SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 184536               August 14, 2013

MASAYUKI HASEGAWA, Petitioner,

vs.
LEILA F. GIRON, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify the Decision 1 dated
30 June 2008 and Resolution 2 dated 18 September 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100091. The appellate court reversed and
set aside the Resolutions of the Department of Justice (DOJ), which
dismissed respondent Leila F. Giron’s complaint for kidnapping and
serious illegal detention against petitioner Masayuki Hasegawa.

On 16 September 2006, respondent filed a Complaint Affidavit for

Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention against petitioner and several
John Does. Respondent alleged that sometime on December 2005, she
and her officemate, Leonarda Marcos (Marcos) filed a complaint
against their employer Pacific Consultants International, J.F. Cancio &
Associates, Jaime F. Cancio, Tesa Tagalo and petitioner for illegal
salary deductions, non-payment of 13th month pay, and non-
remittance of SSS contributions. Respondent averred that since the
filing of said complaint, they have been subjected to threats and verbal
abuse by petitioner to pressure them to withdraw the complaint.
Respondent had also filed separate complaints for grave threats, grave
coercion, slander and unjust vexation against petitioner. Said cases are
pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay City.

Respondent recalled that on 17 July 2006, she received a call from an

alleged messenger of her counsel who requested for a meeting at
Harrison Plaza Mall in Manila. She asked Marcos to accompany her.
While respondent and Marcos were on their way to Harrison Plaza Mall,
they noticed a black Pajero car parked in front of the Package B
Building inside the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) compound, the
place where both of them work. When they reached the mall, they went
inside the SM Department Store to buy a few things. They then noticed
two men following them. Respondent immediately called a close friend
and reported the incident. Thereafter, respondent and Marcos went out
of the department store and stood near the food stalls to make another
phone call. Respondent suddenly felt a man’s gun being pushed against
the right side of her body. She panicked and her mind went blank.
Respondent and Marcos were taken at gunpoint and pushed inside a
black Pajero.3

While inside the vehicle, they were blindfolded and gagged. They were
taunted and repeatedly threatened by their abductors into withdrawing
the case against petitioner. When her blindfold was loosened, respondent
was able to take a good look at her surroundings. She noticed that the car
was parked in a warehouse with concrete walls and high roof. She also
saw four vehicles parked outside. She finally saw three men wearing
bonnets over their faces: the first one, seated beside her; the second one,
seated in front; and the third one, was standing near the parked vehicles.4

Before respondent and Marcos were released, they were once again
threatened by a man who said: "pag tinuloy nyo pa kaso kay Hasegawa,
may paglalagyan na kayo, walang magsusumbong sa pulis, pag nalaman
namin na lumapit kayo, babalikan namin kayo." They were released at
around 11:00 p.m. on 18 July 2006 and dropped off in Susana Heights in
Muntinlupa.5

In a separate Affidavit, Marcos corroborated respondent’s account of the

alleged kidnapping. Marcos added that while she was in captivity, her
blindfold was loosened and she was able to see petitioner inside one of
the vehicles parked nearby, talking to one of their abductors, whom she
noticed to be wearing bonnets.6
Petitioner, in his Counter-Affidavit, denied the accusation of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention against him. Petitioner categorically stated
that he had nothing to do with the kidnapping; that he was neither the
"brains" nor a "participant" in the alleged crimes; that he did not know
the alleged kidnappers; and, that he was not present inside one of the
vehicles talking with one of the abductors at the place alleged by
Marcos.7

Petitioner also pointed out several supposed inconsistencies and

improbabilities in the complaint, such as:

1. Respondent and Marcos claim that petitioner has continuously

warned them about withdrawing the complaint since its filing on
December 2005 but petitioner only came to know about the
complaint on 8 May 2006;

2. After being set free by their alleged abductors, respondent and

Marcos did not immediately report the matter to the police either in
Manila or Muntinlupa;

3. It is strange that respondent and Marcos did not know who their
lawyer’s messenger is and did not find it unusual that their lawyer
would call for a meeting in Harrison Plaza Mall instead of at his
office;

4. Petitioner wondered how respondent and Marcos could

remember and distinguish the alleged black Pajero used by their
captors to be the same black Pajero they saw in the parking lot of
LRTA Package B Building;

5. It is incredible that the two alleged abductors were able to enter

SM Department Store with guns in their possession;

6. It is an act contrary to human nature that upon noticing two men

following them, respondent and Marcos went outside the
 department store to make a phone call, instead of staying inside the
department store;

7. Marcos never mentioned that respondent’s mobile phone was

ringing while they were inside the vehicle;

8. The alleged statements made by the kidnappers demanding

withdrawal of complaint against petitioner are hearsay;

9. It is unimaginable that petitioner was supposedly allowed to text

and Marcos was allowed to call someone on her mobile phone;

10. It was very convenient for Marcos to mention that she saw
petitioner inside one of the vehicles talking to one of the abductors.
If indeed petitioner is involved in the kidnapping, he would never
allow his identity to be exposed;

11. Respondent and Marcos did not report to the Philippine

National Police what had happened to them. Only respondent
wrote a letter to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), two
weeks later, detailing her ordeal. And only respondent filed the
instant case two months later; and

12. Respondent and Marcos continued to work after their alleged

kidnapping.8

Petitioner asserted that respondent and Marcos are extorting money from
him because the instant case was filed right after the negotiations to
settle the civil aspect of the three cases they filed with the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID), National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) and MeTC Pasay failed.9

Petitioner’s personal driver, Edamar Valentino, corroborated petitioner’s

statement that on 17 and 18 July 2006, he drove petitioner at 7:30 a.m.
and brought him home after work as was his usual schedule.10
In a Resolution11 dated 5 January 2007, Senior State Prosecutor Emilie
Fe M. De Los Santos dismissed the complaint for lack of probable
cause.

Respondent filed an appeal from the Resolution of the prosecutor

dismissing her complaint. In her Petition for Review before the DOJ,
respondent claimed that the Investigating Prosecutor gravely erred when
she recommended the dismissal of the case against petitioner despite
overwhelming evidence showing the existence of probable cause. She
thus prayed for the reversal of the Resolution of the Investigating
Prosecutor.

Finding no basis to overturn the findings of the Investigating Prosecutor,

then Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzales dismissed the petition on 11
April 2007.

Respondent’s motion for reconsideration having been denied by the

DOJ, she filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. On
30 June 2008, the Court of Appeals granted the petition, reversed and set
aside the Resolutions of the DOJ and ordered the filing of an
Information for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention against
petitioner. The Court of Appeals found that "the Secretary of Justice
arrogated upon himself the functions of the judge by demanding more
than a sampling, but for pieces of evidence that were understandably not
there yet, being suited to a trial proper." 12 The appellate court went on to
state that the prosecutor usurped the duties belonging to the court when
she "overstretched her duties and applied the standards, not of ordinary
prudence and cautiousness, nor of mere ‘reasonable belief’ and
probability, but of a full-blown trial on the merits, where rules on
admissibility of testimonies and other evidence strictly apply."13

The motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied by the Court
of Appeals in its Resolution14 dated 18 September 2008. Hence, the
instant petition attributing the following errors to the Court of Appeals,
to wit:
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRIEVOUS ERROR IN

REVERSING THE FINDING OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
THAT NO PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS IN THE INSTANT CASE.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRIEVOUS ERROR IN

GRANTING RESPONDENT’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
DESPITE RAISING QUESTIONS OF FACT AND BEING
UNMERITORIOUS.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRIEVOUS ERROR IN

RULING THAT RESPONDENT’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS
THE PROPER MODE OF APPEAL FROM JUDGMENTS OF THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE.15

Petitioner insists that there was no showing that the Secretary of Justice
acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that no probable cause
exists to indict him for the crimes charged. Petitioner asserts that the
Secretary of Justice clearly and sufficiently explained the reasons why
no probable cause exists in this case. Petitioner faults the appellate court
for also having done what it has charged the Secretary of Justice of
doing, i.e., deliberating point by point the issues and arguments raised by
the parties in its Decision. Petitioner also faults the appellate court for
overlooking the fact that the kidnapping and serious illegal detention
charges are but the fourth in a series of successive cases filed by
respondent against petitioner, all of which were dismissed by the BID,
NLRC and MeTC of Pasay City. Petitioner argues that a review of facts
and evidence made by the appellate court is not the province of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Finally, petitioner contends that the
appellate court should have dismissed outright respondent’s petition for
certiorari for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and for being the
wrong mode of appeal.

We had initially denied this petition, but upon motion for

reconsideration of the petitioner, we decided to reconsider said denial
and to give it due course.16

Directed to file her Comment, respondent counters that in preliminary

investigation cases, such as that done in this case, there is, as yet no
occasion for the parties to display their full and exhaustive evidence, as a
mere finding that the kidnapping might have been committed by
petitioner is already sufficient.

The elementary rule is that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to

review the resolution issued by the DOJ through a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground that the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction.17

The grant by the Court of Appeals of the certiorari petition is a

determination that the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal
complaint for kidnapping and serious illegal detention for lack of
probable cause.

The decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint against

the accused depends on the sound discretion of the prosecutor. Courts
will not interfere with the conduct of preliminary investigations, or
reinvestigations, or in the determination of what constitutes sufficient
probable cause for the filing of the corresponding information against an
offender. Courts are not empowered to substitute their own judgment for
that of the executive branch. Differently stated, as the matter of whether
to prosecute or not is purely discretionary on his part, courts cannot
compel a public prosecutor to file the corresponding information, upon a
complaint, where he finds the evidence before him insufficient to
warrant the filing of an action in court. In sum, the prosecutor’s findings
on the existence of probable cause are not subject to review by the
courts, unless these are patently shown to have been made with grave
abuse of discretion.18 We find such reason for judicial review here
present. We sustain the appellate court’s reversal of the ruling of the
Secretary of the DOJ.

Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on
the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged
was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It is a reasonable
ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded on such
a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of
ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or
strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual or
positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based
on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does
not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.19

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that,

more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspects. It
need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not
on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining
probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without
resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no
technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined is
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that
a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to
whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.20

It must be mentioned, though, that in order to arrive at probable cause,

the elements of the crime charged should be present.21
The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code are:

1. the offender is a private individual;

2. he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives

the latter of his liberty;

3. the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and

4. in the commission of the offense, any of the following

circumstances are present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for
more than 3 days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public
authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d)
the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public
officer.

All elements were sufficiently averred in the complaint-affidavit were

sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime may have been
committed and petitioner may have committed it. Respondent, an office
worker, claimed that she and her friend were taken at gunpoint by two
men and forcibly boarded into a vehicle. They were detained for more
than 24-hours. Whether or not the accusations would result in a
conviction is another matter. It is enough, for purposes of the
preliminary investigation that the acts complained of constitute the crime
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.

The findings of the Investigating Prosecutor rest on lack of prima facie

evidence against petitioner.1âwphi1 That the kidnapping and serious
illegal detention charge is a mere fabrication was based on the
Investigating Prosecutor’s observations, as follows: First, no law
enforcement agency has investigated the complaint and indorsed the
same to the prosecution office for preliminary investigation as is the
usual procedure for grave offenses. Second, the other victim, Marcos,
did not file a case against petitioner. Third, respondent continued to
report to work at the LRTA compound where the supposed mastermind
also works. Fourth, there was the unexplained absence of report of the
alleged incident to any police or law enforcement agencies which taints
the trustworthiness of respondent’s allegations. Fifth, respondents’
theory on the motive for her kidnapping has been shown to be fallacious.
Sixth, respondent’s propensity to file a string of cases against petitioner
supports the contention that all these are part of her corrupt scheme to
extort money from petitioner. And seventh, vital witnesses for the
respondent such as the NBI agent assigned to her complaint and her
other officemates who could have corroborated her story were not
presented.

The Investigating Prosecutor has set the parameters of probable cause

too high. Her findings dealt mostly with what respondent had done or
failed to do after the alleged crime was committed. She delved into
evidentiary matters that could only be passed upon in a full-blown trial
where testimonies and documents could be fairly evaluated in according
with the rules of evidence. The issues upon which the charges are built
pertain to factual matters that cannot be threshed out conclusively during
the preliminary stage of the case. Precisely, there is a trial for the
presentation of prosecution's evidence in support of the charge. The
validity and merits of a party’s defense or accusation, as well as
admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during
trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level. 22 By taking into
consideration the defenses raised by petitioner, the Investigating
Prosecutor already went into the strict merits of the case. As aptly stated
by the appellate court:

That the NBI or other prosecutor agencies of the government neglected

to act on the petitioner’s complaint can hardly constitute evidence that
the incident did not in fact happen, or was merely fabricated or invented
to extort money from the private respondent. Instead of faulting the
complainants and questioning their motivations, the strong arm of the
State might be better off investigating non-feasance in public office.
In any event, the perceived inconsistencies are more imaginary than real,
delving as it does on minor, ambiguous and inconsequential matters that
may yet be properly addressed in a full-dress court hearing. We thus
agree with the petitioner’s assertion on the lack of any legal or factual
basis for the public respondent’s refusal to apply the rule that a positive
declaration is superior to a negative averment. It is well to recall that the
nullity of a resolution may be shown not only by what patently appears
on its face, but also by the documentary and the testimonial evidence
found in the records of the case, upon which such ruling is based.

True, discretion lies with the investigator to believe more the

respondent’s alibi, or to shoot down the credibility of the complainant as
well as the testimony of her witnesses. Still, she may not, as here, turn a
blind eye to evidence upon formidable evidence mounting to show the
acts complained of. Such cavalier disregard of the complainants’
documents and attestations may otherwise be the "arbitrary, whimsical
and capricious" emotion described in the term, "grave abuse."

It may not even matter that the respondent presented his own counter-
arguments in avoidance of the complaints, assuming he also did so
adeptly, convincingly; far crucial is discerning that the task transcended
mere discovery of the likelihood or the "probability" that a crime was
committed, but ventured into weighing evidence beyond any reasonable
doubt. Indeed, the respondent Secretary arrogated upon himself the
functions of the judge by demanding more than a sampling, but for
pieces of evidence that were understandably not there yet, being suited
to a trial proper.23

Thus, did the Court of Appeals detail why the holding that there is no
probable cause to indict petitioner amounted to grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the DOJ. Resort by respondent to the extraordinary writ of
certiorari and the grant thereof by the Court of Appeals is correct.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED for

lack of merit. The 30 June 2008 Decision and the 18 September 2008
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100091, are
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL
ARTURO D. BRION
CASTILLO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer or the opinion or
the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Barselas, Jr. with
Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Vicente S. E.
Veloso, concurring. Rollo pp. 16-33.
2
Id. at 36.
3
Id. at 160-161.
4
Id. at 162.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 432-435.
7
Id. at 174.
8
Id. at 175-183.
9
Id. at 46.
10
Id. at 48
11
Id. at 228-241.
12
Id. at 30.
13
Id. at 30-31.
14
Id. at 36.
15
Id. at 58.
16
Id. at 680.
17
Chong v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 184948, 21 July 2009, 593 SCRA
311, 314-315.
18
Baviera v. Prosecutor Paglinawan, 544 Phil. 107, 120-121
(2007).
19
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Gonzales, G.R. No.
180165, 7 April 2009, 584 SCRA 631, 640-641 citing Yu v.
Sandiganbayan, 410 Phil. 619, 627 (2001).
20
Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr., G.R. No. 172829, 18 July 2012, 677
SCRA 113, 120-121 citing Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc.,
G.R. No. 171435, 30 July 2008, 560 SCRA 518, 534-535.
21
Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim, G.R. No. 174168, 30 March 2009,
582 SCRA 517, 530.
22
Clay & Feather International, Inc. v. Lichaytoo, G.R. No.
193105, 30 May 2011, 649 SCRA 516, 525-526 citing Andres v.
Justice Secretary Cuevas, 499 Phil. 36, 49-50 (2005) and
Quiambao v. Hon. Desierto, 481 Phil. 852, 866 (2004).
23
Rollo, pp. 29-30.