Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, Aklan v. Municipality of Buruanga, Aklan, 486 SCRA 229

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 149145. March 31, 2006.]
ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF KALIBO, AKLAN, represented

by BISHOP JUAN N. NILMAR, petitioner, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF
BURUANGA, AKLAN, represented by the HON. PROTACIO S.
OBRIQUE, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J : p
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by the
Roman Catholic Bishop 1 of Kalibo, Aklan, seeking the partial review of the
Decision 2 dated January 31, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
52626. Likewise sought to be reviewed is the Resolution dated July 18, 2001
of the appellate court denying the petitioner's motion for partial
reconsideration.
Factual and Procedural Antecedents
Some time in 1990, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, Aklan, filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) thereof a complaint for declaration of ownership
and quieting of title to land with prayer for preliminary injunction against the
Municipality of Buruanga, Aklan. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4164
and raffled to Branch 1 of the said RTC.
The complaint alleged, among others, that the Roman Catholic Bishop of
Kalibo is the lawful owner and possessor of a parcel of residential and
commercial land (Cadastral Lot No. 138) located at the poblacion of the
Municipality of Buruanga, Aklan. The said lot, with an area of 9,545 square
meters, is a block bounded by four streets on all sides. It is more particularly
described as follows:
A parcel of commercial and residential land known as Cadastral
Lot No. 138, GSS-06-00012, located at Poblacion, Buruanga, Aklan,
containing an area of NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE
(9,545) SQUARE METERS, more or less. Bounded on the North by Viven
Ostan Street; on the East by the Provincial Road; on the South by Nitoy
Sualog Street; and on the West by Emilio Ostan Street, and declared for
taxation purposes in the name of the Roman Catholic Church,
Buruanga, Aklan, under Tax Declaration No. 6339 (1985) and assessed
at P23,850.00, including the improvements thereon. 3
In 1894, the Roman Catholic Church was built in the middle portion of
the said lot and has been in existence since then up to the present.
The complaint further alleged that some time in 1978, 4 the Municipality
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of Buruanga constructed its municipal building on the northeastern portion of
the subject lot after it obtained the permission of Fr. Jesus Patiño, then parish
priest of Buruanga. The municipality promised to remove all the improvements
it constructed thereon if and when the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo needed
the said land. ScTaEA
In October 1989, the said municipal building was razed by fire allegedly
perpetrated by members of the New People's Army. On November 25, 1989,
the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, through its counsel, wrote to the
Municipal Mayor of Buruanga requesting the officials of the said municipality to
refrain from constructing its new building on the same site because it is the
property of the church. Further, it needed the said land for its social action
projects. The letter reads in part:
I am writing you on behalf of my client THE ROMAN CATHOLIC
BISHOP OF KALIBO, AKLAN, a corporation sole and represented by
Bishop Juan N. Nilmar requesting you and the Honorable Members of
the Municipal Council (Sangguniang Bayan) to refrain from constructing
your new Municipal Building on the same site where your old Municipal
Building was burned down because it is constructed on the property of
the Church.
Please be informed that the land of the Church is needed for its
social action projects and additional building, hence, kindly relocate
your New Municipal Building in your own land located along Emilio
Ostan Street, known as Cadastral Lot No. 87.
With respect to your other public buildings such as the Rural
Hospital, Buruanga Community Medicare Hospital, the Basketball Court
and the Grandstand which are all occupying the Church property, you
can continue using the same land subject to your recognition of the
true ownership of the property of the Church — The Roman Catholic
Church — of Buruanga, Aklan, under the Roman Catholic Bishop of
Kalibo, Aklan, the lawful administrator of all church properties in the
Province of Aklan. 5
On March 12, 1990, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo wrote the
Department of Public Works and Highways of the said province requesting the
said office not to issue any building permit to the Municipal Mayor and/or the
Municipality of Buruanga in connection with the construction of its municipal
building on the land owned by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo. 6
These letters went unheeded as the construction of the new municipal

building on the same site proceeded. Consequently, the Roman Catholic Bishop
of Kalibo filed the complaint a quo and prayed that it be declared the lawful
owner and possessor of Lot 138. It likewise prayed that a temporary restraining
order be issued to enjoin the said municipality and its authorized
representatives from constructing the new municipal building thereon and that
the latter be directed to pay damages to the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo.
In its Answer, 7 the Municipality of Buruanga, represented by Mayor
Protacio Obrique, denied that the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo ever
acquired ownership and possession over the land subject of the complaint. It
raised as affirmative defenses that the said lot was surveyed as property of the
municipality on February 3, 1909 in accordance with Section 58 of Act 926 by
A.W. Bushell and approved by the Bureau of Lands on May 15, 1909. 8
Thereafter, a decree was issued on March 14, 1919 in favor of the Municipality
of Buruanga under Case No. 12871 of then Court of Land Registration, Bureau
of Lands.
It was further alleged that the said land was again surveyed in the name
of the Municipality of Buruanga under Act No. 2259 and denominated as Lot No.
138 GSS-06-00012 from the approved cadastral map and that the said
municipality alone had possessed the said land under the claim of title
exclusively for over fifty (50) years, exclusive of all other rights and adverse to
all other claimants.
The Municipality of Buruanga urged the court a quo to dismiss the
complaint and, instead, declare it the absolute and exclusive owner of the
disputed lot.
On November 29, 1990, the court a quo issued the Order 9 appointing
Geodetic Engineer Rodrigo Santiago of the Bureau of Lands as Commissioner
and directing him to identify and delineate the lot in question. In compliance
therewith, Engr. Santiago submitted the Commissioner's Report and Sketch
stating in part:
That as per order of the court dated November 29, 1990 to
delineate the land [in] question, the undersigned court commissioner
notified both parties and the schedule of survey was January 12, 1991
but it was postponed and moved to January 15 as requested by the
representative from the Municipality of Buruanga. aEHTSc
That the land in question involved was pointed to me by the

Honorable Mayor of the Municipality of Buruanga, identified on the plan
as [L]ot 138 located at Poblacion Buruanga with survey no. GSS-06-
00012 approved by the Director Lands last February 19, 1985, listed as
Public Plaza on file in the CENR Office Land Management Sector, Kalibo,
Aklan.
That the Honorable Mayor of the Municipality of Buruanga
pointed also the boundary between the Public Plaza and the Roman
Catholic Church.
The Technical Descriptions are as follows:
Lot 138-A (Public Plaza)

corner 1-2 S86 - 03E 65.54 m.
2-3 S03 - 17E 32.36 m.
3-4 N88 - 71.31 m
54W
4-1 N06 - 33E 35.68 m.
containing an area of 2,319 square meters

Lot 138-B (Roman Catholic Church)
1-2 S86 - 03E 65.54 m.
2-3 S03 - 17E 32.36 m.
N88 -
3-4 71.31 m.
54W
4-1 N06 - 33E 35.68 m.
containing an area of 3,836 square meters
Lot 138-C (Public Plaza)

1-2 N81 - 87.70 m.
19W
2-3 N06 - 33E 38.90 m.
3-4 S83 - 17E 80.35 m.
4-1 S03 - 17E 42.57 m.
containing an area of 3,389 square meters 10
Consistent with the above technical description, the sketch submitted

by Engr. Santiago showed the delineation of Lot 138 into three parts: Lots
138-A, 138-B and 138-C. The municipal building stood on Lot 138-A; the
Roman Catholic Church stood on Lot 138-B and the municipal health center
and the Buruanga Community Medicare building stood on Lot 138-C. It also
showed that portions of Lots 138-A and 138-C were being used as public
plaza.
At the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the following facts:
1. The identity of the lot in question which is Lot 138 consisting of
Lots 138-A, 138-B and 138-C as reflected in the commissioner's
sketch with an area of 9,544 square meters and subdivided as
follows:
Lot 138-A 2,319 square meters
Lot 138-B 3,836 square meters

Lot 138-C 3,389 square meters
2. Lot 138-B is the present site of the Roman Catholic Church of
Buruanga. 11
The parties also agreed that the sole issue for resolution is who between
the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo and the Municipality of Buruanga is the
owner of Lot 138.
After due trial, the court a quo rendered its Decision dated October 30,
1995 declaring the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo as the lawful owner and
possessor of Lot 138-B and the Municipality of Buruanga as the lawful owner
and possessor of Lots 138-A and 138-C, the said lots being public plaza for
public use.
The court a quo found that of the various tax declarations 12 presented by
the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo to support its claim, only one referred to a
portion of Lot 138. Said tax declaration 13 covered the church site and the
parish house situated within Lot 138-B. The other pieces of evidence 14 could
not be relied upon because they contained hearsay information relating to the
disputed lot that occurred before the affiants were born. The affidavit executed
by Fr. Jesus Patiño 15 stating that he was the one who gave verbal permission
to then Municipal Mayor Pedro Omugtong to construct the municipal building on
the vacant lot owned by the church was not accorded any evidentiary value
because he (Fr. Patiño) did not testify during the trial. aTICAc
On the other hand, the court a quo did not give credence to the
Municipality of Buruanga's Exhibit "1," a microfilm enlargement of a plan
showing that the land consisting of 12,615 square meters was subject of Land
Registration Case No. 12871. The plan showed that the survey was approved
on May 15, 1909 and the notations therein indicated that a decree was issued
on March 14, 1919. But no such decree was shown. It was further found by the
court a quo that the plan was requested from the Bureau of Lands Survey
Division on December 22, 1976. However, the same was not duly certified by
the issuing government agency. Even assuming that the disputed lot was
indeed subject of a land registration proceeding and a decree had been issued
therefor in March 1919, the Municipality of Buruanga, despite lapse of decades,
failed to take the necessary judicial steps for the issuance of a title in its name
based on the decree. Neither did it take any other course of action that would
render its title thereto indefeasible.
The court a quo, however, gave probative weight to the testimony of
Manuel Sualog, Chief of the Lands Management Section of the Department of
Environment and National Resources, who was presented by the Municipality of
Buruanga. Sualog testified that the disputed lot was the public plaza of the said
municipality. Standing thereon are the Roman Catholic Church and its parish
house, the new municipal hall, the rural health center, the barangay community
hospital and a basketball court.
During the court a quo's ocular inspection conducted on May 7, 1992, the
town was celebrating its town fiesta. It observed that the public was using the
whole plaza (in Lots 138-A and 138-C) for the festivities. Also, the existence of
the health centers, basketball court and the municipal hall showed that portions
of the disputed lot were being used by the public.
Upon inspection of the church, the court a quo further observed that it
was indeed an old stone structure and probably built in 1894, the year carved
on its left side entrance. It described the church as "vintage turn-of-the century
colonial Filipino church architecture. Moss and ficus grow out of its wall
crevices. The age of the church shows that it has been occupying that
particular space for almost one hundred (100) years long enough for the
plaintiff to have possessed it in the concept of owner continuously, adversely
and publicly against the whole world." 16
The court a quo held that the facts of the present case were similar to
those in Harty v. Municipality of Victoria, 17 where the Court ruled that:
For the above reasons, . . . it should be held, as we do hereby
hold, that the whole of the land not occupied by the church of the town
of Victoria and its parish house, is a public plaza of said town, of public
use and that in consequence thereof, the defendant is absolved of the
complaint without any special ruling as to the costs of both instances.
18
The dispositive portion of the court a quo's decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, Aklan, is declared the
lawful owner and possessor of Lot 138-B with an area of
3,836 square meters in the Commissioner's Report as
against the defendant;
2. Defendant Municipality of Buruanga is declared the lawful

owner and possessor of Lot 138-A with an area of 2,319
square meters and Lot 138-C with an area of 3,389 square
meters in the Commissioner's Report, said lots being public
plaza destined for public use. 19
The Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo seasonably filed its appeal with the
Court of Appeals. It sought the reversal of that portion of the court a quo's
judgment adjudicating the ownership of Lots 138-A and 138-C to the
Municipality of Buruanga.
During the pendency of the case in the appellate court, the Roman
Catholic Bishop of Kalibo moved to submit additional evidence to support its
claim of ownership over the entire Lot 138. The additional evidence consisted of
affidavits of old residents of Buruanga stating that the municipal building was
constructed on the disputed lot only in the late 1950's. Prior thereto, the
municipal building stood at a place called Sunset Park, a block totally different
from the disputed lot. The said motion was denied by the appellate court on the
ground that the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo had already been accorded
full opportunity to present its evidence in the court a quo.
The Municipality of Buruanga did not file its appellee's brief with the CA.
On January 31, 2001, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision
affirming with modification the decision of the court a quo. The CA affirmed the
ownership of the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo over Lot 138-B but reversed
the court a quo's ruling relative to the ownership of Lots 138-A and 138-C. The
appellate court declared the said lots property of public dominion, hence, not
owned by either of the parties.
The CA stated that the court a quo correctly relied on the ruling in Harty,
which was reiterated in Bishop of Calbayog v. Director of Lands, 20 where the
Court held that the public plaza and public thoroughfare were not subject to
registration by the church. In the latter case, it was ruled that since neither the
Church nor the municipality presented positive proof of ownership or exclusive
possession for an appreciable period of time, and the only indubitable fact was
the free and continuous use of the lot in question by the residents of the town,
which had no other public plaza to speak of other than the disputed lot, there
was a strong presumption that the same had been segregated as a public plaza
upon the founding of the municipality therein. AEIHaS

As mentioned earlier, the appellate court reversed that portion of the
court a quo's judgment declaring the Municipality of Buruanga as the owner of
Lots 138-A and 138-C which form part of the public plaza. Citing Articles 419 21
and 420 22 of the Civil Code, the appellate court classified these lots as
property of public dominion; hence, not susceptible to private ownership by the
Municipality of Buruanga. The said lots are merely under its jurisdiction and
administration. Being intended for the common and public welfare, they could
not be appropriated either by the State or by private persons.
The dispositive portion of the assailed CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, upon the premises, the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Lots 138-A and 138-C are
declared property of public dominion not owned by either of the
parties. 23
The Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo moved for a partial reconsideration

of the appellate court's ruling that Lots 138-A and 138-C, being the public
plaza, are property of public dominion. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo
averred that the appellate court erred in affirming the finding of the court a quo
that these lots comprise the public plaza. It maintained that it owned the entire
Lot 138.
The appellate court denied the motion for partial reconsideration, hence,
the recourse to this Court by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo (the
petitioner).
The Petitioner's Arguments
The present petition for review on certiorari alleges that:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN RELYING
UPON THE CASES OF HARTY V. MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIA, TARLAC
(13 Phil. 152 [1909]) and BISHOP OF CALBAYOG V. DIRECTOR OF
LANDS (45 SCRA 418 [1972]) TO SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE
PETITIONER IS NOT THE OWNER OF LOTS 138-A AND 138-C.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING

THAT LOTS 138-A AND 138-C [WHICH ARE WITHIN THE ORIGINAL LOT
138] ARE PROPERTIES OF THE PUBLIC [DOMAIN] AND NOT
SUSCEPTIBLE TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP BY THE PETITIONER.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT
REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE THAT PETITIONER'S OWNERSHIP OF THE
ENTIRE LOT 138 WAS GRANTED AND RECOGNIZED UNDER SPANISH
LAW, AND AFFIRMED IN THE TREATY OF PARIS. 24
The petitioner clarifies that it is seeking a partial review of the appellate

court's Decision dated January 31, 2001 classifying Lots 138-A and 138-C as
property of public dominion and not susceptible to private ownership and that
the petitioner is not entitled to the possession and ownership thereof. It is not
contesting the portion of the CA decision upholding its ownership over Lot 138-
B.

The petitioner opines that the case of Harty, relied upon by the court a
quo and the CA to hold that Lots 138-A and 138-C comprise the public plaza,
are inapplicable because the facts therein are not similar to those of the
present case. The petitioner points out that the public plaza referred to in Harty
was the lot across the street from the church lot. It was not referring to the land
surrounding the Catholic church and the convent of the town of Victoria, which
was bounded by streets on each of its four sides. Thus, when the Court in Harty
limited the ownership of the church to the land "occupied by the church of the
town of Victoria and its parish house," it was not confining the ownership to a
portion of the lot on which the church and parish house were situated. Rather,
the Court in Harty referred to the entire lot or block (bounded by a street on
each of the four sides) on which the church and its parish house were erected.
DTISaH
The petitioner asserts that the following facts that have been established
support its claim of ownership over the entire Lot 138 as against the claim of
the Municipality of Buruanga (respondent municipality):
[a] The church is built in the middle of Lot 138 (which is now
Lot 138-B). It was built therein in 1894. The church was almost 100
years old (at the time the case was instituted with the trial court in
1990). . . .
[b] The Municipality of Buruanga is an old municipality
constituted or created during the colonial period, when the Philippine
Islands was under the Spanish sovereignty. . . .
[c] No building was built on Lot 138 earlier than or at about
the same time as the church. No municipal building was built around
the church for many decades after 1894. . . .
[d] The municipal hall of Buruanga was built on what is now
Lot 138-A only in the late 1950's. . . .
[e] It was not controverted by the private respondent that
then Mayor Omugtong of Buruanga sought and obtained the
permission of the then parish priest, Fr. Jesus Patino, to allow the
municipal government to build its municipal hall on Lot 138-A in the
late 1950's only. . . .
[f] No evidence was adduced by private respondent that it
had obtained title of Lot 138-A or 138-C from the church (the owner of
these lots) or that its possession of any portion of Lot 138 was adverse
to that of the church. . . .
[g] When the municipal hall was burned down by the NPA
rebels in 1989 the church asked the municipal government to relocate
the municipal hall elsewhere since it (church) needed the lot for itself.
[h] Because the municipal government resisted and for the
first time exhibited a possession adverse to the church, the petitioner
promptly filed the instant suit before the lower court for quieting of title
to the subject lot (the entire Lot 138) and to be declared the owner of
such property.
[i] The church has been in continuous, open, adverse,
notorious possession of the entire Lot 138 in the concept of owner
since at least 1894 until the late 1950's. . . .
[j] No evidence has been shown that Lots 138-A and 138-C
were devoted for public use or for use as a public plaza before 1894 or
even at about the time the church was built on Lot 138. . . .
[k] The only evidence as to the supposed character of Lot

138-C as a public plaza is a survey plan allegedly approved on 15 May
1909 denominated as [GSS]-06-00012, Buruanga Settlement Project,
approved only in 1984. Petitioner was not notified of this survey. . . .
[l] The real property tax declaration presented by private
respondent to establish its supposed possession (Exhs. 4, 4-a, and 4-b,
Record, pages 45-47) covered the year 1992 only.
[m] Witness Jaime S. Prado, Sr. (who was born on 17

December 1905 and coming to the age of reason when he was about
10 years old) testified that as far as he can remember (since he was
grade 1) he was brought to mass by his elders at the church of
Buruanga, which was the very same church as of the time he testified
in 1992, and was active in church activities in that church (e.g., tsn, 9
January 1992, pages 5, 16); that the property of the church was
bounded on all four sides by the very same streets that bounded it at
the time he testified (ibid., at page 6-8).
[n] Private respondent indirectly judicially admitted that it

has no title (Torrens or otherwise) to the subject properties when its
star witness (the incumbent Mayor Protacio Obrique of Buruanga)
testified that the properties in the poblacion of Buruanga are not
covered by any title (tsn, 27 July 1992, page 5). 25
The petitioner contends that the pronouncement in Bishop of Calbayog,

cited by the appellate court, does not support its decision. Instead, it actually
supports the petitioner's claim of ownership over Lot 138, including Lots 138-A
and 138-C. In the said case, the lot (Lot 2) that was declared by the Court as
plaza was a separate and distinct lot separated from the church lot (Lot 1) by a
provincial road. Lot 1, held to be owned by the church in the said case, included
not only the space occupied by the church, belfry, convent, parish school and
nuns' residence, but also the empty space which only had concrete benches as
improvements thereon and which was used as a public playground. TaCDIc
The petitioner also cites Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro v. Director of

Lands, 26 where the Court recognized that under the Laws of the Indies (Leyes
de las Indias ), the law in force in the Philippine Islands during the Spanish
regime, the property of the church in the pueblos consisted of one parcel of
land which meant "not only the two buildings but also the land adjacent and
contiguous to said buildings, that is, the parcel which by itself constitutes one
whole piece of land bounded on its four sides by streets, and within which said
buildings, the church and the convent, are situated." 27
According to the petitioner, the appellate court erred in affirming the
finding of the court a quo that Lots 138-A and 138-C comprise the public plaza.
Unlike in Harty, no evidence was allegedly adduced to show that from the time
respondent municipality was created these two lots had been set aside for the
public.
Harty is not applicable, the petitioner expounds, because it was
indubitably established therein that the "plaza was used without let or
hindrance by the public and the residents of Victoria ever since its creation." In
contrast, in the present case, there was allegedly no evidence to show that Lots
138-A and 138-C were set aside as the public plaza, or for any public purpose,
when the Municipality of Buruanga was created during the Spanish period. The
evidence, in fact, show that the entire Lot 138, bounded on all its four sides by
streets, belonged to the church and it had continuous use and occupation
thereof since 1894 when it constructed its church in the middle of Lot 138. No
such use of Lot 138-A and 138-C as the public plaza for the same length of time
or from 1894 had been shown.
The petitioner assails the reliance by the appellate court on the court a
quo's statement during its ocular inspection on Lot 138 in 1992 that it observed
that the property was occupied by the Roman Catholic Church, a parish house,
the municipal hall and three of its municipal edifices, and a basketball court.
Based on this observation, the court a quo concluded, and the appellate court
affirmed, that Lots 138-A and 138-C comprise the public plaza. The petitioner
objects to this conclusion stating that the same cannot overcome the evidence
in favor of the church as to its ownership over these lots traced back to 1894
when it constructed the church in the middle of Lot 138 or what is now Lot 138-
B.
It reiterates that under the Laws of the Indies, when a municipality was
created, the church was assigned a property consisting of a parcel of land
bounded on all its four sides by streets, and that the public plaza was situated
not on the same parcel of land assigned to the church but on a distinct lot
separated by a street from that assigned to the church.
The petitioner likewise argues that even if it, as the owner of the entire
Lot 138, allowed respondent municipality to build its municipal hall on what is
now Lot 138-A in the late 1950's by mere tolerance of the parish priest, it does
not necessarily follow that Lot 138-A had become property of public dominion.
It does not allegedly lose its possession or ownership over the property if the
possession or use by another of the same is by mere tolerance.
Respondent municipality, through its Mayor Protacio Obrique during his
testimony, allegedly admitted that respondent municipality's lot was located in
a portion designated as Lot 2 in its Exhibit "1." The said lot was along the beach
and separated from Lot 138 by Emilio Ostan Street. The alleged import of this
admission is that the entire Lot 138 (designated as Lot 1 in Exhibit "1") was
assigned solely to the church since a different lot was assigned to respondent
municipality.
The petitioner avers that Buruanga is an ancient Spanish town and that
when it was created the Spanish authorities assigned a distinct and separate lot
for its municipal government or pueblo where it could build its municipal hall or
casa real. It could thus be assumed that the casa real of respondent
municipality would be built at about the same time as the church or around
1894. The petitioner contends that nothing in the evidence suggests that the
casa real was built on Lot 138 during the said period. It was only in the late
1950's that the municipal hall was built thereon upon the permission granted
by the parish priest.
Refuting respondent municipality's view that it is unthinkable that the
church would be given a bigger property than the municipal government, the
petitioner submits that such notion is not far fetched considering that the
primary aim of the Spaniards at the time was to spread the Catholic faith to the
colonies. DASCIc
That the entire Lot 138 belonged to the petitioner is allegedly supported
by the practice during the Spanish period, as shown by the layout of the church
convent and church plaza in practically all the old towns in the Philippines and
the early cases 28 decided by the Court, to invariably provide the church with
spacious grounds bounded by the four principal streets of the town.
Even without any document or certificate of title thereto, the petitioner
bases its claim of ownership over Lot 138 under the Spanish Law as recognized
and affirmed under the Treaty of Paris. It cites Roman Catholic Apostolic Church
v. Municipality of Placer 29 where the Court recognized that the church is
entitled not only to possession of its properties but to ownership thereof. Bishop
of Jaro was again invoked by the petitioner as the Court explained therein that
it did not find it strange that the church was unable to exhibit a written title to
its property since the Laws of the Indies in force during the Spanish regime
dictated the layout of the towns and assigned the locations of the church,
square and government administration buildings. The provisions of the Laws of
the Indies pertaining thereto were held to be sufficient to secure the
registration in the name of the church of its land.
The petitioner asserts that even granting arguendo that Lot 138 was not
assigned to it during the Spanish regime or is not owned by it pursuant to the
Laws of the Indies, still, it had acquired ipso jure or by operation of law a
government grant, a vested title, to the disputed lot by virtue of its open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof since
1894. In support of this contention, the petitioner cites Subsection 6 of Section
54 of Act No. 926, which became effective on July 26, 1904, and which provided
that:
6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in
interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by
said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a
bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a
period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this Act, except
when prevented by war or force majeure, shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter.
It is allegedly clear that as early as July 26, 1904, when Act No. 926 took
effect, the petitioner had already acquired a government grant, a vested title,
to Lot 138.
Subsection b of Section 45 of Act No. 2874, approved on November 9,

1919, which amended Act No. 926, is similarly cited by the petitioner. It
provided that:
(b) Those who by themselves or their predecessors in interest
have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, except as against the
Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-
four, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.
On the basis of the foregoing provisions, a land registration proceeding

instituted would, according to the petitioner, "in truth be little more than a
formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is
of the required character and length of time, and registration thereunder would
not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested."
In addition to its arguments on the merits of the case, the petitioner
assails the appellate court's denial of its motion to submit additional evidence
which would have showed that the casa real of respondent municipality,
together with its plaza (Sunset Park Plaza), was located on a distinct lot (Lot 2)
separated from Lot 138 by Emilio Ostan Street.
The petitioner urges the Court to reverse and set aside the portion of the
appellate court's decision declaring Lots 138-A and 138-C as property of public
dominion and to declare the petitioner the absolute owner of the entire Lot 138.
In the alternative, the petitioner prays that it be allowed to submit additional
evidence of its ownership over Lots 138-A and 138-C. DCScaT
Respondent Municipality's Counter-arguments

For its part, respondent municipality contends that, except for the figures
1894 etched on the left wall of the church, the petitioner has not presented any
evidence to show that it had continuous possession of the entire Lot 138 since
the turn of the twentieth century. The petitioner is allegedly of the mistaken
belief that because it possessed Lot 138-B, it must have likewise possessed
Lots 138-A and 138-C. Respondent municipality claims that it is the one that
has been exercising acts of exclusive ownership over the disputed lot.
The petitioner has allegedly misread Harty and Bishop of Calbayog in
claiming that in cases involving the church, the lot adjudicated to it invariably
consisted of the entire block, bounded by a street on each of the four sides, and
the public plazas were situated in separate blocks. While it may true that many
church properties occupy an entire block in certain municipalities, it is allegedly
equally true that other church properties occupy only portions thereof
depending on the exigencies of the locality at the time when the church was
being established.
In those instances that the Court allegedly adjudicated an open space in

favor of the church, the local government was not shown to have exercised
dominion over the property and the church has consistently established some
control over it, like the putting up of a religious monument thereon. On the
other hand, in the present case, respondent municipality insists that it has laid
adverse claim over Lot 138 as early as 1909 when it applied for title over it and
was even issued a decree over the said lot. Respondent municipality places its
actual, public and adverse possession of Lot 138 at the latest in 1958 when it
built its old municipal hall on the said site. Its occupation prior thereto could
also be allegedly presumed from its actual possession thereof.
The petitioner has allegedly failed to establish that the construction of the
old municipal building in 1958 was by mere tolerance on its part. Respondent
municipality harps on the failure of the petitioner to present as its witness Fr.
Patiño, the parish priest who supposedly gave respondent municipality
permission to construct its municipal building on the disputed lot. Respondent
municipality denies ever seeking such permission. Further, the tax declaration
(Exhibit "B") of the petitioner only pertained to Lot 138-B proving that its
ownership was limited to the said lot and did not extend to Lots 138-A and 138-
C.
Respondent municipality avers that it is already contented with the
decision of the appellate court although the latter allegedly erred in concluding
that Lots 138-A and 138-C are property of public dominion without taking into
consideration that respondent municipality applied for the issuance of title
covering the disputed lot and was issued a decree thereto in 1919. The
admission of Mayor Obrique, during his testimony, that respondent municipality
owned the lot along the beach (Lot 2) and situated across the street from Lot
138 could not be allegedly taken to mean that the Mayor was disclaiming
ownership over Lot 138.
Respondent municipality theorizes that in those cases 30 that the Court

upheld the ownership of the church over a subject property, the same have
ever since remained the property of the church and have been in its peaceful
possession. Further, there were no adverse claimants and the primary issue
being resolved was whether, despite non-compliance with procedural
requirements, title may be granted in favor of the church.
Respondent municipality distinguishes the present case from those cases
in that there is an open contest over the ownership and possession of Lots 138-
A and 138-C and respondent municipality has in its favor actual and adverse
possession thereof. It emphasizes that there is nothing in fact and in law that
would support the petitioner's bare claim of ownership and possession over
Lots 138-A and 138-C. On the contrary, there is allegedly strong evidence
showing respondent municipality's exercise of proprietary and governmental
rights over the said lots where it has constructed permanent structures, e.g.,
municipal building, community hospital, health center, social hall/basketball
court, and where public functions are openly conducted.
Respondent municipality urges the Court to dismiss the petition and,

instead, to affirm the decision of the court a quo declaring it the lawful owner
and possessor of Lots 138-A and 138-C. caADSE
Issue
The substantive issue to be resolved is whether the appellate court
correctly declared Lots 138-A and 138-C as property of public dominion,
hence, not susceptible to ownership by either the petitioner and respondent
municipality.
Since respondent municipality no longer sought the review of the
assailed decision of the appellate court, the Court shall mainly resolve the
merits of the petitioner's claim of ownership over Lots 138-A and 138-C vis-
à-vis the appellate court's holding that they are of public dominion, hence,
not susceptible to private ownership.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is denied.
The Laws of the Indies and the cases cited
by the petitioner do not support its claim
of ownership over Lots 138-A and 138-C
The petitioner anchors its claim of ownership over Lots 138-A and 138-C
on its theory that the entire Lot 138, bounded on all its four sides by streets,
was assigned to it as far back as 1894 when the church was built in the middle
of the said lot. The cases it cited allegedly stand for the proposition that "under
the Laws of the Indies, when a municipality was created, the church was
assigned a property consisting of a parcel of land bounded on all its (four) sides
by streets, and that the public plaza was situated not on the same parcel of
land assigned to the church but on a distinct parcel of land separated from the
parcel of land assigned to the church by a street." 31
This allegation fails to persuade. The pertinent provision of the Laws of

the Indies relating to the designation of a parcel of land for the church upon
the establishment of a town or pueblo during the Spanish regime reads:
Ley viij. Que se fabriquen el Templo principal en el sitio, y
disposicion, que se ordena, y otras Iglesias, y Monasterios.
En lugares Mediterráneos no se fabrique el Templo en la plaza,
sino algo distante de ella, donde esté separado de otro qualquier
edificio, que no pertenezca á su comodidad y ordenato, y porque de
todas partes sea visto, y mejor venerado, esté algo levantado de suelo,
de forma que se haya de entrar por gradas, y entre la plaza mayor, y
Templo se edifiquen las Casas Reales, Cabildo, ó Concejo, Aduana, y
Atarazana, en tal distancia, que autoricen al Templo, y no le
embaracen, y en caso de necesidad se puedan socorrer, y si la
poblacion fuere en Costa, dispóngase de forma que en saliendo de Mar
sea visto, y su fábrica como defensa del Puerto, señalando solares
cerca de él, y no á su continuacion, en que se fabriquen Casas Reales,
y tiendas en la plaza para propios, imponiendo algun moderado tributo
en las mercaderias: y asimismo sitios en otras plazas menores para
Iglesias Parroquiales, y Monasterios donde sean convenientes. 32
The above provision prescribed that the church be built at some distance
from the square, separate from other buildings in order that it may be better
seen and venerated, and raised from the ground with steps leading to it. It
decreed that government administration buildings, including casas reales, be
built between the main square and the church and at such distance as not to
shut the church from view. In cases of coastal towns, the church was to be
constructed in such location as to be seen by those coming from the sea and
serve for the defense of the port.
The other provisions of the Laws of the Indies on the establishment of
new towns or pueblos in the archipelago, including the designation of lands for
the church, casa reales (municipal buildings) and public squares, had been
discussed by the Court in this wise:
xxx xxx xxx
The executive authorities and other officials who then

represented the Spanish Government in these Islands were obliged to
adjust their procedure, in the fulfillment of their duties with regard to
the establishment and laying out of new towns, to the Laws of the
Indies, which determined the course that they were to pursue for such
purposes, as may be seen by the following:
Law 6, title 5, book 4, of the Recompilation of the Laws of the

Indies, provides, among other things:
"That within the boundaries which may be assigned to it, there

must be at least thirty residents, and each one of them must have a
house," etc. CcSEIH
Law 7 of the same title and book contains this provision:
"Whoever wishes to undertake to establish a new town in the

manner provided for, of not more than thirty nor less than ten
residents, shall be granted the time and territory necessary for the
purpose and under the same conditions."
It may be affirmed that years afterwards all the modern pueblos

of the Archipelago were formed by taking as a basis for their
establishment the barrios already populated by a large number of
residents who, under the agreement to build the church of the new
pueblo, the court-house and afterwards the schoolhouse, obtained
from the General Government the administrative separation of their
barrio from the pueblo on which it depended and in whose territory it
was previously comprised. In such cases procedure analogous to that
prescribed by the Laws of the Indies was observed.
For the establishment, then, of new pueblos, the administrative

authority of the province, in representation of the Governor-General,
designated the territory for their location and extension and the metes
and bounds of the same; and before the allotting the lands among the
new settlers, a special demarcation was made of the places which were
to serve as the public square of the pueblo, for the erection of the
church, and as sites for the public buildings, among others, the
municipal building or the casa real , as well as of the lands which were
to constitute the commons, pastures, and propios of the municipality
and the streets and roads which were to intersect the new town were
laid out, as may be seen by the following laws:
Law 7, title 7, book 4, of the Recompilation of the Laws of the

Indies, provides:
"The district or territory to be given for settlement by

composition shall be allotted in the following manner: There shall first
be set apart the portion required for the lots of the pueblo, the exido or
public lands, and pastures amply sufficient for the stock which the
residents may have, and as much more as propios del lugar or
common lands of the locality; the rest of the territory and district shall
be divided into four parts — one of them, of his choice, shall be for him
who takes upon himself the obligation to found the pueblo, and the
other three shall be apportioned equally among the settlers."
Law 8, of the same title and book, prescribes, among other

things:
"That, between the main square and the church, there shall be
constructed the casas reales or municipal buildings, the cabildo,
concejo, customs buildings," etc.
Law 14 of the said title and book, also directs among other
things:
"That the viceroys shall have set aside such lands as to them
appear suitable as the common lands (propios) of the pueblos that
have none, therewith to assist in the payment of the salaries of the
corregidores, and sufficient public lands (exidos) and pasture lands as
provided for and prescribed by law."
Law 1, title 13 of the aforesaid book, provides the following:

"Such viceroys and governors as have due authority shall
designate to each villa and lugar newly founded and settled the lands
and lots which they may need and may be given to them, without
detriment to a third party, as propios, and a statement shall be sent to
us of what was designated and given to each, in order that we may
have such action approved." 33
Nowhere in the above provisions was it stated that the parcel of land
designated for the church of the town or pueblo was, in all cases, to be an
entire block or bounded on all its four sides by streets. The petitioner thus
erroneously asseverates that the said ancient laws sustain its claim of
ownership over the entire Lot 138.
Neither can it find support in the cases that it cited. A careful review of
these cases reveal that, in those instances where the Court upheld the claim of
the church over a parcel of land vis-à-vis that of the municipality or national
government, the ownership and possession by the church of the same had been
indubitably established by its exclusive exercise thereon of proprietary acts or
acts of dominion.
For example, in Bishop of Calbayog v. Director of Lands, 34 which
according to the petitioner supports its case, the Court adjudicated in favor of
the church the ownership of Lot 1 (except the portion thereof occupied by a
public thoroughfare) including not only the space occupied by the church,
belfry, convent, parish school and nuns' residence, but also the empty space
which only had concrete benches as improvements thereon. ISTCHE
With respect to the empty space (eastern portion of Lot 1), the Court
noted the following:
. . . The eastern portion of Lot 1, the area in contention, is an
empty space except for concrete benches along the perimeter. A partly
cemented path runs across this lot from east to west leading up to the
front or entrance of the church and appears to be an extension of
Anunciacion St., which runs from the bank of the Catarman river up to
Mendiola St. In the middle of this path, half-way between Mendiola St.
and the church, is a statue of the Sacred Heart of Jesus.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The Roman Catholic Church had made no improvements on

this eastern portion of Lot 1, which at present is being used as a public
playground, although a bandstand stood there for about three years
after it was constructed in 1926 by the members of an orchestra which
was organized by a Fr. Ranera and which used to give musical
performances on the bandstand. On the feast of Corpus Christi the
parishioners would construct an altar on this lot and hold the
procession there. 35
It is apparent that the Court adjudicated to the church the ownership of

Lot 1 (except a portion thereof which was a public thoroughfare) because the
latter was able to establish that it had exercised acts of possession or
ownership over the same including over its empty space. In particular, the
empty space was used for religious functions, such as the Feast of Corpus
Christi and the procession held on the occasion and the church did not ask for
any permit from the local authorities whenever it used the said space for such
activities.
In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that, at one time after
the church was built in 1894 in the middle of Lot 138 (now Lot 138-B), it
exercised acts of ownership or possession over Lots 138-A and 138-C as well.
It must be emphasized that the petitioner's allegation that it merely
tolerated the construction of not only the municipal building but also the other
improvements thereon, e.g., the rural health center, Buruanga community
Medicare hospital, basketball court, Rizal monument and grandstand, has
remained unsubstantiated. The affidavit of Fr. Patiño was correctly not given
any credence since he was not presented on the witness stand; thus,
considered hearsay. Hearsay evidence is generally excluded because the party
against whom it is presented is deprived of his right and opportunity to cross-
examine the person to whom the statement or writing is attributed. 36
The testimony of Mr. Jaime S. Prado, Sr., an octogenarian and resident of

Buruanga, cannot likewise be given any credence because it consisted only of a
bare assertion that the church building and the land on which it was built,
bounded by streets on all its four sides, were the petitioner's property. 37 He
based this statement on the fact that as a child he heard masses at the church
with his parents. This assertion, without more or without any corroborative
evidence, is not sufficient to establish the petitioner's ownership over Lots 138-
A and 138-C especially in light of the fact that Mr. Prado is not competent to
testify on the matter because he had no actual personal knowledge with
respect to any transactions involving Lot 138:
FISCAL DEL ROSARIO:
Q Now, when you were President of the Parish Council, have you
access of any documents relating to church properties in
Buruanga, Aklan?
A Never.
Q Now, you have stated that the boundaries of the property of the
[R]oman [C]atholic [C]hurch in Buruanga, Aklan has previous
names thus, the present name of Viven Ostan, Nitoy Sualog and
Emilio Ostan is at present now. My question is, what was the
previous names of these roads?
A Of Nitoy Sualog, that was Malilipayon Street. The Provincial road

street, before that was Kaaganhon street, West, Emilio Ostan,
before that was Kahaponanon Street and instead of Viven Ostan,
that was Kabulakan Street.
Q So, you will agree with me Mr. Witness so, that previous names is
not in any way related to the names of former parish priest[s] of
Buruanga, Aklan or saints, am I right?
A No, sir.
Q You know very well Rev. Jesus Patinio and Mayor Pedro
Omugtong?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, do you remember if there was any transaction of them

during your lifetime?
A This Padre Patinio and I were close friends. Mr. Omugtong met
Patinio[,] talked together about the land they agreed[,] and I
don't know what is there (sic) agreement but the building was
constructed then.
Q Were you present during the talked (sic) of Rev. Jesus Patinio and
Mayor Pedro Omugtong?
A No, sir. DHEaTS

Q You identified in this Exhibit "F" as Municipal Hall, Rural Health
Unit Hospital, the Buruanga Community Hospital, Basketball
Court and the Grandstand. Now, my question is, are these
buildings constructed by the [R]oman [C]atholic [C]hurch?
A Not one. 38
Even the affidavits of the other residents of Buruanga, which were also
properly considered hearsay, made no mention of any instance where the
petitioner exercised acts of dominion over Lots 138-A and 138-C. These
affidavits uniformly stated:
That we have been residing in this Municipality since birth and
that we have full knowledge of the site where the church now stands;
That during the Pre-Spanish time, the site of the town proper was
swampy, fishermen used to fish in the swamp, trees of different kinds
grows (sic) along the beach;
That when the Spaniards arrived in our town, they introduced

education and religion;
That because there was no site for the church, the Spaniards
forced the inhabitants to work for the filling up of the swamp, men are
hauling stones[,] and women[,] sand and gravel;
That after so many years of hard labor the swamp was filled up
and then the friars build a church in the center of the town;
That as far as we are concerned the site where the church now
stand and the surrounding area and the site where the present
Municipal building now stands is even the part of the property of the
church and not the property of the municipality as allege (sic) by the
Mayor;
That we execute this affidavit with our own free act and
voluntary deed. 39
The information proffered by these affidavits could not have been based
on the personal knowledge of the affiants because they obviously were not yet
born when the events they narrated took place. 40
Like in Bishop of Calbayog, the Court in Hacbang v. Director of Lands 41

adjudicated to the church the ownership of two parcels of land, designated as
Lots 1 and 2 despite the opposition of the Director of Lands who claimed that a
portion on the eastern part of Lot 1 and the entire Lot 2 were public plazas. The
Court affirmed the ownership of the church over these lots upon the following
findings:
It is inferred from the foregoing facts which are held to have
been indisputably established by the evidence, that the disputed
portion of lot No. 1 as well as the entire lot No. 2 belongs to the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Church of the Diocese of Samar and Leyte. It cannot
be denied that said church, for more than half a century, was in the
possession of said lands together with the church, belfry and convent
which existed first on lot No. 1 and later provisionally on lot No. 2. The
fact that the catholic cemetery was located on lot No. 2 and that the
stone posts and pillars were later erected thereon, thereby converting
it into a place for the celebration of the Way of the Cross, conclusively
proves that the property belonged to the church and that the latter's
possession has constantly been under claim of ownership.
. . . [I]t must be presumed upon these facts that said portion
formed part of the parcels of land assigned and adjudicated by the
authorities to the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in said town for the
erection of the church, belfry, convent and cemetery, all of which, as
everybody knows, are necessary for the practice and celebration of the
cults of said religion. 42
The proprietary acts exercised by the church over the disputed lots
consisted of the construction thereon of the church, belfry, convent and
cemetery. Moreover, it conducted thereon the Way of the Cross and other
religious celebrations.
Unlike in the Bishop of Calbayog and Hacbang, in the present case, the
petitioner has not shown that it exercised proprietary acts or acts of
dominion over Lots 138-A and 138-C, to the exclusion of others, to buttress
its claim of ownership over these lots.
Neither can the petitioner rely on Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro v.
Director of Lands 43 where the Court categorically made the finding that the
lot in question (Lot 3) had been in the possession of the church, as owner,
for a time sufficiently long for purposes of prescription. In a prior case 44
involving the said lot, the Court adjudged that the church was "entitled to
the possession of the following property situated in the Municipality of
Sibalom: The Church of Sibalom, the convent, contiguous to the same, and
the land occupied by these two buildings."
The Court interpreted the phrase "land occupied by the church . . . and
its convent" to mean "not only the two buildings, but also the land adjacent
and contiguous to said buildings, that is, the parcel which by itself
constitutes one whole piece of land bounded on its four sides by streets, and
within which said buildings, the church and the convent, are situated." 45
Significantly, the parcel of land that was adjudicated in favor of the
church was the "land adjacent and contiguous to said buildings," i.e., church
and convent. The word "adjacent" has been defined as follows:
The word "adjacent" is of Latin derivation. An examination of its
original use clearly indicates that in order that things shall be adjacent
they shall be thrown near together. CSTDIE
Webster in his International Dictionary defines "adjacent" as

"lying near, close or contiguous; neighboring; bordering upon;" and
gives as synonyms the words "adjoining, contiguous, near."
Roque Barcia in his " Diccionario General Etimológico de la

Lengua Española," in defining the word "adjacent," uses as synonyms
"inmediato, junto, próximo ." Things cannot be "inmediatas, juntas,
próximas" where other objects intervene.

Vicente Salva in his "Nuevo Diccionario Francés-Español" defines
the word "adjacent as "qui est situé aupres, aux environs."
Black in his Law Dictionary defines "adjacent" as "lying near or
close to; contiguous. The difference between adjacent and adjoining
seems to be that the former implies that two objects are not widely
separated, though they may not actually touch."
Harpers' Latin Dictionary as revised by Lewis and Short, in
defining the word "adjaceo," which is equivalent to the English word
"adjacent," says it means "to lie at or near, to be contiguous to, to
border upon."
The Universal Encyclopedia defines an adjacent angle as "an

angle contiguous to another, so that one side is common to both
angles."
In the case of Miller v. Cabell (81 Ky., 184) it was held that where
a change of venue was taken to an adjacent county it must be taken to
an adjoining county.
In the case of Camp Hill Borough (142 Penn. State, 517), it was
held that the word "adjacent" meant adjoining or contiguous.
In the case of In re Municipality, etc. (7 La. Ann., 76), the court

said: "We think the word 'adjacent,' applied to lots, is synonymous with
the word "contiguous.'"
In the case of the People v. Schemerhorne (19 Barber [N.Y.],

576), the court said: "The interpretations given to the 'adjacent' by
Walker are 'lying close, bordering upon something.'" 46
Black's Law Dictionary defines "contiguous" as "in close proximity;

neighboring; adjoining; near in succession; in actual close contact; touching
in at a point or along a boundary; bounded or traversed by." 47
Applying the foregoing definitions, the "land adjacent and contiguous"
to the church and the parish house in the present case is the land comprising
Lot 138-B. On the other hand, Lots 138-A and 138-C are the lands adjacent
and contiguous to the municipal building, rural health center, Buruanga
community Medicare hospital, basketball court, Rizal monument and
grandstand thereon.
Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro therefore is not squarely applicable to
the present case because of significant factual differences. Specifically, in
the former, the buildings or structures on the disputed land all belonged to
the church; hence, this fact was construed by the Court in favor of the
church as constituting its exercise of acts of dominion over the land adjacent
and contiguous to these buildings. On the other hand, the municipal
building, rural health center, Buruanga community Medicare hospital,
basketball court, Rizal monument and grandstand, all standing on Lots 138-A
and 138-C, are not owned by the petitioner. Moreover, the petitioner has not
shown that it had, at any time, exercised acts of dominion over these lots.
Consequently, given its tenuous claim of ownership, Lots 138-A and 138-C,
the lands adjacent and contiguous to the buildings and improvements which
admittedly do not belong to the petitioner, cannot be adjudicated to the
latter under the circumstances.
Seminary of San Carlos v. Municipality of Cebu, 48 cited in Roman
Catholic Bishop of Jaro, is also unavailing to the petitioner because the Court,
among others, simply explained therein that the word "church" refers to the
land upon which the church stands, and not to the church building itself. In
the present case, the petitioner's ownership has not been limited by the
court a quo and the appellate court to the church structure itself but also as
including Lot 138-B, on which it stands.
I n Roman Catholic Apostolic Church v. Municipality of Placer, 49 the
Court definitively recognized the juridical personality and proprietary rights
of the church citing the Treaty of Paris 50 and other pertinent Spanish laws. It
held therein that the church not only was entitled to the possession of the
church, convent and cemetery of Placer but was also the lawful owner
thereof.
It bears stressing that the crux in the foregoing cases, particularly
Bishop of Calbayog, Hacbang and Jaro, is that the church had indubitably
established its exercise of exclusive proprietary acts on the lots that were
subject of the controversy. The same cannot be said with respect to the
petitioner in relation to Lots 138-A and 138-C. In fact, not one of the
enumeration ([a] to [n]) made by the petitioner in its Petition for Review as
allegedly showing its ownership over Lots 138-A and 138-C categorically
establishes that it exercised thereon exclusive proprietary acts or acts of
dominion. AEDCHc
The ruling in Harty v. Municipality of

Victoria is applicable to the present case
Contrary to the stance taken by the petitioner, the ruling in Harty v.
Municipality of Victoria 51 is applicable to the present case. The said case
involved the dispute between the church and the Municipality of Victoria
over the parcel of land that surrounded the parish church of the said town,
and which was called the public plaza of the same. The Court therein held
that "the whole of the land not occupied by the church of the town of Victoria
and its parish house, is a public plaza of the said town, of public use." It
justified its conclusion, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
From the evidence presented by both parties it appears that the
town of Victoria, which was formerly only a barrio of the town of Tarlac
and known as Canarum, was converted into a town in 1855, and
named Victoria; to this end they must have laid out the streets and the
plaza of the town, in the center of which were situated the church and
parish house from the commencement, and at the expiration of about
twelve years the parish of said town was constituted and the priest,
who was to perform the office of curate, was appointed; that from the
very beginning, the large tract of land that surrounds the church and
the parish house was known as a public plaza, destined to the use of all
the residents of the recently founded town; public performances and
religious processions were held thereon without hindrance either on
the part of the local authorities or of the curate of said town.
It must be assumed that the principal residents of the old barrio,
being interested in the conversion of the barrio into a civil town,
arranged in such a way that the barrio, as the center of the future town
which was subsequently called Victoria, should have streets and a
public plaza with its church and parish house, and also a tribunal or
building destined for the use of the municipality and the local official at
the time called the gobernadorcillo and later on capitan municipal, as
has occurred in the foundation of all the towns in these Islands, under
the old administrative laws.
It may be true that the father of the witness Casimiro Tañedo,
who owned the space of land where the church and parish house were
erected, had voluntarily donated it to the Catholic Church, the only one
known at the time, but proper proof is lacking that the donation
affirmed by the said Tañedo comprehended the whole of the large tract
which at the present time constitutes the plaza of the town.
It was a custom observed by all the towns established
administratively in these Islands under the old Laws of the Indies, that
on their creation, a certain amount of land was always reserved for
plazas, commons, and special and communal property, and as it is
unquestionable that the said large space of land was left vacant in the
center of the town of Victoria when it was constituted as a civil town,
more than twelve years prior to the appointment of a permanent
curate therein, there are good grounds to suppose that the late Vicente
Tañedo donated the land now occupied by the church and parish house
in said municipality for religious purposes, or to the church, but not to
the parish curate, because at the time there was no curate at the new
town of Victoria.
Even though all the remaining space of land which now forms the
great plaza of the town of Victoria had been owned by the said Tañedo,
it must be presumed that he waived his right thereto for the benefit of
the townspeople, since from the creation or establishment of the town,
down to the present day, all the residents, including the curate of said
town, have enjoyed the free use of said plaza; it has not been
satisfactorily shown that the municipality or the principales of the town
of Victoria had donated the whole of said land to the curate of Victoria
or to the Catholic Church, as alleged, nor could it have been so
donated, it being a public plaza destined to public use and was not
private ownership, or patrimony of the town of Victoria, or of the
Province of Tarlac. HICATc
It should be noted that, among other things, plazas destined to

the public use are not subject to prescription. (Art. 1936, Civil Code.)
That both the curates and the gobernadorcillos of the said town
procured fruit trees and plants to be set out in the plaza, does not
constitute an act of private ownership, but evidences the public use
thereof, or perhaps the intention to improve and embellish the said
plaza for the benefit of the townspeople.

Certain it is that the plaintiff has not proven that the Catholic
Church or the parish of Victoria was the owner or proprietor of the said
extensive piece of land which now forms the public plaza of said town,
nor that it was in possession thereof under the form and conditions
required by law, inasmuch as it has been fully proven that said plaza
has been used without let or hindrance by the public and the residents
of the town of Victoria ever since its creation. For the above reasons, it
is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be reversed,
and that it should be held, as we do hereby hold, that the whole of the
land not occupied by the church of the town of Victoria and its parish
house, is a public plaza of the said town, of public use, and that in
consequence thereof, the defendant is absolved of the complaint
without any special ruling as to the costs of both instances. 52
The petitioner argues against the applicability of Harty as it makes

much of the fact that the disputed lot therein was situated across the street
from the church lot. When the Court therein limited the ownership of the
church to the land "occupied by the church of the town of Victoria and its
parish house," it did not allegedly confine its ownership to a portion of the lot
on which the church and parish house were situated but to the block
occupied by these structures.
To the Court's mind, however, whether the disputed lot was on the
same block as the church or separated therefrom by a street was not the
crucial factor which constrained the Court in Harty to rule against the
church's claim of ownership over the said property. Rather, it was the fact
that the church was not able to prove its ownership or possession thereof.
The ruling on this point is reiterated below:
Certain it is that the plaintiff has not proven that the Catholic
Church or the parish of Victoria was the owner or proprietor of the said
extensive piece of land which now forms the public plaza of said town,
nor that it was in possession thereof under the form and conditions
required by law, . . . 53
As applied to the present case, that Lots 138-A and 138-C are on the
same block as the lot on which the church and its parish house stand do not
necessarily make them (Lots 138-A and 138-C) also the property of the
petitioner absent any evidence that its ownership or possession extended to
these lots and under the conditions required by law.
Contrary to its submission, the petitioner had
not acquired ipso jure or by operation of law
a government grant or title to the entire Lot 138
The petitioner submits that even granting arguendo that the entire Lot
138 was not assigned to it during the Spanish regime or it is not the owner
thereof pursuant to the Laws of the Indies, its open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of Lot 138 since 1894 and for
many decades thereafter vests ipso jure or by operation of law upon the
petitioner a government grant, a vested title, to the subject property. It cites
Subsection 6 of Section 54 of Act No. 926 54 and Subsection b of Section 45
of Act No. 2874. 55
This contention is likewise not persuasive.
One of the important requisites for the application of the pertinent
provisions of Act No. 926 and Act No. 2874 is the "open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation" of the land by the
applicant. Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over
his own property. 56 The phrase "possession and occupation" was explained
as follows:
It must be underscored that the law speaks of "possession and
occupation." Since these words are separated by the conjunction and,
the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the
order [sic]. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes
constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word
occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Taken together with the words open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to
highlight the fact that for one to qualify under paragraph (b) of the
aforesaid section, his possession of the land must not be mere fiction.
As this Court stated, through then Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel, in Lasam v.
The Director of Lands:
. . . Counsel for the applicant invokes the doctrine laid
down by us in Ramos v. Director of Lands . But it should be
observed that the application of the doctrine of constructive
possession in that case is subject to certain qualifications, and
this court was careful to observe that among these qualifications
is "one particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy
with reference to the portion actually in possession of the
claimant." While, therefore, "possession in the eyes of the law
does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square
meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession,"
possession under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, as
amended by paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not
gained by mere nominal claim. The mere planting of a sign or
symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of
dominion over an immense tract of territory. Possession as a
means of acquiring ownership, while it may be constructive, is
not a mere fiction. . . .
xxx xxx xxx

Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious
and not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and
not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor
can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it
to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous
that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in
the neighborhood.
Use of land is adverse when it is open and notorious. 57

Indisputably, the petitioner has been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of Lot 138-B since 1894 as
evidenced by the church structure built thereon. However, the record is
bereft of any evidence that would tend to show that such possession and
occupation extended to Lots 138-A and 138-C beginning the same period. No
single instance of the exercise by the petitioner of proprietary acts or acts of
dominion over these lots was established. Its unsubstantiated claim that the
construction of the municipal building as well as the subsequent
improvements thereon, e.g., the rural health center, Buruanga community
Medicare hospital, basketball court, Rizal monument and grandstand, was by
its tolerance does not constitute proof of possession and occupation on its
(the petitioner's) part.
Absent the important requisite of open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation thereon since 1894, no government
grant or title to Lots 138-A and 138-C had vested upon the petitioner ipso
jure or by operation of law. Possession under paragraph 6 of section 54 of
Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is
not gained by mere nominal claim. 58
Lots 138-A and 138-C comprise the public
plaza and are property of public dominion;
hence, not susceptible to private ownership
by the petitioner or respondent municipality
The appellate court correctly declared that Lots 138-A and 138-C
comprise the public plaza and are property of public dominion; hence, may
not be the object of appropriation either by the petitioner or respondent
municipality. In support thereof, it cited Bishop of Calbayogratiocinating:
This ruling [referring to Harty] was, in fact, reiterated in Bishop of
Calbayog v. Director of Lands (45 SCRA 418) involving the same
question of ownership of the land which surrounded the parish church
of the town. The Supreme Court therein declared that the public plaza
and public thoroughfare are not subject to registration by the church;
that since neither the Church nor the municipality presented positive
proof of ownership or exclusive possession for an appreciable period of
time, and the only indubitable fact is the free and continuous use of Lot
2 by residents of Catarman, and the town had no public plaza to speak
of other than the disputed parcel of land, there was a strong
presumption that the same had been segregated as a public plaza
upon the founding of the municipality of Catarman. . . . 59
As can be gleaned, the above discussion principally pertained to Lot 2,

a public plaza the ownership of which was disputed by the Bishop of
Calbayog and the Municipality of Catarman. EHaDIC
The appellate court correctly cited Bishop of Calabayog. However, the

ruling therein pertaining to a portion of Lot 1 occupied by a public
thoroughfare is more apropos to the present case. To recall, in the said case,
the application of the Bishop of Calabayog as to the eastern portion of Lot 1
was also being opposed by the Municipality of Catarman on the ground that
it was part of the public plaza. As mentioned earlier, the Court upheld the
ownership of the church over Lot 1 including not only the space occupied by
the church, belfry, convent, parish school and nuns' residence, but also the
empty space which only had some benches as improvements thereon.
Significantly, the portion of Lot 1 occupied by a public thoroughfare (Nalazon
Street) was ordered excluded from the application for registration filed by
the church. The Court therein made the following findings with respect to the
public thoroughfare:
Admittedly Nalazon St. was originally merely a trail used by the
parishioners in going to and from the church. But since 1910, when it
was opened and improved as a public thoroughfare by the
municipality, it had been continuously used as such by the
townspeople of Catarman without objection from the Church
authorities. The acacia trees along both sides of the street were
planted by the municipality in 1920, although these trees were cut
down recently upon order of the priest. There is no proof that the
Church merely tolerated and limited the use of this street for the
benefit of its parishioners, considering that the street traverses the
entire length of the poblacion from south to north and that Lot 1, on
which the church stands, is located almost at the center of the
poblacion. The street does not stop on Lot 1 but extends north toward
the sea, passing along the lot occupied by the Central Elementary
School and the Northern Samar General Hospital. Thus, it is clear that
Nalazon St. inside Lot 1 is used by the residents not only in going to
the church but to the public school and the general hospital north of
Lot 1. 60
In the present case, the following improvements now stand on Lots

138-A and 138-C: the municipal building, rural health center, Buruanga
community Medicare hospital, basketball court, Rizal monument and
grandstand. Except for the construction of the municipal building, the other
improvements were made on Lots 138-A and 138-C, and continuously used
by the public without the petitioner's objection. Further, there is no proof
that the petitioner merely tolerated the construction of these improvements.
On the other hand, the free and continuous use by the public of Lots 138-A
and 138-C, as found by the court a quo and affirmed by the appellate court,
incontrovertibly establishes that they are property for public use.
On this point, Articles 420, quoted anew below, and 424 of the Civil
Code are applicable:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public
dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals,

rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks,
shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and
municipalities, consist of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal
streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public
works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities or
municipalities.
Property for public use of provinces and towns are governed by the
same principles as property of public dominion of the same character. 61 The
ownership of such property, which has the special characteristics of a
collective ownership for the general use and enjoyment, by virtue of their
application to the satisfaction of the collective needs, is in the social group,
whether national, provincial, or municipal. 62 Their purpose is not to serve
the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; they are intended for the
common and public welfare, and so they cannot be the object of
appropriation, either by the State or by private persons. 63
The appellate court committed no reversible
error in denying the petitioner's motion for
reception of evidence
In denying the petitioner's motion for reception evidence, the appellate
court reasoned that based on the records, the petitioner was already
accorded the full opportunity to present its evidence in the court a quo and
that the evidence to be introduced in the desired hearing would not directly
establish its ownership of the disputed lots. 64
The petitioner's motion for reception of evidence filed with the
appellate court stated that the additional evidence that it sought to submit
consisted of affidavits of old residents of Buruanga attesting to the fact that
"the old municipal building was in fact at a place called Sunset Park prior to
its transfer to the present site." 65 These affidavits would allegedly establish
that respondent municipality could not be the owner of Lots 138-A and 138-C
which it had neither possessed nor occupied. 66
The appellate court did not err in denying the petitioner's motion for
reception of evidence. Indeed, the petitioner was already given full
opportunity during the trial in the court a quo to adduce any and all relevant
evidence to substantiate its claim of ownership over the entire Lot 138. In no
sense, therefore, may it be argued that it was denied due process of law. 67
With the reality that those documents were never presented and formally
offered during the trial in the court a quo, their belated admission for
purposes of having them duly considered in the resolution of the case on
appeal would certainly collide with Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
which reads:
SECTION 34. Offer of Evidence. — The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which
the evidence is offered must be specified. 68
In any case, as correctly stated by the appellate court, these affidavits

would not directly establish the petitioner's ownership over Lots 138-A and
138-C. HEISca
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The

Decision dated January 31, 2001 of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution
dated July 18, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 52626 are AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Chico-Nazario,
JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Represented by Bishop Juan N. Nilmar.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, with Associate
Justices Fermin A. Martin, Jr. and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole concurring; rollo, pp.
43-52.
3. Records, p. 1.
4. Subsequent pleadings of the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, however,

placed the commencement of the construction of the municipal building on
the disputed lot some time in 1958.
5. Exhibit "H," folder of exhibits, p. 32.

6. Folder of exhibits, p. 31.
7. Records, p. 11.
8. As appearing in the Plan of Property of Municipality of Buruanga, Exhibit "1"

of the said municipality.
9. Records, p. 26.
10. Id. at 31.
11. Id. at 47.
12. Exhibits "A," "B," "K," "L" and "M," folder of exhibits, pp. 1, 2, 37-39.
13. Exhibit "B," id . at 2.
14. Exhibits "C" (pastoral letter), id . at 3; "D" (petition signed by residents of
Buruanga), id . at 4-28 and; "N" to "Q" (affidavits), id . at 40-43.
15. Exhibit "P," id . at 42.

16. Records, p. 173.
17. 13 Phil. 152 (1909).
18. Id. at 157.

19. Records, p. 174.
20. 150-A Phil. 806 (1972).
21. The provision reads:

Art. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.
22. The provision reads in part:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and
others of similar character.
xxx xxx xxx
23. Rollo , p. 51.
24. Rollo , p. 16.
25. Rollo , pp. 252-259.
26. 54 Phil. 538 (1930).
27. The Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 24-25, citing Roman Catholic Bishop of
Jaro v. Director of Lands, id. at 540-541.
28. Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro v. Director of Lands, supra note 26;
Municipality of Catbalogan v. Director of Lands, 17 Phil. 216 (1910); Hacbang
v. Director of Lands, 61 Phil. 669 (1935).
29. 11 Phil. 315 (1908).
30. Citing, among others, Roman Catholic Apostolic Church v. Municipality of
Placer, supra note 29, and; Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro v. Director of
Lands, supra note 26.
31. Memorandum of the Petitioner, p. 31; Rollo , p. 269.
32. Law VIII, Title VII, Book IV, Recopilación de Leyes de los Reynos de las
Indias. Translated as follows in Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro v. Director of
Lands, supra:
In inland places, the church is not to be built on the square, but at some
distance from it, where it will be separate from every other building not
ministering to its comfort and ornamentation; and in order that it may from
all points be seen and the better venerated, let it be somewhat raised from
the ground, with steps leading up to it; and, between the main square and
the church shall be constructed the government administration buildings
(Casas Reales, Cabildos o Concejo, Aduana y Atarazana) at such distance as
not to shut the church from view, nor to interfere with it, and in case of
necessity to be able to render assistance, and if the town be on the coast, let
the church be so placed as to meet the eye of one coming from the sea, and
be so constructed as to serve for the defense of the port, with residential lots
close to it and booths on the square for burghers, imposing a moderate tax
upon the merchandise; and let it be thus also in smaller localities in the
matter of parish churches and monasteries, wherever convenient.
33. Municipality of Catbalogan v. Director of Lands, 17 Phil. 216, 219-221
(1910); Municipality of Tacloban v. Director of Lands, 17 Phil. 428, 431-433
(1910).
34. Supra note 20.
35. Id. at 809-810.
36. REGALADO, II REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 619 (2000 ed.).
37. TSN, Direct testimony of Mr. Prado, Sr., January 9, 1992, p. 6.
38. Id. at 14-15.
39. Supra note 12.
40. For example, the oldest affiant, Rita Prado, was 79 years old at the time of
the execution of her affidavit on February 11, 1978. She was therefore born
some time in 1899. The church of Buruanga was purportedly built in 1894.
Hence, Rita Prado, as well as the other affiants who were younger than she
was, could not have any personal knowledge as to the construction of the
said church as well as the events that took place prior thereto because they
were not as yet born during the said period.
41. Supra note 28.
42. Id. at 672-673. (Citations omitted).
43. Supra note 26.
44. 10 Phil. 744 (1908).
45. Citing Director of Lands v. Aboc, G.R. No. 15695, 28 October 1926.
Unreported.
46. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Johnson in Catholic Church v. Hastings, et al.,
5 Phil. 701-717 (1906).
47. Citing Ehle v. Tenney Trading Co ., 107 P.2d 210, 212.
48. 19 Phil. 32 (1911).
49. Supra note 29.

50. Article VIII thereof stated:
And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case
may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, can not in any respect
impair the property or rights which by law belongs to the peaceful
possession of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or
private establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other
associations having legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the
aforesaid territories, renounced or ceded, or of private individuals of
whatever nationality such individuals may be.
51. Supra note 17.
52. Id. at 155-157.
53. Id. at 157.
54. Supra.
55. Supra.
56. Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175 (1918).
57. Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68946, May 22,
1992, 209 SCRA 214, 222-224.
58. Id.

59. CA Decision, p. 7; Rollo , p. 49.
60. Bishop of Calbayog v. Director of Lands, supra note 20, at 813.
61. TOLENTINO, II CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES 38 citing 3 MANRESA 111.
62. Id. at 28.
63. Id.
64. CA Resolution dated August 4, 1998; CA rollo, p. 91.
65. CA rollo, p. 79.
66. Id. at 80.
67. Ragudo v. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc ., G.R. No. 146823, August
9, 2005, 466 SCRA 136, 147.
68. Id. at 148.

Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, Aklan v. Municipality of Buruanga, Aklan, 486 SCRA 229

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Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, Aklan v. Municipality of Buruanga, Aklan, 486 SCRA 229

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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 149145. March 31, 2006.]

ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF KALIBO, AKLAN, represented

These letters went unheeded as the construction of the new municipal

That the land in question involved was pointed to me by the

Lot 138-A (Public Plaza)

containing an area of 2,319 square meters

containing an area of 3,836 square meters

Lot 138-C (Public Plaza)

containing an area of 3,389 square meters 10

Consistent with the above technical description, the sketch submitted

Lot 138-B 3,836 square meters

The dispositive portion of the court a quo's decision reads:

2. Defendant Municipality of Buruanga is declared the lawful

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The Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo moved for a partial reconsideration

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING

The petitioner clariﬁes that it is seeking a partial review of the appellate

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[k] The only evidence as to the supposed character of Lot

[m] Witness Jaime S. Prado, Sr. (who was born on 17

[n] Private respondent indirectly judicially admitted that it

The petitioner contends that the pronouncement in Bishop of Calbayog,

The petitioner also cites Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro v. Director of

Subsection b of Section 45 of Act No. 2874, approved on November 9,

On the basis of the foregoing provisions, a land registration proceeding

Respondent Municipality's Counter-arguments

In those instances that the Court allegedly adjudicated an open space in

Respondent municipality theorizes that in those cases 30 that the Court

Respondent municipality urges the Court to dismiss the petition and,

This allegation fails to persuade. The pertinent provision of the Laws of

The executive authorities and other oﬃcials who then

Law 6, title 5, book 4, of the Recompilation of the Laws of the

"That within the boundaries which may be assigned to it, there

Law 7 of the same title and book contains this provision:

"Whoever wishes to undertake to establish a new town in the

It may be aﬃrmed that years afterwards all the modern pueblos

For the establishment, then, of new pueblos, the administrative

Law 7, title 7, book 4, of the Recompilation of the Laws of the

"The district or territory to be given for settlement by

Law 8, of the same title and book, prescribes, among other

Law 1, title 13 of the aforesaid book, provides the following:

. . . The Roman Catholic Church had made no improvements on

It is apparent that the Court adjudicated to the church the ownership of

The testimony of Mr. Jaime S. Prado, Sr., an octogenarian and resident of

A Of Nitoy Sualog, that was Malilipayon Street. The Provincial road

Q Now, do you remember if there was any transaction of them

A No, sir. DHEaTS

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That when the Spaniards arrived in our town, they introduced

Like in Bishop of Calbayog, the Court in Hacbang v. Director of Lands 41

Webster in his International Dictionary deﬁnes "adjacent" as

Roque Barcia in his " Diccionario General Etimológico de la

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The Universal Encyclopedia deﬁnes an adjacent angle as "an

In the case of In re Municipality, etc. (7 La. Ann., 76), the court

In the case of the People v. Schemerhorne (19 Barber [N.Y.],

Black's Law Dictionary deﬁnes "contiguous" as "in close proximity;

The ruling in Harty v. Municipality of

It should be noted that, among other things, plazas destined to

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The petitioner argues against the applicability of Harty as it makes

xxx xxx xxx