CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (APRIL 8, 2021)

V. RULE 113 - ARREST

1. G.R. No. 171465              June 8, 2007

AAA *, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO A. CARBONELL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch
27, Regional Trial Court, San Fernando City, La Union and ENGR. JAIME O.
ARZADON, respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for certiorari1 assails the December 16, 20052 Order of the Regional

Trial Court, Branch 27, San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 6983,
dismissing the rape case filed against private respondent Jaime O. Arzadon for lack of
probable cause; and its February 3, 20063 Order denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

Petitioner worked as a secretary at the Arzadon Automotive and Car Service Center
from February 28, 2001 to August 16, 2001. On May 27, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m.,
Arzadon asked her to deliver a book to an office located at another building but when
she returned to their office, the lights had been turned off and the gate was closed.
Nevertheless, she went inside to get her handbag.

On her way out, she saw Arzadon standing beside a parked van holding a pipe. He
told her to go near him and upon reaching his side, he threatened her with the pipe and
forced her to lie on the pavement. He removed her pants and underwear, and inserted
his penis into her vagina. She wept and cried out for help but to no avail because there
was nobody else in the premises.

Petitioner did not report the incident because Arzadon threatened to kill her and her
family. But when she discovered that she was pregnant as a consequence of the rape,
she narrated the incident to her parents. On July 24, 2002, petitioner filed a complaint
for rape against Arzadon.

On September 16, 2002, Assistant City Prosecutor Imelda Cosalan issued a

Resolution4 finding probable cause and recommending the filing of an information for
rape. Arzadon moved for reconsideration and during the clarificatory hearing held on
October 11, 2002, petitioner testified before the investigating prosecutor. However,
she failed to attend the next hearing hence, the case was provisionally dismissed.

On March 5, 2003, petitioner filed another Affidavit-Complaint5 with a

comprehensive account of the alleged rape incident. The case was assigned to 2nd
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Georgina Hidalgo. During the preliminary
investigation, petitioner appeared for clarificatory questioning. On June 11, 2003, the

1
investigating prosecutor issued a Resolution6 finding that a prima facie  case of rape
exists and recommending the filing of the information.

Arzadon moved for reconsideration and requested that a panel of prosecutors be

constituted to review the case. Thus, a panel of prosecutors was created and after the
clarificatory questioning, the panel issued on October 13, 2003 a Resolution 7 finding
probable cause and denying Arzadon’s motion for reconsideration.

An Information8 for rape was filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, San
Fernando, La Union on February 6, 2004, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6415.
Thereafter, Arzadon filed a "Motion to Hold in Abeyance All Court Proceedings
Including the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest and to Determine Probable Cause for
the Purpose of Issuing a Warrant of Arrest." 9 On March 18, 2004, respondent Judge
Antonio A. Carbonell granted the motion and directed petitioner and her witnesses to
take the witness stand for determination of probable cause.

Arzadon also appealed the Resolution of the panel of prosecutors finding probable
cause before the Department of Justice. On July 9, 2004, then Acting Secretary of
Justice Merceditas Gutierrez found no probable cause and directed the withdrawal of
the Information in Criminal Case No. 6415.10

Upon motion for reconsideration by petitioner, however, Secretary of Justice Raul

Gonzales reversed the July 9, 2004 Resolution and issued another Resolution11 finding
that probable cause exists. Thus, a new Information 12 for rape was filed against
Arzadon docketed as Criminal Case No. 6983.

Consequently, Arzadon filed an "Urgent Motion for Judicial Determination of

Probable Cause for the Purpose of Issuing a Warrant of Arrest." 13 In an Order dated
August 11, 2005, respondent Judge Carbonell granted the motion and directed
petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness stand.

Instead of taking the witness stand, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
claiming that the documentary evidence sufficiently established the existence of
probable cause. Pending resolution thereof, she likewise filed a petition 14 with this
Court for the transfer of venue of Criminal Case No. 6983. The case was docketed as
Administrative Matter No. 05-12-756-RTC and entitled Re: Transfer of Venue of
Criminal Case No. 6983, formerly Criminal Case No. 6415, from the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 27, San Fernando City, La Union, to any Court in Metro Manila.

In a Resolution15 dated January 18, 2006, the Court granted petitioner’s request for
transfer of venue. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
25, and docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-242289. However, the proceedings have
been suspended pending the resolution of this petition.

Meanwhile, on December 16, 2005, respondent Judge Carbonell issued the assailed
Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied hence, this petition.

Petitioner raises the following issues:16

2
 I

RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
GRANTED THE MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE
FILED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND THE SUBSEQUENT DENIAL
OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

II

RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED FURTHER ACTS CONSTITUTING

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE COMPLAINANT AND WITNESSES
TO TAKE THE STAND FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING PROBABLE
CAUSE

III

RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN

HE REFUSED TO INHIBIT FROM FURTHER HANDLING THE CASE DESPITE
WHISPERS OF DOUBT ON HIS BIAS AND PARTIALITY

IV

RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN

IT ISSUED THE ORDER OF FEBRUARY 3, 2006, DENYING THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, DESPITE THE SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION OF
JANUARY 18, 2006, GRANTING THE TRANSFER OF VENUE

Petitioner contends that the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and her witnesses in satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. She argues that respondent Judge Carbonell
should have taken into consideration the documentary evidence as well as the
transcript of stenographic notes which sufficiently established the existence of
probable cause.

Arzadon claims that the petition should be dismissed outright for being the wrong
mode of appeal, it appearing that the issues raised by petitioner properly fall under an
action for certiorari under Rule 65, and not Rule 45, of the Rules of Court.

Respondent Judge Carbonell argues in his Comment17 that the finding of probable

cause by the investigating prosecutor is not binding or obligatory, and that he was
justified in requiring petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness stand in order to
determine probable cause.

The issues for resolution are 1) whether the petition should be dismissed for being the
wrong mode of appeal; and 2) whether respondent Judge Carbonell acted with grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause.

The petition has merit.

3
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is distinct from a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 in that the former brings up for review errors of judgment
while the latter concerns errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is not an allowable ground
under Rule 45. However, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 may be
considered a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 where it is alleged that the
respondents abused their discretion in their questioned actions, as in the instant
case.18 While petitioner claims to have brought the instant action under Rule 45, the
grounds raised herein involve an alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Judge Carbonell. Accordingly, the Court shall treat the same as a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.

However, we must point out the procedural error committed by petitioner in directly
filing the instant petition before this Court instead of the Court of Appeals, thereby
violating the principle of judicial hierarchy of courts. It is well-settled that although
the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum. 19 In this case, however, the gravity of the offense
charged and the length of time that has passed since the filing of the complaint for
rape, compel us to resolve the present controversy in order to avoid further delay.20

We thus proceed to the issue of whether respondent Judge Carbonell acted with grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause.

We rule in the affirmative.

Respondent Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable
cause on the ground that petitioner and her witnesses failed to comply with his orders
to take the witness stand. Thus –

In RESUME therefore, as indubitably borne out by the case record and considering
that the Private Prosecutor, despite several admonitions contumaciously nay
contemptuously refused to comply/obey this Court’s Orders of March 18, 2004,
August 11, 2005 and eight (8) other similar Orders issued in open Court that directed
the complainant/witnesses to take the witness stand to be asked probing/clarificatory
questions consonant with cited jurisprudential rulings of the Supreme Court, this
Court in the exercise of its discretion and sound judgment finds and so holds that NO
probable cause was established to warrant the issuance of an arrest order and the
further prosecution of the instant case.

Record also shows in no unclear terms that in all the scheduled hearings of the case,
the accused had always been present. A contrario, the private complainant failed to
appear during the last four (4) consecutive settings despite due notice without giving
any explanation, which to the mind of the Court may indicate an apparent lack of
interest in the further prosecution of this case. That failure may even be construed as a
confirmation of the Defense’s contention reflected in the case record, that the only
party interested in this case is the Private prosecutor, prodded by the accused’s alleged
hostile siblings to continue with the case.

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WHEREFORE, premises considered, for utter lack of probable cause, the instant case
is hereby ordered DISMISSED.21

He claims that under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, no warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause "to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce."

However, in the leading case of Soliven v. Makasiar,22 the Court explained that this
constitutional provision does not mandatorily require the judge to personally examine
the complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the
report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the
prosecutor’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses.
Thus:

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of
the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible
officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran
that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant
and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants
of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying
himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the
judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the
basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would by unduly laden with
the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.23

We reiterated the above ruling in the case of Webb v. De Leon,24 where we held that
before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine the probability, not the
certainty, of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing
to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial
determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by
substantial evidence.25

It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry

which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the
preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held
for trial or be released. The determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing
the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper –

5
whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged – is the function of the investigating prosecutor.26

True, there are cases where the circumstances may call for the judge’s personal
examination of the complainant and his witnesses. But it must be emphasized that
such personal examination is not mandatory and indispensable in the determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The necessity arises only when
there is an utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable
cause.27 Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the investigating prosecutor,
provided that he likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in support thereof.

Indeed, what the law requires as personal determination on the part of the judge is
that he should not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor. In Okabe
v. Gutierrez,28 we stressed that the judge should consider not only the report of the
investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit and the documentary evidence of the
parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript
of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to
the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information. 29 If the
report, taken together with the supporting evidence, is sufficient to sustain a finding of
probable cause, it is not compulsory that a personal examination of the complainant
and his witnesses be conducted.

In this case, respondent Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case No. 6983 without
taking into consideration the June 11, 2003 Resolution of 2nd Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Georgina Hidalgo, the October 13, 2003 Resolution of the panel of
prosecutors, and the July 1, 2005 Resolution of the Department of Justice, all of
which sustain a finding of probable cause against Arzadon. Moreover, he failed to
evaluate the evidence in support thereof. Respondent judge’s finding of lack of
probable cause was premised only on the complainant’s and her witnesses’ absence
during the hearing scheduled by the respondent judge for the judicial determination of
probable cause.

Petitioner narrated in detail the alleged rape incident both in her Sinumpaang

Salaysay30 dated July 24, 2002 and Complaint-Affidavit31 dated March 5, 2003. She
attended several clarificatory hearings that were conducted in the instant case. The
transcript of stenographic notes32 of the hearing held on October 11, 2002 shows that
she positively identified Arzadon as her assailant, and the specific time and place of
the incident. She also claimed that she bore a child as a result of the rape and, in
support of her contentions, presented the child and her birth certificate as evidence. In
contrast, Arzadon merely relied on the defense of alibi which is the weakest of all
defenses.

After a careful examination of the records, we find that there is sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause. The gravamen of rape is the carnal knowledge by the
accused of the private complainant under any of the circumstances provided in Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. 33 Petitioner has categorically stated that
Arzadon raped her, recounting her ordeal in detail during the preliminary
investigations. Taken with the other evidence presented before the investigating
prosecutors, such is sufficient for purposes of establishing probable cause. It is well-
settled that a finding of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing

6
evidence beyond reasonable doubt. Probable cause is that which engenders a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require that the evidence would
justify conviction. 34

It is clear therefore that respondent Judge Carbonell gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause on the ground that
petitioner and her witnesses failed to take the witness stand. Considering there is
ample evidence and sufficient basis on record to support a finding of probable cause,
it was unnecessary for him to take the further step of examining the petitioner and her
witnesses. Moreover, he erred in holding that petitioner’s absences in the scheduled
hearings were indicative of a lack of interest in prosecuting the case. In fact, the
records show that she has relentlessly pursued the same.

Needless to say, a full-blown trial is to be preferred to ferret out the truth. 35 As it were,
the incidents of this case have been pending for almost five years without having even
passed the preliminary investigation stage. Suffice to say that the credibility of
petitioner may be tested during the trial where the respective allegations and defenses
of the complainant and the accused are properly ventilated. It is only then that the
truth as to Arzadon’s innocence or guilt can be determined.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 27, San Fernando, La Union dated December 16, 2005, and February 3, 2006
dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and the Information in the said case is hereby REINSTATED. The
Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Manila is DIRECTED to take cognizance of the
case and let the records thereof be REMANDED to the said court for further
proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
NACHURA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

7
 CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes
*
 Pursuant to Section 44 of Republic Act No. 9262 (AN ACT DEFINING
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN PROVIDING FOR
PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES
THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES), All records pertaining to cases of
violence against women and their children including those in the barangay shall be
confidential and all public officers and employees and public or private clinics or
hospitals shall respect the right to privacy of the victim. Whoever publishes or causes
to be published, in any format, the name, address, telephone number, school, business
address, employer, or other identifying information of a victim or an immediate
family member, without the latter’s consent shall be liable to the contempt power of
the court.

Any person who violates this provision shall suffer the penalty of one (1) year
imprisonment and a fine of not more than Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱500,000.00).

Section 63, Rule XI of the RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262 also provides: During the investigation, prosecution and
trial of an offense under the Act, law enforcement officials, prosecution, judges, court
personnel and medical practitioners, as well as parties to the case, shall recognize the
right to privacy of the victim-survivor of violence. Law enforcement officers and
prosecutors shall conduct closed-door investigations and shall not allow the media to
have access to any information regarding the victim-survivor. The adult victim,
however, may choose to go public or speak with the media, preferably with the
assistance of her counsel.

The barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel shall not
disclose the names and personal circumstances of the victim-survivors or
complainants or any other information tending to establish their identities to the media
or to the public or compromise her identity.

8
It shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher, reporter or columnist in case of printed
materials, announcer or producer in case of television or radio, director and editor of a
film in case of the movie industry, or any person utilizing try-media or information
technology to cause publicity of the name of identity of the victim-survivor or
complainant without her consent. Identities of children shall not in any way be
disclosed to the public without the conformity of the DSWS officer of the city or
province.

Any person who violates this provision shall suffer the penalty of one (1) year
imprisonment and a fine of not more than Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱500,000.00).
1
 Rollo, pp. 4-18.
2
 Id.  at 20-22. Penned by Judge Antonio A. Carbonell.
3
 Id.  at 24-26.
4
 Id.  at 28-29.
5
 Id.  at 168-170.
6
 Id.  at 31-35.
7
 Id.  at 37-38.
8
 Id.  at 40.
9
 Id.  at 42-46.
10
 Id. at 149-156.
11
 Id. at 79-82.
12
 Id. at 85.
13
 Id. at 87-90.
14
 Records, Vol. 2, pp. 69-78.
15
 Rollo, p. 98.
16
 Id. at 12.
17
 Id. at 230-234.
18
 People v. Court of Appeals, 438 Phil. 215, 231 (2002); GCP-Manny Transport
Services, Inc. v. Principe, G.R. No. 141484, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 555,
561-562.

9
19
 Yared v. Ilarde, 391 Phil. 722, 733 (2000).
20
 See Ouano v. PGTT International Investment Corporation, 434 Phil. 28, 35 (2002).
21
 Rollo, p. 22.
22
 G.R. Nos. L-82585, L-82827, and L-83979, November 14, 1988, 167 SCRA 393.
23
 Id. at 398.
24
 317 Phil. 758 (1995).
25
 Id. at 793.
26
 People v. Inting, G.R. No. 88919, July 25, 1990, 187 SCRA 788, 792-793.
27
 Webb v. De Leon, supra note 24 at 794.
28
 G.R. No. 150185, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 685.
29
 Id. at 707.
30
 Records, Vol. 1, pp. 13-16.
31
 Id. at 8-10.
32
 Id. at 81-93.
33
 People v. Sabardan, G.R. No. 132135, May 21, 2004, 429 SCRA 9, 19.
34
 Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 154239-41, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA
533, 550.
35
 Abugotal v. Tiro, 160 Phil. 884, 890 (1975).

10
2. G.R. No. 181546             September 3, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RICARDO ALUNDAY, accused-appellant.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01164
dated 9 October 2007 which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Bontoc, Mountain Province, Branch 35, in Criminal Case No. 1528, finding
accused-appellant Ricardo Alunday guilty of violation of Section 9, Republic Act No.
6425, otherwise known as "The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972."

On 7 August 2000, two informations were filed against accused-appellant before the
RTC of Bontoc, Mountain Province, for violating the provisions of Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, 2 and
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866.

In Criminal Case No. 1528, accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 9
of Republic Act No. 6425, committed in the following manner:

That on or about August 3, 2000, in the morning thereof at a marijuana plantation

with an area of TEN (10) hectares, more or less, and which form part of the public
domain at Mount Churyon, Betwagan, Sadanga, Mountain Province, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being
authorized by law, and with intent to plant and cultivate, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously plant, cultivate and culture marijuana fruiting tops

11
weighing more than 750 grams, with an estimated value of TEN MILLION
(P10,000,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, knowing fully well that the same is a
prohibited drug or from which a dangerous drug maybe manufactured or derived.3

On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. 1529, accused-appellant was additionally
charged with violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, 4 committed as
follows:

That on or about August 3, 2000, in the morning therof at a marijuana plantation

situated at Mount Churyon, Betwagan, Sadanga, Mountain Province, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any license or
permit thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession an M16 Rifle, a high powered firearm, bearing Serial No. 108639, with
engraved marks of "COREY BOKZ" on the left side of the gun butt and six (6) letter
"x" on the handgrip which he carried outside his residence without any written
authority or permit previously acquired from the authorities to carry or transport the
same.5

On 22 November 2000, accused-appellant assisted by a counsel de oficio pleaded not

guilty6 to both charges. Thereafter, a joint trial ensued.

During the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (a) Senior Police
Officer (SPO) 1 George Saipen; (b) SPO1 Felix Angitag; (c) Police Officer (PO) 2
Joseph Aspilan; (d) Police Senior Inspector Andrew Cayad, Chief, Intelligence
Section, Police Provincial Office, Mountain Province; (e) PO2 Roland Ateo-an; (f)
Edward Sacgaca, Philippine Information Agency; (g) SPO1 Celestino Victor Matias;
and (h) Emilia Gracia Montes, Forensic Analyst, Philippine National Police (PNP),
Crime Laboratory, Camp MBAdo Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet.

The defense, on the other hand, presented accused-appellant Ricardo Alunday, Wayto
Alunday and Linda Dalasnac, aunt and daughter respectively, of accused-appellant.

The prosecution's version of the case is as follows:

Sometime in May 2000, the Intelligence Section of the Police Provincial Office of
Mountain Province received a report from a confidential informant of an existing
marijuana plantation within the vicinity of Mount Churyon, Sadanga, Mountain
Province. Acting on the confidential information, Chief of the Intelligence Section of
Mountain Province, Police Senior Inspector Andrew Cayad (Cayad), engaged the
services of another confidential informant to validate said report. After a series of
validations, the confidential informant confirmed the existence of the subject
plantation.7

Cayad reported the matter to the Provincial Director, who immediately directed Cayad
to lead a 70-men police contingent to make an operation plan. A joint operation from
the whole Mountain Province Police Force was formed. 8 The police operation was
termed Operation Banana.

On 2 August 2000, a contingent composed of policemen from Bauko, Sabangan,

Tadian, Sadanga, Provincial Headquarters and Bontoc Municipal Headquarters

12
proceeded to Mount Churyon. Edward Sacgaca of the Philippine Information Agency
(PIA) was invited to videotape the operation. 9 The team left Bontoc for Betwagan,
Sadanga, in the afternoon of 2 August 2000. 10 They reached Betwagan at about 6
o'clock in the afternoon and slept there up to midnight. Thereafter, they proceeded to
Mount Churyon where they arrived at around 6 o'clock in the morning of the
following day or on 3 August 2000.11 A group of policemen, one of whom was SPO1
George Saipen (Saipen) of the Bontoc PNP, was dispatched to scout the area ahead of
the others, while the rest stayed behind as back-up security. At a distance of 30
meters, Saipen, together with the members of his group, saw Ricardo Alunday
(Alunday) herein accused-appellant, cutting and gathering marijuana plants. SPO1
Saipen and others approached Alunday and introduced themselves as members of the
PNP.12 SPO1 Saipen, together with the other policemen, brought said accused-
appellant to a nearby hut.

Inside the hut, the operatives saw an old woman, an M16 rifle and some dried
marijuana leaves. The other members of the raiding team uprooted and thereafter
burned the marijuana plants, while the team from the Provincial Headquarters got
some samples of the marijuana plants and brought the same to their headquarters. The
samples were turned over by Police Superintendent Rodolfo Anagaran to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for examination. Emilia Gracia Montes, Forensic Analyst, PNP
Crime Laboratory, Camp MBAdo Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, received 17 pieces
of fully grown suspected marijuana plants for laboratory examination and analyses.
She tested the subject specimens and found all to be positive for marijuana.13

Accused-appellant presented a disparate narration of the incident.

He vehemently denied the accusations. He maintained that on 2 August 2000, he went

to Mount Churyon to haul the lumber that he had cut and left by the river. He spent
the night at the hut of an old woman named Ligka Baydon.

At around 6:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day or on 3 August 2000, he
went out of the hut to search for squash to cook for breakfast. A group of policemen
suddenly came. Two of them approached him and asked if he owned the marijuana
plants growing around the premises and the land on which these were planted. He
answered in the negative and further stated that he did not even know how a
marijuana plant looked like. The policemen then proceeded to uproot and burn the
supposed marijuana plants. Subsequently, the policemen took him with them to the
PNP Headquarters in Bontoc despite his refusal to go with them.

Wayto Alunday and Linda Dalasnac, the aunt and daughter of Ricardo Alunday,
respectively, corroborated the latter's testimony that he was indeed at Mount Churyon
on 3 August 2000 to get some lumber.14

After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty in Crim. Case No. 1528 but
was acquitted in Crim. Case No. 1529. The dispositive portion of the trial court's
Decision, dated 8 May 2003 reads:

WHEREFORE, a Joint Judgment is hereby rendered-

13
1. Sentencing Ricardo Alunday alias "Kayad" in Criminal Case 1528, to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos-the
land involved in the commission of the offense not having been shown to be part of
the public domain; and

2. Acquitting the above-named accused in Criminal Case 1529 on reasonable doubt.15

From the decision of conviction, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.16

On 11 November 2004, accused-appellant filed an appellant's brief17 before the

Supreme Court. On 4 March 2005, the Office of the Solicitor General filed the
People's Brief.18

Since the penalty imposed by the trial court was reclusion perpetua, the case was
remanded to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition pursuant to
our ruling in People v. Mateo.19

On 9 October 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings and conclusion of the
RTC, the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated 8 May 2003 of the Regional Trial Court,
First Judicial Region, Branch 35, Bontoc, Mountain Province is hereby AFFIRMED.20

Accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal21 on 5 November 2007. Thus, the Court of

Appeals forwarded the records of the case to us for further review.

In our Resolution22 dated 19 March 2008, the parties were notified that they may file
their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within 30 days from notice.
People23 opted not to file a supplemental brief on the ground that it had exhaustively
argued all the relevant issues in its brief, and the filing of a supplemental brief would
only entail a repetition of the arguments already discussed therein. Accused-appellant
submitted his supplemental brief on 12 June 2008.

In the beginning, accused-appellant raised a lone error, thus:

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.24

Later, in his supplemental brief dated 11 June 2008, he added another alleged error,
thus:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO

THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE DESPITE ITS INADMISSIBILITY FOR
BEING THE RESULT OF AN UNLAWFUL ARREST.25

As regards the guilt of accused-appellant, we find the expostulations of the Court of

Appeals worth reiterating:

14
It is jurisprudential that factual findings of trial courts especially those which revolve
on matters of credibility of witnesses deserve to be respected when no glaring errors
bordering on a gross misapprehension of the facts, or where no speculative, arbitrary
and unsupported conclusions, can be gleaned from such findings. The evaluation of
the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are best undertaken by the trial court
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses' deportment, demeanor,
conduct and attitude under grilling examination.

We have carefully scrutinized the record and found no cogent reason to depart from
this rule.

xxxx

Indeed, in the case at bench, the prosecution was able to establish the following with
conviction:

(1) On 3 August 2000, a police continent raided a marijuana plantation located in

Mount Churyon, Sadanga, Mountain Province.

(2) In the course thereof, appellant was seen cutting and gathering marijuana plants
from the premises.

(3) There were no other plants except marijuana which were growing in the said area.

(4) There was a hut apparently used by appellant and an old woman as a camp or
temporary dwelling which existed alone within the area of the subject plantation.

(5) The samples taken from the said plantation were all found to be positive for
marijuana.

On the face of these positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant's bare
denials must necessarily fail. Moreover, it is interesting to note that appellant never
mentioned his aunt, Wayto Alunday, in his testimony. In fact, she contradicted
appellant's testimony when she said that he ate and slept in her hut. This only bolsters
the conclusion that Wayto Alunday was not present when appellant was captured by
the police.26

Needless to state, the defense of denial cannot prevail over the positive identification
of the accused.27

Contrarily, we find accused-appellant's posturings tenuous. Again, we cannot deviate

from the Court of Appeals' valid observation:

Aside from appellant's preposterous claim that he was looking for squash in the
subject area where only marijuana plants were planted, he did not advance any
explanation for his presence thereat. Besides, prosecution witness Saipen
categorically stated that he caught appellant red-handed harvesting marijuana plants.
Thus, We find it facetious that appellant did not even know what a marijuana plant
looked like.

15
Appellant asserts that the plantation in question was maintained by the Cordillera
People's Liberation Army which witness Cayad confirmed likewise. Thus, appellant
theorizes that he could not have been the perpetrator of the crime charged.

We find appellant's assertion specious. A perusal of Section 9, Art. II of R.A. No.

6425 shows that a violation exists when a person shall cultivate, plant or culture on
any medium Indian hemp, opium poppy (papaver somniferum) or any other plant
which may hereafter be classified as dangerous drug. Indeed, ownership of the land
where the marijuana seedlings are planted, cultivated and cultured is not a requisite of
the offense.28

Accused-appellant further assails his conviction for being improper and illegal
asserting that the court a quo never acquired jurisdiction over his person because he
was arrested without a warrant and that his warrantless arrest was not done under any
of the circumstances enumerated in Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court.
He insists that the arresting officers had three months within which to secure a
warrant from the time they received the information about an existing marijuana
plantation in Mount Churyon, Sadanga, in May 2000, until they effected accused-
appellant's arrest on 3 August 2000. Also, accused maintains that the arresting
officers' failure to secure a warrant can never be justified by the urgency of the
situation.

Accused-appellant's claim of irregularity in his arrest is, at the most, limp.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

Section 5(a) provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit, an offense. Section 5(a) refers to
arrest in flagrante delicto.29 In flagrante delicto means caught in the act of committing
a crime. This rule, which warrants the arrest of a person without warrant, requires that
the person arrested has just committed a crime, or is committing it, or is about to
commit an offense, in the presence or within view of the arresting officer.30

16
It must be recalled that the Intelligence Section of the Provincial Office of the
Mountain Province received the information sometime in May 2000, and accused-
appellant was arrested by SPO1 Saipen during the police raid at the plantation at
Mount Churyon, Sadanga, only on 3 August 2000. This is so because the arrest was
effected only after a series of validations31 conducted by the team to verify or confirm
the report that indeed a marijuana plantation existed at the area and after an operation
plan was formed. As admitted by the accused in his supplemental brief, the
information about the existing marijuana plantation was finally confirmed only on 2
August 2000.32 On 3 August 2000, the arresting team of SPO1 Saipen proceeded to
the marijuana plantation. SPO1 Saipen saw accused-appellant personally cutting and
gathering marijuana plants. Thus, accused-appellant's arrest on 3 August 2000 was
legal, because he was caught in flagrante delicto; that is, the persons arrested were
committing a crime in the presence of the arresting officers.33

In People v. Sucro34 we held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at a
distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene
thereof, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Section 5, par. (a),
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the offense is deemed committed in his presence or
within his view. In essence, Section 5, par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the accused be
caught in flagrante delicto or caught in the act of committing a crime.

SPO1 George Saipen testified on direct examination, thus:

Q.       When you reached that Mount Churyon at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of
August 3, 2000, what did you see there Mr. Witness, if any?

A.       We were able to see a man cutting plants which we came to know as
marijuana plants.

Q.       You said we, who were you companions when you saw a man cutting
marijuana?

A.       The Bontoc Operatives.

Q.       All of you?

A.       Yes, sir.

Q.       You mentioned a while back about marijuana plantation, will you describe to
us why you say that [it] is a marijuana plantation?

A.       That is marijuana plantation because I think, more or less four (4) hectares
were planted with marijuana plants.

Q.       And how tall were these marijuana plants in that marijuana plantation Mr.
Witness?

A.       Some are fully grown around 4 to 5 feet while some are still young about 2 feet
while some are still seedling.

17
Q.       And you said that you saw a man gathering marijuana plants, how far were you
when you saw this man? Could you give us an estimate?

A.       From this witness stand up to there.

COURT:

You stipulate counsel.

PROS. DOMINGUEZ:

About 30 meters, Your Honor.

PROS. DOMINGUEZ:

And how was the terrain of that Mount Churyon, is it flat?

A.       Where the plantation is located it is somewhat slope and a little bit flat.

Q.       You mean rolling hills?

A.       Yes, sir.

Q.       What did you do when you saw a man cutting or gathering marijuana plants?

A.       Upon seeing that man cutting marijuana plants, I cautioned my companions at

my back telling them that there is a man down cutting marijuana which prompted
them to move; that others proceeded to the camp while me and my one companion
went to the man and cautioned him not to make unnecessary movements.35

The Court has consistently ruled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the
procedure for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived.36 We have also ruled that an accused may be estopped from assailing the
illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the information against
him before his arraignment.37 And since the legality of an arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused, any defect in the arrest of the
accused may be deemed cured when he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the
trial court.38 We have also held in a number of cases that the illegal arrest of an
accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after a trial free from error; such arrest does not negate the
validity of the conviction of the accused.

Herein, accused-appellant went into arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, he actively participated in his trial. He raised the additional issue of
irregularity of his arrest only during his appeal to this Court. He is, therefore, deemed
to have waived such alleged defect by submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the
court by his counsel-assisted plea during his arraignment; by his actively participating
in the trial and by not raising the objection before his arraignment.

18
It is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid
information has been filed, the accused arraigned, trial commenced and completed,
and a judgment of conviction rendered against him.39

Accused-appellant was not even denied due process by virtue of his alleged illegal
arrest, because of his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, as
manifested by the voluntary and counsel-assisted plea he entered during arraignment
and by his active participation in the trial thereafter.40

In challenging the existence of a legitimate buy-bust operation, appellant casts

questionable, if not improper, motive on the part of the police officers. Unfortunately
for appellant, jurisprudence instructs us that in cases involving illegal drugs, credence
is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers, for they are presumed to
have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the
contrary.41 Where there is nothing to indicate that the witnesses for the prosecution
were moved by improper motives, the presumption is that they were not so moved
and their testimony, therefore, is entitled to full faith and credit. 42 In this case, the
records are bereft of any indication which even remotely suggests ill motive on the
part of the police officers. The following observations of the trial court are, indeed,
appropriate, thus:

Absent as it is in the record indications of personal interest or improper motive on

their part to testify against the accused, the witnesses for the prosecution being
government law enforcers and/or officials, actually present during the incident in
question in the performance of their duties, are trustworthy sources. And the
recollections in open court of such witnesses of the events that transpired on the
occasion, given in clear and direct manner, corroborating and complimenting each
other on material points, and highly probable in the natural order of things, are easy to
believe and thus accorded full credence.

In contrast, the accused himself, his aunt, and his daughter who testified in behalf of
the former are obviously biased and unreliable witnesses on account of self-interest
and blood kinship. Situated as they are, their inclination to be truthful is highly
suspect. And quite aside from being self-serving and dubious, their testimonies are
inconsistent, and manifestly concocted or improbable to be seriously considered.43

All told, the cultivation of marijuana fruiting tops by accused-appellant having been
established beyond reasonable doubt, we are constrained to uphold appellant's
conviction. The penalty imposed by the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
being in accord with law, is likewise affirmed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 9 October 2007 of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01164, affirming in toto the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 35, Bontoc, Mountain
Province, in Criminal Case No. 1528, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.

19
Footnotes
1
 Penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao with Associate Justices Mario L.
Guariña III and Sixto C. Marella, Jr., concurring. Rollo, pp. 2-14.
2
 SEC. 9. Cultivation of Plants which are Sources of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to
ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall plant, cultivate or
culture on any medium Indian hemp, opium poppy (papaver somniferum) or any other
plant which is or may hereafter be classified as dangerous drug or from which any
dangerous drug may be manufactured or derived.

The land or portions thereof, and/or greenhouses on which any of said plants is
cultivated or cultured shall be confiscated and escheated to the State, unless the owner
thereof can prove that he did not know of such cultivation or culture despite the
exercise of due diligence on his part.

If the land involved is part of the public domain, the maximum of the penalties herein
provided shall be imposed upon the offender.
3
 Records, Vol. I, p. 1.
4
 SEC. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of
Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition.- The penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) shall
be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire,
dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and
other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or
instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition; Provided, That no other crime was committed.
5
 Records, Vol. II, p. 1.
6
 Records, Vol. I, p. 27; Vol. II, p. 28.
7
 TSN, 6 March 2001, pp. 4-5, 17.
8
 Id. at 5.
9
 Id. at 8, 15.
10
 TSN, 18 January 2000, p. 5.
11
 Id. at 6.
12
 Id. at 7-8.

20
13
 TSN, 22 August 2001, p. 6.
14
 TSN, 19 September 2002, p. 5; TSN, 11 December 2002, p. 4.
15
 Records, Vol. I, p. 234.
16
 Id. at 236.
17
 CA rollo, pp. 55-67.
18
 Id. at 81-95.
19
 G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
20
 Rollo, p. 11.
21
 Id. at 12.
22
 Id. at 18.
23
 Id. at 16.
24
 CA rollo, p. 57.
25
 Rollo, p. 22.
26
 Id. at 7-9.
27
 Zanoria v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 538, 546 (1997).
28
 Rollo, p. 10.
29
 People v. Doria, 361 Phil. 595, 627 (1999).
30
 People v. Burgos, 228 Phil. 1, 15 (1986); People v. Pablo, G.R. No. 105326, 28
December 1994, 239 SCRA 500, 505.
31
 TSN, 6 March 2001, p. 17.
32
 Rollo, p. 33.
33
 Teodosio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124346, 8 June 2004, 431 SCRA 194, 207-
208.
34
 G.R. No. 93239, 18 March 1991, 195 SCRA 388.
35
 TSN, 18 January 2001, pp. 6-8.
36
 People v. Tidula, 354 Phil. 609, 624 (1998); People v. Montilla, 349 Phil. 640, 661
(1998); People v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 112035, 16 January 1998, 284 SCRA 199, 210;

21
People v. Mahusay, 346 Phil. 762, 769 (1997); People v. Rivera, 315 Phil. 454, 465
(1995); People v. Lopez, Jr., 315 Phil. 59, 71-72 (1995).
37
 People v. Hernandez, 347 Phil. 56, 74-75 (1997).
38
 People v. Nazareno, 329 Phil. 16, 22 (1996).
39
 People v. Emoy, 395 Phil. 371, 384 (2000).
40
 People v. Navarro, 357 Phil. 1010, 1032-1033 (1998).
41
 People v. Bongalon, 425 Phil. 96, 114 (2002).
42
 People v. Pacis, 434 Phil. 148, 159 (2002).
43
 Records, Vol. I, p. 232.

3. G.R. No. 120330. November 18, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WENCESLAO

JAYSON, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Accused-appellant Wenceslao Jayson was charged with violation of P.D. No. 1866 in
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City. The amended information alleged

That on or about March 16, 1991, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to possess, had in his possession and under his
custody one (1).38 caliber revolver (Paltik), with Serial Number 91955 and four (4)
live ammunitions inside the chamber of said revolver, without first securing the
necessary license to possess the same.

That the same.38 caliber revolver was used by the accused in killing Nelson Jordan on
March 16, 1991.

22
Contrary to law.

Davao City, Philippines, July 12, 1991.

The prosecution evidence shows that in the evening of March 16, 1991, accused-
appellant, then a bouncer at the Ihaw-Ihaw nightclub on Bonifacio Street, Davao City,
shot one Nelson Jordan. He was arrested after he had been pointed by eyewitnesses as
the gunman. Recovered from him was a.38 caliber revolver with serial number
91955,1 four live bullets, and one empty shell. 2 The firearm and ammunition were
covered by a memorandum receipt and mission order issued by Major Francisco
Arquillano, Deputy Commander of the Civil-Military Operation and CAFGU Affairs
of the Davao Metropolitan District Command. 3 The mission order authorized accused-
appellant to carry the said firearm and twelve rounds of ammunition [t]o intensify
intel[ligence] coverage and was for a three-month duration (from February 8, 1991 to
May 8, 1991), subject to the following restrictions:4

VII. The carrying of firearms is prohibited in places where people gather for
political, religious, social, educational, and recreational purposes, such as
churches or chapels, carnival grounds or fans, nightclubs, cabarets, dance
halls, dancing places during fiestas and other celebrations, bars, liquor
drinking places, theaters or movies, cockpits, race tracks and the like, except
when the personnel concerned is on official mission in such places for which
he was authorized to carry firearms.

Accused-appellant was initially charged with murder5 in an information filed on

March 20, 1991 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 22,456-91 in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18 of Davao City but, after plea-bargaining, he was allowed to plead
guilty to the lesser offense of homicide. 6 In a decision dated September 24, 1991, the
trial court sentenced him to imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On July 15, 1991, he was charged with illegal possession of firearm. 8 The information
against him was amended on October 8, 1991 in order to allege that the firearm
subject of the charge had been used in the killing of a person (Nelson Jordan) on
March 16, 1991.

On June 17, 1993,9 he was found guilty by the Regional Trial Court and sentenced to
20 years imprisonment. The trial court found accused-appellant acted in good faith,
believing that the mission order and memorandum receipt issued to him were valid.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals 10 increased the penalty on accused-appellant

to reclusion perpetua and, in accordance with Rule 124, 13 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, certified the case to this Court for review. Both accused-appellant and
plaintiff-appellee have filed supplemental briefs.

Accused-appellant maintains that he acted in the good faith belief that he was
authorized to carry the firearm by virtue of the mission order and memorandum
receipt issued to him by Major Francisco Arquillano of the Davao Metropolitan
District Command. He argues that the failure of the prosecution to present as witness

23
the government official who had certified that accused-appellant was not the holder of
a firearms license is fatal to the prosecution of this case.

I.

Although not raised as an error by the accused-appellant, it is pertinent to consider the

circumstances surrounding accused-appellants arrest and the seizure from him of the
firearm in question considering that both were made without any warrant from a
court.

With respect to the arrest, SPO1 Loreto Tenebro 11 testified that at around 10:00 in the
evening of March 16, 1991, while he and Patrolmen Camotes and Reinerio Racolas
were patrolling in their car, they received a radio message from their camp directing
them to proceed to the Ihaw-Ihaw on Bonifacio Street where there had been a
shooting. Accordingly, they proceeded to the place and there saw the victim, Nelson
Jordan. Bystanders pointed to accused-appellant as the one who had shot Jordan. They
then arrested accused-appellant. Seized from him was a.38 caliber revolver with serial
number 91955. The firearm was covered by a mission order and memorandum
receipt. Considering these facts, we hold that the warrantless arrest and search were
valid.

Rule 113, 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or private person may,

without a warrant, arrest a person:....

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.

In the case at bar there was a shooting. The policemen summoned to the scene of the
crime found the victim. Accused-appellant was pointed to them as the assailant only
moments after the shooting. In fact accused-appellant had not gone very far (only ten
meters away from the Ihaw-Ihaw), although he was then fleeing. The arresting
officers thus acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of the victim and
of facts indicating that accused-appellant was the assailant.

This Court has upheld a warrantless arrest under analogous circumstances. In People
v. Tonog, Jr.,12 the police found the lifeless body of a person with several stab
wounds. An informer pointed to the accused as the person who had killed the victim.
That afternoon, police officers arrested the accused. On their way to the police station,
a policeman noticed bloodstains on the accuseds pants which, when examined, was
found to be the same blood type O found on the fatal knife. The Court upheld the
warrantless arrest and ruled that the blood-stained pants, having been seized as an
incident of a lawful arrest, was admissible in evidence.

In People v. Gerente,13 the police arrested the accused three hours after the victim had
been killed. They went to the scene of the crime where they found a piece of wood
and a concrete hollow block used by the killers in bludgeoning the victim to death. A
neighbor of the accused who witnessed the killing, pointed to him as one of the
assailants. The warrantless arrest was held valid under Rule 113, 5(b).

24
In People v. Acol,14 a group held up a passenger jeepney. Policemen immediately
responded to the report of the crime. One of the victims saw four persons walking
towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom was wearing his jacket. He pointed them to the
policemen. When the group saw the policemen coming, they ran in different
directions. Three were caught and arrested. Each was found in possession of an
unlicensed revolver and charged with illegal possession of firearms. The accused
claimed that the warrantless seizure of firearms was illegal. The Court rejected their
plea and held that the search was a valid incident of a lawful arrest.

The subsequent search of accused-appellants person and the seizure from him of the
firearm was likewise lawful. Rule 126, 12 states:

Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of
an offense, without a search warrant.

In People v. Lua,15 a buy-bust operation was conducted against the accused. After
accused had gone inside his house and returned with the three tea bags of marijuana
and received the marked money, the designated poseur-buyer gave the signal to his
fellow police officers who closed in and arrested the accused. In the course of the
arrest, a police officer noticed something bulging at accuseds waistline, which turned
out to be an unlicensed.38 caliber paltik with two live bullets. Accused was charged
with illegal possession of firearm. The search was held to be a valid incident of a
lawful arrest.

II.

We now come to the main question of accused-appellants liability for illegal

possession of firearm. There is no dispute that accused-appellant was in possession of
the gun in this case. His defense is that the gun is covered by a memorandum receipt
and mission order issued by Major Francisco Arquillano, then Deputy Commander of
the Civil-Military Operation and CAFGU Affairs of the Davao Metropolitan District
Command.

The issuance of mission orders is governed by Memorandum Circular No. 8 dated

October 16, 1986 of the then Ministry of Justice, which in pertinent part
states:16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

.. It is unlawful for any person or office to issue a mission order authorizing the
carrying of firearms by any person unless the following conditions are met:

1. That the AFP officer is authorized by the law to issue the mission order;

2. That the recipient or addressee of the mission order is also authorized by the law to
have a mission order, i.e., he must be an organic member of the command/unit of the
AFP officer issuing the mission order. If mission orders are issued to civilians (not
members of the uniformed service), they must be civilian agents included in the
regular plantilla of the government agency involved in law enforcement and are
receiving regular compensation for the services they are rendering. (In this case, the
agency head or officials so designated by the law shall issue the mission order.)....

25
As the Court of Appeals held, however, Major Arquillano, who had issued the
mission order in question, was not authorized to do the same. Neither was accused-
appellant qualified to have a mission order.

Admittedly, Major Arquillano was not authorized to issue mission orders to civilian
agents of the AFP as he was not any of the following officers mentioned in the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866, 5(a), to
wit:17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) The Minister of National Defense and such other Ministry officials duly
designated by him;

(2) The Chief of Staff, AFP;

(3) Chief of the General/Special/Technical and Personal Staffs of GHQ AFP;

(4) Commanders of the AFP Major Services including the Chiefs of their respective
General/Special/Technical and Personal Staffs;

(5) Commanders and Chiefs of Staffs of AFPWSSU and major commands/units of the
AFP and the Major Services;

(6) Commanders of battalions and higher units and their equivalent in the Philippine
Air Force and Philippine Navy;

(7) Commanders of AFP intelligence units from GHQ AFP down to regional
command levels;

(8) Provincial Commanders, METRODISCOM Commanders, company commanders

and their equivalent in the Philippine Air Force and Philippine Navy; and

(9) Detachment commanders in remote areas whose higher commanders are not easily
available to issue such orders.

Major Arquillano claimed, however, that Colonel Franco Calida, had authorized him
(Major Arquillano) to exercise this function so that people would not be swarming [in
Calidas] office.18 As the appellate court well stated, full faith and credit cannot be
given to such bare assertion. Not only was there no written delegation of authority to
Major Arquillano, it is even doubtful whether Col. Calida, who, as commander of the
unit had authority to issue mission orders, could delegate this authority to his deputy.

Nor was accused-appellant qualified to be issued a mission order because he was a

mere reserve of the Citizen Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) without regular
monthly compensation. In fact he worked as a bouncer in a nightclub, and it was as a
bouncer that he used the gun seized from him.

Even assuming that the issuance to accused-appellant of the mission order was valid,
it is clear that, in carrying the firearm inside the nightclub where he was working as a
bouncer, accused-appellant violated the restrictions in the mission order. These
restrictions prohibited him from carrying firearms in places where people converge

26
unless on official mission. Accused-appellants claim that he had been told by Major
Arquillano that he could carry the firearm anywhere in Davao City 19 was flatly denied
by Major Arquillano who testified that precisely he called accused-appellants
attention to the restrictions.20cräläwvirtualibräry

Nevertheless, it is argued that the prosecution failed to prove accused-appellants guilt

beyond reasonable doubt because the prosecution did not present SPO4 Welliejado S.
Sim of the FAS/Explosive NCO Davao Metropolitan District Command, who had
certified that per records on file [in] this Command Mr. Wenceslao Jayson does not
exist/appear in the list of license holders as of this date. Accused-appellant claims that
the prosecution merely presented as Exhibit H the certification without calling the
issuing authority to testify so that he could be cross-examined with regard to his
certification.

Objection based on this ground must be deemed waived in view of accused-appellants

failure to object to the presentation of the evidence. The certification in question was
marked when the parties entered into a stipulation of facts, 21 but accused-appellants
counsel did not object. Neither did counsel object when the certification was offered
in evidence by the prosecution.22cräläwvirtualibräry

In any event, accused-appellant does not claim to be the holder of a regular license but
only of a mission order and memorandum receipt. Considering the invalidity of these
documents, both the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals correctly held
accused-appellant liable under P.D. No. 1866.

Nor can accused-appellant claim to have acted in the good faith belief that the
documents issued to him sufficed as legal authority for him to carry the firearm. As
the Court of Appeals pointed out, good faith and absence of criminal intent are not
valid defenses because the offense committed is malum prohibitum punishable by
special law.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

III.

It remains for us to determine whether the provisions of the recently enacted R.A. No.
8294, amending P.D. No. 1866,24 can be applied to this case on the theory that it is
more favorable to accused-appellant.25 R.A. No. 8294, provides in pertinent part:

1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or

ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of
Firearms or Ammunition. - The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon
any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess
any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun,.380 or.32 and other firearm of
similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used
or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided,
That no other crime was committed.

....

27
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of
an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. (Emphasis
added)

Apparently, even though the penalty for illegal possession of firearm has been
reduced in the new law, the latter cannot be applied in this case so as to favor
accused-appellant in view of the proviso in 1 that the first paragraph, providing for
lighter penalty, does not apply to cases where another crime has been committed. Nor
can the third paragraph be applied by considering the illegal possession of firearm as a
mere aggravating circumstance because, although the gun seized was used in the
commission of a crime, this case concerns solely the charge of illegal possession of
firearm. The criminal case for homicide is not before us for consideration.

Consequently, this case must be decided in accordance with the ruling in People v.
Quijada,26 that a person who kills another with the use of an unlicensed firearm is
guilty of homicide or murder as the case may be under the Revised Penal Code and
aggravated illegal possession of firearm under P.D. No. 1866, 1, par. 2.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, J., concur.

Regalado, (Chairman), J., Pro hac vice.

Endnotes:

1
 Exh. A.
2
 Exh. B.
3
 Exh. D, id., p. 46.
4
 Ibid.
5
 Exh. I, Records, p. 50.
6
 Exh. J, id., p. 51.
7
 Exh. F, id., p. 47. Per Judge Romeo D. Marasigan.
8
 Id., p. 1.
9
 Id., pp. 68-72. Per Judge Augusto V. Breva.
10
 Per Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and concurred in by Justices
Gloria C. Paras and Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr.

28
11
 TSN, pp. 2-3, 9-10, Nov. 11, 1992.
12
 205 SCRA 774 (1992).
13
 219 SCRA 756 (1993).
14
 232 SCRA 406 (1994).
15
 256 SCRA 539 (1996).
16
 Records, pp. 5-6.
17
 80 O.G., No. 10 1510 (March 5, 1984).
18
 TSN, p. 6, April 20, 1993.
19
 TSN, p. 5, Jan. 29, 1993.
20
 TSN, p. 8, April 20, 1993.
21
 TSN, p. 13, Nov. 11, 1993.
22
 Id., p. 18.
23
 See People v. Quijada, 259 SCRA 191 (1996).
24
 Approved by the President of the Philippines on June 6, 1997,
effective July 6, 1997.
25
 REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 22 provides: Penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony,
who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of
Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such
laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving
the same. This provision has been applied to special offenses. See
People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 (1994); Gonzales v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 95523, August 18, 1997 (R.A. No. 8294 was
retroactively applied to reduce the sentence of petitioner).
26
 259 SCRA 191 (1996).

29
4. G.R. No. 182601               November 10, 2014

JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY

FERNANDEZ and RONALD MUNOZ, Petitioners,
vs.
MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
challenging the decision1 dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution2 dated April 17,
2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 91541.

The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 96, Quezon City, denying Joey M. Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas,
Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez, and Ronald Munoz's (petitioners) Urgent Motion for
Regular Preliminary Investigation, as well as their subsequent motion for
reconsideration.

The Antecedent Facts

The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in the
morning, an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso
(Atty. Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City where the
petitioners and Atty. Generoso reside.3

Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batas an Hills Police
Station) to report the incident.4 Acting on this report, Desk Officer SPOl Primitivo
Monsalve (SPOJ Monsalve) dispatched SP02 Dominador Javier (SP02 Javier) to go to
the scene of the crime and to render assistance.5 SP02 Javier, together with
augmentation personnel from the Airforce, A2C Alano Sayson and Airman Ruel
Galvez, arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged
altercation6 and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.7

30
Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This
prompted the police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police
Station for investigation.8 The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan
Hills Police Station.9 At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty.
Generoso fortunately survived the attack.10

In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for attempted
murder allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 20th h day of February, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill, qualified with evident premeditation, treachery and taking
advantage of superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Murder directly by overt acts,
by then and there stabbing one Atty. MORENO GENEROSO y FRANCO, with a
bladed weapon, but said accused were not able to perform all the acts of execution
which would produce the crime of Murder by reason of some cause/s or accident
other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, said complainant was able to
parry the attack, to his damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.11

On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation12 on the ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged
that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had no personal
knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed that they
were just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper,
and a regular procedure for preliminary investigation should have been performed
pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.13

On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners' Urgent Motion
for Regular Preliminary Investigation.14 The court likewise denied the petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.15

The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65
petition for certiorari. They attributed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, on the R TC for the denial of their motion for preliminary
investigation.16

The Assailed CA Decision

On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of
merit.17 The CA ruled that the word "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest executed by
SP02 Javier carried the meaning of a command. The arresting officer clearly meant to
arrest the petitioners to answer for the mauling of Atty. Generoso. The CA also
recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest so that an inquest
proceeding was called for as a consequence. Thus, the R TC did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion in denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation.

31
The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the order denying the Urgent
Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation is void for failure to clearly state the
facts and the law upon which it was based, pursuant to Rule 16, Section 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The CA found that the RTC had sufficiently explained the
grounds for the denial of the motion.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its
Resolution of April 17, 2008;18 hence, the present petition.

The Issues

The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED

WITHOUT A WARRANT.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY ARRESTED

WHEN THEY WERE MERELY INVITED TO THE POLICE PRECINCT.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO STATE THE
FACTS AND THE LAW UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED.

The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested. No arrest warrant
was ever issued; they went to the police station only as a response to the arresting
officers' invitation. They even cited the Affidavit of Arrest, which actually used the
word "invited. "

The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took place under the terms
of Rule 112, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court. The incident happened two (2)
hours before the police officers actually arrived at the crime scene. The police officers
could not have undertaken a valid warrantless arrest as they had no personal
knowledge that the petitioners were the authors of the crime.

The petitioners additionally argue that the R TC' s Order denying the Urgent Motion
for Regular Preliminary Investigation is void because it was not properly issued.

The Court's Ruling

We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The criminal
proceedings against the petitioners should now proceed.

32
It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners filed has to reach this
Court for its resolution. The thought is very tempting that the motion was employed
simply to delay the proceedings and that the use of Rule 65 petition has been abused.

But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than compensated by fully
examining in this case the legalities surrounding warrantless warrants and establishing
the proper interpretation of the Rules for the guidance of the bench and the bar. These
Rules have evolved over time, and the present case presents to us the opportunity to
re-trace their origins, development and the current applicable interpretation.

I. Brief history on warrantless arrests

The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of 1902, 19 and the
1935,20 197321 and 198722 Constitutions all protect the right of the people to be secure
in their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures. Arrest falls under the
term "seizure. "23

This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the

Constitution of the United States. The Fourth Amendment traces its origins to the
writings of Sir Edward Coke24 and The Great Charter of the Liberties of England
(Magna Carta Libertatum), sealed under oath by King John on the bank of the River
Thames near Windsor, England on June 15, 1215.25 The Magna Carta Libertatum
limited the King of England's powers and required the Crown to proclaim certain
liberties26 under the feudal vassals' threat of civil war.27 The declarations in Chapter 29
of the Magna Carta Libertatum later became the foundational component of the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.28 It provides:

No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised 29 of his Freehold, or

Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor
will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or
by the Law of the Land, We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man
either Justice or Right.30 [Emphasis supplied]

In United States v. Snyder,31 the United States Supreme Court held that this
constitutional provision does not prohibit arrests, searches and seizures without
judicial warrant, but only those that are unreasonable. 32 With regard to an arrest, it is
considered a seizure, which must also satisfy the test of reasonableness.33

In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity of
warrantless arrests. The Court based these rulings on the common law of America and
England that, according to the Court, were not different from the Spanish
laws.34 These court rulings likewise justified warrantless arrests based on the
provisions of separate laws then existing in the Philippines.35

In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson36 that Section 3737 of Act No.
183, or the Charter of Manila, defined the arresting officer's power to arrest without a
warrant, at least insofar as the City of Manila was concerned.

In The United States v. Vallejo, et al., 38 the Court held that in the absence of any
provisions under statutes or local ordinances, a police officer who held similar

33
functions as those of the officers established under the common law of England and
America, also had the power to arrest without a warrant in the Philippines.

The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos 39 that the rules on warrantless
arrest were based on common sense and reason.40 It further held that warrantless arrest
found support under the then Administrative Code41 which directed municipal
policemen to exercise vigilance in the prevention of public offenses.

In The United States v. Fortaleza, 42 the Court applied Rules 27, 28, 29 and 30 43 of the
Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which were provisions taken
from the Spanish Law.

These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules of Court and
jurisprudence. Presently, the requirements of a warrantless arrest are now summarized
in Rule 113, Section 5 which states that: Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when
lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forth with delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) above
has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has
been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.44

For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b) – the provision applicable in
the present case. This provision has undergone changes through the years not just in
its phraseology but also in its interpretation in our jurisprudence.

We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine the applicable
American and Philippine jurisprudence to fully understand its roots and its
appropriate present application.

II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113

A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court

34
Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on American and English common
law principle on warrantless arrests but also on laws then existing in the Philippines.
In Fortaleza,45 the Court cited Rule 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of
the Penal Code which provided that:

Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain, or to cause to be

detained, persons whom there is reasonable ground to believe guilty of some offense.
It will be the duty of the authorities, as well as of their agents, to arrest:

First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of rule 27.

Second. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty greater
than that of confinamiento.

Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty less than
that of confinamiento, if his antecedents or the circumstances of the case would
warrant the presumption that he would fail to appear when summoned by the judicial
authorities.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply, however, to a defendant
who gives sufficient bond, to the satisfaction of the authority or agent who may arrest
him, and who it may reasonably be presumed will appear whenever summoned by the
judge or court competent to try him.

Fourth. A person coining under the provisions of the preceding paragraph may be
arrested, although no formal complaint has been filed against him, provided the
following circumstances are present:

First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful act,
amounting to a crime had been committed.

Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the person
arrested participated in the commission of such unlawful act or crime." [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]

In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 3 7 of the Charter of Manila,
which provided that certain officials, including police officers may, within the
territory defined in the law, pursue and arrest without warrant, any person found in
suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances, reasonably tending to show that
such person has committed, or is about to commit any crime or breach of the peace.

In Santos,46 the Court cited Miles v. Weston,47 which ruled that a peace officer may
arrest persons walking in the street at night when there is reasonable ground to suspect
the commission of a crime, although there is no proof of a felony having been
committed.

The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must justify that there was a
probable cause for an arrest without a warrant. The Court defined probable cause as a
reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing that the accused is guilty.

35
Besides reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is another requirement.
Once these conditions are complied with, the peace officer is not liable even if the
arrested person turned out to be innocent.

Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to the 1940 Rules of Court, it
was not necessary for the arresting officer to first have knowledge that a crime was
actually committed. What was necessary was the presence of reasonably sufficient
grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime; and
that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained
participated in it. In addition, it was also established under the old court rulings that
the phrase "reasonable suspicion" was tantamount to probable cause without which,
the warrantless arrest would be invalid and the arresting officer may be held liable for
its breach.48

In The US. v. Hachaw,49 the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest of a Chinaman

because the arresting person did not state in what way the Chinaman was acting
suspiciously or the particular act or circumstance which aroused the arresting person's
curiosity.

It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our Rules of Court of the rules
on warrantless arrests, the gauge for a valid warrantless arrest was the arresting
officer's reasonable suspicion (probable cause) that a crime was committed and the
person sought to be arrested has participated in its commission. This principle left so
much discretion and leeway on the part of the arresting officer. However, the 1940
Rules of Court has limited this discretion.

B. The 1940 Rules of Court

(Restricting the arresting
officer's determination of
probable cause)

Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code were
substantially incorporated in Section 6, Rule 109 of the 1940 Rules of Court as
follows:50

SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant - When lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about
to commit an offense in his presence;

(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

36
These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of
Court. Notably, the 1940 and 1964 Rules have deviated from the old rulings of the
Court. Prior to the 1940 Rules, the actual commission of the offense was not
necessary in determining the validity of the warrantless arrest. Too, the arresting
officer's determination of probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) applied both as to
whether a crime has been committed and whether the person to be arrested has
committed it.

However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required that there
should be actual commission of an offense, thus, removing the element of the
arresting officer's "reasonable suspicion of the commission of an offense."
Additionally, the determination of probable cause, or reasonable suspicion, was
limited only to the determination of whether the person to be arrested has committed
the offense. In other words, the 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court restricted the arresting
officer's discretion in warrantless arrests under Section 6(b), Rule 113 of the 1964
Rules of Court.

C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure

Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial changes
and was re-worded and re-numbered when it became Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when. lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the
person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section
7. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

As amended, Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the
restrictions introduced under the 1964 Rules of Court. More importantly, however, it
added a qualification that the commission of the offense should not only have been
"committed" but should have been "just committed." This limited the arresting
officer's time frame for conducting an investigation for purposes of gathering
information indicating that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.

D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

37
Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended
with the incorporation of the word "probable cause" as the basis of the arresting
officer's determination on whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.

Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that:

When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it.

From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for
purposes of Section S(b ), the following are the notable changes: first, the
contemplated offense was qualified by the word "just," connoting immediacy; and
second, the warrantless arrest of a person sought to be arrested should be based on
probable cause to be determined by the arresting officer based on his personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

It is clear that the present rules have "objectified" the previously subjective
determination of the arresting officer as to the (1) commission of the crime; and (2)
whether the person sought to be arrested committed the crime. According to Feria,
these changes were adopted to minimize arrests based on mere suspicion or hearsay.51

As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the
arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements separately below, starting
with the element of probable cause, followed by the elements that the offense has just
been committed, and the arresting officer's personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed the crime.

i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure: Probable cause

The existence of "probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant on how
the arresting officer shall proceed on the facts and circumstances, within his personal
knowledge, for purposes of determining whether the person to be arrested has
committed the crime.

i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable cause in warrantless arrests

In Payton v. New York,52 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution does not prohibit arrests without a warrant although such
arrests must be reasonable. According to State v. Quinn, 53 the warrantless arrest of a
person who was discovered in the act of violating the law is not a violation of due
process.

38
The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v. United States 54 that the
Fourth Amendment limited the circumstances under which warrantless arrests may be
made. The necessary inquiry is not whether there was a warrant or whether there was
time to get one, but whether at the time of the arrest probable cause existed. The term
probable cause is synonymous to "reasonable cause" and "reasonable grounds."55

In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should make a
thorough investigation and exercise reasonable judgment. The standards for
evaluating the factual basis supporting a probable cause assessment are not less
stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in a case where a warrant is sought from a
judicial officer. The probable cause determination of a warrantless arrest is based on
information that the arresting officer possesses at the time of the arrest and not on the
information acquired later.56

In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant of

reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. Probable cause involves probabilities
similar to the factual and practical questions of everyday life upon which reasonable
and prudent persons act. It is a pragmatic question to be determined in each case in
light of the particular circumstances and the particular offense involved.57

In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the information in
his possession, his fair inferences therefrom, including his observations. Mere
suspicion does not meet the requirements of showing probable cause to arrest without
warrant especially if it is a mere general suspicion. Probable cause may rest on
reasonably trustworthy information as well as personal knowledge. Thus, the arresting
officer may rely on information supplied by a witness or a victim of a crime; and
under the circumstances, the arresting officer need not verify such information.58

In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable cause in the context of
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In Abelita Ill v. Doria et al., 59 the Court held that personal knowledge of facts must be
based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual
belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably
guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of
the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the
arrest.

i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, distinguished from probable cause in preliminary investigations and the
judicial proceeding for the issuance of a warrant of arrest

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has been

committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of
the crime and should be held for triat.60 In Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban,61 we
defined probable cause as the existence of facts and circumstances as would excite the
belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the

39
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted.

In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable cause as to the
guilt of the respondent was based on the submitted documents of the complainant, the
respondent and his witnesses.62

On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances that
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested.

Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on the
evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that
the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal
proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted
during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates the
evidence in determining probable cause63 to issue a warrant of arrest.

In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5(b),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has
committed the crime. These facts or circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw
evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create
the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion
therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of
the peace officers making.the arrest.

The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable

ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged,64 or an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion, based on
actual facts.65

It is clear therefore that the standard for determining "probable cause" is invariable for
the officer arresting without a warrant, the public prosecutor, and the judge issuing a
warrant of arrest. It is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed
by the person sought to be arrested or held for trial, as the case may be.

However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all determine
"probable cause," within the spheres of their respective functions, its existence is
influenced heavily by the available facts and circumstance within their possession. In
short, although these officers use the same standard of a reasonable man, they possess
dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as set by the rules, upon which they
must determine probable cause.

Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should base his
determination of probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime; the

40
public prosecutor and the judge must base their determination on the evidence
submitted by the parties.

In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts,
evidence or available information that he must personally gather within a limited time
frame.

Hence, in Santos,66 the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of determining

probable cause in warrantless arrests due to the urgency of its determination in these
instances. The Court held that one should not expect too much of an ordinary
policeman. He is not presumed to exercise the subtle reasoning of a judicial officer.
Oftentimes, he has no opportunity to make proper investigation but must act in haste
on his own belief to prevent the escape of the criminal.67

ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113:

The crime has just been committed/personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it

We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two elements as our

jurisprudence shows that these were usually taken together in the Court's
determination of the validity of the warrantless arrests that were made pursuant to
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In Posadas v. Ombudsman,68 the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on December

8, 1994. It was only on December 11, 1994 that Chancellor Posadas requested the
NBI's assistance. On the basis of the supposed identification of two (2) witnesses, the
NBI attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag three (3) days
after the commission of the crime. With this set of facts, it cannot be said that the
officers have personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the persons sought to
be arrested committed the crime. Hence, the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest.

Similarly, in People v. Burgos,69 one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily

surrendered to the authorities, stating that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him to
become a member of the NPA, with a threat of physical harm. Upon receipt of this
information, a joint team of PC-INP units was dispatched to arrest Burgos who was
then plowing the field. Indeed, the arrest was invalid considering that the only
information that the police officers had in effecting the arrest was the information
from a third person. It cannot be also said in this case that there was certainty as
regards the commission of a crime.

In People v. del Rosario,70 the Court held that the requirement that an offense has just
been committed means that there must be a large measure of immediacy between the
time the offense was committed and the time of the arrest. If there was an appreciable
lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest
must be secured.

The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with these requirements
because he was arrested only a day after the commission of the crime and not
immediately thereafter. Additionally, the arresting officers were not present and were

41
not actual eyewitnesses to the crime. Hence, they had no personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense. They became
aware of del Rosario's identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the
custodial investigation.

In People v. Cendana,71 the accused was arrested one (1) day after the killing of the
victim and only on the basis of information obtained from unnamed sources. The
unlawful arrest was held invalid.

In Rolito Go v. CA,72 the arrest of the accused six ( 6) days after the commission of
the crime was held invalid because the crime had not just been committed. Moreover,
the "arresting" officers had no "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that the
accused was the gunman who had shot the victim. The information upon which the
police acted came from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting; one
stated that the accused was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged
gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in the name of the
accused's wife. That information did not constitute "personal knowledge."

In People v. Tonog, Jr.,73 the warrantless arrest which was done on the same day was
held valid. In this case, the arresting officer had knowledge of facts which he
personally gathered in the course of his investigation, indicating that the accused was
one of the perpetrators.

In People v. Gerente,74 the policemen arrested Gerente only about three (3) hours after
Gerente and his companions had killed the victim. The Court held that the policemen
had personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim and of facts indicating that
Gerente and two others had killed him. The warrantless arrest was held valid.

In People v. Alvario,75 the warrantless arrest came immediately after the arresting

officers received information from the victim of the crime. The Court held that the
personal knowledge of the arresting officers was derived from the information
supplied by the victim herself who pointed to Alvario as the man who raped her at the
time of his arrest. The Court upheld the warrantless arrest. In People v. Jayson, 76 there
was a shooting incident. The policemen who were summoned to the scene of the
crime found the victim. The informants pointed to the accused as the assailant only
moments after the shooting. The Court held that the arresting officers acted on the
basis of personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts indicating that the
accused was the assailant. Thus, the warrantless arrest was held valid.

In People v. Acol,77 a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and the policemen
immediately responded to the report of the crime. One of the victims saw four persons
walking towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom was wearing his jacket. The victim
pointed them to the policemen. When the group saw the policemen coming, they ran
in different directions. The Court held that the arrest was valid.

In Cadua v. CA,78 there was an initial report to the police concerning a robbery. A

radio dispatch was then given to the arresting officers, who proceeded to Alden Street
to verify the authenticity of the radio message. When they reached the place, they met
with the complainants who initiated the report about the robbery. Upon the officers'
invitation, the victims joined them in conducting a search of the nearby area where the

42
accused was spotted in the vicinity. Based on the reported statements of the
complainants, he was identified as a logical suspect in the offense just committed.
Hence, the arrest was held valid.

In Doria,79 the Court held that Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission
of the offense.

In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a
relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting incident. He dispatched a team headed by SP03
Ramirez to investigate the incident. SP03 Ramirez later reported that a certain
William Sia was wounded while Judge Abelita III, who was implicated in the
incident, and his wife just left the place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for
Abelita III and when he found him, he informed him of the incident report. P/Supt.
Doria requested Abelita III to go with him to the police headquarters as he had been
reported to be involved in the incident. Abelita III agreed but suddenly sped up his
vehicle and proceeded to his residence where P/Supt. Doria caught him up as he was
about to run towards his house.

The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver's seat as
Abelita III opened the door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver's seat.
The police officers confiscated the firearms and arrested Abelita III. The Court held
that the petitioner's act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which
they investigated, were enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the
police authorities as to the existence of probable cause. Based on these discussions, it
appears that the Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just been
committed" and ''personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be
arrested committed it" depended on the particular circumstances of the case.
However, we note that the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances"
under Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
clarification.

The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's
Law Dictionary,80 "circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or
conditions. " Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual
perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the
crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he
could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the
circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable
cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. However, the
determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be
made immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the
element of immediacy.

In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or

circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within which these facts or
circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a safeguard to
ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances
within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would have

43
no time to base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after
an exhaustive investigation.

The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the
commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are
prone to become contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and
hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section
5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's
determination of probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or
uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited
period of time. The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of
probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the
police officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.

In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold
that the following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should
have been just committed; and 2) the arresting officer's exercise of discretion is
limited by the standard of probable cause to be determined from the facts and
circumstances within his personal knowledge. The requirement of the existence of
probable cause objectifies the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes of
compliance with the Constitutional mandate against unreasonable arrests.

Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of
the present petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a
valid warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has the crime just been committed when
they were arrested? 2) did the arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime? and 3) based on these facts
and circumstances that the arresting officer possessed at the time of the petitioners'
arrest, would a reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the attempted
murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by the petitioners? We rule in the
affirmative.

III. Application of Section S(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules

of Criminal Procedure in the present case: there was a
valid warrantless arrest

We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because it has misapprehended

the facts in its decision.81 From a review of the records, we conclude that the police
officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances upon which they had
properly determined probable cause in effecting a warrantless arrest against the
petitioners. We note, however, that the determination of the facts in the present case is
purely limited to the resolution of the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrests of
the petitioners.

Based on the police blotter82 entry taken at 4:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, the date
that the alleged crime was committed, the petitioners were brought in for investigation
at the Batasan Hills Police Station. The police blotter stated that the alleged crime was

44
committed at 3:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, along Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit,
Quezon City.

The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with Atty.
Generoso and the petitioners already inside the police station, would connote that the
arrest took place less than one hour from the time of the occurrence of the crime.
Hence, the CA finding that the arrest took place two (2) hours after the commission of
the crime is unfounded.

The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty. Generoso's bruises when they
arrived at the scene of the crime is corroborated by the petitioners' admissions that
Atty: Generoso indeed suffered blows from petitioner Macapanas and his brother
Joseph Macapanas,83 although they asserted that they did it in self-defense against
Atty. Generoso.

Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Certificate84 that

was issued by East Avenue Medical Center on the same date of the alleged mauling.
The medical check-up of Atty. Generoso that was made about 8:10 a.m. on the date of
the incident, showed the following findings: "Contusion Hematoma, Left Frontal
Area; Abrasion, T6 area, right midclavicular line periorbital hematoma, left eye;
Abrasion, distal 3rd posterolateral aspect of right forearm; Abrasion, 4th and fifth
digit, right hand; Abrasion on area of ih rib (L ant. Chest wall), tenderness on L
peripheral area, no visible abrasion. In addition, the attending physician, Dr. Eva P.
Javier, diagnosed Atty. Generoso of contusion hematoma, periorbital L., and
traumatic conjunctivitis, o.s.

To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the
complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to
the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged
crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside;
Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for his
mauling and, notably, the petitioners85 and Atty. Generoso86 lived almost in the same
neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the
arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with Atty.
Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what transpired.87

With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they
have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at
the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it
reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances were
well within the police officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time of
the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation,
which are within their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless
arrests.

Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson, 88 the police officers in the present case
saw Atty. Generoso in his sorry bloodied state. As the victim, he positively identified
the petitioners as the persons who mauled him; however, instead of fleeing like what
happened in Jayson, the petitioners agreed to go with the police officers.

45
This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr. 89 where Tonog did not
flee but voluntarily went with the police officers. More than this, the petitioners in the
present case even admitted to have been involved in the incident with Atty. Generoso,
although they had another version of what transpired.

In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the

courts to consider if the police officers have complied with the requirements set under
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically, the
requirement of immediacy; the police officer's personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the determination of probable cause that the
person sought to be arrested committed the crime.

The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl Monsalve
immediately dispatched the arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render personal
assistance to the victim.90 This fact alone negates the petitioners' argument that the
police officers did not have personal knowledge that a crime had been committed - the
police immediately responded and had personal knowledge that a crime had been
committed.1âwphi1

To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the
above-cited provision, does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was
being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is
patent (as in this case) and the police officer has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has
recently committed the crime.

Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where it took
place, its occasion, the personal circumstances of the parties, and the immediate on-
the-spot investigation that took place, the immediate and warrantless arrests of the
perpetrators were proper. Consequently, the inquest proceeding that the City
Prosecutor conducted was appropriate under the circumstances.

IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to

mean as an authoritative command

After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion of the
petitioners' second issue is largely academic. Arrest is defined as the taking of a
person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an
offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his
submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. 91 Thus, application of
actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of
arrest is not required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the
parties to arrest the other and the intent of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary.92

Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest, 93 SP02 Javier could not
but have the intention of arresting the petitioners following Atty. Generoso' s account.
SP02 Javier did not need to apply violent physical restraint when a simple directive to
the petitioners to follow him to the police station would produce a similar effect. In

46
other words, the application of actual force would only be an alternative if the
petitioners had exhibited resistance.

To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the attending policemen have
acquired personal knowledge of the incidents of the crime, including the alleged
perpetrators, the arrest of the petitioners as the perpetrators pointed to by the victim,
was not a mere random act but was in connection with a particular offense.
Furthermore, SP02 Javier had informed the petitioners, at the time of their arrest, of
the charges against them before taking them to Batasan Hills Police Station for
investigation.94

V. The Order denying the motion for preliminary

investigation is valid

In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners attack the R TC Order denying
the petitioners' urgent motion for regular preliminary investigation for allegedly
having been issued in violation of Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987
Constitution95 and Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.96

The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states that the Court is not
persuaded by the evidentiary nature of the allegations in the said motion of the
accused. Aside from lack of clear and convincing proof, the Court, in the exercise of
its sound discretion on the matter, is legally bound to pursue and hereby gives
preference to the speedy disposition of the case."

We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order. The
RTC, in resolving the motion, is not required to state all the facts found in the record
of the case. Detailed evidentiary matters, as the RTC decreed, is best reserved for the
full-blown trial of the case, not in the preliminary incidents leading up to the trial.

Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that
should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. In
resolving a motion, the court is only required to state clearly and distinctly the reasons
therefor. A contrary system would only prolong the proceedings, which was precisely
what happened to this case. Hence, we uphold the validity of the RTC's order as it
correctly stated the reason for its denial of the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the
petition, and hereby AFFIRM the decision dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution
dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91541. The City
Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the criminal
proceedings against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

47
 ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
 Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, and concurred in by Associate
Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a Member of this Court) and Associate Justice
Noel G. Tijam; rollo, pp. 36-46.
2
 Id. at 48.
3
 According to the Certification of the Batasan Hills Police Station as regards the
excerpt of the PNP Complaint at PNP Complaint Volume 19, Series of2005, Entry
No. 324, Page No. 250; RTC records, attached to the CA records, p. 72.
4
 Id. at 5.
5
 Affidavit of Arrest, id. at 6.
6
 As shown by the Certification of the Batasan Hills Police Station as regards the
excerpt of the PNP Complaint at PNP Complaint Volume 19, Series of2005, Entry
No. 324, Page No. 250; id. at 72.
7
 Rollo, p. 37.
8
 RTC records, p. 6.
9
 Rollo, p. 75.
10
 Id. at 37.

48
11
 Id.
12
 Id.
13
 Id. at 37-38.
14
 The pertinent matters state:

Considering the opposition and issues raised by the prosecution, the Court is not
persuaded by the evidentiary nature of the allegations in the said motion of the
accused. Aside from lack of clear and convincing proof, the Court, in the exercise of
its sound discretion on the matter, is legally bound to pursue and hereby gives
preference to the speedy disposition of the case.

ACCORDINGLY, the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation filed by

the accused is DENIED.
15
 Rollo, p. 38.
16
 Id.
17
 Supra note I.
18
 Supra note 2.
19
 Section 5 of The Philippine Bill of 1902. That no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the person or things to be seized.
20
 Section 1(3), Article III -The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
21
 Section 3, Article IV - The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
whatever purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
22
 Section 2, Article III - The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may

49
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
23
 Finkelman, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES, 2006 Ed., p.
82.
24
 Entitled THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND, cited generally by
Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now Forgotten Common-
Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original Meaning of Due Process,
University of Tennessee College of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, April
23, 2008.
25
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magna Carta, last accessed October 10, 2014.
26
 Id.
27
 homas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now Forgotten
Common-Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original Meaning of Due
Process, University of Tennessee College of Law Legal Studies Research Paper
Series, April 23, 2008.
28
 Id at 45.
29
 Wrongfully dispossessed.
30
 Supra note 27.
31
 278 Fed. 650.
32
 The People of the Philippine Islands v. Malasugui, G.R. No. L-44335, 63 Phil. 221,
226 (1936).
33
 Finkelman, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES, 2006 Ed., p.
82.
34
 The United States v. Santos, 36 Phil. 853, 856 (1917).
35
 The United States v. Fortaleza, 12 Phil. 472, 474-480 (1909).
36
 4 Phil. 317, 323-324 (1905).
37
 In The United States v. Fortaleza, the Court cited Section 37 ctf Act No. 183
(Charter of Manila), which designates certain officials, including police officers, as
"peace officers" expressly provides that within the territory defined in the Act they
"may pursue and arrest without warrant, any person found in suspicious places or
under suspicious circumstances, reasonably tending to show that such person has
committed, or is about to commit any crime or breach of the peace; may arrest, or
cause to be arrested without warrant, any offender, when the offense is committed in
the presence of a peace officer or within his view."

50
38
 11 Phil. 193, 197 (1908).
39
 Supra note 34, at 856.
40
 Id. Citizens must be protected from annoyance and crime. Prevention of crime is
just as commendatory as the capture of criminals and the officer should not wait the
commission of the crime.

This rule is supported by the necessities of life.

41
 Sec. 2204, 1916 ed.; Sec. 2258, 1917 ed.
42
 Supra note 35, at 477-479.
43
 Section 37 (a) If the number of barrios in a municipality is less than or equal to the
number of councilors the council shall put each of its members in immediate charge
of a barrio or part of a barrio, so that each barrio shall be under the direction of one or
more councilors.

(b) If the number of barrios exceeds the number of councilors, including the vice-
president, the council shall group the barrios into as many districts as there are
councilors, and shall place each councilor in charge of one such district. Each
councilor shall be empowered to appoint one lieutenant in each barrio or part of barrio
which comes under his immediate supervision. A lieutenant of barrio shall serve
without compensation and shall report directly to the councilor appointing him.

Sec. 38. (a) Each councilor shall keep the people of his barrio or barrios informed as
to the acts of the council, or other governmental measures which directly concern
them, by means of suitable notices posted in a public and conspicuous place in each
barrio. He shall serve in the council as the representative of the people of his barrio or
barrios and shall bring their special needs to the attention of that body.

(b) He shall further promptly inform the president of any unusual or untoward event
occurring within the barrios assigned to him.

(c) He is authorized to use as a symbol of office a cane with silver head, plated ferule
and black cord and tassels.
44
 Malacat v. CA, 347 Phil. 462, 479 (1997).
45
 Supra note 35, at 477-478.
46
 Supra note 34, at 856.
47
 60 Ill. 361 (1871].
48
 Supra note 34, at 854-855.
49
 G.R. No. L-6909, 21 Phil. 514-516 (1912).

51
50
 Resolution of Motion for Reconsideration in Sayo v. The Chief of Police, 80 Phil.
859, 875 (1948).
51
 Oscar M. Herrera, Remedial Law, Book IV, 2007 Edition, citing Feria, Philippine
Legal Studies, Series No. 2, p. 375.
52
 5 Am Jur 2d, p. 688, citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639,
100 S Ct. 1371.
53
 111SC174,97, SE 62, 3 ALR 1500, cited in 5 Am Jur 2d, p. 689.
54
 361 U.S. 98, 4 L. Ed. 2d 134, 80 S Ct. 168, cited in 5 Am Jur 2d, p. 688.
55
 5 Am Jur 2d, p. 690, citing United States v. Keown, 19 F. Supp. 639 (W.D. Ky.
1937) and Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
56
 5 Arn Jur 2d, pp. 691-692, citing Moore v. Marketplace Restaurant, Inc., 754 F. 2d
1336; Be Vier v. Hucal, (CA? Ill) 806 F. 2d 123; Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State
Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560; Martin v. Eaton, 140 Vt 134, 436 A. 2d 751; Warren v.
Dwyer, 906 F. 2d 70; State v. Kendall, 794 P. 2d 114; People v. Villiard, 679 P. 2d
593; State v. Tarica, 59 Wash App 368, 798 P. 2d 296; Hill v. California, 401 U.S.
797; United States v. Bell, 48 F. Supp. 986; Gaudio v. State, 1 Md App 455, 230 A.
2d 700.
57
 5 Arn Jur 2d, pp. 692, citing Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 28 L Ed 2d 484, 91 S
Ct 1106;

United States v. Bell, 48 F. Supp. 986; People v. Exum, 382 Ill 204, 47 N. E. 2d 56;
Wilson v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W. 2d 705; Gaudio v. State, 1 Md App 455, 230 A.
2d 700.
58
 5 Arn Jur 2d, pp. 692, citing Thompson v. State (Del Sup) 539 A. 2d 1052; Ricks v
State, 82 Md. App. 369, 571 A. 2d 887, cert gr 320 Md 3505, 578 A. 2d 778 and affd
322 Md 183, 586 A. 2d 740; People v. Tracy, 186 Mich App 171, 46. N.W. 2d 457;
State v. Leonard (Utah App) 825 P. 2d 664, 177 Utah Adv Rep 49, cert den (Utah)
843 P. 2d 1042.
59
 G.R. No. 170672, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 220, 227.
60
 Paderanga v. Drilon et al., 273 Phil. 290, 296 (1991).
61
 32 Phil. 363, 365 (1915).
62
 Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
63
 People v. CA, 361Phil.401, 413 (1999).
64
 People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 633, 642.
65
 Supra note 59.

52
66
 Supra note 34.
67
 Id.
68
 G.R. No. 131492, September 29, 2000, 341 SCRA 388.
69
 G.R. L-68995, September 4, 1986, 144 SCRA 1.
70
 365 Phil. 292, 312 (1999).
71
 268 Phil. 571, 576 (1990).
72
 G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992, 206 SCRA 138, 150.
73
 G.R. No. 94533, February 4, 1992, 205 SCRA 772, 775, 778.
74
 G.R. No. 95847-48, March 10, 1993, 219 SCRA 756, 761.
75
 341 Phil. 526, 534, 543 (1997).
76
 346 Phil. 847, 853-854 (1997).
77
 232 Phil. 406 (1994).
78
 G.R. No. 123123, August 19, 1999, 232 SCRA 412-413.
79
 Supra note 59.
80
 Fifth Edition, p. 220.
81
 New City Builders, Inc. v. NLRC, 499 Phil. 207, 212-213 (2005).
82
 According to the Certification of the Batasan Hills Police Station as regards the
excerpt of the PNP Complaint at PNP Complaint Volume 19, Series of2005, Entry
No. 324, Page No. 250; RTC records, p. 72.
83
 Rollo, pp. 73-74.
84
 Issued by the Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Charlton S. Sibal, M.D.; RTC records, p. 7.
85
 Joey Pestilos then resided at Block 1, Lot 6, Don Primitivo Extension, Brgy. Holy
Spirit, Quezon City; Dwight Macapanas then resided at No. 24 Kasiyahan St., Brgy.
Holy Spirit, Quezon City; Miguel Gaces then resided at No. 13, Kasiyahan St., Brgy.
Holy Spirit, Quezon City; Jerry Fernandez resided at No. 16, Kasiyahan St., Brgy.
Holy Spirit, Quezon City; Ronald Mufioz then resided at No. 15, Kasiyahan St., Brgy.
Holy Spirit, Quezon City; RTC records, p. 4.
86
 Atty. Generoso then resided at No. 16 Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon
City per the referral letter of the Police Inspector to the City Prosecutor, dated
February 20, 2005; id.

53
87
 Rollo, p. 75.
88
 Supra note 76.
89
 G.R. No. 144497, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 139.
90
 Rollo, p. 40.
91
 Rule 113, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court.
92
 Sanchez v. Demetriou, G.R. Nos. 111771-77, November 9, 1993, 227 SCRA 627,
637-638; see also People v. Mi/ado, 462 Phil. 411, 417 (2003).
93
 The pertinent portion of the Affidavit of Arrest states:

That, immediately we proceeded at the said place and upon arrival complainant
appeared complained and pointed to the undersigned to suspects [Joey] Pestilos,
Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces[,] Jerry Fernandez and Ronald Munoz at (sic)
those who mauled him.

That, I informed all the suspects of the charges imputed [against] them by
complainant Atty. Generoso then invited them to Batasan Police Station for
Investigation x x x" (Emphasis ours)
94
 Rollo, p. 41.
95
 Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be
refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
96
 SEC. 3. Resolution of motion. - After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action
or claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.

The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground
relied upon is not indubitable.

In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor.

54
5. G.R. No. L-21805. February 25, 1967.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FIDEL

TAN, Defendant-Appellee.

Solicitor General for plaintiff and Appellant.

E. A. Fernandez for defendant and appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. PRISONERS; WARDEN’S FAILURE TO REMIT PRISONER TO PLACE OF

CONFINEMENT, IS BREACH OF DUTY. — There being no showing that the
prisoner’s life would be endangered by the trip to Muntinlupa penitentiary, the
warden’s failure to send him thither was a breach of duty for which said officer
should be held accountable. It needs no stressing that to allow provincial wardens to
retain insular prisoners without proper authorization would open the way to all sorts
of discrimination in the treatment of prisoners and constitute a standing invitation for
the commission of abuses and anomalies for personal or political motives.

2. ID.; CREDITING OF GOOD CONDUCT; TIME ALLOWANCE VESTED IN

DIRECTOR OF PRISONS. — There is, in the case at bar, no justification for the
warden’s usurping the authority of the Director of Prisons in crediting the prisoner
with good conduct time allowance. Article 99 of the Revised Penal Code vests such
authority exclusively in the Director and no one else.

3. ID.; DUTY OF COURT TO SEE THAT PRISONER SERVE PENALTY. — It is

the prerogative of the court meting out the punishment to see to it that the punishment
be served until, by act of lawfully authorized administrative agencies of the state, the
convict is pardoned or paroled or, on lawful grounds, set at liberty sooner than the
expiration of the sentence imposed.

4. ID.; PRISONER’S RE-ARREST WOULD NOT PLACE HIM IN JEOPARDY OR

DEPRIVE HIM OF LIBERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. — The
prisoner’s re-arrest would not place him twice in jeopardy because his re-
incarceration is merely a continuation of the penalty that he had not completely served
due to the erroneous act of the warden; it is not a new or subsequent conviction.

55
Neither would his re-arrest deprive him of liberty without due process of law, because
he was not yet entitled to liberty at the time he was released. Service of penalties and
allowance for good conduct are specifically, even elaborately, governed by the Penal
Code and do not depend upon the good faith of the warden and of the prisoner.

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal from the order, dated 4 January 1963, of the Court of First Instance of Samar,
in its Criminal Case No. 4097, denying the government’s motion for the rearrest of
the accused-appellee, Fidel Tan.

The aforesaid appellee was, under a modified judgment, sentenced by said court to
suffer —

"an indeterminate penalty ranging from TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS,
as minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS, as maximum, both of
prision correccional, with the accessory penalties provided by law, indemnify the
heirs of Sinforoso Volfango P3,000.00, and pay the costs."cralaw virtua1aw library

He appealed, but upon his own motion the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, in a
resolution of 1 August 1958.

The sentence having become final, the accused was committed to the Director of
Prisons, on 2 March 1959, through the provincial warden.

The provincial warden did not, however, commit the prisoner to the national
penitentiary but retained him in the Samar provincial jail.

Thereafter, the warden took it upon himself to apply the provisions of Articles 97 and
99 of the Revised Penal Code as well as Act No. 2489, and credited the prisoner with
good conduct time allowance. After the prisoner’s actual confinement in jail for 2
years 8 months and 21 days, the warden released him on 23 November 1961.

On 6 September 1962, the provincial fiscal moved for the re- arrest of the accused and
to order him recommitted to the national penitentiary, on the ground that the
provincial warden had no authority to release him with good conduct time allowance.
The motion was unopposed. Acting on the motion, the court required the warden to
explain why the prisoner was kept in the provincial jail and not "sent to Manila" and
to answer the fiscal’s allegation that he released the prisoner without an order from
the Director of Prisons and before the service of the full term of the sentence.

The warden explained as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That said prisoner was not made to serve his imprisonment in the national

56
penitentiary because sometime in 1959 our office received a communication from the
Director of Prisons to withhold transfers of prisoners from the provincial jails to the
New Bilibid Prison due to congestion resulting in the bloody riots. In same year when
my attention was called why prisoner Fidel Tan, was not yet sent to Muntinlupa in
spite of the cessation of the riots, I have explained in a letter dated October 1, 1959, to
the Assistant Director of Prisons, that same prisoner could not be sent as he was
undergoing close medical treatment of his left lumbar region where previous wound
was located, his left thigh, and presence of blood in the urine as evidenced by a
medical certificate sent together with my explanation. Being of the opinion and belief
then that if this prisoner be transferred to the national penitentiary he might be
involved in another occasional and undetermined riots, where his physical condition
cannot resist the fear and which may aggravate his ailment, that for the sake of
humanity, until his physical condition should improve but which did not until his time
of release.

"That said prisoner was released without order from the Director of Prisons on the
ground that he cannot be made to still be lodged in the provincial jail when the date of
his release was already due, much less send him to Muntinlupa when the term of his
sentence minus good behavior credit has expired.

"That said prisoner was released after having served the term diminished by the credit
of good conduct time allowance in accordance with the provisions of Art. XI, sec. 1
(a) and (b) of the Revised Rules and Regulations for the Government of Insular and
Provincial Prisoners in the Philippines. That the computation made by me was correct
according to my interpretation in good faith of the aforementioned provision based on
the maximum term of sentence of 4 years 2 months."cralaw virtua1aw library

On 21 September 1962, the lower court issued an order requiring the appearance of
the warden to show the veracity of his information and, on 4 January 1963, it issued
the order that is now the subject of this appeal denying the fiscal’s petition to
recommit the accused.

The excuses tendered by the provincial warden are clearly unacceptable. The alleged
fear that the convict Tan might be involved in occasional riots in the Insular
Penitentiary is but a flimsy pretext for evading the warden’s plain duty of remitting
the prisoner to his proper place of confinement. Having been sentenced to more than
one year of imprisonment, the convict was not a provincial prisoner but an insular
prisoner (Adm. Code, section 1740), and there being no showing that his life would
be endangered by the trip to Muntinlupa penitentiary, the warden’s failure to send him
thither was a breach of duty for which said officer should be held accountable. It
needs no stressing that to allow provincial wardens to retain insular prisoners without
proper authority would open the way to all sorts of discrimination in the treatment of
prisoners and constitute a standing invitation for the commission of abuses and
anomalies for personal or political motives.

Nor do we find in the record any justification for the warden’s usurping the authority
of the Director of Prisons in crediting the prisoner with good conduct time allowance.
Article 99 of the Revised Penal Code vests such authority exclusively in the Director
and no one else.

57
Assuming that appellee Tan was entitled to good conduct time allowance, his release
by the provincial warden, after an imprisonment of only 2 years 8 months and 1 day,
was premature. Under paragraph No. 1, Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code, he may
be allowed a deduction of five (5) days for each month of good behavior during his
first two years of imprisonment, which would be 24 months multiplied by 5, or 120
days; under paragraph No. 2, he may be allowed a deduction of eight (8) days a month
for the next three years. For the balance of eight (8) months, multiplied by 8, we have
64 days; so that the total credit for good behavior would be 184 days equivalent to 6
months and 4 days. 1 The prisoner’s actual confinement of 2 years, 8 months and 21
days, plus his possible total credit of 6 months and 4 days, would give the result of 3
years. 2 months and 25 days. Since the maximum term of his sentence is 4 years and 2
months, appellee Tan, assuming that he is entitled to good conduct time allowance,
has an unserved portion of 11 months and 5 days. 2

The court below denied the fiscal’s motion for the rearrest of the accused-appellee on
the following grounds: (a) that when the accused-appellee commenced serving his
sentence and was committed to the warden, the court lost jurisdiction over the
prisoner’s "person with respect to his imprisonment" ; (b) that to re-arrest him after
his release would amount to double jeopardy, deprive him of his liberty without due
process of law; and (c) that the accused abided by the judgment and served it in good
faith, even if the act of the jailer was irresponsible and erroneous.

We agree with the Solicitor-General that the lower court had already lost jurisdiction
to amend or alter its judgment of conviction, but not over its execution or satisfaction.
The court’s jurisdiction was not terminated by the commitment of the convict to the
jail authorities — the commitment was but the start in carrying out of the court’s
decision. It is the prerogative of the court meting out the punishment to see to it that
the punishment be served until, by act of lawfully authorized administrative agencies
of the state, the convict is pardoned or paroled or, on lawful grounds, set at liberty
sooner than the expiration of the sentence imposed.

The prisoner’s re-arrest 3 would not place him twice in jeopardy because his re-
incarceration is merely a continuation of the penalty that he had not completely served
due to the erroneous act of the warden; it is not a new or subsequent conviction.
Neither would his re-arrest deprive him of liberty and without due process of law,
because he was not yet entitled to liberty at the time he was released. Service of
penalties and allowance for good conduct are specifically, even elaborately, governed
by the Penal Code and do not depend upon the good faith of the warden and of the
prisoner.

For the foregoing reasons, the appealed order is hereby reversed and a new one
entered, ordering the re-arrest, and the continuance of the imprisonment, of the
accused-appellee, Fidel Tan, for one (1) year, five (5) months and eleven (11) days
more.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Director of Prisons, who is hereby
directed to incarcerate the appellee in the national penitentiary, if present conditions
thereat would allow his accommodation, or if not, in any other suitable jail, without
prejudice to credit for good behavior from the time he was jailed on 2 March 1959, in
accordance with Article 99 of the Revised Penal Code.

58
Let another copy of this decision be sent to the Secretary of Justice, that he may take
action, if warranted, against the warden concerned. No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and

Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1. The Solicitor-General computation is 6 months and

10 days.

2. The Solicitor-General computation is 10 months and

29 days. The foregoing computations suffer from
clerical errors and disregard par. 2, Art. 97.

3. Some authorities hold that a fresh warrant is not

necessary (4 Moran 120, 1963 Ed.).

59
6. G.R. No. 141211            August 31, 2001

CITY WARDEN OF THE MANILA CITY JAIL, petitioner,

vs.
RAYMOND S. ESTRELLA, RONEL N. AMPARO, ALFRED F. LEHNER,
RONALD C. RODRIGO, ANTHONY G. MUNSAYAC, ARIEL A. DEL
ROSARIO, ORLANDO D. DEL ROSARIO, VICTOR B. SAMSON, RICHARD
S. NACUA, ALFONSO B. RELLOSO, ARMANDO A. REYES, MARY GRACE
H. TANUSAN, GARY ZALDE C. VELARDE, ELISEO G. PEREZ, FEDERICO
P. MALONZO, ROMEO D. DAPAT, LETICIA M. SANTOS, NAGAMURA A.
MACABUAT, SULAIMAN M. MACALIM, RENATO S. MANLAPIG, JOSE P.
REYES, JOCELYN V. IBAÑEZ, JOEL D. AGUILAR, ISAGANI R. MANZO,
MARVIN Q. PADRONES, CHARLIE Q. QUIRMIT, ANDREW A. SALCEDO,
EDUARDO E. GINETA, EDUARDO S. MARTINEZ, MOLLY G. LALIK,
GERARDO J. MALOGA, HENRY B. MANCILLA, ARMANDO C. BUELAS,
and-RICHARD C. MAGALLON, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the order, dated November 22, 1999, of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 52, Manila, directing by writ of habeas corpus the release from
confinement of herein respondents.

The antecedents are as follows:

In celebration of Law Day on September 18, 1999, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) initiated a jail visitation
program. IBP volunteer lawyers and law students visited various jails in Metro
Manila. In the City Jail of Manila, they found thirty-four (34) prisoners, herein
respondents, whom they believed were entitled to be released after deducting time
allowances for good conduct in the service of their respective sentences. The thirty-
four (34) prisoners and their sentences are the following:

1. Raymond Estrella y six (6) years for carnapping1

Serdan

60
2. Ronel2 Amparo y Nuñez six (6) years for carnapping3
3. Alfred Lehner y Feichti six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to two
(2) years, four (4) months,
and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as maximum,
for serious physical injuries4 
two sentences of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one (1) year
of prision correccional, as
maximum, for illegal
possession of drugs5
4. Ronald C. Rodrigo two (2) years imprisonment
for illegal possession of
drugs6
5. Anthony Munsayac y six (6) months and one (1)
Gonzales day to two (2) years for
illegal possession of drugs7
6. Ariel del Rosario y one (1) year imprisonment
Aguilar for illegal possession of
firearms8
7. Orlando Del Rosario y one (1) year imprisonment
Dela Cruz for illegal possession of
drugs9
8. Victor Samson y Bustos six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to one
(1) year of prision
correccional as maximum,
and to pay the costs.10
9. Richard Nacua y one (1) month and one (1)
Sanchez day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one (1) year
of prision correccional, as
maximum, for illegal
11
possession of drugs
10. Alfonso Relloso y two (2) years and six (6)
Barrantes12 months of prision
correccional for illegal
possession of drugs13
11. Armando Reyes y two (2) years imprisonment
Alvarez for illegal possession of
drugs14
12. Mary Grace Tanusan y one (1) year of prision
Habaro correccional minimum for
illegal possession of drugs15

61
13. Gary Zalde Velarde y two (2) months for theft 16 
Concepcion seven (7) months
imprisonment for theft17
14. Eliseo Perez y eight (8) months
Gutierrez imprisonment for illegal
possession of drugs18
15. Federico Malonzo y six (6) months imprisonment
Perez for illegal possession of
drugs19
16. Romeo Dapat y David six (6) months imprisonment
for illegal possession of
drugs20
17. Leticia Santos y six (6) months imprisonment
Malorina for illegal possession of
drugs21
18. Nagamura Macabuat y six (6) months imprisonment
Ali for illegal possession of
drugs22
19. Sulaiman Macaalin y six (6) months imprisonment
Malawani23 for illegal possession of
drugs24
20. Renato Manlapig y six (6) months imprisonment
Saulo for illegal possession of
drugs.25
21. Jose Reyes y Punzalan six (6) months imprisonment
for illegal possession of
drugs26
22. Jocelyn Ibañez27 y three (3) months of arresto
Villejo mayor for theft28
23. Joel Aguilar y Dagalan (3) months imprisonment for
three violation of P.D. No. 9, par.
3 as amended by B.P. Blg.
629
24. Isagani Manzo y Rio six (6) months imprisonment
for illegal possession of
drugs30
25. Marvin Padrones y six (6) months imprisonment
Quintana for illegal possession of
drugs31
26. Charlie Quirmit y six (6) months imprisonment
Quintana for illegal possession of
drugs.32
27. Andrew Salcedo y six (6) months imprisonment
Arcega for illegal possession of
drugs33

62
28. Eduardo Gineta y one (1) year imprisonment
Embuedo for illegal possession of
drugs34
29. Eduardo Martinez y six (6) months imprisonment
Salva for illegal possession of
drugs35
30. Molly Lalik y six (6) months imprisonment
Gabunada for illegal possession of
drugs36
31. Gerado Maloga y six (6) months imprisonment
Jacinto for illegal possession of
drugs37
32. Henry Mancilla y six (6) months and one (1)
Barquin day of imprisonment for
illegal possession of drugs.38
33. Armando Buelas y six (6) months and one (1)
Clares day of imprisonment for
illegal possession of drugs.39
34. Richard Magallon y six (6) months imprisonment
Clarito for illegal possession of
drugs40

Respondents asked herein petitioner Rosendo M. Dial, City Warden of the Manila
City Jail, to effect their release on the ground that they had already served their
sentences, less time allowances for good conduct. Respondents invoked Arts. 97 and
99 of the Revised Penal Code which provide:

ART. 97. Allowance for good conduct. — The good conduct of any prisoner in any
penal institution shall entitle him to the following deduction from the period of his
sentence:

1. During the first two years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of
five days for each month of good behavior;

2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be
allowed a deduction of eight days for each month of good behavior;

3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he
shall be allowed a deduction of ten days for each month of good behavior; and

4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed
a deduction of fifteen days for each month of good behavior.

ART 99. Who grants time allowances. — Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of
Prisons shall grant allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall
not be revoked.

63
However, petitioner City Warden denied respondents' request on the ground that only
the Director of the Bureau of Corrections can grant them allowances for good conduct
under Art. 99 of the Revised Penal Code. Nonetheless, on October 11, 1999,
petitioner City Warden issued certifications of good behavior to respondents stating
that had respondents been credited time allowances for good conduct, they should
have been released on the following dates indicated opposite their names:

Date of Date of Date of

Confinement Decision Release after
Deducting
Good
Conduct
Time
Allowances
1 Raymond S. Mar. 28, 1994 Apr. 19, Feb. 22,
Estrella 1999 199941
2 Ronel N. Mar. 29, 1994 Jun. 27, Feb. 23,
Amparo 1994 199942
3 Alfred F. Jun. 21, 1996 Aug. 26, April 16,
Lehner 1998 199943
4 Ronald C. Oct. 28, 1997 Dec. 10, June 28,
Rodrigo 1997 199944
5 Anthony G. Oct. 12, 1997 Feb. 20, Aug. 2,
Munsayac 1998 199945
6 Ariel A. Del Oct. 2, 1998 Apr. 7, Aug. 2,
Rosario 1999 199946
7 Orlando D. Oct. 31, 1998 Feb. 9, Aug. 2,
Del Rosario 1999 199947
8 Victor B. Oct. 16, 1998 Nov. 17, Aug. 8,
Samson 1998 199948
9 Richard S. Oct. 15, 1998 Jan. 27, Aug. 15,
Nacua 1999 199949
10 Alfonso B. May 23, 1997 Aug. 24, Aug. 23,
Relloso 1999 199950
11 Armando A. Oct. 25, 1997 Aug. 4, Aug. 25,
Reyes 1999 199951
12 Mary Grace Oct. 10, 1998 Feb. 8, Aug. 30,
H. Tanauan 1999 199952
13 Gary Zalde Jan. 21, 1999 Feb. 9, Sept. 6,
C. Velarde 1999 199953
14 Eliseo G. Feb. 22, 1999 Jun. 25, Sept. 12,
Perez 1999 199954
15 Federico G. Apr. 18, 1999 Sept. 1, Sept. 18,
Malonzo 1999 199955
16 Romeo D. Apr. 18, 1999 Sept. 1, Sept. 18,

64
 Dapat 1999 199956
17 Leticia M. Apr. 30, 1999 Sept. 1, Sept. 30,
Santos 1999 199957
18 Nagamura May 4, 1999 Sept. 9, Oct. 4, 199958
A. Macabuat 1999
19 Sulaiman M. May 4, 1999 Sept. 9, Oct. 4, 199959
Macalim 1999
20 Renato S. May 5, 1999 Sept. 2, Oct. 5, 199960
Manlupig 1999
21 Jose P. May 10, 1999 Aug. 26, Oct. 10,
Reyes 1999 199961
22 Jocelyn V. Jul. 28, 1999 Aug. 20, Oct. 13,
Ibañez 1999 199962
23 Joel D. Aug. 29, 1999 Sept. 16, Oct. 14,
Aguilar 1999 199963
24 Isagani R. May 21, 1999 Aug. 25, Oct. 21,
Manzo 1999 199964
25 Marvin Q. May 21, 1999 Aug. 25, Oct.
Padrones 1999 21,199965
26 Charlie Q. May 21, 1999 Aug. 25, Oct. 21,
Quirmit 1999 199966
27 Andrew A. Jun. 1, 1999 Sept. 1, Nov. 1,
Salcedo 1999 199967
28 Eduardo E. Jun. 17, 1998 Mar. 15, Nov. 17,
Gineta 1999 199968
29 Eduardo S. Jun. 20, 1999 Aug. 26, Nov. 20,
Martinez 1999 199969
30 Molly G. Jun. 21, 1999 Aug. 26, Nov. 21,
Lalik 1999 199970
31 Gerardo J. Jun. 26, 1999 Aug. 26, Nov. 26,
Maloga 1999 199971
32 Henry B. Jun. 24, 1999 Aug. 26, Nov. 26,
Mancilla 1999 199972
33 Armando C. Jun. 24, 1999 Aug. 26, Nov. 26,
Buelas 1999 199973
34 Richard C. Jun. 29, 1999 Aug. 25, Nov. 29,
Magallon 1999 199974

On October 15, 1999, respondents, represented by the IBP National Committee on

Legal Aid, filed in this Court a petition for habeas corpus, alleging that —

4.4 [Petitioner] Manila City Jail Warden has issued verified certifications to the effect
that the [respondents] have exhibited good behavior and exemplary conduct in the

65
service of their sentences. These grant [respondents] an irrevocable good conduct time
allowance pursuant to Article 99 of the same Code.

4.5. By virtue of the good behavior and exemplary conduct of the [respondents] as
duly recognized by the [petitioner], the former are now entitled to demand as a matter
of right, and the latter is justified in granting, their release from their present
confinement considering the fact that they are deemed to have fully served the period
of their respective sentences.

4.6 [Respondents], however, remain in confinement at the MCJ and are continually
deprived of their liberty because of the refusal of the [petitioner] Manila City Jail
Warden, or other wardens other than the Director of Prisons, to grant their release;

4.7 [Petitioner] justifies his refusal to release the prisoners from confinement with this
Honorable Court's ruling in the case of People vs. Tan, G.R. No. 1-21805, February
25, 1967, a pertinent portion of which reads:

There is no justification in the provincial warden's usurping the authority of the

Director of Prisons in crediting the prisoner with good conduct time allowance. Such
authority is exclusively vested in the Director.

4.8 Under the present organization of the jail system, all City, provincial, and
municipal jails are now under the Bureau of Jail Management, which in turn is under
the supervision of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). On the
other hand, the Director of Prisons (now the Director of the National Bureau of
Corrections) is under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and has no
authority over jail wardens in the cities, provinces, and municipalities;

4.9 It appears that the provisions of Articles 97 and 99 of the Revised Penal Code, in
the absence of a concurrent change in the designation of the officer authorized to
grant the time allowance from the National Director (formerly the Director of Prisons)
to the Jail Wardens, was rendered ineffective and inapplicable as far as the prisoners
confined in the city, provincial, and municipal jails are concerned.

4.10 The above interpretation, if sustained, would favor some prisoners to the
detriment and prejudice of [respondents], who are detained at the Manila City Jail,
clearly a palpable violation of the constitutional mandate to equal protection of the
law.

4.11 On the other hand, Articles 97 and 99 should be construed in a manner consistent
with the Constitution and favorable to herein [respondents] to the effect that the
authority to grant the good conduct allowances has been shifted to the respective jail
wardens, who, despite the different nomenclature of their position, perform the same
function and responsibility as custodians of the [respondents] while in the service of
their respective sentences.

4.12 It is most respectfully submitted that the above provisions shall be construed in a
manner that would not lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice or would defeat the
clear purpose of the lawmakers (People vs. Manantan, 5 SCRA 684). In one case, it
was held by this Honorable Supreme Court that a "Legal provision being susceptible

66
of two interpretations, the Supreme Court adopts the one in consonance with the
presumed intention of the legislature to give its enactments the most reasonable and
beneficial construction, the one that will render them operative and effective and
harmonious with other provisions of law" (Sesbreno vs. Central Board of Assessment
Appeals, 270 SCRA 360).

4.13 Thus, [respondents] cannot be deprived of their liberty simply because Articles
97 and 99 of the Revised Penal Code were rendered obscure, silent, and insufficient
by the reorganization of the jail management without the correlative revisions on the
title or name of the proper officer to be vested with the authority to grant the
mandated allowance for good behavior. Verily, it was never intended in the
reorganization to deny the grant of good conduct allowance as an incentive to hasten
the reformation and rehabilitation of the [respondents];

4.14 Pending remedial legislation to address the resulting violation of the

constitutional right of [respondents] and those similarly affected, [respondents] seek
their release by praying that this Honorable Court order the [petitioner] Chief
Inspector Rosendo M. Dial, in his capacity as City Warden of the Manila City Jail, to
release herein [respondents], in the exercise of its judicial power and pursuant to
Article 9 of the New Civil Code which states:

Art. 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the law.75

In the resolution of November 15, 1999,76 the Court issued the writ of habeas
corpus which it made returnable to the Regional Trial Court, Manila. The case was
eventually raffled to Branch 52 of that court. In his return,77 petitioner City Warden,
through the Solicitor General, opposed the release of respondents, arguing that while
the Director of the Bureau of Corrections no longer exercises authority over city and
municipal prisoners, he remains the sole authority under Art. 99 of the Revised Penal
Code who can grant time allowances for good conduct to prisoners.

It turned out that 22 of the 34 respondents had already been released. 78 These were
Ronald C. Rodrigo, Anthony G. Munsayac, Ariel A. Del Rosario, Orlando D. Del
Rosario, Victor B. Samson, Richard S. Nacua, Armando A. Reyes, Mary Grace H.
Tanusan, Gary Zalde C. Velarde, Eliseo G. Perez, Federico P. Malonzo, Romeo D.
Dapat, Leticia M. Santos, Nagamura A. Macabuat, Sulaiman M. Macalim, Renato S.
Manlapig, Jose P. Reyes, Jocelyn V. Ibañez, Joel D. Aguilar, Charlie Q. Quirmit,
Andrew A. Salcedo, and Molly G. Lalik. On November 22, 1999, the trial court
issued its challenged order directing petitioner City Warden to release from
confinement respondents Raymond S. Estrella, Ronel N. Amparo, Alfred F. Lehner,
Alfonso B. Relloso, Isagani R. Manzo, Marvin Q. Padrones, Eduardo E. Gineta, and
Eduardo S. Martinez, while deferring the release of respondents Gerardo J. Maloga,
Henry B. Mancilla, and Armando C. Buelas until November 26, 1999 and respondent
Richard C. Magallon until November 29, 1999.79

The trial court held that (1) the Director of the Bureau of Corrections no longer has
jurisdiction over city and municipal jails, and it is thus legally impossible for him to
grant time allowances for good conduct to herein respondents who are inmates of the
Manila City Jail; (2) respondents had been denied the equal protection of the laws

67
because "national prisoners, who are still under the authority of the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections, may be dispensed benefits by him under Art. 97, whereas local
prisoners, over whom he lost authority, control, and supervision, are left with no one
to dispense benefits under Art. 97";80 and (3) that the certifications issued by
petitioner City Warden constituted sufficient basis to grant respondents' release under
Art. 97. It held that in the exercise of its "equity jurisdiction" under Art. 9 of the Civil
Code, it could fill in "the hiatus or gap [in the law] on who is to grant local prisoners
good conduct time allowance under Art. 97."

Hence this petition for review on certiorari filed by the Solicitor General.

I.

Before considering the merits of the petition, we will first deal with the technical
objections raised by respondents.

First. Respondents contend that the petition was filed late on December 2, 1999
because both petitioner City Warden and the Office of the Solicitor General received
the questioned release order on November 22, 1999.81

The contention is without merit. Under B.P. Blg. 129, §39, the period of appeal
in habeas corpus cases shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment
appealed from.82 Petitioner thus had until November 24, 1999 to appeal. However, on
November 23, 1999, prior to the expiration of the period to appeal, the Solicitor
General asked for an extension of fifteen (15) days from November 24, 1999, or until
December 9, 1999, within which to file the present petition. The Court having granted
the motion,83 the instant petition was timely filed on December 2, 1999.

Second. Respondents contend that the City Warden did not authorize the filing of the
present petition, and that the City Warden in fact ordered the release of all of the
respondents a few days after the issuance of the assailed order of November 22, 1999.
Corollary to this, they contend that the petition should be verified by the City Warden,
who is the real party in interest, and not by the Solicitor General or the latter's
assistants.

This contention likewise lacks merit. Under P.D. No. 78, §1,84 the Office of the
Solicitor General is the legal representative of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring the services of a lawyer,
excepting only as may otherwise be provided by law. That the City Warden appears to
have acquiesced in the release order of the trial court by his compliance therewith
does not preclude the Solicitor General from taking a contrary position and appealing
the same. The Solicitor General's duty is to present what he considers would legally
uphold the best interest of the Government.85

With respect to respondents' objection to the verification of the petition for review
filed in this case, Rule 7, §4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief.86

68
The verification in this case, by Associate Solicitor Rico Sebastian D. Liwanag,
states:

2. I was involved in the preparation of the foregoing Petition For Review on

Certiorari.

3. I have read the same, the contents of which are true and correct based on my
knowledge and belief.87

This complies with the requirement of Rule 7, §4 as above quoted.

II

With respect to the merits, the Solicitor General contends that the trial court erred —

IN RULING THAT CITY WARDENS MAY GRANT GOOD CONDUCT TIME

ALLOWANCE UNDER ARTICLES 97 AND 99 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE.

The Solicitor General contends that despite changes in the organizational structure of
the prison system, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections remains the exclusive
authority for granting good conduct time allowances and, therefore, it was error for
the lower court to order the release of respondents on the basis of certifications issued
by the City Warden as to time allowances for good conduct that respondents are
entitled to.

Respondents argue that the trial court did not actually rule that the City Warden can
grant good conduct time allowances under Art. 97 but merely relied on the City
Warden's certifications regarding the prison records of respondent, thus:

While it appears that the recent reorganization in the structure and management of the
jail system created a hiatus or gap on who is to grant local prisoners good conduct
time allowance under Art. 97, however, this Court opines and must hold that does not
stop, deter, prevent this Court from extending reliefs to petitioners on their benefits
under Art. 97, since after all, they became and remained entitled thereto. In his
certifications (Exhs. A to A-33) issued, respondent Warden confirmed that
petitioners behaved properly and exhibited conduct during their entire incarceration in
the jail and that if Art. 97 be applied in their favor, they are already eligible for
release. Considering the clear pronouncement of the Warden himself, who has
immediate control and supervision over petitioners, this Court, thus, sees no valid and
justifiable reason/ground why such certifications would not be enough, under the
present circumstances, to grant petitioners their entitled benefits under Art. 97, ergo,
their immediate release, even in the absence of a new law or rule designating the
authority which shall determine and grant such benefits on good conduct time
allowance on local prisoner. Parenthetically, it cannot be denied that the Warden is in
a better position than the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to determine who
among the prisoners behaved well to be entitled under Art. 97. Obviously, the
Director, in performing his tasks under Art. 99, has to refer, rely and depend on the
report and recommendations of the warden of subject prisoners.88

69
We hold that the trial court erred in ordering the release of respondents before full
service of their sentences without the certification at least of the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections as to their good conduct time allowances.

First. The trial court held that the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, now the Bureau
of Corrections,89 no longer has the authority to grant good conduct time allowances to
inmates in the provincial, city, and municipal jails in view of the enactment of R.A.
No. 6975, otherwise known as the Department of the Interior and Local Government
Act of 1990, which places provincial, city, and municipal jails under the supervision
and control of the Bureau of Jail Management.90

The flaw in this argument is that it assumes that the authority to grant good conduct
time allowances flows from the grant of the power of supervision and control, so that
only those vested with this power can grant good conduct time allowances to
prisoners. But this is not so. Under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (R.A.
No. 409), the Director of Prisons did not have control and supervision of the city jails
of Manila. It was the Chief of Police of Manila who under §34 of the Charter "shall
exercise supervision, administration, and control over the city jail and municipal
prisoners." And yet, the Director of Prisons was acknowledged as the authority for
granting good conduct time allowances to all prisoners regardless of their place of
detention.

Neither is there any inconsistency between Art. 99 and R.A. No. 6975. Repeals by
implication are not favored. To the contrary, every statute must be so interpreted and
brought in accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. Interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi.91 For
there to be an implied repeal, there must be a clear showing of repugnance. The
language used in the later statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what
has been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not
suffice.92

Second. Nor is there any basis for the conclusion of the trial court that it could rely on
the certifications issued by the city Warden as to the good conduct time allowances of
respondents because the Director of the Bureau of Corrections would also have to
depend on the same anyway as respondents are not under his control and supervision.
The question here is who has authority to grant good conduct time allowances, not on
what basis such allowances should be made.

In Kabigting v. Director of Prisons,93 it was held that in habeas corpus proceedings,

the trial court has no power to grant the petitioner time allowances for good conduct
"[because] in accordance with Article 99 of the Revised Penal Code it is the Director
of the Prisons who shall grant allowances for good conduct if such good conduct has
been observed by the prisoner concerned." In People v. Tan,94 it was emphatically
held that a provincial warden cannot grant credit for good conduct to a prisoner and
order his release because Art. 99 of the Revised Penal Code vests the authority to
grant prisoners good conduct time allowances "exclusively in the Director and [in] no
one else." In that case, the prisoner was under the supervision and control of the
provincial warden, but the authority of the Director to grant good conduct time
allowances was upheld. Indeed, there is nothing in R.A. No. 6975 which repeals Art.
99 of the Revised Penal Code.

70
Moreover, there are good reasons for holding in this case that the trial court could not
rely on the certifications issued by the City Warden in crediting respondents with time
allowances for good conduct. In the first place, the certifications issued by the City
Warden lacked data on the dates when respondents started serving sentence. 95 Such
data are important because, as has been observed, good conduct time allowances
under Art. 97 may only be earned by prisoners while serving their sentence. 96 While
Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code provides that time spent in preventive
imprisonment shall be credited in full or four-fifths in service of sentence, it does not
say that the prisoners shall earn the credit for good behavior under Art. 97 during such
period of preventive detention.

In the second place, the certifications issued by the City Warden contain errors. Some
of the data stated therein are contrary to those stated in the documents submitted by
respondents in support of their petition for habeas corpus. For example, in the case of
respondent Alfred F. Lehner, the City Warden's certification states that he was
sentenced on August 26, 1998 to imprisonment for "three (3) years to four (4) months
and one (1) day" in Criminal Case Nos. 96-150703-04. However, Lehner's sentence in
each of those cases was actually a prison term of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one (1) year of prision correccional, as maximum, 97 and the decision
was rendered on August 30, 1996, not August 26, 1998 as stated in the certification.
In the case of Gary Zalde Velarde y Concepcion, the City Warden's certification
erroneously states Velarde's sentence in Criminal Case No. 314691-SA to be for
seven (7) months to two (2) months imprisonment 98 when his sentence was actually
two (2) months.99 He was sentenced to seven (7) months for theft in another case, 100 
which fact was not disclosed in the certification.

Needless to say, the writ of habeas corpus remains available as a remedy against any
abuse of the authority granted by Art. 99 of the Revised Penal Code to the Director of
Prisons, but that is altogether a different kettle of fish from the question posed in this
case. Here, the question is whether a court may rely on the certification of the City
Warden as to good conduct time allowances in ordering the release of prisoners by
writ of habeas corpus. We hold that it cannot, in view of Art. 99 of the Revised Penal
Code vesting the authority to grant good conduct time allowances solely in the
Director of Prisons.

In view of the foregoing, we are constrained to order the re-arrest of all of

respondents. This can be done without placing them in double jeopardy of being
punished for the same offense because their re-incarceration is merely a continuation
of the penalties that they had not completely served due to the invalid crediting of
good conduct time allowances in their favor.101

WHEREFORE, the appealed order is SET ASIDE and the case is hereby
REMANDED to the trial judge for further proceedings, taking into account the
certification of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections as to the good conduct time
allowances to which respondents may be entitled, by either granting the writ of habeas
corpus with respect to some of the respondents or ordering the re-arrest of others, as
the facts may warrant.

SO ORDERED.

71
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon Jr., JJ ., concur.

Footnotes
1 
Exh. B-1; Records, pp. 46-48.
2 
Also spelled "Ronnel" in the Records.
3 
Id.
4 
This sentence was imposed in a decision, dated August 26, 1998 in Criminal Case
No. 96-853 by the RTC, Branch 27 of Manila. Records, pp. 50-61.
5 
Per the decision, dated April 6, 1998, also by the RTC, Branch 27, Manila in
Criminal Case Nos. 96-150703 and 96-0150704. Exh. B-2; Records, p. 49.
6 
Exh. B-3; Records, p. 62.
7 
Exh. B-4; id., p. 63.
8 
Exh. B-5; id., pp. 64-66.
9 
Exh. B-6; id., p. 67.
10 
Exh. B-7; id.; pp. 68-69.
11 
Exh. B-8; id., pp. 70-71.
12 
Also spelled "Barante" in the Records.
13 
Exh. A-9; Records, p. 21. See also Annex B-9 of Petition; Rollo, pp. 207-208.
14 
Exh. B-10; Records, p. 74.
15 
Records, p. 73. See also Exhs. A-11 and B-11; Records, pp. 23 and 75.
16 
Id., p. 72. See also Exh. A-12; id., p. 24.
17 
Exh. B-12; id., p. 76.
18 
Exh. B-13; id., p. 77.
19 
Exh. B-14; id., p. 78.
20 
Exh. B-15; id., p. 79.
21 
Exh. B-16; id., p. 80.

72
22 
Exh. B-17; id., p. 81.
23 
Also spelled "Mabawani" in the Records.
24 
Supra note 22.
25 
Exh. B-18; Records, p. 82.
26 
Exh. B-19; id., p. 83.
27 
Also spelled "Ibañez" and "Ibanes" in the Records.
28 
Exh. B-20; Records, p. 84.
29 
Exb. B-21; id, p. 85.
30 
Exh. B-22; id., p. 86.
31 
Id.
32 
Id.
33 
Exh. B-23; Records, p. 87.
34 
Exh. B-24; id., p. 88.
35 
Exh. B-25; id., p. 89.
36 
Exh. B-26; id., p. 90.
37 
Exh. B-27; id., p. 91.
38 
Exh. B-28; id., p. 92.
39 
Exh. B-29; id., p. 93.
40 
Exh. B-30; id., p 94.
41 
Exh. A; id., p. 12.
42 
Exh. A-1; id., p. 13.
43 
Exh. A-2; id., p. 14.
44 
Exh. A-3; id., p. 15
45 
Exh. A-4; id., p. 16.
46 
Exh. A-5; id., p. 17.

73
47 
Exh. A-6; id., p. 18.
48 
Exh. A-7; id., p. 19.
49 
Exh. A-8, id., p. 20.
50 
Exh. A-9; id., p. 21.
51 
Exh. A-10; id., p. 22.
52 
Exh. A-11; id., p. 23.
53 
Exh. A-12; id., p. 24.
54 
Exh. A-13; id., p. 25.
55 
Exh. A-14; id., p. 26.
56 
Exh. A-15; id., p. 27.
57 
Exh. A-16; id., p. 28.
58 
Exh. A-17; id., p. 29.
59 
Exh. A-18; id., p. 30.
60 
Exh. A-19; id., p. 31.
61 
Exh. A-20; id., p. 32.
62 
Exh. A-21; id., p. 33.
63 
Exh. A-22; id., p. 34.
64 
Exh. A-23; id., p. 35.
65 
Exh. A-24; id., p. 36.
66 
Exh. A-25; id., p. 37.
67 
Exh. A-26; id., p. 38.
68 
Exh. A-27; id., p. 39.
69 
Exh. A-28; id., p. 40.
70 
Exh. A-29; id., p. 41.
71 
Exh. A-30; id., p. 42.

74
72 
Exh. A-31; id., p. 43.
73 
Exh. A-32; id., p. 44.
74 
Exh. A-33; id., p. 45.
75 
Petition (G.R. No. 140194), pp. 6-8; Records, pp. 6-8.
76 
Id., pp. 95-96.
77 
Id., pp. 102-107.
78 
Per Order, dated November 19, 1999; id., p. 109.
79 
Per Judge Edgardo F. Sundiam. Records, pp. 110-115; Rollo, pp. 131-136.
80 
Prisoners are classified either as municipal, provincial, or national depending on the
length of their sentence under the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as amended
by P.D. No. 29, which provides:

SEC. 1739. Persons deemed to be municipal prisoners. — The following persons are

to be considered municipal prisoners:

(a) Persons detained or sentenced for violation of municipal or city ordinances.

(b) Persons detained pending trial before justices of the peace or before municipal
courts.

(c) Persons detained by order of a justice of the peace or judge of a municipal court
pending preliminary investigation of the crime charged, until the court shall remand
them to the Court of First Instance.

(d) Persons who by reasons of their sentence may be deprived of liberty for not more
than six months. The imposition of subsidiary imprisonment shall not be taken into
consideration in fixing the status of a prisoner hereunder except when the sentence
imposes a fine only.

SEC. 1740. Persons deemed to be provincial prisoners. — The following persons, not

being municipal prisoners, shall be considered provincial prisoners.

(a) Persons detained pending preliminary investigation before the Court of First
Instance.

(b) Persons who by reason of their sentence may be deprived of liberty for not more
than three years or are subjected to a fine of not more than one thousand pesos, or are
subjected to both penalties; but if a prisoner receives two or more sentences in the
aggregate exceeding the period of three years, he shall not be considered a provincial
prisoner. The imposition of subsidiary imprisonment shall not be taken into
consideration in fixing the status of a prisoner hereunder except when the sentence
imposes a fine only.

75
SEC. 1741. National Prisoners. — Prisoners who are neither municipal nor provincial
prisoners shall be considered national prisoners, among whom shall be reckoned, in
any event, all persons sentenced for violation of the Customs Law or other law within
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs or enforceable by it.

As the Solicitor General points out, respondents Raymond S. Estrella and Ronel N.
Amparo are national prisoners. It likewise appears that respondent Alfred F. Lehner is
a national prisoner by reason of his multiple sentences.
81 
Respondents' Memorandum, p. 4; Rollo, p. 397.
82 
Now part of Rule 41, §3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure per A.M. No. 0-1-1-
03-SC- Re Amendment to Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
effective July 15, 2001.
83 
Resolution of December 15, 1999; Rollo, p. 244.
84 
Now in ADM. CODE, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12, §35.
85 
See Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 289 SCRA 586 (1998)
citing Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 575 (1994); Orbos v. Civil Service
Commission, 189 SCRA 459 (1990).
86 
Under A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, effective May 1, 2000, the same now reads:

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on
authentic records.
87 
Petition, p. 13; Rollo, p. 128.
88 
RTC Release Order, p. 3; Rollo, p. 133.
89 
ADM. CODE, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 8, §26 provides that the Bureau of
Corrections under the Department of Justice "shall exercise such powers and
functions as are now provided for by the Bureau of Prisons or may hereafter provided
by law."
90 
The pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 6975 read:

SEC. 60. Composition. — The Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, hereinafter

referred to as the Jail Bureau, is hereby created initially consisting of officers and
uniformed members of the Jail Management and Penology Service as constituted
under Presidential Decree No. 765.

SEC. 61. Powers and Functions. — The Jail Bureau shall exercise supervision and
control over all city and municipal jails. The provincial jails shall be supervised and
controlled by the provincial government within its jurisdiction, whose expenses shall
be subsidized by the National Government for not more than three (3) years after the
effectivity of this Act.

76
91 
Republic of the Philippines v Marcopper Mining Corporation, G.R. No. 137174,
July 10, 2000 citing Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole, 251 SCRA 242 (1995).
92 
Agujetas v. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 17 (1996) citing AGPALO,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 287-288 (1990).
93 
G.R. No. L-12276, Aug. 26, 1958.
94 
19 SCRA 433 (1967).
95 
What the certifications only stated are the dates of confinement which in the case of
all of the respondents antedated the dates judgment was rendered against them.
96 
Baking v. Director of Prisons, 28 SCRA 851 (1969). Detention prisoners can earn
good conduct allowances under Act 1533, §5 if they "voluntarily offer in writing to
performance such labor as may be assigned by them."
97 
Exh. B-2; Records, p. 49.
98 
Exh. A-12; id., p. 24.
99 
Id., p. 72.
100 
Id., p. 76.
101 
People v. Tan, 19 SCRA 433 (1967).

77