Age Is Allowed in This Title.: May Adopt
Age Is Allowed in This Title.: May Adopt
Art. 183. A person of age and in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights MAY ADOPT, provided he
is in a position to support and care for his children, legitimate or illegitimate, in keeping with the means of
the family.
ONLY MINORS MAY BE ADOPTED, EXCEPT in the cases when the adoption of a person of majority
age is allowed in this Title.
In addition, the adopter must be at least sixteen years older than the person to be adopted, UNLESs the
adopter is the PARENT BY NATURE OF THE ADOPTED, OR IS THE SPOUSE OF THE LEGITIMATE
PARENT of the person to be adopted. (27a, EO 91 and PD 603)
(1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final accounts rendered upon the
termination of their guardianship relation;
(2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(3) An alien, except:
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on
inter-country adoptions as may be provided by law. (28a, EO 91 and PD 603)
Art. 185. Husband and wife must JOINTLY adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. (29a, EO 91 and PD 603)
Art. 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other, joint
parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code. (29a, EO and PD 603)
(1) A person of legal age, unless he or she is a child by nature of the adopter or his or her spouse, or, prior to
the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter as his or her own child
DURING MINORITY.
(2) An alien with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has no diplomatic relations; and
(3) A person who has already been adopted unless such adoption has been previously revoked or rescinded.
(30a, EO 91 and PD 603)
Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be NECESSARY:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both
shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child,
including the right of the adopted to use the SURNAME OF THE ADOPTERS;
(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate and be vested in the
adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental
authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and
(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives. (39(1)a, (3)a,
PD 603)
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the following rules:
(1) Legitimate and illegitimate children and descendants and the surviving spouse of the adopted shall
INHERIT FROM THE ADOPTED, in accordance with the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession;
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur with the
adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or ascendants and the
other half, by the adopters;
(3) When the surviving spouse or the illegitimate children of the adopted concur with the adopters, they shall
divide the entire estate in equal shares, one-half to be inherited by the spouse or the illegitimate children of the
adopted and the other half, by the adopters.
(4) When the adopters concur with the illegitimate children and the surviving spouse of the adopted, they
shall divide the entire estate in equal shares, one-third to be inherited by the illegitimate children, one-third
by the surviving spouse, and one-third by the adopters;
(5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the entire estate; and
(6) When ONLY COLLATERAL BLOOD RELATIVES OF THE ADOPTED SURVIVE, THEN THE
ORDINARY RULES of legal or intestate succession shall apply. (39(4)a, PD 603)
Art. 191. If the adopted is a minor or otherwise incapacitated, the ADOPTION MAY BE JUDICIALLY
RESCINDED UPON PETITION of any person authorized by the court or proper government instrumental
acting on his behalf, on the same grounds prescribed for loss or suspension of parental authority. If the adopted
is at least eighteen years of age, HE MAY PETITION FOR JUDICIAL RESCISSION OF THE ADOPTION
ON THE SAME GROUNDS PRESCRIBED FOR DISINHERITING AN ASCENDANT. (40a, PD 603)
Art. 192. The adopters may petition the court for the judicial rescission of the adoption in any of the
following cases:
(1) If the adopted has committed any act constituting ground for disinheriting a descendant; or
(2) When the adopted has abandoned the home of the adopters during minority for at least one year,
or, by some other acts, has definitely repudiated the adoption. (41a, PD 603)
Art. 193. If the adopted minor has not reached the age of majority at the time of the judicial rescission of the
adoption, the court in the same proceeding shall reinstate the parental authority of the parents by nature,
unless the latter are disqualified or incapacitated, in which case the court shall appoint a guardian over the
person and property of the minor. If the adopted person is physically or mentally handicapped, the court
shall appoint in the same proceeding a guardian over his person or property or both.
Judicial RESCISSION OF THE ADOPTION SHALL EXTINGUISH ALL RECIPROCAL RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN THE ADOPTERS AND THE ADOPTED arising from the relationship of parent
and child. The adopted shall likewise lose the right to use the surnames of the adopters and shall resume his
surname prior to the adoption.
The court shall accordingly order the amendment of the records in the proper registries. (42a, PD 603)
Section 4. Counseling Service. – The Department shall provide the services of licensed social workers to the
following:
(a) Biological Parent(s) – Counseling shall be provided to the parent(s) before and after the birth of
his/her child. No binding commitment to an adoption plan shall be permitted before the birth of his/her
child. A period of six (6) months shall be allowed for the biological parent(s) to reconsider any decision
to relinquish his/her child for adoption before the decision becomes irrevocable. Counseling and
rehabilitation services shall also be offered to the biological parent(s) after he/she has relinquished
his/her child for adoption.
Steps shall be taken by the Department to ensure that no hurried decisions are made and all alternatives
for the child's future and the implications of each alternative have been provided.
(b) Prospective Adoptive Parent(s) – Counseling sessions, adoption fora and seminars, among others,
shall be provided to prospective adoptive parent(s) to resolve possible adoption issues and to prepare
him/her for effective parenting.
(c) Prospective Adoptee – Counseling sessions shall be provided to ensure that he/she understands the
nature and effects of adoption and is able to express his/her views on adoption in accordance with
his/her age and level of maturity.
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral
character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically
capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to
support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16)
year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological
parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee's parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her
country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the
Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and
maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her
diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to
adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her
adopted son/daughter: Provided, Further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the alien's
qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity
or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative
within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse; or
(c) The GUARDIAn with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her
financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, However, that the other
spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint
parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
xxx
Section 1. Short Title. — This Act shall be known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995."
ARTICLE III PROCEDURE Sec. 7. Inter-Country Adoption as the Last Resort. — The Board shall ensure
that all possibilities for adoption of the child under the Family Code have been exhausted and that inter-country
adoption is in the best interest of the child. Towards this end, the Board shall set up the guidelines to ensure that
steps will be taken to place the child in the Philippines before the child is placed for inter-country adoption:
Provided, however, That the maximum number that may be allowed for foreign adoption shall not exceed six
hundred (600) a year for the first five (5) years.
Sec. 8. Who May be Adopted. — Only a legally free child may be the subject of inter-country adoption. In
order that such child may be considered for placement, the following documents must be submitted to the
Board:
(a)Child study; (b)Birth certificate/foundling certificate; (c)Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of
abandonment/death certificate of parents; (d)Medical evaluation /history; (e)Psychological evaluation, as
necessary; and (f)Recent photo of the child.
Sec. 9. Who May Adopt. — An alien or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad may file an
application for inter-country adoption of a Filipino child if he/she:
(a) is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age and at least sixteen (16) years older than the child to be
adopted, at the time of application unless the adopter is the parent by nature of the child to be adopted or the
spouse of such parent;
(b) if married, his/her spouse must jointly file for the adoption;
(c) has the capacity to act and assume all rights and responsibilities of parental authority under his national
laws, and has undergone the appropriate counseling from an accredited counselor in his/her country;
(d) has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(e) is eligible to adopt under his/her national law;
(f) is in a position to provide the proper care and support and to give the necessary moral values and example to
all his children, including the child to be adopted;
(g) agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as embodied under Philippine laws, the U.N. Convention on the
Rights of the Child, and to abide by the rules and regulations issued to implement the provisions of this Act;
(h) comes from a country with whom the Philippines has diplomatic relations and whose government maintains
a similarly authorized and accredited agency and that adoption is allowed under his/her national laws; and
(i) possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided herein and in other applicable
Philippine laws.
Sec. 2. Objectives. –
(a) The best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration in all matters relating to his care,
custody and adoption, in accordance with Philippine laws, the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights
of the Child, UN Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children
with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption, Nationally and Internationally, and the Hague
Convention on the Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Inter-country Adoption.
(b) The State shall provide alternative protection and assistance through foster care or adoption for every
child who is a foundling, neglected, orphaned, or abandoned. To this end, the State shall:
(i) ensure that every child remains under the care and custody of his parents and is provided with love,
care, understanding and security for the full and harmonious development of his personality. Only
when such efforts prove insufficient and no appropriate placement or adoption within the child’s
extended family is available shall adoption by an unrelated person be considered.
(ii) safeguard the biological parents from making hasty decisions in relinquishing their parental authority
over their child;
(iii) prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his biological parents;
(iv) conduct public information and educational campaigns to promote a positive environment for
adoption;
(v) ensure that government and private sector agencies have the capacity to handle adoption inquiries,
process domestic adoption applications and offer adoption-related services including, but not
limited to, parent preparation and post-adoption education and counseling;
(vi) encourage domestic adoption so as to preserve the child’s identity and culture in his native
land, and only when this is not available shall inter-country adoption be considered as a last resort;
and
(vii) protect adoptive parents from attempts to disturb their parental authority and custody over their
adopted child.
Any voluntary or involuntary termination of parental authority shall be administratively or judicially declared so
as to establish the status of the child as “legally available for adoption” and his custody transferred to the
Department of Social Welfare and Development or to any duly licensed and accredited child-placing or child-
caring agency, which entity shall be authorized to take steps for the permanent placement of the child.
FACTS:
Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth P600,000. She executed a will written in
Spanish, affixed her signature and acknowledged before Notary Public by her and the witnesses. Among
the legacies made in the will was the P20,000 for Rene Teotico who was married to the testatrix’s niece,
Josefina Mortera. The usufruct of Maria’s interest in the Calvo Building were left to the said spouses and the
ownership thereof was left in equal parts to her grandchildren, the legitimate children of said spouses.
Josefina was likewise instituted, as sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not
otherwise disposed by will.
Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will but was OPPOSED BY ANA DEL VAL CHAN,
claiming that she was an adopted child of Francisca (deceased sister of Maria) and an acknowledged natural
child of Jose (deceased brother of Maria), Ana Del Val Chan filed and opposition alleging that the will was
not executed as required by law, the testatrix was physically and mentally incapable to execute the will, and
the will was executed under duress.
The probate court allowed the opposition, who further alleged that the legacy to Dr. Teotico was void, him
being the physician who took care of the testatrix during her last illness. The question whether the oppositor has
the right to oppose as well as the validity of the will are the main issues of the case.
HELD:
It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding is that
he must have an interest in the estate, will or in the property to be affected by either as executor or as a
claimant of the estate and be benefited by such as an heir or one who has a claim against it as creditor.
Under the terms of the will, defendant has no right to intervene because she has no such interest in the estate
either as HEIR, EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR because it did not appear therein any provision
designating her as heir/ legatee in any portion of the estate. She could have acquired such right if she was a
legal heir of the deceased but she is not under the CIVIL CODE.
Even if her allegations were true, the law does not give her any right to succeed the estate of the deceased
sister of both Jose and Francisca because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from
succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father and that RELATIONSHIP ESTABLISHED BY
ADOPTION IS LIMITED SOLELY TO THE ADOPTER AND ADOPTED and does not extend to the
relatives of the adopting parents except only as expressly provided by law. As a consequence, she is an heir of
the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in the probate proceeding.
Respondent Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her minor children, Bernardo Go and Jessica Go filed with
the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of
Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu. (special proceedings)
The Solicitor General filed an opposition to the petition alleging that the petition for correction of entry in
the Civil Registry pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines in relation to Rule 108 of
the Revised Rules of Court, contemplates a summary proceeding and correction of mere clerical errors, those
harmless and innocuous changes such as the correction of a name that is merely mispelled, occupation of
parents, etc., and NOT CHANGES OR CORRECTIONS INVOLVING CIVIL STATUS, NATIONALITY,
OR CITIZENSHIP WHICH ARE SUBSTANTIAL AND CONTROVERSIAL.
The trial court issued an order directing the publication of the petition and the date of hearing thereof in the
Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in the city and province of Cebu, once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks, and notice thereof, duly served on the Solicitor General, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu
City and Go Eng.
Subsequently, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that since the
petition seeks to change the nationality or citizenship of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go from "Chinese" to
"Filipino" and their status from "Legitimate" to Illegitimate", and changing also the status of the mother
from "married" to "single" the corrections sought are not merely clerical but substantial, involving as they do
the citizenship and status of the petitioning minors and the status of their mother.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss granting the instant petition and ordering the Local Civil
Registrar of the City of Cebu to make the necessary cancellation and/or correction.
ISSUE: The petitioner Republic of the Philippines raises a lone error for the grant of this petition, stating that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE CORRECTION OF THE PETITIONER'S
CITIZENSHIP AND CIVIL STATUS AND THE CITIZENSHIP AND CIVIL STATUS OF HER MINOR
CHILDREN BERNARDO GO AND JESSICA GO.
RULING: The petitioner premises its case on precedents from the 1954 case of Ty Kong Tin v. Republic (94
Phil. 321) to the 1981 case of Republic v. Caparosso (107 SCRA 67), that entries which can be corrected under
Article 412 of the New Civil Code as implemented by Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court refer to those
mistakes that are clerical in nature or changes that are harmless and innocuous.
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial
as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is
also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate
remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding- One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte
application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the
latter an opportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding."
Changes or corrections in the entries in the civil registry were governed, at first, by Act No. 3753 (Civil
Registry Law) which placed these matters exclusively upon the sound judgment and discretion of the civil
registrars. With the effectivity of the New Civil Code on August 30, 1950, these matters were governed by
Article 412 thereof which prescribes judicial order before an entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected. This requirement was deemed necessary to forestall the commission of fraud or other mischief in
these matters.
But even then, it is not any correction that can be considered under Article 412 of The Civil Code. The nature of
the corrections sought has to be considered and if found to refer only to clerical errors the same may be allowed
under said article which was construed to contemplate only a summary proceeding.
The court's role in hearing the petition to correct certain entries in the civil registry is to ascertain the truth
about the facts recorded therein. Under our system of administering justice, truth is best ascertained or
approximated by trial conducted under the adversary system.
Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and
where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered, THE SUIT OR PROCEEDING IS
APPROPRIATE.
Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil register are-(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to-(l) issue an order
fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once
a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are
likewise entitled to oppose the petition: (I) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of
entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can
no longer be described as "summary". There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed
either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled
and/or corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary
proceedings.
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were MARRIED , begot three children. During
the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple's relationship was undisturbed.
Anna Marie subsequently filed a petition for legal separation which was granted . They had an
agreement for support of the children and that Anna Marie can enter into agreements without the
written consent of Herbert. Petitioner left for the US.
Issue:
C a n m i n o r c h i l d r e n b e l e g a l l y a d o p t e d w i t h o u t t h e written consent of a natural parent on the
ground that the latter has abandoned them?
Held:
A r t i c l e 2 5 6 o f t h e F a m i l y C o d e p r o v i d e s f o r i t s retroactivity "insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or a c q u i r e d r i g h t s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e C i v i l
C o d e o r o t h e r laws." As amended by the Family Code, the statutory provision
on consent for adoption now reads: Art. 188.
Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be NECESSARY:
T h e w r i t t e n consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary: (2)the parents by nature of the
child, the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality.
Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has
abandoned the child or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate."
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The questioned Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET
ASIDE thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang,
by the spouse respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately executory.
PEOPLE V. TOLEDANO
Facts:
On February 21, 1990, Spouses Alvin Clouse, a natural-born US Citizen and Evelyn Clouse, a FORMER
FILIPINO WHO BECAME A NATURALIZED US CITIZEN, filed a petition to adopt Solomon Alcala, a
minor who is EVELYN'S YOUNGEST BROTHER.
Issue:
Held:
Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code of
the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph
Alcala.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified
to adopt, viz.:
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on
inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.
There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph
Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision.
In the first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America.
In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child
of his spouse.
In the third place, when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph
Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost
her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988.
Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a)
of Article 184 of E.O. 209. SHE WAS A FORMER FILIPINO CITIZEN. She sought to adopt her younger
brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating
Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:
Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together with
Article 184.
Under the Family Code, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the
concept of joint parental authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted
is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The
rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
NOTE:
The alien husband can now adopt under Sec. 7 (b) of R.A. No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998). The
Supreme Court has held in several cases that when husband and wife are required to adopt jointly, each one of
them must be qualified to adopt in his or her own right. However, the American husband must comply with the
requirements of the law including the residency requirement of 3 years. Otherwise, the adoption will not be
allowed.
The natural parents executed affidavits giving their irrevocable consent to the adoption and the DSWD
recommended approval of the petition on the basis of its evaluation.
On August 3, 1988, the Family Code became effective, prohibiting the adoption of a Filipino child by aliens.
The Solicitor General appealed to the granting of the petition for adoption by the RTC.
As heretofore stated, the Court of Appeals certified the case to this Court
Issue: WON aliens may be allowed to adopt when the petition for adoption was filed prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code prohibiting the same.
Held: Yes. An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the
time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent
enactment of a new law disqualifying him.
Vested right include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption
from new obligations created after the right has vested.
Facts:
Issue: May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after
the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?
Ruling:
“Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the
adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919
of the Civil Code.”
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the
decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had already abrogated and repealed the right of
an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its
earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having
been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the
FIVE–YEAR BAR RULE UNDER RULE 100 OF THE RULES OF COURT and that the adopter would lose
the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a
prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection.
It must also be acknowledged that a PERSON HAS NO VESTED RIGHT IN STATUTORY PRIVILEGES.
While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a “right,” the PRIVILEGE TO ADOPT IS ITSELF
NOT NATURALLY INNATE OR FUNDAMENTAL BUT RATHER A RIGHT MERELY CREATED BY
STATUTE. It is a privilege that is governed by the state’s determination on what it may deem to be for the best
interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an
adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State. Concomitantly, a right of action
given by statute may be taken away at anytime before it has been exercised.
Art. 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. (29a, E. O. 91 and PD 603)
FACTS:
Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a PETITION TO ADOPT Jason Condat who had been living with her family
since 4 months old.
Salvador Condat, father of the child, and the social worker assigned was served with copies of the order
finding that the petition was sufficient in form and substance. The copy was also posted on the bulletin
board of the court. NOBODY APPEARED TO OPPOSE THE PETITION.
The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2, 1988, when the
law applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a
petition for adoption may be filed by EITHER OF THE SPOUSES OR BY BOTH OF THEM .
However, after the trial court rendered its decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the Court of
Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new law,
joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.
ISSUE: WON the petition to adopt Jason should be granted considering only Zenaida filed the petition.
HELD:
The petition for adoption was filed when the law applicable was PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code),
where such PETITION MAY BE FILED EITHER OF THE SPOUSES OR BOTH OF THEM. After the
trial court rendered its favorable decision and while the case was pending on appeal in CA, Family Code took
effect WHERE JOINT ADOPTION OF BOTH SPOUSES IS MANDATORY.
Non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or a special proceeding. The Family Code will have
retrospective application if it will not prejudice or impair vested rights. When Zenaida filed the petition, she
was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law in force at the time and thus vested and
must not be prejudiced. A PETITION MUST NOT BE DISMISSED BY REASON OF FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH LAW NOT YET IN FORCE AND EFFECT AT THE TIME.
Furthermore, the affidavit of consent attached by the husband showed that he actually joined his wife in
adopting Jayson. His declarations and subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court was sufficient to make
him a co-petitioner. Future of an innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid
adherence to procedural rules on the form of the pleadings.
On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition before the Regional
Trial Court of Angeles City[1] to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years old,
respectively, younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr, a member of the United States Air Force, is an
American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who
became a naturalized American. They have two children. Both Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their natural
parents, gave their consent to the adoption.
After trial, the lower court rendered its decision on September 10, 1990 granting the petition and declaring
Alvin and Maricel to be the children of the spouses Dye by adoption.[2]Respondent Regional Trial Court
disregarded the sixteen-year age gap requirement of the law, the spouses being only fifteen years and three
months and fifteen years and nine months older than Maricel Due, on the ground that a literal implementation of
the law would defeat the very philosophy behind adoption statutes, namely, to promote the welfare of a child.
ISSUE: The Republic filed this petition for review on a pure question of law, contending that the spouses Dye
are not qualified under the law to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due.
RULING: The Court finds the petition meritorious and hereby grants it.
Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and, therefore, an alien is disqualified from adopting the minors
Maricel and Alvin Due because he does not fall under any of the three aforequoted exceptions laid down by
the law. He is NOT A FORMER FILIPINO CITIZEN who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity. Nor
does he seek to adopt his wife's legitimate child. Although he seeks to adopt with his wife her relatives by
consanguinity, he is not married to a Filipino citizen, for Rosalina was already a naturalized American at the
time the petition was filed, thus excluding him from the coverage of the exception. The law here does not
provide for an alien who is married to a FORMER FILIPINO CITIZEN SEEKING TO ADOPT JOINTLY
WITH HIS OR HER SPOUSE A RELATIVE BY CONSANGUINITY, as an exception to the general rule that
aliens may not adopt.
"Art. 185. Husband and wife must adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child;
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other."
None of the above exceptions applies to Samuel and Rosalina Dye, for they did not petition to adopt the latter's
child but her brother and sister.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City in Special Proceeding No. 4203 (In the Matter of the Petition for Adoption of the minors Maricel
R. Due and Alvin R. Due), dated September 10, 1990 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC VS COURT OF APPEALS
A petition for Review onCertiorari was filed with this Court, assailing the trial court's decision. This Court
referred the case to the Court of Appeals which, on 09 July 1991, affirmed the trial court's decision.
Issue
: Can the spouses adopt the minors?
Held
:While James Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to adopt under any of the exceptional cases
enumerated in paragraph (3) of the aforequoted article, Lenita, however, can qualify pursuant to paragraph
(3)(a).
Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the legitimate child of
the other, joint p a r e n t a l a u t h o r i t y s h a l l b e e x e r c i s e d b y t h e s p o u s e s i n
accordance with this Code.