G.R. No.

147387               December 10, 2003 President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.
RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS, MANUEL M. GARCIA, FRANCIS G.
ESCUDERO, and AGAPITO A. AQUINO, AS MEMBERS OF THE The petition for certiorari and prohibition in G.R. No. 147387 was filed by
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND ALSO AS TAXPAYERS, IN Rodolfo C. Fariñas, Manuel M. Garcia, Francis G. Escudero and Agapito
THEIR OWN BEHALF AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE MEMBERS A. Aquino. At the time of filing of the petition, the petitioners were members
OF THE MINORITY IN THE HOUSE OF of the minority bloc in the House of Representatives. Impleaded as
REPRESENTATIVES, petitioners, respondents are: the Executive Secretary, then Speaker of the House of
vs. Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., the Commission on Elections,
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government
FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND (DILG), the Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary General of the
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE SENATE, AND House of Representatives.
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents. The petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 152161 was filed by Gerry A.
Salapuddin, then also a member of the House of Representatives.
x-----------------------x Impleaded as respondent is the COMELEC.

G.R. No. 152161 Legislative History of Republic Act No. 9006

CONG. GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN, petitioner, Rep. Act No. 9006, entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free,
vs. Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. Practices," is a consolidation of the following bills originating from the
House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively:
DECISION
House Bill (HB) No. 9000 entitled "AN ACT ALLOWING THE USE OF
CALLEJO, SR., J.: MASS MEDIA FOR ELECTION PROPAGANDA, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 881, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE ‘OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE,’ AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER
Before the Court are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as
PURPOSES;"1
amended, seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic
Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals
Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) …
which provides:
Senate Bill (SB) No. 1742 entitled "AN ACT TO ENHANCE THE
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, HOLDING OF FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST, PEACEFUL, AND CREDIBLE
whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which ELECTIONS THROUGH FAIR ELECTION PRACTICES."2
he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-
A Bicameral Conference Committee, composed of eight members of the After taking up other pending matters, the House proceeded to vote on the
Senate3 and sixteen (16) members of the House of Representatives,4 was Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions of
formed to reconcile the conflicting provisions of the House and Senate HB No. 9000 and SB No. 1742. The House approved the report with 125
versions of the bill. affirmative votes, 3 negative votes and no abstention. In explaining their
negative votes, Reps. Fariñas and Garcia expressed their belief that
On November 29, 2000, the Bicameral Conference Committee submitted Section 14 thereof was a rider. Even Rep. Escudero, who voted in the
its Report,5 signed by its members, recommending the approval of the bill affirmative, expressed his doubts on the constitutionality of Section 14.
as reconciled and approved by the conferees. Prior to casting his vote, Rep. Dilangalen observed that no senator signed
the Bicameral Conference Committee Report and asked if this procedure
was regular.12
During the plenary session of the House of Representatives on February
5, 2001, Rep. Jacinto V. Paras proposed an amendment to the Bicameral
Conference Committee Report. Rep. Didagen P. Dilangalen raised a point On the same day, the Senate likewise approved the Bicameral Conference
of order commenting that the House could no longer submit an Committee Report on the contrasting provisions of SB No. 1742 and HB
amendment thereto. Rep. Sergio A.F. Apostol thereupon moved that the No. 9000.
House return the report to the Bicameral Conference Committee in view of
the proposed amendment thereto. Rep. Dilangalen expressed his Thereafter, Rep. Act No. 9006 was duly signed by then Senate President
objection to the proposal. However, upon viva voce voting, the majority of Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. and then Speaker of the House of Representatives
the House approved the return of the report to the Bicameral Conference Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. and was duly certified by the Secretary of the
Committee for proper action.6 Senate Lutgardo B. Barbo and the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives Robert P. Nazareno as "the consolidation of House Bill
In view of the proposed amendment, the House of Representatives elected No. 9000 and Senate Bill No. 1742," and "finally passed by both Houses
anew its conferees7 to the Bicameral Conference Committee.8 Then again, on February 7, 2001."
for unclear reasons, upon the motion of Rep. Ignacio R. Bunye, the House
elected another set of conferees9 to the Bicameral Conference President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed Rep. Act No. 9006 into law on
Committee.10 February 12, 2001.

On February 7, 2001, during the plenary session of the House of The Petitioners’ Case
Representatives, Rep. Bunye moved that the House consider the
Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the contrasting provisions of The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14
HB No. 9000 and SB No. 1742. Rep. Dilangalen observed that the report of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus
had been recommitted to the Bicameral Conference Committee. The Chair Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1),
responded that the Bicameral Conference Report was a new one, and was Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject
a result of the reconvening of a new Bicameral Conference Committee. which should be expressed in its title.
Rep. Dilangalen then asked that he be given time to examine the new
report. Upon motion of Rep. Apostol, the House deferred the approval of According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section
the report until the other members were given a copy thereof.11 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a
proscribed rider. They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of
Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it becomes
Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the effective.
lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the
elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an Code is a good law; hence, should not have been repealed. The
office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,13 that
considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional
certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election mandate on the "Accountability of Public Officers:"14
Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter
of Rep. Act No. 9006. Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at
all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and
the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section justice, and lead modest lives.
67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof
which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus: Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the
House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering those members of the
holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their respective
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso certificates of candidacy.
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
The Respondents’ Arguments
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against
appointive officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who For their part, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer urge this Court to dismiss the petitions contending, preliminarily, that the
considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of petitioners have no legal standing to institute the present suit. Except for
candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they the fact that their negative votes were overruled by the majority of the
campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the members of the House of Representatives, the petitioners have not shown
other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on that they have suffered harm as a result of the passage of Rep. Act No.
appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned 9006. Neither do petitioners have any interest as taxpayers since the
from their offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy. assailed statute does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety
as irregularities attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section Invoking the "enrolled bill" doctrine, the respondents refute the petitioners’
14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law allegations that "irregularities" attended the enactment of Rep. Act No.
which provides that "[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval" is a 9006. The signatures of the Senate President and the Speaker of the
violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as House, appearing on the bill and the certification signed by the respective
Secretaries of both houses of Congress, constitute proof beyond cavil that According to the respondents, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as
the bill was duly enacted into law. it repeals Section 67, leaving Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code
intact and effective, does not violate the equal protection clause of the
The respondents contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, as it Constitution. Section 67 pertains to elective officials while Section 66
repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is not a proscribed rider pertains to appointive officials. A substantial distinction exists between
nor does it violate Section 26(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. The title of these two sets of officials; elective officials occupy their office by virtue of
Rep. Act No. 9006, "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, their mandate based upon the popular will, while the appointive officials
Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices," are not elected by popular will. The latter cannot, therefore, be similarly
is so broad that it encompasses all the processes involved in an election treated as the former. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or
exercise, including the filing of certificates of candidacy by elective things similarly situated are treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
officials. responsibilities imposed.

They argue that the repeal of Section 67 is germane to the general subject Further, Section 16, or the "Effectivity" clause, of Rep. Act No. 9006 does
of Rep. Act No. 9006 as expressed in its title as it eliminates the effect of not run afoul of the due process clause of the Constitution as it does not
prematurely terminating the term of an elective official by his filing of a entail any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty and property. Specifically, the
certificate of candidacy for an office other than the one which he is section providing for penalties in cases of violations thereof presume that
permanently holding, such that he is no longer considered ipso facto the formalities of the law would be observed, i.e., charges would first be
resigned therefrom. The legislature, by including the repeal of Section 67 filed, and the accused would be entitled to a hearing before judgment is
of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006, has deemed it fit to rendered by a court having jurisdiction. In any case, the issue about lack of
remove the "unfairness" of considering an elective official ipso facto due process is premature as no one has, as yet, been charged with
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for violation of Rep. Act No. 9006.
another elective office. With the repeal of Section 67, all elective officials
are now placed on equal footing as they are allowed to finish their Finally, the respondents submit that the respondents Speaker and
respective terms even if they run for any office, whether the presidency, Secretary General of the House of Representatives did not commit grave
vice-presidency or other elective positions, other than the one they are abuse of discretion in not excluding from the Rolls those members thereof
holding in a permanent capacity. who ran for the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections. These
respondents merely complied with Rep. Act No. 9006, which enjoys the
The respondents assert that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus presumption of validity until declared otherwise by the Court.
Election Code need not be expressly stated in the title of Rep. Act No.
9006 as the legislature is not required to make the title of the act a The Court’s Ruling
complete index of its contents. It must be deemed sufficient that the title be
comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general subject which Before resolving the petitions on their merits, the Court shall first rule on
the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every means the procedural issue raised by the respondents, i.e., whether the
necessary for its accomplishment. Section 26(1) of Article VI of the petitioners have the legal standing or locus standi to file the petitions at
Constitution merely calls for all the parts of an act relating to its subject to bar.
find expression in its title. Mere details need not be set forth.
The petitions were filed by the petitioners in their capacities as members of
the House of Representatives, and as taxpayers and registered voters.
Generally, a party who impugns the validity of a statute must have a accountability of public officers, has been validly repealed by Section 14 of
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or Rep. Act No. 9006, is one of "overarching significance" that justifies this
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.15 The rationale for Court’s adoption of a liberal stance vis-à-vis the procedural matter on
requiring a party who challenges the constitutionality of a statute to allege standing. Moreover, with the national elections barely seven months away,
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is "to assure that it behooves the Court to confront the issue now and resolve the same
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon forthrightly. The following pronouncement of the Court is quite apropos:
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."16 ... All await the decision of this Court on the constitutional question.
Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has
However, being merely a matter of procedure, this Court, in several cases assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy
involving issues of "overarching significance to our society,"17 had adopted demand that [its] constitutionality . . . be now resolved. It may likewise be
a liberal stance on standing. Thus, in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department added that the exceptional character of the situation that confronts us, the
of Energy,18 this Court brushed aside the procedural requirement of paramount public interest, and the undeniable necessity for a ruling, the
standing, took cognizance of, and subsequently granted, the petitions national elections beings barely six months away, reinforce our stand.27
separately filed by then Senator Francisco Tatad and several members of
the House of Representatives assailing the constitutionality of Rep. Act Every statute is presumed valid.28 The presumption is that the legislature
No. 8180 (An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no
Purposes). further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the
law.29
The Court likewise took cognizance of the petition filed by then members
of the House of Representatives which impugned as unconstitutional the It is equally well-established, however, that the courts, as guardians of the
validity of a provision of Rep. Act No. 6734 (Organic Act for the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) in Chiongbian v. enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental
Orbos.19 Similarly, the Court took cognizance of the petition filed by then law.30 And where the acts of the other branches of government run afoul of
members of the Senate, joined by other petitioners, which challenged the the Constitution, it is the judiciary’s solemn and sacred duty to nullify the
validity of Rep. Act No. 7716 (Expanded Value Added Tax Law) in same.31
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance.20
Proceeding from these guideposts, the Court shall now resolve the
Members of Congress, such as the petitioners, were likewise allowed by substantial issues raised by the petitions.
this Court to challenge the validity of acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of
various government agencies or instrumentalities in Del Mar v. Philippine Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not a Rider32
Amusement and Gaming Corporation,21 Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona,
Jr.,22 Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,23 Albano v.
Reyes,24 and Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization.25 At the core of the controversy is Section 14, the repealing clause of Rep.
Act No. 9006, which provides:
Certainly, the principal issue posed by the petitions, i.e., whether Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which this Court had declared in Sec. 14. Sections 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas
Dimaporo26 as deriving its existence from the constitutional provision on Pambansa Blg. 881) and Sections 10 and 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 are
hereby repealed. As a consequence, the first proviso in the third paragraph of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an
of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is rendered ineffective. All laws, abstract or index of the Act.34
presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or any part
thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: "An Act to Enhance the Holding of
modified or amended accordingly. Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair
Election Practices." Section 2 of the law provides not only the declaration
The repealed provision, Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, quoted of principles but also the objectives thereof:
earlier, reads:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles. – The State shall, during the election
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises
whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which or permits for the operation of media of communication or information to
he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice- guarantee or ensure equal opportunity for public service, including access
President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the to media time and space, and the equitable right to reply, for public
filing of his certificate of candidacy. information campaigns and fora among candidates and assure free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
The State shall ensure that bona fide candidates for any public office shall
SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.35
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No.
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the
and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said
encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that
subject finding expression in its title.33 the title be a complete index of its content.36

To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code,
requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other
Court laid down the rule that – than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No.
9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election
propaganda, does not violate the "one subject-one title" rule. This Court
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes
has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title,
should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of
may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may
legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed
be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing
sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.37
general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each
and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing
The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the So I would want to beg the House contingent, let’s get it over with. To me,
particular matter are particularly instructive: ha, it’s not a very touchy issue. For me, it’s even a very correct provision. I
feel very comfortable with it and it was voted in the Senate, at least, so I
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE: would like to appeal to the ... para matapos na, then we come back as a
Bicam just for the title Is that what you’re ...?
Yes, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to clarify.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
So all we’re looking for now is an appropriate title to make it broader so
that it would cover this provision [referring to the repeal of Section 67 of It’s not the title per se, it’s the coverage. So if you will just kindly bear with
the Omnibus Election Code], is that correct? That’s all. Because I us. I’m happy that there is already one comfortable senator there among ...
believe ... several of us were also comfortable with it. But it would be well that when
we rise from this Bicam that we’re all comfortable with it.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
We are looking for an appropriate coverage which will result in the
nomenclature or title. Yes. Anyway, let’s listen to Congressman Marcos.

SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE: REP. MARCOS:

Because I really do not believe that it is out of place. I think that even with Mr. Chairman, may I just make the observation that although it is true that
the term "fair election practice," it really covers it, because as expressed the bulk of provisions deals with the area of propaganda and political
by Senator Roco, those conditions inserted earlier seemed unfair and it is advertising, the complete title is actually one that indulge full coverage. It
an election practice and, therefore, I think, I’m very comfortable with the says "An Act to enhance the holding of free, orderly, honest ... elections
title "Fair Election Practice" so that we can get over with these things so through fair election practices." But as you said, we will put that aside to
that we don’t come back again until we find the title. I mean, it’s one discuss later one.
provision which I think is fair for everybody. It may seem like a limitation
but this limitation actually provides for fairness in election practices as the Secondly, I think the Declaration of Principles contained in Section 2,
title implies. paragraph 2 is perfectly adequate in that it says that it shall ensure
candidates for public office that may be free from any form of harassment
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO): and discrimination.

Yes. Surely this provision in Section 67 of the old Election Code of the existing
Omnibus Election Code is a form of harassment or discrimination. And so I
think that in the effort at leveling the playing field, we can cover this and it
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
should not be considered a rider.

SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
I agree, Mr. Chairman. I think the Congresswoman from Ilocos had very Mr. Chairman, why don’t we use "An Act rationalizing the holding of free,
clearly put it, that it is covered in the Declaration of Principles and in the orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, amending for the purpose
objective of this bill. And therefore, I hope that the House contingent would Batasang Pambansa known as the Omnibus Election Code?"
agree to this so that we can finish it now. And it expressly provides for fair
election practices because ... THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): Why don’t we remove "fair" and then this shall be cited as Election
Practices Act?"
Yeah, I think what is on the table is that we are not disputing this, but we
are looking for a title that is more generic so that then we have less of an REP. PICHAY:
objection on constitutionality. I think that’s the theory. So, there is
acceptance of this. That’s not an election practice. That’s a limitation.

Maybe we should not call it na limitation on elected officials. Maybe we THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
should say the special provision on elected officials. So how is that? Alam
mo ito ...
Ah - - - ayaw mo iyong practice. O, give me another noun.
REP. MARCOS:
REP. MARCOS:
I think we just change the Section 1, the short title.
The Fair Election.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Also, Then we say - - on the short title of the Act, we say ...
O, Fair Election Act.
REP. MARCOS:
REP. MACARAMBON:
What if we say fair election practices? Maybe that should be changed...
Nagbi-brainstorm tayo dito, eh. How about if we change the title to
enhance the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and ensure equal
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): opportunity for public service through fair election practices?

O, sige, fine, fine. Let’s a brainstorm. Equal... REP. PICHAY:

REP. PADILLA: Fair election practices?

REP. MACARAMBON: THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

Yeah. To ensure equal opportunity for public service through fair ... Wala na, wala na. Mahina tayo sa practice, eh.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): O, wala na? We will clean up.

Wala nang practices nga. REP. MARCOS:

REP. PICHAY: Title?

Wala nang practices. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): The short title, "This Act ..."

It shall be cited as Fair Election Act. THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):

(Informal discussions) You’re back to your No. 21 already.

REP. PICHAY: REP. MARCOS:

Approve na iyan. The full title, the same?

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

Done. So, okay na iyon. The title will be "Fair Election Act." Iyon na nga. The full title is "An Act to enhance the holding ..." That’s the
House version, eh, dahil pareho, hindi ba? Then the short title "This Act
The rest wala nang problema ano? shall be known as the Fair Election Act."38

VOICES: The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a

form of harassment or discrimination that had to be done away with and
repealed. The executive department found cause with Congress when the
Wala na.
President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some
sectors of society and in government may believe that the repeal of
REP. MACARAMBON: Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage political adventurism. But
policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is
Wala na iyong practices? within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the
government.39 It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute,
legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are
whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one
means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative class may be treated and regulated differently from the other.44 The Court
discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this manner:
manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious
conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
judicial cognizance.40 Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra 41 upholding the validity of the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is
provision and by its pronouncement in the same case that the provision limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which
has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it
repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
and the paramount objective of election laws – the fair, honest and orderly circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
election of truly deserving members of Congress – is achieved. enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for
subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those
of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the who do not.45
enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action
and study of the legislators and the public. 42 In this case, it cannot be Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and
claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate
the Omnibus Election Code as the same was amply and comprehensively of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may
deliberated upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners, as be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions.46 On the other hand,
members of the House of Representatives, expressed their reservations appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by
regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a
legislators were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure47 while others
67 of the Omnibus Election Code. serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.48

Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that
Is Not Violative of the Equal under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service
Protection Clause of the Constitution43 Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order
No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service,
The petitioners’ contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take
Election Code pertaining to elective officials gives undue benefit to such part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective
officials as against the appointive ones and violates the equal protection officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously
clause of the constitution, is tenuous. expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.49
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election e. There was no meeting actually conducted by the 2nd/3rd BCC
Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of and that its alleged Report was instantly made and passed around
officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of for the signature of the BCC members;
the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those
occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass f. The Senate has no record of the creation of a 2nd BCC but only
upon or look into the wisdom of this classification. of the first one that convened on November 23, 2000;

Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., g. The "Effectivity" clauses of SB No. 1741 and HB No. 9000, as
elected officials vis-a-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material well as that of the compromise bill submitted by the BCC that
and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same convened on November 20, 2000, were couched in terms that
classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the comply with the publication required by the Civil Code and
Constitution is, thus, not infringed. jurisprudence, to wit:

The Enrolled Bill Doctrine ...

Is Applicable In this Case
However, it was surreptitiously replaced in its final form as it appears in §
Not content with their plea for the nullification of Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 16, R.A. No. 9006, with the provision that "This Act shall take effect
9006, the petitioners insist that the entire law should be nullified. They immediately upon its approval;"
contend that irregularities attended the passage of the said law particularly
in the House of Representatives catalogued thus: h. The copy of the compromise bill submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC
that was furnished the members during its consideration on
a. Creation of two (2) sets of BCC (Bicameral Conference February 7, 2001, did not have the same § 16 as it now appears in
Committee) members by the House during its session on February RA No. 9006, but § 16 of the compromise bill, HB 9000 and SB
5, 2001; 1742, reasons for which no objection thereto was made;

b. No communication from the Senate for a conference on the i. The alleged BCC Report presented to the House on February 7,
compromise bill submitted by the BCC on November 29, 2000; 2001, did not "contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of
the changes in or amendments to the subject measure;" and
c. The new Report submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC was presented
for approval on the floor without copies thereof being furnished the j. The disappearance of the "Cayetano amendment," which is
members; Section 12 of the compromise bill submitted by the BCC. In fact,
this was the subject of the purported proposed amendment to the
d. The 2nd/3rd BCC has no record of its proceedings, and the compromise bill of Member Paras as stated in paragraph 7 hereof.
Report submitted by it was not signed by the Chairman (Sen. The said provision states, thusly:
Roco) thereof as well as its senator-members at the time it was
presented to and rammed for approval by the House;
Sec. 12. Limitation on Elected Officials. – Any elected official who runs for Finally, the "Effectivity" clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which
president and vice-president shall be considered ipso facto resigned from provides that it "shall take effect immediately upon its approval," is
his office upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy.50 defective. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid. In
Tañada v. Tuvera,54 this Court laid down the rule:
The petitioners, thus, urge the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the
bill. The Court is not persuaded. Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the ... the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of
signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in
the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may
passed are conclusive of its due enactment. A review of cases 51 reveals make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date
the Court’s consistent adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reason to without its previous publication.
deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged
by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g., Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its
creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. discretion provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or
This Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal extended….55
rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are
merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no Following Article 2 of the Civil Code56 and the doctrine enunciated in
concern.52 Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Rep. Tañada, Rep. Act No. 9006, notwithstanding its express statement, took
Act No. 9006 must be resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates its ruling effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette or a
in Arroyo v. De Venecia,53 viz.: newspaper of general circulation.

But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched
deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a principles in constitutional law is that the courts do not involve themselves
law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive
absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a
or the rights of private individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the
any rate, courts have declared that ‘the rules adopted by deliberative court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the
bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of limits of legislative power.57 No such transgression has been shown in this
the body adopting them.’ And it has been said that ‘Parliamentary rules are case.
merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern.
They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.’
Consequently, ‘mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to
invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite costs.
number of members have agreed to a particular measure.’"
SO ORDERED.
The Effectivity Clause
Is Defective Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
 10 
See note 6 at 20.

11 
Journal of the House of Representatives, Vol. 64, February 7,
Footnotes 2001, p. 29.

12 
1 
Annex "A," Petition. Id. at 32-35.

13 
2 
Annex "B," id. 202 SCRA 779 (1991).

14 
3 
Senators Raul S. Roco, Francisco S. Tatad, Vicente C. Sotto III, SECTION 1, ARTICLE XI, CONSTITUTION.
Gregorio B. Honasan, Robert S. Jaworski, Teresa Aquino-Oreta,
Loren Legarda-Leviste and Sergio Osmeña III. 15 
People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).

4 
Representatives Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr., Imee R. Marcos, 16 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7 L.Ed.2d 633 (1962).
Benasing O. Macarambon, Jr., Rodolfo C. Fariñas, Roseller L.
Barinaga, Hussin U. Amin, Edmundo O. Reyes, Jr., Constantino 17 
Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 346
G. Jaraula, Alipio Cirilo V. Badelles, Francis Joseph G. Escudero, SCRA 485 (2000); Carpio v. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290
Eleandro Jesus F. Madrona, Ernesto A Nieva, Aniceto G. Saludo, (1992); Osmeña v. Comelec, 199 SCRA 750 (1991); Basco v.
Eduardo R. Gullas, Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., Sergio Antonio F. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52 (1991); Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA
Apostol, Prospero A. Pichay, Jr. and Roy Padilla, Jr. 221 (1991); Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194
SCRA 317 (1991); Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 (1965).
5 
Annex "C," Petition.
18 
281 SCRA 330 (1997).
6 
Journal of the House of Representatives, Vol. 62, February 5,
2001, pp. 12-13. 19 
245 SCRA 253 (1995).
7 
Representatives Edmundo O. Reyes, Jr., Jacinto V. Paras, 20 
235 SCRA 630 (1994).
Augusto "Boboy" Syjuco, Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Carlos M.
Padilla, Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr., Gerardo S. Espina, Ricardo V. 21 
Supra.
Quintos and Isidro S. Rodriguez, Jr.
22 
8  232 SCRA 110 (1994).
See note 6.
23 
9  235 SCRA 506 (1994).
Representatives Carlos M. Padilla, Salvio B. Fortuno, Dante V.
Liban, Roan I. Libarios, Nestor C. Ponce, Jr., Loretta Ann P. 24 
Rosales, Magtanggol T. Gunigundo and Edmundo O. Reyes, Jr. 175 SCRA 264 (1989).
25  38 
246 SCRA 334 (1995). Records of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the
Disagreeing Provisions of Senate Bill No. 1742 and House Bill No.
26 
Supra. 9000 (Committee on Electoral Reforms), November 23, 2000, pp.
95-99.
27 
Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835 (1969).
39 
Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256 (1989).
28 
Samson v. Aguirre, 315 SCRA 53 (1999).
40 
Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 US 422, 80 L Ed 772
29  (1935). See also Garcia v. Corona, 321 SCRA 218
In re Guarina, 24 Phil. 37 (1913).
(1999); Samson v. Aguirre, 315 SCRA 54 (1999); Victoriano v.
30 
Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54 (1974); Morfe v.
Tatad v. Secretary of Department of Energy, supra. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968).
31 
SECTION 1, ARTICLE VIII, CONSTITUTION reads: 41 
Supra.

Sec. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court 42 
Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957).
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
43 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable protection of the laws (SECTION 1, ARTICLE III,
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been CONSTITUTION).
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the 44 
Tiu v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 278 (1999).
Government.
45 
32  Ichong v. Hernandez, supra, citing 2 Cooley, Constitutional
A rider is a provision not germane to the subject matter of the
Limitations, pp. 824-825.
bill. (Alalayan v. NPC, 24 SCRA 172 [1968]).
46 
33  For example, under the Constitution, the grounds by which the
Alalayan v. NPC, supra.
tenure of the members of the House of Representatives and the
34 
Senate may be shortened may be summarized as follows:
Cordero v. Cabatuando, 6 SCRA 418 (1962).

35 
a) Sec. 16, Art. VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any
Underscoring ours. other office or employment in the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
36 
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra. government-owned or controlled corporations or
subsidiaries;
37 
Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208 (1987).
 b) Sec. 16 (3), Art. VI: Expulsion as a disciplinary action Sec. 55. Political Activity. – No officer or employee in the
for disorderly behavior; Civil Service including members of the Armed Forces,
shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan political
c) Sec. 17, Art. VI: Disqualification as determined by activity or take part in any election except to vote nor shall
resolution of the appropriate Electoral Tribunal in an he use his official authority or influence to coerce the
election contest; and political activity of any other person or body. Nothing
herein provided shall be understood to prevent any officer
or employee from expressing his views on current political
d) Sec. 7, par. 2, Art. VI: Voluntary renunciation of office.
problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of his
candidates for public office whom he supports: Provided,
Further, under Sec. 2, Art. XI of the Constitution, the That public officers and employees holding political offices
President and the Vice-President, along with other may take part in political and electoral activities but it shall
impeachable officers, may be removed from office "on be unlawful for them to solicit contributions from their
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of subordinates or subject them to any of the acts involving
the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, subordinates prohibited in the Election Code.
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust."
50 
47 
MEMORANDUM of the Petitioners in G.R. No. 147387, pp. 19-
Section 46, Chapter 7, Title I, Subtitle A. Civil Service 20.
Commission, Book V of the 1987 Administrative Code provides, in
part, that "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be 51 
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra; Morales v. Subido, 27
suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and
SCRA 131 (1969); Casco (Phil.) Inc. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347
after due process." Further, Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus
(1963); Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1 (1947).
Rules Implementing Book V of the 1987 Administrative Code
enumerates the "grave offenses" which are grounds for dismissal
52 
upon the commission of first offense as follows: dishonesty, gross Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960).
neglect of duty, gross misconduct, being notoriously undesirable,
53 
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, falsification of 277 SCRA 268 (1997).
official document, physical or mental incapacity or disability due to
vicious habits, among others. 54 
146 SCRA 446 (1986).
48 
Officers and employees holding primarily confidential positions 55 
Id. at 452.
have terms of office which expire upon loss of confidence in them
by the appointing authority. (Hernandez v. Villegas, 14 SCRA 544 56 
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion
[1965]). of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided. This Code shall take effect one year after publication.
49 
Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I Subsection A. Civil Service
Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 57 
See Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,
(Executive Order No. 292) reads in full: supra; Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18 (1997); Bondoc v. Pineda,
201 SCRA 792 (1991); Osmeña v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 750
(1991); Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, 192 SCRA 51 (1990); Gonzales v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA
774 (1967).