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Addis Ababa City Administration Land Lease Proclamation
Addis Ababa City Administration Land Lease Proclamation
HOUSING IN ETHIOPIA:
A POLICY ASSESSMENT
CUT
Coalition for Urban Transitions
NPC
National Planning Commission
PPP
Private–public partnerships
Key findings from this paper’s analysis of the Ethiopian housing framework include:
• Ethiopia has made important progress in tackling historically high and rising
urban housing demand, particularly through its condominium development
homeownership programme – the Integrated Housing Development
Programme (IHDP) – which built nearly 400,000 units in 12 years.
• However, IHDP units are largely unaffordable for their target of lowest-income
households, and the home ownership programme has been unable to meet
demand and has incurred unsustainably high costs (subsidies totalling an
estimated US$9 billion).
Based on these key insights, this paper proposes the following policy
recommendations (Section 4) to help scale up affordable housing and ensure
compact development in Ethiopia’s cities:
• Lay the groundwork for fiscal measures that can foster compactness and
housing affordability, including through urban cadastres and regular property
valuation. Revising impact fees and implementing a development tax would
internalise urban infrastructure costs and help to bolster local revenue
collection, limit distortionary impacts on housing affordability, and encourage
more efficient use of urban land. Urban cadastres and regular revaluation of
properties should be key priorities.
fertile agricultural Ethiopia, like many of its East African neighbours, is experiencing
rapid urbanisation and facing both policy challenges. This
land, and reduction paper identifies six cross-cutting housing policy instruments
in recreational that best encompass Ethiopia’s national housing framework
from the perspective of housing affordability and compact urban
spaces for leisure. development. These six policies are set out in Section 3.
The structure of the paper is as follows. After this introductory section, Section 2
maps out Ethiopia’s current housing policy landscape. Section 3 then carries out
i. Typically, a housing expenditure threshold over 40% is considered a burden on households, between 30% and 40%
is considered unaffordable, and expenditure under 30% is considered affordable.
The numerous benefits provided by compact cities have been subject to debate
in light of COVID-19. Especially at the outset of the pandemic, questions emerged
regarding the vulnerability of densely populated cities and their potential to spread
COVID-19, due to close proximity among residents and the difficulty in applying
social distancing measures. However, as documented in the OECD report Cities
policy responses to COVID-19, urban density alone does not make cities and their
residents more vulnerable to the impacts of COVID-19, and is not necessarily
correlated with higher transmission rates.3 Rather, structural socio-economic
conditions in many cases underpin urban residents’ resilience or vulnerability (e.g.
access to good health care). In fact, dense urban environments can provide quicker
access to health and social services, create support networks to combat social
isolation and make use of “social infrastructure” (i.e. community institutions) to
alleviate the consequences of COVID-19. This paper does not specifically analyse
the impacts of COVID-19 on urban housing in Ethiopia, although this remains an
important area for further research.
The paper applies the definitions of urban sustainability and affordable housing as
laid out in Housing policies for sustainable and inclusive cities. Urban sustainability
is thus considered from the perspective of compact urban development, which is
characterised by “dense and proximate development patterns […] linked by public
transport systems [and with] accessibility to local services and jobs”.4 Affordable
housing, in line with the definition employed by many OECD and non-OECD
countries, can be measured relative to the proportion of households or population
that spend more than 40% of their disposable income on housing costs. Housing
affordability definitions naturally vary from country to country (see Box 1 for the
Ethiopian context). Building on the methodology developed in Housing policies for
sustainable and inclusive cities, this paper focuses on the formal housing market,
and hence informal housing remains outside its scope. While regional governments
and secondary cities are discussed in the paper, the primary focus of the assessment
and recommendations is on the federal government and on Ethiopia’s capital
city, Addis Ababa, where the greatest demand for and supply of housing are
concentrated.
ii The Ethiopian framework plan – the National Urban Development Spatial Plan (NUDSP) – as well as some
legislation under consideration (rent cap, tenant–landlord regulation), are not discussed in full, as they were still
either under review or discussion at the time of writing.
23.5
MILLION - urban residents
increase to 42.3 million by 2037, growing at 3.8% per year, while the
World Bank projects this growth at a higher rate of 5.4% per year.6 The
main drivers of urbanisation are:
112
MILLION - total population
There are marked differences between the livelihoods of people
in rural areas (of whom 25.6% live in poverty) and urban areas
(of whom 14.8% live in poverty).9 This “urban advantage” drives
natural population growth – where the mortality rate is lower
than the fertility rate – which is estimated to have accounted for
up to 40% of urban population growth as of 2012.10
Ethiopia’s urbanisation rate is
currently significantly below • dministration and planning: The reclassification of rural
A
the sub-Saharan average villages into towns accounted for approximately 33% of growth
in the total urban population as of 2012,iv while the expansion
of existing urban areas into nearby settlements accounted
for 3%.11 The government’s efforts to embed (sustainable)
urbanisation priorities within national development plans
such as the 2015–2020 Growth and Transformation Plan II also
40.4%
Sub-Saharan urbanisation rate
iii Ethiopia’s urban population stands at 38%, according to the new methodology developed
by the OECD, the European Commission and a coalition of four other international
organisations (World Bank, FAO, UN-Habitat, ILO) to define the degree of urbanisation in
the world – where urban centres are defined and measured as high-density places having at
least 50,000 inhabitants, rather than according to nationally varying definitions for “urban”
and “rural”. That being said, the housing data analysed throughout this paper was produced
according to Ethiopia’s statistical definition of “urban”.
iv As detailed by the World Bank in its 2015 Ethiopia Urbanization Review: “Rural villages are
21%
upgraded to towns when they meet the following requirements: over half of the population
are engaged in non-farming activities such as petty trading, service provision and the like;
most of the residents in the area are benefiting from urban-based facilities like electricity,
piped-water supply, telephones, schools, and health services; total population living in
Ethiopia’s urbanisation rate that particular location is 2,000 and above; and the area is believed to have potential for
economic growth and attraction of migrants to engage in nonfarm activities.”
42.3
formal and informal, of only 15% of the country’s total workforce,
and 60% of all new jobs created between 2005 and 2011 were in
Million - urban residents
urban centres.14 Accordingly, rural–urban migration accounted
for 24% of the growth of urban populations as of 2012.15
The capital city of Addis Ababa is by far the most populous city in
Ethiopia, having undergone rapid growth in terms of population,
25.6%
RURAL residents
3.8 million in 2015 versus 2.8 million in 2000 (37% increase), and of
built-up area, 113 km2 in 2015 versus 85 km2 in 2000 (32% increase).vi,18
live in poverty
14.8%
URBAN residents
live in poverty
v Ethiopia’s population age structure is almost identical to the sub-Saharan Africa regional aggregate and contrasts
with that of OECD member states: percentage of total population aged 0–14 (Ethiopia, 40.8%; sub-Saharan Africa,
42.5%; OECD, 17.7%); percentage of total population aged 15–64 (Ethiopia, 55.7%; sub-Saharan Africa, 54.6%; OECD,
65.1%); percentage of total population aged 65 and above (Ethiopia, 3.5%; sub-Saharan Africa, 2.9%; OECD, 17.2%).
vi Pesaresi, M., Florczyk, A., Schiavina, M., Melchiorri, M. and Maffenini, L., 2019. GHS settlement grid,
updated and refined REGIO model 2014 in application to GHS-BUILT R2018A and GHS-POP R2019A,
multitemporal (1975-1990-2000-2015), R2019A. European Commission, Joint Research Centre.
DOI:10.2905/42E8BE89-54FF-464E-BE7B-BF9E64DA5218.
40%
from natural
33%
from the reclassification of rural
24%
from rural-urban
3%
from the expansion of urban areas
population growth villages into towns migration into nearby settlements
Key:
DELIMITATION
DELIMITATION
NUMBER OF
HOUSING UNITS
(% OF TOTAL), BY
TYPE OF TENURE
Notes: CSA considers a housing unit to be “free of charge or subsidised” (simply referred to as “Free or Subsidised”
in the table) if it is provided to a tenant for free or at a subsidised rate on behalf of a relative or an employer.
Source: Author elaboration adapted from Ethiopia’s Central Statistical Agency Welfare Monitoring Survey
2015/2016.20
vii Since the Welfare Monitoring Survey 2015/2016 did not collect disaggregated data according to the type
of rental tenure, the most relevant data source was last collected in 2007, when the third and most recent
national population and housing census was conducted (Table 2). The census data reveal the constitution of
the rental market in 2007 and are largely consistent with WMS 2015/2016 (Table 1), and hence inform current
understanding of Ethiopia’s urban rental tenure.
DELIMITATION
TYPE OF TENURE
TOTAL HOUSING UNITS 15 103 137 12 206 118 2 897 019 628 986
TOTAL OWNER-OCCUPIED
12 303 481 11 164 791 1 138 690 205 196
UNITS
% OF TOTAL HOUSING UNITS 81.46% 91.47% 39.31% 32.62%
TOTAL RENT-FREE UNITS 1 016 246 815 291 200 955 37 293
% OF TOTAL HOUSING UNITS 6.73% 6.68% 6.94% 5.93%
TOTAL RENTAL UNITS 1 783 410 226 036 1 557 374 386 497
% OF TOTAL HOUSING UNITS 11.81% 1.85% 53.76% 61.45%
Rental from kebele 362 303 16 875 345 428 148 645
% of total rental units 20.32% 7.47% 22.18% 38.46%
Rental from private household 1 363 129 194 015 1 169 114 222 384
% of total rental units 76.43% 85.83% 75.07% 57.54%
Notes: The CSA considers “Rent-Free Units” to be owner-occupied units where the inhabitant does not pay rent.
For the purposes of this paper, “Rent-Free Units” have been included as a distinct category, and thus have not been
accounted for in the tabulation of total owner-occupied units. “Occupied difference rent” indicates housing units
occupied by households paying a difference in rent. Such a household owns another housing unit that is rented for
either less or more compared to the rent of the housing unit the household is occupying at the time of the census.
Source: Author elaboration adapted from the 2007 Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia.21
While access to services, such as water, sanitation, solid waste and electricity, is
significantly better in urban areas than rural areas, it nonetheless remains low.
Almost all urban households have access to an improved source of drinking water
and 93% have access to electricity, yet only 16% use improved sanitation (e.g. flush/
pour-flush to piped sewer/septic/latrine).ix,25 Solid waste management also poses a
challenge, as it is often discharged into open areas, endangering public health.
viii Flooring materials differ widely in urban and rural areas: “earth or sand”, “vinyl or asphalt strips” and “carpet” are
most often used in urban households (23% each), whereas the floors in rural households are primarily of “earth or
sand” (55%) and “dung” (39%).
ix Household coverage for water, sanitation and electricity remains low in Ethiopia. Nearly two-thirds (65%) of
all households have access to an improved source of drinking water, but only 6% use improved sanitation. The
remaining 94% use unimproved sanitation: generally a shared facility (9%), an unimproved facility (53%) or no
facility (32%). Urban households are more likely than rural households to use improved sanitation (16% versus 4%),
and while nearly all urban households (93%) have access to electricity, this is only the case for 26% at the national
level. Unimproved sanitation poses numerous health risks, which can be compounded by rapid urbanisation as
cities struggle to provide wastewater infrastructure to a fast-growing population. Sanitation-related issues are
among the leading causes of disease transmission in Africa, especially for cholera, diarrhoea, dysentery and
typhoid. The low share of improved sanitation in Ethiopia’s cities is a common challenge across urban areas in
sub-Saharan Africa, where only 20% of the population is estimated to have safely managed sanitation and 25% to
basic sanitation.26
HOUSEHOLDS
HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS
Yes 93% 8% 26%
ELECTRICITY
No 7% 92% 74%
NATURAL FLOOR
Earth, sand 23% 55% 48%
Dung 9% 39% 33%
RUDIMENTARY FLOOR
Wood/planks 0.3% 0.1% 0.2%
FLOORING Palm/bamboo 0.8% 1.7% 1.5%
MATERIAL FINISHED FLOOR
Parquet or polished wood 1% 0.1% 0.3%
Vinyl or asphalt strips 23% 1.2% 5.6%
Ceramic tiles 4% 0.1% 0.9%
Cement 16% 1.6% 4.5%
Carpet 23% 1.4% 5.8%
One 65% 72% 70%
ROOMS USED Two 25% 23% 24%
FOR SLEEPING
Three or more 9% 5% 6%
Source: Ethiopia’s Central Statistical Agency’s Demographic and Health Survey 2016.27
x Proclamation Number 80/1993 states: “In the case of urban land used for social services and low cost houses,
the rate of rent payable in accordance with sub-article 1 of this Article shall be low” (Article 8, §2). Proclamation
272/2002, “Re-enactment of the Urban Lease Holding Proclamation”, which repealed the original 1993
Proclamation, similarly states, “Region or City government may permit urban land for lease payment down to nil
for a development activity, social service-rendering institution, low-cost housing, private dwelling houses and
similar undertakings it purports to encourage” (Article 8, §2). Neither proclamation provided a definition of “low-
cost houses/housing”.
xi Formal housing refers to housing owned by individuals, private developers or the government, and that complies
with all legal standards, including the land lease law as well as building codes and standards. Housing delivery
systems under this group include housing cooperatives, privately owned individual houses, private real estate
developments, government housing for civil servants and government-owned condominium housing.
In the OECD, affordable housing is typically measured relative to the proportion of household/
population expenditure on housing costs that does not exceed 30% of disposable income (over
40% is deemed a burden by the OECD). In the Ethiopian context, housing may appear relatively
affordable at first glance: expenditures on “housing (rent), water, electricity and gas” account
for around 19% of annual expenditures for households across all consumption quintiles (19.5%
average for urban households), which is not dissimilar to the OECD average of 22%.37
However, upon further scrutiny it is clear that the Ethiopian context is very different, for
instance with regard to other expenditure categories. Across the OECD, 14% of total household
expenditure on average is on “food and non-alcoholic beverages”, whereas in Ethiopia this
category accounts for more than 54% of total expenditures for fully 80% of households (even
households in the fifth consumption quintile expend 44% in this category): Ethiopian urban
households in the first consumption quintile spend up to 60% of annual expenditures on “food
and non-alcoholic beverages”.38
In practice, this means that housing and food costs alone account for 65% of annual
expenditures for the average urban household in Ethiopia – a figure that rises to 80% for urban
households in the first consumption quintile and only goes as low as 60% for households in the
fifth quintile. Even with housing finance, only 3.5% of urban households are estimated to be
able to afford the cheapest new housing unit (20m2) built by a formal developer or contractor,
which would cost around 600,000 ETB (PPP US$ 55,871).39
For households in Addis Ababa, median rent shares as a proportion of household consumption
are estimated to be much lower for those occupying informal housing (14.8%) than formal
housing (45%), IHDP (52%) or cooperatives (56%); low-income households in Addis Ababa (e.g.
quintiles one and two) can essentially only afford informal housing or kebele housing.40 This is
illustrative of the great challenge in Ethiopia to define and provide affordable housing for all.41
Source: FDRE CSA, 2017. Demographic and Health Survey 2016; C-GIDD, 2020. GIDD database; OECD,
2021. Building for a better tomorrow; OECD AHD, n.d. OECD Affordable Housing Database: Indicator HC1.1;
Zhang et al., 2019. Unlocking Ethiopia’s Urban Land and Housing Markets.
There are 780 subnational governments including the 9 regions and 2 chartered
cities, as well as 6 zones, 98 urban local governments (ULGs) and 665 rural
woreda districts (woredas can be rural or urban) (Figure 1).44 The regional states
are structured into zones that are headed by appointed executives and councils
and serve a coordinating role as well as linking between regions and the next
level of government, which consists of woredas and ULGs (also referred to as city
administrations).45 Approximately 1,385 urban settlements have populations mostly
below 20,000 and do not have ULG status, functioning instead under the authority
of woredas.46
FEDERAL GOVERMENT
9 REGIONS AND
2 CHARTERED CITIES
6 TERRITORIAL ZONES
Note: *Kebele administration units were the lowest level of government for years but they no longer exist, having been
integrated into woredas.47
xii Each level of government is responsible for the provision of public services at its level, whereas the federal
state is responsible for shared competences and for all powers that have not been delegated to the regional
level. The regional governments are responsible for a wide range of policy domains, including economic and
social development policies, while the woredas are in charge of water provision and distribution, building and
maintenance of local roads, primary schools and primary health care services, among other services.
Revenue sources are clearly assigned to the federal and regional states, but weak fiscal bases
and collection obstacles undermine local governments’ fiscal revenues. This renders local
governments highly reliant on intergovernmental transfers, limiting their autonomy.
Tax revenue: the constitution allows the regional states to levy the following taxes: income tax
on employees of the state government; agricultural tax on farmers; tax on individual traders,
houses and other property owned by private persons or regional governments; sales tax on
public enterprises owned by the state government; and forest products. Regional states also
receive income from shared taxes levied by the federal government on profit, sales, excise and
personal taxes on enterprises (the list is jointly established); taxes on the profits of shareholders
(companies and individuals); and taxes on income derived from large-scale mining, petroleum
and gas operations. This regional system of taxation creates important income inequalities
between regions, as the limited tax bases are unevenly distributed in the country. There is also
an imbalance between federal and regional states, and between the regional states themselves,
in the distribution of shared taxes. The chartered city of Addis Ababa, estimated to generate
25% of national GDP, has the power to create new taxes and levies.
Other sources of revenue: regional states and chartered cities (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa)
also benefit from other sources of revenues, including: administrative fees and charges, such as
work permits, court fines and fees, forfeits, business and professional registration and licence
fees; sale of public goods and services; government investment income; and miscellaneous
revenues. Addis Ababa raises revenues through urban land lease, yet this is decreasing as a
share of its total local revenue.
Source: OECD/UCLG, 2016. “Ethiopia” in Subnational Governments Around the World - Part III: Country
Profiles, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, and United Cities and Local
Governments, Barcelona. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/regional/regional-policy/profile-Ethiopia.pdf.
The OECD, in partnership with the Coalition for Urban Transitions, has developed a framework
to assess how national housing policy instruments can affect urban compactness and housing
affordability. Sixteen national housing policy instruments from around the world were
categorised into three groups owing to the cross-cutting nature of many policies: i) policy
instruments affecting use of land for housing development, thus affecting the general housing
market; ii) policy instruments mainly affecting the owner-occupied housing market; and iii)
policy instruments mainly affecting the rental housing market.
The overall assessment found that in the first group of policies on land use, regulatory
instruments, such as urban growth boundaries (UGBs), urban services boundaries (USBs) and
greenbelts, as well as tradable/transferable development rights, bear a risk of negative impacts
on compactness and housing affordability. These policies require particularly careful design
and implementation – for example, with regard to their capacity to adapt to urbanisation trends
in the case of greenbelts or UGBs and USBs. In contrast, fiscal instruments, such as split-rate
taxes, taxes on vacant land, impact fees, development taxes and incentives for higher density/
accessibility, tend to be more adaptable and are more conducive to increasing compactness
and housing affordability. Such instruments can be particularly effective in preventing windfall
gains for landowners and redistributing a degree of landowners’ benefits directly to urban
residents.
Source: Moreno-Monroy et al., 2020. Housing policies for sustainable and inclusive cities.
The result of the mapping exercise reveals that several key instruments for compact
urban development and affordable housing are already implemented or in progress
in Ethiopia:
• “Impact fees” are in place, in the form of the national land allocation
system which incorporates benchmark prices since 2011 to try to recover
infrastructure costs.
• “The perpetual use of social housing for rent in central urban areas” is
especially prevalent in Ethiopia through kebele housing units.
• “Rent control” applies to kebele and federal housing corporation (FHC) units
but is not extended to the private rental market.
The mapping exercise also found that Ethiopia lacks several key policy instruments
which are in use globally to enhance housing affordability and compact urban
development:
• From the category of policy instruments affecting the use of land for housing
development, the Ethiopian national policy framework lacks split-rate
property taxes and vacant urban land taxes (in fact, standard property taxes
are not effectively implemented in Ethiopian cities in practice), a development
tax, tradable/transferable development rights, urban growth/service
boundaries, and greenbelts.
• From the category of policy instruments mainly affecting the rental housing
market, the Ethiopian national policy framework lacks subsidies or tax
incentives to investors and developers for affordable rental housing. Rental
housing allowances apply to employees of certain universities, public
institutions and companies, but remain unavailable to urban residents who
would benefit from such support.
The full results of the mapping exercise are summarised in Table 4 and expanded
upon in the following subsections, which assess the six main national housing
policy instruments in Ethiopia and their impacts on urban compactness and
housing affordability.
Note: In the “Policy” column, the following colours assess the extent to which a given policy instrument is generally advisable, based on analysis in Housing
policies for sustainable and inclusive cities (not necessarily prescriptive for the Ethiopian context), in order to achieve compact and inclusive cities:
Impact fees Internalise the cost of More dense and less Mixed – prevent windfall Yes, within the national land
infrastructure provision fragmented development gains for landowners (for allocation system: since 2011,
by charging developers/ as incentives to build near developing their land benchmark prices for land
landowners for their existing stock increase without providing necessary allocation are required to be set
developments in order to infrastructure) and increase at cost-recovery levels for the
recover the social cost of access to services provision of basic infrastructure
conversion to housing
Development tax Internalises the social and Less sprawl, as it provides Mixed – can capture and No
environmental loss of open disincentives to landowners redistribute landowners’
space by levying tax on for land conversion benefits to urban residents
land that is converted from
agricultural to urban use
Tradable or Compensate restricted May not directly reduce Uncertain – depends on the No
transferable development rights by sprawl but can produce initial state of regulation and
development allowing a right to develop a more dense development allocation of development
rights plot of land to be transferred if restricted rights in urban rights
to another plot; often used to fringes are traded to urban
preserve historical buildings centres; the correct cap
needs to be established
Urban growth Contain sprawling housing Less sprawl and more dense Increased housing prices No
boundaries or development by physically development, but more
urban service limiting developable fringe sprawl and more fragmented
boundaries areas if boundaries are not
drawn properly or updated
periodically
Incentives for Incentivise housing Less sprawl and more dense Increased affordable housing Yes: since IHDP as a whole has
higher density or development with higher development stock; access requirements benefitted from preferential
accessibility density/floor-to-area ratio can increase inequality subsidies, high-density housing
and with better access through housing cost developments are incentivised
through subsidies; used in overburden (higher grants indirectly (IHDP developments
areas where densification and subsidies can capitalise can be up to 7 or 12 floors but
needs to be encouraged into higher prices) there are no specific subsidies/
(e.g. near public transit incentives for higher-floored
infrastructure or high IHDP developments); incentives
employment areas) are not in place for non-IHDP
housing developments
Mortgage interest Allows taxpayers to own Results in an increase either Higher housing prices in Yes: IHDP’s mortgage loans are
deduction their homes and brings in space consumed per capita places with rigid housing issued by the Commercial Bank
positive externalities to their or in the share of single- supply; increased wealth of Ethiopia at subsidised rates
communities family homes in peripheral inequality when beneficiaries
areas (more in places with are high-income households
rigid housing supply) that benefit from large tax
deductions
Rental housing Ease housing cost burden Neutral Mixed – Increase access to No: only certain universities,
allowances or for renters by lowering rents affordable housing for lower- government organisations
rent-subsidy through a subsidy income households and can and companies provide rental
vouchers also increase residential housing allowances for their
mobility; can boost rents and respective tenants
land prices if supply is rigid
Rent control Establish controls on rent Neutral Mixed – May increase Yes: rent controls are in place
(e.g. initial rent level, and/or affordability of rental for kebele and FHC units. In
increases in rent levels) housing in the short-term but addition, a tentative regulation
decrease supply across the to fix a rent cap has been
housing market proposed for the private rental
market (in discussion)
Perpetual use of Create a pool of social More compact since such Lower costs for social Yes: kebele housing stock was
social housing housing units to be leased housing is located in more housing tenants and often historically located on
for rent in central out to eligible households central, and generally denser, increased overall access to prime urban land in central
areas through a below-market use areas social housing areas. While some units have
contract been demolished, many kebele
units remain in central areas
and their residents rent at
below-market rates (in Addis
Ababa, however, much of the
inner city has been delineated
for redevelopment, including
kebele units located there)
Subsidies or tax Ensure access to affordable Mixed – More compact Lower housing costs, but No
incentives for housing by providing development through potentially greater spatial
affordable rental incentives to investors and regeneration and conversion segregation; if developments
housing developers of central housing stock are built at low cost in areas
or explicit subsidies for with low connectivity this
multi-family dwellings; can lead to poor-quality
less compact development housing and worse access
through development in to jobs and services. Tax
peripheral areas, with incentives may create
maximum negative effects some distortions (e.g. tax
when combined with low avoidance)
occupancy rates
Source: Table adapted from Housing policies for sustainable and inclusive cities, with complementary information
regarding Ethiopia (rightmost column) derived from the analysis conducted in this paper.
This section and its six subsequent subsections provide in-depth analysis of six
major national housing policy instruments affecting housing affordability and
compact development in Ethiopia. The previous section found that, out of 16 global
policy instruments, seven policy instruments are in place in Ethiopia. In fact, these
are in operation in the form of six different programmes and initiatives listed below:
• Land-use planning
• Cooperative housing
• Kebele housing
Land allocation for As the sole suppliers of urban land in Land has been allocated for It incentivises developers to
affordable housing Ethiopia, public authorities provide land residential purposes to high- construct affordable housing, but
through leases via direct allocation and density condominiums (namely rigid supply of suitable land may
auction (the latter accounts for a minor within the context of IHDP), limit supply of affordable housing.
portion of land provision). All land was which contributes positively to Too costly (due to low benchmark
nationalised in 1974 and Ethiopia’s urban compactness when located in prices, the government has not
land lease policy was established in 1993 central urban areas. captured a significant source of
and revised in 2002 and 2011. revenue that could be channelled
into provisioning more affordable
housing).
Integrated Housing A homeownership programme designed IHDP condominiums are high While IHDP increases the available
Development to provide housing for low-income density relative to land area affordable housing stock, higher-
Programme (IHDP) households through the construction and contribute to compactness, income households mostly benefit
of condominiums. A total of 383,000 when centrally located. When (low-income households are
housing units were constructed between IHDP redevelopments have unable to afford upfront down
2006 and 2018, primarily in Addis Ababa displaced kebele residents payments and long-term mortgage
(314,000). to the urban periphery, payments).
contributes to sprawl. When
built along the urban periphery,
IHDP condominiums negatively
impact compactness and
contribute to sprawl.
Cooperative A means of securing land for private, Medium-density development, Increases affordable homes.
housing collective construction of housing units but may contribute to urban However, the required
by a small group (typically 10 to 20 sprawl if built in the urban upfront capital costs as well
individuals). It occupies a limited portion periphery. It is estimated that as construction costs render
of total housing and benefits middle- and up to 60% of land allocated to cooperatives still unaffordable for
high-income households. In secondary cooperatives in Addis Ababa is low-income households.
cities, it is often the main source of located in the periphery.
housing supply. It has been suspended
in Addis Ababa since 2005, but there is
growing interest in re-establishing it.
Kebele housing: Inexpensive and often low-quality Kebele units are high density Remains by far the most affordable
low-income- government-owned rental units. relative to built-up area and formal housing option in urban
household targeted Established in 1975, when the Derg the majority are located in areas in Ethiopia (e.g. 10 ETB per
rental housing nationalised a vast portion of informal central urban areas. However, month). Kebele units are often
settlements. Over the years, some such density is largely due to sublet informally and thus are
kebele units have been demolished while kebele units’ small floor area, occupied by more households than
other informal settlements have been overcrowding and limited on paper.
regularised and added to kebele housing infrastructure connections.
stock.
Source: Author elaboration based on interviews from the fact-finding mission and on the analysis in section 3.2.
Key findings from the analysis in the subsequent subsections are summarised
below:
• During the last two decades, Ethiopia has made important progress in
tackling historically high and rising urban housing demand. The federal
government has assumed an active role in addressing the country’s urban
housing shortage, contributing significant resources to increasing the housing
stock. Through IHDP alone, between 2006 and 2016, a notable 383,000
condominium housing units have been constructed, involving nearly 2,000
contractors and 12,000 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). However,
supply has been unable to satisfy demand due in part to lack of capacity,
construction and transfer delays, a continued rapid urbanisation rate and the
Subsections 3.2.1–3.2.6 assess in full detail the six defining national urban housing
policy instruments that best encompass Ethiopia’s national housing framework
from the dual perspective of housing affordability and compact urban development.
Limited control over urban land-use planning has also resulted in the existence
of a relatively high proportion of vacant land in Ethiopian cities. The World Bank
estimates that underdeveloped land accounts for an important portion of the
total land area in a range of different cities: approximately 46% in Addis Ababa
and in Mekelle, 25% in Bahir Dar, 77% in Dessie and 32% in Hawassa.60 It is
important to note that these figures consider green spaces, protected areas, urban
agriculture, forests, water bodies and land identified as having a special function
as “undeveloped”, meaning that the proportion of truly vacant land is likely to be
lower. In the Bole and Akaki-Kaliti sub-cities of Addis Ababa, which have been the
two main expansion frontiers in terms of built-up area between 2005 and 2019, more
than 303 hectares of land, equivalent to an estimated 21,643 residential plots and
90,000 housing units, have been left vacant for over 10 years – up to 57% of Bole
sub-city is vacant.61
Vacant land within the urban core, especially in Addis Ababa, is widespread
and often remains undeveloped for years. There are three main reasons for the
high proportion of vacant urban land. First, there is low government capacity to
process and transfer land lease rights and to monitor and enforce land parcels and
leases. Ethiopian law forbids lessees to hold land for more than two years without
developing it, although in practice, many developers and investors opt to hold
land for speculative purposes for many years.62 Second, certain zoning regulations
that mandate a minimum height requirement for development may be unfeasible
for an individual, cooperative or small business to comply with. As a result, such
stakeholders may decide to postpone developing land and wait to transfer their
lease at a higher price.63 The numerous vacant lots are also often occupied by
informal developments, further complicating potential future efforts by either the
government or private entities to develop such land. Third, the relative absence
In Ethiopia, taxes on property (e.g. land, buildings)i in cities are not effectively
implemented. Although some forms of taxation exist (e.g. roof taxes, permit
holding fees), they are not regularly updated or enforced, and the rates are too
low to constitute a source of revenue. In Addis Ababa, despite attempts in the
1990s to register and revalue properties, property taxation is absent in practice
due to deliberate property undervaluation, the absence of revaluation, and the
government’s inability to register most new properties.64 In Dire Dawa, Bahir Dar
and Mekelle, a pilot project to design and implement property taxation is underway
but has not yet concluded. Public ownership of land and political obstacles facing
the implementation of property taxation in Ethiopian cities may present challenges,
but the absence of such taxes represents a massive missed opportunity for land
value captureii and local government revenue generation in Ethiopia.iii,65 This also
presents a barrier to related fiscal instruments, such as split-rate taxes (land taxed
at a higher rate than the buildings on it) or a vacant urban land tax, which could
serve to limit land speculation, to boost local tax revenue and to reduce incentives
for urban sprawl, as seen in Table 4. It is worth bearing in mind in the context of
taxing vacant urban land that care must be taken to avoid disenfranchising those
with legitimate rights: i.e. those who are not hoarding parcels for speculation, but
are waiting until they can afford to build on their plots to the required planning
standards/height. Another key consideration is how to coordinate between
regulation and tax measures to avoid underdevelopment.
i Property taxes include recurrent taxes on immovable property or net wealth, taxes on the change of ownership
of property through inheritance or gift, and taxes on financial and capital transactions. Unless otherwise noted,
within the context of this paper the term “property tax(es)” refers to the category of recurrent taxes on immovable
property, encompassing land and buildings.
ii Land value capture is rooted in the notion that public action should generate public benefit, and can be
understood as a policy approach that enables communities to recover and reinvest land value increases that result
from public investment and government actions: examples of land value capture instruments include land value
taxes, impact fees, land banking, charges on building rights, and more.
iii Generally speaking, property tax revenues tend to be much larger in developed countries (2.2% of GDP) than in
developing countries (0.6% of GDP), and – due to a variety of historical, cultural and institutional reasons – are
particularly low in African countries at 0.38% of GDP on average across 32 African countries.
As a consequence, many rural residents (typically farmers) living outside the urban
periphery decide to pre-emptively subdivide and sell their land informally, which
incentivises urban sprawl and the continued expansion of informal settlements.
Tradable or transferrable development rights, where the right to develop a plot of
land (i.e. at the periphery) is transferred to another plot (i.e. in the urban centre),
can in certain contexts provide an additional measure of flexibility to planners to
produce denser development and reduce incentives for sprawl,68 though the impacts
on housing affordability are uncertain (Table 4). Transferrable development rights,
as with urban growth/service boundaries and greenbelts (also absent in Ethiopia),
may not be able to adequately limit urban sprawl, especially in a context with a high
degree of informal land transactions and settlements.
As the sole suppliers of urban land in Ethiopia, local governments play a key role
in land provision, but face a financial burden as land is allocated far below market
value and often below cost-recovery levels (Box 4). Although the cities of Mekelle,
Bahir Dar, Hawassa and Adama sold leases worth over US$77 million between 2014
and 2017 in their expansion areas alone, rapid urbanisation would inhibit municipal
governments from capitalising on a potentially major source of revenue via the
lease system. By Ethiopian law, land must be provided with basic minimum services
prior to being leased, meaning that road, water and electricity infrastructure must
already be provided before any significant revenue is generated. Moreover, except
for a minimal down payment, revenues are collected throughout the entire duration
of a lease, which can extend up to 50 years in certain cases, thus providing a
significant financial obstacle for local governments.70
Since leases are fixed payments determined at a given point in time, they do not
correspondingly reflect changes in the market value of land. This marks a significant
missed opportunity for land value capture and regular own-source revenue for
cities.71 Property taxes can enable a shift away from the current model where cities
rely primarily on land acquisition and inefficient land leasing that fails to capture
BOX 4 Urban land lease policy in Ethiopia: land allocation and auction
In Ethiopia, land is provided either by direct allocation or auction, often at benchmark prices
far below cost-recovery levels for the provision of basic infrastructure. Direct allocation is more
widely used, and auction is only used for a minor fraction of the total allocated land parcels:
6.2% in Addis Ababa (2011–2013); 3.6% in Mekelle (2012–2013); 2.3% in Kombolcha (2012–
2013); 2.9% in Bahir Dar (2013).75 Since the 2011 land lease proclamation, benchmark prices
have been required to be set at cost-recovery levels for the provision of basic infrastructure,
and the price-setting for auctions starts at cost-recovery levels.76 In this way, the Ethiopian
framework includes impact fees. Despite these requirements, the benchmark prices remain
substantially below market prices: for instance, in cities such as Bahir Dar, Dessir and
Kombolcha, benchmark prices were tens to even hundreds of times lower than auction prices.
In addition, land for condominiums (as well as certain private individual homes) has primarily
been auctioned starting at either low benchmark prices or at nearly no cost.
Zhang et al. estimate that forgone revenues from land allocated at no cost or benchmark prices
amounted to 206 billion ETB annually in Addis Ababa between 2013 and 2017 (approximately
seven times the city’s annual budget), which is equivalent to the construction costs of
approximately 300,000 IHDP units.77 Land revenues in Adama, Addis Ababa and Mekelle
have been found to account for below 10% of total city revenues. Such a low land revenue
rate indicates a missed opportunity for land value capture that is detrimental to the financial
stability of local governments.
The land leasing and land allocation systems have historically led to non-transparent
urban land pricing in Ethiopian cities. A clause in the 2002 land lease revision allowing for
“negotiation”, led to a scenario where, of 1,000 land lease transactions between 2002 to
2009, more than 96% of plots were leased through “negotiation”, and only 4% via allotment
at benchmark prices and auctioning – the price per m2 for a plot of land in one of Addis
Ababa’s sub-cities could reach 50 times the price of another plot in the same area.78 The 2011
proclamation scrapped “negotiation” as a modality for land leasing and made all commercial
land dependent on auction (at least on paper). This certainly increased the government’s
Source: World Bank, 2015. Ethiopia Urbanization Review; Goodfellow, 2017. Taxing property in a neo-
developmental state; Zhang et al., 2019. Unlocking Ethiopia’s Urban Land and Housing Markets; Lall et al.,
2017. Africa’s Cities: Opening Doors to the World.
i A limited number of units are available to rent for school teachers. It has been reported that, in recent years,
the Addis Ababa government has begun to extend units for rental to households that are displaced by IHDP
redevelopment but unable to afford the down payment or mortgage for any type of IHDP unit.
Between 2006 and 2010, the first four-year phase of IHDP, the government set a
target to construct 360,000 condominium housing units, of which 175,000 (48.6%)
were planned in Addis Ababa, by far the most populated city in the country, and the
remaining 185,000 (51.4%) in selected regional cities.82 Although the target was not
accomplished, the IHDP has rendered the government the leading housing provider
during the period, supplying 232,915 condominium units (51.2%) of a total of 455,473
urban units between 2007 and 2013.83
In mid-2010, IHDP was suspended in all regions except for Addis Ababa. The
suspension was due to slow uptake and high costs, namely the limited ability
of households to pay the down payment and monthly mortgage, and of regional
states to repay construction loans, as well as low effective demand due in part to
opposition to high-rise condominiums from local populations on socio-cultural and
aesthetic grounds.84 In the regional cities (excluding Addis Ababa), a total of 69,921
units were constructed through IHDP before the suspension.85
Between 2006 and 2018, IHDP has led to the total construction of 383,000 housing
units (314,000 in Addis Ababa) and the subsequent transfer of an estimated 245,000
units (182,000 in Addis Ababa; 62,300 in secondary cities), while also involving
nearly 2,000 contractors and 12,000 SMEs in housing development projects.86 IHDP
has thus made a considerable contribution to the overall urban housing stock in
a short time, while also providing local economic opportunities. Prior to IHDP,
the domestic construction sector lacked relative capacity and expertise, but it has
been bolstered through the programme. However, factors such as rapid population
growth, the rising cost of labour and construction materials, limited government
capacity and high subsidies have inhibited IHDP’s ability to satisfy rising demand
for housing, for which there is an estimated shortage of between 1.2 million and 1.5
million housing units.87
IHDP units have been allocated on the basis of a lottery system and financed by mortgage
loans from the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia issued at subsidised rates (a form of mortgage
interest deduction). The lottery was closed to new registrants in 2013 in Addis Ababa (IHDP
was suspended in regional cities in mid-2010). In order to qualify for a housing unit, an
applicant could not already have owned a home (nor their spouse), had to be at least 18 years
old and to have lived for at least six months in the city in which they were applying for a
unit. The lottery system included special provisions such that 30% of IHDP units had to be
allocated to women and that the elderly or handicapped were granted priority for ground floor
housing units.88 Applicants had to have saved a certain percentage of the cost of their intended
apartment as down payment in the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia before they could be included
IHDP’s housing loan programmes were divided into three categories, each designed for a
different target population and reflecting different financial requirements (Table 6):
• The “10/90” programme was intended for low-income households, with civil servants
highlighted as a target group, earning a monthly income below 1,000 ETB. The programme
requires a down payment of 10% of the total purchase price, with the remaining 90%
constituted by a loan to be paid back over a period of 25 years at a rate of 9.5%, and
beneficiaries are only eligible for the studio unit.
• The “20/80” programme requires a 20% down payment with the remaining 80%
constituted by a 20-year loan at a rate of 9.5%.
• The “40/60” programme was intended for middle- and high-income households, requiring
a down payment of 40%, with the remaining 60% constituted by a 17-year loan at a rate of
7.5%.89
Note: *A later draw for the 40/60 programme only included applicants who had saved the full cost of the down payment.
Source: MUDHC, 2014. National Report on Housing & Sustainable Urban Development.
The “40/60” programme was the last of the three loan programmes to be introduced (in 2014
and only in Addis Ababa) and was specifically designed as a revision to IHDP in recognition
that IHDP’s subsidies were not financially sustainable.90 To this end, the required 40% down
payment of the “40/60” programme has helped to somewhat reduce the financial burden on
the government, as the units are allocated closer to the market price (the units still remain
subsidised).91
Source: MUDHC, 2014. National Report on Housing & Sustainable Urban Development; UN-Habitat, 2011.
The Ethiopia Case of Condominium Housing; World Bank, 2015. Ethiopia Urbanization Review; MUDHC/
Cities Alliance, 2015. State of Ethiopian Cities Report 2015.
IHDP’s “10/90”, “20/80” and “40/60” housing loan programmes (Box 5) have
increased access to relatively affordable housing, but they remain prohibitively
expensive for low-income households. Although a household in the lowest
consumption quintile is eligible for the “10/90” loan, the monthly payment for a
IHDP UNIT TYPE PLANNED UNITS (%) UNIT SIZE LOAN ELIGIBILITY
Source: Adapted from Tipple and Yitbarek Alemayehu, 2014. Stocktaking of the housing sector in sub-Saharan Africa.
Part 3: Ethiopia.95
ii As detailed in the 2015 World Bank review, income data in Ethiopia are sparsely reported, which is why
consumption data are employed as a proxy. The housing affordability of IHDP is assessed based on the threshold
that households should not spend more than 30% of annual expenditures on housing costs. Though, as noted in
Box 1, even the 30% threshold may be too high for many urban households in Ethiopia.
As stated, IHDP faces unsustainably large implicit subsidies of about US$9 billion.
In an effort to reduce the financial risk borne by local contractors and to ensure
availability of construction materials, the federal and regional governments secured
a value-added tax exemption on the import of machinery and materials purchased
in bulk for IHDP such as crushers, loaders, cement, rebar, glass and aluminium.iii,99
The federal government and Addis Ababa City Administration also financed the
provision of infrastructure (e.g. access roads, utilities) and provided the design
and construction management of the condominiums free of charge (whether
designed/managed by the government or outsourced to consultants). Analysis by
Zhang et al. in 2019 revealed that the average cost to the government for delivery
of one IHDP unit was 647,007 ETB (US$23,292), equating to approximately 12,094
ETB (US$431) per m2: on this basis, the total cost of construction of all IHDP units
to the government thus was estimated to exceed 247 billion ETB (approximately
US$9 billion).100 If one assumes that the full average transfer price was recovered
by the government upon the sale of all constructed units, the 383,000 IHDP units
constructed between 2006 and 2018 were estimated to have incurred government
subsidies amounting to approximately 150 billion ETB (US$5.3 billion). This would
suggest that only 35% of the cost of constructing an IHDP unit is recovered by the
government. Indeed, although the cost of IHDP units are much lower than private
sector units (approximately 25% the cost of private development), such savings are
largely due to the lack of inclusion of the direct costs of construction, infrastructure,
financing and land in the sale price of IHDP units.101
iii In addition, Ethiopia’s heavy reliance on imported materials and machinery for housing construction in general
has seen strong price fluctuation for these goods, depending on the exchange rate: in 2018, the national bank’s
devaluation of the currency to encourage exports led to a 50% increase in the price of construction materials.
In Addis Ababa, where most IHDP condominiums have been constructed, initial
condominium projects as well as select redevelopment projects were constructed in
select areas of the inner city, yet most condominiums have been built in the urban
periphery, thereby contributing to urban sprawl.102 Nearly all IHDP developments
between 2013 and 2018 were in fact built more than 15 km from the city centre of
Addis Ababa.103 IHDP was conceived primarily to substantially increase the urban
housing stock, due to significant demand as well as a pressing need to improve
housing conditions for low-income households and to begin formalising a large
informal housing sector: evidently, responding to this demand has been a top
priority, but a consequence of this provision-oriented approach is the risk of a lack
of cross-sectoral integration of housing policy with spatial planning and transport
policy, further inhibiting compact and connected urban development.104
In 2005, new cooperative housing units were prohibited at the federal level, owing
primarily to exploitation of the preferential land allocation system granted to
cooperatives in order to engage in speculation; such exploitation and ensuing
speculation was tied to the lack of government capacity to perform regular
monitoring and reporting. Although new cooperative housing units remain
prohibited in Addis Ababa, several regions passed legislation in 2010 in order to
resume cooperative housing for two-storey structures that continue to benefit from
preferential subsidies such as near-free land allocation, which represent a grant
for buying or constructing a new home (Table 4).107 In secondary cities, cooperative
housing is often the main source of the housing supply. In recent years, there
has been renewed interest to resume cooperative housing in Addis Ababa, but no
legislation to this effect has passed yet.
As the Ethiopian urban housing market features few formal housing options,
cooperatives have historically embodied the primary formal private housing
provision mechanism. However, they currently constitute a limited portion of the
total urban housing stock and remain a housing option primarily for middle- and
high-income households. Owing to the high upfront capital costs, cooperative
housing remains affordable for only a limited portion of Ethiopia’s urban
population: Zhang et al. conducted a recent survey in the cities of Addis Ababa,
Adama and Mekelle, finding that 70% of households inhabiting cooperative housing
are from the top two consumption quintiles: 47.8% (Q5), 22.4% (Q4), 15.6% (Q3),
7.7% (Q2), 5.5% (Q1).108
Kebele housing rents are very inexpensive (typically costing 10 ETB per month) and
do not cover the cost of operation and maintenance, with the result that the quality
of many units has considerably deteriorated. Kebele housing stock is of particularly
low quality for a number of reasons: major renovations by tenants were not allowed
by the kebele councils, the government is largely inactive in providing maintenance,
rebuilding with stronger materials is prohibited, rent is low and tenants choose
not to make general repairs or upgrades for fear of having to pay increased rent.113
Despite such challenges, kebele housing is considered, in a sense, to represent
a form of social security: it is often centrally located, which increases access to
services and minimises transport costs, and it is the most affordable formal housing
option in the country, with many informal arrangements commonly made between
tenants such that family members or friends may effectively “inherit” or “sublet”
kebele units. Such informality between tenants and sub-tenants has also been
iv Kebele administration units were the lowest level of government but they no longer exist, having been integrated
into woredas.
The most recent official data indicated the existence of 362,303 kebele units at
the national level, with 345,428 units located in urban areas (95%), as of 2007.115
The actual figures may be higher than these estimations owing to the difficulty
in comprehensively accounting for all units. Moreover, several households may
unofficially inhabit a unit that is officially intended for only one household on
paper, adding another layer of complexity in order to accurately account for all
households living in kebele housing. On a different but related note, informal
settlements in Ethiopian cities (settlements deemed “illegal” or “informal” by
the government, hence excluding kebele housing) are routinely regularised on
the basis of cut-off years cross-referenced with satellite images: in Addis Ababa,
settlements appearing in satellite images prior to 1997 could be regularised while
those appearing afterwards risked demolition and relocation, but the cut-off years
have not remained consistent and have been associated with election cycles.
Regularisation is also undertaken proactively by city governments, for instance in
Hawassa, where nearly 18,000 informal settlements were regularised in 2016,116 or in
Dire Dawa, where 7,000 out of 10,000 informal houses where regularised.117
In 2007, 41% (148,645) of all kebele units in Ethiopia were located in Addis Ababa.118
Moreover, in 2008, it was estimated that more than 40% of the population of Addis
Ababa lived in older kebele housing units covering 11% of the total land area of
the city.119 Not only do the lowest-income households live in kebele units, average
consumption levels of those renting kebele units in Addis Ababa are 33% below
those renting in the private market, indicating that lowest-income households
are more likely to rent kebele units than private rental options, for which a robust
formal market is already lacking.120
As an important portion of urban kebele housing units have been located on prime
urban land, redeveloping such units poses both an opportunity for bringing new
urban functions and a challenge concerning the displacement of numerous low-
income households that may not be able to afford housing elsewhere. In Addis
Ababa, the majority of kebele housing is located in the urban centre where land
is highly valuable – for instance, across from the Presidential Palace – which
has prompted redevelopment efforts.121 While kebele housing has historically
represented the perpetual use of social housing for rent in central urban areas, this
is changing. For example, much of Addis Ababa’s inner city has been delineated
for redevelopment. By and large, the clearing and redevelopment of kebele units
remains very much at the discretion of public authorities.
The first inner-city redevelopment and relocation plan occurred in the central Lideta
sub-city of Addis Ababa within the context of IHDP. A total of 1,160 residential
housing units – 997 kebele units, 123 privately owned and 40 rental housing
administration units – were cleared for redevelopment and were replaced by a
mix of 53 eight-storey and thirteen-storey condominiums accounting for a total of
1,859 units.122 Owners or tenants displaced by redevelopment projects are typically
Reducing the total stock of kebele units via redevelopment poses an additional
challenge for housing affordability given that many households cannot afford the
down payment or monthly fees of IHDP condominiums and are thus faced with
few formal housing options.127 Since there is no significant formal rental market –
aside from kebele units, the total number of which evidently diminishes following
redevelopment projects – these households may be forced to resort to informal
housing if they can neither afford an IHDP unit nor secure a kebele unit, both of
which are in high demand.
v A draft bill proposed in 2020, the Real Estate Development Marketing Proclamation, seeks to regulate the real
estate sector, including price hikes.
The quality and size of FHC units are typically better than kebele housing
units – large villas are included in FHC housing stock – and tend to be low-
rise constructions built on large land parcels. While the existing FHC stock is
generally low density, FHC is pursuing a densification programme in order to
make better use of space and capture greater value from land use. In particular,
many of the large villa-style houses are being demolished in order to be replaced
by high-rise apartment buildings (up to 20 storeys). Inclusionary zoning applies
to FHC densification (on a separate but related note, such zoning theoretically
applies to private residential developments, but it is not strictly enforced and the
“affordability” threshold remains very high for most households). The overall
impact of FHC on compactness depends on the location of where redevelopment
and new construction occur; when at the urban periphery, the outcome is
not optimal with regard to sprawl and access to services, even if the resulting
developments are higher density than those they are replacing. With regard to the
new efforts to densify FHC stock in Addis Ababa, for instance, most FHC properties
are located in central parts of the city, indicating a positive impact on compactness
but also a key missed opportunity, since transport planning and infrastructure
development have not been coordinated in the densification programme to date.
Although FHC units remain generally affordable, they cater to a limited market.
Since FHC units only occupy a small portion of the total housing stock, primarily
target government officials and remain too expensive for much of the population,
they hardly qualify as an affordable housing option for the majority of urban
households.
On the one hand, several of these policies were cross-cutting, covering seven
of the sixteen international policy instruments identified in Housing policies for
sustainable and inclusive cities. On the other hand, certain key instruments for
affordability and compactness from the international assessment were absent from
the Ethiopian context, such as a split-rate tax and a vacant urban land tax (property
taxes are not effectively implemented in Ethiopian cities in practice), a development
tax and incentives for developers for the construction of affordable rental housing
(Section 3.2 and Table 4). Key components of these policy instruments, as well as
their impact on compactness and housing affordability, were assessed (Section 3.2
and Table 5).
Based on the assessment, this paper identifies the following five overarching
policy recommendations to achieve a more robust framework for compact urban
development and affordable housing:
1. Lay the groundwork for fiscal measures that can foster compactness and
housing affordability, including through urban cadastres and regular
property valuation
Implementing revised impact fees (current rates are far too low) and considering
a development tax (not in place) would be a first step towards internalising
urban infrastructure costs and the real cost of sprawl, and help to: ensure
that infrastructure provision accompanies development; bolster local revenue
collection; limit distortionary impacts on housing affordability; and encourage
more efficient use of urban land. As detailed in this paper and in Housing
policies for sustainable and inclusive cities,132 fiscal measures absent from
the Ethiopian framework, such as a split-rate tax and a tax on vacant urban
land, could incentivise the renovation of existing structures and discourage
the hoarding of vacant land for speculation. However, before considering a
split-rate tax or vacant urban land tax, property taxation is a prerequisite but
it is not effectively implemented in Ethiopian cities. The relative absence of
property taxes is a major missed opportunity for land value capture and local
government revenue generation and, despite the potential implementation
challenges (see Section 3.2.1. Land-use planning), it is crucial to accelerate their
use in Ethiopian cities and enforce their collection, and also to regularly revalue
vi The OECD’s “Recommendation on the Public Governance of PPPs” sets out three core principles: i) establishing
a clear, predictable and legitimate institutional framework; ii) grounding the selection of PPPs in value for
money; and iii) using the budget process transparently to minimise fiscal risks and ensure the integrity of
the procurement process. The “PPPs Reference Guide: Version 3”, to which the OECD contributed, is another
comprehensive source.
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