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Hasegawa vs. Giron - Probable Cause - Kidnapping
Hasegawa vs. Giron - Probable Cause - Kidnapping
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify the Decision 1 dated
30 June 2008 and Resolution 2 dated 18 September 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100091. The appellate court reversed and
set aside the Resolutions of the Department of Justice (DOJ), which
dismissed respondent Leila F. Giron’s complaint for kidnapping and
serious illegal detention against petitioner Masayuki Hasegawa.
While inside the vehicle, they were blindfolded and gagged. They were
taunted and repeatedly threatened by their abductors into withdrawing
the case against petitioner. When her blindfold was loosened, respondent
was able to take a good look at her surroundings. She noticed that the car
was parked in a warehouse with concrete walls and high roof. She also
saw four vehicles parked outside. She finally saw three men wearing
bonnets over their faces: the first one, seated beside her; the second one,
seated in front; and the third one, was standing near the parked vehicles.4
Before respondent and Marcos were released, they were once again
threatened by a man who said: "pag tinuloy nyo pa kaso kay Hasegawa,
may paglalagyan na kayo, walang magsusumbong sa pulis, pag nalaman
namin na lumapit kayo, babalikan namin kayo." They were released at
around 11:00 p.m. on 18 July 2006 and dropped off in Susana Heights in
Muntinlupa.5
3. It is strange that respondent and Marcos did not know who their
lawyer’s messenger is and did not find it unusual that their lawyer
would call for a meeting in Harrison Plaza Mall instead of at his
office;
10. It was very convenient for Marcos to mention that she saw
petitioner inside one of the vehicles talking to one of the abductors.
If indeed petitioner is involved in the kidnapping, he would never
allow his identity to be exposed;
Petitioner asserted that respondent and Marcos are extorting money from
him because the instant case was filed right after the negotiations to
settle the civil aspect of the three cases they filed with the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID), National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) and MeTC Pasay failed.9
The motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied by the Court
of Appeals in its Resolution14 dated 18 September 2008. Hence, the
instant petition attributing the following errors to the Court of Appeals,
to wit:
I.
II.
III.
Petitioner insists that there was no showing that the Secretary of Justice
acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that no probable cause
exists to indict him for the crimes charged. Petitioner asserts that the
Secretary of Justice clearly and sufficiently explained the reasons why
no probable cause exists in this case. Petitioner faults the appellate court
for also having done what it has charged the Secretary of Justice of
doing, i.e., deliberating point by point the issues and arguments raised by
the parties in its Decision. Petitioner also faults the appellate court for
overlooking the fact that the kidnapping and serious illegal detention
charges are but the fourth in a series of successive cases filed by
respondent against petitioner, all of which were dismissed by the BID,
NLRC and MeTC of Pasay City. Petitioner argues that a review of facts
and evidence made by the appellate court is not the province of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Finally, petitioner contends that the
appellate court should have dismissed outright respondent’s petition for
certiorari for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and for being the
wrong mode of appeal.
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on
the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged
was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It is a reasonable
ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded on such
a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of
ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or
strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual or
positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based
on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does
not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.19
It may not even matter that the respondent presented his own counter-
arguments in avoidance of the complaints, assuming he also did so
adeptly, convincingly; far crucial is discerning that the task transcended
mere discovery of the likelihood or the "probability" that a crime was
committed, but ventured into weighing evidence beyond any reasonable
doubt. Indeed, the respondent Secretary arrogated upon himself the
functions of the judge by demanding more than a sampling, but for
pieces of evidence that were understandably not there yet, being suited
to a trial proper.23
Thus, did the Court of Appeals detail why the holding that there is no
probable cause to indict petitioner amounted to grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the DOJ. Resort by respondent to the extraordinary writ of
certiorari and the grant thereof by the Court of Appeals is correct.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL
ARTURO D. BRION
CASTILLO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer or the opinion or
the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Barselas, Jr. with
Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Vicente S. E.
Veloso, concurring. Rollo pp. 16-33.
2
Id. at 36.
3
Id. at 160-161.
4
Id. at 162.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 432-435.
7
Id. at 174.
8
Id. at 175-183.
9
Id. at 46.
10
Id. at 48
11
Id. at 228-241.
12
Id. at 30.
13
Id. at 30-31.
14
Id. at 36.
15
Id. at 58.
16
Id. at 680.
17
Chong v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 184948, 21 July 2009, 593 SCRA
311, 314-315.
18
Baviera v. Prosecutor Paglinawan, 544 Phil. 107, 120-121
(2007).
19
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Gonzales, G.R. No.
180165, 7 April 2009, 584 SCRA 631, 640-641 citing Yu v.
Sandiganbayan, 410 Phil. 619, 627 (2001).
20
Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr., G.R. No. 172829, 18 July 2012, 677
SCRA 113, 120-121 citing Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc.,
G.R. No. 171435, 30 July 2008, 560 SCRA 518, 534-535.
21
Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim, G.R. No. 174168, 30 March 2009,
582 SCRA 517, 530.
22
Clay & Feather International, Inc. v. Lichaytoo, G.R. No.
193105, 30 May 2011, 649 SCRA 516, 525-526 citing Andres v.
Justice Secretary Cuevas, 499 Phil. 36, 49-50 (2005) and
Quiambao v. Hon. Desierto, 481 Phil. 852, 866 (2004).
23
Rollo, pp. 29-30.