Nehemiah P.

Montecillo
Subject:PALE

Cases Pertaining to Canons and Sections of the New Code of Judicial Conduct

1. Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane vs. Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119, June 30, 2008

ATTY. MELVIN D.C. MANE, Complainant, -versus- JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Calamba City,
Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119 [Formerly A.M. O.C.A. IPI No. 07-2709-RTJ], SECOND DIVISION, June 30, 2008, Carpio Morales, J.

An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hurdling the Bar Examinations which this Court administers,
taking of the Lawyer's
oath, and signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge his functions and duties as, inter alia, an officer of
the court, irrespective of where he obtained his law degree. For a judge to determine the fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on the
basis of his alma mater is clearly an engagement in an argumentum ad hominem.

FACTS:
Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane (Complainant) charged Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen (Respondent), Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court,
Calamba City, of demeaning, humiliating and berating him during the hearing on February 27, 2006 of Civil Case No. 3514-2003-C, "Rural Bank
of Cabuyao, Inc. v. Samuel Malabanan, et al" in which he was counsel for the plaintiff. In the course of the proceedings on the said date,
respondent made the following remarks as reflected in the transcript of stenographic notes taken on the same date:

COURT:
. . . Sir, are you from the College of Law of the University of the Philippines?
ATTY. MANE:
No[,] [Y]our Honor[,] from Manuel L. Quezon University[,] [Y]our Honor.
COURT:
No, you're not from UP.
ATTY. MANE:
I am very proud of it.
COURT:
Then you're not from UP. Then you cannot equate yourself to me because there is a saying and I know this, not all law students are created
equal, not all law schools are created equal, not all lawyers are created equal despite what the Supreme Being that we all are created equal in
His form and substance. (Emphasis supplied)

For his part, respondent claimed that complainant filed on 15 December 2005 an urgent motion to inhibit, portions of which maliciously stated
that respondent issued an order for a consideration other than the merits of the case. Moreover, on the unacted motion filed by the same
complainant to furnish him a copy of the "unedited" tape recording of the proceedings, respondent claims that complainant again made
implications that the trial court was illegally, unethically and unlawfully engaged in 'editing' the transcript of records to favor a party litigant
against the interest of complainant's client.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a Judge (YES)

RULING:
An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hurdling the Bar Examinations which this Court administers,
taking of the Lawyer's oath, and signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge his functions and duties as,
inter alia, an officer of the court, irrespective of where he obtained his law degree. For a judge to determine the fitness or competence of a
lawyer primarily on the basis of his alma mater is clearly an engagement in an argumentum ad hominem.

A judge must address the merits of the case and not on the person of the counsel. If respondent felt that his integrity and dignity were being
"assaulted," he acted properly when he directed complainant to explain why he should not be cited for contempt. He went out of bounds,
however, when he, as the above-quoted portions of the transcript of stenographic notes show, engaged on a supercilious legal and personal
discourse.

2. Datu Inocencio C. Siawan v. Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-95-1056, May 21, 2001.

DATU INOCENCIO C. SIAWAN, Complainant, -versus- JUDGE AQUILINO A. INOPIQUEZ, JR., Respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-95-1056, SECOND DIVISION, May 21, 2001, Mendoza, J.

A judge should not handle a case where he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and impartiality, which axiom is
intended to preserve and promote public confidence in the integrity and respect for the judiciary. Respondent’s bias towards Restituto showed
when he allowed his father-in-law to advise the former, who is said to be his political leader during the proceedings held in Crim. Case No. 584. It
must have been disconcerting on the part of Seco, the accused, to see the private complainant Restituto openly consulting the father-in-law of
the person sitting in judgment of this case.

FACTS:
The facts are split into two (2) separate cases handled by respondent Judge – Crim. Case No. 584 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Juliana
Enriqua Seco (Crim. Case No. 584); and Election Case Nos. 333 and 292.
Crim Case No. 584:

The accused Juliana Enriqua Seco (Seco) filed before a Municipal Circuit Trial Court a Motion for the Inhibition of respondent Judge who
presided over her case on the ground that the father-in-law of said respondent Judge was conspicuously present in the proceedings and even
had the chance to converse and advise the private complainant in the said criminal case, Restituto C. Pedrano (Restituto), reportedly his
political leader and protegee. The said Motion was signed by the accused herself with the assistance of one Atty. Superable as counsel.
Respondent Judge, however, denied the Motion.

Thereafter, an Affidavit of Desistance was executed by the private complainant Restituto before the Provincial Prosecutor. On the basis of the
said Affidavit, the complaint was dismissed. Seco then sued Restituto for damages, as a result of which the latter filed an Omnibus Motion to
revive Crim Case No. 584 which was dismissed over a year ago.
Respondent Judge ordered the reinstatement of Crim. Case No. 584, and withdrew from the records of the case the Affidavit of Desistance filed
earlier. By reason of statements made by respondent Judge in his order to the effect that the crime has not yet prescribed and double jeopardy
will not set in, another case, Crim. Case No. 1181, filed by Restituto against Seco again, involving the same facts and issues, was lodged. This
time, respondent Judge voluntarily inhibited himself by reason of his relation to the counsel of the offended party.
Election Case No. 333:

In this case, the petitioner was retired RTC Judge Ponciano Inopiquez, respondent’s uncle. Respondent Judge did not inhibit himself, stating that
the petitioner was not running for public office, but was merely seeking his right to vote.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge is administratively liable for abuse of authority and ignorance of the law in not recusing himself from the
aforementioned cases (YES)

RULING:
Crim. Case No. 583
Indeed, although the disqualification of judges is limited only to cases where the judge is related to counsel within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, the Rules nonetheless provide that a judge may, in the exercise of his discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a
case for other just and valid reasons. A judge should not handle a case where he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to
bias and impartiality, which axiom is intended to preserve and promote public confidence in the integrity and respect for the judiciary.
Respondent’s bias towards Restituto showed when he allowed his father-in-law to advise the former, who is said to be his political leader
during the proceedings held in Crim. Case No. 584. It must have been disconcerting on the part of Seco, the accused, to see the private
complainant Restituto openly consulting the father-in- law of the person sitting in judgment of this case.To maintain the appearance of
impartiality in his court, at the first instance, respondent should have stopped his father-in-law from meddling in the proceedings. If he did not
want to offend or displease him, he should have outrightly inhibited himself from further trying the case. However, he even denied the motion
for inhibition filed by the accused.
As regards Election Case No. 333, Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides for the grounds which prohibit a judge from sitting in
judgement. One of which is his relation by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth
degree. respondent judge was disqualified from hearing the petition of his uncle and it was immaterial that the petition was meritorious. The
purpose of the prohibition is to prevent not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of a judge. The failure
of respondent judge to inhibit himself constitutes an abuse of his authority and undermines public confidence in the impartiality of judges.

3. Office of the Court Administrator v. Paderanga, A.M. No. RTJ-01- 1660, August 25, 2005.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, -versus- JUDGE MAXIMO G.W. PADERANGA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Misamis
Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1660, SECOND DIVISION, August 25, 2005, Austria-Martinez, J.

Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge should be patient, attentive and courteous to all lawyers, especially the
inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind
that the litigants are made for the courts instead of the courts for the litigants. In this case, respondent judge's act of unceremoniously citing
Atty. Oclarit in contempt while declaring himself as having absolute power is a clear evidence of his unjustified use of the authority vested upon
him by law. He has lost sight of the fact that the power to cite persons in contempt is at his disposal for purposes that are impersonal, because
that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.

FACTS:
During a hearing for pre-trial presided by herein respondent Judge, Atty. Oclarit filed a motion to approve a compromise agreement entered
into by the parties pointing out that the compromise agreement was reached before a barangay captain. Counsel for the defendants opposed
the motion because the defendants were placed in a disadvantageous condition, arguing that the case was before the court not before the
barangay. At this point, Atty. Oclarit informed the respondent Judge that the compromise agreement was signed and was explaining further
when respondent Judge told him repeatedly to 'shut up’. Then Atty. Oclarit requested respondent Judge to stop shouting at him. The court
rhetorically asked: 'why should the court precisely not cite you for contempt for doing that, that is, for settling the case before the barangay
captain.’
Consequently, the presiding judge cited Atty. Oclarit in contempt of court and imposed on him a fine of P1,000.00. At that moment, respondent
Judge issued a verbal order holding Atty. Oclarit for direct contempt of court and sentencing Atty. Oclarit to serve one (1) day in jail and to pay a
fine of P1,000.00. Atty. Oclarit indicated that he would challenge the ruling. The next day, with Atty. Oclarit in jail, he received a copy of the
written order declaring him in direct contempt of court and sentencing him to pay a fine of P1,000.00 and also to serve one (1) day in jail. He
was released after serving one (1) day in jail. Apparently, he also paid the fine of P1,000.00.

CA Justice De Leon, in his report and recommendation, recommended that respondent Judge be reprimanded for drastically resorting to his
contempt powers with a warning that a repetition of similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge was administratively liable for his act of citing Atty. Oclarit in contempt (YES)

RULING:
Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge should be patient, attentive and courteous to all lawyers, especially the
inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of
mind that the litigants are made for the courts instead of the courts for the litigants. In this case, respondent judge's act of unceremoniously
citing Atty. Oclarit in contempt while declaring himself as having absolute power is a clear evidence of his unjustified use of the authority vested
upon him by law. He has lost sight of the fact that the power to cite persons in contempt is at his disposal for purposes that are impersonal,
because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise. Respondent Judge is guilty
of grave abuse of authority.

4. Manansala III v. Asdala, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1916, May 10, 2005.

MELENCIO P. MANANSALA III, Complainant, -versus- JUDGE FATIMA G. ASDALA, Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 87, Quezon City,
Respondent. A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1916, EN BANC, May 10, 2005, Carpio-Morales, J.
Rightly or wrongly, the public identifies the abstract precept of justice, and the administration of justice, with the persona and actuations of the
visible human judge that they see, and with whom they come in contact, or deal with. Respondent judge's plea of good faith thus becomes
tenous when it is remembered that as a former fiscal or prosecutor, respondent judge ought to know that there is no legal or statutory warrant
or basis, at that time, for her requests/ actions in seeking to obtain temporary custody of the still-to-be-inquested Herbst, or for the
compounding or amicable settlement of the malicious mischief (or vandalism) case, against the latter. However one looks at it, either course of
action amounted to an unjustified, if not unlawful, interference or meddling, or persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer.

FACTS:
Winfried Herbst (Herbst) had been detained at Police Station 10 in Kamuning, Quezon City for breaking a glass wall in the office of Melencio
Manansala (complainant). Late afternoon that day, herein respondent Judge Asdala (respondent) called up the Station Commander Atty.
Coronel nad requested that Herbst be released to her custody. Atty. Coronel, however, did not accede to respondent's request, he informing
her that complainant was adamant in filing criminal charges against Herbst and they were just waiting for the arrival of the inquest fiscal. Two
(2) days later, Mark Cabigao, the sheriff assigned at respondent's sala, together with two policemen, requested that the Mercedes Benz car of
Herbst which he parked within the vicinity be turned over to their custody.

Investigating Justice Dacudao, in his Report and Recommendation, found respondent Judge answerable for palpable abuse of authority or plain
misconduct.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge should be held administratively liable for her acts (YES)

RULING:
The Supreme Court found Investigating Justice Dacudao’s findings to be well-taken. Investigating Justice Dacudao, in his findings, indicated that
respondent Judge can be faulted for requesting Atty. Coronel to release Herbst into her custody despite Herbst being scheduled to undergo an
inquest investigation; and for asking for the compounding or amicable settlement of the malicious mischief case against Herbst. Rightly or
wrongly, the public identifies the abstract precept of justice, and the administration of justice, with the persona and actuations of the visible
human judge that they see, and with whom they come in contact, or deal with. Respondent judge's plea of good faith thus becomes tenous
when it is remembered that as a former fiscal or prosecutor, respondent judge ought to know that there is no legal or statutory warrant or
basis, at that time, for her requests/ actions in seeking to obtain temporary custody of the still-to-be-inquested Herbst, or for the compounding
or amicable settlement of the malicious mischief (or vandalism) case, against the latter. However one looks at it, either course of action
amounted to an unjustified, if not unlawful, interference or meddling, or persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer.

As for respondent's act of ordering her sheriff to engage the assistance of policemen and retrieve Herbst's car, the Court found that respondent
should also be faulted therefor. For by such act, she availed of the services of a government employee for private concerns. In any event, that
her sheriff was even ordered to engage the services of policemen could not have been intended other than to demonstrate her perceived might
as a judge in order to hopefully secure an unimpeded release of the car. Her claim that the sheriff was all too willing to help does not, even if
true, albeit the sheriff's testimony does not reflect such claim, extenuate her or mitigate her liability.
 5. Venancio Inonog v. Judge Francisco B. Ibay, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2175, July 28, 2009.
VENANCIO INONOG, Complainant, -versus- JUDGE FRANCISCO B. IBAY, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 135, MAKATI
CITY, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2175, EN BANC, July 28, 2009, Leonardo-De Castro, J.

The phrase "improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice" shown in Section 3 of
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is so broad and general that it encompasses wide spectrum of acts that could constitute indirect contempt.
However, the act of complainant in parking his car in a slot allegedly reserved for respondent judge does not fall under this category. There was
no showing that he acted with malice and/or bad faith or that he was improperly motivated to delay the proceedings of the court by making use
of the parking slot supposedly reserved for respondent judge. We cannot also say that the said act of complainant constitutes disrespect to the
dignity of the court.

FACTS:
The present administrative case stemmed from the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Venancio P. Inonog, filed with the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) on April 26, 2005, charging Judge Francisco B. Ibay of the RTC, Branch 135, Makati City with gross abuse of authority. The complaint
involved an incident in the Makati City Hall basement parking lot for which respondent judge cited complainant in contempt of court because
complainant parked his superior's vehicle at the parking space reserved for respondent judge.Complainant alleged that he is the security-driver
of the Chief of the Business Permit Division of Makati City. According to complainant, at around 1:00 a.m. of March 18, 2005, he parked the
vehicle that he drives for his boss in a vacant parking space at the basement of the City Hall because the slot where he usually parked was
already occupied. At the time, the parking slots at the basement of the Makati City Hall were indicated only by numbers and not by names of
officials to whom they were assigned. Thereafter, complainant notified his superior that he will not be reporting for work for the rest of that
day, March 18, 2005, because he was not feeling well. Thus, he left the vehicle in the said basement parking area and went home to Tanay,
Rizal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the responded judge erred in citing the complainant indirect contempt of court

RULING:
Yes. Indirect contempt is not committed in the presence of the court and can be punished only after notice and hearing (Zarate v. Balderian,
329 SCRA 558). In the instant case, there was no defiance of authority on the part of the complainant when he parked his vehicle at the spot
reserved for the respondent judge. The incident is too flimsy to be a basis of a contempt proceedings. At most, the act resulted to a minor
inconvenience on the part of the respondent but it was unlikely that it delayed the administration of justice. Besides, it was not shown that
complainant parked his vehicle at the spot intentionally to show disrespect to Judge Ibay. Respondent Judge Ibay acted precipitously in citing
complainant in contempt of court in a manner which obviously smacks of retaliation rather than upholding of the court's honor.

Assuming, without conceding, that the complainant had committed indirect contempt of court, he was nonetheless entitled to be charged in
writing and given an opportunity to be heard by himself or counsel. Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court specifically outlines the procedural
requisites before a person may be punished for indirect contempt, thus: (1) a complaint in writing which may either be a motion for contempt
filed by a party or an order issued by the court requiring a person to appear and explain his conduct; and, (2) an opportunity for the person
charged to appear and explain his conduct (Pacuribot v. Lim, Jr., 275 SCRA 543). Proceedings against persons charged with contempt of court
are commonly treated as criminal in nature, thus this mode of procedure should be strictly followed.

Records failed to show that complainant was properly notified of Judge Ibay's order directing the former to appear and explain why he should
not be cited in contempt of court. The hearing was set at 10:30 A.M. or only about two and a half hours after respondent judge found that his
parking space was occupied. The lack of notice accounts for the complainant's failure to appear at the hearing. Verily, complainant was not
given a reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of his defense.

The phrase "improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice" shown in Section 3
of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is so broad and general that it encompasses wide spectrum of acts that could constitute indirect contempt.
However, the act of complainant in parking his car in a slot allegedly reserved for respondent judge does not fall under this category. There was
no showing that he acted with malice and/or bad faith or that he was improperly motivated to delay the proceedings of the court by making
use of the parking slot supposedly reserved for respondent judge. We cannot also say that the said act of complainant constitutes disrespect to
the dignity of the court. In sum, the incident is too flimsy and inconsequential to be the basis of an indirect contempt proceeding.

6. J. King & Sons Company, Inc., v. Judge Agapito L. Hontanosas, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-03-1802, September 21, 2004.

J. KING & SONS COMPANY, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, RICHARD L. KING, Complainant, -versus- JUDGE AGAPITO L.
HONTANOSAS, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC, BRANCH 16, CEBU CITY, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1802, EN BANC, September 21, 2004, Per Curiam

Case law repeatedly teaches that judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of restrictions thereon,
which he has to pay for accepting and occupying an exalted position in the administration of justice. Although there is a question of whether or
not respondent had used the facilities free of charge, the investigating justice nevertheless finds that respondent judge should have not
frequented the place to prevent any appearance of impropriety considering that, as admitted by respondent, there are at least three (3) cases
filed by complainant which are pending before his court. This is a violation of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
FACTS:
Complainant alleges: It is the plaintiff in a case for Specific Performance with Damages with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Attachment,
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-27870, pending before the RTC presided over by respondent. On July 2, 2002, respondent issued an Order
granting the application for writ of preliminary attachment upon applicant’s filing of a bond in the amount of P35,973,600.00. An urgent motion
to discharge and lift writ of preliminary attachment was filed by defendants before the respondent on July 5, 2002 and on the same day,
respondent issued an Order lifting the writ of preliminary attachment. Said Order dated July 5, 2002 was issued sans proper notice and hearing
as required by section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent approved defendants’ counter-bond despite knowledge that
the bonding company’s Supreme Court Clearance was not valid and the maximum net retention of the bonding company had a deficiency of
P22,541,463.69. At a meeting in his house, respondent asked Rafael King to match defendants’ offer to pay P250,000.00 so that the Order of
July 5, 2002 will be reconsidered formally if a motion for reconsideration is filed by complainant. Respondent’s favorite hang-out is the karaoke
music lounge of Metropolis Hotel owned by herein complainant, and he uses said facilities “gratis et amore.”
In compliance with the directive of the Court Administrator, respondent filed his Comment, dated August 22, 2002, wherein he vehemently
denies soliciting money from the King brothers. He contends that complainant is merely a dissatisfied litigant which cannot accept an
unfavorable court ruling; and that the questioned orders relative to Civil Case No. CEB-27870 were issued by him in the exercise of lawful
judicial discretion in accordance with the rules of procedure, the evidence on record, and with the dictates of justice and equity.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the use of respondent judge of the complainant’s karaoke bar is a violation of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
2. Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of law

RULING:
1. Although there is a question of whether or not respondent had used the facilities free of charge, the investigating justice nevertheless finds
that respondent judge should have not frequented the place to prevent any appearance of impropriety considering that, as admitted by
respondent, there are at least three (3) cases filed by complainant which are pending before his court. This is a violation of Canon 2 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct.
CANON 2 A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
Rule 2.01 A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
It is evident from the aforesaid provisions that both the reality and the appearance must concur. Case law repeatedly teaches that judicial office
circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of restrictions thereon, which he has to pay for accepting and occupying
an exalted position in the administration of justice. The irresponsible or improper conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary. It
is thus the duty of the members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary.
This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and regional trial court judges like herein respondent, because they are
judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the litigating parties. They are the intermediaries between conflicting interests and the
embodiments of the people’s sense of justice. Thus, their official conduct should remain free from any appearance of impropriety and should
be beyond reproach.

2. Yes, respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of law. For clarity, the undisputed facts leading to the lifting of the writ of preliminary
injunction are reiterated, thus: On July 2, 2002, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. On July 5, 2002 defendants filed an urgent motion to
lift writ of preliminary injunction and on the same day an order lifting the writ of preliminary injunction was issued...Respondent of the other
hand, countered in his testimony that he granted the motion to lift the writ of preliminary attachment because he thought that it was the most
equitable thing to do...

In the present administrative case, no opportunity was given to complainant to even oppose the motion to lift attachment. Respondent failed
to persuade the investigating justice of the alleged urgency to grant the motion to lift the writ of preliminary attachment as a justification for
granting the motion without a full-blown hearing. It may also be said that the July 5, 2002 Order may have been too hastily issued considering
the fact that a copy of the said motion was mailed only on July 3, 2002 (Exhibit “5”). Hence, as argued by complainant, the motion could not
have been set for hearing earlier than July 6, 2002 without doing violence to the 3-day notice rule.

7. Atty. Gloria Lastimosa-Dalawampu v. Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr., A.M. RTJ-03-1793, February 5, 2004.

ATTY. GLORIA LASTIMOSA-DALAWAMPU, Complainant, -versus- JUDGE RAPHAEL B. YRASTORZA, SR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU CITY,
BRANCH 14, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1793, FIRST DIVISION, February 5, 2004, Ynares-Santiago, J.

A judge should conduct proceedings in court with fitting dignity and decorum. Respondent cannot justify his action by a desire to hasten the
proceedings before him. Respondent’s unfounded act of insulting the complainant in open court and cutting her off in mid-sentence while she
was still explaining her side exhibited a manifest disregard by respondent of his duty to be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers.

FACTS:
Complainant filed a complaint for serious misconducts against the respondent. The complaint alleged that in January 2002, the complainant
appeared as a counsel for the accused before the respondent in a Criminal Case. After her client was arraigned, the complainant moved for the
re-settling of the pre-trial conference in view of absence of the trial prosecutor assigned to Branch 14. However, before she could finish her
statement, respondent judge purportedly cut her off by saying, “If you cannot handle this case, Atty. Dalawampu, you better give this case to
another lawyer.” When complainant answered that she can handle the case, respondent again cut her off saying, “Do not give me so many
excuses, Atty. Dalawampu! I don’t care who you are!” When complainant was about to leave the courtroom, she heard respondent say, “I don’t
care who you are. You can file one thousand administrative cases against me. I don’t care.”
According to the complainant, the foregoing incident was not the first time that she was berated by the respondent judge. Sometime in
October 2000, she was scolded by respondent judge for failure to file the pre-trial brief even if a pre-trial brief is not compulsory in criminal
cases.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the desistance and withdrawal of the complaint made by the complainant warrants the dismissal of the administrative case
against respondent judge
2. Whether of not the respondent judge violated his duty to maintain respect for the dignity of the court and to the members of the bar and
bench alike

RULING:
1. No. The Court must reiterate the rule that mere desistance on the part of the complainant does not warrant the dismissal of an
administrative complaint against any member of the bench and the judiciary. The Court’s interest in the affairs of the judiciary is a paramount
concern that knows no bounds. Hence, instead of dismissing the charge as recommended, the Court, in the exercise of its power of
administrative supervision, resolves to reprimand respondent judge for his failure to exercise greater circumspection in dealing with the
complainant.
Upon his assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He becomes the visible representation of the law and, more
importantly, of justice. He must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. A magistrate of the law must comport himself
at all times in such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the
epitome of integrity and justice.
2. Yes, respondent judge violated his duty to maintain respect for the dignity of the court and members of the bar and bench alike.
Respondent’s unfounded act of insulting the complainant in open court and cutting her off in mid- sentence while she was still explaining her
side exhibited a manifest disregard by respondent of his duty to be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers. A judge should conduct
proceedings in court with fitting dignity and decorum. Respondent cannot justify his action by a desire to hasten the proceedings before him.
A judge’s duty to observe courtesy to those who appear before him is not limited to lawyers. The said duty also includes being courteous to
litigants and witnesses.
Judges are strictly mandated to abide by the law, the Code of Judicial Conduct and existing administrative policies in order to maintain the faith
of our people in the administration of justice. Any act which falls short of the exacting standard for public office, especially on the part of those
expected to preserve the image of the judiciary, shall not be countenanced.

8. Mataga v. Rosete, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1488,October 13, 2004.

ADARLINA G. MATAGA, Complainant, -versus- JUDGE MAXWELL S. ROSETE, Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Santiago City and Process Server
GASAT M. PAYOYO, Municipal Trial Court, Cordon, Isabela, Respondents.
A.M. No. MTJ-03-1488, FIRST DIVISION, October 13, 2004, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be examined with a discriminating eye, for its consequential effect are by
their nature highly penal, such that the respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or disbarment. Mere imputation of judicial
misconduct in the absence of sufficient proof to sustain the same will never be countenanced. If a judge should be disciplined for misconduct, the
evidence against him should be competent.

FACTS:
Adarlina Mataga alleged that she was a retired Court Stenographer who applied for a disability retirement. Her application was subsequently
approved and a check amounting to P165,530.08 was prepared in the name of Mataga. It was released to respondent Gasat Payoyo who turned
it over to Judge Maxwell Rosete.Payoyo brought Mataga to the house of Judge Rosete where she was given P44,000.00 as her terminal pay.
Mataga then came to know that the retirement benefit granted to her was in the amount of P165,530.08, which respondents did not deliver to
her. Judge Rosete denied the allegations stating that Mataga has not been to his house, nor has he given her the sum of P44,000.00 as her
terminal pay. Judge Rosete however admitted that the check was turned over to him by the Supreme Court security guard after it was
misplaced by his co-respondent, Payoyo. Then, he immediately handed the check to Payoyo because the complainant had requested Payoyo to
follow up her check. Payoyo also denied the accusations against him. He claimed that Judge Rosete instructed him to claim the check and
encash the same at the Land Bank of the Philippines. After encashing the check, he claimed that he turned over the full amount of
complainant’s disability benefit.
A second investigation of the case was recommended by the OCA. After conducting another investigation, Mataga had no more complaint
against Judge Rosete. The complaint was directed at the dishonesty of respondent Payoyo in his dealings with Mataga.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint against respondent Judge Rosete should be dismissed. (YES)

RULING:
Any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be examined with a discriminating eye, for its consequential effect are by
their nature highly penal, such that the respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or disbarment. Mere imputation of judicial
misconduct in the absence of sufficient proof to sustain the same will never be countenanced. If a judge should be disciplined for misconduct,
the evidence against him should be competent.On the other hand, respondent Payoyo should be held administratively liable. The records of the
case revealed the dishonesty of Payoyo, his acts in not giving the complainant the full amount of her terminal leave benefits and in putting the
blame on Judge Rosete.
The behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the clerk of lowest
rank, should be circumscribed with a high degree of responsibility. The image of a court, as a true temple of justice, is mirrored in the conduct,
official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat. Judicial personnel are expected to be living examples of uprightness in the
performance of official duties to preserve at all times the good name and standing of the courts in the community.
Payoyo’s acts all fall short of the measure of uprightness expected of judicial personnel. For respondent Payoyo's dishonesty, he should be
suspended for a period of six months.

9. Anonymous v. Judge Rio C. Achas, MTCC Branch 2, Ozamiz City, Misamis Occidental, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801, February 27, 2013.

ANONYMOUS, Complainant, -versus- JUDGE RIO C. ACHAS, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Ozamis City, Misamis Occidental,
Respondent. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801, THIRD DIVISION, February 27, 2013, MENDOZA, J.

The Court held that it is not proper for a judge to be perceived as going out with a woman not his wife for it is a blemish to his integrity and
propriety, as well as to
that of the Judiciary. For going out with a woman not his wife, Judge Achas violated Canons 2 and 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
With regard to Judge Achas’s involvement in cockfighting, no evidence was presented that Judge Achas engaged in cockfighting and betting.
However, he admitted that he reared fighting cocks for leisure. While rearing fighting cocks is not illegal, Judge Achas should avoid mingling
with a crowd of cockfighting bettors as it undoubtedly impairs the respect due him. As a judge, he must impose upon himself personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.

FACTS:
An anonymous letter-complaint was received by the Court, alleging immorality and conduct unbecoming of a judge against respondent Judge
Rio C. Achas. According to the letter, (1) it is of public knowledge in the city that Judge Achas is living scandalously with a woman who is not his
wife; (2) he lives beyond his means; (3) he is involved with illegal activities through his connection with bad elements, the kuratongs; (4) he
comes to court very untidy and dirty; (5) he decides his cases unfairly in exchange for material and monetary consideration; and (6) he is
involved with cockfighting/gambling.
Upon investigation, it was found that Judge Achas and his legal wife has been separated for quite some time and they are living apart. It was
also found out that he and a young woman would go out occasionally in public and it was not a secret around town. With regard to the
allegations of illegal activities and deciding his cases unfairly, the investigating Judge could not be certain whether such were true and found it
vague and unsubstantiated. With regard to the allegation that respondent Judge would come to court untidy and dirty, the investigating judge
contended that it was a matter of personal hygiene and in the eye of the beholder.
Judge Achas denied all the charges but admitted that he was separated from his legal wife and that he reared game cocks only for leisure and
extra income. The OCA recommended that Judge Achas be reprimanded as to the charge of immorality and recommended that he be ordered
to refrain from going to cockpits with a warning that the same or similar complaint in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Achas should be reprimanded. (YES)
RULING:
Under Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, anonymous complaints filed against judges must be supported by public records of
indubitable integrity. For anonymous complaints, the burden of proof in administrative proceedings which usually rests with the complainant,
must be supported by indubitable public records and by what is sufficiently proven during the investigation. If the burden of proof is not
overcome, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his defense.
In the case, no evidence was attached to the letter-complaint. The complainant never appeared, and no public records were brought forth.
Judge Achas denied all the charges and only admitted that he was separated from his wife and that he reared fighting cocks. Hence, the charges
that he (1) lives beyond his means, (2) is involved with illegal activities through his connection with the kuratongs, (3) comes to court very
untidy and dirty, and (4) decides his cases unfairly in exchange for material and monetary consideration should be dismissed for lack of
evidence.
With regard to the charges that (1) it is of public knowledge that he is living scandalously with a woman not his wife and that (2) he is involved
with cockfighting/gambling, Judge Achas should be reprimanded and fined.
Under the New Code of Judicial Conduct
Canon 2
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but
must also be seen to be done.
Canon 4
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Although Judge Achas denied the allegation against him going out with a young lass and there was no evidence presented to prove the
contrary, he did admit that he was separated from his wife. The Court held that it is not proper for a judge to be perceived as going out with a
woman not his wife for it is a blemish to his integrity and propriety, as well as to that of the Judiciary. For going out with a woman not his wife,
Judge Achas violated Canons 2 and 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. With regard to Judge Achas’s involvement in cockfighting, no
evidence was presented that Judge Achas engaged in cockfighting and betting. However, he admitted that he reared fighting cocks for leisure.
While rearing fighting cocks is not illegal, Judge Achas should avoid mingling with a crowd of cockfighting bettors as it undoubtedly impairs the
respect due him. As a judge, he must impose upon himself personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen
and should do so freely and willingly.

10.Sonia C. Decena and Rey C. Decena v. Judge Nilo Malanyaon, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2217 (2013).

SONIA C. DECENA and REY C. DECENA, Petitioners, -versus- JUDGE NILO A. MALANYAON, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 32, IN PILI,
CAMARINES SUR, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2217, FIRST DIVISION, April 8, 2013, BERSAMIN, J.

Respondent judge, upon occupying a seat beside his daughter (who was the lawyer for the respondent in the case) that was reserved for the
lawyers during the hearing to advise his daughter on what to do and say during the hearing, to the point of coaching his daughter and upon
introducing himself as the "counsel of the respondent’s counsel", engaged in the private practice of law which is unbecoming of him as an RTC
Judge. Such excuse, seemingly grounded on a "filial" duty towards his wife and his daughter, did not furnish enough reason for him to forsake
the ethical conduct expected of him as a sitting judge. He ought to have restrained himself from sitting at that hearing, being all too aware that
his sitting would have him cross the line beyond which was the private practice of law.

Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the Bench must accept that his right to practice law as a member of the Philippine Bar is
thereby suspended, and it shall continue to be so suspended for the entire period of his incumbency as a judge. The term practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases in court or to participation in court proceedings, but extends to the preparation of pleadings or papers in
anticipation of a litigation, the giving of legal advice to clients or persons needing the same, the preparation of legal instruments and contracts
by which legal rights are secured, and the preparation of papers incident to actions and special proceedings.

FACTS:
Complainant, Rey Decena, had brought an administrative case against the respondent’s wife, then the Assistant Provincial Health Officer of the
Province of Camarines Sur; and during the hearing of the administrative case the respondent, a judge by profession, sat beside his daughter,
Atty. Kristina, who was the counsel of her mother in the case.
During the early stage of the hearing, the respondent coached her daughter in making manifestations/motions before the hearing officer, by
scribbling on some piece of paper and giving the same to the former, thus prompting her daughter to rise from her seat and/or ask permission
from the officer to speak, and then make some manifestations while reading or glancing on the paper given by the respondent. At one point,
the respondent even prompted her daughter to demand that the collaborating counsel of the complainant’s principal counsel be required to
produce his PTR number.
When the complainant’s principal counsel arrived and took over, she inquired regarding the personality of the respondent, being seated at the
lawyer’s bench beside Atty. Kristina. The respondent then proudly introduced himself and manifested that he was the "counsel of the
respondent’s counsel". Complainant’s principal counsel proceeded to raise the propriety of the respondent’s sitting with and assisting his
daughter in that hearing, being a member of the judiciary, to which the respondent loudly retorted that he be shown any particular rule that
prohibits him from sitting with his daughter at the lawyers’ bench. He insisted that he was merely "assisting" her daughter, who "just passed
the bar", defend the respondent in the case who was his wife, and was likewise helping the latter defend herself.
The complainants averred that the actuations of the respondent during the hearing of his wife’s administrative case in the Civil Service
Commission constituted violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippines Judiciary.

ISSUE:
Whether the actuations of Judge Malanyaon complained of constituted conduct unbecoming of a judge. (YES)

RULING:
Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits sitting judges like Judge Malanyaon from engaging in the private practice of law
or giving professional advice to clients. Section 11, Canon 4 (Propriety), of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule 5.07 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct reiterate the prohibition from engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. The prohibition is
based on sound reasons of public policy, considering that the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney are inherently
incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a sitting judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give
their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending favors to their own private interests, and assure the public of
their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the
public interest.

Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the Bench must accept that his right to practice law as a member of the Philippine Bar is
thereby suspended, and it shall continue to be so suspended for the entire period of his incumbency as a judge. The term practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases in court or to participation in court proceedings, but extends to the preparation of pleadings or papers in
anticipation of a litigation, the giving of legal advice to clients or persons needing the same, the preparation of legal instruments and contracts
by which legal rights are secured, and the preparation of papers incident to actions and special proceedings.

Any propensity on the part of a magistrate to ignore the ethical injunction to conduct himself in a manner that would give no ground for
reproach is always worthy of condemnation. We should abhor any impropriety on the part of judges, whether committed in or out of their
courthouses, for they are not judges only occasionally. The Court has fittingly emphasized in Castillo v. Calanog, Jr.:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his
performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality; a
public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained, a judge’s official life cannot simply be
detached or separated from his personal existence.

11. Tormis v. Judge Paredes, A.M. RTJ-13-2366, February 4, 2015.

JILL M. TORMIS, Complainants, -versus – JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES, Respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366, SECOND DIVISION, February 4, 2015, MENDOZA, J.

A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence and respect for himself, the Court and the
Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self- restraint. He should choose his words and
exercise more caution and control in expressing himself. In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. Furthermore, a magistrate
should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill- mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments.
He is required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language.
Judge Paredes in using intemperate language and unnecessary comments tending to project Judge Tormis as a corrupt and ignorant judge in his
class discussions, was correctly found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge by Justice Dy. When Judge Paredes failed to restrain himself and
included Francis, whose condition and personal circumstances, as properly observed by Justice Diy, had no relevance to the topic that was then
being discussed in class, it strongly indicated his intention to taint their reputations.

FACTS:
In her Affidavit/Complaint, dated September 5, 2011, Jill charged Judge Paredes with grave misconduct. Jill was a student of Judge Paredes in
Political Law Review during the first semester of school year 2010-2011 at the Southwestern University, Cebu City. She averred that sometime
in August 2010, in his class discussions, Judge Paredes named her mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis (Judge Tormis), then Presiding Judge of
Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cebu City, as one of the judges involved in the marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge Paredes also
mentioned in his class that Judge Tormis was abusive of her position as a judge, corrupt, and ignorant of the law.
Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his discussions not only once but several times. In one session, Judge Paredes was even
said to have included in his discussion Francis Mondragon Tormis (Francis), son of Judge Tormis, stating that he was a "court-noted addict."
In his Comment, dated October 28, 2011, Judge Paredes denied the accusations of Jill. He stated that Judge Tormis had several administrative
cases, some of which he had investigated; that as a result of the investigations, he recommended sanctions against Judge Tormis; that Judge
Tormis used Jill, her daughter, to get back at him; that he discussed in his class the case of Lachica v. Tormis, but never Judge Tormis'
involvement in the marriage scams nor her sanctions as a result of the investigation conducted by the Court; that he never personally attacked
Judge Tormis' dignity and credibility; that the marriage scams in Cebu City constituted a negative experience for all the judges and should be
discussed so that other judges, court employees and aspiring lawyers would not emulate such misdeeds; that the marriage scams were also
discussed during meetings of RTC judges and in schools where remedial law and legal ethics were taught; that he talked about past and
resolved cases, but not the negative tendencies of Judge Tormis; that there was nothing wrong in discussing the administrative cases involving
Judge Tormis because these cases were known to the legal community and some were even published in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated
(SCRA) and other legal publications; and that when he was the executive judge tasked to investigate Judge Tormis, he told her to mend her
ways, but she resented his advice.

ISSUE:
Whether Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. (YES)

RULING:
Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010, the investigation relative to the said case had not
yet been concluded. In fact, the decision on the case was promulgated by the Court only on April 2, 2013. In 2010, he still could not make
comments on the administrative case to prevent any undue influence in its resolution. Commenting on the marriage scams, where Judge
Tormis was one of the judges involved, was in contravention of the subjudice rule. Justice Diy was, therefore, correct in finding that Judge
Paredes violated Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Court shares the view of Justice Diy that although the reasons of Judge Paredes for discussing the marriage scams in his classes seemed
noble, his objectives were carried out insensitively and in bad taste. The pendency of the administrative case of Judge Tormis and the publicity
of the marriage scams did not give Judge Paredes unrestrained license to criticize Judge Tormis in his class discussions. The publicity given to
the investigation of the said scams and the fact that it was widely discussed in legal circles let people expressed critical opinions on the issue.
There was no need for Judge Paredes to "rub salt to the wound," as Justice Diy put it.
Judge Paredes in using intemperate language and unnecessary comments tending to project Judge Tormis as a corrupt and ignorant judge in his
class discussions, was correctly found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge by Justice Dy.
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence and respect for himself, the Court and the
Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self- restraint. He should choose his words and
exercise more caution and control in expressing himself. In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. Furthermore, a
magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill- mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic
comments. He is required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language.
When Judge Paredes failed to restrain himself and included Francis, whose condition and personal circumstances, as properly observed by
Justice Diy, had no relevance to the topic that was then being discussed in class, it strongly indicated his intention to taint their reputations.

12. Banas v. Judge Rubia, A.M. RTJ-14-2388, June 10, 2014.

EMILIE SISION-BARIAS, Complainant, -versus – JUDGE MARINO E. RUBIA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT [RTC], BRANCH 24, BIÑAN LAGUNA and
EILEEN A. PECAÑA, DATA ENCODER II, RTC, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, BIÑNAN, LAGUNA, Respondents.
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2388, EN BANC, June 10, 2014, PER CURIAM
In Gandeza Jr. v. Tabin, this court reminded judges: Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only impropriety but
also the mere appearance
of impropriety in all activities.
The evidence on record supports the allegations that a meeting with complainant, a litigant with several cases pending before his sala, took
place. Respondent Judge Rubia's mere presence in the dinner meeting provides a ground for administrative liability. Respondent Judge Rubia
clearly failed to live up to the standards of his office. By participating in the dinner meeting and by failing to admonish respondent Pecaña for
her admitted impropriety, respondent Judge Rubia violated Canons 1 and 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

FACTS:
Complainant Emilie Sison-Barias is involved in three cases pending before the sala of respondent Judge Marino Rubia. The first case being an
intestate proceeding; the second case is a guardianship proceeding over Romelias Almeda-Barias; and the third case is a civil action for
annulment of contracts and reconveyance of real properties filed by Romelias Almeda-Barias, represented by Evelyn Tanael, against
complainant, among others. In all these cases, a parcel of land covered by a transfer certificate title and part of the estate of complainant’s late
husband was involved.
Complainant alleged that there was delay in the publication of the notice in the petition for issuance of letters of administration filed.
Complainant’s brother informed her about relations with respondent Pecaña and how she could provided help to her dilemma. Complainant
and respondent Pecaña along with respondent Judge Rubia met for a dinner meeting; respondents allegedly asked complainant inappropriate
questions.

ISSUE:
Whether Judge Rubia should be administratively held liable. (YES)
RULING:
By meeting a litigant and advising her to talk to opposing counsel, respondent Judge Rubia violated several canons of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.Respondent Judge Rubia failed to act in a manner that upholds the dignity mandated by his office. He was already made aware of the
impropriety of respondent Pecaña's actions by virtue of her admissions in her comment. At the time of the referral of the complaint to the
Office of the Court Administrator, respondent Judge Rubia was already the Executive Judge of Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan,
Laguna. As a judge, he had the authority to ensure that all court employees, whether or not they were under his direct supervision, act in
accordance with the esteem of their office.

Respondent Pecaña even alleged that respondent Judge Rubia made several warnings to all court employees not to intercede in any case
pending before any court under his jurisdiction as Executive Judge. However, nothing in the record shows that respondent Judge Rubia took
action after being informed of respondent Pecaña's interactions with a litigant, such as ascertaining her actions, conducting an inquiry to
admonish or discipline her, or at least reporting her actions to the Office of the Court Administrator. For this failure alone, respondent Judge
Rubia should be held administratively liable.Furthermore, the evidence on record supports the allegations that a meeting with complainant, a
litigant with several cases pending before his sala, took place. Respondent Judge Rubia's mere presence in the dinner meeting provides a
ground for administrative liability.

In Gandeza Jr. v. Tabin, this court reminded judges: Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only impropriety but
also the mere appearance of impropriety in all activities. Respondent Judge Rubia clearly failed to live up to the standards of his office. By
participating in the dinner meeting and by failing to admonish respondent Pecaña for her admitted impropriety, respondent Judge Rubia
violated Canons 1 and 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
As to complainant's questioning of respondent Judge Rubia's actions in the issuance of the orders in her pending cases and the exercise of his
judgment, this court agrees that complainant should resort to the appropriate judicial remedies. This, however, does not negate the
administrative liability of respondent Judge Rubia. His actions failed to assure complainant and other litigants before his court of the required
"cold neutrality of an impartial judge." Because of this, respondent Judge Rubia also violated Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct on
Impartiality.

The totality of the actions of respondent Judge Rubia is a clear manifestation of a lack of integrity and impartiality essential to a judge. By
meeting with complainant, respondent Judge Rubia also violated Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

13. Ascaño v. Presiding Judge Jacinto, A.M. RTJ-15-2405, January 12, 2015.
ANTONIO S. ASCAÑO, JR., CONSOLACION D. DANTES, BASILISA A. OBALO, JULIETA D. TOLEDO, JOSEPH Z. MAAC, EMILIANO E. LUMBOY, TITA
F. BERNARDO, IGMEDIO L. NOGUERA, FIDEL S. SARMIENTO, SR., DAN T. TAUNAN, AMALIA G. SANTOS, AVELINA M. COLONIA, ERIC S.
PASTRANA, and MARIVEL B. ISON, Complainants, -versus – PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE S. JACINTO, JR., Branch 45, Regional Trial Court, San Jose
Occidental Mindoro, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405, FIRST DIVISION, January 12, 2015, SERENO, C.J.

A Judge should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court, viz.:
It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The act betrays lack of patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge
must at all times be temperate in his language. He must choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise
and just man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness.
In this case, instead of reprimanding Mayor Villarosa for not asking for the court's permission to leave while the trial was ongoing, respondent
appeared to serve as the former's advocate. He did so by declaring in open court that the abrupt exit of the Mayor should be excused, as the
latter had an important appointment to attend. Respondent does not deny this in his Comment. It was the Mayor's lawyer, and not respondent
judge, who had the duty of explaining why the mayor left the courtroom without asking for the court's permission.
FACTS:
Complainants were allegedly section leaders of the lessees of market stalls in the public market of Occidental Mindoro. The Mayor of the
Municipality of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Jose T. Villarosa allegedly wanted to demolish the public market, so that the Municipality can use
the space to erect the new "San Jose Commercial Complex." Thus, on 26 June 2012, complainants filed a Petition for Prohibition with Urgent
Application for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) against the Municipality and Mayor
Villarosa. The case was docketed as Special Civil Action No. R-1731 and was raffled to respondent's sala.
While the entire entourage of Mayor Villarosa, none of whom were parties to the case, were all allowed inside the courtroom during the 2 July
2012 hearing, only 12 out of the more than 500 members accompanying complainants on that day were allowed to enter. Worse, upon the
motion of the Mayor, all the complainants were escorted out of the courtroom except for Julieta D. Toledo, who was scheduled to give her
testimony that day.

At the next hearing held on 3 July 2012, Mayor Villarosa stepped out of the courtroom to take a call. He exited through the door used by the
judge and the employees of the court. According to complainants, the Mayor did not speak to anyone, not even his lawyer, before leaving the
courtroom. Thus, it came as a surprise to everyone when respondent suddenly explained that the Mayor had to excuse himself for an important
appointment.

Petitioners claimed that during the hearings held on 2 and 3 July 2012, respondent "argued, berated, accused, scolded, confused and
admonished petitioners without basis or justification." They further claimed that respondent judge asked complainants "confusing and
misleading questions all geared and intended to elicit answers damaging to the cause of petitioners and favorable to the cause of their
adversary."
Complainants led the instant complaint charging respondent with serious violations of the canons of the Codes of Judicial Conduct and Judicial
Ethics and for Violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019.

ISSUE:
1. Whether respondent judge should be held administratively liable on the ground of bias and partiality (NO).
2. Whether respondent judge is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge (YES)

RULING:
1. Petitioners failed to substantiate their allegation that respondent acted with bias and partiality. Mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not
enough. Clear and convincing evidence is necessary to prove a charge of bias and partiality. The circumstances detailed by petitioners failed to
prove that respondent exhibited "manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence" in the discharge of his judicial
functions, as required by Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, when he issued the Order lifting the TRO. This Court cannot accept the contention that
respondent's bias and partiality can be gleaned from the mere fact that he did not allow the "more than 500 members" who accompanied
petitioners during the hearing to enter the courtroom. As indicated in the report, due to the standard sizes of our courtrooms, it is highly
improbable that this huge group could have been accommodated inside. With respect to the exclusion of the other witnesses while Julieta
Toledo was giving her testimony, this is sanctioned by Section 15, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
2. As stated in the report, respondent raised his voice and uttered abrasive and unnecessary remarks to petitioners' witness. Respondent failed
to conduct himself in accordance with the mandate of Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
A Judge should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court, viz.:
It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The act betrays lack of patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge
must at all times be temperate in his language. He must choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise
and just man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness.
In this case, instead of reprimanding Mayor Villarosa for not asking for the court's permission to leave while the trial was ongoing, respondent
appeared to serve as the former's advocate. He did so by declaring in open court that the abrupt exit of the Mayor should be excused, as the
latter had an important appointment to attend. Respondent does not deny this in his Comment. It was the Mayor's lawyer, and not respondent
judge, who had the duty of explaining why the mayor left the courtroom without asking for the court's permission.

14. Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, A.M. No. RTJ-09- 2200, April 2, 2014.
ANTONIO M. LORENZANA, Complainant, -versus – JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, SECOND DIVISION, April 2, 2014, BRION, J.

The New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a judge from joining or maintaining an account in a social networking site such as
Friendster. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of
expression. This right "includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and impart information and ideas through any media
regardless of frontiers." Joining a social networking site is an exercise of one’s freedom of expression. The respondent judge’s act of joining
Friendster is, therefore, per se not violative of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their
freedom of expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality
and independence of the Judiciary.

FACTS:
A supplemental complaint was filed against Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, who was alleged to have committed an act of impropriety when she
displayed her photographs in a social networking website called “Friendster” and posted her personal details as an RTC Judge for the purpose of
finding a compatible partner. She also posed with her upper body barely covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing was worn
underneath except probably a brassiere.
Judge Austria submitted that the photos she posted in the social networking website "Friendster" could hardly be considered vulgar or lewd.
She added that an "off- shouldered" attire is an acceptable social outfit under contemporary standards and is not forbidden. She further stated
that there is no prohibition against attractive ladies being judges; she is proud of her photo for having been aesthetically made.

The Court of Appeals recommended that the respondent be admonished for failing to observe strict propriety and judicial decorum required by
the office. The Office of the Court Administration agreed with the CA recommendation that the respondent’s act of posting seductive photos in
her Friendster account contravened the standard of propriety set forth by the Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Austria’s act of allegedly posting seductive photos in her Friendster account contravened the standard of propriety and
judicial decorum required by the office. (YES)

RULING:
The Supreme Court said that while judges are not prohibited from becoming members of and from taking part in social networking activities,
they should be reminded that they do not thereby shed off their status as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the same ethical
responsibilities and duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday activities. It is in this light that the Supreme Court ruled the
respondent in the charge of impropriety when she posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the public.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a judge from joining or maintaining an account in a social networking site such as
Friendster. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of
expression. This right "includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and impart information and ideas through any media
regardless of frontiers." Joining a social networking site is an exercise of one’s freedom of expression. The respondent judge’s act of joining
Friendster is, therefore, per se not violative of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their
freedom of expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality
and independence of the Judiciary.

This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of judges in all of their activities, whether it be in the course of their judicial office
or in their personal lives. In particular, Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit impropriety and even the
appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
Based on this provision, the SC held that the respondent disregarded the propriety and appearance of propriety required of her when she
posted Friendster photos of herself wearing an "off-shouldered" suggestive dress and made this available for public viewing. While the
respondent’s act of posting her photos would seem harmless and inoffensive had this act been done by an ordinary member of the public. As
the visible personification of law and justice, however, judges are held to higher standards of conduct and thus must accordingly comport
themselves.

15. Atty. Jerome Norman L. Tacorda for: Odel L. Gedraga v. Judge Reynaldo B. Clemens, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2359 (2013).
ATTY. JEROME NORMAN L. TACORDA for: ODEL L. GEDRAGA, Complainant, - versus – JUDGE REYNALDO B. CLEMENS, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2359, FIRST DIVISION, October 23, 2013, SERENO, C.J.

For respondent judge to be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must be gross or patent. To
constitute gross ignorance of the law, not only must the acts be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but they must also be motivated by
bad faith, fraud, malice or dishonesty.

Facts:
The case from a Complaint-Affidavit filed by Atty. Jerome Tacorda charging respondent Judge Reynaldo Clemens for gross ignorance of the law
and alleged violation of the Witness Examination Rule. The complainant claims that Odel Gedraga, then fifteen years, was presented as witness
before the sala of Judge Clemens for a criminal case involving the alleged murder of Odel’s father.
Atty. Tacorda alleges that the Child Witness Examination Rule was not properly followed by the respondent Judge when he made certain rulings
that were not implemented and from Judge Clemens’ alleged failure to castigate the defense counsel for standing beside the witness.
Furthermore, the Judge also continued the hearing for three hours, during which Gedraga was subjected to the rigors of trial despite his
minority. Finally, Atty. Tacorda claims that Judge Clemens remained passive in many occasions. In his Comment, Judge Clemens belied all the
allegations of Atty. Tacorda as having no basis.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Clemens is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for supposedly violating the Child Witness Examination
Rule (NO).

RULING:
The Supreme Court sustained the findings of the OCA that the acts of Judge Clemens were far from being ill-motivated and in bad faith as to
justify any administrative liability on his part, as a complete reading of the TSN reveals that he was vigilant in his conduct of the proceedings.
According to the SC, in the instances mentioned in the Complaint-Affidavit, he had been attentive to the manifestations made by Atty. Tacorda
and had acted accordingly and with dispatch.
In administrative proceedings, the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed the latter’s duties would prevail and that the
complainant has the burden of proving the contrary by substantial evidence. Charges based on suspicion and speculation cannot be given
credence.

For respondent judge to be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must be gross or patent. To
constitute gross ignorance of the law, not only must the acts be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but they must also be motivated by
bad faith, fraud, malice or dishonesty.
In this case, the OCA found that Atty. Tacorda failed to prove that the acts of Judge Clemens were ill-motivated.