Lennox Complaint

1 LAW OFFICES OF DALE K.
GALIPO
Dale K. Galipo, Esq. (Bar No. 144074)
2 [email protected]
21800 Burbank Boulevard, Suite 310
3 Woodland Hills, California 91367
Tel: (818) 347-3333
4 Fax: (818) 347-4118
5
Attorney for Plaintiff
6
7 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
8 COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
9
MARY ELLEN LENNOX, individually Case No.
10 and as successor in interest to decedent
11 Jordan Zenka, COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
12 Plaintiff, 1. Unreasonable Search and
13 Seizure—Excessive Force (42
vs. U.S.C. § 1983)
14 2. Unreasonable Search and
15 CITY OF SACRAMENTO; COUNTY Seizure—Denial of Medical Care
OF SACRAMENTO; STATE OF (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
16 CALIFORNIA; MICHAEL PINOLA; 3. Fourteenth Amendment—
17 and DOES 1-25, inclusive, Substantive Due Process
4. Municipal Liability—
18 Defendants. Unconstitutional Custom, Practice,
19 or Policy (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
5. Municipal Liability—Ratification
20 (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
21 6. Municipal Liability—Failure to
Train (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
22 7. Battery (wrongful death and
23 survival)
8. Negligence (wrongful death and
24 survival)
25 9. Violation of Cal. Civil Code § 52.1
26 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
27
28
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

1 COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
2 COMES NOW Plaintiff MARY ELLEN LENNOX, individually and as
3 successor in interest to Jordan Zenka (“DECEDENT”) for her Complaint against
4 Defendants City of Sacramento, County of Sacramento, State of California, Michael
5 Pinola, and Does 1-25, inclusive, and allege as follows:
6
7 JURISDICTION AND VENUE
8 1. This Court has jurisdiction over the present matter because, as
9 delineated within this Complaint, the nature of the claims and the amount in
10 controversy meet the requirements for jurisdiction in the Superior Court of the State
11 of California.
12 2. Venue is proper in this Court under Section 395(a) of the California
13 Code of Civil Procedure because all incidents, events, and occurrences giving rise to
14 this action occurred in the County of Sacramento, California, and because
15 Defendants reside in the County of Sacramento, California.
16
17 INTRODUCTION
18 3. This civil rights and state tort action seeks compensatory and punitive
19 damages from Defendants for violating various rights under the United States
20 Constitution and state law in connection with the officer-involved use of force and
21 shooting of Plaintiff’s son, Jordan Zenka (“DECEDENT”), on December 13, 2020.
22
23 PARTIES
24 4. At all relevant times, DECEDENT was an individual residing in the
25 Sacramento, California.
26 5. Plaintiff MARY ELLEN LENNOX is the mother of DECEDENT.
27 MARY ELLEN LENNOX sues in her individual capacity as the mother of
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1 DECEDENT and also as the successor in interest to DECEDENT. MARY ELLEN
2 LENNOX seeks both survival and wrongful death damages under federal and state
3 law.
4 6. At all relevant times, Defendant CITY OF SACRAMENTO (“CITY”)
5 is and was a municipal corporation existing under the laws of the State of California.
6 CITY is a chartered subdivision of the State of California with the capacity to be
7 sued. CITY is responsible for the actions, omissions, policies, procedures, practices,
8 and customs of its various agents and agencies, including the City of Sacramento
9 Police Department and its agents and employees. At all relevant times, Defendant
10 CITY was responsible for assuring that the actions, omissions, policies, procedures,
11 practices, and customs of the City of Sacramento Police Department and its
12 employees and agents complied with the laws of the United States and of the State
13 of California. At all relevant times, CITY was the employer of Defendants DOES
14 1-10.
15 7. At all relevant times, Defendant COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
16 (“COUNTY”) is and was a municipal corporation existing under the laws of the
17 State of California. COUNTY is a chartered subdivision of the State of California
18 with the capacity to be sued. COUNTY is responsible for the actions, omissions,
19 policies, procedures, practices, and customs of its various agents and agencies,
20 including the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department and its agents and
21 employees. At all relevant times, Defendant COUNTY was responsible for assuring
22 that the actions, omissions, policies, procedures, practices, and customs of the
23 Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department and its employees and agents complied
24 with the laws of the United States and of the State of California. At all relevant
25 times, COUNTY was the employer of Defendants DOES 11-20.
26 8. Defendant STATE OF CALIFORNIA (the “STATE”) is a duly created
27 and existing public entity. The STATE operates and manages the California
28
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1 Highway Patrol (“CHP”) and is and at all relevant times was responsible for the
2 management and overseeing of the CHP, for the actions or inactions of the
3 Defendants, and for the policies, practices and/or customs relating to the CHP. At
4 all relevant times the STATE was the employer of the Defendants.
5 9. Defendant MICHAEL PINOLA (“PINOLA”) is a police officer
6 working for the City Sacramento Police Department. At all relevant times, PINOLA
7 was acting under color of law and within the course and scope of his duties as a
8 police officer for the City of Sacramento Police Department. PINOLA was acting
9 with the complete authority and ratification of his principal, Defendant CITY.
10 10. Defendants DOES 1-10 are police officers working for the City
11 Sacramento Police Department. At all relevant times, DOES 1-10 were acting under
12 color of law and within the course and scope of their duties as police officers for the
13 City of Sacramento Police Department. DOES 1-10 were acting with the complete
14 authority and ratification of their principal, Defendant CITY.
15 11. Defendants DOES 11-20 are deputy sheriffs working for the
16 Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department. At all relevant times, DOE DEPUTIES
17 were acting under color of law within the course and scope of their duties as
18 sheriff’s deputies for the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department. DOES 11-20
19 were acting with the complete authority and ratification of their principal, Defendant
20 COUNTY.
21 12. Defendants DOES 21-22 are managerial, supervisorial, and
22 policymaking employees of the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department and City
23 of Sacramento Police Department who were acting under color of law within the
24 course and scope of their duties as managerial, supervisorial, and policymaking
25 employees for the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department and City of Sacramento
26 Police Department. DOES 21-22 were acting with the complete authority and
27 ratification of their principal, Defendants CITY and COUNTY.
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1 13. Defendants DOES 23-25 are California Highway Patrol (“CHP”)
2 Officers. At all relevant times, CHP DOES 23-25 were acting under color of law
3 and within the course and scope of their duties as law enforcement officers for the
4 California Highway Patrol and the STATE. DOES 23-25 were acting with the
5 complete authority and ratification of their principal.
6 14. On information and belief, DOES 1-25 were residents of the County of
7 Sacramento.
8 15. In doing the acts and failing and omitting to act as hereinafter
9 described, Defendants DOES 1-20 were acting on the implied and actual permission
10 and consent of the CITY and COUNTY.
11 16. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate,
12 association or otherwise of Defendants DOES 1-25 (“DOE OFFICERS”), inclusive,
13 are unknown to Plaintiff, who otherwise sue these Defendants by such fictitious
14 names. Plaintiff will seek leave to amend her complaint to show the true names and
15 capacity of these Defendants when they have been ascertained. Each of the
16 fictitiously-named Defendants is responsible in some manner for the conduct or
17 liabilities alleged herein.
18 17. At all times mentioned herein, each and every defendant was the agent
19 of each and every other defendant and had the legal duty to oversee and supervise
20 the hiring, conduct, and employment of each and every defendant.
21 18. All of the acts complained of herein by Plaintiff against Defendants
22 were done and performed by said Defendants by and through their authorized
23 agents, servants, and/or employees, all of whom at all relevant times herein were
24 acting within the course, purpose, and scope of said agency, service, and/or
25 employment capacity. Moreover, Defendants and their agents ratified all of the acts
26 complained of herein.
27 19. DOES 1-25 are sued in their individual capacity.
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1 20. On February 16, 2021, Plaintiff MARY ELLEN LENNOX filed a
2 comprehensive and timely claim for damages with the CITY of Sacramento
3 pursuant to applicable sections of the California Government Code.
4 21. On March 9, 2021, the CITY rejected Plaintiff’s claims.
6 comprehensive and timely claim for damages with the STATE of California
8 23. Plaintiff MARY ELLEN LENNOX’s claims with the STATE of
9 California were rejected by operation of law.
11 comprehensive and timely claim for damages with the COUNTY of Sacramento
13 25. On April 5, 2021, the COUNTY rejected Plaintiff’s claims.
14
15 FACTS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
16 26. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation in
17 paragraphs 1 through 25 of her Complaint with the same force and effect as if fully
18 set forth herein.
19 27. At approximately 6:35 a.m. on December 13, 2020, PINOLA and DOE
20 OFFICERS (DOES 1-20 and 23-25) responded to the area near the 3200 block of
21 Arena Boulevard in North Natomas, in the City of Sacramento, California after
22 reports that a vehicle had collided into a grocery store building. Police officers
23 working for the City of Sacramento Police Department, sheriff’s deputies for the
24 County of Sacramento Sheriff’s Department, and California Highway Patrol officers
25 working for the State of California all responded to the incident. DECEDENT went
26 inside the grocery store and was having a mental health crisis. PINOLA and DOE
27 OFFICERS initially arrived on scene and attempted to speak with DECEDENT.
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1 However, as more DOE OFFICERS arrived including a police K-9 unit, OFFICERS
2 escalated the situation by deploying less-than lethal bean bag rounds and tasers
3 multiple times on DECEDENT, before fatally shooting him. Even after lethal shots
4 were fired, OFFICERS continued to tase the DECEDENT as he laid on the ground
5 bleeding to death. Plaintiff alleges that all the force used against the DECEDENT
6 was excessive and unreasonable under the circumstances.
7 28. At all relevant times, DECEDENT was not armed with a gun, and
8 posed no immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury to any other person.
9 29. The OFFICERS unnecessarily escalated the situation, had other options
10 available, and OFFICERS gave no verbal warning that deadly force was going to be
11 used.
12 30. Further, the shooting and other uses of force violated PINOLA, DOES
13 1-20’s, and DOES 23-25’s training and standard police officer training, including
14 violating training with respect to the use of deadly force and with respect to dealing
15 with individuals experiencing a mental health crisis.
16 31. After being tased, shot with bean bag round and bullets from a lethal
17 firearm, and other undiscovered uses of force, DECEDENT was immobile, bleeding
18 profusely, and in obvious and critical need of emergency medical care and
19 treatment. Defendants PINOLA, DOES 1-20, and DOES 23-25 did not timely
20 summon medical care or permit medical personnel to treat DECEDENT. Instead,
21 while DECEDENT lay bleeding on the ground, DOE OFFICERS continued to tase
22 him. The delay of medical care to DECEDENT caused DECEDENT extreme
23 physical and emotional pain and suffering, and was a contributing cause of
24 DECEDENT’S death.
25 32. DECEDENT survived for a period of time after the shooting and
26 experienced pre-death pain and suffering. He was later pronounced dead at the
27 scene.
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1 33. Plaintiff MARY ELLEN LENNOX is DECEDENT’s mother and
2 successor in interest as defined in Section 377.11 of the California Code of Civil
3 Procedure and succeeds to DECEDENT’s interest in this action as the mother of
4 DECEDENT.
5 34. Plaintiff incurred funeral and burial expenses as a result of the
6 shooting.
7
8 FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
9 Unreasonable Search and Seizure—Excessive Force (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
10 (Against PINOLA, DOE OFFICERS, DOES 1-20 and DOES 23-25)
14 36. At approximately 6:35 a.m. on December 13, 2020, PINOLA and DOE
15 OFFICERS (DOES 1-20 and 23-25) responded to the area near the 3200 block of
16 Arena Boulevard in North Natomas, in the City of Sacramento, California after
17 reports that a vehicle had collided into a grocery store building. Police officers
18 working for the City of Sacramento Police Department, sheriff’s deputies for the
19 County of Sacramento Sheriff’s Department, and California Highway Patrol
20 working for the State of California all responded to the incident. DECEDENT went
21 inside the grocery store and was having a mental health crisis. PINOLA and DOE
22 OFFICERS initially arriving on scene attempted to speak with DECEDENT.
23 However, as more DOE OFFICERS arrived including a police K-9 unit,
24 OFFICERS, while acting under the color of state law and in the course and scope of
25 their duties as officers, deployed less-than lethal bean bag rounds and tasers multiple
26 times on DECEDENT before fatally shooting him. Even after the initial lethal shots
27 were fired, DOE OFFICERS continued to fire at the DECEDENT while he was
28
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1 falling to the ground and later tased the DECEDENT as he laid on the ground
2 bleeding.
3 37. While acting under color of state law and in the course and scope of
4 their duties as a police officers for the Sacramento Police Department, County of
5 Sacramento, and as a California Highway Patrol Officer for the State of California,
6 the involved officers escalated the situation and fired multiple shots at DECEDENT,
7 striking and injuring DECEDENT and ultimately killing him.
8 38. At all relevant times, DECEDENT was not armed with a gun, and
9 posed no immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury to any person.
10 DECEDENT was in the midst of a mental health crisis, and displayed clear signs of
11 mental distress, which was escalataed by involved DOE OFFICERS, who had other
12 reasonable alternatives available to them.
13 39. Defendants’ unjustified shooting and other uses of force against
14 DECEDENT deprived DECEDENT of his right to be secure in his person against
15 unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed to him under the Fourth
16 Amendment to the United States Constitution and applied to state actors by the
17 Fourteenth Amendment.
18 40. The shooting and other uses of force, including the Tasers and bean bag
19 rounds, were excessive and unreasonable, particularly because DECEDENT posed
20 no immediate threat at the time of the shooting and other uses of force. Moreover,
21 PINOLA, DOES 1-20, and DOES 23-25 failed to give DECEDENT a warning that
22 they were prepared to use force against him, let alone deadly force, prior to
23 shooting. Further, the shooting violated the officers’ training and standard police
24 officer training, training with respect to the use of deadly force and with respect to
25 dealing with individuals displaying clear signs of mental distress and with mental
26 health concerns. PINOLA and DOE OFFICERS unnecessarily escalated the
27
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1 situation and had other reasonable less than lethal options available to them at the
2 time of the incident.
3 41. As a result of the foregoing, DECEDENT suffered great physical pain
4 and emotional distress up to the time of his death after the shooting, loss of
5 enjoyment of life, loss of life, and lost earning capacity.
6 42. The conduct of Defendants PINOLA, DOES 1-20, and DOES 23-25
7 was willful, wanton, malicious, and done with reckless disregard for the rights and
8 safety of DECEDENT, and therefore warrants the imposition of exemplary and
9 punitive damages as to Defendants PINOLA, DOES 1-20, and DOES 23-25.
10 43. Plaintiff MARY ELLEN LENNOX brings this claim as successor in
11 interest to DECEDENT, and seeks survival damages for pre-death pain and
12 suffering, loss of life, and loss of enjoyment of life for the violation of
13 DECEDENT’S rights on this claim. Plaintiffs further seek statutory attorney’s fees
14 and costs under this claim.
15
16 SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
17 Unreasonable Search and Seizure—Denial of Medical Care (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
18 (Against PINOLA, DOE OFFICERS, DOES 1-20 and DOES 23-25)
22 45. After being shot with bean bag rounds, tased numerous times, and shot
23 with rounds from a lethal firearm, DECEDENT was immobile, bleeding profusely,
24 and in obvious and critical need of emergency medical care and treatment.
25 Defendants did not timely summon medical care or permit medical personnel to
26 treat DECEDENT. In fact, as DECEDENT lay bleeding on the ground, DOE
27 OFFICERS continued to tase him. The delay of medical care to DECEDENT
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1 caused DECEDENT extreme physical and emotional pain and suffering and was a
2 contributing cause of DECEDENT’s death.
3 46. The denial of medical care by the Defendant PINOLA, DOES 1-20,
4 and DOES 23-25 deprived DECEDENT of his right to be secure in his person
5 against unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed to him under the Fourth
6 Amendment to the United States Constitution and applied to state actors by the
7 Fourteenth Amendment.
8 47. As a result of the foregoing, DECEDENT suffered great physical pain
9 and emotional distress up to the time of his death, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of
10 life, and loss of earning capacity.
11 48. Defendant PINOLA, DOES 1-20, and DOES 23-25 knew that failure to
12 provide timely medical treatment to DECEDENT could result in further significant
13 injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, but disregarded that serious
14 medical need, causing DECEDENT great bodily harm and death.
15 49. DECEDENT survived for a period of time after incident. He was later
16 pronounced dead at the scene of the incident.
17 50. The conduct of PINOLA, DOES 1-20, and DOES 23-25 was willful,
18 wanton, malicious, and done with reckless disregard for the rights and safety of
19 DECEDENT and therefore warrants the imposition of exemplary and punitive
20 damages as to Defendants PINOLA, DOES 1-20, and DOES 23-25.
21 51. As a result of their misconduct, Defendants PINOLA, DOES 1-20, and
22 DOES 23-25 are liable for DECEDENT’s injuries, either because they were integral
23 participants in the excessive use of force and denial of medical care, or because they
24 failed to intervene to prevent these violations.
25 52. Plaintiff MARY ELLEN LENNOX brings this claim as successor in
26 interest to DECEDENT, and seeks survival damages for the violation of
27 DECEDENT’s rights on this claim including pre-death pain and suffering, loss of
28
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1 life, and loss of enjoyment of life. Plaintiff further seeks statutory attorney’s fees
2 and costs under this claim.
3
4 THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
5 Fourteenth Amendment-Substantive Due Process (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
6 (Against PINOLA, DOE OFFICERS 1-20 and DOES 23-25)
7 53. Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates by reference herein
8 paragraphs 1 through 52 of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
9 54. PINOLA and DOE OFFICERS acted under color of state law.
10 55. By engaging in the foregoing conduct, PINOLA and DOE OFFICERS,
11 including DOES 1-20 and 23-25 deprived Plaintiff of her right to a familial
12 relationship with DECEDENT in such a manner as to shock the conscience,
13 including by using excessive and unreasonable deadly force against DECEDENT
14 and by denying DECEDENT medical care, all of which caused injuries that resulted
15 in DECEDENT’s death. This conduct violated Plaintiff’s rights, privileges, and
16 immunities secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
17 56. By engaging in the foregoing conduct, PINOLA and DOE OFFICERS
18 acted with deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of DECEDENT and
19 Plaintiff, and with purpose to harm unrelated to any legitimate law enforcement
20 objective.
21 57. PINOLA and DOE OFFICERS are liable to Plaintiff for the
22 interference with her familial relationship with her son, either because they were
23 integral participants in the unreasonable and excessive use of force and denial of
24 medical care or because they failed to intervene to prevent these violations.
25 58. Plaintiff seeks wrongful death damages under this claim. Plaintiff also
26 seeks statutory attorney’s fees under this claim.
27 ///
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1 FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
2 Municipal Liability – Unconstitutional Custom or Policy (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
3 (Against Defendants CITY, COUNTY, STATE, and DOES 21-22)
4 59. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation in paragraphs
5 1 through 58 of her Complaint with the same force and effect as if fully set forth
6 herein.
7 60. Defendants PINOLA and DOE OFFICERS acted under color of law.
8 61. When DOE OFFICERS, including DOES 1-20, fatally shot
9 DECEDENT while he was having a mental health crisis, and when Defendants
10 denied DECEDENT prompt and necessary medical care, Defendants PINOLA and
11 DOE OFFICERS acted pursuant to an expressly adopted official policy or a
12 longstanding practice or custom of the Defendants CITY and COUNTY.
13 62. On information and belief, Defendants PINOLA and DOE OFFICERS
14 were not disciplined, reprimanded, retrained, suspended, or otherwise penalized in
15 connection with DECEDENT’s death.
16 63. Defendants DOES 21-22, together with other CITY and COUNTY
17 policymakers and supervisors, maintained, inter alia, the following unconstitutional
18 customs, practices, and policies:
19 (a) Using excessive force, including excessive use of deadly force;
20 (b) Providing inadequate training regarding the use of deadly force,
21 less-than-lethal force, and de-escalation, including inadequate
22 training with respect to dealing with individuals experiencing a
23 mental health crisis;
24 (c) Employing and retaining as individuals such as Defendants DOE
25 DEPUTIES 11-20, whom Defendant COUNTY at all times
26 material herein knew or reasonably should have known had
27
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1 dangerous propensities for abusing their authority and for using
2 excessive force;
3 (d) Employing and retaining individuals such as Defendants
4 PINOLA and DOE OFFICERS 1-10, whom Defendant CITY at
5 all times material herein knew or reasonably should have known
6 had dangerous propensities for abusing their authority and for
7 using excessive force;
8 (e) Inadequately supervising, training, controlling, assigning, and
9 disciplining COUNTY deputies and other personnel, including
10 Defendants DOE DEPUTIES 11-20, whom Defendant
11 COUNTY knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should
12 have known had the aforementioned propensities and character
13 traits, including a failure to train with respect to the use of lethal
14 firearms;
15 (f) Inadequately supervising, training, controlling, assigning, and
16 disciplining CITY officers and other personnel, including
17 Defendants PINOLA and DOE OFFICERS 1-10, whom
18 Defendant CITY knew or in the exercise of reasonable care
19 should have known had the aforementioned propensities and
20 character traits, including a failure to train with respect to the use
21 of lethal firearms;
22 (g) Maintaining grossly inadequate procedures for reporting,
23 supervising, investigating, reviewing, disciplining and
24 controlling misconduct by COUNTY deputies and CITY
25 officers;
26 (h) Failing to adequately discipline COUNTY deputies and CITY
27 officers for the above-referenced categories of misconduct,
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1 including “slaps on the wrist,” discipline that is so slight as to be
2 out of proportion to the magnitude of the misconduct, and other
3 inadequate discipline that is tantamount to encouraging
4 misconduct;
5 (i) Announcing that unjustified shootings are “within policy,”
6 including shootings that were later determined in court to be
7 unconstitutional;
8 (j) Even where shootings are determined in court to be
9 unconstitutional, refusing to discipline, terminate, or retrain the
10 officers involved;
11 (k) Encouraging, accommodating, or facilitating a “blue code of
12 silence,” “blue shield,” “blue wall,” “blue curtain,” “blue veil,”
13 or simply “code of silence,” pursuant to which law enforcement
14 officers do not report other officers’ errors, misconduct, or
15 crimes. Pursuant to this code of silence, if questioned about an
16 incident of misconduct involving another officer, while
17 following the code, the officer being questioned will claim
18 ignorance of the other officers’ wrongdoing; and
19 (l) Maintaining a policy of inaction and an attitude of indifference
20 towards soaring numbers of police shootings and other uses of
21 force, including by failing to discipline, retrain, investigate,
22 terminate, and recommend officers for criminal prosecution who
23 participate in shootings of unarmed people.
24 64. By reason of the aforementioned acts and omissions, Plaintiff has
25 suffered loss of the love, companionship, affection, comfort, care, society, training,
26 guidance, and past and future support of DECEDENT. The aforementioned acts and
27
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1 omissions also caused DECEDENT’s pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life,
2 and death.
3 65. Defendants CITY and COUNTY and DOES 21-22, together with
4 various other officials, whether named or unnamed, had either actual or constructive
5 knowledge of the deficient policies, practices and customs alleged in the paragraphs
6 above. Despite having knowledge as stated above, Defendants CITY and COUNTY
7 and DOES 21-22, condoned, tolerated and through actions and inactions thereby
8 ratified such policies. Said defendants also acted with deliberate indifference to the
9 foreseeable effects and consequences of these policies with respect to the
10 constitutional rights of DECEDENT, Plaintiff, and other individuals similarly
11 situated.
12 66. By perpetrating, sanctioning, tolerating and ratifying the outrageous
13 conduct and other wrongful acts, DOES 21-22 acted with intentional, reckless, and
14 callous disregard for the life of DECEDENT and for DECEDENT’s and Plaintiff’s
15 constitutional rights. Furthermore, the policies, practices, and customs
16 implemented, maintained, and still tolerated by Defendants CITY and COUNTY
17 and DOES 21-22 were affirmatively linked to and were a significantly influential
18 force behind the injuries of DECEDENT and Plaintiff.
19 67. The following are only a few examples of continued misconduct by
20 sheriff’s deputies working for the COUNTY, which indicate the COUNTY’s failure
21 to properly train its sheriff’s deputies, maintained unconstitutional; customs,
22 practices, or policies, and furth ratified the misconduct of employees:
23 a. In Rivera, et al. v County of Sacramento, et al., Case No.: 2:18-
24 cv-00056; family of Decedent Jesse Attaway brought a lawsuit alleging
25 excessive use of force by officers when they fatally shot Decedent, who
26 was unarmed at the time and having a mental health crisis. The parties
27 settled the case prior to trial for $625,000.
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1 b. In Isayeva v. County of Sacramento, et al.; Case No.: 2:13-cv-
2 02015; Plaintiffs alleged the use of force by law enforcement was
3 excessive and unreasonable under the circumstances where they shot
4 and killed Paul Tereschenko, who was or was believed to be mentally
5 ill and who was unarmed at the time. The parties settled the case for
6 $350,000.
7 c. In Rose v. County of Sacramento; Case No.: 2:18-cv-00056; a
8 jury returned a verdict in Plaintiff’s favor for the amount of $6.5
9 million. The family of Jonathan Rose brought suit alleging the
10 Defendant Officers used excessive and unreasonable force when they
11 shot and killed Mr. Rose, a person suffering with diagnosed mental
12 health disorders who was unarmed and posing no threat of serious
13 bodily injury or death at the time.
14 d. Donohue v. County of Sacramento, Case No.: 2:11-cv-01488-
15 CKD; the Plaintiff alleged the county deputies used excessive force
16 during a traffic stop when the hit him over the head, face, and back
17 numerous times with a department issued, metal flashlight. The parties
18 settled the case for $150,000.
19 e. In N.M. et al., v. City of Rancho Cordova, et al., Case No.: 2:18-
20 cv-01830; the mother and minor son of decedent Mikel McIntyre
21 brought a lawsuit alleging the excessive and unreasonable use of force
22 against Mr. McIntyre while he was having a mental health crisis when
23 deputies fired 28 rounds at him, striking him seven times – six of which
24 were in the back. Sacramento County officials agreed to pay out more
25 than $1.7 million to settle the wrongful death lawsuit stemming from
26 the May 2017 shooting of Mr. McIntyre by Sacramento sheriff’s
27 deputies.
28 f. Multiple other lawsuits have resulted in jury verdicts against
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1 Defendant COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO for liability related to
2 deputies’ excessive use of force, pursuant to policy, custom, or
3 practice. See, e.g., Jones v. County of Sacramento, Case No.: 2:09-cv-
4 01025-DAD; Hunter v. County of Sacramento, Case No.: 2:06-cv-
5 00457-GEB-AC; Johnson v. Sacramento County, Case No.: 2:06-cv-
6 00169-RRB-GGH.
8 police officers working for the CITY, which indicate the CITY’s failure to properly
9 train its police officers, maintained unconstitutional; customs, practices, or policies,
10 and furth ratified the misconduct of employees:
11 a. In Clark v. City of Sacramento, Case No.: 2:19-cv-00075; the
12 family of Mr. Stephon Clark brought a lawsuit against the City of
13 Sacramento police department and its involved officers alleging the use
14 of force against Mr. Clark was excessive and unreasonable when they
15 shot and killed Mr. Clark while he was in the backyard of his
16 grandparents’ home. The parties came to a $2.4 million settlement.
17 b. In Cole v. City of Sacramento, et al., Case No.: 2:20-cv-00464;
18 Mr. Cole brought a lawsuit alleging the excessive and unreasonable use
19 of force by officers where they shot at Mr. Cole’s dog who was non-
20 threatening at the time and caused injury to Mr. Cole and to his dog.
21 The parties settled the case for $99,000.
22 c. Cain v. City of Sacramento, Case No.: 2:17-cv-00848-
23 JAM-DB; Alleging that on April 10, 2017, a police officer grabbed,
24 tackled, and punched a man for jaywalking, without realizing the
25 beating was recorded. The resulting lawsuit was settled for $550,000.
26 d. Hernandez v. City of Sacramento, Case No.: 2:17-cv-
27 02311-JAM-DB (Alleging that on March 6, 2017, three police officers
28 chased an unarmed man who had been loitering in front of a
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1 convenience store into a hospital where he was then tased, beaten, and
2 pinned to ground until he asphyxiated to the point of coma. The
3 resulting lawsuit was settled for $5,200,000.
4 e. Mann v. City of Sacramento, Case No.: 2:16-cv-01847-
5 WBS-DB; alleging that on July 11, 2016, a mentally-ill man was
6 falsely reported to have a gun when two police officers unsuccessfully
7 attempted to run-over the man with their patrol vehicle and, after
8 failing to do so, exited the vehicle, pursued the man on foot as he fled,
9 cornered the man, and shot him to death. The resulting lawsuit was
10 settled for $719,000.
11 f. Halcomb v. City of Sacramento, Case No.: 2:14-cv-
12 02796-MCE-DB; alleging that on August 8, 2014, three police officers
13 broke into the wrong residence seeking the subject of an arrest warrant
14 who lived at a different address and used excessive and unreasonable
15 force against the resident. The resulting lawsuit was settled for
16 $220,000, after it was discovered that a police officer lied about the
17 existence of a warrant.
18 g. Namoca v. City of Sacramento, Case No.: 2:16-cv-
19 02283-TLN-EFB; alleging that on June 7, 2016, two police officers
20 falsely accused a minor of “tampering” with a mailbox, tackled him to
21 the ground dislocating his shoulder, and unlawfully detained him in the
22 back of a police car for nearly an hour while conducting pretextual
23 records searches before finally releasing him when it became apparent
24 that no lawful justification for the arrest could be found. The resulting
25 lawsuit was settled for $40,000.
26 69. Accordingly, Defendants CITY, COUNTY and DOES 21-22 each are
27 liable to Plaintiff for compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
28
-18-
1 70. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and as successor in interest to
2 DECEDENT and seeks both survival and wrongful death damages under this claim.
3 Plaintiff also seeks attorney’s fees and costs under this claim.
4
5 FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
6 Municipal Liability—Ratification (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
8
71. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation in paragraphs
9
1 through 70 of this Complaint with the same force and effect as if fully set forth
10
herein.
11
72. The acts of PINOLA and DOE OFFICERS 1-20 deprived Plaintiff and
12
DECEDENT of their particular rights under the United States Constitution.
13
73. At all relevant times, PINOLA and DOE OFFICERS were acting under
14
color of law.
15
74. Upon information and belief, a final policymaker, acting under color of
16
law, who had final policymaking authority concerning the acts of PINOLA and
17
DOE OFFICERS, ratified the individual Defendants’ acts and the bases for them.
18
Upon information and belief, the final policymakers knew of and specifically
19
approved of PINOLA and DOE OFFICERS’ acts. Upon information and belief, the
20
final policymaker(s) have determined that the acts of Defendants PINOLA and DOE
21
OFFICERS were “within policy.”
22
75. As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned conduct,
23
DECEDENT endured pain and suffering and lost his life and earning capacity.
24
76. The following are only a few examples of continued misconduct by
25
sheriff’s deputies working for the COUNTY, which indicate the COUNTY’s failure
26
to properly train its sheriff’s deputies, maintained unconstitutional; customs,
27
practices, or policies, and furth ratified the misconduct of employees:
28
-19-
3 an excessive use of force by officers when they fatally shot Decedent,
4 who was unarmed at the time and having a mental health crisis. The
5 parties settled the case prior to trial for $625,000.
11 $350,000.
13 jury returned a verdict in Plaintiff’s favor and after Defendants filed an
14 appeal, the parties came to a settlement agreement in the amount of
15 $5.6 million. The family of Jonathan Rose brought suit alleging the
21 CKD; The Plaintiff alleged the county deputies used excessive force
26 cv-01830; The mother and minor son of decedent Mikel McIntyre
-20-
5 deputies.
12 00169-RRB-GGH.
-21-
11 WBS-DB; Alleging that on July 11, 2016, a mentally-ill man was
18 02796-MCE-DB; Alleging that on August 8, 2014, three police officers
25 02283-TLN-EFB; Alleging that on June 7, 2016, two police officers
-22-
4 78. Plaintiff brings this claim as successor in interest to DECEDENT and
5 seeks survival and wrongful death damages under this claim, including for
6 DECEDENT’s pain and suffering, loss of earning capacity, and loss of enjoyment of
7 life.
8 79. Plaintiff seeks reasonable costs and attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. §
9 1988.
10
11 SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
12 Municipal Liability – Failure to Train (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
14 80. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation in paragraphs
15 1 through 79 of their Complaint with the same force and effect as if fully set forth
16 herein.
17 81. Defendants PINOLA and DOE OFFICERS acted under color of law.
18 82. The acts of OFFICERS, including fatally shooting DECEDENT while
19 he was the middle of a mental health crisis, failing to give a warning that deadly
20 force would be used prior to shooting, using excessive amounts of less than lethal
21 force including bean bag rounds and tasers, and then denying DECEDENT prompt
22 and necessary medical care, failing to de-escalate a situation involving an individual
23 clearly suffering a mental health crisis, and failing to utilize less than lethal options
24 available to them, deprived DECEDENT and Plaintiff of their particular rights under
25 the United States Constitution.
26 83. The training policies of Defendants CITY and COUNTY were not
27 adequate to train their officers and deputies to handle the usual and recurring
28
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1 situations with which they must deal. This includes training polices with respect to
2 the use of force, including deadly force, less-lethal force, de-escalation of situation,
3 handling situations involving individuals with mental health crisis, and with respect
4 to shooting at occupied motor vehicles and their drivers.
5 84. Defendants CITY and COUNTY was deliberately indifferent to the
6 obvious consequences of its failure to train its deputies adequately.
7 85. The failure of Defendant CITY and COUNTY to provide adequate
8 training caused the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights by Defendants PINOLA and
9 DOE OFFICERS 1-20; that is, the defendants’ failure to train is so closely related to
10 the deprivation of the Plaintiff’s rights as to be the moving force that caused the
11 ultimate injury.
13 sheriff’s deputies working for the COUNTY, which indicate the COUNTY’s failure
14 to properly train its sheriff’s deputies, maintained unconstitutional; customs,
15 practices, or policies, and furth ratified the misconduct of employees:
18 an excessive use of force by officers when they fatally shot Decedent,
19 who was unarmed at the time and having a mental health crisis. The
20 parties settled the case prior to trial for $625,000.
26 $350,000.
28
-24-
1 jury returned a verdict in Plaintiff’s favor and after Defendants filed an
2 appeal, the parties came to a settlement agreement in the amount of
3 $5.6 million. The family of Jonathan Rose brought suit alleging the
9 CKD; The Plaintiff alleged the county deputies used excessive force
14 cv-01830; The mother and minor son of decedent Mikel McIntyre
21 deputies.
28 00169-RRB-GGH.
-25-
27 WBS-DB; Alleging that on July 11, 2016, a mentally-ill man was
-26-
6 02796-MCE-DB; Alleging that on August 8, 2014, three police officers
13 02283-TLN-EFB; Alleging that on June 7, 2016, two police officers
20 88. By reason of the aforementioned acts and omissions, Plaintiff has
21 suffered loss of the love, companionship, affection, comfort, care, society, training,
22 guidance, and past and future support of DECEDENT. The aforementioned acts and
23 omissions also caused DECEDENT’s pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life,
24 and death.
25 89. Accordingly, Defendants CITY AND COUNTY and DOES 21-22 each
26 are liable to Plaintiff for compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
27
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1 90. Plaintiff brings this claim as successor in interest to DECEDENT and
2 seeks both survival and wrongful death damages under this claim. Plaintiff also
3 seeks attorney’s fees and costs under this claim.
4
5 SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
6 Battery (wrongful death and survival claim)
7 (Against all Defendants)
11 92. PINOLA and DOE OFFICERS, including DOES 1-20 and 23-25,
12 while working and acting within the course and scope of their duties, DOES 11-20
13 as deputy sheriffs for the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department, PINOLA and
14 DOES 1-10 as police officers for Sacramento City Police Department, and DOES
15 23-25 as California Highway Patrol officers fatally shot DECEDENT. At the time
16 of the shooting, DECEDENT was not armed with a gun and posed no immediate
17 threat of death or serious bodily injury to the deputies and officers or to anyone else.
18 The shooting was excessive and objectively unreasonable.
19 93. On December 13, 2020, at approximately 6:35 a.m. in Sacramento,
20 California, police officers working for the City of Sacramento Police Department,
21 sheriff’s deputies for the County of Sacramento Sheriff’s Department, and
22 California Highway Patrol working for the State of California all responded to the
23 incident where DECEDENT had crashed a vehicle into a grocery store.
24 DECEDENT went inside the grocery store, and was having a mental health crisis.
25 PINOLA and DOE OFFICERS initially arriving on scene attempted to speak with
26 DECEDENT. However, as more DOE OFFICERS arrived including a police K-9-
27 unit, PINOLA and DOE OFFICERS escalated the situation and deployed multiple
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1 less-than lethal bean bag rounds and tasers multiple times on DECEDENT before
2 fatally shooting him. Even after lethal shots were fired, OFFICERS continued to
3 tase the DECEDENT as he laid on the ground bleeding. All of the force deployed,
4 including the less-than-lethal and lethal force, was unreasonable.
5 94. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of PINOLA and DOE
6 OFFICERS as alleged above, DECEDENT sustained injuries, died from his injuries,
7 and also lost his earning capacity. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of
8 PINOLA and DOE OFFICERS as alleged above, DECEDENT suffered survival
9 damages pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 377.34, including during the
10 time that he survived after the shooting before dying later at the scene on the date of
11 the shooting.
12 95. The COUNTY is vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of DOE
13 DEPUTIES 11-20 pursuant to section 815.2(a) of the California Government Code,
14 which provides that a public entity is liable for the injuries caused by its employees
15 within the scope of the employment if the employee’s act would subject him or her
16 to liability.
17 96. The CITY is vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of PINOLA and
18 DOE OFFICERS 1-10 pursuant to section 815.2(a) of the California Government
19 Code, which provides that a public entity is liable for the injuries caused by its
20 employees within the scope of the employment if the employee’s act would subject
21 him or her to liability.
22 97. The conduct of PINOLA and DOES 1-20 was malicious, wanton,
23 oppressive, and accomplished with a conscious disregard for the rights of Plaintiffs
24 and DECEDENT, entitling Plaintiffs, individually and as the successors in interest
25 to DECEDENT, to an award of exemplary and punitive damages as to Defendants
26 PINOLA and DOES 1-20.
27
28
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2 DECEDENT, and seeks both survival damages and wrongful death damages under
3 this claim.
4 EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
5 Negligence (wrongful death and survival claim)
9 set forth herein.
10 100. Deputy sheriffs, including Defendants DOE DEPUTIES 11-20, police
11 officers, including PINOLA and DOES 1-10, and CHP DOES 23-25 have a duty to
12 use reasonable care to prevent harm or injury to others. This duty includes using
13 appropriate tactics, giving appropriate commands, giving warnings, and not using
14 any force unless necessary, using less than lethal options, and only using deadly
15 force as a last resort.
16 101. Defendants PINOLA and DOES 1-20 and 23-25 breached this duty of
17 care. The actions and inactions of Defendants PINOLA and DOES 1-20 and 23-25
18 were negligent and reckless, including but not limited to:
19 (a) the failure to properly and adequately assess the need to use
20 deadly force and other force against DECEDENT;
21 (b) the negligent tactics and handling of the situation with
22 DECEDENT, including pre-shooting negligence;
23 (c) the negligent use of deadly force and less-than-lethal force
24 against DECEDENT, including negligently handling a situation
25 with an individual who was in clear mental distress;
26 (d) the failure to provide prompt medical care to DECEDENT;
27
28
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1 (e) the failure to properly train and supervise employees, both
2 professional and non-professional, including DOES 1-25, with
3 respect to the use of deadly force;
4 (f) the failure to ensure that adequate numbers of employees with
5 appropriate education and training were available to meet the
6 needs of and protect the rights of DECEDENT;
7 (g) the negligent communication of information during the incident;
8 and
9 (h) the negligent handling of a situation with someone in clear
10 mental distress and failure to use proper de-escalation tactics and
11 techniques.
12 102. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct as alleged
13 above, and other undiscovered negligent conduct, DECEDENT was caused to suffer
14 severe pain and suffering and ultimately died. Also, as a direct and proximate result
15 of Defendants’ conduct as alleged above, Plaintiff has suffered emotional distress
16 and mental anguish. Plaintiff also has been deprived of the life-long love,
17 companionship, comfort, support, society, care and sustenance of DECEDENT, and
18 will continue to be so deprived for the remainder of her natural life.
19 103. The COUNTY is vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of Defendants
20 DOES 11-20 pursuant to section 815.2(a) of the California Government Code,
21 which provides that a public entity is liable for the injuries caused by its employees
22 within the scope of the employment if the employee’s act would subject her or her
23 to liability.
24 104. The CITY is vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of Defendants
25 PINOLA and DOES 1-10 pursuant to section 815.2(a) of the California Government
26 Code, which provides that a public entity is liable for the injuries caused by its
27
28
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1 employees within the scope of the employment if the employee’s act would subject
2 her or her to liability.
4 DECEDENT, and seeks both wrongful death and survival damages under this claim.
5
6 NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
7 (Violation of Cal. Civil Code § 52.1)
12 107. California Civil Code, Section 52.1 (the Bane Act), prohibits any
13 person from intentionally interfering with a person’s constitutional rights, which can
14 be shown by a reckless disregard for that person’s constitutional rights. Here,
15 PINOLA and DOES 1-20 and 23-25 acted with a reckless disregard for
16 DECEDENT’s constitutional rights when they used less-than-lethal force against
17 DECEDENT and then fatally shot him, which shows Defendants’ intent to violate
18 DECEDENT’s constitutional rights.
19 108. On information and belief, Defendants PINOLA and DOES 1-20 and
20 23-25, while working for the COUNTY and acting within the course and scope of
21 their duties, intentionally committed and attempted to commit acts of violence
22 against DECEDENT, including fatally shooting him with a firearm without
23 justification or excuse, continuing to tase DECEDENT after he was shot and on the
24 ground, integrally participating and failing to intervene in the shooting, and denying
25 him necessary medical care.
26 109. When Defendants OFFICERS fatally shot DECEDENT with a firearm,
27 intentionally used excessive force and non-deadly force, intentionally violated the
28
-32-
1 DECEDENT’s right to be free from excessive force by demonstrating a reckless
2 disregard for DECEDENT’s rights to be free from excessive force, to medical care,
3 to be free from state actions that shock the conscience, and to life, liberty, and
4 property.
5 110. On information and belief, Defendants intentionally shot DECEDENT
6 to discourage DECEDENT from exercising his civil rights, to retaliate against him
7 for invoking such rights, or to prevent him from exercising such rights, which he
8 was fully entitled to enjoy.
9 111. The conduct of Defendants DOES 1-20 and 23-25 was a substantial
10 factor in causing Plaintiff’s harms, losses, injuries, and damages.
11 112. The COUNTY and CITY are vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of
12 Defendant DOES 1-10 and 11-20 pursuant to section 815.2(a) of the California
13 Government Code, which provides that a public entity is liable for the injuries
14 caused by its employees within the scope of the employment if the employee’s act
15 would subject him or her to liability. Defendants DOES 21-22 are vicariously liable
16 under California law and the doctrine of respondeat superior.
17 113. The conduct of Defendants was malicious, wanton, oppressive, and
18 accomplished with a conscious disregard for DECEDENT’s and Plaintiff’s rights,
19 justifying an award of exemplary and punitive damages as to Defendants DOES 1-
20 20 and 23-25.
21 114. Plaintiff brings this claim as successor in interest to DECEDENT, and
22 seeks survival damages under this claim. Plaintiff is also seeking attorney’s fees
23 and a multiplier under this claim pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code §52 et seq.
24
25
26
27
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1 PRAYER FOR RELIEF
2 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff MARY ELLEN LENNOX requests entry of
3 judgment in her favor and against Defendants City of Sacramento, County of
4 Sacramento, Michael Pinola, State of California, and Does 1-25, inclusive, as
5 follows:
6 A. For compensatory damages, including both survival damages and
7 wrongful death damages under federal and state law, in the
8 amount to be proven at trial;
9 B. For funeral and burial expenses;
10 C. For punitive damages against the individual defendants in an
11 amount to be proven at trial;
12 D. For interest;
13 E. For reasonable attorneys’ fees, including litigation expenses;
14 F. For costs of suit; and
15 G. For such further other relief as the Court may deem just, proper,
16 and appropriate.
17
18 DATED: August 26, 2021 LAW OFFICES OF DALE K. GALIPO
19
20
21 Dale K. Galipo
22 Attorney for Plaintiff
23
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1 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
2 Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury.
3
4 DATED: August 26, 2021 LAW OFFICES OF DALE K. GALIPO
5
6
7 Dale K. Galipo
8 Attorney for Plaintiff
9
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-35-

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1 LAW OFFICES OF DALE K.

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

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