291-A Phil.

451

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 77875, February 04, 1993 ]
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. ALBERTO SANTOS,
JR., HOUDIEL MAGADIA, GILBERT ANTONIO, REGINO DURAN,
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, AND THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

The instant petition for certiorari  seeks to set aside the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. 4-1206-85, promulgated on December 11,1986,[1]
containing the following disposition:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the Decision appealed from

is set aside and another one entered, declaring the suspension of complainants to be
illegal and consequently, respondent PAL is directed to pay complainants their
salaries corresponding to the respective period(s) of their suspension, and to delete
the disciplinary action from Complainants’ service records." [2]

These material facts recited in the basic petition are virtually undisputed and we reproduce the
same hereunder:

“1. Individual respondents are all Port Stewards of Catering Sub-Department,

Passenger Services Department of petitioner. Their duties and responsibilities,
among others, are:

‘Prepares meal orders and check­lists, setting up standard equipment in

accordance with the requirements of the type of service for each flight;
skiing, binning and inventorying of Commissary supplies and
equipment.’

“2. On various occasions, several deductions were made from their salary. The
deductions represented losses of inventoried items charged to them for mishandling
of company properties x x x which respondents resented. Such that on August 21,
1984, individual respondents, represented by the union, made a formal notice
regarding the deductions to petitioner thru Mr. Reynaldo Abad, Manager for
Catering. x x x

“3. As there was no action taken on said representation, private respondents filed a
formal grievance on November 4, 1984 pursuant to the grievance machinery Step 1
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between petitioner and the union. x x x The
topics which the union wanted to be discussed in the said grievance were the
illegal/questionable salary deductions and inventory of bonded goods and
merchandise being done by catering service personnel which they believed should
not be their duty.

"4. The said grievance was submitted on November 21, 1984 to the office of Mr.
Reynaldo Abad, Manager for Catering, who at the time was on vacation leave. x x x.

“5. Subsequently, the grievants (individual respondents) thru the shop steward wrote
a letter on December 5, 1984 addressed to the office of Mr. Abad, who was still on
leave at the time, that inasmuch as no reply was made to their grievance which ‘was
duly received by your secretary’ and considering that petitioner had only five days to
resolve the grievance as provided for in the CBA, said grievance as believed by them
(private respondents) was deemed resolved in their favor. x x x.

“6. Upon Mr. Abad's return on December 7, 1984, he immediately informed the
grievants and scheduled a meeting on December 12, 1984. x x x.

“7. Thereafter, the individual respondents refused to conduct inventory works.

Alberto Santos, Jr. did not conduct ramp inventory on December 7, 10 and 12.
Gilbert Antonio did not conduct ramp inventory on December 10. In like manner,
Regino Duran and Houdiel Magadia did not conduct the same on December 10 and
12.

“8. At the grievance meeting which was attended by some union representatives, Mr.
Abad resolved the grievance by denying the petition of individual respondents and
adopted the position that inventory of bonded goods is part of their duty as catering
service personnel, and as for the salary deductions for losses, he rationalized:

‘1. It was only proper that employees are charged for the amount due to
mishandling of company property which resulted to losses. However, loss
may be cost price 1/10 selling price.'

“9. As there was no ramp inventory conducted on the mentioned dates, Mr. Abad, on
January 3, 1985 wrote by an inter-office memorandum addressed to the grievants,
individual respondents herein, for them to explain on (sic) why no disciplinary
action should be taken against them for not conducting ramp inventory. x x x.

“10. The directive was complied with x x x. The reason for not conducting ramp
inventory was put forth as:

'4) Since the grievance step 1 was not decided and no action was done by
your office within 5 days from November 21, 1984, per provision of the
PAL-PALEA CBA, Art. IV, Sec. 2, the grievance is deemed resolved in
PALEA's favor.'

“11. Going over the Explanation, Mr. Abad found the same unsatisfactory. Thus, a
penalty of suspension ranging from 7 days to 30 days were (sic) imposed depending
 on the number of infractions committed.*

"12. After the penalty of suspension was meted down, PALEA filed another
grievance asking for lifting of, or at least, holding in abeyance the execution of said
penalty. The said grievance was forthwith denied but the penalty of suspension with
respect to respondent Santos was modified, such that his suspension which was
originally from January 15, 1985 to April 5, 1985 was shortened by one month and
was lifted on March 5, 1985. The union, however, made a demand for the
reimbursement of the salaries of individual respondents during the period of their
suspension.

"13. Petitioner stood pat (o)n the validity of the suspensions. Hence, a complaint for
illegal suspension was filed before the Arbitration Branch of the Commission. x x x
Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana, on March 17, 1986, ruled in favor of petitioner
by dismissing the complaint. x x x. [3]

Private respondents appealed the decision of the labor arbiter to respondent commission which
rendered the aforequoted decision setting aside the labor arbiter's order of dismissal. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration having been denied, it interposed the present petition.

The Court is accordingly called upon to resolve the issue of whether or not public respondent
NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in rendering the
aforementioned decision.

Evidently basic and firmly settled is the rule that judicial review by this Court in labor cases
does not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the labor officer or
office based his or its determination, but is limited to issues of jurisdiction and grave abuse of
discretion.[4] It has not been shown that respondent NLRC has unlawfully neglected the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins it to perform as a duty or has otherwise
unlawfully excluded petitioner from the exercise of a right to which it is entitled.

The instant case hinges on the interpretation of Section 2, Article IV of the PAL-PALEA
Collective Bargaining Agreement (hereinafter, CBA), to wit:

"Section 2 - Processing of Grievances

xxx

STEP 1 - Any employee who believes that he has a justifiable grievance shall take
the matter up with his shop steward. If the shop steward feels there is justification
for taking the matter up with the Company, he shall record the grievance on the
grievance form heretofore agreed upon by the parties. Two (2) copies of the
grievance form properly filled, accepted, and signed shall then be presented to and
discussed by the shop steward with the division head. The division head shall answer
the grievance within five (5) days from the date of presentation by inserting his
decision on the grievance form, signing and dating same, and returning one copy to
the shop steward. If the division head fails to act within the five (5)-day
regl(e)mentary period, the grievance must be resolved in favor of the aggrieved
 party. If the division head's decision is not appealed to Step II, the grievance shall he
considered settled on the basis of the decision made, and shall not be eligible for
further appeal."[5] (Emphasis ours.)

Petitioner submits that since the grievance machinery was established for both labor and
management as a vehicle to thresh out whatever problems may arise in the course of their
relationship, every employee is duty bound to present the matter before management and give
the latter an opportunity to impose whatever corrective measure is possible. Under normal
circumstances, an employee should not preempt the resolution of his grievance; rather, he has
the duty to observe the status quo.[6]

Citing Section 1, Article IV of the CBA, petitioner further argues that respondent employees
have the obligation, just as management has, to settle all labor disputes through friendly
negotiations. Thus, Section 2 of the CBA should not be narrowly interpreted.[7] Before the
prescriptive period of five days begins to run, two concurrent requirements must be met, i.e.,
presentment of the grievance and its discussion between the shop steward and the division head
who in this case is Mr. Abad. Section 2 is not self-executing; the mere filing of the grievance
does not trigger the tolling of the prescriptive period.[8]

Petitioner has sorely missed the point.

It is a fact that the sympathy of the Court is on the side of the laboring classes, not only because
the Constitution imposes such sympathy, but because of the one-sided relation between labor
and capital.[9] The constitutional mandate for the protection of labor is as explicit as it is
demanding. The purpose is to place the workingman on an equal plane with management - with
all its power and influence - in negotiating for the advancement of his interests and the defense
of his rights.[10] Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to
accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less
privileges in life should have more privileges in law.[11]

It is clear that the grievance was filed with Mr. Abad's secretary during his absence.[12] Under
Section 2 of the CBA aforequoted, the division head shall act on the grievance within five (5)
days from the date of presentation thereof, otherwise "the grievance must be resolved in favor of
the aggrieved party." It is not disputed that the grievants knew that division head Reynaldo
Abad was then "on leave” when they filed their grievance which was received by Abad's
secretary.[13] This knowledge, however, should not prevent the application of the CBA.

On this score, respondent NLRC aptly ruled:

"x x x Based on the facts heretofore narrated, division head Reynaldo Abad had to
act on the grievance of complainants within five days from 21 November 1984.
Therefore, when Reynaldo Abad failed to act within the reglementary period,
complainants, believing in good faith that the effect of the CBA had already set in,
cannot be blamed if they did not conduct ramp inventory for the days thereafter. In
this regard, respondent PAL argued that Reynaldo Abad was on leave at the time the
grievance was presented. This, however, is of no moment, for it is hard to believe
 that everything under Abad's authority would have to stand still during his absence
from office. To be sure, it is to be expected that someone has to be left to attend to
Abad's duties. Of course, this may be a product of inadvertence on the part of PAL
management, but certainly, complainants should not be made to suffer the
consequences.”[14]

Contrary to petitioner's submission,[15] the grievance of employees is not a matter which

requires the personal act of Mr. Abad and thus could not be delegated. Petitioner could at least
have assigned an officer-in-charge to look into the grievance and possibly make his
recommendation to Mr. Abad. It is of no moment that Mr. Abad immediately looked into the
grievance upon returning to work, for it must be remembered that the grievants are workingmen
who suffered salary deductions and who rely so much on their meager income for their daily
subsistence and survival. Besides, it is note­worthy that when these employees first presented
their complaint on August 21, 1984, petitioner failed to act on it. It was only after a formal
grievance was filed and after Mr. Abad returned to work on December 7, 1984 that petitioner
decided to turn an ear to their plaints.

As respondent NLRC has pointed out, Abad's failure to act on the matter may have been due to
petitioner's inadvertence,[16] but it is clearly too much of an injustice if the employees be made
to bear the dire effects thereof. Much as the latter were willing to discuss their grievance with
their employer, the latter closed the door to this possibility by not assigning someone else to
look into the matter during Abad's absence. Thus, private respondents should not be faulted for
believing that the effects of the CBA in their favor had already stepped into the controversy.

If the Court were to follow petitioner’s line of reasoning, it would be easy for management to
delay the resolution of labor problems, the complaints of the workers in particular, and hide
under the cloak of its officers being "on leave” to avoid being caught by the 5-day deadline
under the CBA. If this should be allowed, the workingmen will suffer great injustice for they
will necessarily be at the mercy of their employer. That could not have been the intendment of
the pertinent provision of the CBA, much less the benevolent policy underlying our labor laws.

ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the
assailed decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED. This
judgment is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Feliciano, Nocon, and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1]
Per Presiding Commissioner Edna Bonto-Perez and Com­missioners Daniel M. Lucas, Jr. and
Mirasol V. Corleto.

[2] Original Record, 119.

* Private respondents were meted the penalty of suspension without pay as follows: Alberto
Santos, Jr., from January 15 to April 5, 1985 (Exh. H, Original Record, 45); Regino Duran, from
January 15 to February 4, 1985 (Exh. I, ibid., 46); Gilbert Antonio, from January 15 to 21, 1985
(Exh. J, ibid., 47); and Houdiel Magadia, from January 15 to February 4, 1985 (Exh. K, ibid.,
48).

[3] Petition, 2-5; Rollo, 3-6.

[4] Pan Pacific Industrial Sales., Inc. vs. NLRC, et al., 194 SCRA 633 (1991).

[5] Exhibit S; Original Record, 57.

[6] Petition, 8; Rollo, 9.

[7] Ibid., 8-9; Rollo, 9-10.

[8] Ibid., 9, Rollo, 10.

[9] Reliance Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. vs. NLRC, et al., 193 SCRA 365 (1991).

[10] Dagupan Bus Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, et al., 191 SCRA 328 (1990).

[11] Ditan vs. POEA, et al., 191 SCRA 823 (1990).

[12] Exhibit E; Original Record, 42.

[13] Original Record, 105.

[14] Ibid., 118-119.

[15] Petition, 9-10; Rollo, 10-11.

[16] Original Record, 119.

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