported the move away from impos-
ing capital punishment, in its haste it has paid no attention to the ground
on which the alternative of unrestricted life imprisonment is constructed.
This may very well turn out to be quicksand, which may swallow the very
19 The National Crime Record Bureau published the first Prison Statistics India in 1995.
20 The Court placed reliance on a report compiled jointly by Amnesty International India
and People’s Union for Civil Liberties, Tamil Nadu (2008).
constitutional values that we have come to cherish. Regrettably, the Court

has failed to take into account the consequences of an unrestricted period
of incarceration on the physical and psychological well-being of a prisoner.
By deeply distrusting the potential of people to change and failing to rec-
ognise that constant striving towards self-improvement has been central to
social change, Indian penal policy seems to be slipping backwards towards
the retributive goals of punishment, instead of being progressive and creat-
ing an environment conducive to reform.
What underlies Sriharan is the strong sense that sentencing is an end in
itself, with no consideration of the consequences. With no hope of release,
what will be the incentive for a prisoner to live each day? What will moti-
vate him to change? Would he prefer to end his life himself, instead of ‘dying
a bit inside’ each day? Furthermore, as has been quoted in Mauer, King and
Young (2004: 1):
A crime prevention policy which accepts keeping a prisoner for life even if he is no
longer a danger to society would be compatible neither with modern principles on
the treatment of prisoners during the execution of their sentence nor with the idea
of the reintegration of offenders into society.
The recent judicial discourse on life imprisonment in India has raised many
issues that must be addressed if human dignity is to prevail over purely
retributive and deterrence based ideologies. One can only hope that the
Indian Supreme Court will reconsider these aspects soon, but until it does,
the sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of remission is here to
stay.
REFERENCES
Amnesty International India and People’s Union for Civil Liberties, Tamil
Nadu (2008) Lethal Lottery, the Death Penalty in India. Available online
at www.amnesty.org/en/report/info/ASA20/007/2008 (accessed 1 October
2015).
Appleton, C and Grøver, B (2007) ‘The Pros and Cons of Life without
Parole’ British Journal of Criminology, 47, 597.
Batra, B (2010) ‘Life imprisonment and premature release: Nalini’s case is a
timely reminder’. Available online at www.lawandotherthings.blogspot.
co.uk/2010/03/life-imprisonment-premature-release.html (accessed 1
October 2015).
Bureau for Police Research and Development (2003) Model
Prison Manual 2003. Available online at www.bprd.nic.in/write
readdata/linkimages/1445424768-content%20%20chapters.pdf (accessed
1 October 015).
Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law (2013) Report of the Commit-

tee on Amendments to Criminal Law available online at www.thehindu.
com/multimedia/archive/01340/Justice_Verma_Comm_1340438a.pdf
(accessed 16 December 2015).
Committee on Reforms of Criminal Justice System (2003) Report, vol 1,
Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. Available online at
www.mha.nic.in/hindi/sites/upload_files/mhahindi/files/pdf/criminal_
justice_system.pdf, (accessed 1 October 2015).
Law Commission of India (1972), The Trial and Punishment of Social
and Economic Offences, Report No 47. Available online at www.law-
commissionofindia.nic.in/1-50/report47.pdf (accessed 18 December
2015).
––— (2014) Consultation Paper on Capital Punishment. Available online
at www.lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/views/Consultation%20Paper-
Capital%20Punishment.doc (accessed 19 December 2015).
––— (2015) The Death Penalty, Report No. 262. Available online at www.
lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/Report262.pdf (accessed 1 October
2015).
Mauer, M, King, R and Young, MC (2004) The Meaning of ‘Life’: Long
Prison Sentences in Context. Available online at www.sentencingproject.
org/doc/publications/inc_meaningoflife.pdf (accessed 1 October 2015).
Ministry of Home Affairs (2013) ‘Advisory on Section 433 A of Cr.P.C
and Restriction on powers of remission or commutation in certain cases’
Advisory No. V-17013/2/2013-PR. Available online at www.mha1.nic.in/
PrisonReforms/pdf/Advisory%20on%20433A_0.pdf, (accessed 1 October
2015).
National Crime Records Bureau (1995) Prison Statistics India. Available
online at www.ncrb.nic.in/prisonstatisticarchieve/data/Prison1995/
Prison1995.htm (accessed 19 December 2015).
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PSI-2013/PrisonStat2013.htm (accessed 1 October 2015).
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PSI-2014rev1/PrisonStat2014rev1 (accessed 19 December 2015).
National Human Rights Commission (2003) Guidelines on Premature
Release of Prisoners. Available online at www.nhrc.nic.in/documents/
prematurerelease.pdf (accessed 1 October 2015).
Sheleff, L (1987) Ultimate Penalties: Capital Punishment, Life Imprison-
ment, Physical Torture (Columbus, Ohio State University Press).
Van Zyl Smit, D (2002) Taking Life Imprisonment Seriously in National
and International Law (The Hague, Kluwer Law International).
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Law Bulletin 27, 334.
TABLE OF CASES
Aftab Ahmed Ansari alias Aftab Ansari v The State of West Bengal (2014)
Criminal Appeal Nos 1242–1243 of 2010
Bachan Singh v State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684
CA Pious v State of Kerala (2007) 8 SCC 312
Dalbir Singh and others v State of Punjab (1979) 3 SCC 745
Francis Coralie Mullin v Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi AIR 1981
SC 746
Gopal Vinayak Godse v State of Maharashtra AIR 1961 SC 600
Haru Ghosh v State of West Bengal Criminal Appeal No 1173 of 2008
Kamalanantha v State of Tamil Nadu (2005) 5 SCC 194
Maru Ram v Union of India AIR 1980 SC 2147
Mohammad Giasuddin v State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1977 SC 1926
Mohd Munna v Union of India (2005) 7 SCC 417
Mohinder Singh v State of Punjab (2013) 3 SCC 294
Naskar (Life Convict) v State of WB (2000) 7 SCC 626
Prakash Dhawal Khairnar (Patil) v State of Maharashtra (2002) 2 SCC 35
Prem Chand Garg and another v Excise Commissioner, UP and others 1963
AIR 996
Ram Anup Singh and others v State of Bihar (2002) 6 SCC 686
Sangeet and another v State of Haryana (2013) 2 SCC 452
Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v State of Maharashtra (2009) 6
SCC 498
Shri Bhagwan v State of Rajasthan (2001) 6 SCC 296
State of Gujarat and another v Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat AIR 1998
SC 3164
State of Madhya Pradesh v Ratan Singh 1976 (3) SCC 470
Subhash Chander v Krishan Lal and others (2001) 4 SCC 458
Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (1978) 4 SCC 494
Swamy Shraddananda v State of Karnataka (2008) 13 SCC 767
Union of India v Sriharan alias Murugan and others, 25 April 2014 WP
(Crl) No 48 of 2014
Union of India v Sriharan alias Murugan and others, 2 December 2015 WP
(Crl) No 48 of 2014
Vikram Singh alias Vicky and another v Union of India and others AIR
2015 SC 3577
Zahid Hussein v State of West Bengal (2001) 3 SCC 750

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Dhanuka, Madhurima. "A New Form of Life Imprisonment for India?.

" Life Imprisonment and

Downloaded from Bloomsbury Collections, www.bloomsburycollections.com, 18 August 2021,

Access provided by: Marwadi University Rajkot

II. LIFE IMPRISONMENT: BASICS

International Criminal Court.

In addition to the constitutional powers to remit, the executive has been

see National Human Rights Commission (2003).

A. Life Means ‘Life’?

III. ADVENT OF A NEW SENTENCING POLICY—LIFE IMPRISONMENT

These conflicting opinions became the subject matter of discussion in Union

9 As per Art 145(3) of the Constitution of India of 1950.

Article 21 arises when the question of punishment is being considered. … Thus, it

IV. LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT REMISSION: A STEP BACKWARDS

A. Existence or Lack of Statutory Framework

11 See Committee of Reforms on Criminal Justice System (2003) Ch 14.7.

B. Assumption of Early Release in 14 Years: The Reality

West Bengal, India (on file with the author).

of the inmates whose sentences were remitted served only 14 years of

Throughout the verdict in Sriharan (2015), there were constant references

D. An Alternative to the Death Sentence

LWOP may be perceived as a harsher punishment than death, as the

Major modern international human rights instruments do not deal with

than death (Wright 1991).

be created to foster a sense of repentance and penitence in a criminal so that he

At a time when the punishment of life imprisonment per se is being chal-

constitutional values that we have come to cherish. Regrettably, the Court

Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law (2013) Report of the Commit-

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