G.R. No. 70145 November 13, 1986 lack of personality to sue.

lack of personality to sue. Respondent bank in the other civil case (CC-11139) for damages moved to dismiss suit in
view of the existence already of the Interpleader case.
MARCELO A. MESINA, petitioner, 
vs. The trial court in the interpleader case issued an order dated July 13, 1984, denying the motion to dismiss of
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ARSENIO M. GONONG, in his capacity as petitioner Mesina and ruling that respondent bank's complaint sufficiently pleaded a cause of action for itnerpleader.
Judge of Regional Trial Court — Manila (Branch VIII), JOSE GO, and ALBERT UY, respondents. Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court on September 26, 1984. Upon
motion for respondent Jose Go dated October 31, 1984, respondent judge issued an order on November 6, 1984,
declaring petitioner in default since his period to answer has already expirecd and set the ex-parte presentation of
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC for short), now the
respondent bank's evidence on November 7, 1984.
Court of Appeals (CA) in AC-G.R. S.P. 04710, dated Jan. 22, 1985, which dismissed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed by Marcelo A. Mesina against the trial court in Civil Case No. 84-22515. Said case (an Interpleader)
was filed by Associated Bank against Jose Go and Marcelo A. Mesina regarding their conflicting claims over Petitioner Mesina filed a petition for certioari with preliminary injunction with IAC to set aside 1) order of respondent
Associated Bank Cashier's Check No. 011302 for P800,000.00, dated December 29, 1983. court denying his omnibus Motion to Dismiss 2) order of 3) the order of default against him.

Briefly, the facts and statement of the case are as follows: On January 22, 1985, IAC rendered its decision dimissing the petition for certiorari. Petitioner Mesina filed his Motion
for Reconsideration which was also denied by the same court in its resolution dated February 18, 1985.
Respondent Jose Go, on December 29, 1983, purchased from Associated Bank Cashier's Check No. 011302 for
P800,000.00. Unfortunately, Jose Go left said check on the top of the desk of the bank manager when he left the Meanwhile, on same date (February 18, 1985), the trial court in Civil Case #84-22515 (Interpleader) rendered a
bank. The bank manager entrusted the check for safekeeping to a bank official, a certain Albert Uy, who had then a decisio, the dispositive portion reading as follows:
visitor in the person of Alexander Lim. Uy had to answer a phone call on a nearby telephone after which he
proceeded to the men's room. When he returned to his desk, his visitor Lim was already gone. When Jose Go
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering plaintiff Associate
inquired for his cashier's check from Albert Uy, the check was not in his folder and nowhere to be found. The latter
Bank to replace Cashier's Check No. 011302 in favor of Jose Go or its cas equivalent with legal
advised Jose Go to go to the bank to accomplish a "STOP PAYMENT" order, which suggestion Jose Go immediately
rate of itnerest from date of complaint, and with costs of suit against the latter.
followed. He also executed an affidavit of loss. Albert Uy went to the police to report the loss of the check, pointing to
the person of Alexander Lim as the one who could shed light on it.
SO ORDERED.
The records of the police show that Associated Bank received the lost check for clearing on December 31, 1983,
coming from Prudential Bank, Escolta Branch. The check was immediately dishonored by Associated Bank by On March 29, 1985, the trial court in Civil Case No. C-11139, for damages, issued an order, the
sending it back to Prudential Bank, with the words "Payment Stopped" stamped on it. However, the same was again pertinent portion of which states:
returned to Associated Bank on January 4, 1984 and for the second time it was dishonored. Several days later,
respondent Associated Bank received a letter, dated January 9, 1984, from a certain Atty. Lorenzo Navarro
The records of this case show that on August 20, 1984 proceedings in this case was (were)
demanding payment on the cashier's check in question, which was being held by his client. He however refused to
ordered suspended because the main issue in Civil Case No. 84-22515 and in this instant case
reveal the name of his client and threatened to sue, if payment is not made. Respondent bank, in its letter, dated
are the same which is: who between Marcelo Mesina and Jose Go is entitled to payment of
January 20, 1984, replied saying the check belonged to Jose Go who lost it in the bank and is laying claim to it.
Associated Bank's Cashier's Check No. CC-011302? Said issue having been resolved already in
Civil casde No. 84-22515, really this instant case has become moot and academic.
On February 1, 1984, police sent a letter to the Manager of the Prudential Bank, Escolta Branch, requesting
assistance in Identifying the person who tried to encash the check but said bank refused saying that it had to protect
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion sholud be as it is hereby granted and this
its client's interest and the Identity could only be revealed with the client's conformity. Unsure of what to do on the
case is ordered dismissed.
matter, respondent Associated Bank on February 2, 1984 filed an action for Interpleader naming as respondent,
Jose Go and one John Doe, Atty. Navarro's then unnamed client. On even date, respondent bank received
summons and copy of the complaint for damages of a certain Marcelo A. Mesina from the Regional Trial Court In view of the foregoing ruling no more action should be taken on the "Motion For
(RTC) of Caloocan City filed on January 23, 1984 bearing the number C-11139. Respondent bank moved to amend Reconsideration (of the order admitting the Intervention)" dated June 21, 1984 as well as the
its complaint, having been notified for the first time of the name of Atty. Navarro's client and substituted Marcelo A. Motion For Reconsideration dated September 10, 1984.
Mesina for John Doe. Simultaneously, respondent bank, thru representative Albert Uy, informed Cpl. Gimao of the
Western Police District that the lost check of Jose Go is in the possession of Marcelo Mesina, herein petitioner.
When Cpl. Gimao went to Marcelo Mesina to ask how he came to possess the check, he said it was paid to him by SO ORDERED.
Alexander Lim in a "certain transaction" but refused to elucidate further. An information for theft (Annex J) was
instituted against Alexander Lim and the corresponding warrant for his arrest was issued (Annex 6-A) which up to the Petitioner now comes to Us, alleging that:
date of the filing of this instant petition remains unserved because of Alexander Lim's successful evation thereof.
1. IAC erred in ruling that a cashier's check can be countermanded even in the hands of a holder in due course.
Meanwhile, Jose Go filed his answer on February 24, 1984 in the Interpleader Case and moved to participate as
intervenor in the complain for damages. Albert Uy filed a motion of intervention and answer in the complaint for
Interpleader. On the Scheduled date of pretrial conference inthe interpleader case, it was disclosed that the "John 2. IAC erred in countenancing the filing and maintenance of an interpleader suit by a party who had earlier been
Doe" impleaded as one of the defendants is actually petitioner Marcelo A. Mesina. Petitioner instead of filing his sued on the same claim.
answer to the complaint in the interpleader filed on May 17, 1984 an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Ex Abudante
Cautela alleging lack of jurisdiction in view of the absence of an order to litigate, failure to state a cause of action and
3. IAC erred in upholding the trial court's order declaring petitioner as in default when there was no proper order for In his third assignment of error, petitioner assails the then respondent IAC in upholding the trial court's order
him to plead in the interpleader complaint. declaring petitioner in default when there was no proper order for him to plead in the interpleader case. Again, such
contention is untenable. The trial court issued an order, compelling petitioner and respondent Jose Go to file
their Answers setting forth their respective claims. Subsequently, a Pre-Trial Conference was set with notice to
4. IAC went beyond the scope of its certiorari jurisdiction by making findings of facts in advance of trial.
parties to submit position papers. Petitioner argues in his memorandum that this order requiring petitioner to file his
answer was issued without jurisdiction alleging that since he is presumably a holder in due course and for value, how
Petitioner now interposes the following prayer: can he be compelled to litigate against Jose Go who is not even a party to the check? Such argument is trite and
ridiculous if we have to consider that neither his name or Jose Go's name appears on the check. Following such line
of argument, petitioner is not a party to the check either and therefore has no valid claim to the Check. Furthermore,
1. Reverse the decision of the IAC, dated January 22, 1985 and set aside the February 18, 1985 resolution denying the Order of the trial court requiring the parties to file their answers is to all intents and purposes an order to
the Motion for Reconsideration. interplead, substantially and essentially and therefore in compliance with the provisions of Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court. What else is the purpose of a law suit but to litigate?
2. Annul the orders of respondent Judge of RTC Manila giving due course to the interpleader suit and declaring
petitioner in default. The records of the case show that respondent bank had to resort to details in support of its action for Interpleader.
Before it resorted to Interpleader, respondent bank took an precautionary and necessary measures to bring out the
Petitioner's allegations hold no water. Theories and examples advanced by petitioner on causes and effects of a truth. On the other hand, petitioner concealed the circumstances known to him and now that private respondent bank
cashier's check such as 1) it cannot be countermanded in the hands of a holder in due course and 2) a cashier's brought these circumstances out in court (which eventually rendered its decision in the light of these facts), petitioner
check is a bill of exchange drawn by the bank against itself-are general principles which cannot be aptly applied to charges it with "gratuitous excursions into these non-issues." Respondent IAC cannot rule on whether respondent
the case at bar, without considering other things. Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he is a holder in due RTC committed an abuse of discretion or not, without being apprised of the facts and reasons why respondent
course and for consideration or value as shown by the established facts of the case. Admittedly, petitioner became Associated Bank instituted the Interpleader case. Both parties were given an opportunity to present their sides.
the holder of the cashier's check as endorsed by Alexander Lim who stole the check. He refused to say how and why Petitioner chose to withhold substantial facts. Respondents were not forbidden to present their side-this is the
it was passed to him. He had therefore notice of the defect of his title over the check from the start. The holder of a purpose of the Comment of respondent to the petition. IAC decided the question by considering both the facts
cashier's check who is not a holder in due course cannot enforce such check against the issuing bank which submitted by petitioner and those given by respondents. IAC did not act therefore beyond the scope of the remedy
dishonors the same. If a payee of a cashier's check obtained it from the issuing bank by fraud, or if there is some sought in the petition.
other reason why the payee is not entitled to collect the check, the respondent bank would, of course, have the right
to refuse payment of the check when presented by the payee, since respondent bank was aware of the facts WHEREFORE, finding that the instant petition is merely dilatory, the same is hereby denied and the assailed orders
surrounding the loss of the check in question. Moreover, there is no similarity in the cases cited by petitioner since of the respondent court are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
respondent bank did not issue the cashier's check in payment of its obligation. Jose Go bought it from respondent
bank for purposes of transferring his funds from respondent bank to another bank near his establishment realizing
that carrying money in this form is safer than if it were in cash. The check was Jose Go's property when it was SO ORDERED.
misplaced or stolen, hence he stopped its payment. At the outset, respondent bank knew it was Jose Go's check and
no one else since Go had not paid or indorsed it to anyone. The bank was therefore liable to nobody on the check
but Jose Go. The bank had no intention to issue it to petitioner but only to buyer Jose Go. When payment on it was
therefore stopped, respondent bank was not the one who did it but Jose Go, the owner of the check. Respondent
bank could not be drawer and drawee for clearly, Jose Go owns the money it represents and he is therefore the
drawer and the drawee in the same manner as if he has a current account and he issued a check against it; and
from the moment said cashier's check was lost and/or stolen no one outside of Jose Go can be termed a holder in
due course because Jose Go had not indorsed it in due course. The check in question suffers from the infirmity of
not having been properly negotiated and for value by respondent Jose Go who as already been said is the real
owner of said instrument.

In his second assignment of error, petitioner stubbornly insists that there is no showing of conflicting claims and
interpleader is out of the question. There is enough evidence to establish the contrary. Considering the
aforementioned facts and circumstances, respondent bank merely took the necessary precaution not to make a
mistake as to whom to pay and therefore interpleader was its proper remedy. It has been shown that the interpleader
suit was filed by respondent bank because petitioner and Jose Go were both laying their claims on the check,
petitioner asking payment thereon and Jose Go as the purchaser or owner. The allegation of petitioner that
respondent bank had effectively relieved itself of its primary liability under the check by simply filing a complaint for
interpleader is belied by the willingness of respondent bank to issue a certificate of time deposit in the amount of
P800,000 representing the cashier's check in question in the name of the Clerk of Court of Manila to be awarded to
whoever wig be found by the court as validly entitled to it. Said validity will depend on the strength of the parties'
respective rights and titles thereto. Bank filed the interpleader suit not because petitioner sued it but because
petitioner is laying claim to the same check that Go is claiming. On the very day that the bank instituted the case in
interpleader, it was not aware of any suit for damages filed by petitioner against it as supported by the fact that the
interpleader case was first entitled Associated Bank vs. Jose Go and John Doe, but later on changed to Marcelo A.
Mesina for John Doe when his name became known to respondent bank.
G.R. No. L-58340             July 16, 1991 On March 11, 1981, five of the petitioners, Kawasaki Port Service Corporation, Naikai Shipping Co., Ltd., Naikai Tug
Boat Service Co., Ltd., The Port Service Corporation and Licensed Land Sea Pilots Association filed their "Special
Appearance to Question Jurisdiction of This Honorable Court Over Persons of Defendants" contending that the lower
KAWASAKI PORT SERVICE CORPORATION, NAIKAI SHIPPING CO. LTD., NAIKAI TUG BOAT SERVICE CO.,
court does not and cannot acquire jurisdiction over the persons of defendants on the grounds that private
THE PORT SERVICE CORPORATION, LICENSED LAND SEA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, HAYAKOMA UNYU K.K.,
respondent's action does not refer to its personal status; that the action does not have for subject matter property
TOKYO KISEN COMPANY, LTD., OMORI KAISOTEN, LTD., TOHOKU UNYU CO., LTD. AND SEITETSU UNYU
contemplated in Section 17 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, that the action does not pray that defendants be
CO., LTD., petitioners, 
excluded from any interest or property in the Philippines; that no property of the defendants has been attached; that
vs.
the action is in personam; and that the action does not fall within any of the four cases mentioned in Section 17, Rule
THE HON. AUGUSTO M. AMORES, Judge of Br. XXIV, Court of First Instance of Manila, and C.F. SHARP &
14 of the Rules of Court.
CO., INC., respondents.

On March 17, 1981, another three of herein petitioners, Hayakoma Unyu K.K., Tokyo Kisen Company, Ltd. and
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the orders of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, * Branch
Omori Kaisoten, Ltd. also filed their special appearance adopting the same arguments as that of the first five.
XXIV in Civil Case No. 132077: (a) dated July 13, 1981 denying the special appearances of petitioners as
defendants in said case to question the court's jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants and (b) dated
September 22, 1981, denying the motion for reconsideration of said order. On April 28, 1981, the two other petitioners, Tohoku Unyu Co., Ltd. and Seitetsu Unyu Co., Ltd., filed their "Special
Appearance to Question the Jurisdiction of the Honorable Court" over their persons adopting in toto as theirs the
"Special Appearance" dated March 11, 1981 of Kawasaki Port Service.
The antecedents of this case are as follows:

On July 13, 1981, the respondent Court issued its order denying said special appearances. The motion for
On May 7, 1980, the private respondent C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc. filed a complaint for injunction and/or declaratory
reconsideration of said order filed by the petitioners was also denied on September 22, 1981.
relief in the then Court of First Instance of Manila against seventy-nine (79) Japanese corporations as defendants,
among which are the petitioners herein. Said complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 132077. The complaint
alleges, among others, that the plaintiff is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines; that Hence, the present petition.
there is another corporation organized under the law of Japan with the corporate name C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha;
that the plaintiff and C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha are in all respects separate and distinct from each other; that C.F.
After the required pleadings were filed, the First Division of this Court, in the resolution of April 14, 1982, gave due
Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha appears to have incurred obligations to several creditors amongst which are defendants,
course to the petition and required both parties to submit simultaneous memoranda within thirty (30) days from
also foreign corporations organized and existing under the laws of Japan; that due to financial difficulties, C.F. Sharp
notice. Both parties complied by submitting the required memoranda.
Kabushiki Kaisha failed and/or refused to pay its creditors; and that in view of the failure and/or refusal of said C.F.
Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha to pay its alleged obligations to defendants, the latter have been demanding or have been
attempting to demand from C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc., the payment of the alleged obligations to them of C.F. Sharp The main issue in this case is whether or not private respondent's complaint for injunction and/or declaratory relief is
Kabushiki Kaisha, notwithstanding that C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc. is a corporation separate and distinct from that of C.F. within the purview of the provisions of Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha and that the former had no participation whatsoever or liability in connection with the
transactions between the latter and the defendants.
The petitioners contend that the respondent judge acted contrary to the provisions of Section 17 of Rule 14 for the
following reasons: (1) private respondent's prayer for injunction, as a consequence of its alleged non-liability to the
As alleged in the complaint, the private respondent prayed for injunctive relief against the petitioners' demand from petitioners for debts of C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha of Japan, conclusively establishes that private respondent's
the private respondent for the payment of C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha's liabilities to the petitioners. cause of action does not affect its status; (2) the respondent court cannot take jurisdiction of actions against the
petitioners as they are non-residents and own no property within the state; (3) the petitioners have not as yet claimed
a lien or interest in the property within the Philippines at the time the action was filed which is a requirement under
As an alternative to injunction, the private respondent prayed that a judicial declaration be made that, as a separate
Section 17 of Rule 14; (4) extra-territorial service on a non-resident defendant is authorized, among others, when the
and independent corporation, it is not liable for the obligations and liabilities of C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha.
subject of the action is property within the Philippines in which the relief demanded consists in excluding defendant
from any interest therein; and (5) inasmuch as the reliefs prayed for by the private respondent in the complaint are in
Since the defendants are non-residents, without business addresses in the Philippines but in Japan, the private personam, service by registered mail cannot be availed of because Section 17 of Rule 14 authorized this mode of
respondent prayed for leave of court to effect extraterritorial service of summons. service only in actions in rem or quasi in rem.

On June 11, 1980, the respondent judge issued an order authorizing the private respondent to effect extraterritorial For its part, the private respondent countered that (1) the action refers to its status because the basic issue
service of summons on defendants therein. presented to the lower court for determination is its status as a corporation which has a personality that is separate,
distinct and independent from the personality of another corporation, i.e., C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha of Japan; (2)
under Section 17 of Rule 14, the subject matter or property involved in the action does not have to belong to the
Subsequently, private respondent filed an urgent ex-parte motion dated June 23, 1980 for Extraterritorial Service of
defendants. The provisions of said section contemplate of a situation where the property belongs to the plaintiff but
Summons Upon Defendants by registered mail with return cards pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 14 of the Rules of
the defendant has a claim over said property, whether that claim be actual or contingent; (3) the prayer of the plaintiff
Court.
that the defendants be excluded from any interest in the properties of the plaintiff within the Philippines has the effect
of excluding the defendants from the properties of the plaintiff in the Philippines for the purpose of answering for the
Acting on said motion, the respondent judge issued an order dated June 30, 1980 granting the motion and debts of C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha of Japan to the defendants in accordance with Section 17 of Rule 14; and (4)
authorizing extraterritorial service of summons upon defendants to be effected by registered mail with return cards. the action before the lower court is an action quasi in rem as the remedies raised in the complaint affect the personal
status of the plaintiff as a separate, distinct and independent corporation and relates to the properties of the plaintiff
in the Philippines over which the petitioners have or claim an interest, actual or contingent.
The petition is impressed with merit. Finally, the alternative relief sought is injunction, that is to enjoin petitioners from demanding from private respondent
the payment of the obligations of C.F. Sharp K.K., It was not prayed that petitioners be excluded from any property
located in the Philippines, nor was it alleged, much less shown, that the properties of the defendants, if any, have
Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:
been attached.

Section 17. Extraterritorial service. — When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the
Hence, as ruled by this Court, where the complaint does not involve the personal status of plaintiff, nor any property
Philippines and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is,
in the Philippines in which defendants have or claim an interest, or which the plaintiff has attached, but purely an
property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent,
action for injunction, it is a personal action as well as an action in personam, not an action in rem or quasi in rem. As
or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest
a personal action, personal or substituted service of summons on the defendants, not extraterritorial service, is
therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of
necessary to confer jurisdiction on the court. In an action for injunction, extra-territorial service of summons and
court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under section 7; or by publication in a
complaint upon the non-resident defendants cannot subject them to the processes of the regional trial courts which
newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such times as the court may order, in which case a
are powerless to reach them outside the region over which they exercise their authority. Extra-territorial service of
copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of
summons will not confer on the court jurisdiction or Power to compel them to obey its orders (Dial Corporation v.
the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall
Soriano, 161 SCRA 738 [1988] citing Section 3-a Interim Rules of Court, Section 21, subpar. 1, BP Blg. 129).
specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the
defendant must answer.
Considering that extra-territorial service of summons on the petitioners was improper, the same was null and
void.1âwphi1
This Court had ruled that extraterritorial service of summons is proper only in four (4) instances, namely: "(1) when
the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs: (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is,
property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when WHEREFORE, the petition is Granted and the questioned orders dated July 13, 1981 and September 22, 1981 of
the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property the respondent Judge, are Reversed and Set Aside.
located in the Philippines; and (4) when the defendant non-resident's property has been attached within the
Philippines." (De Midgely v. Ferandos, 64 SCRA 23 [1975]; The Dial Corporation v. Soriano, 161 SCRA 737 [1988]).
SO ORDERED.

In the case at bar, private respondent has two (2) alternative principal causes of action, to wit: either for declaratory
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
relief or for injunction. Allegedly, in both cases, the status of the plaintiff is not only affected but is the main issue at
Fernan, C.J.,, took no part.
hand.

As defined, "Status means a legal personal relationship, not temporary in nature nor terminable at the mere will of
the parties, with which third persons and the state are concerned" (Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn Gesellschaft, 290
NYS 181; cited in 40 Words and Phrases, 129, Permanent Edition).

It is easy to see in the instant case, that what is sought is a declaration not only that private respondent is a
corporation for there is no dispute on that matter but also that it is separate and distinct from C.F. Sharp Kabushiki
Kaisha and therefore, not liable for the latter's indebtedness. It is evident that monetary obligations does not, in any
way, refer to status, lights and obligations. Obligations are more or less temporary, but status is relatively permanent.
But more importantly, as cited in the case of (Dy Poco v. Commissioner of Immigration, et al., 16 SCRA 618 [1966]),
the prevailing rule is that "where a declaratory judgment as to a disputed fact would be determinative of issues rather
than a construction of definite stated rights, status and other relations, commonly expressed in written instrument,
the case is not one for declaratory judgment." Thus, considering the nature of a proceeding for declaratory judgment,
wherein relief may be sought only to declare rights and not to determine or try issues, there is more valid reason to
adhere to the principle that a declaratory relief proceeding is unavailable where judgment would have to be made,
only after a judicial investigation of disputed issues (ibid). In fact, private respondent itself perceives that petitioners
may even seek to pierce the veil of corporate identity (Rollo, p. 63).

Private respondent alleges that most if not all, of the petitioners have merely demanded or have attempted to
demand from the former the payment of the obligations of C.F. Sharp K.K., (Rollo, p. 63). Otherwise stated, there is
no action relating to or the subject of which are the properties of the defendants in the Philippines for it is beyond
dispute that they have none in this jurisdiction nor can it be said that they have claimed any lien or interest, actual or
contingent over any property herein, for as above stated, they merely demanded or attempted to demand from
private respondent payment of the monetary obligations of C.F. Sharp K.K., No action in court has as yet ensued.
Verily, the fact that C.F. Sharp Philippines is an entity separate and distinct from C.F. Sharp K.K., is a matter of
defense that can be raised by the former at the proper time.
G.R. No. L-23645            October 29, 1968 Mails posted during the said period starting in 1958, which are found in street or post-office mail boxes
without the required semi-postal stamp, shall be returned to the sender, if known, with a notation calling for
the affixing of such stamp. If the sender is unknown, the mail matter shall be treated as nonmailable and
BENJAMIN P. GOMEZ, petitioner-appellee, 
forwarded to the Dead Letter Office for proper disposition.
vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as Postmaster General, HON. BRIGIDO R. VALENCIA, in his capacity as
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, and DOMINGO GOPEZ, in his capacity as Acting Adm. Order 7, amending the fifth paragraph of Adm. Order 3, reads as follows:
Postmaster of San Fernando, Pampanga, respondent-appellants.
In the case of the following categories of mail matter and mails entitled to franking privilege which are not
Lorenzo P. Navarro and Narvaro Belar S. Navarro for petitioner-appellee. exempted from the payment of the five centavos intended for the Philippine Tuberculosis Society, such
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero and Solicitor extra charge may be collected in cash, for which official receipt (General Form No. 13, A) shall be issued,
Dominador L. Quiroz for respondents-appellants. instead of affixing the semi-postal stamp in the manner hereinafter indicated:

CASTRO, J.: 1. Second-class mail. — Aside from the postage at the second-class rate, the extra charge of five
centavos for the Philippine Tuberculosis Society shall be collected on each separately-addressed piece of
second-class mail matter, and the total sum thus collected shall be entered in the same official receipt to
This appeal puts in issue the constitutionality of Republic Act 1635,1 as amended by Republic Act 2631,2 which
be issued for the postage at the second-class rate. In making such entry, the total number of pieces of
provides as follows:
second-class mail posted shall be stated, thus: "Total charge for TB Fund on 100 pieces . .. P5.00." The
extra charge shall be entered separate from the postage in both of the official receipt and the Record of
To help raise funds for the Philippine Tuberculosis Society, the Director of Posts shall order for the period Collections.
from August nineteen to September thirty every year the printing and issue of semi-postal stamps of
different denominations with face value showing the regular postage charge plus the additional amount of
2. First-class and third-class mail permits. — Mails to be posted without postage affixed under permits
five centavos for the said purpose, and during the said period, no mail matter shall be accepted in the
issued by this Bureau shall each be charged the usual postage, in addition to the five-centavo extra charge
mails unless it bears such semi-postal stamps: Provided, That no such additional charge of five centavos
intended for said society. The total extra charge thus received shall be entered in the same official receipt
shall be imposed on newspapers. The additional proceeds realized from the sale of the semi-postal
to be issued for the postage collected, as in subparagraph 1.
stamps shall constitute a special fund and be deposited with the National Treasury to be expended by the
Philippine Tuberculosis Society in carrying out its noble work to prevent and eradicate tuberculosis.
3. Metered mail. — For each piece of mail matter impressed by postage meter under metered mail permit
issued by this Bureau, the extra charge of five centavos for said society shall be collected in cash and an
The respondent Postmaster General, in implementation of the law, thereafter issued four (4) administrative orders
official receipt issued for the total sum thus received, in the manner indicated in subparagraph 1.
numbered 3 (June 20, 1958), 7 (August 9, 1958), 9 (August 28, 1958), and 10 (July 15, 1960). All these
administrative orders were issued with the approval of the respondent Secretary of Public Works and
Communications. 4. Business reply cards and envelopes. — Upon delivery of business reply cards and envelopes to holders
of business reply permits, the five-centavo charge intended for said society shall be collected in cash on
each reply card or envelope delivered, in addition to the required postage which may also be paid in cash.
The pertinent portions of Adm. Order 3 read as follows:
An official receipt shall be issued for the total postage and total extra charge received, in the manner
shown in subparagraph 1.
Such semi-postal stamps could not be made available during the period from August 19 to September 30,
1957, for lack of time. However, two denominations of such stamps, one at "5 + 5" centavos and another
5. Mails entitled to franking privilege. — Government agencies, officials, and other persons entitled to the
at "10 + 5" centavos, will soon be released for use by the public on their mails to be posted during the
franking privilege under existing laws may pay in cash such extra charge intended for said society, instead
same period starting with the year 1958.
of affixing the semi-postal stamps to their mails, provided that such mails are presented at the post-office
window, where the five-centavo extra charge for said society shall be collected on each piece of such mail
xxx           xxx           xxx matter. In such case, an official receipt shall be issued for the total sum thus collected, in the manner
stated in subparagraph 1.
During the period from August 19 to September 30 each year starting in 1958, no mail matter of whatever
class, and whether domestic or foreign, posted at any Philippine Post Office and addressed for delivery in Mail under permits, metered mails and franked mails not presented at the post-office window shall be
this country or abroad, shall be accepted for mailing unless it bears at least one such semi-postal stamp affixed with the necessary semi-postal stamps. If found in mail boxes without such stamps, they shall be
showing the additional value of five centavos intended for the Philippine Tuberculosis Society. treated in the same way as herein provided for other mails.

In the case of second-class mails and mails prepaid by means of mail permits or impressions of postage Adm. Order 9, amending Adm. Order 3, as amended, exempts "Government and its Agencies and Instrumentalities
meters, each piece of such mail shall bear at least one such semi-postal stamp if posted during the period Performing Governmental Functions." Adm. Order 10, amending Adm. Order 3, as amended, exempts "copies of
above stated starting with the year 1958, in addition to being charged the usual postage prescribed by periodical publications received for mailing under any class of mail matter, including newspapers and magazines
existing regulations. In the case of business reply envelopes and cards mailed during said period, such admitted as second-class mail."
stamp should be collected from the addressees at the time of delivery. Mails entitled to franking privilege
like those from the office of the President, members of Congress, and other offices to which such privilege
has been granted, shall each also bear one such semi-postal stamp if posted during the said period.
The FACTS. On September l5, 1963 the petitioner Benjamin P. Gomez mailed a letter at the post office in San 1. It is said that the statute is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. More specifically the claim is
Fernando, Pampanga. Because this letter, addressed to a certain Agustin Aquino of 1014 Dagohoy Street, made that it constitutes mail users into a class for the purpose of the tax while leaving untaxed the rest of the
Singalong, Manila did not bear the special anti-TB stamp required by the statute, it was returned to the petitioner. population and that even among postal patrons the statute discriminatorily grants exemption to newspapers while
Administrative Order 9 of the respondent Postmaster General grants a similar exemption to offices performing
governmental functions. .
In view of this development, the petitioner brough suit for declaratory relief in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, to test the constitutionality of the statute, as well as the implementing administrative orders issued,
contending that it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution as well as the rule of uniformity and equality The five centavo charge levied by Republic Act 1635, as amended, is in the nature of an excise tax, laid upon the
of taxation. The lower court declared the statute and the orders unconstitutional; hence this appeal by the exercise of a privilege, namely, the privilege of using the mails. As such the objections levelled against it must be
respondent postal authorities. viewed in the light of applicable principles of taxation.

For the reasons set out in this opinion, the judgment appealed from must be reversed. To begin with, it is settled that the legislature has the inherent power to select the subjects of taxation and to grant
exemptions.4 This power has aptly been described as "of wide range and flexibility."5 Indeed, it is said that in the field
of taxation, more than in other areas, the legislature possesses the greatest freedom in classification.6 The reason
I.
for this is that traditionally, classification has been a device for fitting tax programs to local needs and usages in order
to achieve an equitable distribution of the tax burden.7
Before reaching the merits, we deem it necessary to dispose of the respondents' contention that declaratory relief is
unavailing because this suit was filed after the petitioner had committed a breach of the statute. While conceding that
That legislative classifications must be reasonable is of course undenied. But what the petitioner asserts is that
the mailing by the petitioner of a letter without the additional anti-TB stamp was a violation of Republic Act 1635, as
statutory classification of mail users must bear some reasonable relationship to the end sought to be attained, and
amended, the trial court nevertheless refused to dismiss the action on the ground that under section 6 of Rule 64 of
that absent such relationship the selection of mail users is constitutionally impermissible. This is altogether a different
the Rules of Court, "If before the final termination of the case a breach or violation of ... a statute ... should take
proposition. As explained in Commonwealth v. Life Assurance Co.:8
place, the action may thereupon be converted into an ordinary action."

While the principle that there must be a reasonable relationship between classification made by the
The prime specification of an action for declaratory relief is that it must be brought "before breach or violation" of the
legislation and its purpose is undoubtedly true in some contexts, it has no application to a measure whose
statute has been committed. Rule 64, section 1 so provides. Section 6 of the same rule, which allows the court to
sole purpose is to raise revenue ... So long as the classification imposed is based upon some standard
treat an action for declaratory relief as an ordinary action, applies only if the breach or violation occurs after the filing
capable of reasonable comprehension, be that standard based upon ability to produce revenue or some
of the action but before the termination thereof.3
other legitimate distinction, equal protection of the law has been afforded. See Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v.
Bowers, supra, 358 U.S. at 527, 79 S. Ct. at 441; Brown Forman Co. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 2d
Hence, if, as the trial court itself admitted, there had been a breach of the statute before the firing of this action, then U.S. 56, 573, 80 S. Ct. 578, 580 (1910).
indeed the remedy of declaratory relief cannot be availed of, much less can the suit be converted into an ordinary
action.
We are not wont to invalidate legislation on equal protection grounds except by the clearest demonstration that it
sanctions invidious discrimination, which is all that the Constitution forbids. The remedy for unwise legislation must
Nor is there merit in the petitioner's argument that the mailing of the letter in question did not constitute a breach of be sought in the legislature. Now, the classification of mail users is not without any reason. It is based on ability to
the statute because the statute appears to be addressed only to postal authorities. The statute, it is true, in terms pay, let alone the enjoyment of a privilege, and on administrative convinience. In the allocation of the tax burden,
provides that "no mail matter shall be accepted in the mails unless it bears such semi-postal stamps." It does not Congress must have concluded that the contribution to the anti-TB fund can be assured by those whose who can
follow, however, that only postal authorities can be guilty of violating it by accepting mails without the payment of the afford the use of the mails.
anti-TB stamp. It is obvious that they can be guilty of violating the statute only if there are people who use the mails
without paying for the additional anti-TB stamp. Just as in bribery the mere offer constitutes a breach of the law, so in
The classification is likewise based on considerations of administrative convenience. For it is now a settled principle
the matter of the anti-TB stamp the mere attempt to use the mails without the stamp constitutes a violation of the
of law that "consideration of practical administrative convenience and cost in the administration of tax laws afford
statute. It is not required that the mail be accepted by postal authorities. That requirement is relevant only for the
adequate ground for imposing a tax on a well recognized and defined class."9 In the case of the anti-TB stamps,
purpose of fixing the liability of postal officials.
undoubtedly, the single most important and influential consideration that led the legislature to select mail users as
subjects of the tax is the relative ease and convenienceof collecting the tax through the post offices. The small
Nevertheless, we are of the view that the petitioner's choice of remedy is correct because this suit was filed not only amount of five centavos does not justify the great expense and inconvenience of collecting through the regular
with respect to the letter which he mailed on September 15, 1963, but also with regard to any other mail that he means of collection. On the other hand, by placing the duty of collection on postal authorities the tax was made
might send in the future. Thus, in his complaint, the petitioner prayed that due course be given to "other mails without almost self-enforcing, with as little cost and as little inconvenience as possible.
the semi-postal stamps which he may deliver for mailing ... if any, during the period covered by Republic Act 1635,
as amended, as well as other mails hereafter to be sent by or to other mailers which bear the required postage,
And then of course it is not accurate to say that the statute constituted mail users into a class. Mail users were
without collection of additional charge of five centavos prescribed by the same Republic Act." As one whose mail
already a class by themselves even before the enactment of the statue and all that the legislature did was merely to
was returned, the petitioner is certainly interested in a ruling on the validity of the statute requiring the use of
select their class. Legislation is essentially empiric and Republic Act 1635, as amended, no more than reflects a
additional stamps.
distinction that exists in fact. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter said, "to recognize differences that exist in fact is living law;
to disregard [them] and concentrate on some abstract identities is lifeless logic."10
II.
Granted the power to select the subject of taxation, the State's power to grant exemption must likewise be conceded
We now consider the constitutional objections raised against the statute and the implementing orders. as a necessary corollary. Tax exemptions are too common in the law; they have never been thought of as raising
issues under the equal protection clause.
It is thus erroneous for the trial court to hold that because certain mail users are exempted from the levy the law and what is essentially a public function. The money is treated as a special fund and as such need not be appropriated
administrative officials have sanctioned an invidious discrimination offensive to the Constitution. The application of by law.18
the lower courts theory would require all mail users to be taxed, a conclusion that is hardly tenable in the light of
differences in status of mail users. The Constitution does not require this kind of equality.
3. Finally, the claim is made that the statute is so broadly drawn that to execute it the respondents had to issue
administrative orders far beyond their powers. Indeed, this is one of the grounds on which the lower court invalidated
As the United States Supreme Court has said, the legislature may withhold the burden of the tax in order to foster Republic Act 1631, as amended, namely, that it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
what it conceives to be a beneficent enterprise.11 This is the case of newspapers which, under the amendment
introduced by Republic Act 2631, are exempt from the payment of the additional stamp.
Administrative Order 3, as amended by Administrative Orders 7 and 10, provides that for certain classes of mail
matters (such as mail permits, metered mails, business reply cards, etc.), the five-centavo charge may be paid in
As for the Government and its instrumentalities, their exemption rests on the State's sovereign immunity from cash instead of the purchase of the anti-TB stamp. It further states that mails deposited during the period August 19
taxation. The State cannot be taxed without its consent and such consent, being in derogation of its sovereignty, is to to September 30 of each year in mail boxes without the stamp should be returned to the sender, if known, otherwise
be strictly construed.12 Administrative Order 9 of the respondent Postmaster General, which lists the various offices they should be treated as nonmailable.
and instrumentalities of the Government exempt from the payment of the anti-TB stamp, is but a restatement of this
well-known principle of constitutional law.
It is true that the law does not expressly authorize the collection of five centavos except through the sale of anti-TB
stamps, but such authority may be implied in so far as it may be necessary to prevent a failure of the undertaking.
The trial court likewise held the law invalid on the ground that it singles out tuberculosis to the exclusion of other The authority given to the Postmaster General to raise funds through the mails must be liberally construed,
diseases which, it is said, are equally a menace to public health. But it is never a requirement of equal protection that consistent with the principle that where the end is required the appropriate means are given.19
all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all.13 As this Court has had occasion to say, "if the law
presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it
The anti-TB stamp is a distinctive stamp which shows on its face not only the amount of the additional charge but
might have been applied."14
also that of the regular postage. In the case of business reply cards, for instance, it is obvious that to require mailers
to affix the anti-TB stamp on their cards would be to make them pay much more because the cards likewise bear the
2. The petitioner further argues that the tax in question is invalid, first, because it is not levied for a public purpose as amount of the regular postage.
no special benefits accrue to mail users as taxpayers, and second, because it violates the rule of uniformity in
taxation.
It is likewise true that the statute does not provide for the disposition of mails which do not bear the anti-TB stamp,
but a declaration therein that "no mail matter shall be accepted in the mails unless it bears such semi-postal stamp"
The eradication of a dreaded disease is a public purpose, but if by public purpose the petitioner means benefit to a is a declaration that such mail matter is nonmailable within the meaning of section 1952 of the Administrative Code.
taxpayer as a return for what he pays, then it is sufficient answer to say that the only benefit to which the taxpayer is Administrative Order 7 of the Postmaster General is but a restatement of the law for the guidance of postal officials
constitutionally entitled is that derived from his enjoyment of the privileges of living in an organized society, and employees. As for Administrative Order 9, we have already said that in listing the offices and entities of the
established and safeguarded by the devotion of taxes to public purposes. Any other view would preclude the levying Government exempt from the payment of the stamp, the respondent Postmaster General merely observed an
of taxes except as they are used to compensate for the burden on those who pay them and would involve the established principle, namely, that the Government is exempt from taxation.
abandonment of the most fundamental principle of government — that it exists primarily to provide for the common
good.15
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed, and the complaint is dismissed, without pronouncement as to
costs.
Nor is the rule of uniformity and equality of taxation infringed by the imposition of a flat rate rather than a graduated
tax. A tax need not be measured by the weight of the mail or the extent of the service rendered. We have said that
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Angeles and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
considerations of administrative convenience and cost afford an adequate ground for classification. The same
Zaldivar, J., is on leave.
considerations may induce the legislature to impose a flat tax which in effect is a charge for the transaction,
operating equally on all persons within the class regardless of the amount involved.16 As Mr. Justice Holmes said in
sustaining the validity of a stamp act which imposed a flat rate of two cents on every $100 face value of stock
transferred:

One of the stocks was worth $30.75 a share of the face value of $100, the other $172. The inequality of
the tax, so far as actual values are concerned, is manifest. But, here again equality in this sense has to
yield to practical considerations and usage. There must be a fixed and indisputable mode of ascertaining a
stamp tax. In another sense, moreover, there is equality. When the taxes on two sales are equal, the same
number of shares is sold in each case; that is to say, the same privilege is used to the same extent.
Valuation is not the only thing to be considered. As was pointed out by the court of appeals, the familiar
stamp tax of 2 cents on checks, irrespective of income or earning capacity, and many others, illustrate the
necessity and practice of sometimes substituting count for weight ...17

According to the trial court, the money raised from the sales of the anti-TB stamps is spent for the benefit of the
Philippine Tuberculosis Society, a private organization, without appropriation by law. But as the Solicitor General
points out, the Society is not really the beneficiary but only the agency through which the State acts in carrying out
 After trial, the Court a quo rendered a decision declaring the municipal ordinance in question null and
void; ordering the respondent Municipal Treasurer to refund to the petitioner the payments it made
under the said ordinance from September 27, 1966 to May 2, 1967, amounting to P 25,500.00, as well
as all payments made subsequently thereafter; and enjoining and prohibiting the respondents, their
G.R. No. L-28138 August 13, 1986 agents or deputies, from collecting the tax of P.30 per bag on the cassava flour or starch belonging to
intervenor, Purakan Plantation Company, manufactured or milled in the Municipality of Balabagan, but
shipped out through the Municipality of Malabang.
MATALIN COCONUT CO., INC., petitioner-appellee, 
vs.
THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF MALABANG, LANAO DEL SUR, AMIR M. BALINDONG and HADJI After the promulgation of the decision, the Trial Court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
PANGILAMUN MANALOCON, MUNICIPAL MAYOR and MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF upon motion of petitioner, requiring the respondent Municipal Treasurer to deposit with the Philippine
MALABANG, LANAO DEL SUR, respondents-appellants. PURAKAN PLANTATION National Bank, Iligan Branch, in the name of the Municipality of Malabang, whatever amounts the
COMPANY, intervenor-appellee. petitioner had already paid or shall pay pursuant to the ordinance in question up to and until final
termination of the case; the deposit was not to be withdrawn from the said bank without any order from
the court. On motion for reconsideration by respondents, the writ was subsequently modified on July 20,
1967, to require the deposit only of amounts paid from the effectivity of the writ up to and until the final
termination of the suit.
On August 24, 1966, the Municipal Council of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, invoking the authority of
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, enacted Municipal From the decision of the trial court, the respondents appealed to this Court.
Ordinance No. 45-46, entitled "AN ORDINANCE IMPOSING A POLICE INSPECTION FEE OF P.30
PER SACK OF CASSAVA STARCH PRODUCED AND SHIPPED OUT OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF
MALABANG AND IMPOSING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF." The ordinance made it A motion to dismiss appeal filed by petitioner-appellee, was denied by this court in its resolution of
unlawful for any person, company or group of persons "to ship out of the Municipality of Malabang, October 31, 1967. Subsequently, respondents-appellants filed a motion to dissolve the writ of
cassava starch or flour without paying to the Municipal Treasurer or his authorized representatives the preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the trial court on July 20, 1967. This motion was also denied
corresponding fee fixed by (the) ordinance." It imposed a "police inspection fee" of P.30 per sack of by this Court on January 10, 1968.
cassava starch or flour, which shall be paid by the shipper before the same is transported or shipped
outside the municipality. Any person or company or group of individuals violating the ordinance "is liable Of the assignments of error raised by the appellants in their Brief, only the following need be discussed:
to a fine of not less than P100.00, but not more than P1,000.00, and to pay Pl.00 for every sack of flour (1) that the trial court erred in adjudicating the money claim of the petitioner in an action for declaratory
being illegally shipped outside the municipality, or to suffer imprisonment of 20 days, or both, in the relief; and (2) that the trial court erred in declaring the municipal ordinance in question null and void.
discretion of the court.
The respondents-appellants maintain that it was error for the trial court, in an action for declaratory
The validity of the ordinance was challenged by the Matalin Coconut, Inc. in a petition for declaratory relief, to order the refund to petitioner-appellee of the amounts paid by the latter under the municipal
relief filed with the then Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur against the Municipal Council, the ordinance in question. It is the contention of respondents-appellants that in an action for declaratory
Municipal Mayor and the Municipal Treasurer of Malabang, Lanao del Sur. Alleging among others that relief, all the court can do is to construe the validity of the ordinance in question and declare the rights of
the ordinance is not only ultra vires, being violative of Republic Act No. 2264, but also unreasonable, those affected thereby. The court cannot declare the ordinance illegal and at the same time order the
oppressive and confiscatory, the petitioner prayed that the ordinance be declared null and void ab refund to petitioner of the amounts paid under the ordinance, without requiring petitioner to file an
initio,  and that the respondent Municipal Treasurer be ordered to refund the amounts paid by petitioner ordinary action to claim the refund after the declaratory relief judgment has become final. Respondents
under the ordinance. The petitioner also prayed that during the pendency of the action, a preliminary maintain that under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, the court may advise the parties to file the proper
injunction be issued enjoining the respondents from enforcing the ordinance. The application for pleadings and convert the hearing into an ordinary action, which was not done in this case.
preliminary injunction, however, was denied by the trial court; instead respondent Municipal Treasurer
was ordered to allow payment of the taxes imposed by the ordinance under protest. We find no merit in such contention. Under Sec. 6 of Rule 64, the action for declaratory relief may be
converted into an ordinary action and the parties allowed to file such pleadings as may be necessary or
Claiming that it was also adversely affected by the ordinance, Purakan Plantation Company was proper, if before the final termination of the case "a breach or violation of an...ordinance, should take
granted leave to intervene in the action. The intervenor alleged that while its cassava flour factory was place." In the present case, no breach or violation of the ordinance occurred. The petitioner decided to
situated in another municipality, i.e., Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, it had to transport the cassava starch pay "under protest" the fees imposed by the ordinance. Such payment did not affect the case; the
and flour it produced to the seashore through the Municipality of Malabang for loading in coastwise declaratory relief action was still proper because the applicability of the ordinance to future transactions
vessels; that the effect of the enactment of Ordinance No. 45-46, is that intervenor had to refrain from still remained to be resolved, although the matter could also be threshed out in an ordinary suit for the
transporting its products through the Municipality of Malabang in order to ship them by sea to other recovery of taxes paid (Shell Co. of the Philippines, Ltd. vs. Municipality of Sipocot, L-12680, March 20,
places. 1959). In its petition for declaratory relief, petitioner-appellee alleged that by reason of the enforcement
of the municipal ordinance by respondents it was forced to pay under protest the fees imposed pursuant
to the said ordinance, and accordingly, one of the reliefs prayed for by the petitioner was that the
respondents be ordered to refund all the amounts it paid to respondent Municipal Treasurer during the
pendency of the case. The inclusion of said allegation and prayer in the petition was not objected to by escorted by a policeman from the police checkpoint to the beach for the purpose of
the respondents in their answer. During the trial, evidence of the payments made by the petitioner was protecting the truck and its cargoes from molestation by undesirable elements could
introduced. Respondents were thus fully aware of the petitioner's claim for refund and of what would not also be given credence by the Court because it has been shown, beyond doubt,
happen if the ordinance were to be declared invalid by the court. that the petitioner has not asked for the said police protection because there has
been no occasion where its trucks have been molested, even for once, by bad
Respondents' contention, if sustained, would in effect require a separate suit for the recovery of the fees elements from the police checkpoint to the bodega at the beach, it is solely for the
paid by petitioner under protest. Multiplicity of suits should not be allowed or encouraged and, in the purpose of verifying the correct number of bags of cassava flour starch loaded on the
context of the present case, is clearly uncalled for and unnecessary. trucks of the petitioner as stated in the trip tickets, when unloaded at its bodega at the
beach. The imposition, therefore, of a police inspection fee of P.30 per bag, imposed
by said ordinance is unjust and unreasonable.
The main issue to be resolve in this case whether not Ordinance No. 45-66 enacted by respondent
Municipal Council of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, is valid. The respondents-appellants contend that the
municipality has the power and authority to approve the ordinance in question pursuant to Section 2 of The Court finally finds the inspection fee of P0.30 per bag, imposed by the ordinance
the Local Autonomy Act (Republic Act No. 2264). in question to be excessive and confiscatory. It has been shown by the petitioner,
Matalin Coconut Company, Inc., that it is merely realizing a marginal average profit of
P0.40, per bag, of cassava flour starch shipped out from the Municipality of Malabang
Since the enactment of the Local Autonomy Act, a liberal rule has been followed by this Court in because the average production is P15.60 per bag, including transportation costs,
construing municipal ordinances enacted pursuant to the taxing power granted under Section 2 of said while the prevailing market price is P16.00 per bag. The further imposition, therefore,
law. This Court has construed the grant of power to tax under the above-mentioned provision as of the tax of P0.30 per bag, by the ordinance in question would force the petitioner to
sufficiently plenary to cover "everything, excepting those which are mentioned" therein, subject only to close or stop its cassava flour starch milling business considering that it is maintaining
the limitation that the tax so levied is for public purposes, just and uniform (Nin Bay Mining Company vs. a big labor force in its operation, including a force of security guards to guard its
Municipality of Roxas, Province of Palawan, 14 SCRA 661; C.N. Hodges vs. Municipal Board, Iloilo City, properties. The ordinance, therefore, has an adverse effect on the economic growth
et al., 19 SCRA 28). of the Municipality of Malabang, in particular, and of the nation, in general, and is
contrary to the economic policy of the government.
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the amount collected under the ordinance in question
partakes of the nature of a tax, although denominated as "police inspection fee" since its undeniable Having found the ordinance in question to be invalid, we find it unnecessary to rule on the other errors
purpose is to raise revenue. However, we cannot agree with the trial court's finding that the tax imposed assigned by the appellants.
by the ordinance is a percentage tax on sales which is beyond the scope of the municipality's authority
to levy under Section 2 of the Local Autonomy Act. Under the said provision, municipalities and
municipal districts are prohibited from imposing" any percentage tax on sales or other taxes in any WHEREFORE, petition is dismissed. The decision of the court a quo is hereby affirmed. No costs.
form based thereon. " The tax imposed under the ordinance in question is not a percentage tax on sales
or any other form of tax based on sales. It is a fixed tax of P.30 per bag of cassava starch or flour SO ORDERED.
"shipped out" of the municipality. It is not based on sales.

However, the tax imposed under the ordinance can be stricken down on another ground. According to
Section 2 of the abovementioned Act, the tax levied must be "for public purposes, just and uniform"
(Emphasis supplied.) As correctly held by the trial court, the so-called "police inspection fee" levied by
the ordinance is "unjust and unreasonable." Said the court a quo:

... It has been proven that the only service rendered by the Municipality of Malabang,
by way of inspection, is for the policeman to verify from the driver of the trucks of the
petitioner passing by at the police checkpoint the number of bags loaded per trip
which are to be shipped out of the municipality based on the trip tickets for the
purpose of computing the total amount of tax to be collect (sic) and for no other
purpose. The pretention of respondents that the police, aside from counting the
number of bags shipped out, is also inspecting the cassava flour starch contained in
the bags to find out if the said cassava flour starch is fit for human consumption could
not be given credence by the Court because, aside from the fact that said purpose is
not so stated in the ordinance in question, the policemen of said municipality are not
competent to determine if the cassava flour starch are fit for human consumption. The
further pretention of respondents that the trucks of the petitioner hauling the bags of
cassava flour starch from the mill to the bodega at the beach of Malabang are
 for Reconsideration. Effectively, the last day for filing was October 20, 2008 the following Monday or the

first working day after October 18, 2008. The petitioner filed his petition with us on October 22, 2008 or

two days late; hence, our Resolution of dismissal of November 11, 2008. 
 

NILO PATES vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS The Motion for Reconsideration

Our Resolution of November 11, 2008 dismissed the petition in caption pursuant to Section 3, The petitioner asks us in his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with Reiteration for the

Rule 64 of the Rules of Court which provides: Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to reverse the dismissal of his petition, arguing that the
 
SEC. 3. Time to file petition.The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days petition was seasonably filed under the fresh period rule enunciated by the Supreme Court in a number
from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The of cases decided beginning the year 2005. The fresh period refers to the original period provided under
filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or
resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall the Rules of Court counted from notice of the ruling on the motion for reconsideration by the tribunal
interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file
the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days below, without deducting the period for the preparation and filing of the motion for reconsideration.
in any event, reckoned from notice of denial.
He claims that, historically, the fresh period rule was the prevailing rule in filing petitions
 
for certiorari. This Court, he continues, changed this rule when it promulgated the 1997 Rules of Civil
taking into account the following material antecedents:
  Procedure and Circular No. 39-98, which both provided for the filing of petitions within the remainder of
a.     February 1, 2008 The COMELEC First Division issued its Resolution (assailed in the
the original period, the remainder being the original period less the days used up in preparing and filing
petition);
a motion for reconsideration. He then points out that on September 1, 2000 or only three years after,
 
this Court promulgated A.M. No. 00-02-03-SC bringing back the fresh period rule. According to the
b.     February 4, 2008 The counsel for petitioner Nilo T. Pates (petitioner) received a copy
of the February 1, 2008 Resolution; petitioner, the reason for the change, which we supposedly articulated in Narzoles v. National Labor

  Relations Commission,[1] was the tremendous confusion generated by Circular No. 39-98.

c.      February 8, 2008 The petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration (MR) of The fresh period rule, the petitioner further asserts, was subsequently applied by this Court in
the February 1, 2008 Resolution (4 days from receipt of the February 1,
the following cases:
2008 Resolution)
(1) Neypes v. Court  of Appeals[2] which thenceforth applied the fresh period rule to ordinary
 
appeals of decisions of the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals;
d.     September 18, 2008 The COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution denying the
petitioners MR (also assailed in the petition). (2) Spouses de los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat[3] reiterating Neypes;

  (3) Active Realty and Development Corporation v. Fernandez[4] which, following Neypes,

e.      September 22, 2008 The petitioner received the COMELEC en banc Resolution applied the fresh period rule to ordinary appeals from the decisions of the Municipal Trial Court to the
of September 18, 2008 Regional Trial Court; and

(4) Romero v. Court of Appeals[5] which emphasized that A.M. No. 00-02-03-SC is a curative

Under this chronology, the last day for the filing of a petition for certiorari, i.e., 30 days from notice of the
statute that may be applied retroactively.
final COMELEC Resolution, fell on a Saturday (October 18, 2008), as the petitioner only had the

remaining period of 26 days to file his petition, after using up 4 days in preparing and filing his Motion
 A reading of the ruling in these cases, the petitioner argues, shows that this Court has patent difference between the two i.e., the exception that Section 2, Rule 64 refers to is Section 3 which

consistently held that the order or resolution denying the motion for reconsideration or new trial is provides for a special period for the filing of petitions for certiorari from decisions or rulings of the

considered as the final order finally disposing of the case, and the date of its receipt by a party is the COMELEC en banc. The period is 30 days from notice of the decision or ruling (instead of the 60 days

correct reckoning point for counting the period for appellate review. that Rule 65 provides), with the intervening period used for the filing of any motion for reconsideration

The Respondents Comment deductible from the originally-granted 30 days (instead of the fresh period of 60 days that Rule 65

We asked the respondents to comment on the petitioners motion for reconsideration. The provides).

Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), citing Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and its related Thus, as a matter of law, our ruling of November 11, 2008 to dismiss the petition for late filing

cases, asked via a Manifestation and Motion that it be excused from filing a separate comment. We cannot but be correct. This ruling is not without its precedent; we have previously ordered a similar

granted the OSGs manifestation and motion. dismissal in the earlier case of Domingo v. Commission on Elections.[7] The Court, too, has countless

For her part, respondent Emelita B. Almirante (respondent Almirante) filed a comment stating times in the past stressed that the Rules of Court must be followed. Thus, we had this to say in Fortich

that: (1) we are absolutely correct in concluding that the petition was filed out of time; and (2) the v. Corona:[8]
 
petitioners reliance on Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (as amended by A.M. No. 00-02-03-SC) Procedural rules, we must stress, should be treated with utmost respect and
due regard since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy
is totally misplaced, as Rule 64, not Rule 65, is the vehicle for review of judgments and final orders or
the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the
resolutions of the COMELEC. Respondent Almirante points out that Rule 64 and Rule 65 are different; administration of justice. The requirement is in pursuance to the bill of rights inscribed
in the Constitution which guarantees that "all persons shall have a right to the speedy
Rule 65 provides for a 60-day period for filing petitions for certiorari, while Rule 64 provides for 30 days. disposition of their before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies," the
adjudicatory bodies and the parties to a case are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the
OUR RULING rules. While it is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true
that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to
We do not find the motion for reconsideration meritorious.
ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. There have been some
A. As a Matter of Law instances wherein this Court allowed a relaxation in the application of the rules,
but this flexibility was "never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to
Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that unless otherwise provided by the violate the rules with impunity." A liberal interpretation and application of the
rules of procedure can be resorted to only in proper cases and under justifiable
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Court causes and circumstances. (Emphasis supplied)
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. For this reason, the  
 
Rules of Court provide for a separate rule (Rule 64) specifically applicable only to decisions of the
As emphasized above, exceptional circumstances or compelling reasons may have existed in
COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. This Rule expressly refers to the application of Rule 65 in the
the past when we either suspended the operation of the Rules or exempted a particular case from their
filing of a petition for certiorari, subject to the exception clause except as hereinafter provided.[6]
application.[9] But, these instances were the exceptions rather than the rule, and we invariably took
Even a superficial reading of the motion for reconsideration shows that the petitioner has not
this course of action only upon a meritorious plea for the liberal construction of the Rules of Court based
challenged our conclusion that his petition was filed outside the period required by Section 3, Rule 64;
on attendant exceptional circumstances. These uncommon exceptions allowed us to maintain the
he merely insists that the fresh period rule applicable to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 should
stability of our rulings, while allowing for the unusual cases when the dictates of justice demand a
likewise apply to petitions for certiorari of COMELEC rulings filed under Rule 64.
correspondingly different treatment.
Rule 64, however, cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if it expressly refers to the latter

rule. They exist as separate rules for substantive reasons as discussed below.Procedurally, the most
Under this unique nature of the exceptions, a party asking for the suspension of the Rules of Court Counterbalanced against these reasons, however, are other considerations no less weighty,

comes to us with the heavy burden of proving that he deserves to be accorded exceptional the most significant of which is the importance the Constitution and this Court, in obedience to the

treatment. Every plea for a liberal construction of the Rules must at least be accompanied by an Constitution, accord to elections and the prompt determination of their results. Section 3, Article IX-C of

explanation of why the party-litigant failed to comply with the rules and by a justification for the the Constitution expressly requires that the COMELECs rules of procedure should expedite the

requested liberal construction.[10] disposition of election cases. This Court labors under the same command, as our proceedings are in

Significantly, the petitioner presented no exceptional circumstance or any compelling fact the constitutional extension of cases that start with the COMELEC.

reason to warrant the non-application of Section 3, Rule 64 to his petition.He failed to explain why Based on these considerations, we do not find convenience and uniformity to be reasons

his filing was late. Other than his appeal to history, uniformity, and convenience, he did not explain why sufficiently compelling to modify the required period for the filing of petitions for certiorari under Rule

we should adopt and apply the fresh period rule to an election case. 64. While the petitioner is correct in his historical data about the Courts treatment of the periods for the

To us, the petitioners omissions are fatal, as his motion does not provide us any reason filing of the different modes of review, he misses out on the reason why the period under Section 3,

specific to his case why we should act as he advocates. Rule 64 has been retained. The reason, as made clear above, is constitutionally-based and is no less

B. As a Matter of Policy than the importance our Constitution accords to the prompt determination of election results. This

In harking back to the history of the fresh period rule, what the petitioner apparently wants for reason far outweighs convenience and uniformity. We significantly note that the present petition itself,

reasons of uniformity and convenience is the simultaneous amendment of Section 3, Rule 64 and the through its plea for the grant of a restraining order, recognizes the need for haste in deciding election

application of his proposed new rule to his case. To state the obvious, any amendment of this provision cases. 

is an exercise in the power of this Court to promulgate rules on practice and procedure as provided by C. Our Liberal Approach

Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. Our rulemaking, as every lawyer should know, is different Largely for the same reason and as discussed below, we are not inclined to suspend the rules

from our adjudicatory function. Rulemaking is an act of legislation, directly assigned to us by the to come to the rescue of a litigant whose counsel has blundered by reading the wrong applicable

Constitution, that requires the formulation of policies rather than the determination of the legal rights and provision. The Rules of Court are with us for the prompt and orderly administration of justice; litigants

obligations of litigants before us. As a rule, rulemaking requires that we consult with our own cannot, after resorting to a wrong remedy, simply cry for the liberal construction of these rules.[12] Our

constituencies, not necessarily with the parties directly affected in their individual cases, in order to ruling in Lapid v. Laurea[13] succinctly emphasized this point when we said:
 
ensure that the rule and the policy that it enunciates are the most reasonable that we can promulgate Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the
rules of procedure, rather than seek exceptions as loopholes. Technical rules of
under the circumstances, taking into account the interests of everyone not the least of which are the
procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to
constitutional parameters and guidelines for our actions. We point these out as our adjudicatory powers effect the prompt, proper and orderly disposition of cases and, thus, effectively
prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of these rules cannot justly
should not be confused with our rulemaking prerogative.  be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. [Emphasis
supplied.]
We acknowledge that the avoidance of confusion through the use of uniform standards is not
We add that even for this Court, liberality does not signify an unbridled exercise of discretion. It has its
without its merits. We are not unmindful, too, that no less than the Constitution requires that motions for
limits; to serve its purpose and to preserve its true worth, it must be exercised only in the most
reconsideration of [division] decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.[11] Thus, the ruling
appropriate cases.[14]
of the Commission en banc on reconsideration is effectively a new ruling rendered separately and

independently from that made by a division.

 Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the motion for reconsideration for lack of substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007,6 whereby it withdrew the
nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees.
merit. Our Resolution of November 11, 2008 is hereby declared FINAL. Let entry of judgment be made
The amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales, and (3)
in due course. Borje.
 
SO ORDERED. Following the close of the polls, or on June 20, 2007, Villanueva sent a letter to COMELEC Chairperson
Benjamin Abalos,7 transmitting therewith the signed petitions of more than 81% of the CIBAC members,
in order to confirm the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of
G.R. Nos. 179431-32               June 22, 2010 Borje. In their petitions, the members of CIBAC averred that Lokin and Tugna were not among the
nominees presented and proclaimed by CIBAC in its proclamation rally held in May 2007; and that
Galang had signified his desire to focus on his family life.
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION
(CIBAC),Petitioner, 
vs. On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en banc sitting as
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents. the National Board of Canvassers a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second
nominee.8 The right of CIBAC to a second seat as well as the right of Lokin to be thus proclaimed were
purportedly based on Party-List Canvass Report No. 26, which showed CIBAC to have garnered a
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x grand total of 744,674 votes. Using all relevant formulas, the motion asserted that CIBAC was clearly
entitled to a second seat and Lokin to a proclamation.
G.R. No. 180443
The motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., Petitioner, 
vs. Notwithstanding Villanueva’s filing of the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, CINCHONA C. list of nominees and the petitions of more than 81% of CIBAC members, the COMELEC failed to act on
GONZALES and ARMI JANE R. BORJE, Respondents. the matter, prompting Villanueva to file a petition to confirm the certificate of nomination, substitution
and amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC on June 28, 2007.9
DECISION
On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8219,10 whereby it resolved to set the matter
BERSAMIN, J.: pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the
substitution of Borje for proper disposition and hearing. The case was docketed as E.M. No. 07-054.
The principal question posed in these consolidated special civil actions for certiorari and mandamus is
whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) can issue implementing rules and regulations In the meantime, the COMELEC en banc, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, issued National
(IRRs) that provide a ground for the substitution of a party-list nominee not written in Republic Act (R.A.) Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 200711 to partially proclaim the following
No. 7941,1 otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, the law that the COMELEC thereby parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List System as having won in the May
implements. 14, 2007 elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong, Bayan Muna, CIBAC, Gabriela Women's Party,
Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives, Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action,
Common Antecedents Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms, Inc., Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party, Alagad,
Luzon Farmers Party, Cooperative-Natco Network Party, Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns and
Abono; and to defer the proclamation of the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions with
The Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered under pending disputes until final resolution of their respective cases.
the party-list system of representation that manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007
synchronized national and local elections. Together with its manifestation of intent to
participate,2 CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five The COMELEC en banc issued another resolution, NBC Resolution No. 07-72 dated July 18,
nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of 2007,12 proclaiming Buhay Hayaan Yumabong as entitled to 2 additional seats and Bayan Muna,
qualifying votes. The nominees, in the order that their names appeared in the certificate of nomination CIBAC, Gabriela Women's Party, and Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives to an additional
dated March 29, 2007,3 were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; seat each; and holding in abeyance the proclamation of the nominees of said parties, organizations and
(3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang. The nominees’ certificates coalitions with pending disputes until the final resolution of their respective cases.
of acceptance were attached to the certificate of nomination filed by CIBAC. The list of nominees was
later published in two newspapers of general circulation, The Philippine Star News4 (sic) and The With the formal declaration that CIBAC was entitled to an additional seat, Ricardo de los Santos,
Philippine Daily Inquirer.5 purportedly as secretary general of CIBAC, informed Roberto P. Nazareno, Secretary General of the
House of Representatives, of the promulgation of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 and requested that Lokin Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941.18the law that the COMELEC
be formally sworn in by Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume office. Nazareno replied, seeks to thereby implement.
however, that the request of Delos Santos could not be granted because COMELEC Law Director
Alioden D. Dalaig had notified him of the pendency of E.M. 07-054. In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that a petition for certiorari is an inappropriate recourse in law
due to the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as Representative and her assumption of that office; that
On September 14, 2007, the COMELEC en banc resolved E.M. No. 07-05413 thuswise: Lokin’s proper recourse was an electoral protest filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET); and that, therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction over the matter being raised by Lokin.
WHEREFORE, considering the above discussion, the Commission hereby approves the withdrawal of
the nomination of Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Sherwin N. Tugna and Emil Galang as second, third and fourth For its part, CIBAC posits that Lokin is guilty of forum shopping for filing a petition for mandamus and a
nominees respectively and the substitution thereby with Atty. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as second petition for certiorari, considering that both petitions ultimately seek to have him proclaimed as the
nominee and Atty. Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee for the party list CIBAC. The new order of second nominee of CIBAC.
CIBAC's nominees therefore shall be:
Issues
1. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva
The issues are the following:
2. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales
(a) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy;
3. Armi Jane R. Borje
(b) Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping;
SO ORDERED.
(c) Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the Party-
The COMELEC en banc explained that the actions of Villanueva in his capacity as the president of List System Act; and
CIBAC were presumed to be within the scope of his authority as such; that the president was charged
by Section 1 of Article IV of the CIBAC By-Laws to oversee and direct the corporate activities, which (d) Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
included the act of submitting the party's manifestation of intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 excess of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and allowing the
elections as well as its certificate of nominees; that from all indications, Villanueva as the president of amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC without any basis in fact or law and after the
CIBAC had always been provided the leeway to act as the party's representative and that his actions close of the polls, and in ruling on matters that were intra-corporate in nature.
had always been considered as valid; that the act of withdrawal, although done without any written
Board approval, was accomplished with the Board’s acquiescence or at least understanding; and that
the intent of the party should be given paramount consideration in the selection of the nominees. Ruling

As a result, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of The petitions are granted.
CIBAC.14 Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office
A
as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC on September 17, 2007. 15 The Court has jurisdiction over the case

Precís of the Consolidated Cases The COMELEC posits that once the proclamation of the winning party-list organization has been done
and its nominee has assumed office, any question relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the candidates to the House of Representatives falls under the jurisdiction of the HRET pursuant to
In G.R. No. 179431 and G.R. No. 179432, Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, Lokin should raise the question he poses herein
COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC. either in an election protest or in a special civil action for quo warranto in the HRET, not in a special
civil action for certiorari in this Court.
In G.R. No. 180443, Lokin assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 promulgated on January 12,
2007;16 and the resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E.M. No. 07-054 (approving CIBAC’s We do not agree.
withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang as CIBAC’s second, third and fourth
nominees, respectively, and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales and Borje in their stead, based on the
right of CIBAC to change its nominees under Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804).17 He alleges that An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between
the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to
determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to
hold the office. It can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has The filing of identical petitions in different courts is prohibited, because such act constitutes forum
been voted for in the preceding elections. shopping, a malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and as abusing
their processes. Forum shopping is an improper conduct that degrades the administration of justice.21
A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of
the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from the office, but Nonetheless, the mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not necessarily
not to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a constitute forum shopping. The test is whether the several actions filed involve the same transactions
contest where the parties strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated even if the and the same essential facts and circumstances.22 The actions must also raise identical causes of
respondent may be unseated. action, subject matter, and issues.23 Elsewise stated, forum shopping exists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present, or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.24
The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto, for it
concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second nominee of Lokin has filed the petition for mandamus to compel the COMELEC to proclaim him as the second
CIBAC. Although an election protest may properly be available to one party-list organization seeking to nominee of CIBAC upon the issuance of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 (announcing CIBAC’s entitlement to
unseat another party-list organization to determine which between the defeated and the winning party- an additional seat in the House of Representatives), and to strike down the provision in NBC Resolution
list organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal votes, Lokin’s case is not one in which a No. 07-60 and NBC Resolution No. 07-72 holding in abeyance "all proclamation of the nominees of
nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the same concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in
party-list organization. Neither does an action for quo warranto lie, considering that the case does not abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases." He has insisted that the COMELEC had the
involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some other ministerial duty to proclaim him due to his being CIBAC’s second nominee; and that the COMELEC had
cause of disqualification for her. no authority to exercise discretion and to suspend or defer the proclamation of winning party-list
organizations with pending disputes.
Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the
review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article On the other hand, Lokin has resorted to the petition for certiorari to assail the September 14, 2007
IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales. The resolution of the COMELEC (approving the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang
constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales as the second nominee and Borje as the third nominee); and to
provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the challenge the validity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804, the COMELEC’s basis for allowing CIBAC’s
Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in accordance withdrawal of Lokin’s nomination.
with Rule 65 to be filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court
has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokin’s petitions for certiorari and for mandamus against the Applying the test for forum shopping, the consecutive filing of the action for certiorari and the action for
COMELEC. mandamus did not violate the rule against forum shopping even if the actions involved the same parties,
because they were based on different causes of action and the reliefs they sought were different.
B 
Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping C
Invalidity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804
Forum shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. Thus, The legislative power of the Government is vested exclusively in the Legislature in accordance with the
forum shopping may arise: (a) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks doctrine of separation of powers. As a general rule, the Legislature cannot surrender or abdicate its
a favorable decision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another; or (b) if, after having filed a petition legislative power, for doing so will be unconstitutional. Although the power to make laws cannot be
in the Supreme Court, a party files another petition in the Court of Appeals, because he thereby delegated by the Legislature to any other authority, a power that is not legislative in character may be
deliberately splits appeals "in the hope that even as one case in which a particular remedy is sought is delegated.25
dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open"; or (c) where a party attempts
to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction from a court after failing to obtain the writ from another court.19
Under certain circumstances, the Legislature can delegate to executive officers and administrative
boards the authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs. To render such delegation lawful, the Legislature
What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles that are to control in given cases. The
caused to the courts and the litigants by a party who accesses different courts and administrative Legislature should set a definite or primary standard to guide those empowered to execute the law. For
agencies to rule on the same or related causes or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in as long as the policy is laid down and a proper standard is established by statute, there can be no
the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the unconstitutional delegation of legislative power when the Legislature leaves to selected instrumentalities
same issue.20 the duty of making subordinate rules within the prescribed limits, although there is conferred upon the
executive officer or administrative board a large measure of discretion. There is a distinction between
the delegation of power to make a law and the conferment of an authority or a discretion to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law, for the power to make laws necessarily involves a discretion as to Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
what it shall be.26
Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.-Each registered party, organization or coalition
The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express legislative purpose, or to effect the shall submit to the COMELEC not later that forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not
operation and enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively legislative in character, but is rather less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required
administrative in nature. The rules and regulations adopted and promulgated must not, however, number of votes.
subvert or be contrary to existing statutes. The function of promulgating IRRs may be legitimately
exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of a law. The power of administrative A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing
agencies is confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any elective office or a person who
administrative regulation cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment. It is axiomatic that has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or
the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the
its implementation. Indeed, administrative or executive acts shall be valid only when they are not COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes
contrary to the laws or the Constitution.27 incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list.
Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list
To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to be valid:28 system shall not be considered resigned.

1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature; The provision is daylight clear. The Legislature thereby deprived the party-list organization of the right to
change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the COMELEC,
2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature; except when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the
nominee becomes incapacitated. The provision must be read literally because its language is plain and
free from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning. Such meaning is
3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has intended to convey. Even where the
courts should be convinced that the Legislature really intended some other meaning, and even where
4. It must be reasonable. the literal interpretation should defeat the very purposes of the enactment, the explicit declaration of the
Legislature is still the law, from which the courts must not depart.34 When the law speaks in clear and
The COMELEC is constitutionally mandated to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for
to the conduct of an election, a plebiscite, an initiative, a referendum, and a recall.29 In addition to the application.35Accordingly, an administrative agency tasked to implement a statute may not construe it by
powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the COMELEC is also charged to expanding its meaning where its provisions are clear and unambiguous.36
promulgate IRRs implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws that the
COMELEC enforces and administers.30 The legislative intent to deprive the party-list organization of the right to change the nominees or to alter
the order of the nominees was also expressed during the deliberations of the Congress, viz:
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 pursuant to its powers under the Constitution, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, and the Party-List System Act.31 Hence, the COMELEC met the first requisite. MR. LAGMAN: And again on Section 5, on the nomination of party list representatives, I do not see any
provision here which prohibits or for that matter allows the nominating party to change the nominees or
The COMELEC also met the third requisite. There is no question that Resolution No. 7804 underwent to alter the order of prioritization of names of nominees. Is the implication correct that at any time after
the procedural necessities of publication and dissemination in accordance with the procedure submission the names could still be changed or the listing altered?
prescribed in the resolution itself.
MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, that is a good issue brought out by the distinguished Gentleman from Albay
Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was valid or not is thus to be tested on the basis of whether and perhaps a perfecting amendment may be introduced therein. The sponsoring committee will gladly
the second and fourth requisites were met. It is in this respect that the challenge of Lokin against consider the same.
Section 13 succeeds.
MR. LAGMAN: In other words, what I would like to see is that after the list is submitted to the
As earlier said, the delegated authority must be properly exercised. This simply means that the resulting COMELEC officially, no more changes should be made in the names or in the order of listing.
IRRs must not be ultra vires as to be issued beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It is basic that
an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress,32 for administrative IRRs are solely MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, there may be a situation wherein the name of a particular nominee has been
intended to carry out, not to supplant or to modify, the law. The administrative agency issuing the IRRs submitted to the Commission on Elections but before election day the nominee changed his political
may not enlarge, alter, or restrict the provisions of the law it administers and enforces, and cannot party affiliation. The nominee is therefore no longer qualified to be included in the party list and the
engraft additional non-contradictory requirements not contemplated by the Legislature.33 political party has a perfect right to change the name of that nominee who changed his political party
affiliation.
MR. LAGMAN: Yes of course. In that particular case, the change can be effected but will be the express exception excludes all others, although it is always proper in determining the applicability of the
exception rather than the rule. Another exception most probably is the nominee dies, then there has to rule to inquire whether, in a particular case, it accords with reason and justice.391avvphi1
be a change but any change for that matter should always be at the last part of the list so that the
prioritization made by the party will not be adversely affected.37 The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something from the scope of the
general words of a statute, which is otherwise within the scope and meaning of such general words.
The usage of "No" in Section 8 – "No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be Consequently, the existence of an exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the statute shall apply to
allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee all cases not excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict construction; hence, any doubt will be
dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, or becomes incapacitated, in which case the name of the resolved in favor of the general provision and against the exception. Indeed, the liberal construction of a
substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list" – renders Section 8 a negative law, and is indicative statute will seem to require in many circumstances that the exception, by which the operation of the
of the legislative intent to make the statute mandatory. Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, statute is limited or abridged, should receive a restricted construction.
be directory, for there is but one way to obey the command "thou shall not," and that is to completely
refrain from doing the forbidden act,38 subject to certain exceptions stated in the law itself, like in this E
case. Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded 
the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941
Section 8 does not unduly deprive the party-list organization of its right to choose its nominees, but
merely divests it of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order in the list of its nominees’ Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 states:
names after submission of the list to the COMELEC.
Section 13. Substitution of nominees. – A party-list nominee may be substituted only when he dies,
The prohibition is not arbitrary or capricious; neither is it without reason on the part of lawmakers. The or his nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes incapacitated to continue as such,
COMELEC can rightly presume from the submission of the list that the list reflects the true will of the or he withdraws his acceptance to a nomination. In any of these cases, the name of the substitute
party-list organization. The COMELEC will not concern itself with whether or not the list contains the nominee shall be placed last in the list of nominees.
real intended nominees of the party-list organization, but will only determine whether the nominees pass
all the requirements prescribed by the law and whether or not the nominees possess all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Thereafter, the names of the nominees will be published No substitution shall be allowed by reason of withdrawal after the polls.
in newspapers of general circulation. Although the people vote for the party-list organization itself in a
party-list system of election, not for the individual nominees, they still have the right to know who the Unlike Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, the foregoing regulation provides four instances, the fourth being
nominees of any particular party-list organization are. The publication of the list of the party-list when the "nomination is withdrawn by the party."
nominees in newspapers of general circulation serves that right of the people, enabling the voters to
make intelligent and informed choices. In contrast, allowing the party-list organization to change its Lokin insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in expanding to four the three statutory
nominees through withdrawal of their nominations, or to alter the order of the nominations after the grounds for substituting a nominee.
submission of the list of nominees circumvents the voters’ demand for transparency. The lawmakers’
exclusion of such arbitrary withdrawal has eliminated the possibility of such circumvention.
We agree with Lokin.
D 
Exceptions in Section 8 of R.A. 7941 are exclusive The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,40 has neither the
authority nor the license to expand, extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to implement thereby.
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 enumerates only three instances in which the party-list organization can The IRRs the COMELEC issues for that purpose should always accord with the law to be implemented,
substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC, and should not override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic that the IRRs should remain consistent
namely: (a) when the nominee dies; (b) when the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (c) with the law they intend to carry out.41
when the nominee becomes incapacitated.

Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government under legislative
The enumeration is exclusive, for, necessarily, the general rule applies to all cases not falling under any authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
of the three exceptions. carrying the law’s general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be expanded by such IRRs,
because an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.42
When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule, the exceptions
are strictly but reasonably construed. The exceptions extend only as far as their language fairly The COMELEC explains that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 has added nothing to Section 8 of R.A.
warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exceptions. No. 7941,43because it has merely reworded and rephrased the statutory provision’s phraseology.
Where the general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, none but the enacting authority can
curtail the former. Not even the courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an
The explanation does not persuade. We declare Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes a
party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the nomination to
To reword means to alter the wording of or to restate in other words; to rephrase is to phrase anew or in the Commission on Elections.
a new form.44 Both terms signify that the meaning of the original word or phrase is not altered.
Accordingly, we annul and set aside:
However, the COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941,
because it established an entirely new ground not found in the text of the provision. The new ground (a) The resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E. M. No. 07-054 approving Citizens’
granted to the party-list organization the unilateral right to withdraw its nomination already submitted to Battle Against Corruption’s withdrawal of the nominations of Luis K. Lokin, Jr., Sherwin N.
the COMELEC, which Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 did not allow to be done. Neither was the grant of the Tugna, and Emil Galang as its second, third, and fourth nominees, respectively, and ordering
unilateral right contemplated by the drafters of the law, who precisely denied the right to withdraw the their substitution by Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as second nominee and Armi Jane R. Borje
nomination (as the quoted record of the deliberations of the House of Representatives has indicated). as third nominee; and
The grant thus conflicted with the statutory intent to save the nominee from falling under the whim of the
party-list organization once his name has been submitted to the COMELEC, and to spare the electorate (b) The proclamation by the Commission on Elections of Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as a
from the capriciousness of the party-list organizations. Party-List Representative representing Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption in the House of
Representatives.
We further note that the new ground would not secure the object of R.A. No. 7941 of developing and
guaranteeing a full, free and open party-list electoral system. The success of the system could only be We order the Commission on Elections to forthwith proclaim petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr. as a Party-List
ensured by avoiding any arbitrariness on the part of the party-list organizations, by seeing to the Representative representing Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption in the House of Representatives.
transparency of the system, and by guaranteeing that the electorate would be afforded the chance of
making intelligent and informed choices of their party-list representatives.
We make no pronouncements on costs of suit.
The insertion of the new ground was invalid. An axiom in administrative law postulates that
administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of their IRRs, but SO ORDERED.
must ensure that their IRRs are reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If the IRRs are
shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they were authorized to be issued, they
must be held to be invalid and should be struck down.45

F
Effect of partial nullity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804

An IRR adopted pursuant to the law is itself law.46 In case of conflict between the law and the IRR, the
law prevails. There can be no question that an IRR or any of its parts not adopted pursuant to the law is
no law at all and has neither the force nor the effect of law.47 The invalid rule, regulation, or part thereof
cannot be a valid source of any right, obligation, or power.

Considering that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 – to the extent that it allows the party-list
organization to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC – was invalid, CIBAC’s
withdrawal of its nomination of Lokin and the others and its substitution of them with new nominees
were also invalid and ineffectual. It is clear enough that any substitution of Lokin and the others could
only be for any of the grounds expressly stated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941. Resultantly, the
COMELEC’s approval of CIBAC’s petition of withdrawal of the nominations and its recognition of
CIBAC’s substitution, both through its assailed September 14, 2007 resolution, should be struck down
for lack of legal basis. Thereby, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction, having relied on the invalidly
issued Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 to support its action.

WHEREFORE, we grant the petitions for certiorari and mandamus.

 3. In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
placed the entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value
at P2.38 million.[4]
4. NQSRMDC resisted the DARs action. In February, 1992, it sought and was granted by the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB), through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) in DARAB
Case No. X-576, a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction which ordered the DAR Region X
Director, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Bukidnon, the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Office (MARO) of Sumilao, Bukidnon, the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank), and their
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY B. BAULA, authorized representatives to desist from pursuing any activity or activities concerning the subject land
MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND until further orders.[5]
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE 5. Despite the DARAB order of March 31, 1992, the DAR Regional Director issued a
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents. memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, directing the Land Bank to open a trust account for P2.38 million in
the name of NQSRMDC and to conduct summary proceedings to determine the just compensation of
the subject property. NQSRMDC objected to these moves and filed on June 9, 1992 an Omnibus
DECISION
Motion to enforce the DARAB order of March 31, 1992 and to nullify the summary proceedings
MARTINEZ, J.: undertaken by the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank on the valuation of the subject property.
6. The DARAB, on October 22, 1992, acted favorably on the Omnibus Motion by (a) ordering the
The dramatic and well-publicized hunger strike staged by some alleged farmer-beneficiaries in DAR Regional Director and Land Bank to seriously comply with the terms of the order dated March 31,
front of the Department of Agrarian Reform compound in Quezon City on October 9, 1997 commanded 1992; (b) nullifying the DAR Regional Directors memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, and the summary
nationwide attention that even church leaders and some presidential candidates tried to intervene for proceedings conducted pursuant thereto; and (c) directing the Land Bank to return the claim folder of
the strikers cause. Petitioner NQSRMDCs subject property to the DAR until further orders.[6]
The strikers protested the March 29, 1996 Decision[1] of the Office of the President (OP), issued 7. The Land Bank complied with the DARAB order and cancelled the trust account it opened in the
through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, which approved the name of petitioner NQSRMDC.[7]
conversion of a one hundred forty-four (144)-hectare land from agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional
area. This led the Office of the President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, 8. In the meantime, the Provincial Development Council (PDC) of Bukidnon, headed by Governor
to issue the so-called Win-Win Resolution[2] on November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its earlier Carlos O. Fortich, passed Resolution No. 6,[8] dated January 7, 1993, designating certain areas along
Decision after it had already become final and executory. The said Resolution modified the approval Bukidnon-Sayre Highway as part of the Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Zones where the subject property is
of the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent of forty-four (44) hectares, and ordered situated.
the remaining one hundred (100) hectares to be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
9. What happened thereafter is well-narrated in the OP (TORRES) Decision of March 29, 1996,
But, did the Win-Win Resolution culminate in victory for all the contending parties? pertinent portions of which we quote:

The above-named petitioners cried foul. They have come to this Court urging us to annul and set
Pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the
aside the Win-Win Resolution and to enjoin respondent Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao of the Department
Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon, on March 4, 1993, enacted Ordinance No. 24 converting or
of Agrarian Reform from implementing the said Resolution.
re-classifying 144 hectares of land in Bgy. San Vicente, said Municipality, from agricultural to
Thus, the crucial issue to be resolved in this case is: What is the legal effect of the Win-Win industrial/institutional with a view of providing an opportunity to attract investors who can inject new
Resolution issued by the Office of the President on its earlier Decision involving the same subject economic vitality, provide more jobs and raise the income of its people.
matter, which had already become final and executory?
Parenthetically, under said section, 4th to 5th class municipalities may authorize the classification of five
The antecedent facts of this controversy, as culled from the pleadings, may be stated as follows:
percent (5%) of their agricultural land area and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition.
1. This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the
Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the On 12 October 1993, the Bukidnon Provincial Land Use Committee approved the said
petitioners. The property is covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14371 [3] of the Registry of Ordinance. Accordingly, on 11 December 1993, the instant application for conversion was filed by Mr.
Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon. Gaudencio Beduya in behalf of NQSRMDC/BAIDA (Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Development
Association).
2. In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing Corporation,
now Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a period of ten (10) years under
the Crop Producer and Growers Agreement duly annotated in the certificate of title. The lease expired in Expressing support for the proposed project, the Bukidnon Provincial Board, on the basis of a Joint
April, 1994. Committee Report submitted by its Committee on Laws, Committee on Agrarian Reform and Socio-
Economic Committee approved, on 1 February 1994, the said Ordinance now docketed as Resolution 1. The area is considered as a prime agricultural land with irrigation facility;
No. 94-95. The said industrial area, as conceived by NQSRMDC (project proponent) is supposed to
have the following components: 2. The land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA);

1. The Development Academy of Mindanao which constitutes the following: Institute for Continuing 3. The existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not applicable;
Higher Education; Institute for Livelihood Science (Vocational and Technical School); Institute for
Agribusiness Research; Museum, Library, Cultural Center, and Mindanao Sports Development
Complex which covers an area of 24 hectares; 4. There is no clear and tangible compensation package arrangements for the beneficiaries;

2. Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park which consists of corn processing for corn oil, corn starch, various 5. The procedures on how the area was identified and reclassified for agro-industrial project has no
corn products; rice processing for wine, rice-based snacks, exportable rice; cassava processing for reference to Memo Circular No. 54, Series of 1993, E.O. No. 72, Series of 1993, and E.O. No. 124,
starch, alcohol and food delicacies; processing plants, fruits and fruit products such as juices; Series of 1993.
processing plants for vegetables processed and prepared for market; cold storage and ice plant;
cannery system; commercial stores; public market; and abattoir needing about 67 hectares; A Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was filed on January 9, 1995 by applicant but the
same was denied (in an Order dated June 7, 1995).[9]
3. Forest development which includes open spaces and parks for recreation, horse-back riding,
memorial and mini-zoo estimated to cover 33 hectares; and 10. Thus, the DAR Secretary ordered the DAR Regional Director to proceed with the compulsory
acquisition and distribution of the property.[10]
4. Support facilities which comprise the construction of a 360-room hotel, restaurants, dormitories and a 11. Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon appealed[11] the order of denial to the Office of the
housing project covering an area of 20 hectares. President and prayed for the conversion/reclassification of the subject land as the same would be more
beneficial to the people of Bukidnon.
The said NQSRMDC Proposal was, per Certification dated January 4, 1995, adopted by the
Department of Trade and Industry, Bukidnon Provincial Office, as one of its flagship projects.The same 12. To prevent the enforcement of the DAR Secretarys order, NQSRMDC, on June 29, 1995, filed
was likewise favorably recommended by the Provincial Development Council of Bukidnon; the with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction, [12] docketed as
municipal, provincial and regional office of the DAR; the Regional Office (Region X) of the DENR (which CA-G.R. SP No. 37614.
issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate on June 5, 1995); the Executive Director, signing By 13. Meanwhile, on July 25, 1995, the Honorable Paul G. Dominguez, then Presidential Assistant
Authority of PAUL G. DOMINGUEZ, Office of the President Mindanao; the Secretary of DILG; and
for Mindanao, after conducting an evaluation of the proposed project, sent a memorandum [13] to the
Undersecretary of DECS Wilfredo D. Clemente. President favorably endorsing the project with a recommendation that the DAR Secretary reconsider his
decision in denying the application of the province for the conversion of the land.
In the same vein, the National Irrigation Administration, Provincial Irrigation Office, Bagontaas Valencia,
Bukidnon, thru Mr. Julius S. Maquiling, Chief, Provincial Irrigation Office, interposed NO OBJECTION to 14. Also, in a memorandum[14] to the President dated August 23, 1995, the Honorable Rafael
the proposed conversion as long as the development cost of the irrigation systems thereat which Alunan III, then Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG),
is P2,377.00 per hectare be replenished by the developer x x x. Also, the Kisolon-San Vicente Irrigators recommended the conversion of the subject land to industrial/institutional use with a request that the
Multi Purpose Cooperative, San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, interposed no objection to the proposed President hold the implementation of the DAR order to distribute the land in question.
conversion of the land in question as it will provide more economic benefits to the community in terms
15. On October 23, 1995, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 37614, issued a
of outside investments that will come and employment opportunities that will be generated by the
Resolution[15] ordering the parties to observe status quo pending resolution of the petition. At the hearing
projects to be put up x x x.
held in said case on October 5, 1995, the DAR, through the Solicitor General, manifested before the
said court that the DAR was merely in the processing stage of the applications of farmers-claimants and
On the same score, it is represented that during the public consultation held at the Kisolan Elementary has agreed to respect status quo pending the resolution of the petition.[16]
School on 18 March 1995 with Director Jose Macalindong of DAR Central Office and DECS
Undersecretary Clemente, the people of the affected barangay rallied behind their respective officials in 16. In resolving the appeal, the Office of the President, through then Executive Secretary Ruben
endorsing the project. D. Torres, issued a Decision in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, dated March 29, 1996, reversing the DAR
Secretarys decision, the pertinent portions of which read:
Notwithstanding the foregoing favorable recommendation, however, on November 14, 1994, the DAR,
thru Secretary Garilao, invoking its powers to approve conversion of lands under Section 65 of R.A. No. After a careful evaluation of the petition vis--vis the grounds upon which the denial thereof by Secretary
6657, issued an Order denying the instant application for the conversion of the subject land from Garilao was based, we find that the instant application for conversion by the Municipality of Sumilao,
agricultural to agro-industrial and, instead, placed the same under the compulsory coverage of CARP Bukidnon is impressed with merit. To be sure, converting the land in question from agricultural to agro-
and directed the distribution thereof to all qualified beneficiaries on the following grounds: industrial would open great opportunities for employment and bring about real development in the area
towards a sustained economic growth of the municipality. On the other hand, distributing the land to When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare donated to DECS, it
would-be beneficiaries (who are not even tenants, as there are none) does not guarantee such benefits. discovered that the title over the subject property was no longer in its name. It soon found out that
during the pendency of both the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, with Preliminary Injunction it filed
Nevertheless, on the issue that the land is considered a prime agricultural land with irrigation facility it against DAR in the Court of Appeals and the appeal to the President filed by Governor Carlos O.
maybe appropriate to mention that, as claimed by petitioner, while it is true that there is, indeed, an Fortich, the DAR, without giving just compensation, caused the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title on
irrigation facility in the area, the same merely passes thru the property (as a right of way) to provide August 11, 1995 and had it transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under TCT No. T-
water to the ricelands located on the lower portion thereof. The land itself, subject of the instant petition, 50264[19] of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon. Thereafter, on September 25, 1995, DAR caused the
is not irrigated as the same was, for several years, planted with pineapple by the Philippine Packing issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 and had it registered in the
Corporation. name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries under TCT No. AT-3536[20] of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon.
19. Thus, on April 10, 1997, NQSRMDC filed a complaint [21] with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
On the issue that the land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA) and that Malaybalay, Bukidnon (Branch 9), docketed as Civil Case No. 2687-97, for annulment and cancellation
the existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not applicable, suffice it to state of title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others. The RTC then issued a Temporary
that the said NCA was declared null and void by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board Restraining Order on April 30, 1997[22] and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction on May 19, 1997,
[23]
(DARAB) as early as March 1, 1992. Deciding in favor of NQSRMDC, the DARAB correctly pointed out  restraining the DAR and 141 others from entering, occupying and/or wresting from NQSRMDC the
that under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6657, the subject property could not validly be the subject of possession of the subject land.
compulsory acquisition until after the expiration of the lease contract with Del Monte Philippines, a Multi-
National Company, or until April 1994, and ordered the DAR Regional Office and the Land Bank of the 20. Meanwhile, on June 23, 1997, an Order[24] was issued by then Executive Secretary Ruben D.
Philippines, both in Butuan City, to `desist from pursuing any activity or activities covering petitioners Torres denying DARs motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the reglementary period
land. of fifteen (15) days. The said order further declared that the March 29, 1996 OP decision had already
become final and executory.
On this score, we take special notice of the fact that the Quisumbing family has already contributed 21. The DAR filed on July 11, 1997 a second motion for reconsideration of the June 23, 1997
substantially to the land reform program of the government, as follows: 300 hectares of rice land in Order of the President.
Nueva Ecija in the 70s and another 400 hectares in the nearby Municipality of Impasugong, Bukidnon,
ten (10) years ago, for which they have not received just compensation up to this time. 22. On August 12, 1997, the said writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC was challenged
by some alleged farmers before the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari and prohibition,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 44905, praying for the lifting of the injunction and for the issuance of a writ
Neither can the assertion that there is no clear and tangible compensation package arrangements for of prohibition from further trying the RTC case.
the beneficiaries hold water as, in the first place, there are no beneficiaries to speak about, for the land
is not tenanted as already stated. 23. On October 9, 1997, some alleged farmer-beneficiaries began their hunger strike in front of the
DAR Compound in Quezon City to protest the OP Decision of March 29, 1996. On October 10, 1997,
Nor can procedural lapses in the manner of identifying/reclassifying the subject property for agro- some persons claiming to be farmer-beneficiaries of the NQSRMDC property filed a motion for
industrial purposes be allowed to defeat the very purpose of the law granting autonomy to local intervention (styled as Memorandum In Intervention) in O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424, asking that the OP
government units in the management of their local affairs. Stated more simply, the language of Section Decision allowing the conversion of the entire 144-hectare property be set aside.[25]
20 of R.A. No. 7160, supra, is clear and affords no room for any other interpretation. By unequivocal 24. President Fidel V. Ramos then held a dialogue with the strikers and promised to resolve their
legal mandate, it grants local government units autonomy in their local affairs including the power to grievance within the framework of the law. He created an eight (8)-man Fact Finding Task Force (FFTF)
convert portions of their agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization and disposition chaired by Agriculture Secretary Salvador Escudero to look into the controversy and recommend
to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities. possible solutions to the problem.[26]

WHEREFORE, in pursuance of the spirit and intent of the said legal mandate and in view of the 25. On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President resolved the strikers protest by issuing the
favorable recommendations of the various government agencies abovementioned, the subject Order, so-called Win/Win Resolution penned by then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, the
dated November 14, 1994 of the Hon. Secretary, Department of Agrarian Reform, is hereby SET ASIDE dispositive portion of which reads:
and the instant application of NQSRMDC/BAIDA is hereby APPROVED.[17]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Office of the President, through Executive
17.On May 20, 1996, DAR filed a motion for reconsideration of the OP decision. Secretary Ruben Torres, dated March 29, 1996, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

18 On September 11, 1996, in compliance with the OP decision of March 29, 1996, NQSRMDC 1. NQSRMDCs application for conversion is APPROVED only with respect to the
and the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) executed a Memorandum of approximately forty-four (44) hectare portion of the land adjacent to the highway, as
Agreement whereby the former donated four (4) hectares from the subject land to DECS for the recommended by the Department of Agriculture.
establishment of the NQSR High School.[18]
 2. The remaining approximately one hundred (100) hectares traversed by an irrigation The respondents, through the Solicitor General, opposed the petition and prayed that it be
canal and found to be suitable for agriculture shall be distributed to qualified farmer- dismissed outright on the following grounds:
beneficiaries in accordance with RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law with a right of way to said portion from the highway provided in the portion (1) The proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a petition for review directly with the
fronting the highway. For this purpose, the DAR and other concerned government Court of Appeals in accordance with Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court;
agencies are directed to immediately conduct the segregation survey of the area, (2) The petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Win-Win Resolution
valuation of the property and generation of titles in the name of the identified before filing the present petition; and
farmer-beneficiaries.
(3) Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping.
3. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby directed to carefully and meticulously These are the preliminary issues which must first be resolved, including the incident on the motion
determine who among the claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries. for intervention filed by the alleged farmer-beneficiaries.

4. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby further directed to expedite payment Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it is
of just compensation to NQSRMDC for the portion of the land to be covered by the necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction. An error of
CARP, including other lands previously surrendered by NQSRMDC for CARP judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction,  and which error is
coverage. reviewable only by an appeal.[35] On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act
complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without  or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
5. The Philippine National Police is hereby directed to render full assistance to the [36]
 This error is correctable only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.[37]
Department of Agrarian Reform in the implementation of this Order.
It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of any
We take note of the Memorandum in Intervention filed by 113 farmers on October 10, 1997 without quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions,[38] including the Office of the President,
[39]
ruling on the propriety or merits thereof since it is unnecessary to pass upon it at this time.  may be taken to the Court of Appeals by filing a verified petition for review[40] within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the said judgment, final order or resolution, [41] whether the appeal involves questions of
fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.[42]
SO ORDERED.[27]
However, we hold that, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable
A copy of the Win-Win Resolution was received by Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon, Mayor considering that the present petition contains an allegation that the challenged resolution is patently
Rey B. Baula of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and NQSRMDC on November 24, 1997[28] and, on December 4, illegal[43] and was issued with grave abuse of discretion and beyond his (respondent Secretary Renato
1997, they filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition (under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of C. Coronas) jurisdiction[44] when said resolution substantially modified the earlier OP Decision of March
Court) and injunction with urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary 29, 1996 which had long become final and executory. In other words, the crucial issue raised here
injunction (under Rule 58, ibid.), against then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona and DAR involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule
Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao. 43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the assailed resolution is an original special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have correctly done. The pertinent
On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To Intervene [29] was filed by alleged farmer- portion of Section 1 thereof provides:
beneficiaries, through counsel, claiming that they are real parties in interest as they were previously
identified by respondent DAR as agrarian reform beneficiaries on the 144-hectare property subject of SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
this case. The motion was vehemently opposed[30] by the petitioners. judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
In seeking the nullification of the Win-Win Resolution, the petitioners claim that the Office of the discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
President was prompted to issue the said resolution after a very well-managed hunger strike led by fake adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
farmer-beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in pressuring and/or politically blackmailing the Office of the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
the President to come up with this purely political decision to appease the farmers, by reviving and modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
modifying the Decision of 29 March 1996 which has been declared final and executory in an Order and justice may require.
of 23 June 1997.[31] Thus, petitioners further allege, respondent then Deputy Executive Secretary
Renato C. Corona committed grave abuse of discretion and acted beyond his jurisdiction when he x x x x x x x x x.
issued the questioned Resolution of 7 November 1997.[32] They availed of this extraordinary writ of
certiorari because there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases cases in which the act of the
[33]
 They never filed a motion for reconsideration of the subject Resolution because (it) is patently illegal lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void.[45]
or contrary to law and it would be a futile exercise to seek a reconsideration .[34]
The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the person aggrieved by the assailed illegal
act may file a verified petition (for certiorari) in the proper court. The proper court where the petition
must be filed is stated in Section 4 of the same Rule 65 which reads:
SEC. 4. Where petition filed.- The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the discussed later, we find the assailed resolution wholly void and requiring the petitioners to file their
judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.
omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-
the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the entrenched in our jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals:[56]
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial
agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. (4a) justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended its
Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice
have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, [46] prohibition[47] and mandamus.[48] But so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should
the jurisdiction of these three (3) courts are also delineated in that, if the challenged act relates to acts have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case."
or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, the petition must be filed with
the Regional Trial Court which exercises jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme As to the second issue of whether the petitioners committed a fatal procedural lapse when they
Court. And if it involves the act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, the petition shall be filed only with failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed resolution before seeking judicial recourse,
the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise provided by law or the Rules of Court. We have clearly suffice it to state that the said motion is not necessary when the questioned resolution is a patent nullity,
discussed this matter of concurrence of jurisdiction in People vs. Cuaresma, et. al.,[49] through now Chief [57]
 as will be taken up later.
Justice Andres R. Narvasa, thus:
With respect to the third issue, the respondents claim that the filing by the petitioners of: (a) a
petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. SP No. 37614) with the Court of
x x x. This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo Appeals; (b) a complaint for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial and 141 others (Civil Case No. 2687-97) with the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon; and (c)
Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their the present petition, constitute forum shopping.
respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of
Appeals (formerly, Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa We disagree.
Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latters competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to
those in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as The rule is that:
according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to
which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigation commenced in the courts while an
most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This specially so, as in
Appeals. (Citations omitted) this case, where the court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction (citations omitted).

But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping has been laid down in
directly to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant. This has the 1986 case of Buan vs. Lopez (145 SCRA 34), x x x and that is, forum shopping exists where the
been the judicial policy to be observed and which has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
[50]
 Uy vs. Contreras, et. al.,[51] Torres vs. Arranz,[52] Bercero vs. De Guzman,[53] and Advincula vs. judicata in the other, as follows:
Legaspi, et. al.[54] As we have further stated in Cuaresma:
There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC Case No. 86-36563 identity of parties,
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, as well as identity of rights
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and the identity on the two
the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless of
upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration: all the
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket. requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant.'[58]

Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in It is clear from the above-quoted rule that the petitioners are not guilty of forum shopping. The test
the interest of speedy justice[55] and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present for determining whether a party has violated the rule against forum shopping is where a final judgment
controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the in one case will amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration. A cursory examination of the
magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, as will be cases filed by the petitioners does not show that the said cases are similar with each other. The petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals sought the nullification of the DAR Secretarys order to proceed with assailed Win-Win Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the
the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the subject property. On the other hand, the civil case in Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken
RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the annulment and cancellation of title issued in the name of the from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to
Republic of the Philippines, with damages, was based on the following grounds: (1) the DAR, in be filed in exceptionally meritorious cases, as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18,
applying for cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDCs title, used documents which were earlier declared still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first motion for
null and void by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title was made without payment of just reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into
compensation; and (3) without notice to NQSRMDC for the surrender of its title. The present petition is finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its
entirely different from the said two cases as it seeks the nullification of the assailed Win-Win Resolution March 29,1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the
of the Office of the President dated November 7, 1997, which resolution was issued long after the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.
previous two cases were instituted.
In San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.[60] we held:
The fourth and final preliminary issue to be resolved is the motion for intervention filed by alleged
farmer-beneficiaries, which we have to deny for lack of merit. In their motion, movants contend that they Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President had long
are the farmer-beneficiaries of the land in question, hence, are real parties in interest. To prove this, become final and executory, the same can no longer be reviewed by the courts. It is well-established in
they attached as Annex I in their motion a Master List of Farmer-Beneficiaries. Apparently, the alleged our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their
master list was made pursuant to the directive in the dispositive portion of the assailed Win-Win quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within
Resolution which directs the DAR to carefully and meticulously determine who among the claimants are the purview of the doctrine of res judicata [Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497 (1956), Ipekdijna
qualified farmer-beneficiaries. However, a perusal of the said document reveals that movants are those Merchandizing Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72.]
purportedly Found Qualified and Recommended for Approval. In other words, movants are The rule of res judicata  which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent
merely recommendee farmer-beneficiaries. authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is a party who would be benefited or officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial
injured by the judgment or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Real interestmeans powers [Brillantes v. Castro, supra at 503].
a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent,
subordinate or consequential interest.[59] Undoubtedly, movants interest over the land in question is a The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-
mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not real parties in interest. judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to
write finis to disputes once and for all. [61] This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without
Furthermore, the challenged resolution upon which movants based their motion is, as intimated which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always
earlier, null and void. Hence, their motion for intervention has no leg to stand on. be maintained by those who wield the power of adjudication. Any act which violates such principle must
Now to the main issue of whether the final and executory Decision dated March 29,1996 can still immediately be struck down.
be substantially modified by the Win-Win Resolution. Therefore, the assailed Win-Win Resolution which substantially modified the Decision of March 29,
We rule in the negative. 1996 after it has attained finality, is utterly void. Such void resolution, as aptly stressed by Justice
Thomas A. Street[62] in a 1918 case,[63] is a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at
The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines are sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.[64]
embodied in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:
WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Resolution dated
November 7, 1997, issued by the Office of the President in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, is hereby
SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise provided NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Motion For Leave To Intervene filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries is
for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy hereby DENIED.
thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in SO ORDERED.
exceptionally meritorious cases. (Emphasis ours)

It is further provided for in Section 9 that The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character
whenever practicable.
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of
March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration
thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having
lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for
reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the
 action, reiterating its argument that the original term of 25 years stipulated in the contract of
lease had not yet expired and that, at any rate, under said contract he has the exclusive
option to renew the same for another 25 years.

After some further exchanges consisting of petitioner's opposition to private respondent's

aforesaid motion for preliminary hearing, the latter's reply thereto, and the parties' respective
position papers, the municipal trial court rendered judgment on October 26, 1989 ordering
private respondent to vacate the premises subject of the ejectment case.3
G.R. No. 94733 February 17, 1993
On November 8, 1989, private respondent filed a "Manifestation/Motion" before said trial
MUNICIPALITY OF BIÑAN, LAGUNA, represented by Hon. Bayani Alonte, Municipal court praying that the issues raised in the motion for preliminary hearing, apparently because
Mayor of Biñan, Laguna, petitioner,  it was in the nature of a motion to dismiss, be first resolved instead of rendering judgment on
vs. the pleadings. Thereafter, on November 10, 1989, private respondent received a copy of the
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JESUS M. GARCIA, respondents. decision of the trial court, hence he filed a notice of appeal to the Regional Trial Court of
Laguna on November 20, 1989, which was assigned to Branch 24 thereof at Biñan, Laguna.
Neol Cangco Zarate for private respondents.
On December 5, 1989, petitioner filed before said court a motion for execution pending
appeal and on December 14, 1989, Hon. Jose Mar. Garcia, presiding judge of said branch of
the regional trial court granted petitioner's aforesaid motion for discretionary execution.4 The
REGALADO, J.: following day, December 15, 1989, a writ of execution was issued directing the deputy sheriff
or his duly authorized representative to enforce the terms of the judgment of the court a quo.5
This is an appeal via certiorari from the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals
promulgated on May 31, 1990 in CA-G.R. SP No. 195821 wherein it set aside the order On December 29, 1989, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
granting a writ of execution pending appeal issued on December 14, 1989 by Branch 24 of for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, assailing the
the Regional Trial Court at Biñan, Laguna in Civil Case No. B-3201 thereof; and further aforesaid order of execution pending appeal on the ground that petitioner failed to furnish
annulled the judgment rendered by the Municipal Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna in an private respondent with a copy of the motion therefor filed by it in the aforementioned Civil
ejectment case, docketed as Civil Case No. 2473, and which case is pending on appeal in Case No. B-3201, contrary to Section 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, hence the invalidity of
the aforestated Civil Case No. B-3201. Respondent court having denied the reconsideration the lower court's order of December 14, 1989 which granted the writ of execution. Petitioner
in its resolution of August 9, 1990,2 petitioners have taken this recourse to us against the seasonably filed its comment and/or opposition to said petition.
backdrop of the antecedents hereunder chronologically detailed.
Resolving this issue posed by the pleadings, respondent court rendered judgment on May 31,
On September 27, 1989, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 2473 for unlawful detainer, with a 1990 setting aside the questioned order for being violative of the requirement in Section 6,
prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, against private respondent in the Rule 15 of the Rules of Court which provides that no motion shall be acted upon by the court
Municipal Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna alleging that it was no longer amenable to the renewal without proof of prior notice thereof to the adverse party. Aside from annulling the
of its 25-year lease contract with private respondent over the premises involved because of controversial order, however, respondent court likewise annulled the judgment of the court a
its pressing need to use the same for national and provincial offices therein. quo in Civil Case No. 2473, which judgment is pending on appeal in Civil Case No. B-3201 of
the aforesaid regional trial court. Respondent court granted the second additional relief on the
On October 5, 1989, private respondent filed his answer to the complaint contending that the ground that the decision is contrary to the agreement of the parties which should be
contract of lease for the original period of 25 years had not yet expired and, assuming that it considered the law between them.6
had expired, he has exercised his option to stay in the premises for another 25 years as
expressly provided in the said contract. On October 9, 1989, petitioner filed its reply to private The assailed judgment and ratiocinations of respondent court are best reproduced for
respondent's answer. convenient reference:

On October 16, 1989, private respondent filed this time a "Motion for Preliminary Hearing as if FIRSTLY, the respondent Municipality filed a Motion For Execution pending
a Motion to Dismiss Has Been Filed" on the ground that the complaint states no cause of appeal. Petitioner contends that said motion did not comply with Section 4,
 Rule 15 and the ruling of Azajar vs. Court of Appeals (145 SCRA 333). Under the issuance of a writ of execution during the pendency of the appeal therein was the sole
Section 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, no motion shall be acted upon by issue raised in the petition for certiorari filed in respondent Court of Appeals.9 The allegation
the Court without proof of such motion. The respondent Court by doing so that the decision of the municipal trial court was improvidently and irregularly issued was
acted with serious abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack of or in raised by private respondent only as an additional or alternative argument to buttress his
excess of jurisdiction to issue a writ of execution pending appeal. theory that the issuance of a discretionary writ of execution was not in order, as can be
gleaned from the text of said petition itself, to wit:
SECONDLY, petitioner assails the decision of the lower court on the ground
that it failed to consider that the judgment proceeded from an inferior court V. ERRORS/ISSUES
which was improvidently and irregularly rendered when it failed to resolve
first the issue raised in the motion to dismiss. This refers to a situation where xxx xxx xxx
the lease contract shall be for twenty five (25) years, renewable for another
twenty five (25) years at the option of the lessee or his heirs. . . . Besides, when the respondent Judge issued the writ, it (sic) failed to consider
that the judgment rendered by the inferior court was improvidently and
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and considering the evidence and irregularly issued, when said court failed to resolve first the pending Motion
the highest consideration of law and applicable jurisprudence, the petition To Dismiss, a procedural process before any judgment on the merit(s) may
for certiorari is hereby granted. The order dated December 14, 1989 in Civil be had. 10
Case No. B-3201, issued without notice to petitioner together with the writ of
execution pending appeal, being null and void, is therefore ordered set aside, Further, even assuming that the said issue was squarely raised and sufficiently controverted,
being contrary to Section 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. The judgment of the same cannot be considered a proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari  under
the inferior court in Civil Case No. 2475 (sic, 2473) is likewise ordered Rule 65 which is limited only to challenges against errors of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the
annulled, being contrary to the agreement of the parties which is considered municipal trial court over the ejectment case filed by the petitioner against private respondent
the law between them.7 is not disputed. Thus, assuming that the said lower court committed a mistake on the merits
of the case, it was nonetheless in the due exercise of its jurisdiction. The error, if any was
Petitioner duly filed a motion for reconsideration of said judgment on the ground that the committed by the trial court, was at most one of judgment or procedure correctible by ordinary
Court of Appeals should have confined itself to the questioned order of the respondent appeal.
regional trial court dated December 14, 1989 and subject of private respondent's petition
for certiorari with preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. SP No. 19582. Neither can it be said that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion or exceeded
its jurisdiction when it failed to conduct a preliminary hearing, as prayed for in private
As earlier stated, respondent court denied said motion, hence, the instant petition wherein the respondent's "Motion for Preliminary Hearing as if a Motion to Dismiss Has Been Filed,"
petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals overstepped the bounds of its authority in before summarily rendering judgment on the merits of the case. The said motion of private
annulling the decision of the municipal trial court even if said decision was not an issue raised respondent is anchored on the ground that the complaint allegedly states no cause of action
by private respondent in CA-G.R. SP No. 19582 and which decision is in fact pending on since the original term of 25 years stipulated in the contract of lease had not yet expired and
appeal with the regional trial court.8 assuming that it had expired, private respondent had made known to petitioner his exclusive
option to renew it for another 25 years. 11
In his comment, private respondent refutes petitioner's contention and claims that the issue of
the merits of the judgment of the municipal trial court was sufficiently raised and controverted, Section 5, Rule of the Rules of Court pertinently provides:
hence, respondent court was not in error when it passed judgment on the same. Moreover,
private respondent makes the riposte that it is a cherished rule in procedural law that a Sec. 5. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. — Any of the grounds for
controversy should be settled in one single proceeding in order to avoid multiplicity of suits. dismissal provides for in this Rule, except improper venue, preliminary
hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.
We are favorably impressed with the merits of the instant petition.
The aforequoted provision allows the grounds for a motion to dismiss to be set up as
Respondent Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction in a certiorari proceeding involving an affirmative defenses in the answer if no motion to dismiss has been filed.
incident in a case to rule on the merits of the main case itself which was not on appeal before
it. The validity of the order of the regional trial court, dated December 14, 1989, authorizing
However, contrary to the claim of private respondent, the preliminary hearing permitted under were ultra jurisdictio.  That judgment was on appeal before the regional trial court.
the said provision is not mandatory even when the same is prayed for. It rests largely on the Respondent court's authority was, therefore, limited to ruling upon the issue of whether or not
sound discretion of the trial court. The use of the word "may" in said provision shows that the regional trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order directing the
such a hearing is not a matter of right demandable from the trial court. Where the provision issuance of a discretionary writ of execution against private respondent. Whether or not the
reads "may," this word shows that it is not mandatory but discretional. It is an auxiliary verb municipal trial court committed a mistake in arriving at its decision is an issue that is beyond
indicating liberty, opportunity, permission and possibility. 12 the authority of respondent court to decide. It is lodged in another and appropriate forum with
appellate powers the exercise of which should not be usurped or preemted by respondent
Moreover, a preliminary hearing on an affirmative defense for failure to state a cause of Court of Appeals.
action is not necessary. As we have ruled in Heirs of Juliana Clavano vs. Genato, et al.: 13

. . . respondent Judge committed an error in conducting a preliminary hearing

on the private respondent's affirmative defenses. It is a well-settled rule that WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is GRANTED. The decision of respondent Court Appeals
in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a dated May 31, 1990, insofar as it annulled the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Biñan,
cause of action, the question submitted to the court for determination is the Laguna in Civil Case No. 2473, and its resolution of August 9, 1990 are hereby REVERSED
sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself. Whether those and SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna
allegations are true or not is beside the point, for their truth is hypothetically for further appropriate proceedings.
admitted by the motion. The issue rather is: admitting them to be true, may
the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the SO ORDERED.
complaint? Stated otherwise, the sufficiency of the cause of action must
appear on the face of the complaint in order to sustain a dismissal on this
ground. No extraneous matter may be considered nor facts not alleged,
which would require evidence and therefore, must be raised as defenses and
await the trial. In other words, to determine sufficiency of the cause of action,
only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no other should be considered.

The respondent Judge departed from this rule in conducting a hearing and in
receiving evidence in support of private respondent's affirmative defense,
that is, lack of cause of action.

It is a familiar doctrine in this jurisdiction that certiorari  will issue only to correct errors of
jurisdiction and that no error or mistake committed by a court will be corrected
by certiorari unless said court had acted in the premises without jurisdiction or in excess
thereof or with such grave abuse of discretion as would amount to lack of jurisdiction. It is
available only for these purposes and not to correct errors of procedure or mistake in the
judge's finding or conclusions. 14

If a judgment of a municipal trial court is sought to be reviewed, the remedy is an appeal to

the regional trial court, not the filing of a special civil action of certiorari. Appeal, whether from
an interior court or a regional trial court, is antithetical to a special civil action
of certiorari. 15 When the remedy of appeal is available, the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari cannot be resorted to because the availability of appeal proscribes recourse to
the special civil action of certiorari. 16

Indeed, the respondent Court of Appeals went beyond the realm of its authority and its
pronouncements on the judgment rendered by the municipal trial court on the ejectment case
 P25,000.00 (Criminal Case No. 240-M-90); P35,000.00 (Criminal Case No. 241-M-90) and P25,000.00
(Criminal Case No. 242-M-90). 1

On May 9, 1991, private respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of said order contending
that the recommended bail in the amount of P1,000.00 was in accordance with the Bail Bond Guide for
the National Prosecution Service pursuant to the Ministry of Justice Circular No. 36 dated September 1,
1981. 2 But on August 23, 1991, petitioner denied the motion and directed the issuance of the warrant of
arrest against private respondent. 3

On August 27, 1991, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with an urgent prayer for preliminary injunction to nullify and set aside the orders dated April
29, 1991 and August 23, 1991 issued by the petitioner, reiterating that the recommended bail bonds
were accordance with the guidelines on bail bonds issued by the then Ministry of Justice and that the
G.R. Nos. 103752-53 November 25, 1992 increase of the bail bond was violative of his constitutional rights against excessive bail. 4

HON. AMADO M. CALDERON in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 11, On September 4, 1991, the Court of Appeals required the Solicitor General representing the People of
Malolos, Bulacan, petitioner,  the Philippines to comment on the petition and show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be
vs. issued within ten days from receipt. 5
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL and MAURO DIONISIO, respondents.
On December 17, 1991, the Appellate Court nullified the questioned orders issued by petitioner for
This is a joint petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 103753) and mandamus (G.R. No. 103752). failure to show the reasons for the increase of the bail bonds as required by Section 17 of Rule 114 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. Moreover, the Court of Appeals added that the
unwarranted increase of amount violated private respondent's constitutional right against excessive
In G.R. No. 103753, petitioner seek the review of the decision dated December 17, 1991 and the
bail. 6
resolution dated January 28, 1992 of the Court of Appeals declaring null and void petitioner's orders
dated April 29, 1991 and April 23, 1991 which motu propio increased the bail bonds posted by private
respondent who was accused violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (CA-G.R. SP No. 25801), without citing On January 13, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration after he was refused representation
justifiable reason therefor. by the Office of the Solicitor General. 7 On January 28, 1992, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration. 8
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 103752, petitioner prays for judgment commanding respondent Solicitor
General to forthwith represent him by filing a petition before this Court by way of appeal from the Hence, this joint special civil action for certiorari and mandamus.
decision of the Appellate Court in CA-G.R. SP No. 25801.
The two issues to be resolved in this case are whether or not petitioner has standing to file this instant
The undisputed facts are as follows: petition for certiorari and whether or not a writ of mandamus may issue commanding the Solicitor
General to appear in behalf of petitioner.
On January 29, 1990, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor filed three separate informations for
violations Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan (Malolos) against This joint petition for certiorari and mandamus must fail. We see no necessity in discussing the merits of
accused-private respondent involving the following amounts: P114,902.00 (Criminal Case 240-M-90), petitioner's order dated April 29, 1991 which motu proprio increased the bail bond or private respondent
P141,710.00 (Criminal Case 241-M-90) and P110,923.00 (Criminal Case 242-M-90). These three because this joint petition for certiorari and mandamus suffers from a procedural infirmity.
informations were assigned to different salas.
To recall, this case originally started as "People of the Philippines v. Mauro Dionisio," in three separate
Subsequently, the Provincial Prosecutor recomended bail of P1,000.00 for each case, and conformably informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. After petitioner raised the bail bonds of accused,
with the recommendations, private respondent filed three separate bail bonds of P1,000.00 for his the latter elevated his case before the Appellate Court entitled; "Mauro Dionisio v. Hon. Amado
provisional liberty. Calderon, Presiding Judge, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan Branch II." Subsequently, petitioner believing that
he was a real party in interest filed this instant petition for certiorari and mandamus against the Solicitor
General and the accused Mauro Dionisio.
On petition of private respondent, the aforementioned cases were consolidated in the sala of petitioner.

On April 29, 1991, "after noting from the records that the bonds posted by the private respondent was
only P1,000.00 for each of the three case" petitioner issued an order increasing the bail bond to
Petitioner, with his years in experience in the judiciary, should have known that he has no standing to a prosecution already started, our own Solicitor General may even dismiss, abandon, discontinue or
file this instant petition because he is merely a nominal party as gleaned from Section 5 of Rule 65 of compromise suits either with or without stipulation with the other party." We added that, "upon receipt of
the Revised Rules of Court which states that: a case certified to him, the Solicitor General exercises his discretion in the management of the case. He
may start the prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate action in court or he may opt not to file a
Defendants and the costs in certain case. — When the petition filed relates to the acts case at all. He may do everything within his legal authority but always conformably with the national
or omissions of a court or judge, the petitioner shall joint, as parties defendant with interest and the policy of the government on the matter at hand."
such court or judge, the person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in
the court; and it shall be the duty to such person or persons to appear and defend, On the basis of the aforequoted jurisprudence, it is evident that since the Solicitor General has the right
both in his or their own behalf or in behalf of the court or judge affected by the to decide when and how to defend or prosecute a case, his duty, therefore, is discretionary and not
proceedings, and cost awarded in such proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be ministerial. A duty is ministerial when the discharged of the same requires neither the exercise of official
against the person or persons in interest only and not against the court or judge. discretion nor judgment. 13
(Emphasis supplied).
What would be the consequence if the Solicitor General were compelled to appear and defend
Accordingly, a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party. In such petitioner's act of increasing private respondent's bail? Obviously, he would acting contrary to the bail
capacity, therefore, he should not appear as a party seeking the reversal of the decision that is bond guidelines of the Executive Department, specifically the Department of Justice. Taking up the
unfavorable to the action taken by him. 9 cudgels for the petitioner would place him at cross purpose with the avowed policies of the Executive
Department of which he is undeniably a part, as expressed in the different circulars issued by said
In the case at bar, private complainant being the real party interested in upholding petitioner's agency.
questioned orders increasing the bail bonds, had the legal personality to file the instant case. Since he
did not even bother to assail the decision of the Court of Appeals holding petitioner's actuations as Clearly, the pleadings show that petitioner is not entitled to the mandamus he seeks from this Court, for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, then much less should petitioner go out of his way to he has neither shown a clear legal right to the thing demanded nor demonstrated that it is the Solicitor
file this joint petition for certiorari and mandamus. General's imperative duty to defend him on the sole ground that he is public officer.

Judge Calderon should be reminded of the well-known doctrine that a judge should detach himself from WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the writ
case where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review. The raison d'etre for such doctrine is of mandamus applied for is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED.
the fact so the judge is not an active combatant in such proceeding and must leave the opposing parties
to contend their individual positions and the appellate court to decide the issues without his active
participation. By filing this case, petitioner in a way ceased to be judicial and has become adversarial
instead. 10

Considering that petitioner has no standing to file this certiorari proceeding, then logically his petition
for mandamusalso deserves scant consideration. Nonetheless, we feel that we would be making a
significant contribution to jurisprudence if we definitely settled the question of whether mandamus will lie
to compel the Solicitor General to represent a judge whose decision has been nullified by the Court of
Appeals. It is our considered opinion that petitioner cannot compel the Solicitor General to defend his
unwarranted act of increasing the private respondent's bail. As a special civil action, mandamus lies
only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty but not to compel the performance of the
discretionary duty. 11

In the case at bar, petitioner contends that pursuant to paragraph (1) of Section 35, Chapter 12, of Book
IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, it is the specific legal duty of the Solicitor General "to represent
the government and its officers before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and other courts and
tribunals in all civil action and special proceedings in which the government or any officer thereof in his
official capacity is a party." To buttress his contention, he cites our recent case Ramon A. Gonzales
v. Fransisco Chavez. 12

Petitioner has not read carefully our decision. In the Gonzales case, we held that the Solicitor General
may not just drop a case without any legal and valid reason because his discretion is not unlimited. To
quote, "(L)ike the Attorney General who has absolute discretion in choosing to prosecute or to abandon
 of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no
case to exceed fifteen (15) days.

Previous to the amendment, Section 4, Rule 65 provided in the lone paragraph that
"(t)he petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court."
On 19 October 1998, petitioners received a copy of the NLRC Resolution denying their
motion for reconsideration. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari in this Court on 17
December 1998. The Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the ruling
in St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. NLRC.[1]
Acting on the petition, the court of appeals denied the same for late filing. Apparently,
JUANITA NARZOLES, PERLITA GUTIERREZ, MYLENE GERONAGA, LETICIA M. the CA applied Section 4, Rule 65, as amended by Circular No. 39-98, in computing the
FORNAL, ARNEL DIMALIBOT, MARITES SAGUID, IRENE MARCENE, ABRAM period for the filing of the petition for certiorari. It held:
GERONAGA, ROLANDO LU, MARIBETH HERNANDEZ, CORAZON AGARAP,
PATRICIA ROSARIO, BERNADETTE LU, ANGELES MANGUL and JOSEFINA The reglementary period to file petition for certiorari is sixty (60) days from notice of the
MARTE, petitioners, vs.  NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, accrual of the cause for certiorari (Sec. 4, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
EASTERN MINDORO INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCES (EMITS),
AND MR. MARCIAL S. SEMILLA, respondents. Petitioner's last day to file their petition for certiorari is December 8, 1998. The petition was
filed before the Honorable Supreme Court on December 17, 1998. Consequently, this court
RESOLUTION hereby RESOLVES TO DISMISS the petition for having been filed beyond the reglementary
period.[2]
KAPUNAN, J.:
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioners filed the
Section 4, rule 65, as amended by Circular No. 39-98, provides that the 60-day period present petition for review.
for filing a petition for certiorari shall be interrupted by the filing of a motion for reconsideration
or new trial. In the event of the denial of the motion, the petitioner only has the remaining There is no question that the amendments brought about by Circular No. 39-98, which
period within which to file the petition. Does the amendment apply to cases where the motion took effect on September 1, 1998, were already in force, and therefore applicable when
for reconsideration was filed before the amendment although the petition was filed after the petitioners filed their petition. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts are applicable to
amendment took effect? This is the question originally raised by the instant petition. actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense.[3] No vested rights attach to procedural laws.[4] Consequently, the
From the adverse decision of the Labor Arbiter dismissing their complaint for illegal CA, in accordance with Circular No. 39-98, correctly deducted the 16 days (the fifteenth day
dismissal, petitioner-employees appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. The was a Sunday) it took for petitioners to file their motion for reconsideration from the 60-day
NLRC modified the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordered respondents to reinstate reglementary period. As petitioners only had the remaining period of 44 days from 19 October
petitioners "but without backwages." Petitioners received the NLRC decision on 23 July 1998, 1998, when it received a copy of the resolution denying reconsideration, to file the petition
and filed a motion for reconsideration on 3 August 1998. (The last day for filing said motion for certiorari, or until 8 December 1998, the filing of the petition on 17 December 1998 was
was on 2 August 1998, a Sunday.) nine (9) days too late.
On September 1, 1998, the amendment to Section 4, Rule 65 took effect per Circular Petitioners, however, claim exception to the retroactive application of Circular No. 39-98
No. 39-98. The amendment added another paragraph to said Section, and reads: since it would work injustice to them.[5] We do not deem it necessary to rule on this contention
in view of further amendments to Section 4, Rule 65.
If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due time after notice of
said judgment, order, or resolution the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is The Court has observed that Circular No. 39-98 has generated tremendous confusion
denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall resulting in the dismissal of numerous cases for late filing. This may have been because,
not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension historically, i.e., even before the 1997 revision to the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party had a
fresh period from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration to file a petition
for certiorari. Were it not for the amendments brought about by Circular No. 39-98, the cases As regards the contention of respondents that the case ought to be dismissed,
so dismissed would have been resolved on the merits. Hence, the Court deemed it wise to considering that only three of the fifteen petitioners verified the petition for certiorari originally
revert to the old rule allowing a party a fresh 60-day period from notice of the denial of the filed in this Court, the same is best resolved by the Court of Appeals, where the records of the
motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari. Earlier this year, the Court resolved, case remain.
in A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, to further amend Section 4, Rule 65 to read as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolved to GIVE DUE COURSE to, and
GRANT, the petition. The case is hereby REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further
Sec. 4. When and were petition filed. - The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days proceedings.
from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new
trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be SO ORDERED.
counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a
lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in
the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a
quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be
filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in
no case exceeding fifteen (15) days. [Underscoring supplied.]

The latest amendments took effect on September 1, 2000, following its publication in the
Manila Bulletin on august 4, 2000 and in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 7, 2000, two
newspapers of general circulation.
In view of its purpose, the Resolution further amending Section 4, Rule 65 can only be
described as curative in nature, and the principles governing curative statutes are applicable.
Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal
proceedings which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal
requirements.[6] They are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities and curb certain
evils. They are intended to enable persons to carry into effect that which they have designed
or intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by reason of some statutory
disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid that which, before the enactment
of the statute was invalid. Their purpose is to give validity to acts done that would have been
invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with. [7] Curative statutes,
therefore, by their very essence, are retroactive.[8]
Accordingly, while the Resolution states that the same "shall take effect on September 1,
2000, following its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation," its retroactive
application cannot be denied. In short, the filing of the petition for certiorari in this Court on 17
December 1998 is deemed to be timely, the same having been made within the 60-day
period provided under the curative Resolution. We reach this conclusion bearing in mind that
the substantive aspects of this case involves the rights and benefits, even the livelihood, of
petitioner-employees.
 1. Declaring the dismissal of complainant Ruperto Evangelista, Jr. as having been effected illegally by
respondent Metro Transit Organization, Inc. and Jovencio P. Bantang, Jr.;

2. Ordering respondents to immediately reinstate complainant to his former position without loss of
seniority rights and other monetary benefits with full back wages in the amount of FORTY SIX
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY PESOS AND FIFTY SIX CENTAVOS (P46,580.56);

3. Respondent is further ordered to pay the thirteenth month due the complainant in the amount of
THREE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY AND ONE PESOS (P3,881.00);

4. Respondent is further ordered to pay the award of moral damages to complainant in the amount of
METRO TRANSIT ORGANIZATION, INC. and JOVENCIO P. BANTANG, JR., petitioners, vs.  THE TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND (P25,000.00) PESOS and exemplary damages in the amount of TWENTY
COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (First Division) FIVE THOUSAND (P25,000.00); and
and RUPERTO EVANGELISTA, JR., respondents.
5. Finally, respondent is ordered to pay for and as attorneys fees the amount of TEN THOUSAND
FORTY SIX PESOS AND TWENTY TWO CENTAVOS (P10,046.22) which is equivalent to ten (10%)
percent of the total award due the complainant herein.
The Case
Petitioners appealed the Labor Arbiters decision to the National Labor Relations Commission
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 to reverse the Decision dated 30 April 1999 and the (NLRC for brevity). The NLRC rendered a judgment on March 7, 1996 affirming the Labor Arbiters
Resolution dated 16 February 2002 of the Court of Appeals[1] in CA-G.R. SP No. 50122. decision but deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages. Petitioners did not file any motion for
reconsideration. Instead, petitioners directly filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65.

The Facts
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (MTO for brevity) is a government-owned and controlled
corporation operating a light rail transit (LRT for brevity), while petitioner Jovencio Bantang, Jr. (Bantang
for brevity) is an officer of MTO. Respondent Ruperto Evangelista (Evangelista for brevity) worked as a On April 30, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition for certiorari
cash assistant in the Treasury Division of MTO. filed by petitioners. The Court of Appeals ruled that the special civil action of certiorari will lie only if
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The
On December 29, 1989, after completion of an inventory count of tokens, petitioners discovered Court of Appeals held that the plain and adequate remedy is a motion for reconsideration of the
that 2,000 pieces of tokens were missing. Petitioners conducted an investigation which resulted in assailed NLRC decision, which motion is mandatory.
implicating Evangelista as one of the alleged perpetrators responsible for the loss of the tokens. The
evidence presented against Evangelista included three handwritten letters by three persons, namely: On the merits of the case, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners failed to adduce substantial
George Kasunuran, a vault keeper of MTO; Renato Mendoza, a treasury personnel of MTO; and evidence to prove Evangelistas culpability for the loss of the 2,000 pieces of tokens.Petitioners
Edgardo de Leon, owner of a token outlet. presented only the handwritten letters implicating Evangelista. The Court of Appeals doubted the
veracity of the handwritten letters because the letters were not sufficiently identified. The affidavit
Based on the handwritten letters, petitioners terminated Evangelistas employment on April 3, 1990 allegedly executed by petitioners principal witness, Renato Mendoza (Mendoza for brevity), who
for lack of trust and confidence. Petitioners also filed a criminal case for qualified theft against identified Evangelista as the culprit, was not sworn to before any administering officer.
Evangelista before the prosecutors office but the investigating prosecutor dismissed the case.
The Court of Appeals also found that petitioner Bantang prepared Mendozas unsworn affidavit,
Subsequently, Evangelista filed a case for illegal dismissal against petitioners. On September 5, and that Mendoza signed it under a threat of dismissal if he failed to cooperate with
1991, Labor Arbiter Oswald B. Lorenzo rendered a decision declaring that petitioners illegally dismissed petitioners. Mendoza later renounced under oath before the investigating prosecutor his unsworn
Evangelista. The Labor Arbiter ordered petitioners to reinstate Evangelista to his former position, with affidavit which pointed to Evangelista as the culprit. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that petitioners
payment of full back wages. The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiters decision reads: failed to allow Evangelista to explain his side during the investigation. Neither did petitioners give
Evangelista an opportunity to contest the veracity of the handwritten letters presented against him.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: The Court of Appeals denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, the present petition.
 Evangelista did not file any comment to the instant petition despite notices sent to him or his special civil action for certiorari, subject to certain exceptions. Thus, in Abraham v. NLRC,[2] the Court
counsel at the address on record and despite earnest efforts by petitioners to locate his new address ruled:
and that of his counsel. Hence, in a Resolution dated July 3, 2002, the Court considered the case
submitted for resolution. Generally, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is filed before
the respondent tribunal to allow it an opportunity to correct its imputed errors. However, the following
have been recognized as exceptions to the rule:
Issues
(a) where the order is a patent of nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;

Petitioners raise the following assignment of errors: (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by
the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
I

(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS NOT THE PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY
perishable;
AVAILABLE TO PETITIONERS;

(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;

II

(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF
THE RESOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION IS NECESSARY
BEFORE RESORTING TO A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the
trial court is improbable;
III
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED
PRIVATE RESPONDENT. (h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and

(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. (Emphasis supplied)
The Courts Ruling
In Seagull Shipmanagement and Transport, Inc. v. NLRC,[3] we ruled:

We shall jointly discuss the first two issues raised by petitioners since these are interrelated. xxx. The law intends to afford the tribunal, board or office, an opportunity to rectify the errors and
mistakes it may have lapsed into before resort to the courts of justice can be had. However, in the case
Petitioners contend that a motion for reconsideration is not necessary before resort to the special at bar, petitioners had not only failed to explain its failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65. Petitioners contend that they availed of certiorari under Rule 65 NLRC, it has also failed to show sufficient justification for dispensing with the requirement. Certiorari
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to set aside the NLRC decision because certiorari is the cannot be resorted to as a shield from the adverse consequences of petitioners' own omission to file the
plain, speedy, adequate and only remedy available to petitioners.Petitioners argue that without the required motion for reconsideration.
extraordinary relief of injunction, the NLRC can immediately execute the questioned decision rendering
the issues raised in the petition moot and academic. Moreover, petitioners assert that a motion for
reconsideration of the NLRC decision is no longer necessary because the questions that will be raised An examination of the records reveals that petitioners did not file a motion for reconsideration of
in the motion for reconsideration are the very same questions which the NLRC already considered. the NLRC decision. As petitioners alleged in their petition before the Court of Appeals, a motion for
reconsideration is not necessary as the questions raised before the court are the very same issues
We are not persuaded. which the NLRC already considered.[4] Except for this bare allegation, petitioners failed to show
sufficient justification for dispensing with the requirement of a prior motion for
The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is indispensable before resort to the special reconsideration. Petitioners failed to state any justification that their case falls within any of the
civil action for certiorari to afford the court or tribunal the opportunity to correct its error, if any. The rule exceptions.
is well-settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition to the filing of a
 Certiorari is not a shield from the adverse consequences of an omission to file the required motion findings of the Labor Arbiter, when affirmed by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, are binding on this
for reconsideration. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals in its decision,[5]petitioners may not Court unless patently erroneous. In the instant case, we find no patent errors.
arrogate to themselves the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or
not. In Zapata v. NLRC,[6] this Court held: It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence already
considered in the proceedings below. The jurisdiction of this Court is limited only to reviewing errors of
law that may have been committed by the lower courts.[10] Likewise, it is not for this Court to re-examine
Petitioner cannot, on its bare and self-serving representation that reconsideration is unnecessary, conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute the findings of fact of an
unilaterally disregard what the law requires and deny respondent NLRC its right to review its administrative tribunal which has expertise in its special field.[11]
pronouncements before being hailed to court to account therefor. On policy considerations, such
prerequisite would provide an expeditious termination to labor disputes and assist in the decongestion WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the petition for review is
of court dockets by obviating improvident and unnecessary recourse to judicial proceedings. The DENIED.
present case exemplifies the very contingency sought to be, and which could have been, avoided by the
observance of said rules. SO ORDERED.

The plain and adequate remedy referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a motion for reconsideration
of the assailed decision. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the court or agency to rectify its
mistakes without the intervention of a higher court. To dispense with this requirement, there must be a
concrete, compelling, and valid reason for the failure to comply with the requirement.
Petitioners argue that the findings of the Court of Appeals have no basis in fact and are contrary to
law. Petitioners contend that the retraction of Mendoza is not sufficient to overturn the other evidence
which independently establish the guilt of Evangelista. Petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals relied
merely on the recantation of Mendoza. Petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals disregarded the
positive identification of Evangelista by another witness, De Leon, the owner of the token
outlet. Petitioners claim that other than his bare denial, Evangelista failed to present any other evidence
to substantiate his self-serving denial.
Finally, petitioners lament that despite the overwhelming evidence pointing to the guilt of
Evangelista, the Court of Appeals still chose to ignore the plain and concrete evidence warranting the
termination of Evangelistas employment. Petitioners aver that the dismissal by the prosecutor of the
criminal case against respondent does not ipso facto make Evangelistas dismissal illegal. Petitioners
insist that the dismissal by the prosecutor of a criminal complaint against an employee for qualified theft
does not bind the labor tribunal in determining whether the employee has committed an act of
dishonesty for stealing company property.
We cannot agree with petitioners.
It is true that the criminal case for qualified theft against Evangelista and the complaint for illegal
dismissal against petitioners deal with two different issues cognizable by two different tribunals. Indeed,
these two cases respectively require distinct and well delineated degrees of proof. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt is required to sustain a criminal conviction, while only substantial evidence is required
to make a finding of culpability in a labor case. A labor arbiter or tribunal may legally sustain an
employees dismissal for dishonesty in stealing company property even if the employee has not been
convicted of qualified theft in a criminal case arising from the same act.[7] Even if the employee is
acquitted in the criminal case, he may still be legally dismissed for the same act, unless the acquittal
exonerates him from any wrongdoing.[8]
The instant case, however, is a petition for review where only questions of law may be raised.
[9]
 What petitioners are attempting to do here is to urge the Court to re-examine the probative value or
evidentiary weight of the evidence presented below. The Court cannot do this unless the appreciation of
the pieces of evidence on hand is glaringly erroneous. This is where petitioners fail.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of both the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter that petitioners
failed to present substantial evidence to establish that Evangelista stole the 2,000 pieces of tokens. The
 Following trial under the Rule on Summary Procedure, the MeTC rendered judgment on
September 19, 1994 against the 23 non-answering defendants, ordering them to vacate the premises
occupied by each of them, and to pay jointly and severally P10,000.00 per month from the date they last
paid their rent until the date they actually vacate, plus interest thereon at the legal rate allowed by law,
as well as P10,000.00 as attorneys fees and the costs of the suit. As to the 20 private respondents,
the MeTC issued a separate judgment[6] on the same day sustaining their rights under the Land Reform
Law, declaring petitioners cause of action as not duly warranted by the facts and circumstances of the
case and dismissing the case without prejudice.
Not satisfied with the judgment dismissing the complaint as against the private respondents,
petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court (Branch 47) of Manila (RTC).[7] In a Decision[8] dated July
5, 1996, the RTC sustained the decision of the MeTC.
Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA for brevity),
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41394. In a Resolution dated March 21, 1997, the CA dismissed the
petition on two grounds: (a) the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by petitioners counsel
ANTONIO T. DONATO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FILOMENO ARCEPE, TIMOTEO and not by petitioner himself, in violation of Revised Circular No. 28-91;[9] and, (b) the only annex to the
BARCELONA, IGNACIO BENDOL, THELMA P. BULICANO, ROSALINDA CAPARAS, petition is a certified copy of the questioned decision but copies of the pleadings and other material
ROSITA DE COSTO, FELIZA DE GUZMAN, LETICIA DE LOS REYES, ROGELIO GADDI, portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition are not annexed, contrary to
PAULINO GAJARDO, GERONIMO IMPERIAL, HOMER IMPERIAL, ELVIRA LESLIE, Section 3, paragraph b, Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA).[10]
CEFERINO LUGANA, HECTOR PIMENTEL, NIMFA PIMENTEL, AURELIO G. ROCERO,
ILUMINADA TARA, JUANITO VALLESPIN, AND NARCISO YABUT, respondents. On April 17, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[11] attaching thereto a photocopy of
the certification of non-forum shopping duly signed by petitioner himself[12] and the relevant records of
the MeTC and the RTC.[13] Five days later, or on April 22, 1997, petitioner filed a Supplement [14] to his
DECISION motion for reconsideration submitting the duly authenticated original of the certification of non-forum
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: shopping signed by petitioner.[15]
In a Resolution[16] dated June 23, 1997 the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration and
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed on July 17, 1997 which should be a petition its supplement, ruling that petitioners subsequent compliance did not cure the defect in the instant
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It assails the Resolutions[1] dated March 21, petition.[17]
1997 and June 23, 1997 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41394.[2]
Hence, the present petition anchored on the following grounds:
The factual background of the case is as follows:
I.
Petitioner Antonio T. Donato is the registered owner of a real property located at Ciriaco Tuason
Street, San Andres, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 131793 issued by the Register RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION BASED
of Deeds of the City of Manila on November 24, 1978. On June 7, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint ON HYPER-TECHNICAL GROUNDS BECAUSE:
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (Branch 26) of Manila (MeTC) for forcible entry and unlawful detainer
against 43 named defendants and all unknown occupants of the subject property.[3]
A. PETITIONER HAS SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH SUPREME COURT
Petitioner alleges that: private respondents had oral contracts of lease that expired at the end of CIRCULAR NO. 28-91. MORE, PETITIONER SUBSEQUENTLY SUBMITTED
each month but were impliedly renewed under the same terms by mere acquiescence or tolerance; DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE PROCEEDINGS A DULY AUTHENTICATED
sometime in 1992, they stopped paying rent; on April 7, 1994, petitioner sent them a written demand to CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING WHICH HE HIMSELF SIGNED AND
vacate; the non-compliance with said demand letter constrained him to file the ejectment case against EXECUTED IN THE UNITED STATES.
them.[4]
Of the 43 named defendants, only 20 (private respondents, [5] for brevity) filed a consolidated B. PETITIONER HAS SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH SECTION 3, RULE 6 OF THE
Answer dated June 29, 1994 wherein they denied non-payment of rentals. They contend that they REVISED INTERNAL RULES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS. MORE,
cannot be evicted because the Urban Land Reform Law guarantees security of tenure and priority right PETITIONER SUBSEQUENTLY SUBMITTED DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE
to purchase the subject property; and that there was a negotiation for the purchase of the lots occupied PROCEEDINGS COPIES OF THE RELEVANT DOCUMENTS IN THE CASES
by them but when the negotiation reached a passive stage, they decided to continue payment of rentals BELOW.
and tendered payment to petitioners counsel and thereafter initiated a petition for consignation of the
rentals in Civil Case No. 144049 while they await the outcome of the negotiation to purchase. C. PETITIONER HAS A MERITORIOUS APPEAL, AND HE STANDS TO LOSE
SUBSTANTIAL PROPERTY IF THE APPEAL IS NOT GIVEN DUE COURSE. THE
 RULES OF PROCEDURE MUST BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED TO DO AND THAT IT RENDERS THE EVICTION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE. PREMATURE.

II. G. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE

RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT ALL THE ALLEGED CASE FOR CONSIGNATION DOES NOT BAR THE EVICTION OF
ELEMENTS OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER ARE PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.

III. IV.

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE RTC MANILA, BRANCH RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS
47, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF MTC MANILA, BRANCH SHOULD PAY PETITIONER A REASONABLE COMPENSATION FOR THEIR USE AND
26, THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE EJECTED FROM THE SUBJECT PROPERTY OCCUPANCY OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IN THE AMOUNT OF AT LEAST P10,000.00 PER
WITHOUT VIOLATING THEIR SECURITY OF TENURE EVEN IF THE TERM OF THE LEASE IS MONTH FROM THE DATE THEY LAST PAID RENT UNTIL THE TIME THEY ACTUALLY VACATE
MONTH-TO-MONTH WHICH EXPIRES AT THE END OF EACH MONTH. IN THIS REGARD, THE SAME, WITH LEGAL INTEREST AT THE MAXIMUM RATE ALLOWED BY LAW UNTIL PAID.

A. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE V.

RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT
TENANTS UNDER P.D. 1517 MAY BE EVICTED FOR NON-PAYMENT OF RENT, RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS
TERMINATION OF LEASE OR OTHER GROUNDS FOR EJECTMENT. SHOULD PAY PETITIONER ATTORNEYS FEES AND EXPENSES OF LITIGATION OF AT
LEAST P20,000.00, PLUS COSTS.[18]
B. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE
RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE Petitioner submits that a relaxation of the rigid rules of technical procedure is called for in view of
ALLEGED PRIORITY RIGHT TO BUY THE LOT THEY OCCUPY DOES NOT the attendant circumstances showing that the objectives of the rule on certification of non-forum
APPLY WHERE THE LANDOWNER DOES NOT INTEND TO SELL THE shopping and the rule requiring material portions of the record be attached to the petition have not been
SUBJECT PROPERTY, AS IN THE CASE AT BAR. glaringly violated and, more importantly, the petition is meritorious.
The proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review
C. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, if the error, subject of the recourse, is one of
RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a court with grave abuse of discretion
SUBJECT PROPERTY IS LOCATED WITHIN A ZONAL IMPROVEMENT AREA amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a
OR APD. petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. As enunciated by the Court in Fortich  vs. Corona:
[19]

D. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE

RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it is
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction. An error of
UNDER THE LAW RESULT IN THE WAIVER OF PROTECTION AGAINST judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is
EVICTION. reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act
complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of
E. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of
RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT jurisdiction. This error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.[20] (Emphasis supplied).
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE ENTITLED TO PROTECTION UNDER
P.D. 2016 SINCE THE GOVERNMENT HAS NO INTENTION OF ACQUIRING Inasmuch as the present petition principally assails the dismissal of the petition on ground of procedural
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. flaws involving the jurisdiction of the court a quo to entertain the petition, it falls within the ambit of a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
F. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE
RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THAT THERE IS At the time the instant petition for certiorari was filed, i.e., on July 17, 1997, the prevailing rule is
AN ON-GOING NEGOTIATION FOR THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY the newly promulgated 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, considering that the CA Resolution
being assailed was rendered on March 21, 1997, the applicable rule is the three-
month reglementary period, established by jurisprudence.[21] Petitioner received notice of the assailed his motion for reconsideration.[30] In Jaro  vs. Court of Appeals,[31] the Court reiterated the doctrine laid
CA Resolution dismissing his petition for review on April 4, 1997. He filed his motion reconsideration down in Cusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz[32] and Piglas-Kamao  vs. National Labor Relations Commission[33] that
on April 17, 1997, using up only thirteen days of the 90-day period. Petitioner received the CA subsequent submission of the missing documents with the motion for reconsideration amounts to
Resolution denying his motion on July 3, 1997 and fourteen days later, or on July 17, 1997, he filed a substantial compliance which calls for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. We find no cogent
motion for 30-day extension of time to file a petition for review which was granted by us; and petitioner reason to depart from this doctrine.
duly filed his petition on August 15, 1997, which is well-within the period of extension granted to him.
Truly, in dismissing the petition for review, the CA had committed grave abuse of discretion
We now go to the merits of the case. amounting to lack of jurisdiction in putting a premium on technicalities at the expense of a just resolution
of the case.
We find the instant petition partly meritorious.
Needless to stress, "a litigation is not a game of technicalities." [34] When technicality deserts its
The requirement regarding the need for a certification of non-forum shopping in cases filed before function of being an aid to justice, the Court is justified in exempting from its operations a particular
the CA and the corresponding sanction for non-compliance thereto are found in the then prevailing case.[35] Technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate justice. While the swift
Revised Circular No. 28-91.[22] It provides that the petitioner himself must make the certification against unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, granting substantial justice is an even more urgent
forum shopping and a violation thereof shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of the multiple ideal.[36]
petition or complaint. The rationale for the rule of personal execution of the certification by the petitioner
himself is that it is only the petitioner who has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated The Courts pronouncement in Republic vs. Court of Appeals[37] is worth echoing: cases should be
similar actions or proceedings in other courts or tribunals; even counsel of record may be unaware of determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and
such fact.[23] The Court has ruled that with respect to the contents of the certification, the rule on defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of
substantial compliance may be availed of. This is so because the requirement of strict compliance with justice would be better served.[38] Thus, what should guide judicial action is that a party litigant is
the rule regarding the certification of non-forum shopping simply underscores its mandatory nature in given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his action or defense rather than for him to lose
that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded, life, honor or property on mere technicalities. [39]This guideline is especially true when the petitioner has
but it does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable satisfactorily explained the lapse and fulfilled the requirements in his motion for reconsideration, [40] as in
circumstances.[24] this case.
The petition for review filed before the CA contains a certification against forum shopping but said In addition, petitioner prays that we decide the present petition on the merits without need of
certification was signed by petitioners counsel. In submitting the certification of non-forum shopping duly remanding the case to the CA. He insists that all the elements of unlawful detainer are present in the
signed by himself in his motion for reconsideration,[25] petitioner has aptly drawn the Courts attention to case. He further argues that the alleged priority right to buy the lot they occupy does not apply where
the physical impossibility of filing the petition for review within the 15-day reglementary period to appeal the landowner does not intend to sell the subject property, as in the case; that respondents cannot be
considering that he is a resident of 1125 South Jefferson Street, Roanoke, Virginia, U.S.A. were he to entitled to protection under P.D. No. 2016 since the government has no intention of acquiring the
personally accomplish and sign the certification. subject property, nor is the subject property located within a zonal improvement area; and, that
assuming that there is a negotiation for the sale of the subject property or a pending case for
We fully agree with petitioner that it was physically impossible for the petition to have been consignation of rentals, these do not bar the eviction of respondents.
prepared and sent to the petitioner in the United States, for him to travel from Virginia, U.S.A. to the
nearest Philippine Consulate in Washington, D.C., U.S.A., in order to sign the certification before the We are not persuaded. We shall refrain from ruling on the foregoing issues in the present petition
Philippine Consul, and for him to send back the petition to the Philippines within the 15- for certiorari. The issues involved are factual issues which inevitably require the weighing of evidence.
day reglementary period. Thus, we find that petitioner has adequately explained his failure to personally These are matters that are beyond the province of this Court in a special civil action for certiorari. These
sign the certification which justifies relaxation of the rule. issues are best addressed to the CA in the petition for review filed before it. As an appellate court, it is
empowered to require parties to submit additional documents, as it may find necessary, or to receive
We have stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were precisely designed to promote evidence, to promote the ends of justice, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 9, B.P. Blg. 129,
and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, to wit:
literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective[26] which is simply to prohibit and
penalize the evils of forum-shopping.[27] The subsequent filing of the certification duly signed by the
petitioner himself should thus be deemed substantial compliance, pro hac  vice. The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive
evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within
In like manner, the failure of the petitioner to comply with Section 3, paragraph b, Rule 6 of the its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further
RIRCA, that is, to append to his petition copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the proceedings.
records as would support the petition, does not justify the outright dismissal of the petition. It must be
emphasized that the RIRCA gives the appellate court a certain leeway to require parties to submit WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 21, 1997 and
additional documents as may be necessary in the interest of substantial justice. Under Section 3, June 23, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41394 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
paragraph d of Rule 3 of the RIRCA, [28] the CA may require the parties to complete the annexes as the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in CA-G.R. No. 41394, entitled,
court deems necessary, and if the petition is given due course, the CA may require the elevation of a Antonio T. Donato vs. Hon. Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 47, Filomeno Arcepe, et
complete record of the case as provided for under Section 3(d)(5) of Rule 6 of the RIRCA. [29] At any al.
rate, petitioner attached copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the records below with
 SO ORDERED.
In said labor case, it appears that despite many opportunities given to L.C. Big Mak
and Israel, the two did not file their position papers. Labor Arbiter Jose C. Del Valle, Jr. even
had the notices and orders sent to L.C. Big Maks head office in Lucena City, addressed to its
owner, respondent Francis Dy,[9] when those sent to the Naga branch were returned.Still,
they failed to comply.

On November 12, 2001, Labor Arbiter Del Valle rendered a Decision[10] in favor of
Deocariza. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered against

respondent, ordering the latter to reinstate complainant to her former position
without loss of seniority right[s] and to pay complainant the total amount of
JOSE DEL VALLE JR VS. FRANCIS DY
FORTY-EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY-SIX PESOS and
72/100 (P48,756.72), representing the latters backwages, salary differential
DECISION pay, unpaid salary, overtime pay, night shift differential and cash bond, as
computed above.
QUISUMBING,  J.:
SO ORDERED.[11]

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision[1] dated June 17, 2005 and the Resolution[2] dated January 3, 2006 of the Court of A copy of the decision was sent by registered mail to Dy and Israel at L.C. Big
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81536. The appellate court had set aside the Orders Maks Lucena City office. Based on the registry return receipt, it was received on November
dated September 17, 2003,[3] October 2, 2003[4] and November 13, 2003[5] of the Regional 22, 2001.[12]
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 55 of Lucena City dismissing the complaint for injunction and
damages filed by L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc. and respondent Francis Dy against petitioners Since no appeal was made, the decision became final and executory. Consequently, a Writ of
Labor Arbiter Jose C. Del Valle, Jr. and National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Sheriff Execution[13] was issued on December 17, 2001.
Adolfo C. Alemania.
On February 18, 2002, L.C. Big Mak and Israel filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution.
[14]
The instant petition stemmed from a complaint[6] for illegal dismissal and monetary benefits  They claimed that they were completely unaware of the decision and the writ of
[7]
filed by Clea Deocariza in May 2001 against L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc.  and its Human execution. They contended that the notices and orders requiring them to file a position paper
Resources Officer for Bicol, Teresa Israel.[8] were not made known to their officers in Lucena City. They further stated that had their legal
department in Lucena City been informed of said orders, the requisite position paper would
have been filed.
On April 4, 2002, Labor Arbiter Del Valle issued an Order[15] denying the Motion to Quash Writ On July 11, 2003, L.C. Big Mak and Dy filed a complaint[20] for injunction and damages
of Execution. He ruled that L.C. Big Mak and Israel waived their opportunity to submit their with the RTC of Lucena City. They claimed that the labor arbiters decision is void on the grounds
position paper by their continued inaction on the lawful orders and notices sent to them. He of lack of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion, violation of due process and denial of substantial
further ruled that the judgment can now be executed as a matter of right, it being final and justice. They questioned the order for Dy to reinstate Deocariza despite the fact that she is not his
executory. employee and despite her resignation and the release or quitclaim she executed. They alleged
that Israel is a franchisee of L.C. Big Mak and Deocariza was one of her employees in the L.C.
On April 24, 2003, acting on a motion for issuance of a writ of execution by Deocariza, Labor Big Mak Naga branch which negates the existence of an employer-employee relationship
Arbiter Del Valle issued an Order[16] directing all parties to appear on May 12, 2003 for a pre- between Dy and Deocariza. They prayed that the properties levied upon be released.
execution conference. However, only Deocariza attended the conference.
On September 17, 2003, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of
On May 13, 2003, Labor Arbiter Del Valle issued a Writ of Execution[17] directed to NLRC jurisdiction as it questions the propriety of actions taken by the labor tribunal.[21] Dy and L.C. Big
Sheriff Adolfo C. Alemania, the pertinent portion of which reads: Mak filed a motion for reconsideration,[22] but the same was treated as not filed for failure to
include the requisite notice of hearing and explanation why service was not done personally, and
NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby ordered to go to the premises of
respondent BIG MA[K] BURGER, Incorporated/Tess [I]srael at Lucena City for failure of their counsel to indicate his Roll Number on the motion.[23] Dy and L.C. Big Mak filed
together with the complainant and let her be reinstated to her former position their motion for reconsideration after effecting the necessary corrections but said motion was
without loss of seniority right[s] and collect from said respondent the amount
of P48,756.72, representing complainants backwages, salary differential, denied for lack of merit.[24]
unpaid salary, overtime pay, night shift and cash bond and to turn over the said
amount to this Branch for further disposition.
Dy, without including L.C. Big Mak as petitioner, then filed a petition for certiorari with the
In case you fail to collect the said amount in CASH from the Court of Appeals asking that the orders of the RTC be set aside and the complaint be tried on
respondent, you are hereby directed to cause the satisfaction of the same to the merits. He imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it did not only
be made out of movable goods or chattels in the possession of the
dismiss the provisional remedy sought but also dismissed the main action for damages
respondent or any other person or entity holding in behalf of the respondent
or in the absence thereof, from immovable property not exempt from without a valid ground. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and disposed as follows:
execution.[18]
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed orders
xxxx of the trial court, dated 17 September 2003, 2 October 2003, and 13
November 2003, respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE. This case is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
On June 16, 2003, Sheriff Alemania went to L.C. Big Maks head office
SO ORDERED.[25]
[19]
in Lucena City and levied upon 33 sacks of flour and three sacks of refined sugar.
 The appellate court found Dy a stranger to the labor case. It ruled that contrary to the Stated simply, the issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred
trial courts stand, deciding Dys complaint on the merits does not encroach upon the in giving due course to Dys petition despite its procedural infirmities and (2) whether the trial
jurisdiction of the labor tribunal. It held that the power of the NLRC to execute its judgment court had jurisdiction over Dys complaint for injunction and damages.
extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. Thus, if the
sheriff levies upon the assets of a third person in which the judgment debtor has no interest, Petitioners contend that the appellate court should not have given due course to Dys
then the sheriff is acting beyond the limits of his authority and is amenable to control and petition since the proper remedy was appeal and not certiorari. And even if certiorari were the
correction by a court of competent jurisdiction in a separate and independent action. proper remedy, petitioners aver that the petition was still dismissible as it was filed beyond
the 60-day period. They also contend that the trial court was correct in dismissing the
Labor Arbiter Del Valle and Sheriff Alemania filed a motion for complaint for lack of jurisdiction. They argue that the complaint was actually in the nature of a
reconsideration[26] which the Court of Appeals denied. Thus, they come before us raising the Motion to Quash Writ of Execution and with respect to the acts of the labor tribunal, a case
following issues: growing out of a labor dispute, as the acts complained of were incidents of the execution.[28]

I.
Respondent Dy counters that the appellate courts decision correctly addressed the
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, TENTH
DIVISION, CORRECTLY APPLIED SECTION 4, RULE 65 OF THE RULES evasion of the positive duty incumbent upon the trial court to decide [the complaint] according
OF COURT IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS BELATED PETITION FOR to its merits as the complaint for nullification of wrongful levy with damages was properly
CERTIORARI.
within its jurisdiction to resolve.[29]
II.
We resolve to grant the instant petition.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, TENTH
DIVISION, ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND
NULLIFYING THE ORDERS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DATED It was erroneous for the Court of Appeals to have granted the petition and ordered
SEPTEMBER 17, OCTOBER 2 AND NOVEMBER 13, 2003 WHICH WERE
the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
ISSUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING LAW AND APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE AND MERITS OF THE CASE THEREON.
It is established that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to entertain original actions
III.
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, including those in which the jurisdiction of
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, TENTH any lower court is in issue.[30] It bears emphasis, however, as provided in the Rule itself, that
DIVISION EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION AND ERRED [WHEN IT
DISREGARDED THE LAW,] DOCTRINES AND PRINCIPLES IN LAW one requisite to a petition for certiorari is that there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
PARTICULARLY ON: 1. APPEAL; 2. JURISDICTION OVER LABOR adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law[31] from the acts of the respondent tribunal. In
DISPUTES; 3. DETERMINATION OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT
the instant case, the remedy of appeal from the order of the RTC dismissing the complaint for
MATTER AND NATURE OF THE ACTION; 4. THIRD PARTY CLAIM[;] AND
5. APPLICATION OF JURISPRUDENCE ON A PARTICULAR CASE WHEN injunction and damages was available to respondent Dy and it was a plain, speedy and
IT ISSUED THE ASSAILED DECISION AND RESOLUTION.[27] adequate remedy. Hence, following the general rule, the questioned petition for certiorari filed
by respondent Dy before the Court of Appeals, was not proper. As an exception, the remedy In a desperate attempt to remove his complaint from the labor arbiters jurisdiction, Dy claims
of certiorari may be successfully invoked, both in cases wherein an appeal does not lie and in that he is not a party to the illegal dismissal case. He alleges that Deocarizas employer
those wherein the right to appeal having been lost with or without the appellants negligence, is Israel, whom he claims is a mere franchisee of L.C. Big Mak. Dy argues that being a
where the court has no jurisdiction to issue the order or decision which is the subject matter stranger to the case, the levying of his properties is a clear denial of substantial justice and
of the remedy.[32] In the instant case, however, as will be seen from the discussion below, the due process. And to further make it appear that his complaint is separate and independent
RTC acted within its jurisdiction in issuing its questioned orders. from the labor case, Dy, upon reaching the appellate stage, dropped L.C. Big Mak as co-
petitioner and was already claiming that the 33 sacks of flour and three sacks of sugar are his
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action and hence, the jurisdiction personal properties.
of a court, are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.[33] This
Court has held that: These contentions, however, deserve no credit.

The rule is that, the nature of an action and the subject matter thereof, as
well as which court or agency of the government has jurisdiction over the Dy failed to substantiate his allegation that Israel is a mere franchisee and that Israel is
same, are determined by the material allegations of the complaint in relation Deocarizas real employer. On the contrary, it was established that Israel is also just an
to the law involved and the character of the reliefs prayed for, whether or not
the complainant/plaintiff is entitled to any or all of such reliefs.[34] employee of L.C. Big Mak because of an illegal dismissal complaint filed by Israel against
L.C. Big Mak and a memorandum issued by the latter to Israel as one of its Human Resource
Officers. Also, contrary to Dys claims, he is not a stranger to the illegal dismissal case. He is
Although the complaint filed by Dy before the trial court was for injunction and damages, it
a party in his capacity as owner of L.C. Big Mak, the employer sued in the illegal dismissal
does not only challenge the legality or propriety of the writ of execution, but also attacks the
case. Moreover, Dy cannot claim sole ownership of the properties levied upon by simply
validity of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The complaint was in effect a motion to quash the
dropping L.C. Big Mak as petitioner. In his complaint filed before the RTC, he categorically
writ of execution of a decision and an action to annul the decision itself, both of which were
admitted under oath that the levied properties belong to L.C. Big Mak and not to him. Thus,
rendered in an illegal dismissal case. It is thus a case properly within the jurisdiction of the
he is now estopped from contending otherwise.
labor arbiter and not the trial court, since the subject matter of Dys complaint is an incident of
a labor case.
Even assuming that Dy is a stranger or third party to the labor case, jurisdiction over his claim
still lies with the labor arbiter. Dy should have filed his third-party claim before the labor
Jurisprudence abound confirming the rule that regular courts have no jurisdiction to
arbiter from whom the writ of execution originated before instituting a civil case.[37] The
act on labor cases or various incidents arising therefrom, including the execution of decisions,
NLRCs Manual on Execution of Judgment[38] provides for the mechanism for third-party
[35]
awards or orders.  Jurisdiction to try and adjudicate such cases pertains exclusively to the
claimants to assert their claims over properties levied upon by the sheriff pursuant to an order
proper labor official concerned under the Department of Labor and Employment. To hold
or decision of the NLRC or labor arbiter.
otherwise is to sanction split jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of
justice.[36]
 By virtue of Executive Order No. 174, dated 05 October 1965, issued by President Diosdado
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 17, 2005 and Resolution Macapagal, the municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status
of a fifth class municipality beginning 01 July 1963 by operation of Section 2 of Republic Act No.
dated January 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81536 are REVERSED and SET
1515.2 The executive order added that "(t)he conversion of this municipal district into (a) municipality as
ASIDE. The Orders dated September 17, 2003, October 2, 2003 and November 13, 2003 of the proposed in House Bill No. 4864 was approved by the House of Representatives."

Regional Trial Court, Branch 55 of Lucena City dismissing the complaint filed by L.C. Big Mak On 05 June 1989, the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto  with the Regional
Burger, Inc. and respondent Francis Dy are hereby REINSTATED. Trial Court, Branch 62, in Gumaca, Quezon, against the officials of the Municipality of San Andres.
Docketed Special Civil Action No. 2014-G, the petition sought the declaration of nullity of Executive
Order No. 353 and prayed that the respondent local officials of the Municipality of San Andres be
permanently ordered to refrain from performing the duties and functions of their respective
SO ORDERED.
offices.3 Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General,4 the petitioning municipality
contended that Executive Order No. 353, a presidential act, was a clear usurpation of the inherent
powers of the legislature and in violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Hence,
petitioner municipality argued, the officials of the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres had no
right to exercise the duties and functions of their respective offices that righfully belonged to the
corresponding officials of the Municipality of San Narciso.

G.R. No. 103702 December 6, 1994

In their answer, respondents asked for the dismissal of the petition, averring, by way of affirmative and
special defenses, that since it was at the instance of petitioner municipality that the Municipality of San
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO, QUEZON; MAYOR JUAN K. UY; COUNCILORS: DEOGRACIAS Andres was given life with the issuance of Executive Order No. 353, it (petitioner municipality) should be
R. ARGOSINO III, BENITO T. CAPIO, EMMANUEL R. CORTEZ, NORMANDO MONTILLA, deemed estopped from questioning the creation of the new municipality;5 that because the Municipality
LEONARDO C. UY, FIDEL C. AURELLANA, PEDRO C. CARABIT, LEONARDO D. AURELLANA, of San Andred had been in existence since 1959, its corporate personality could no longer be assailed;
FABIAN M. MEDENILLA, TRINIDAD F. CORTEZ, SALVADOR M. MEDENILLA, CERELITO B. and that, considering the petition to be one for quo warranto, petitioner municipality was not the proper
AUREADA and FRANCISCA A. BAMBA, petitioners,  party to bring the action, that prerogative being reserved to the State acting through the Solicitor
vs. General.6
HON. ANTONIO V. MENDEZ, SR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, 4th Judicial
Region, Gumaca, Quezon; MUNICIPALITY OF SAN ANDRES, QUEZON; MAYOR FRANCISCO DE
On 18 July 1991, after the parties had submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, the trial court resolved
LEON; COUNCILORS: FE LUPINAC, TOMAS AVERIA, MANUEL O. OSAS, WILFREDO O.
to defer action on the motion to dismiss and to deny a judgment on the pleadings.
FONTANIL, ENRICO U. NADRES, RODELITO LUZOIR, LENAC, JOSE L. CARABOT, DOMING
AUSA, VIDAL BANQUELES and CORAZON M. MAXIMO, respondents.
On 27 November 1991, the Municipality of San Andres filed anew a motion to dismiss alleging that the
case had become moot and academic with the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known
Manuel Laserna, Jr. for petitioners.
as the Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect on 01 January 1991. The movant municipality
cited Section 442(d) of the law, reading thusly:
Florante Pamfilo for private respondents.
Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. — . . .

(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to
VITUG, J.: exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of
On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued, pursuant to the then Sections 68 and 2630 of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall
the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.
of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of the same province,
the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their The motion was opposed by petitioner municipality, contending that the above provision of law
respective sitios. was inapplicable to the Municipality of San Andres since the enactment referred to legally
existing municipalities and not to those whose mode of creation had been void ab initio.7
Executive Order No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the President and coursed through
the Provincial Board of Quezon, of the municipal council of San Narciso, Quezon, in its Resolution No. 8 In its Order of 02 December 1991, the lower court8 finally dismissed the petition9 for lack of cause of
of 24 May 1959.1 action on what it felt was a matter that belonged to the State, adding that "whatever defects (were)
present in the creation of municipal districts by the President pursuant to presidential issuances and his ouster or the right of another to hold a position within a one-year period can abrogate an action
executive orders, (were) cured by the enactment of R.A. 7160, otherwise known as Local Government belatedly filed, 19 so also, if not indeed with greatest imperativeness, must a quo warranto  proceeding
Code of 1991." In an order, dated 17 January 1992, the same court denied petitioner municipality's assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision be timely raised. 20 Public interest
motion for reconsideration. demands it.

Hence, this petition "for review on certiorari." Petitioners 10 argue that in issuing the orders of 02 Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional
December 1991 and 17 January 1992, the lower court has "acted with grave abuse of discretion delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a
amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction." Petitioners assert that the existence of a municipality choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely
created by a null and void presidential order may be attacked either directly or even collaterally by of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation.
anyone whose interests or rights are affected, and that an unconstitutional act is not a law, creates no Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No.
office and is inoperative such as though its has never been passed. 11 353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years when, on 24
December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call
Petitioners consider the instant petition to be one for "review on certiorari" under Rules 42 and 45 of the for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the
Rules of Court; at the same time, however, they question the orders of the lower court for having been case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State's recognition of the continued
issued with "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction, and that there is existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district,
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law available to petitioners to Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after
correct said Orders, to protect their rights and to secure a final and definitive interpretation of the legal having surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. Section 31 of Batas
issues involved." 12 Evidently, then, the petitioners intend to submit their case in this instance under Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, constituted as
Rule 65. We shall disregard the procedural incongruence. municipal circuits, in the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country, certain
municipalities that comprised the municipal circuits organized under Administrative Order No. 33, dated
13 June 1978, issued by this Court pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537. Under this administrative
The special civil action of quo warranto is a "prerogative writ by which the Government can call upon order, the Municipality of San Andres had been covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit Court of San
any person to show by what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise." 13 When Francisco-San Andres for the province of Quezon.
the inquiry is focused on the legal existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a
proceeding for quo warranto  or any other credit proceeding. 14 It must be brought "in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines" 15 and commenced by the Solicitor General or the fiscal "when directed by At the present time, all doubts on the de jure  standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under the
the President of the Philippines . . . ." 16 Such officers may, under certain circumstances, bring such an Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives,
action "at the request and upon the relation of another person" with the permission of the court. 17 The appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be one of
Rules of Court also allows an individual to commence an action for quo warranto  in his own name but the twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant
this initiative can be done when he claims to be "entitled to a public office or position usurped or is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized
unlawfully held or exercised by another." 18 While the quo warranto proceedings filed below by petitioner pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective
municipality has so named only the officials of the Municipality of San Andres as respondents, it is municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be
virtually, however, a denunciation of the authority of the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres considered as regular municipalities." No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442(d) of
to exist and to act in that capacity. the Local Government Code is proferred. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would
succeed. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that
when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are
At any rate, in the interest of resolving any further doubt on the legal status of the Municipality of San retrospective, 21 and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing
Andres, the Court shall delve into the merits of the petition. laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the
usual qualification against impairment of vested rights. 22
While petitioners would grant that the enactment of Republic Act
No. 7160 may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality, they, All considered, the de jure  status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must now
however, contend that since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said be conceded.
law, petitioner municipality had acquired a vested right to seek the nullification of Executive Order No.
353, and any attempt to apply Section 442 of Republic Act 7160 to the petition would perforce be
violative of due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioners.

Petitioners' theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been seasonably brought. SO ORDERED.
Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959
but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso
finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal District,
and later the Municipality, of San Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of
a duly created local government unit. In the same manner that the failure of a public officer to question
 "Effective March 4, 1994, Mr. Ray Allas was appointed Director III by President Fidel V.
Ramos and as a consequence, [petitioner's] services were terminated without prejudice to
[his] claim for all government benefits due [him]."

Attached to the letter was the appointment of respondent Ray Allas as "Director III, CIIS,
Bureau of Customs, vice Pedro Mendoza."
Petitioner wrote the Customs Commissioner demanding his reinstatement with full back
wages and without loss of seniority rights. No reply was made.
On December 2, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto against respondent
Allas before the Regional Trial Court, Paranaque, Branch 258.[3] The case was tried and on
September 11, 1995, a decision was rendered granting the petition. The court found that
petitioner was illegally terminated from office without due process of law and in violation of his
security of tenure, and that as he was deemed not to have vacated his office, the
PEDRO MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. RAY ALLAS and GODOFREDO appointment of respondent Allas to the same office was void ab initio. The court ordered the
OLORES, respondents. ouster of respondent Allas from the position of Director III, and at the same time directed the
reinstatement of petitioner to the same position with payment of full back salaries and other
benefits appurtenant thereto.
DECISION
Respondent Allas appealed to the Court of Appeals. On February 8, 1996, while the
PUNO, J.: case was pending before said court, respondent Allas was promoted by President Ramos to
the position of Deputy Commissioner of Customs for Assessment and Operations. As a
Before us, petitioner prays for the execution of the decision of the trial court [1] granting consequence of this promotion, petitioner moved to dismiss respondent's appeal as having
his petition for quo warranto which ordered his reinstatement as Director III, Customs been rendered moot and academic. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed
Intelligence and Investigation Service, and the payment of his back salaries and benefits. the case accordingly. The order of dismissal became final and entry of judgment was made
on March 19, 1996.[4]
Petitioner Pedro Mendoza joined the Bureau of Customs in 1972. He held the positions
of Port Security Chief from March 1972 to August 1972, Deputy Commissioner of Customs On May 9, 1996, petitioner filed with the court a quo a Motion for Execution of its
from August 1972 to September 1975, Acting Commissioner of Customs from September decision. On July 24, 1996, the court denied the motion on the ground that the contested
1975 to April 1977 and Customs Operations Chief I from October 1987 to February 1988. position vacated by respondent Allas was now being occupied by respondent Godofredo
[2]
 On March 1, 1988, he was appointed Customs Service Chief of the Customs Intelligence Olores who was not a party to the quo warranto petition.[5]
and Investigation Service (CIIS). In 1989, the position of Customs Service Chief was
reclassified by the Civil Service as "Director III" in accordance with Republic Act No. 6758 Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of
and National Compensation Circular No. 50. Petitioner's position was thus categorized as Appeals questioning the order of the trial court.[6] On November 27, 1997, the Court of
"Director III, CIIS" and he discharged the function and duties of said office. Appeals dismissed the petition.[7] Hence, this recourse.

On April 22, 1993, petitioner was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector, Petitioner claims that:
Collection District X, Cagayan de Oro City. In his place, respondent Ray Allas was appointed
as "Acting Director III" of the CIIS. Despite petitioner's new assignment as Acting District "The Court of Appeals grossly erred in holding that a writ of execution may no longer be
Collector, however, he continued to receive the salary and benefits of the position of Director issued, considering that respondent Olores who was not a party to the case now occupies the
III. subject position."[8]
In September 1994, petitioner received a letter from Deputy Customs Commissioner
Cesar Z. Dario, informing him of his termination from the Bureau of Customs, in view of The instant petition arose from a special civil action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of
respondent Allas' appointment as Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos. The pertinent the Revised Rules of Court. Quo warranto is a demand made by the state upon some
portion of the letter reads: individual or corporation to show by what right they exercise some franchise or privilege
appertaining to the state which, according to the Constitution and laws of the land, they
cannot legally exercise except by virtue of a grant or authority from the state.[9] In other words,
a petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or "WHEREFORE, viewed in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered granting
exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not this petition for quo warranto by:
well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.[10] The action may be
commenced for the Government by the Solicitor General or the fiscal[11] against individuals 1. Ousting and excluding respondent Ray Allas from the position of Director III, Customs
who usurp a public office, against a public officer whose acts constitute a ground for the Intelligence and Investigation Service of the Bureau of Customs; and
forfeiture of his office, and against an association which acts as a corporation without being
legally incorporated.[12] The action may also be instituted by an individual in his own name 2. Reinstating petitioner Pedro C. Mendoza, Jr. to the position of Director III, Customs
who claims to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or Intelligence and Investigation Service of the Bureau of Customs with full back wages and
exercised by another.[13] other monetary benefits appurtenant thereto from the time they were withheld until
Where the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the reinstated."[19]
controverted position, otherwise respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the
office.[14] If the court finds for the respondent, the judgment should simply state that the The trial court found that respondent Allas usurped the position of "Director III, Chief of
respondent is entitled to the office.[15] If, however, the court finds for the petitioner and the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service." Consequently, the court ordered that
declares the respondent guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising respondent Allas be ousted from the contested position and that petitioner be reinstated in his
the office, judgment may be rendered as follows: stead. Although petitioner did not specifically pray for his back salaries, the court ordered that
he be paid his "full back wages and other monetary benefits" appurtenant to the contested
"Sec. 10. Judgment where usurpation found.-- When the defendant is found guilty of position "from the time they were withheld until reinstated."
usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising an office, position, right, privilege, The decision of the trial court had long become final and executory, and petitioner prays
or franchise, judgment shall be rendered that such defendant be ousted and altogether for its execution. He alleges that he should have been reinstated despite respondent Olores'
excluded therefrom, and that the plaintiff or relator, as the case may be, recover his appointment because the subject position was never vacant to begin with. Petitioner's
costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the respective rights in and to the removal was illegal and he was deemed never to have vacated his office when respondent
office, position, right, privilege, or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires." Allas was appointed to the same. Respondent Allas' appointment was null and void and this
nullity allegedly extends to respondent Olores, his successor-in-interest.[20]
If it is found that the respondent or defendant is usurping or intruding into the office, or
unlawfully holding the same, the court may order: Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his
successor in office. This rule, however, is not applicable in quo warranto cases.[21] A judgment
(1) The ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office; in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office, even though such
(2) The recovery of costs by plaintiff or relator; successor may trace his title to the same source. This follows from the nature of the writ
of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but always against the
(3) The determination of the respective rights in and to the office, position, right, person-- to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act
privilege or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.[16] in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim. [22] In the case at bar, the
petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against respondent Allas. What was
The character of the judgment to be rendered in quo warranto rests to some extent in threshed out before the trial court was the qualification and right of petitioner to the contested
the discretion of the court and on the relief sought. [17] In the case at bar, petitioner prayed for position as against respondent Ray Allas, not against Godofredo Olores. The Court of
the following relief: Appeals did not err in denying execution of the trial court's decision.

"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that respondent be ousted and altogether excluded Petitioner has apprised this Court that he reached the compulsory retirement age of
from the position of Director III, Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service of the Bureau sixty-five (65) years on November 13, 1997. Reinstatement not being possible, petitioner now
of Customs, and petitioner be seated to the position as the one legally appointed and entitled prays for the payment of his back salaries and other benefits from the time he was illegally
thereto. dismissed until finality of the trial court's decision.[23]
Respondent Allas cannot be held personally liable for petitioner's back salaries and
Other reliefs, just or equitable in the premises, are likewise prayed for."[18] benefits. He was merely appointed to the subject position by the President of the Philippines
in the exercise of his constitutional power as Chief Executive. Neither can the Bureau of
In granting the petition, the trial court ordered that: Customs be compelled to pay the said back salaries and benefits of petitioner. The Bureau of
Customs was not a party to the petition for quo warranto.[24]
 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals in On October 29, 1974, a complaint for eminent domain was filed by petitioner MERALCO against forty-
CA-G.R. SP No. 41801 is affirmed. two (42) defendants with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch XXII,
Pasig, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED
The complaint alleges that for the purpose of constructing a 230 KV Transmission line from Barrio
Malaya to Tower No. 220 at Pililla, Rizal, petitioner needs portions of the land of the private respondents
consisting of an aggregate area of 237,321 square meters. Despite petitioner's offers to pay
compensation and attempts to negotiate with the respondents', the parties failed to reach an
agreement.

Private respondents question in their motion to dismiss dated December 27, 1974 the petitioner's legal
existence and the area sought to be expropriated as too excessive.

On January 7, 1975, respondents Gil de Guzman and Teresa Bautista filed a motion for contempt of
court alleging, among other things that petitioner's corporate existence had expired in 1969 and
therefore it no longer exists under Philippine Laws.

  But despite the opposition of the private respondents, the court issued an Order dated January 13, 1975
authorizing the petitioner to take or enter upon the possession of the property sought to be
G.R. No. L-59791 February 13, 1992 expropriated.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,  On July 13, 1976, private respondents filed a motion for withdrawal of deposit claiming that they are
vs. entitled to be paid at forty pesos (P40.00) per square meter or an approximate sum of P272,000.00 and
THE HONORABLE GREGORIO G. PINEDA, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, prayed that they be allowed to withdraw the sum of P71,771.50 from petitioner's deposit-account with
Branch XXI, Pasig, Metro Manila, TEOFILO ARAYON, SR., GIL DE GUZMAN, LUCITO SANTIAGO the Philippine National Bank, Pasig Branch. However, respondents motion was denied in an order
and TERESA BAUTISTA, respondents dated September 3, 1976.

MEDIALDEA, J.: In the intervening period, Branch XXII became vacant when the presiding Judge Nelly Valdellon-Solis
retired, so respondent Judge Pineda acted on the motions filed with Branch XXII.
This is a petition for review on  certiorari on pure question of law seeking the nullification of the orders
issued by the respondent Judge Gregorio G. Pineda, in his capacity as the presiding Judge of the Court Pursuant to a government policy, the petitioners on October 30, 1979 sold to the National Power
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch 21, Pasig, Metro Manila in Civil Case No. Corporation (Napocor) the power plants and transmission lines, including the transmission lines
20269, entitled "Manila Electric Company v. Teofilo Arayon, et al." The aforesaid orders are as follows: traversing private respondents' property.
(1) the order dated December 4, 1981 granting the motion for payment of private respondents; (2) the
order dated December 21, 1981 granting the private respondents' omnibus motion; and (3) the order On February 11, 1980, respondent court issued an Order appointing the members of the Board of
dated February 9, 1982 adjudging in favor of private respondents the fair market value of their property Commissioners to make an appraisal of the properties.
at forty pesos (P40.00) per square meter for a total of P369,720.00 and denying the motions for
contempt for being moot and academic and the motion for reconsideration of the orders dated
December 4, 1981 and December 21, 1981 for lack of merit. On June 5, 1980, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has lost all its
interests over the transmission lines and properties under expropriation because of their sale to the
Napocor. In view of this motion, the work of the Commissioners was suspended.
The antecedent facts giving rise to the controversy at bar are as follows:
On June 9, 1981, private respondents filed another motion for payment. But despite the opposition of
Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing the petitioner, the respondent court issued the first of the questioned Orders dated December 4, 1981
under the laws of Philippines. Respondent Honorable Judge Gregorio G. Pineda is impleaded in his granting the motion for payment of private respondents, to wit:
official capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal,
Branch XXI, Pasig, Metro Manila. While private respondents Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Gil de Guzman, Lucito
Santiago and Teresa Bautista are owners in fee simple of the expropriated property situated at Malaya, As prayed for by defendants Teofilo Arayon, Lucito Santiago, Teresa Bautista and Gil
Pililla, Rizal. de Guzman, thru counsel Gil de Guzman, in their Motion for Payment, for reasons
therein stated, this Court hereby orders the plaintiff to pay the movants the amount of
 P20,400.00 for the expropriated area of 6,800 square meters, at P3.00 per square On February 9, 1982 the respondent court denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and motion
meter without prejudice to the just compensation that may be proved in the final for contempt, the dispositive portion of which is hereunder quoted as follows:
adjudication of this case.
Viewed in the light of the foregoing, this Court hereby adjudges in favor of defendants
The aforesaid sum of P20,400.00 having been deposited by plaintiff in the Philippine Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Lucito Santiago, Teresita Bautista and Atty. Gil de Guzman the
National Bank (Pasig Branch) under Savings Account No. 9204, let the Deputy Sheriff fair market value of their property taken by MERALCO at P40.00 per square meter for
of this Branch Mr. Sofronio Villarin withdraw said amount in the names of Teofilo a total of P369,720.00, this amount to bear legal interest from February 24, 1975 until
Arayon, Lucito Santiago, Teresa Bautista and Gil de Guzman, the said amount to be fully paid plus consequential damages in terms of attorney's fees in the sum of
delivered to the defendant's counsel Atty. Gil de Guzman who shall sign for the P10,000.00, all these sums to be paid by MERALCO to said defendants with costs of
receipt thereof. suit, minus the amount of P102,800.00 already withdrawn by defendants.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 108) For being moot and academic, the motions for contempt are DENIED; for lack of
merit, the motion for reconsideration of the orders of December 4, 1981 and
On December 15, 1981, private respondents filed an Omnibus Motion praying that they be allowed to December 21, 1981 is also DENIED.
withdraw an additional sum of P90,125.50 from petitioner's deposit-account with the Philippine National
Bank. SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 211-212)

By order dated December 21, 1981, the respondent court granted the Omnibus Motion hereunder Furthermore, the respondent court stressed in said order that "at this stage, the Court starts to appoint
quoted as follows: commissioners to determine just compensation or dispenses with them and adopts the testimony of a
credible real estate broker, or the judge himself would exercise his right to formulate an opinion of his
Acting on the Omnibus Motion dated December 15, 1981 filed by Atty. Gil de own as to the value of the land in question. Nevertheless, if he formulates such an opinion, he must
Guzman, counsel for Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Lucito Santiago, Teresita Bautista and for base it upon competent evidence." (Rollo, p. 211)
himself, and it appearing that there is deposited in the bank in trust for them the
amount of P90,125.50 to guarantee just compensation of P272,000.00, thereby Hence, this petition.
leaving a balance of P161,475.00 still payable to them, the same is hereby
GRANTED. Subsequently, the respondent court issued an Order dated March 22, 1982 granting the private
respondents' motion for execution pending appeal, thus requiring petitioner to deposit P52,600.00
Mr. Nazario Nuevo and Marianita Burog, respectively the Manager and Cashier, representing the consideration paid by Napocor for the property it bought from petitioner which includes
Philippine National Bank, Pasig Branch, Pasig, Metro Manila are hereby ordered to the subject matter of this case, computed at P200.55 per square meter and to render an accounting.
allow Sheriff Sofronio Villarin to withdraw and collect from the bank the amount of
P90,125.50 under Savings Account No. 9204 and to deliver the same to Atty. Gil de On March 26, 1982, petitioner filed a petition for preliminary injunction with this Court seeking to enjoin
Guzman upon proper receipt, pending final determination of just compensation. respondent judge and all persons acting under him from enforcing the Order dated March 22, 1982.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 120) This Court issued a temporary restraining order addressed to respondent judge. A motion to lift the
restraining order was filed by the respondents. Despite a series of oppositions and motions to lift the
Private respondents filed another motion dated January 8, 1982 praying that petitioner be ordered to said order, this Court reiterated its stand and noted that the restraining order is still effective.
pay the sum of P169, 200.00.
The petitioner strongly maintains that the respondent court's act of determining and ordering the
On January 12, 1982 petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Orders dated December 4, 1981 payment of just compensation to private respondents without formal presentation of evidence by the
and December 21, 1981 and to declare private respondents in contempt of court for forging or causing parties on the reasonable value of the property constitutes a flagrant violation of petitioner's
to be forged the receiving stamp of petitioner's counsel and falsifying or causing to be falsified the constitutional right to due process. It stressed that respondent court ignored the procedure laid down by
signature of its receiving clerk in their Omnibus Motion. the law in determining just compensation because it formulated an opinion of its own as to the value of
the land in question without allowing the Board of Commissioners to hold hearings for the reception of
In response to private respondents' motion for payment dated January 8, 1982, petitioner filed an evidence.
opposition alleging that private respondents are not entitled to payment of just compensation at this
stage of the proceeding because there is still no appraisal and valuation of the property. On the other hand, private respondents controvert the position of the petitioner and contend that the
petitioner was not deprived of due process. They agreed with respondent court's ruling dispensing the
need for the appointment of a Board of Commissioners to determine just compensation, thus concluding expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, "no objection to the
that the respondent court did not err in determining just compensation. exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard."

Furthermore, petitioner argues that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in granting the The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination
motion for execution pending appeal and consequently denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss. by the Court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is
Respondent judge should have ordered that Napocor be impleaded in substitution of petitioner or could done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The
have at least impleaded both the Napocor and the petitioner as party plaintiffs. order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings
of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage
The controversy boils down to the main issue of whether or not the respondent court can dispense with of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue.
the assistance of a Board of Commissioners in an expropriation proceeding and determine for itself the Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous in its
just compensation. appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a
dissatisfied party may seek reversal of the order by taking an appeal therefrom.
The applicable laws in the case at bar are Sections 5 and 8 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The said sections particularly deal with the ascertainment of compensation and the court's action upon Respondent judge, in the case at bar, arrived at the valuation of P40.00 per square meter on a property
commissioners' report, to wit: declared for real estate tax purposes at P2.50 per hectare on the basis of a "Joint Venture Agreement
on Subdivision and Housing Projects" executed by A.B.A Homes and private respondents on June 1,
1972. This agreement was merely attached to the motion to withdraw from petitioner's deposit.
Sec. 5. Upon the entry of the order of condemnation, the court shall appoint not more Respondent judge arrived at the amount of just compensation on its own, without the proper reception
than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain of evidence before the Board of Commissioners. Private respondents as landowners have not proved
and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. The by competent evidence the value of their respective properties at a proper hearing. Likewise, petitioner
order of appointment shall designate the time and place of the first session of the has not been given the opportunity to rebut any evidence that would have been presented by private
hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the time within which their report respondents. In an expropriation case such as this one where the principal issue is the determination of
is to be filed with the court. just compensation, a trial before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present
evidence on the issue of just compensation. Contrary to the submission of private respondents, the
x x x           x x x          x x x appointment of at least three (3) competent persons as commissioners to ascertain just compensation
for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. While it is true
Sec. 8. Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in the preceding that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court may substitute its own estimate of
section, or even before the expiration of such period but after all the interested parties the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, i.e., where the Commissioners have applied illegal
have filed their objections to the report or their statement of agreement therewith, the principles to the evidence submitted to them or where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of
court may, after hearing, accept the report and render judgment in accordance evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive (Manila Railroad
therewith; or, for cause shown, it may recommit the same to the commissioners for Company v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286). Thus, trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right
further report of facts; or it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners, that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all. Moreover, in such instances, where
or it may accept the report in part and reject it in part; and it may make such order or the report of the commissioners may be disregarded, the trial court may make its own estimate of value
render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the from competent evidence that may be gathered from the record. The aforesaid joint venture agreement
exercise of his right of condemnation, and to the defendant just compensation for the relied upon by the respondent judge, in the absence of any other proof of valuation of said properties, is
property so taken. incompetent to determine just compensation.

We already emphasized in the case of Municipality of Biñan v. Hon. Jose Mar Garcia (G.R. No. 69260, Prior to the determination of just compensation, the property owners may rightfully demand to withdraw
December 22, 1989, 180 SCRA 576, 583-584) the procedure for eminent domain, to wit: from the deposit made by the condemnor in eminent domain proceedings. Upon an award of a smaller
amount by the court, the property owners are subject to a judgment for the excess or upon the award of
a larger sum, they are entitled to a judgment for the amount awarded by the court. Thus, when the
There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation. The first is concerned with respondent court granted in the Orders dated December 4, 1981 and December 21, 1981 the motions
the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent of private respondents for withdrawal of certain sums from the deposit of petitioner, without prejudice to
domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. the just compensation that may be proved in the final adjudication of the case, it committed no error.
It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that
the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the
public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just Records, specifically Meralco's deed of sale dated October 30, 1979, in favor of Napocor show that the
compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint". An order latter agreed to purchase the parcels of land already acquired by Meralco, the rights, interests and
of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally easements over those parcels of land which are the subject of the expropriation proceedings under Civil
disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. Case No. 20269, (Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXII), as well as those parcels of land
So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules occupied by Meralco by virtue of grant of easements of right-of-way (see Rollo, pp. 341-342). Thus,
Meralco had already ceded and in fact lost all its rights and interests over the aforesaid parcels of land (2) to pay the sum of P21,879.56 as accumulated interests on the debt up to February
in favor of Napocor. In addition, the same contract reveals that the Napocor was previously advised and 11, 1959 plus 7% interest per annum, from February 12,1959 until fully paid;
actually has knowledge of the pending litigation and proceedings against Meralco (see Rollo, pp. 342-
343). Hence, We find the contention of the petitioner tenable. It is therefore proper for the lower court to (3) to pay l0% of the judgment as attorney's fees and costs; and
either implead the Napocor in substitution of the petitioner or at the very least implead the former as
party plaintiff.
(4) should she fail to pay, or deposit with the Clerk of Court, the above amounts within
a period of ninety (90) days from receipt of a copy of the decision, the four mortgaged
All premises considered, this Court is convinced that the respondent judge's act of determining and lots would be sold at public auction to satisfy the mortgage debt, and the surplus if
ordering the payment of just compensation without the assistance of a Board of Commissioners is a any should be delivered to the defendant Nelita Vda. de Bacaling. (pp. 12-13, Record
flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process and is a gross violation of the on Appeal,)
mandated rule established by the Revised Rules of Court.
Mrs. Bacaling failed to pay the judgment debt within 90 days after receipt of the decision of the court.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the order dated February 9, 1982 issued by the Consequently, the mortgaged lots were sold at public auction on February 28, 1961. The GSIS was the
respondent judge insofar as it finally determined the amount of just compensation is nullified. This case highest bidder at the sale.
is hereby ordered remanded to the lower court for trial with the assistance of a Board of
Commissioners. Further, the National Power Corporation is impleaded as party plaintiff therein.
On March 1, 1961, the GSIS filed a motion for confirmation of the sale of the property to it (p. 25,
Record on Appeal). On October 10, 1961, it reiterated said motion and further asked for a deficiency
judgment against the mortgagor, its bid of P74,558.25 being inadequate to cover the judgment debt
which had swelled to P339,302.58 as of August 31, 1961 (p. 30, Record on Appeal).
G.R. No. L-45322 July 5, 1989
On December 18, 1972, respondent Maria Teresa Integrated Development Corporation (MTIDC), as
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner,  alleged assignee of the mortgagor's "right of redemption," filed a "Motion to Exercise the Right of
vs. Redemption" (p. 34, Record on Appeal). The motion was granted by the trial court in an order dated
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOILO, BRANCH III, ILOILO CITY and NELITA M. VDA. DE December 20, 1972. Check No. MK-45594 of the China Banking Corporation in the amount of P
BACALING & MARIA TERESA INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents. l,100,000 was delivered by MTIDC to the GSIS as payment of the redemption price. However, the
check was dishonored by the drawee bank because it was drawn against a closed account.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
On motion of the GSIS the court issued on February 3, 1973 an order declaring null and void the
The legal issue presented in this appeal by certiorari is whether, after the judicial foreclosure of a real redemption of the property by respondent MTIDC.
estate mortgage and the confirmation of the sale, the trial court may grant or fix another period for the
redemption of the foreclosed property by the assignee of the mortgagor's equity of redemption. Thereafter, written proposals were sent by said respondent to the GSIS for the redemption of the
foreclosed property, but the GSIS required cash payment of the redemption price.
In 1957, a real estate loan of P600,000 payable in monthly installments within a period of ten (10) years
with 7% interest per annum, was granted to the spouses Ramon and Nelita Bacaling by the petitioner, On October 25, 1975, respondent Nelita Bacaling filed a motion to re-open the case so she could prove
Government Service Insurance System (hereafter GSIS) for the development of the Bacaling-Moreno the inadequacy of the price of the sale of the mortgaged property (p. 63, Record on Appeal). The GSIS
subdivision. To secure the repayment of the loan, the Bacalings executed in favor of the GSIS a real filed an opposition. In an order dated December 8, 1975, respondent court denied Nelita's motion,
estate mortgage on four (4) lots owned by them. Out of the approved loan of P600,000, only P240,000 confirmed the sale of the mortgaged property, and rendered a deficiency judgment in favor of GSIS (p.
had been released to them by the GSIS as of November 11, 1957. 76, Record on Appeal).

The Bacalings failed to finish the subdivision project and pay the amortizations on the loan so the GSIS, On December 19, 1975, fourteen (14) years after the foreclosure sale on February 28, 1961 and almost
on May 22, 1959, filed in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo a complaint for judicial foreclosure of the three (3) years after the court had annulled on February 3, 1973 its redemption of the foreclosed
mortgage (Civil Case No. 5233). During the pendency of the case, Ramon Bacaling passed away. property, respondent MTIDC filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order and sought the
restoration of its right of redemption. The court, over the strong opposition of the GSIS, reconsidered on
In a decision dated October 5, 1960, the court ordered the widow, for herself and as administratrix of January 19, 1976 its order of December 8, 1975 and granted MTIDC a period of one year after the
the estate of Ramon Bacaling, to pay the GSIS: finality of its order of January 19, 1976 to redeem the Bacaling properties (p. 94, Record on Appeal).

(1) P240,000 with interest at 7% per annum from May 22, 1959 until the amount was The GSIS sought a reconsideration of that order on the ground that the court may not extend the period
fully paid; for the redemption of the property (p. 95, Record on Appeal).
On February 12,1976, the court modified its order of January 19, 1976 by giving MTIDC one (1) year vest their rights in the purchaser,subject to such rights of redemption as may be
from January 19, 1976 within which to redeem the Bacaling property, instead of one year from the allowed by law. (Emphasis supplied.)
finality of the January 19, 1976 order (p. 101, Record on Appeal). Petitioner received a copy of this last
order on February 12,1976. There is no right of redemption from a judicial foreclosure sale after the confirmation of the sale, except
those granted by banks or banking institutions as provided by the General Banking Act (Limpin vs.
On March 1, 1976, the GSIS appealed by certiorari to this Court raising purely legal questions (p. 102, Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70987, Sept. 29,1988). This has been the consistent
Record on Appeal). interpretation of Rule 68 in a long line of decisions of this Court.

In her Comment on the petition for review, Nelita Vda. de Bacaling asked for the dismissal of GSIS We may say, furthermore, that this Court has already held that in mortgage
petition on the grounds that: (1) the appeal has become moot and academic because the one-year foreclosures the rights of the mortgagee and persons holding under him are cut off by
redemption period fixed by the trial court had expired without the properties being redeemed; and (2) the sale when duly confirmed, and with them the equity of redemption. The reason for
the questioned order (dated February 12, 1976) is also pending appeal in the Court of Appeals (CA- that holding is that the right of redemption being purely statutory, and there being no
G.R. No. 60842) hence, this case should be remanded to that Court. statute conferring that right, it does not exist. (Benedicto vs. Yulo, 26 Phil. 166;
Emphasis supplied.)
The respondent MTIDC, in its Comment, alleged the same grounds for the dismissal of the appeal, and
further argued the legality of the lower court's order because anyway the GSIS entertained and ... When the foreclosure sale is validly confirmed by the court title vests upon the
encouraged its overtures for the redemption of the foreclosed property. purchaser in the foreclosure sale, and the confirmation retroacts to the date of the
sale (Binalbagan Estate, Inc. vs. Gatuslao, et al., 74 Phil. 128).  Only foreclosure of
On May 30,1977, this Court, through the First Division, gave due course to the petition. mortgages to banking institutions (including the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation)
and those made extrajudicially are subject to legal redemption, by express provision
of statute, and the present case does not come under exceptions. (Villar vs. Javier de
On October 21, 1977, We denied the motion to remand this appeal to the Court of Appeals. Paderanga, 97 Phil. 608-609;Emphasis ours.)

After the respondents had filed their Comments, the case was declared submitted for decision on Where the foreclosure is  judicially effected, however, no equivalent right of
January 27, 1978. redemption exists. The law (Sec. 3, Rule 68, Rules of Court) declares that a judicial
foreclosure sale, 'when confirmed by an order of the court, ... shall operate to divest
Considering the long lapse of the time that this case has been awaiting adjudication, and apprehensive the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the
that supervening events may have rendered the issues moot and academic, this Court on September purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law.' Such
21, 1988 gave the parties ten (10) days from notice to manifest whether they are still interested in rights exceptionally 'allowed by law' (i.e., even after confirmation by an order of the
prosecuting the case. In a Manifestation filed November 16, 1988, the GSIS declared that it is still court) are those granted by the charter of the Philippine National Bank (Acts No. 2747
interested in prosecuting its appeal. and 2938), and the General Banking Act (R.A. 337) (See Moran, Comments on the
Rules, 1970 Ed., Vol. 3, p. 273, citing Gonzales vs. PNB, 48 Phil. 824,828; and
We find merit in the appeal. Sections 2 and 3, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court provide: Martin, Rules of Court, etc., 3rd Ed., Vol. 3, p. 289, citing Villar vs. Javier de
Paderanga, 97 Phil. 64; Piano vs. Cayanong 7 SCRA 397). These laws confer on the
mortgagor, his successors in interest or any judgment creditor of the mortgagor, the
SEC. 2. Judgment on foreclosure for payment or sale. — if upon the trial in such right to redeem the property sold on the foreclosure-after confirmation by the court of
action the court shall find the facts set forth in the complaint to be true, it shall the foreclosure sale —  which right may be exercised within a period of one (1) year,
ascertain the amount due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt or obligation, counted from the date of registration of the certificate of sale in the Registry of
including interest and costs, and shall render judgment for the sum so found due and Property.
order that the same be paid into court within a period of not less than ninety (90) days
from the date of the service of such order, and that in default of such payment the
property be sold to realize the mortgage debt and costs. But, to repeat, no such right of redemption exists in case of judicial foreclosure of a
mortgage if the mortgagee is not the PNB or a bank or banking institution. In such a
case, the foreclosure sale when confirmed by an order of the court, ... shall operate to
SEC. 3. Sale of mortgaged property; effect. — When the defendant, after being divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the
directed to do so as provided in the last preceding section, fails to pay the principal, purchaser.' There then exists only what is known as the equity of redemption.  This is
interest, and costs at the time directed in the order, the court shall order the property simply the right of the defendant mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage and retain
to be sold in the manner and under the regulations that govern sales of real estate ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within the 90-day period after
under execution. Such sale shall not affect the rights of persons holding prior the judgment becomes final, in accordance with Rule 68, or even after the foreclosure
encumbrances upon the property or a part thereof, and when confirmed by an order sale but prior to its confirmation. (Limpin vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
of the court, it shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to 70987, September 29, 1988.)
Since the GSIS is not a bank or banking institution, its mortgage is covered by the general rule that aforementioned parcels of land against Rafael Montero, Rosa Abrenica, Marcial Esplana, Cesario
there is no right of redemption after the judicial foreclosure sale has been confirmed. Hence, Judge Versola, Estanislao Versola, Liberate Mosquito and Francisca de la Cruz. On May 27, 1967, the trial
Numeriano Estenzo exceeded his jurisdiction and acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the court in said case rendered a decision 4 in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants declaring as
respondent, MTIDC, another one-year period to redeem the Bacaling properties over the opposition of null and void the deeds conveying to the defendants Lots 4305 and 962 and ordering the latter to
petitioner GSIS as mortgagee- purchaser thereof at the public sale. His orders dated January 19, 1976 surrender possession of said lots to the former (plaintiffs Montes), who are among the presumptive legal
and February 12, 1976 are null and void. heirs of the late Gregorio Monte.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The appealed orders dated January 19, 1976 and On appeal by the defendants to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 40121-R, the assailed
February 12, 1976 of Judge Numeriano Estenzo in Civil Case No. 5233 are hereby annulled and set judgment was affirmed by the said court in its Decision 5 dated March 17, 1971 but with the
aside. modifications that the appellants excluding Francisca de la Cruz, were ordered to pay, jointly and
severally, the appellees, as the presumptive heirs of deceased Gregorio Monte, the sum of Eight
Hundred Pesos (P800.00) per annum as actual damages from September 29, 1956, the date of filing of
Costs against the private respondents. SO ORDERED.
the complaint until the appellees are restored to the possession of Lot 4305 and that only appellant
Rafael Montero was ordered to pay the appellees the sum of Four Hundred Pesos (P400.00) as
G.R. No. 72981 January 29, 1988 attorney's fees, the appealed judgment was affirmed in all other respects, with costs against appellants
except Appellant Francisca de la Cruz (p. 40, Annex "A," Record on Appeal).
FRANCISCA DE LA CRUZ (DECEASED) substituted by ROSA ABRENICA assisted by her
husband Rafael Montero, petitioner,  Be it noted however that the appellate court made the following findings of fact in the body of its
vs. decision which do not appear in the dispositive portion:
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, BENITO MONTE (Deceased), substituted by MIGUEL
MONTE, MARIANO MONTE, (Deceased), substituted by ALFREDO MONTE, GERONIMA MONTE,
... While the uncontradicted evidence of the plaintiffs discloses that plaintiffs Mariano
the spouses ANDRES RABARA and JULIANA MACANAS, FAUSTINA LEONIN and JOSEFA
and Benito Monte were the children of the late Vicente Monte, who was a brother of
MACANAS, and the spouses MONTENILLO RAFANAN and AURELIA RAFANAN, respondents.
the deceased Gregorio Monte, and plaintiff Lydia Monte was the eldest daughter of
Tiburcio Monte, deceased brother of Mariano and Benito, the equally reliable
evidence of the defendants also reveals that defendant Francisca de la Cruz is the
surviving spouse of Gregorio Monte, the two having been legally married on April
PARAS, J.: 8,1944 (Exhibit "l 6"-Montero). As we have occasion to state elsewhere in this
decision, Article 1001 of the new Civil Code provides, "Should brothers and sisters or
their children survive with the widow or widower, the later shall be entitled to one-half
This is an appeal by certiorari from the Decision 1 of the Intermediate Appellate Court, promulgated July
of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half."
30, 1985, as modified by its Resolution 2 dated October 24, 1985 and from the Resolution 3 dated
November 15, 1985, denying the Motion for Reconsideration. Briefly stated the Intermediate Appellate
Court ruled in the modified decision that the buyers of the subject properties are absolute owners Besides, an undivided half of the area of Lot 962 belonged to the conjugal partnership
thereof, they being innocent purchasers for value and the complaint instituted against them was of Gregorio Monte and defendant Francisca de la Cruz. It will be recalled that on June
dismissed for lack of cause of action. Furthermore the case was ordered remanded to the court of origin 30, 1944, Gregorio Monte and Victoriano Lucena settled extrajudicially the intestate
with direction to hear the case on the merits but always in conformity with the appellate court's decision. estate of the late Simeona Lucena, first wife of the former and brother of the latter,
In effect the appellate court declared that the action for partition instituted in the lower court was whereby they agreed that an undivided half of Lot 962 would pertain for Victoriano as
converted into an action for damages against those responsible for the transfer of the subject properties his inheritance from his sister. Then, in the same document of partition (Exhibit "l7" —
to the above-mentioned purchasers or transferees. Montero), Victoriano sold his inheritance to Gregorio Monte, who at that time was
already legally married to defendant Francisca de la Cruz.
For a clearer understanding of the present case, the background facts may be stated as follows:
Under the above circumstances, we believe and so hold that the ownership and
possession of Lots 4305 and 962 should be surrendered by defendants Monteros
The late Gregorio Monte owned during his lifetime two (2) parcels of land, Lot 4305 of the Cadastral
Esplanas and Versolas, not only to the plaintiffs, but to the heirs of Gregorio Monte in
Survey of Urdaneta and Lot 962 of the Cadastral Survey of Villasis, both in Pangasinan. He was
general and this includes both the plaintiffs and defendant de la Cruz, as well as the
survived by his spouse, Francisca de la Cruz, (now deceased and substituted in this petition by her
other heirs who might later on appear. (pp. 31-32, Annex "A," Record on Appeal)
daughter Rosa Abrenica Claiming to be the nearest surviving heirs of the late Gregorio Monte as the
children of the latter's brothers, Vicente and Tiburcio Monte, 1) Benito (now deceased and substituted in
this petition by Miguel Monte), 2) Mariano (now deceased and substituted in this petition by Alfredo and Francisca de la Cruz filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court, which was
Geronima Monte) and Lydia, all surnamed Monte filed on September 29, 1956, Civil Case No. T-338 in denied by said court on May 7, 1971. The denial of the Motion for Reconsideration was appealed to Us
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan to recover possession and ownership of the two (2) by way of Petition for Review docketed as L- 33564, raising as one of the issues therein the failure of
the appellate court to embody in the dispositive portion of its decision its findings of facts appearing in
the body of said decision, that Francisca de la Cruz is one of the heirs of Gregorio Monte, as the Questioning the judgment of the lower court, plaintiff Francisca de la Cruz appealed to the Court of
surviving spouse who is entitled to inherit from the estate of the deceased Gregorio Monte. In Our Appeals, assigning the following errors:
Resolution, dated August 5, 1971, in said case We denied the "petition for being factual (insufficient
showing that the findings of facts are unsupported by substantial evidence) and for lack of merit." (p. 21, I. The trial court erred in holding that by virtue of the decision in CA-G.R. No. 40121-
Rollo). R, it has no more authority to pass upon and resolve the issue of the right of plaintiff
to demand her share and the partition of the property in question.
After the judgment of the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 40121-R, became final, the plaintiffs-appellees
therein caused the cancellation of the original title covering the two (2) lots. Miguel Monte, Alfredo II. The trial court erred in holding that, since the dispositive portion of the decision of
Monte and Lydia Monte, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, (Exh. "E") among themselves on CA-G.R. No. 40121 -R (Appendix "B" of the Record on Appeal) did not specifically
February 7, 1972, wherein they made it appear 'that they were the only legal heirs of the late Gregorio mention any right of the plaintiff as the surviving spouse to inherit from the estate of
Monte. After obtaining titles to said lots in their names, they caused the sale of Lot 962 to spouses her deceased husband Gregorio Monte, she has, therefore, no more right to inherit
Montenillo Rafanan and Aurelia Rafanan on February 12, 1972, and Lot 4305 to spouses Andres and demand for a partition of the property in question.
Rabara and Juliana Macanas, Faustina Leonin and Josefa Macanas, on February 9, 1972.
III. The trial court erred in holding that since the adjudication of the properties in
Francisca de la Cruz filed against the Montes on February 12, 1972, but was amended to include their question among the defendants Montes as heirs of the late Gregorio Monte was on
buyers, Rafanans, Rabaras, and Leonins (herein private respondents) on March 25, 1972, a complaint the basis of a fraudulent deed of extrajudicial partition, the plaintiff, as the surviving
for partition docketed as Civil Case No. U-2374 with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan alleging spouse, has still the right to demand her rightful share thereto pursuant to the
among others in her complaint that earlier pending the consideration of the motion for the writ of provisions of Section 4, Rule 74 of the New Rules of Court.
execution of the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 40121-R (p. 2, Record on
Appeal or p. 41, Rollo, CA-G.R. No. 61294), she demanded from the aforementioned defendants for the
partition of the subject lots in accordance with the judgment rendered by the appellate court to wit: IV. The trial court erred in holding that the defendants-purchasers of the lands in
question are buyers-in-good faith. (p. 17, Rollo)
a) That Lot 4305 shall be divided equally between the herein plaintiff on one hand and
herein defendants on the other; and The appellate court in its Decision, promulgated July 30, 1985, set aside the assailed decision of the
lower court and remanded the case to the court of origin to hear the case on the merits based on the
following reasons:
b) That Lot 962 shall be divided such that (l) one-fourth (1/4) of said lot shall be given
as the share of herein plaintiff in the conjugal partnership and the remaining three
fourths (3/4) thereto shall be divided equally between plaintiff on one hand and the A close scrutiny of the evidence on record, shows that the case filed against the
herein defendants on the other; but notwithstanding said demand and others made plaintiffs herein in Civil Case No. T-338 was for annulment of the deeds conveying to
subsequently thereafter, the herein defendants refused and up to the present time still the defendants therein (which included plaintiff Francisca de la Cruz), the two lots: Lot
continuously refuse to cause a partition of the said parcels of land as called for by the 4305 and Lot 962, and for the plaintiffs therein to be declared the legal heirs of
judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals; and instead said defendants MIGUEL Gregorio Monte, they being the latter's brothers and sisters and children of Gregorio
MONTE, ALFREDO MONTE, GERONIMA MONTE de RAMOS, MONTE and LYDIA Monte's deceased brothers and sirters.
MONTE sold the aforesaid parcels of land to the other defendants, the spouses
ANDRES RABARA and JULIANA MACANAS and the spouses MONTENILLO On appeal to the Court of Appeals, therefore, said court in its judgment merely
RAFANAN and AURELIA RAFANAN to the damage and prejudice of herein plaintiffs. modified the ruling of the Court of First Instance and ordered that Francisca de la
(pp. 41-42, Rollo). Cruz be excluded from liability for damages in favor of the plaintiffs-appellees therein.

On January 30, 1976, the trial court in Civil Case No. U-2374 rendered a decision, 6 the dispositive There is, therefore, no prayer in said case for plaintiff Francisca de la Cruz to be
portion reading as follows: declared as the legal heir of her deceased husband, Gregorio Monte.

In view of this situation, this Court is of the opinion that it has absolutely no authority In fact the decision of the Court of First Instance in its Civil Case No. T-338 directed
to modify or review the decision of the Court of Appeals. For this reason, the Court that "the defendants ... (to) surrender the possession over Lot 4304, and defendants
feels that there is no necessity of passing upon the merit of the issues raised in this Rafael Montero and Rosa Abrenica (to) surrender the possession over Lot No. 962 to
case as the decision has already become final. Considering the incidents relative to the plaintiffs who are among the presumptive legal heirs of the late Gregorio Monte."
this case that have already transpired, this court is constrained to order the dismissal (emphasis ours).
of the complaint with costs against the plaintiff.

SO ORDERED. (Decision, p. 26, Record on Appeal)

 On appeal to the Appellate Court, therefore, the latter had no occasion to rule on 4. THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND VIOLATED
whether Francisca de la Cruz, as presumptive heir of the late Gregorio Monte should SECTION 9 OF THE NEW JUDICIARY ACT (BP NO. 129) IN ORDERING THE
be given her share in the two lots in question. REMANDING OF THE CASE FOR FURTHER TRIAL ON THE MERITS IN THE
LOWER COURT. (p. 87, Rollo)
That is precisely why the Supreme Court dismissed plaintiffs petition for review on
certiorari filed before it; because in that petition, plaintiff Francisca de la Cruz sought A perusal of the records shows that the "Deed of Extrajudicial Partition" was executed by Miguel,
a declaration other right to inherit from the estate of Gregorio Monte, which the Alfredo and Lydia all surnamed Angeles on February 7, 1972, wherein they made it appear that they are
Supreme Court denied, not on the basis of the fact that Francisca de la Cruz is not an the only legal heirs of the late Gregorio Monte. It was presented to the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan
heir of Gregorio Monte, but on the ground that the issues raised therein were factual for registration on February 8, 1972 at 2:05 P.M. Consequently, TCT No. 16132 covering Lot 4305 in
and should be ventilated in the court below. the name of Gregorio Monte (Exh. "G") was cancelled and TCT No. 93920 was issued in the names of
Miguel, Alfredo and Lydia, all surnamed Montes (Exh.1-Rabara) and OCT No. 9919 covering Lot 962 in
The court a quo, therefore, committed error when it dismissed plaintiff's complaint for the names of Gregorio Monte and Simeona Lucena, with the annotation that the undivided one-half
partition because plaintiff was not asking the court to annul or modify the decision of (1/2) portion thereof was the subject of an extrajudicial partition and sale between Gregorio Monte and
the Court of Appeals or that of the Supreme Court (in CA-G.R. No. 40121-R and Victoriano Lucena, brother of Simeona Lucena (Exh. "H") was also cancelled and TCT No. 93396 in the
GRL-33564, respectively). The plaintiff was simply asking that the estate of her names of the same Montes, Miguel, Alfredo and Lydia. Both these two new TCT's issued in the names
deceased husband, Gregorio Monte, consisting of the two (2) lots in question, be of the aforementioned Montes carried the annotations that these transactions were made subject to the
partitioned and that she be given her share as Gregorio Monte's surviving spouse, in provisions of Sec. 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court in favor of any other heir or person who has been
accordance with the law on intestate succession. unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the estate of the deceased Gregorio Monte, within the
period of two (2) years after the execution on February 7, 1972 and registration on February 8, 1972 of
the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition.
The basis of plaintiff's complaint is, therefore, Rule 69 7 of the Rules of Court and not
a petition for review of the decision of the Court of First Instance and/or the Court of
Appeals, which would be absurd under any circumstances. (pp. 21-23, Rollo). Lot 4309 was sold on February 9, 1972 to spouses Andres Rabara and Juliana Macanas, Faustina
Leonin and Josefa Macanas (Exh. "2," Rabaras). On the same date, another deed of sale was executed
by Miguel Monte and Lydia Monte covering their alleged shares over Lot 962 to Alfredo Monte, thereby
A Motion for Reconsideration of the appellane court's decision was filed by the defendants-appellees consolidating the latter's ownership over said lots. Subsequently Lot 962 was sold on February 12, 1972
spouses Rabara, spouses Rafanan, Faustina F. Leonin and Josefa Macanas on the grounds that said to spouses Montenillo Rafanan and Aurelia Rafanan by Alfredo Monte. The two (2) deeds of sale
decision is contrary to law and that the issues raised in said case are now barred by the principle of res covering Lot 4305 and Lot 962 were registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan
judicata. Although overruling the application of the principle of res judicata to the case at bar, the only on February 10, 1972, after the complaint for Partition was filed by herein petitioner Francisca de la
appellate court modified its ruling as earlier stated. Hence the present petition for review on certiorari, Cruz on February 12, 1972. Such registration resulted in the issuance of new titles in the names of the
plaintiff- appellant presenting the following: buyers with the same annotations contained on the former titles issued in the names of the vendors-
Montes.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
In ruling that the buyers were vendees in good faith and for value, the respondent appellate court
1. THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT measured the transaction by applying the same yardstick We laid down in the case of Cui and Jovan
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS RABARAS, ET AL AND RAFANANS, ET AL ARE vs. Narson, to wit:
PURCHASERS IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE;
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another without notice that
2. THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND VIOLATED THE some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair
RULE ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN RENDERING A MODIFIED DECISION price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim
DECLARING RESPON DENTS RABARAS AND RAFANANS AS PURCHASERS IN or interest of some other person in the property. Good faith consists in an honest
GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE BRIEF OF SAID intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another. Good faith
RESPONDENTS AND NOT ON THE EVIDENCE AND FACTS ADDUCED DURING is the opposite of fraud and of bad faith, and its non-existence must be established by
THE TRIAL IN THE LOWER COURT AND ELEVATED IT FOR REVIEW AND RE- competent proof. (51 Phil 606, [p. 26, Rollo])
APPRAISAL;
The appellate court concluded that the respondents-vendees bought the subject properties from the
3. THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MODIFYING THE registered owners without notice that some other person or persons had a right to or interest in such
ORIGINAL DECISION RENDERED BY IT AND CONVERTING THE ORIGINAL properties and that they paid a full fair price for the same, before they had notice of the claim or interest
ACTION FOR PARTITION OF THE (ESTATE OF) DECEASED GREGORIO MONTE of the appellant in such subject properties. Such finding is not supported by substantial evidence on the
INTO AN ACTION FOR DAMAGES AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS MONTES; AND record.
It cannot be doubted that the buyers herein had notices of the claim of third persons aside from the A This is the same, sir.
claim or right of the registered owners. As mentioned earlier these claims were annotated on the two (2)
titles covering Lots 962 and 4305, which were shown to the buyers together with the decision of the Q It is the same shown to you?
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 40121-R, dated March 17, 1971. That these buyers were Idly aware
that the subject properties were under litigation can be surmised from their oral testimonies in the trial
court, to wit: A Yes, sir?

TESTIMONY OF RESPONDENT AURELLA RAFANAN: Q Now, when was this shown to you?

Atty. Tan: A It was between February 1 and February 8.

Q Now, why did they have to show the decision to you? Q Can you not make sure whether it was on February 8?

A To show to me that they were really the owners of the property. A I can not.

Q Why, do you have any doubt as to their ownership prior to xxx xxx xxx
February 5, 1972?
Q You are not very sure that it was on February 8?
A Yes, because they said that the land was involved in a case.
A I can not remember.
Q And as a matter of fact you have known that Lot 962 was under
litigation that is why you did not bother to buy it because you were Q What particular part of the day did they come to you and offer the
not very sure as to who was the real owner then, is it not? purchase or sale of this Lot 4305?

A Yes, sir. (Tsn., pp. 67-68, Testimony of Aurelia Rafanan, October A I can not remember.
17, 1975)
COURT:
TESTIMONY OF RESPONDENT ANDRES RABARA:
Q Was it morning or afternoon, after lunch?
ATTY. TAN:
ATTY. TAN:
Q What else was shown to you aside from the decision of the Court
of Appeals and the certificate of title as you claimed? Q Or in the evening?

A It is only the title and the decision of the Court of Appeals. A After lunch.

Q What was the date of the title that you saw which was presented Q And when they offered to you what did you tell them?
to you?

A We made dealing, I bet for the said land.

A I can not remember.

Q All right, the title of this property which you claimed was
xxx xxx xxx presented to you and which was the basis of you and your in-laws
in purchasing the property appears to have been issued on
Q You were shown the original owner's duplicate of this title Exhibit February 8, 1972 at 2:05 in the afternoon. Will you tell this
"1-Rabara" before you purchased the land? Honorable Court now whether this particular title was shown to you
on February 8, 1972 after lunch when this title was issued in
 Lingayen, Pangasinan by the Register of Deeds at 2:00 p.m. on We believe that in the instance case, no further evidence has to be adduced either in the appellate court
February 8, 1972? or in the trial court, for We find it sufficiently clear that the buyers were in bad faith.

A That is why I consulted my lawyer to see about the reality of the WHEREFORE, We hereby AFFIRM the original decision dated July 30, 1985 of the Court of Appeals
documents. and order the remand of the case to the trial court, not for the purpose of determining anymore the good
faith or bad faith of the buyers, but for the trial court to order a partition of the estate with petitioner heir
Q That is not the question, Mr. Witness. herein (as substituted by her own heirs), getting her rightful share as the surviving spouse and heir of
the deceased Gregorio Monte.
COURT:
SO ORDERED.
Do you still maintain that this title Exhibit 1 was shown to you
sometime between February 1 and February 8, 1972 after lunch
when it appears that this title was only issued on February 8, 1972
at 2:05 p.m.

A I can not remember, sir.

Q So, when you stated a while ago on direct examination that you
relied only upon the title because it was presented to you between
February first and February 8 is not correct because you do not
remember whether that title was shown to you or not?

A I did not pay much attention to the date. (tsn., pp. 16-28,
Testimony of Andres Rabara, October 17, 1975) (pp. 67-68, Rollo)

A purchaser of a valued piece of property cannot just close his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man upon his guard and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there
were no defect in the title of the vendors. Respondents-buyers should have acted with that measure of
precaution which may reasonably be required to a prudent man in a like situation.

The appellate court therefore gravely erred in the appreciation of evidence on the good faith and
innocence of respondents buyers. Consequently, because respondents-buyers, were not buyers in
good faith and for value, We find no basis for the appellate court to convert the original action for
partition into an action for damages against respondents-Montes.

The respondent appellate court, however, on the same occasion ordered the remanding of the case to
the lower court for further trial on the merits to determine the rightful heirs to the subject properties in
the partition case. Such ruling is likewise assailed by the petitioner contending that respondent Court of
Appeals violated Sec. 9 of the New Judiciary Act (BP 129) in remanding the case for trial on the merits
in the lower court instead of conducting a hearing and receiving evidence necessary to resolve factual
issues raised. Sec. 9, of Batas Pambansa 129 merely lays down the power of the appellate court to try
and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual
issues raised in cases falling within its original or appellate jurisdiction including the power to grant and
conduct new trials or further proceedings. Such power is not made obligatory on the appellate court but
gives the said court the option whether to remand the case for trial on the merits in the lower court or for
the appellate court to conduct the trial itself.
 its trade name Chin Chun Su Medicated Cream with the Philippine Patent Office and other appropriate
governmental agencies; that KEC Cosmetics Laboratory of the petitioner obtained the copyrights
through misrepresentation and falsification; and, that the authority of Quintin Cheng, assignee of the
patent registration certificate, to distribute and market Chin Chun Su products in the Philippines had
already been terminated by the said Taiwanese Manufacturing Company.
After due hearing on the application for preliminary injunction, the trial court granted the same in
an Order dated February 10, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the application of plaintiff Elidad C. Kho, doing business under the style of KEC
Cosmetic Laboratory, for preliminary injunction, is hereby granted. Consequentially, plaintiff is required
to file with the Court a bond executed to defendants in the amount of five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) to the effect that plaintiff will pay to defendants all damages which defendants may
sustain by reason of the injunction if the Court should finally decide that plaintiff is not entitled thereto.

SO ORDERED.[3]

The respondents moved for reconsideration but their motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial
ELIDAD C. KHO, doing business under the name and style of KEC COSMETICS court in an Order dated March 19, 1992.[4]
LABORATORY, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SUMMERVILLE GENERAL
MERCHANDISING and COMPANY, and ANG TIAM CHAY, respondents. On April 24, 1992, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 27803, praying for the nullification of the said writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the trial court. After the respondents filed their reply and almost a month after petitioner
DECISION submitted her comment, or on August 14 1992, the latter moved to dismiss the petition for violation of
Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91, a circular prohibiting forum shopping. According to the petitioner, the
DE LEON, JR., J.:
respondents did not state the docket number of the civil case in the caption of their petition and, more
significantly, they did not include therein a certificate of non-forum shopping. The respondents opposed
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] dated May 24, 1993 of the Court of the petition and submitted to the appellate court a certificate of non-forum shopping for their petition.
Appeals setting aside and declaring as null and void the Orders[2] dated February 10, 1992 and March
19, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, of Quezon City granting the issuance of a writ of On May 24, 1993, the appellate court rendered a Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 27803 ruling in favor
preliminary injunction. of the respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:

The facts of the case are as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby given due course and the orders of respondent court dated
On December 20, 1991, petitioner Elidad C. Kho filed a complaint for injunction and damages with February 10, 1992 and March 19, 1992 granting the writ of preliminary injunction and denying
a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-91-10926, petitioners motion for reconsideration are hereby set aside and declared null and void. Respondent
against the respondents Summerville General Merchandising and Company (Summerville, for brevity) court is directed to forthwith proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-91-10926 and resolve the issue
and Ang Tiam Chay. raised by the parties on the merits.

The petitioners complaint alleges that petitioner, doing business under the name and style of KEC
SO ORDERED.[5]
Cosmetics Laboratory, is the registered owner of the copyrights Chin Chun Su and Oval Facial Cream
Container/Case, as shown by Certificates of Copyright Registration No. 0-1358 and No. 0-3678; that
she also has patent rights on Chin Chun Su & Device and Chin Chun Su for medicated cream after In granting the petition, the appellate court ruled that:
purchasing the same from Quintin Cheng, the registered owner thereof in the Supplemental Register of
the Philippine Patent Office on February 7, 1980 under Registration Certificate No. 4529; that The registration of the trademark or brandname Chin Chun Su by KEC with the supplemental register of
respondent Summerville advertised and sold petitioners cream products under the brand name Chin the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer cannot be equated with registration in the
Chun Su, in similar containers that petitioner uses, thereby misleading the public, and resulting in the principal register, which is duly protected by the Trademark Law.
decline in the petitioners business sales and income; and, that the respondents should be enjoined from
allegedly infringing on the copyrights and patents of the petitioner.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondents, on the other hand, alleged as their defense that Summerville is the exclusive
and authorized importer, re-packer and distributor of Chin Chun Su products manufactured by Shun Yi As ratiocinated in La Chemise Lacoste, S.S. vs. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 373, 393:
Factory of Taiwan; that the said Taiwanese manufacturing company authorized Summerville to register
Registration in the Supplemental Register, therefore, serves as notice that the registrant is using or has IN DELAYING THE RESOLUTION OF PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION,
appropriated the trademark. By the very fact that the trademark cannot as yet be on guard and there are THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DENIED PETITIONERS RIGHT TO SEEK
certain defects, some obstacles which the use must still overcome before he can claim legal ownership TIMELY APPELLATE RELIEF AND VIOLATED PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
of the mark or ask the courts to vindicate his claims of an exclusive right to the use of the same. It would
be deceptive for a party with nothing more than a registration in the Supplemental Register to posture IV
before courts of justice as if the registration is in the Principal Register.
RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
The reliance of the private respondent on the last sentence of the Patent office action on application DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO CITE THE
Serial No. 30954 that registrants is presumed to be the owner of the mark until after the registration is PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN CONTEMPT.[9]
declared cancelled is, therefore, misplaced and grounded on shaky foundation. The supposed
presumption not only runs counter to the precept embodied in Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of
Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases but considering all the facts ventilated The petitioner faults the appellate court for not dismissing the petition on the ground of violation of
before us in the four interrelated petitions involving the petitioner and the respondent, it is devoid of Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91. Also, the petitioner contends that the appellate court violated
factual basis. As even in cases where presumption and precept may factually be reconciled, we have Section 6, Rule 9 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals when it failed to rule on her
held that the presumption is rebuttable, not conclusive, (People v. Lim Hoa, G.R. No. L-10612, May 30, motion for reconsideration within ninety (90) days from the time it is submitted for resolution. The
1958, Unreported). One may be declared an unfair competitor even if his competing trademark is appellate court ruled only after the lapse of three hundred fifty-four (354) days, or on June 3, 1994. In
registered (Parke, Davis & Co. v. Kiu Foo & Co., et al., 60 Phil 928; La Yebana Co. v. chua Seco & Co., delaying the resolution thereof, the appellate court denied the petitioners right to seek the timely
14 Phil 534).[6] appellate relief. Finally, petitioner describes as arbitrary the denial of her motions for contempt of court
against the respondents.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. This she followed with several motions to declare We rule in favor of the respondents.
respondents in contempt of court for publishing advertisements notifying the public of the promulgation
of the assailed decision of the appellate court and stating that genuine Chin Chun Su products could be Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, one of the grounds for the
obtained only from Summerville General Merchandising and Co. issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is a proof that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded,
and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or
In the meantime, the trial court went on to hear petitioners complaint for final injunction and acts complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually. Thus, a preliminary injunction order may be
damages. On October 22, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision [7] barring the petitioner from using granted only when the application for the issuance of the same shows facts entitling the applicant to the
the trademark Chin Chun Su and upholding the right of the respondents to use the same, but relief demanded.[10] This is the reason why we have ruled that it must be shown that the invasion of the
recognizing the copyright of the petitioner over the oval shaped container of her beauty cream. The trial right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of complainant is clear and
court did not award damages and costs to any of the parties but to their respective counsels were unmistakable, and, that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
awarded Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) each as attorneys fees. The petitioner duly damage.[11]
appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals.
In the case at bar, the petitioner applied for the issuance of a preliminary injunctive order on the
On June 3, 1994, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution[8] denying the petitioners motions ground that she is entitled to the use of the trademark on Chin Chun Su and its container based on her
for reconsideration and for contempt of court in CA-G.R. SP No. 27803. copyright and patent over the same. We first find it appropriate to rule on whether the copyright and
patent over the name and container of a beauty cream product would entitle the registrant to the use
Hence, this petition anchored on the following assignment of errors: and ownership over the same to the exclusion of others.
I Trademark, copyright and patents are different intellectual property rights that cannot be
interchanged with one another. A trademark is any visible sign capable of distinguishing the goods
RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF (trademark) or services (service mark) of an enterprise and shall include a stamped or marked container
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO RULE ON of goods.[12] In relation thereto, a trade name means the name or designation identifying or
PETITIONERS MOTION TO DISMISS. distinguishing an enterprise.[13] Meanwhile, the scope of a copyright is confined to literary and artistic
works which are original intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain protected from the
II moment of their creation.[14] Patentable inventions, on the other hand, refer to any technical solution of a
problem in any field of human activity which is new, involves an inventive step and is industrially
applicable.[15]
RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN REFUSING TO PROMPTLY Petitioner has no right to support her claim for the exclusive use of the subject trade name and its
RESOLVE PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. container. The name and container of a beauty cream product are proper subjects of a trademark
inasmuch as the same falls squarely within its definition. In order to be entitled to exclusively use the
III same in the sale of the beauty cream product, the user must sufficiently prove that she registered or
used it before anybody else did. The petitioners copyright and patent registration of the name and
container would not guarantee her the right to the exclusive use of the same for the reason that they are The petitioner likewise contends that the appellate court unduly delayed the resolution of her
not appropriate subjects of the said intellectual rights. Consequently, a preliminary injunction order motion for reconsideration. But we find that petitioner contributed to this delay when she filed
cannot be issued for the reason that the petitioner has not proven that she has a clear right over the successive contentious motions in the same proceeding, the last of which was on October 27, 1993,
said name and container to the exclusion of others, not having proven that she has registered a necessitating counter-manifestations from private respondents with the last one being filed on
trademark thereto or used the same before anyone did. November 9, 1993. Nonetheless, it is well-settled that non-observance of the period for deciding cases
or their incidents does not render such judgments ineffective or void. [17] With respect to the purported
We cannot likewise overlook the decision of the trial court in the case for final injunction and damages she suffered due to the alleged delay in resolving her motion for reconsideration, we find that
damages. The dispositive portion of said decision held that the petitioner does not have trademark the said issue has likewise been rendered moot and academic by our ruling that she has no right over
rights on the name and container of the beauty cream product. The said decision on the merits of the the trademark and, consequently, to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
trial court rendered the issuance of the writ of a preliminary injunction moot and academic
notwithstanding the fact that the same has been appealed in the Court of Appeals. This is supported by Finally, we rule that the Court of Appeals correctly denied the petitioners several motions for
our ruling in La Vista Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[16], to wit: contempt of court. There is nothing contemptuous about the advertisements complained of which, as
regards the proceedings in CA-G.R. SP No. 27803 merely announced in plain and straightforward
Considering that preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy which may be granted at any time after language the promulgation of the assailed Decision of the appellate court. Moreover, pursuant to
the commencement of the action and before judgment when it is established that the plaintiff is entitled Section 4 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the said decision nullifying the injunctive
to the relief demanded and only when his complaint shows facts entitling such reliefs xxx and it writ was immediately executory.
appearing that the trial court had already granted the issuance of a final injunction in favor of petitioner WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in its decision rendered after trial on the merits xxx the Court resolved to Dismiss the instant petition dated May 24, 1993 and June 3, 1994, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against the
having been rendered moot and academic. An injunction issued by the trial court after it has already petitioner.
made a clear pronouncement as to the plaintiffs right thereto, that is, after the same issue has been
decided on the merits, the trial court having appreciated the evidence presented, is proper, SO ORDERED.
notwithstanding the fact that the decision rendered is not yet final xxx. Being an ancillary remedy, the
proceedings for preliminary injunction cannot stand separately or proceed independently of the decision
rendered on the merit of the main case for injunction. The merit of the main case having been already
determined in favor of the applicant, the preliminary determination of its non-existence ceases to have
any force and effect. (italics supplied)

La Vista categorically pronounced that the issuance of a final injunction renders any question on the
preliminary injunctive order moot and academic despite the fact that the decision granting a final
injunction is pending appeal. Conversely, a decision denying the applicant-plaintiffs right to a final
injunction, although appealed, renders moot and academic any objection to the prior dissolution of a writ
of preliminary injunction.
The petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in not dismissing the petition for certiorari for
non-compliance with the rule on forum shopping. We disagree. First, the petitioner improperly raised the
technical objection of non-compliance with Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 by filing a motion to
dismiss the petition for certiorari filed in the appellate court. This is prohibited by Section 6, Rule 66 of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that (I)n petitions for certiorari before the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals, the provisions of Section 2, Rule 56, shall be observed. Before giving
due course thereto, the court may require the respondents to file their comment to, and not a motion to
dismiss, the petition xxx (italics supplied). Secondly, the issue was raised one month after petitioner had
filed her answer/comment and after private respondent had replied thereto. Under Section 1, Rule 16 of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss shall be filed within the time for but before
filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim. She therefore could no longer submit a
motion to dismiss nor raise defenses and objections not included in the answer/comment she had
earlier tendered. Thirdly, substantial justice and equity require this Court not to revive a dissolved writ of
injunction in favor of a party without any legal right thereto merely on a technical infirmity. The granting
of an injunctive writ based on a technical ground rather than compliance with the requisites for the
issuance of the same is contrary to the primary objective of legal procedure which is to serve as a
means to dispense justice to the deserving party.
 On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over legislative power
from the President. 2 This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The Act was signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on
June 15, 1988.

Before the law's effectivity, on May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell
Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were
later placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance with the CARL.

Hacienda Palico

On September 29, 1989, respondent DAR, through respondent Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
(MARO) of Nasugbu, Batangas, sent a notice entitled "Invitation to Parties" to petitioner. The Invitation
was addressed to "Jaime Pimentel, Hda. Administrator, Hda. Palico." 3 Therein, the MARO invited
petitioner to a conference on October 6, 1989 at the DAR office in Nasugbu to discuss the results of the
G.R. No. 127876 December 17, 1999 DAR investigation of Hacienda Palico, which was "scheduled for compulsory acquisition this year under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program." 4

ROXAS & CO., INC., petitioner, 

vs. On October 25, 1989, the MARO completed three (3) Investigation Reports after investigation and
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, SECRETARY ocular inspection of the Hacienda. In the first Report, the MARO found that 270 hectares under Tax
OF AGRARIAN REFORM, DAR REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR REGION IV, MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN Declaration Nos. 465, 466, 468 and 470 were "flat to undulating (0-8% slope)" and actually occupied
REFORM OFFICER OF NASUGBU, BATANGAS and DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and cultivated by 34 tillers of sugarcane. 5 In the second Report, the MARO identified as "flat to
ADJUDICATION BOARD, respondents. undulating" approximately 339 hectares under Tax Declaration No. 0234 which also had several actual
occupants and tillers of sugarcane; 6 while in the third Report, the MARO found approximately 75
hectare under Tax Declaration No. 0354 as "flat to undulating" with 33 actual occupants and tillers also
  of sugarcane. 7

PUNO, J.: On October 27, 1989, a "Summary Investigation Report" was submitted and signed jointly by the
MARO, representatives of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) and Land Bank of the
This case involves three (3) haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas owned by petitioner and the validity of the Philippines (LBP), and by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO). The Report recommended
acquisition of these haciendas by the government under Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive that 333.0800 hectares of Hacienda Palico be subject to compulsory acquisition at a value of
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. P6,807,622.20. 8 The following day, October 28, 1989, two (2) more Summary Investigation Reports
were submitted by the same officers and representatives. They recommended that 270.0876 hectares
and 75.3800 hectares be placed under compulsory acquisition at a compensation of P8,109,739.00 and
Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas,
P2,188,195.47, respectively. 9
namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas.
Hacienda Palico is 1,024 hectares in area and is registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
985. This land is covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 0465, 0466, 0468, 0470, 0234 and 0354. Hacienda On December 12, 1989, respondent DAR through then Department Secretary Miriam D. Santiago sent
Banilad is 1,050 hectares in area, registered under TCT No. 924 and covered by Tax Declaration Nos. a "Notice of Acquisition" to petitioner. The Notice was addressed as follows:
0236, 0237 and 0390. Hacienda Caylaway is 867.4571 hectares in area and is registered under TCT
Nos. T-44662, T-44663, T-44664 and T-44665. Roxas y Cia, Limited

The events of this case occurred during the incumbency of then President Corazon C. Aquino. In Soriano Bldg., Plaza Cervantes
February 1986, President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3 promulgating a Provisional Constitution. As
head of the provisional government, the President exercised legislative power "until a legislature is
elected and convened under a new Constitution." 1 In the exercise of this legislative power, the Manila, Metro Manila. 10
President signed on July 22, 1987, Proclamation No. 131 instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program and Executive Order No. 229 providing the mechanisms necessary to initially implement the Petitioner was informed that 1,023.999 hectares of its land in Hacienda Palico were subject to
program. immediate acquisition and distribution by the government under the CARL; that based on the DAR's
valuation criteria, the government was offering compensation of P3.4 million for 333.0800 hectares; that
whether this offer was to be accepted or rejected, petitioner was to inform the Bureau of Land and 0236 were "flat to undulating (0-8% slope)." On this area were discovered 162 actual occupants
Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD) of the DAR; that in case of petitioner's rejection or failure to reply and tillers of sugarcane. 20 In the second Report, it was found that approximately 235 hectares under
within thirty days, respondent DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings with notice to Tax Declaration No. 0390 were "flat to undulating," on which were 92 actual occupants and tillers of
petitioner to determine just compensation for the land; that if petitioner accepts respondent DAR's offer, sugarcane. 21
or upon deposit of the compensation with an accessible bank if it rejects the same, the DAR shall take
immediate possession of the land. 11 The results of these Reports were discussed at the conference. Present in the conference were
representatives of the prospective farmer beneficiaries, the BARC, the LBP, and Jaime Pimentel on
Almost two years later, on September 26, 1991, the DAR Regional Director sent to the LBP Land behalf of the landowner. 22 After the meeting, on the same day, September 21, 1989, a Summary
Valuation Manager three (3) separate Memoranda entitled "Request to Open Trust Account." Each Investigation Report was submitted jointly by the MARO, representatives of the BARC, LBP, and the
Memoranda requested that a trust account representing the valuation of three portions of Hacienda PARO. They recommended that after ocular inspection of the property, 234.6498 hectares under Tax
Palico be opened in favor of the petitioner in view of the latter's rejection of its offered value. 12 Declaration No. 0390 be subject to compulsory acquisition and distribution by CLOA. 23 The following
day, September 22, 1989, a second Summary Investigation was submitted by the same officers. They
Meanwhile in a letter dated May 4, 1993, petitioner applied with the DAR for conversion of Haciendas recommended that 737.2590 hectares under Tax Declaration Nos. 0236 and 0237 be likewise placed
Palico and Banilad from agricultural to non-agricultural lands under the provisions of the CARL. 13 On under compulsory acquisition for distribution. 24
July 14, 1993, petitioner sent a letter to the DAR Regional Director reiterating its request for conversion
of the two haciendas. 14 On December 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through the Department Secretary, sent to petitioner two (2)
separate "Notices of Acquisition" over Hacienda Banilad. These Notices were sent on the same day as
Despite petitioner's application for conversion, respondent DAR proceeded with the acquisition of the the Notice of Acquisition over Hacienda Palico. Unlike the Notice over Hacienda Palico, however, the
two Haciendas. The LBP trust accounts as compensation for Hacienda Palico were replaced by Notices over Hacienda Banilad were addressed to:
respondent DAR with cash and LBP bonds. 15 On October 22, 1993, from the mother title of TCT No.
985 of the Hacienda, respondent DAR registered Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. Roxas y Cia. Limited
6654. On October 30, 1993, CLOA's were distributed to farmer beneficiaries. 16
7th Floor, Cacho-Gonzales Bldg. 101 Aguirre St., Leg.
Hacienda Banilad
Makati, Metro Manila. 25
On August 23, 1989, respondent DAR, through respondent MARO of Nasugbu, Batangas, sent a notice
to petitioner addressed as follows: Respondent DAR offered petitioner compensation of P15,108,995.52 for 729.4190 hectares
and P4,428,496.00 for 234.6498 hectares. 26
Mr. Jaime Pimentel
On September 26, 1991, the DAR Regional Director sent to the LBP Land Valuation Manager a
Hacienda Administrator "Request to Open Trust Account" in petitioner's name as compensation for 234.6493 hectares of
Hacienda Banilad. 27 A second "Request to Open Trust Account" was sent on November 18, 1991 over
Hacienda Banilad 723.4130 hectares of said Hacienda. 28

Nasugbu, Batangas 17 On December 18, 1991, the LBP certified that the amounts of P4,428,496.40 and P21,234,468.78 in
cash and LBP bonds had been earmarked as compensation for petitioner's land in Hacienda Banilad. 29
The MARO informed Pimentel that Hacienda Banilad was subject to compulsory acquisition
under the CARL; that should petitioner wish to avail of the other schemes such as Voluntary On May 4, 1993, petitioner applied for conversion of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad.
Offer to Sell or Voluntary Land Transfer, respondent DAR was willing to provide assistance
thereto. 18 Hacienda Caylaway

On September 18, 1989, the MARO sent an "Invitation to Parties" again to Pimentel inviting the latter to Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered for sale to the government on May 6, 1988 before the
attend a conference on September 21, 1989 at the MARO Office in Nasugbu to discuss the results of effectivity of the CARL. The Hacienda has a total area of 867.4571 hectares and is covered by four (4)
the MARO's investigation over Hacienda Banilad. 19 titles — TCT Nos. T-44662, T-44663, T-44664 and T-44665. On January 12, 1989, respondent DAR,
through the Regional Director for Region IV, sent to petitioner two (2) separate Resolutions accepting
On September 21, 1989, the same day the conference was held, the MARO submitted two (2) Reports. petitioner's voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway, particularly TCT Nos. T-44664 and T-
In his first Report, he found that approximately 709 hectares of land under Tax Declaration Nos. 0237 44663. 30 The Resolutions were addressed to:
 Roxas & Company, Inc. 4) Letter dated December 15, 1992 issued by Reynaldo U. Garcia of the Municipal
Planning & Development, Coordinator and Deputized Zoning Administrator addressed
7th Flr. Cacho-Gonzales Bldg. to Mrs. Alicia P. Logarta advising that the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas has no
objection to the conversion of the lands subject of referenced titles to non-
agricultural. 37
Aguirre, Legaspi Village
On August 24, 1993 petitioner instituted Case No. N-0017-96-46 (BA) with respondent DAR
Makati, M. M 31 Adjudication Board (DARAB) praying for the cancellation of the CLOA's issued by respondent DAR in
the name of several persons. Petitioner alleged that the Municipality of Nasugbu, where the haciendas
On September 4, 1990, the DAR Regional Director issued two separate Memoranda to the LBP are located, had been declared a tourist zone, that the land is not suitable for agricultural production,
Regional Manager requesting for the valuation of the land under TCT Nos. T-44664 and T-44663. 32 On and that the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had reclassified the land to non-agricultural.
the same day, respondent DAR, through the Regional Director, sent to petitioner a "Notice of
Acquisition" over 241.6777 hectares under TCT No. T-44664 and 533.8180 hectares under TCT No. T- In a Resolution dated October 14, 1993, respondent DARAB held that the case involved the prejudicial
44663. 33 Like the Resolutions of Acceptance, the Notice of Acquisition was addressed to petitioner at question of whether the property was subject to agrarian reform, hence, this question should be
its office in Makati, Metro Manila. submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform for determination. 38

Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, petitioner, through its President, Eduardo J. Roxas, sent a letter to the On October 29, 1993, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals CA-G.R. SP No. 32484. It questioned
Secretary of respondent DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of the expropriation of its properties under the CARL and the denial of due process in the acquisition of its
Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to landholdings.
non-agricultural. As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of
Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other
uses. 34 Meanwhile, the petition for conversion of the three haciendas was denied by the MARO on November 8,
1993.
In a letter dated September 28, 1992, respondent DAR Secretary informed petitioner that a
reclassification of the land would not exempt it from agrarian reform. Respondent Secretary also denied Petitioner's petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals on April 28, 1994. 39 Petitioner moved for
petitioner's withdrawal of the VOS on the ground that withdrawal could only be based on specific reconsideration but the motion was denied on January 17, 1997 by respondent court. 40
grounds such as unsuitability of the soil for agriculture, or if the slope of the land is over 18 degrees and
that the land is undeveloped. 35 Hence, this recourse. Petitioner assigns the following errors:

Despite the denial of the VOS withdrawal of Hacienda Caylaway, on May 11, 1993, petitioner filed its A. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
application for conversion of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad. 36 On July 14, 1993, petitioner, through PETITIONER'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS PREMATURE FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST
its President, Eduardo Roxas, reiterated its request to withdraw the VOS over Hacienda Caylaway in ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN VIEW OF THE PATENT ILLEGALITY OF THE
light of the following: RESPONDENTS' ACTS, THE IRREPARABLE DAMAGE CAUSED BY SAID
ILLEGAL ACTS, AND THE ABSENCE OF A PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE
1) Certification issued by Conrado I. Gonzales, Officer-in-Charge, Department of REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW — ALL OF WHICH ARE
Agriculture, Region 4, 4th Floor, ATI (BA) Bldg., Diliman, Quezon City dated March 1, EXCEPTIONS TO THE SAID DOCTRINE.
1993 stating that the lands subject of referenced titles "are not feasible and
economically sound for further agricultural development. B. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER'S LANDHOLDINGS ARE SUBJECT TO COVERAGE UNDER THE
2) Resolution No. 19 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas approving the COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW, IN VIEW OF THE UNDISPUTED
Zoning Ordinance reclassifying areas covered by the referenced titles to non- FACT THAT PETITIONER'S LANDHOLDINGS HAVE BEEN CONVERTED TO NON-
agricultural which was enacted after extensive consultation with government AGRICULTURAL USES BY PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 1520 WHICH
agencies, including [the Department of Agrarian Reform], and the requisite public DECLARED THE MUNICIPALITY NASUGBU, BATANGAS AS A TOURIST ZONE,
hearings. AND THE ZONING ORDINANCE OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU RE-
CLASSIFYING CERTAIN PORTIONS OF PETITIONER'S LANDHOLDINGS AS
NON-AGRICULTURAL, BOTH OF WHICH PLACE SAID LANDHOLDINGS
3) Resolution No. 106 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas dated March 8, OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF AGRARIAN REFORM, OR AT THE VERY LEAST
1993 approving the Zoning Ordinance enacted by the Municipality of Nasugbu. ENTITLE PETITIONER TO APPLY FOR CONVERSION AS CONCEDED BY
RESPONDENT DAR.
 C. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO The kind of compensation to be paid the landowner is also specific. The law provides that the deposit
DECLARE THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE RESPONDENT DAR VOID FOR must be made only in "cash" or "LBP bonds." 45 Respondent DAR's opening of trust account deposits in
FAILURE TO OBSERVE DUE PROCESS, CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENTS petitioner' s name with the Land Bank of the Philippines does not constitute payment under the law.
BLATANTLY DISREGARDED THE PROCEDURE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF Trust account deposits are not cash or LBP bonds. The replacement of the trust account with cash or
PRIVATE LANDS UNDER R.A. 6657, MORE PARTICULARLY, IN FAILING TO GIVE LBP bonds did not ipso facto cure the lack of compensation; for essentially, the determination of this
DUE NOTICE TO THE PETITIONER AND TO PROPERLY IDENTIFY THE compensation was marred by lack of due process. In fact, in the entire acquisition proceedings,
SPECIFIC AREAS SOUGHT TO BE ACQUIRED. respondent DAR disregarded the basic requirements of administrative due process. Under these
circumstances, the issuance of the CLOA's to farmer beneficiaries necessitated immediate judicial
D. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO action on the part of the petitioner.
RECOGNIZE THAT PETITIONER WAS BRAZENLY AND ILLEGALLY DEPRIVED
OF ITS PROPERTY WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION, CONSIDERING THAT II. The Validity of the Acquisition Proceedings Over the Haciendas.
PETITIONER WAS NOT PAID JUST COMPENSATION BEFORE IT WAS
UNCEREMONIOUSLY STRIPPED OF ITS LANDHOLDINGS THROUGH THE Petitioner's allegation of lack of due process goes into the validity of the acquisition proceedings
ISSUANCE OF CLOA'S TO ALLEGED FARMER BENEFICIARIES, IN VIOLATION themselves. Before we rule on this matter, however, there is need to lay down the procedure in the
OF R.A. 6657. 41 acquisition of private lands under the provisions of the law.

The assigned errors involve three (3) principal issues: (1) whether this Court can take cognizance of this A. Modes of Acquisition of Land under R. A. 6657
petition despite petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies; (2) whether the acquisition
proceedings over the three haciendas were valid and in accordance with law; and (3) assuming the
haciendas may be reclassified from agricultural to non-agricultural, whether this court has the power to Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), provides for two (2)
rule on this issue. modes of acquisition of private land: compulsory and voluntary. The procedure for the compulsory
acquisition of private lands is set forth in Section 16 of R.A. 6657, viz:
I. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.
Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. — For purposes of acquisition of
private lands, the following procedures shall be followed:
In its first assigned error, petitioner claims that respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding that
petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies. As a general rule, before a party may be allowed to
invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of justice, he is expected to have exhausted all means of a). After having identified the land, the landowners and the
administrative redress. This is not absolute, however. There are instances when judicial action may be beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to acquire the land to
resorted to immediately. Among these exceptions are: (1) when the question raised is purely legal; (2) the owners thereof, by personal delivery or registered mail, and
when the administrative body is in estoppel; (3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; (4) when post the same in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and
there is urgent need for judicial intervention; (5) when the respondent acted in disregard of due process; barangay hall of the place where the property is located. Said
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear notice shall contain the offer of the DAR to pay a corresponding
the implied or assumed approval of the latter; (7) when irreparable damage will be suffered; (8) when value in accordance with the valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18,
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (9) when strong public interest is involved; (10) and other pertinent provisions hereof.
when the subject of the controversy is private land; and (11) in quo warranto proceedings. 42
b) Within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of written notice
Petitioner rightly sought immediate redress in the courts. There was a violation of its rights and to by personal delivery or registered mail, the landowner, his
require it to exhaust administrative remedies before the DAR itself was not a plain, speedy and administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his
adequate remedy. acceptance or rejection of the offer.

Respondent DAR issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA's) to farmer beneficiaries over c) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the LBP shall pay
portions of petitioner's land without just compensation to petitioner. A Certificate of Land Ownership the landowner the purchase price of the land within thirty (30) days
Award (CLOA) is evidence of ownership of land by a beneficiary under R.A. 6657, the Comprehensive after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. 43 Before this may be awarded to a farmer beneficiary, the land must first Government and surrenders the Certificate of Title and other
be acquired by the State from the landowner and ownership transferred to the former. The transfer of muniments of title.
possession and ownership of the land to the government are conditioned upon the receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment or deposit by the DAR of the compensation with an accessible d) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct
bank. Until then, title remains with the landowner. 44 There was no receipt by petitioner of any summary administrative proceedings to determine the
compensation for any of the lands acquired by the government. compensation for the land requiring the landowner, the LBP and
other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just
 compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of 1. Update the masterlist of all agricultural lands covered under the
the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is CARP in his area of responsibility. The masterlist shall include such
deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case information as required under the attached CARP Masterlist Form
within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision. which shall include the name of the landowner, landholding area,
TCT/OCT number, and tax declaration number.
e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment, or,
in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the 2. Prepare a Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each
deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the title (OCT/TCT) or landholding covered under Phase I and II of the
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, CARP except those for which the landowners have already filed
the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall applications to avail of other modes of land acquisition. A case
request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate folder shall contain the following duly accomplished forms:
of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The
DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to a) CARP CA Form 1 — MARO Investigation
the qualified beneficiaries. Report

f) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter b) CARP CA Form 2 — Summary Investigation
to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just Report of Findings and Evaluation
compensation.
c) CARP CA Form 3 — Applicant's Information
In the compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the landowners and the farmer Sheet
beneficiaries must first be identified. After identification, the DAR shall send a Notice of Acquisition to
the landowner, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post it in a conspicuous place in the
municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is located. Within thirty days from d) CARP CA Form 4 — Beneficiaries
receipt of the Notice of Acquisition, the landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the Undertaking
DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer. If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a
deed of transfer in favor of the government and surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty days from e) CARP CA Form 5 — Transmittal Report to the
the execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the PARO
purchase price. If the landowner rejects the DAR's offer or fails to make a reply, the DAR conducts
summary administrative proceedings to determine just compensation for the land. The landowner, the The MARO/BARC shall certify that all information contained in the
LBP representative and other interested parties may submit evidence on just compensation within above-mentioned forms have been examined and verified by him
fifteen days from notice. Within thirty days from submission, the DAR shall decide the case and inform and that the same are true and correct.
the owner of its decision and the amount of just compensation. Upon receipt by the owner of the
corresponding payment, or, in case of rejection or lack of response from the latter, the DAR shall
deposit the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds with an accessible bank. The DAR shall immediately 3. Send a Notice of Coverage and a letter of invitation to a
take possession of the land and cause the issuance of a transfer certificate of title in the name of the conference/meeting to the landowner covered by the Compulsory
Republic of the Philippines. The land shall then be redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries. Any party Case Acquisition Folder. Invitations to the said conference/meeting
may question the decision of the DAR in the regular courts for final determination of just compensation. shall also be sent to the prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the
BARC representative(s), the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
representative, and other interested parties to discuss the inputs to
The DAR has made compulsory acquisition the priority mode of the land acquisition to hasten the the valuation of the property. He shall discuss the MARO/BARC
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). 46 Under Section 16 of the investigation report and solicit the views, objection, agreements or
CARL, the first step in compulsory acquisition is the identification of the land, the landowners and the suggestions of the participants thereon. The landowner shall also
beneficiaries. However,  the law is silent on how the identification process must be made. To fill in this be asked to indicate his retention area. The minutes of the meeting
gap, the DAR issued on July 26, 1989 Administrative Order No. 12, Series or 1989, which set the shall be signed by all participants in the conference and shall form
operating procedure in the identification of such lands. The procedure is as follows: an integral part of the CACF.

II. OPERATING PROCEDURE 4. Submit all completed case folders to the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer (PARO).
A. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, with the assistance of the pertinent
Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), shall: B. The PARO shall:
1. Ensure that the individual case folders are forwarded to him by 4. Upon the landowner's receipt of payment, in case of acceptance,
his MAROs. or upon deposit of payment in the designated bank, in case of
rejection or non-response, the Secretary shall immediately direct
2. Immediately upon receipt of a case folder, compute the valuation the pertinent Register of Deeds to issue the corresponding Transfer
of the land in accordance with A.O. No. 6, Series of 1988. 47 The Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the
valuation worksheet and the related CACF valuation forms shall be Philippines. Once the property is transferred, the DAR, through the
duly certified correct by the PARO and all the personnel who PARO, shall take possession of the land for redistribution to
participated in the accomplishment of these forms. qualified beneficiaries.

3. In all cases, the PARO may validate the report of the MARO Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989 requires that the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
through ocular inspection and verification of the property. This (MARO) keep an updated master list of all agricultural lands under the CARP in his area of
ocular inspection and verification shall be mandatory when the responsibility containing all the required information. The MARO prepares a Compulsory Acquisition
computed value exceeds = 500,000 per estate. Case Folder (CACF) for each title covered by CARP. The MARO then sends the landowner a "Notice of
Coverage" and a "letter of invitation" to a "conference/meeting" over the land covered by the CACF. He
also sends invitations to the prospective farmer-beneficiaries the representatives of the Barangay
4. Upon determination of the valuation, forward the case folder, Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and other interested
together with the duly accomplished valuation forms and his parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of the property and solicit views, suggestions, objections or
recommendations, to the Central Office. The LBP representative agreements of the parties. At the meeting, the landowner is asked to indicate his retention area.
and the MARO concerned shall be furnished a copy each of his
report.
The MARO shall make a report of the case to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) who shall
complete the valuation of the land. Ocular inspection and verification of the property by the PARO shall
C. DAR Central Office, specifically through the Bureau of Land be mandatory when the computed value of the estate exceeds P500,000.00. Upon determination of the
Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD), shall: valuation, the PARO shall forward all papers together with his recommendation to the Central Office of
the DAR. The DAR Central Office, specifically, the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD),
1. Within three days from receipt of the case folder from the PARO, shall review, evaluate and determine the final land valuation of the property. The BLAD shall prepare,
review, evaluate and determine the final land valuation of the on the signature of the Secretary or his duly authorized representative, a Notice of Acquisition for the
property covered by the case folder. A summary review and subject property. 48 From this point, the provisions of Section 16 of R.A. 6657 then apply. 49
evaluation report shall be prepared and duly certified by the BLAD
Director and the personnel directly participating in the review and For a valid implementation of the CAR program, two notices are required: (1) the Notice of Coverage
final valuation. and letter of invitation  to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the representatives of the
BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of
2. Prepare, for the signature of the Secretary or her duly authorized 1989; and (2) the Notice of Acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL.
representative, a Notice of Acquisition (CARP CA Form 8) for the
subject property. Serve the Notice to the landowner personally or The importance of the first notice, i.e., the Notice of Coverage and the letter of invitation to the
through registered mail within three days from its approval. The conference, and its actual conduct cannot be understated. They are steps designed to comply with the
Notice shall include, among others, the area subject of compulsory requirements of administrative due process. The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the
acquisition, and the amount of just compensation offered by DAR. State's police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes
retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private
3. Should the landowner accept the DAR's offered value, the BLAD property in accordance with the Constitution. 50 But where, to carry out such regulation, the owners are
shall prepare and submit to the Secretary for approval the Order of deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also a taking under the
Acquisition. However, in case of rejection or non-reply, the DAR power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What
Adjudication Board (DARAB) shall conduct a summary is required is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial
administrative hearing to determine just compensation, in rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary. 51 The Bill of Rights provides that "[n]o
accordance with the procedures provided under Administrative person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 52 The CARL was not
Order No. 13, Series of 1989. Immediately upon receipt of the intended to take away property without due process of law. 53 The exercise of the power of eminent
DARAB's decision on just compensation, the BLAD shall prepare domain requires that due process be observed in the taking of private property.
and submit to the Secretary for approval the required Order of
Acquisition. DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989, from whence the Notice of Coverage first sprung, was amended in
1990 by DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 and in 1993 by DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993. The Notice of
Coverage and letter of invitation to the conference meeting were expanded and amplified in said d) Complete the Field
amendments. Investigation Report based on
the result of the ocular
DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 entitled "Revised Rules Governing the Acquisition of Agricultural Lands inspection/investigation of the
Subject of Voluntary Offer to Sell and Compulsory Acquisition Pursuant to R.A. 6657," requires that: property and documents
submitted. See to it that Field
Investigation Report is duly
B. MARO accomplished and signed by all
concerned.
1. Receives the duly accomplished CARP Form
Nos. 1 & 1.1 including supporting documents. 5. MARO

2. Gathers basic ownership documents listed a) Assists the DENR Survey

under 1.a or 1.b above and prepares Party in the conduct of a
corresponding VOCF/CACF by boundary/ subdivision survey
landowner/landholding. delineating areas covered by
OLT, retention, subject of VOS,
3. Notifies/invites the landowner and CA (by phases, if possible),
representatives of the LBP, DENR, BARC and infrastructures, etc., whichever
prospective beneficiaries of the schedule of is applicable.
ocular inspection of the property at least one
week in advance. b) Sends Notice of Coverage
(CARP Form No. 5) to
4. MARO/LAND BANK FIELD OFFICE/BARC landowner concerned or his
duly authorized representative
a) Identify the land and inviting him for a conference.
landowner, and determine the
suitability for agriculture and c) Sends Invitation Letter
productivity of the land and (CARP Form No. 6) for a
jointly prepare Field conference/public hearing to
Investigation Report (CARP prospective farmer-
Form No. 2), including the beneficiaries, landowner,
Land Use Map of the property. representatives of BARC, LBP,
DENR, DA, NGO's, farmers'
b) Interview applicants and organizations and other
assist them in the preparation interested parties to discuss
of the Application For Potential the following matters:
CARP Beneficiary (CARP
Form No. 3). Result of
Field
c) Screen prospective farmer- Investigation
beneficiaries and for those
found qualified, cause the Inputs to
signing of the respective valuation
Application to Purchase and
Farmer's Undertaking (CARP Issues raised
Form No. 4).
Comments/r
ecommendat
 ions by all Agency/Unit Document
parties
concerned. (requirements)

d) Prepares Summary of A. Identification and

Minutes of the
conference/public hearing to be
guided by CARP Form No. 7. Documentation

e) Forwards the completed x x x           x x x          x x x

VOCF/CACF to the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Office 5 DARMO Issue Notice of Coverage CARP
(PARO) using CARP Form No.
8 (Transmittal Memo to to LO by personal delivery Form No. 2
PARO).

with proof of service, or

x x x           x x x          x x x

registered mail with return

DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 lays down the rules on both Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) and
Compulsory Acquisition (CA) transactions involving lands enumerated under Section 7 of the
CARL. 54 In both VOS and CA. transactions, the MARO prepares the Voluntary Offer to Sell Case card, informing him that his
Folder (VOCF) and the Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF), as the case may be, over a
particular landholding. The MARO notifies the landowner as well as representatives of the LBP, BARC property is now under CARP
and prospective beneficiaries of the date of the ocular inspection of the property at least one week
before the scheduled date and invites them to attend the same. The MARO, LBP or BARC conducts the
coverage and for LO to select
ocular inspection and investigation by identifying the land and landowner, determining the suitability of
the land for agriculture and productivity, interviewing and screening prospective farmer beneficiaries.
Based on its investigation, the MARO, LBP or BARC prepares the Field Investigation Report which shall his retention area, if he desires
be signed by all parties concerned. In addition to the field investigation, a boundary or subdivision
survey of the land may also be conducted by a Survey Party of the Department of Environment and to avail of his right of retention;
Natural Resources (DENR) to be assisted by the MARO. 55 This survey shall delineate the areas
covered by Operation Land Transfer (OLT), areas retained by the landowner, areas with infrastructure,
and at the same time invites him
and the areas subject to VOS and CA. After the survey and field investigation, the MARO sends a
"Notice of Coverage" to the landowner or his duly authorized representative inviting him to a conference
or public hearing with the farmer beneficiaries, representatives of the BARC, LBP, DENR, Department to join the field investigation to
of Agriculture (DA), non-government organizations, farmer's organizations and other interested parties.
At the public hearing, the parties shall discuss the results of the field investigation, issues that may be be conducted on his property
raised in relation thereto, inputs to the valuation of the subject landholding, and other comments and
recommendations by all parties concerned. The Minutes of the conference/public hearing shall form part
of the VOCF or CACF which files shall be forwarded by the MARO to the PARO. The PARO reviews, which should be scheduled at
evaluates and validates the Field Investigation Report and other documents in the VOCF/CACF. He
then forwards the records to the RARO for another review. least two weeks in advance of

DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 was amended by DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993. DAR A.O. No. 1, said notice.
Series of 1993 provided, among others, that:
A copy of said Notice shall CARP
IV. OPERATING PROCEDURES:
be posted for at least one Form No. 17
Steps Responsible Activity Forms/
week on the bulletin board of Investigation Report (FIR)

the municipal and barangay and Land Use Map. However,

halls where the property is the field investigation shall

located. LGU office concerned proceed even if the LO, the

notifies DAR about compliance representatives of the DENR and

with posting requirements thru prospective ARBs are not available

return indorsement on CARP provided, they were given due

Form No. 17. notice of the time and date of

6 DARMO Send notice to the LBP, CARP investigation to be conducted.

BARC, DENR representatives Form No. 3 Similarly, if the LBP representative

and prospective ARBs of the schedule of the field investigation is not available or could not come

to be conducted on the subject on the scheduled date, the field

property. investigation shall also be conducted,

7 DARMO With the participation of CARP after which the duly accomplished

BARC the LO, representatives of Form No. 4 Part I of CARP Form No. 4 shall

LBP the LBP, BARC, DENR Land Use be forwarded to the LBP

DENR and prospective ARBs, Map representative for validation. If he agrees

Local Office conducts the investigation on to the ocular inspection report of DAR,

subject property to identify he signs the FIR (Part I) and

the landholding, determines accomplishes Part II thereof.

its suitability and productivity; In the event that there is a

and jointly prepares the Field difference or variance between

the findings of the DAR and the 9 DARMO Furnishes a copy of the CARP

LBP as to the propriety of duly accomplished FIR to Form No. 4

covering the land under CARP, the landowner by personal

whether in whole or in part, on delivery with proof of

the issue of suitability to agriculture, service or registered mail

degree of development or slope, will return card and posts

and on issues affecting idle lands, a copy thereof for at least

the conflict shall be resolved by one week on the bulletin

a composite team of DAR, LBP, board of the municipal

DENR and DA which shall jointly and barangay halls where

conduct further investigation the property is located.

thereon. The team shall submit its LGU office concerned CARP

report of findings which shall be notifies DAR about Form No. 17

binding to both DAR and LBP, compliance with posting

pursuant to Joint Memorandum requirement thru return

Circular of the DAR, LBP, DENR endorsement on CARP

and DA dated 27 January 1992. Form No. 17.

8 DARMO Screen prospective ARBs B. Land Survey

BARC and causes the signing of CARP 10 DARMO Conducts perimeter or Perimeter

the Application of Purchase Form No. 5 And/or segregation survey or

and Farmer's Undertaking DENR delineating areas covered Segregation

(APFU). Local Office by OLT, "uncarpable Survey Plan

 areas such as 18% slope landowner "by personal delivery with proof of service or registered mail with return card." Another copy
of the Report and Map shall likewise be posted for at least one week in the municipal or barangay halls
and above, unproductive/ where the property is located.

unsuitable to agriculture, Clearly then, the notice requirements under the CARL are not confined to the Notice of Acquisition set
forth in Section 16 of the law. They also include the Notice of Coverage first laid down in DAR A.O. No.
12, Series of 1989 and subsequently amended in DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 and DAR A.O. No. 1,
retention, infrastructure. Series of 1993. This Notice of Coverage does not merely notify the landowner that his property shall be
placed under CARP and that he is entitled to exercise his retention right; it also notifies him, pursuant to
In case of segregation or DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990, that a public hearing, shall be conducted where he and representatives
of the concerned sectors of society may attend to discuss the results of the field investigation, the land
subdivision survey, the valuation and other pertinent matters. Under DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993, the Notice of Coverage
also informs the landowner that a field investigation of his landholding shall be conducted where he and
the other representatives may be present.
plan shall be approved
B. The Compulsory Acquisition of Haciendas Palico and Banilad
by DENR-LMS.
In the case at bar, respondent DAR claims that it, through MARO Leopoldo C. Lejano, sent a letter of
C. Review and Completion invitation entitled "Invitation to Parties" dated September 29, 1989 to petitioner corporation, through
Jaime Pimentel, the administrator of Hacienda Palico. 57 The invitation was received on the same day it
of Documents was sent as indicated by a signature and the date received at the bottom left corner of said invitation.
With regard to Hacienda Banilad, respondent DAR claims that Jaime Pimentel, administrator also of
Hacienda Banilad, was notified and sent an invitation to the conference. Pimentel actually attended the
11. DARMO Forward VOCF/CACF CARP
conference on September 21, 1989 and signed the Minutes of the meeting on behalf of petitioner
corporation. 58 The Minutes was also signed by the representatives of the BARC, the LBP and farmer
to DARPO. Form No. 6 beneficiaries. 59 No letter of invitation was sent or conference meeting held with respect to Hacienda
Caylaway because it was subject to a Voluntary Offer to Sell to respondent DAR. 60
xxx xxx xxx.
When respondent DAR, through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), sent to the various
DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993, modified the identification process and increased the number of parties the Notice of Coverage and invitation to the conference, DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989 was
government agencies involved in the identification and delineation of the land subject to already in effect more than a month earlier. The Operating Procedure in DAR Administrative Order No.
acquisition. 56 This time, the Notice of Coverage is sent to the landowner before the conduct of the field 12 does not specify how notices or letters of invitation shall be sent to the landowner, the
investigation and the sending must comply with specific requirements. Representatives of the DAR representatives of the BARC, the LBP, the farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties. The
Municipal Office (DARMO) must send the Notice of Coverage to the landowner by "personal delivery procedure in the sending of these notices is important to comply with the requisites of due process
with proof of service, or by registered mail with return card," informing him that his property is under especially when the owner, as in this case, is a juridical entity. Petitioner is a domestic
CARP coverage and that if he desires to avail of his right of retention, he may choose which area he corporation, 61 and therefore, has a personality separate and distinct from its shareholders, officers and
shall retain. The Notice of Coverage shall also invite the landowner to attend the field investigation to be employees.
scheduled at least two weeks from notice. The field investigation is for the purpose of identifying the
landholding and determining its suitability for agriculture and its productivity. A copy of the Notice of The Notice of Acquisition in Section 16 of the CARL is required to be sent to the landowner by "personal
Coverage shall be posted for at least one week on the bulletin board of the municipal and barangay delivery or registered mail." Whether the landowner be a natural or juridical person to whose address
halls where the property is located. The date of the field investigation shall also be sent by the DAR the Notice may be sent by personal delivery or registered mail,  the law does not distinguish. The DAR
Municipal Office to representatives of the LBP, BARC, DENR and prospective farmer beneficiaries. The Administrative Orders also do not distinguish. In the proceedings before the DAR, the distinction
field investigation shall be conducted on the date set with the participation of the landowner and the between natural and juridical persons in the sending of notices may be found in the Revised Rules of
various representatives. If the landowner and other representatives are absent, the field investigation Procedure of the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). Service of pleadings before the DARAB is
shall proceed, provided they were duly notified thereof. Should there be a variance between the findings governed by Section 6, Rule V of the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure. Notices and pleadings are
of the DAR and the LBP as to whether the land be placed under agrarian reform, the land's suitability to served on private domestic corporations or partnerships in the following manner:
agriculture, the degree or development of the slope, etc., the conflict shall be resolved by a composite
team of the DAR, LBP, DENR and DA which shall jointly conduct further investigation. The team's
Sec. 6. Service upon Private Domestic Corporation or Partnership. — If the defendant
findings shall be binding on both DAR and LBP. After the field investigation, the DAR Municipal Office
is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly
shall prepare the Field Investigation Report and Land Use Map, a copy of which shall be furnished the
 registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, preliminary conference, DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued and this required that the Notice of
agent, or any of its directors or partners. Coverage must be sent "to the landowner concerned or his duly authorized representative." 69

Similarly, the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines, in Section 13, Rule 14 provides: Assuming further that petitioner was duly notified of the CARP coverage of its haciendas, the areas
found actually subject to CARP were not properly identified before they were taken over by respondent
Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. — If the defendant DAR. Respondents insist that the lands were identified because they are all registered property and the
is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly technical description in their respective titles specifies their metes and bounds. Respondents admit at
registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, the same time, however, that not all areas in the haciendas were placed under the comprehensive
agent, or any of its directors. agrarian reform program invariably by reason of elevation or character or use of the land. 70

Summonses, pleadings and notices in cases against a private domestic corporation before the DARAB The acquisition of the landholdings did not cover the entire expanse of the two haciendas, but only
and the regular courts are served on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its portions thereof. Hacienda Palico has an area of 1,024 hectares and only 688.7576 hectares were
directors. These persons are those through whom the private domestic corporation or partnership is targetted for acquisition. Hacienda Banilad has an area of 1,050 hectares but only 964.0688 hectares
capable of action. 62 were subject to CARP. The haciendas are not entirely agricultural lands. In fact, the various tax
declarations over the haciendas describe the landholdings as "sugarland," and "forest, sugarland,
pasture land, horticulture and woodland." 71
Jaime Pimentel is not the president, manager, secretary, cashier or director of petitioner corporation. Is
he, as administrator of the two Haciendas, considered an agent of the corporation?
Under Section 16 of the CARL, the sending of the Notice of Acquisition specifically requires that the
land subject to land reform be first identified. The two haciendas in the instant case cover vast tracts of
The purpose of all rules for service of process on a corporation is to make it reasonably certain that the land. Before Notices of Acquisition were sent to petitioner, however, the exact areas of the landholdings
corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it. 63 Service must be made on a were not properly segregated and delineated. Upon receipt of this notice, therefore, petitioner
representative so integrated with the corporation as to make it a priori supposable that he will realize his corporation had no idea which portions of its estate were subject to compulsory acquisition, which
responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers served on him, 64 and bring home to portions it could rightfully retain, whether these retained portions were compact or contiguous, and
the corporation notice of the filing of the action. 65 Petitioner's evidence does not show the official duties which portions were excluded from CARP coverage. Even respondent DAR's evidence does not show
of Jaime Pimentel as administrator of petitioner's haciendas. The evidence does not indicate whether that petitioner, through its duly authorized representative, was notified of any ocular inspection and
Pimentel's duties is so integrated with the corporation that he would immediately realize his investigation that was to be conducted by respondent DAR. Neither is there proof that petitioner was
responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers served on him. At the time the given the opportunity to at least choose and identify its retention area in those portions to be acquired
notices were sent and the preliminary conference conducted, petitioner's principal place of business compulsorily. The right of retention and how this right is exercised, is guaranteed in Section 6 of the
was listed in respondent DAR's records as "Soriano Bldg., Plaza Cervantes, Manila," 66 and "7th Flr. CARL, viz:
Cacho-Gonzales Bldg., 101 Aguirre St., Makati, Metro Manila." 67 Pimentel did not hold office at the
principal place of business of petitioner. Neither did he exercise his functions in Plaza Cervantes,
Manila nor in Cacho-Gonzales Bldg., Makati, Metro Manila. He performed his official functions and Sec. 6. Retention Limits. — . . . .
actually resided in the haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas, a place over two hundred kilometers away
from Metro Manila. The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous,
shall pertain to the landowner; Provided, however, That in case the area selected for
Curiously, respondent DAR had information of the address of petitioner's principal place of business. retention by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose
The Notices of Acquisition over Haciendas Palico and Banilad were addressed to petitioner at its offices whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land
in Manila and Makati. These Notices were sent barely three to four months after Pimentel was notified with similar or comparable features. In case the tenant chooses to remain in the
of the preliminary conference. 68Why respondent DAR chose to notify Pimentel instead of the officers of retained area, he shall be considered a leaseholder and shall lose his right to be a
the corporation was not explained by the said respondent. beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another
agricultural land, he loses his right as a leaseholder to the land retained by the
landowner. The tenant must exercise this option within a period of one (1) year from
Nevertheless, assuming that Pimentel was an agent of petitioner corporation, and the notices and the time the landowner manifests his choice of the area for retention.
letters of invitation were validly served on petitioner through him, there is no showing that Pimentel
himself was duly authorized to attend the conference meeting with the MARO, BARC and LBP
representatives and farmer beneficiaries for purposes of compulsory acquisition of petitioner's Under the law, a landowner may retain not more than five hectares out of the total area of his
landholdings. Even respondent DAR's evidence does not indicate this authority. On the contrary, agricultural land subject to CARP. The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact
petitioner claims that it had no knowledge of the letter-invitation, hence, could not have given Pimentel or contiguous, pertains to the landowner. If the area chosen for retention is tenanted, the tenant shall
the authority to bind it to whatever matters were discussed or agreed upon by the parties at the have the option to choose whether to remain on the portion or be a beneficiary in the same or another
preliminary conference or public hearing. Notably, one year after Pimentel was informed of the agricultural land with similar or comparable features.
C. The Voluntary Acquisition of Hacienda Caylaway cannot be dispensed with. It is part of administrative due process and is an essential requisite to enable
the landowner himself to exercise, at the very least, his right of retention guaranteed under the CARL.
Petitioner was also left in the dark with respect to Hacienda Caylaway, which was the subject of a
Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS). The VOS in the instant case was made on May 6, 1988, 72 before the III. The Conversion of the three Haciendas.
effectivity of R.A. 6657 on June 15, 1988. VOS transactions were first governed by DAR Administrative
Order No. 19, series of 1989, 73 and under this order, all VOS filed before June 15, 1988 shall be heard It is petitioner's claim that the three haciendas are not subject to agrarian reform because they have
and processed in accordance with the procedure provided for in Executive Order No. 229, thus: been declared for tourism, not agricultural
purposes. 78 In 1975, then President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1520 declaring the municipality of
III. All VOS transactions which are now pending before the DAR and for which no Nasugbu, Batangas a tourist zone. Lands in Nasugbu, including the subject haciendas, were allegedly
payment has been made shall be subject to the notice and hearing requirements reclassified as non-agricultural 13 years before the effectivity of R. A. No. 6657. 79 In 1993, the Regional
provided in Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989, dated 26 July 1989, Section Director for Region IV of the Department of Agriculture certified that the haciendas are not feasible and
II, Subsection A, paragraph 3. sound for agricultural development. 80 On March 20, 1992, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1520, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas adopted Resolution No. 19 reclassifying certain areas of
All VOS filed before 15 June 1988, the date of effectivity of the CARL, shall be heard Nasugbu as non-agricultural. 81 This Resolution approved Municipal Ordinance No. 19, Series of 1992,
and processed in accordance with the procedure provided for in Executive Order No. the Revised Zoning Ordinance of Nasugbu 82 which zoning ordinance was based on a Land Use Plan
229. for Planning Areas for New Development allegedly prepared by the University of the
Philippines. 83 Resolution No. 19 of the Sangguniang Bayan was approved by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Batangas on March 8, 1993. 84
xxx xxx xxx.
Petitioner claims that proclamation No. 1520 was also upheld by respondent DAR in 1991 when it
Sec. 9 of E.O. 229 provides: approved conversion of 1,827 hectares in Nasugbu into a tourist area known as the Batulao Resort
Complex, and 13.52 hectares in Barangay Caylaway as within the potential tourist belt. 85 Petitioner
Sec. 9. Voluntary Offer to Sell. — The government shall purchase all agricultural present evidence before us that these areas are adjacent to the haciendas subject of this petition,
lands it deems productive and suitable to farmer cultivation voluntarily offered for sale hence, the haciendas should likewise be converted. Petitioner urges this Court to take cognizance of
to it at a valuation determined in accordance with Section 6. Such transaction shall be the conversion proceedings and rule accordingly. 6
exempt from the payment of capital gains tax and other taxes and fees.
We do not agree. Respondent DAR's failure to observe due process in the acquisition of petitioner's
Executive Order 229 does not contain the procedure for the identification of private land as set forth in landholdings does not ipso facto give this Court the power to adjudicate over petitioner's application for
DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989. Section 5 of E.O. 229 merely reiterates the procedure conversion of its haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural. The agency charged with the mandate
of acquisition in Section 16, R.A. 6657. In other words, the E.O. is silent as to the procedure for the of approving or disapproving applications for conversion is the DAR.
identification of the land, the notice of coverage and the preliminary conference with the landowner,
representatives of the BARC, the LBP and farmer beneficiaries. Does this mean that these At the time petitioner filed its application for conversion, the Rules of Procedure governing the
requirements may be dispensed with regard to VOS filed before June 15, 1988? The answer is no. processing and approval of applications for land use conversion was the DAR A.O. No. 2, Series of
1990. Under this A.O., the application for conversion is filed with the MARO where the property is
First of all, the same E.O. 229, like Section 16 of the CARL, requires that the land, landowner and located. The MARO reviews the application and its supporting documents and conducts field
beneficiaries of the land subject to agrarian reform be identified before the notice of acquisition should investigation and ocular inspection of the property. The findings of the MARO are subject to review and
be issued. 74 Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered for sale in 1989. The Hacienda has a total area evaluation by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO). The PARO may conduct further field
of 867.4571 hectares and is covered by four (4) titles. In two separate Resolutions both dated January investigation and submit a supplemental report together with his recommendation to the Regional
12, 1989, respondent DAR, through the Regional Director, formally accepted the VOS over the two of Agrarian Reform Officer (RARO) who shall review the same. For lands less than five hectares, the
these four RARO shall approve or disapprove applications for conversion. For lands exceeding five hectares, the
titles. 75 The land covered by two titles has an area of 855.5257 hectares, but only 648.8544 hectares RARO shall evaluate the PARO Report and forward the records and his report to the Undersecretary for
thereof fell within the coverage of R.A. 6657. 76 Petitioner claims it does not know where these portions Legal Affairs. Applications over areas exceeding fifty hectares are approved or disapproved by the
are located. Secretary of Agrarian Reform.

Respondent DAR, on the other hand, avers that surveys on the land covered by the four titles were The DAR's mandate over applications for conversion was first laid down in Section 4 (j) and Section 5
conducted in 1989, and that petitioner, as landowner, was not denied participation therein, The results (l) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987 and reiterated in the CARL and Memorandum Circular
of the survey and the land valuation summary report, however, do not indicate whether notices to attend No. 54, Series of 1993 of the Office of the President. The DAR's jurisdiction over applications for
the same were actually sent to and received by petitioner or its duly authorized representative. 77 To conversion is provided as follows:
reiterate, Executive Order No. 229 does not lay down the operating procedure, much less the notice
requirements, before the VOS is accepted by respondent DAR. Notice to the landowner, however,
 A. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is mandated to ascertain the information necessary for the processing of the application. The Chairman of the CLUPPI
"approve or disapprove applications for conversion, restructuring or deliberates on the merits of the investigation report and recommends the appropriate action. This
readjustment of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses," recommendation is transmitted to the Regional Director, thru the Undersecretary, or Secretary of
pursuant to Section 4 (j) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of Agrarian Reform. Applications involving more than fifty hectares are approved or disapproved by the
1987. Secretary. The procedure does not end with the Secretary, however. The Order provides that the
decision of the Secretary may be appealed to the Office of the President or the Court of Appeals, as the
B. Sec. 5 (l) of E.O. 129-A, Series of 1987, vests in the DAR, case may be, viz:
exclusive authority to approve or disapprove applications for
conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial, Appeal from the decision of the Undersecretary shall be made to the Secretary, and
industrial and other land uses. from the Secretary to the Office of the President or the Court of Appeals as the case
may be. The mode of appeal/motion for reconsideration, and the appeal fee, from
C. Sec. 65 of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Undersecretary to the Office of the Secretary shall be the same as that of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, likewise empowers Regional Director to the Office of the Secretary. 90
the DAR to authorize under certain conditions, the conversion of
agricultural lands. Indeed, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to
resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
D. Sec. 4 of Memorandum Circular No. 54, Series of 1993 of the competence. 91Respondent DAR is in a better position to resolve petitioner's application for conversion,
Office of the President, provides that "action on applications for being primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. The power to determine
land use conversion on individual landholdings shall remain as the whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exempt from the
responsibility of the DAR, which shall utilize as its primary coverage of the CARL lies with the DAR, not with this Court.
reference, documents on the comprehensive land use plans and
accompanying ordinances passed upon and approved by the local Finally, we stress that the failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in the
government units concerned, together with the National Land Use acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the CLOA's already issued to the
Policy, pursuant to R.A. No. 6657 and E.O. No. 129-A. 87 farmer beneficiaries. To assume the power is to short-circuit the administrative process, which has yet
to run its regular course. Respondent DAR must be given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in
Applications for conversion were initially governed by DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1990 entitled "Revised the acquisition proceedings. In Hacienda Palico alone, CLOA's were issued to 177 farmer beneficiaries
Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands and Non-Agricultural Uses," in 1993. 92 Since then until the present, these farmers have been cultivating their lands. 93 It goes
and DAR A.O. No. 2, Series of 1990 entitled "Rules of Procedure Governing the Processing and against the basic precepts of justice, fairness and equity to deprive these people, through no fault of
Approval of Applications for Land Use Conversion." These A.O.'s and other implementing guidelines, their own, of the land they till. Anyhow, the farmer beneficiaries hold the property in trust for the rightful
including Presidential issuances and national policies related to land use conversion have been owner of the land.
consolidated in DAR A.O. No. 07, Series of 1997. Under this recent issuance, the guiding principle in
land use conversion is: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted in part and the acquisition proceedings over the three
haciendas are nullified for respondent DAR's failure to observe due process therein. In accordance with
to preserve prime agricultural lands for food production while, at the same time, the guidelines set forth in this decision and the applicable administrative procedure, the case is hereby
recognizing the need of the other sectors of society (housing, industry and remanded to respondent DAR for proper acquisition proceedings and determination of petitioner's
commerce) for land, when coinciding with the objectives of the Comprehensive application for conversion.
Agrarian Reform Law to promote social justice, industrialization and the optimum use
of land as a national resource for public welfare. 88 SO ORDERED

"Land Use" refers to the manner of utilization of land, including its allocation, development and
management. "Land Use Conversion" refers to the act or process of changing the current use of a piece
of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the DAR. 89 The conversion of agricultural land
to uses other than agricultural requires field investigation and conferences with the occupants of the
land. They involve factual findings and highly technical matters within the special training and expertise
of the DAR. DAR A.O. No. 7, Series of 1997 lays down with specificity how the DAR must go about its
task. This time, the field investigation is not conducted by the MARO but by a special task force, known
as the Center for Land Use Policy Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI-DAR Central Office). The
procedure is that once an application for conversion is filed, the CLUPPI prepares the Notice of Posting.
The MARO only posts the notice and thereafter issues a certificate to the fact of posting. The CLUPPI
conducts the field investigation and dialogues with the applicants and the farmer beneficiaries to
 No. T-159703 was cancelled and TCT No. T-30,762(M) was issued in the name of
respondent-spouses.

That there was failure to pay the loan obtained from the respondent-spouses and that the
latter had the right to foreclose the mortgage either judicially or extrajudicially are not
disputed. The only issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the extra-judicial
foreclosure sale complied with the requirements of Act No. 3135 as amended by Act No.
4118 which governs the extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage.

Petitioner-spouses contend that the extra-judicial foreclosure sale was null and void for the
following reasons:

1) The Petitioner-spouses were not notified of the extra-judicial foreclosure;

2) The Sheriff's certificate of posting of notice was not presented;

3) There was no proof that the newspaper in which the notice of extra-judicial foreclosure sale
was made was one of general circulation; and
G.R. No. 106953 August 19, 1993
4) The property mentioned in the Notice of Sheriff's Sale and in the minutes of auction sale
CESAR SAN JOSE AND MARGARITA BATONGBAKAL, petitioners,  was covered by TCT No. T-169705 not by TCT No. 
vs. T-159703, the title to the mortgaged property subject of the foreclosure sale.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. MARCOS DE GUZMAN AND GLORIA DE
GUZMAN, respondents. The trial court upheld the validity of the foreclosure sale. *** On appeal, the Court of Appeals
in its aforecited decision dated 20 March 1992 likewise held that the foreclosure sale was
PADILLA, J.: valid. A Motion for Reconsideration was denied on 26 August 1992. Hence this petition for
review.
In this Petition for Review, Cesar San Jose and Margarita Batongbakal (hereinafter referred
to as petitioner-spouses), seek to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals ** in C.A. The provision of Act No. 3135 as amended by Act No. 4118 relevant to the issues in this case
G.R. No. 30769-CV entitled "Spouses Cesar San Jose and Margarita Batongbakal vs. is Section 3 which states:
Spouses Marcos de Guzman and Gloria de Guzman".
Sec. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of sale for not less that
The relevant facts in this case are as follows: twenty (20) days in at least three public places of the municipality or city
where the property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four
Petitioner-spouses filed a complaint to annul the extra-judicial foreclosure sale conducted by hundred pesos, such notice shall also be published once a week for at least
the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan of the property covered by T.C.T. No. T-159703 located in three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Duhat, Bocaue, Bulacan. municipality or city.

The land was mortgaged by the petitioner-spouses to private respondent-spouses Marcos In Tambunting v. Court of Appeals,1 the Court stressed that the statutory provisions governing
and Gloria de Guzman on 14 April 1972 as security for the payment of a loan of P12,000.00. publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with, and that
For allegedly failing to comply with the conditions of the mortgage, the private respondent- even the slightest deviations therefrom will invalidate the notice. In the case at bar, the Notice
spouses extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgage and the land was sold at a sheriff's sale held of Sheriff's sale referred to the property covered by TCT No. T-169705. This was the notice
on 25 November 1975 with respondent-spouses as purchasers thereof. Consequently, TCT actually published in "The New Record" as shown by the Affidavit of Publication executed by
the Business Manager of the aforementioned publication. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals upheld the validity of the Notice based on the theory that although the property to be 1) Declaring the Extra-judicial Foreclosure Sale of the property of the petitioner-
sold pursuant to the foreclosure of mortgage was indeed covered by TCT No. T-159703 spouses null and void.
and not by TCT No. 
T-169705, the technical description, however, in the notice was the actual and correct 2) Ordering the appropriate Register of Deeds to reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
technical description of the property. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that 159703 in the name of petitioner Margarita Batongbakal married to petitioner Cesar San
the discrepancy in the title number was "purely a typographical error" which "did not render Joso, giving it full force and effect as though it had never been cancelled.
null and void the public auction sale held by the Sheriff. The number of the transfer certificate
as an identification of real property is not controlling. What controls is the technical 3) Ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 
description."2 T-30.762 (M) in the name of private respondent spouses Marcos and Gloria de Guzman for
being void ab initio.
We disagree and consequently we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
With costs against the private respondents.
In the Tambunting case, 3 this Court stated that the failure to advertise a mortgage
foreclosure sale in compliance with statutory requirements constitutes a jurisdictional defect SO ORDERED.
invalidating the sale and that a substantial error or omission in a notice of sale will render the
notice insufficient and vitiate the sale.

The notice of Sheriff's Sale, in this case, did not state the correct number of the transfer
certificate of title of the property to be sold. This is a substantial and fatal error which resulted
in invalidating the entire Notice. That the correct technical description appeared on the Notice
does not constitute substantial compliance with the statutory requirements. The purpose of
the publication of the Notice of Sheriff's Sale is to inform all interested parties of the date,
time and place of the foreclosure sale of the real property subject thereof. Logically, this not
only requires that the correct date, time and place of the foreclosure sale appear in the notice
but also that any and all interested parties be able to determine that what is about to be sold
at the foreclosure sale is the real property in which they have an interest.

The Court is not unaware of the fact that the majority of the population do not have the
necessary knowledge to be able to understand the technical descriptions in certificates of
title. It is to be noted and stressed that the Notice is not meant only for individuals with the
training to understand technical descriptions of property but also for the layman with an
interest in the property to be sold, who normally relies on the number of the certificate of title.
To hold that the publication of the correct technical description, with an incorrect title number,
of the property to be sold constitutes substantial compliance would certainly defeat the
purpose of the Notice. This is not to say that a correct statement of the title number but with
an incorrect technical description in the notice of sale constitutes a valid notice of sale. The
Notice of Sheriff's Sale, to be valid, must contain the correct title number and
the correct technical description of the property to be sold.

We need not discuss the other grounds for nullifying the foreclosure sale having found that
there was no compliance with the statutory notice requirement.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and a new
decision rendered:
 never reached its destination because Mable 10 sank with the 811 pieces of logs somewhere
off Cabuli Point in Palawan on its way to Manila. As alleged by the petitioners in their
complaint and as found by both the trial and appellate courts, the barge where the logs were
loaded was not seaworthy such that it developed a leak. The appellate court further found
that one of the hatches was left open causing water to enter the barge and because the
barge was not provided with the necessary cover or tarpaulin, the ordinary splash of sea
waves brought more water inside the barge.

On March 8, 1972, the petitioners wrote a letter to Manila Bay demanding payment of
P150,000.00 for the loss of the shipment plus P100,000.00 as unrealized profits but the latter
ignored the demand. Another letter was sent to respondent Pioneer claiming the full amount
of P100,000.00 under the insurance policy but respondent refused to pay on the ground that
its hability depended upon the "Total loss by Total Loss of Vessel only". Hence, petitioners
commenced Civil Case No. 86599 against Manila Bay and respondent Pioneer.

After hearing, the trial court found in favor of the petitioners. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby rendered judgment as

G.R. No. L-66935 November 11, 1985 follows:

ISABELA ROQUE, doing busines under the name and style of Isabela Roque Timber (a) Condemning defendants Manila Bay Lighterage Corporation and Pioneer
Enterprises and ONG CHIONG, petitioners,  Insurance and Surety Corporation to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the
vs. sum of P100,000.00;
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT and PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY
CORPORATION, respondent. (b) Sentencing defendant Manila Bay Lighterage Corporation to pay plaintiff,
in addition, the sum of P50,000.00, plus P12,500.00, that the latter advanced
to the former as down payment for transporting the logs in question;

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: (c) Ordering the counterclaim of defendant Insurance against plaintiffs,
dismissed, for lack of merit, but as to its cross-claim against its co-defendant
Manila Bay Lighterage Corporation, the latter is ordered to reimburse the
This petition for certiorari asks for the review of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate
former for whatever amount it may pay the plaintiffs as such surety;
Court which absolved the respondent insurance company from liability on the grounds that
the vessel carrying the insured cargo was unseaworthy and the loss of said cargo was
caused not by the perils of the sea but by the perils of the ship. (d) Ordering the counterclaim of defendant Lighterage against plaintiffs,
dismissed for lack of merit;
On February 19, 1972, the Manila Bay Lighterage Corporation (Manila Bay), a common
carrier, entered into a contract with the petitioners whereby the former would load and carry (e) Plaintiffs' claim of not less than P100,000.00 and P75,000.00 as
on board its barge Mable 10 about 422.18 cubic meters of logs from Malampaya Sound, exemplary damages are ordered dismissed, for lack of merits; plaintiffs' claim
Palawan to North Harbor, Manila. The petitioners insured the logs against loss for for attorney's fees in the sum of P10,000.00 is hereby granted, against both
P100,000.00 with respondent Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation (Pioneer). defendants, who are, moreover ordered to pay the costs; and

On February 29, 1972, the petitioners loaded on the barge, 811 pieces of logs at Malampaya (f) The sum of P150,000.00 award to plaintiffs, shall bear interest of six per
Sound, Palawan for carriage and delivery to North Harbor, Port of Manila, but the shipment cent (6%) from March 25, 1975, until amount is fully paid.
Respondent Pioneer appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. Manila Bay did not and the cargo of other shippers, and the hiring of a sufficient number of competent officers
appeal. According to the petitioners, the transportation company is no longer doing business and seamen. The petitioners' arguments have no merit.
and is without funds.
There is no dispute over the liability of the common carrier Manila Bay. In fact, it did not
During the initial stages of the hearing, Manila Bay informed the trial court that it had bother to appeal the questioned decision. However, the petitioners state that Manila Bay has
salvaged part of the logs. The court ordered them to be sold to the highest bidder with the ceased operating as a firm and nothing may be recovered from it. They are, therefore, trying
funds to be deposited in a bank in the name of Civil Case No. 86599. to recover their losses from the insurer.

On January 30, 1984, the appellate court modified the trial court's decision and absolved The liability of the insurance company is governed by law. Section 113 of the Insurance Code
Pioneer from liability after finding that there was a breach of implied warranty of provides:
seaworthiness on the part of the petitioners and that the loss of the insured cargo was caused
by the "perils of the ship" and not by the "perils of the sea". It ruled that the loss is not In every marine insurance upon a ship or freight, or freightage, or upon any
covered by the marine insurance policy. thing which is the subject of marine insurance, a warranty is implied that the
ship is seaworthy.
After the appellate court denied their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners filed this
petition with the following assignments of errors: Section 99 of the same Code also provides in part.

I Marine insurance includes:

THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IN (1) Insurance against loss of or damage to:
CASES OF MARINE CARGO INSURANCE, THERE IS A WARRANTY OF
SEAWORTHINESS BY THE CARGO OWNER. (a) Vessels, craft, aircraft, vehicles, goods, freights, cargoes, merchandise, ...

II From the above-quoted provisions, there can be no mistaking the fact that the term "cargo"
can be the subject of marine insurance and that once it is so made, the implied warranty of
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT seaworthiness immediately attaches to whoever is insuring the cargo whether he be the
THE LOSS OF THE CARGO IN THIS CASE WAS CAUSED BY "PERILS OF shipowner or not.
THE SHIP" AND NOT BY "PERILS OF THE SEA."
As we have ruled in the case of Go Tiaoco y Hermanos v. Union Insurance Society of
III Canton (40 Phil. 40):

THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT ORDERING The same conclusion must be reached if the question be discussed with
THE RETURN TO PETITIONER OF THE AMOUNT OF P8,000.00 WHICH reference to the seaworthiness of the ship. It is universally accepted that in
WAS DEPOSITED IN THE TRIAL COURT AS SALVAGE VALUE OF THE every contract of insurance upon anything which is the subject of marine
LOGS THAT WERE RECOVERED. insurance, a warranty is implied that the ship shall be seaworthy at the time
of the inception of the voyage. This rule is accepted in our own Insurance
In their first assignment of error, the petitioners contend that the implied warranty of Law (Act No. 2427, sec. 106). ...
seaworthiness provided for in the Insurance Code refers only to the responsibility of the
shipowner who must see to it that his ship is reasonably fit to make in safety the Moreover, the fact that the unseaworthiness of the ship was unknown to the insured is
contemplated voyage. immaterial in ordinary marine insurance and may not be used by him as a defense in order to
recover on the marine insurance policy.
The petitioners state that a mere shipper of cargo, having no control over the ship, has
nothing to do with its seaworthiness. They argue that a cargo owner has no control over the As was held in Richelieu and Ontario Nav. Co. v. Boston Marine, Inc., Co. (136 U.S. 406):
structure of the ship, its cables, anchors, fuel and provisions, the manner of loading his cargo
 There was no look-out, and both that and the rate of speed were contrary to committed a mistake by turning loose the barge from the tugboat east of Cabuli Point. The
the Canadian Statute. The exception of losses occasioned by trial court also found that the stranding and foundering of Mable 10 was due to improper
unseaworthiness was in effect a warranty that a loss should not be so loading of the logs as well as to a leak in the barge which constituted negligence.
occasioned, and whether the fact of unseaworthiness were known or
unknown would be immaterial. On the contention of the petitioners that the trial court found that the loss was occasioned by
the perils of the sea characterized by the "storm and waves" which buffeted the vessel, the
Since the law provides for an implied warranty of seaworthiness in every contract of ordinary records show that the court ruled otherwise. It stated:
marine insurance, it becomes the obligation of a cargo owner to look for a reliable common
carrier which keeps its vessels in seaworthy condition. The shipper of cargo may have no xxx xxx xxx
control over the vessel but he has full control in the choice of the common carrier that will
transport his goods. Or the cargo owner may enter into a contract of insurance which ... The other affirmative defense of defendant Lighterage, 'That the supposed
specifically provides that the insurer answers not only for the perils of the sea but also loss of the logs was occasioned by force majeure... "was not supported by
provides for coverage of perils of the ship. the evidence. At the time Mable 10 sank, there was no typhoon but ordinary
strong wind and waves, a condition which is natural and normal in the open
We are constrained to apply Section 113 of the Insurance Code to the facts of this case. As sea. The evidence shows that the sinking of Mable 10 was due to improper
stated by the private respondents: loading of the logs on one side so that the barge was tilting on one side and
for that it did not navigate on even keel; that it was no longer seaworthy that
In marine cases, the risks insured against are "perils of the sea" (Chute v. was why it developed leak; that the personnel of the tugboat and the barge
North River Ins. Co., Minn—214 NW 472, 55 ALR 933). The purpose of such committed a mistake when it turned loose the barge from the tugboat east of
insurance is protection against contingencies and against possible damages Cabuli point where it was buffeted by storm and waves, while the tugboat
and such a policy does not cover a loss or injury which must inevitably take proceeded to west of Cabuli point where it was protected by the mountain
place in the ordinary course of things. There is no doubt that the term 'perils side from the storm and waves coming from the east direction. ..."
of the sea' extends only to losses caused by sea damage, or by the violence
of the elements, and does not embrace all losses happening at sea. They In fact, in the petitioners' complaint, it is alleged that "the barge Mable 10 of defendant carrier
insure against losses from extraordinary occurrences only, such as stress of developed a leak which allowed water to come in and that one of the hatches of said barge
weather, winds and waves, lightning, tempests, rocks and the like. These are was negligently left open by the person in charge thereof causing more water to come in and
understood to be the "perils of the sea" referred in the policy, and not those that "the loss of said plaintiffs' cargo was due to the fault, negligence, and/or lack of skill of
ordinary perils which every vessel must encounter. "Perils of the sea" has defendant carrier and/or defendant carrier's representatives on barge Mable 10."
been said to include only such losses as are of extraordinary nature, or arise
from some overwhelming power, which cannot be guarded against by the It is quite unmistakable that the loss of the cargo was due to the perils of the ship rather than
ordinary exertion of human skill and prudence. Damage done to a vessel by the perils of the sea. The facts clearly negate the petitioners' claim under the insurance
perils of the sea includes every species of damages done to a vessel at sea, policy. In the case of Go Tiaoco y Hermanos v. Union Ins. Society of Canton, supra, we had
as distinguished from the ordinary wear and tear of the voyage, and distinct occasion to elaborate on the term "perils of the ship." We ruled:
from injuries suffered by the vessel in consequence of her not being
seaworthy at the outset of her voyage (as in this case). It is also the general
rule that everything which happens thru the inherent vice of the thing, or by It must be considered to be settled, furthermore, that a loss which, in the
the act of the owners, master or shipper, shall not be reputed a peril, if not ordinary course of events, results from the natural and inevitable action of the
otherwise borne in the policy. (14 RCL on Insurance, Sec. 384, pp. 1203- sea, from the ordinary wear and tear of the ship, or from the negligent failure
1204; Cia. de Navegacion v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 277 US 66, 72 L. ed. of the ship's owner to provide the vessel with proper equipment to convey the
787, 48 S. Ct. 459). cargo under ordinary conditions, is not a peril of the sea. Such a loss is
rather due to what has been aptly called the "peril of the ship." The insurer
undertakes to insure against perils of the sea and similar perils, not against
With regard to the second assignment of error, petitioners maintain, that the loss of the cargo perils of the ship. As was well said by Lord Herschell in Wilson, Sons & Co.
was caused by the perils of the sea, not by the perils of the ship because as found by the trial v. Owners of Cargo per the Xantho ([1887], 12 A. C., 503, 509), there must,
court, the barge was turned loose from the tugboat east of Cabuli Point "where it was in order to make the insurer liable, be some casualty, something which could
buffeted by storm and waves." Moreover, petitioners also maintain that barratry, against not be foreseen as one of the necessary incidents of the adventure. The
which the cargo was also insured, existed when the personnel of the tugboat and the barge
 purpose of the policy is to secure an indemnity against accidents which may Lighterage Corporation in the decision of the trial court is accordingly reduced by the same
happen, not against events which must happen. amount.

In the present case the entrance of the sea water into the ship's hold through SO ORDERED.
the defective pipe already described was not due to any accident which
happened during the voyage, but to the failure of the ship's owner properly to
repair a defect of the existence of which he was apprised. The loss was
therefore more analogous to that which directly results from simple
unseaworthiness than to that which result from the perils of the sea.

xxx xxx xxx

Suffice it to say that upon the authority of those cases there is no room to
doubt the liability of the shipowner for such a loss as occurred in this case.
By parity of reasoning the insurer is not liable; for generally speaking, the
shipowner excepts the perils of the sea from his engagement under the bill of
lading, while this is the very perils against which the insurer intends to give
protection. As applied to the present case it results that the owners of the
damaged rice must look to the shipowner for redress and not to the insurer.

Neither can petitioners allege barratry on the basis of the findings showing negligence on the
part of the vessel's crew.

Barratry as defined in American Insurance Law is "any willful misconduct on the part of
master or crew in pursuance of some unlawful or fraudulent purpose without the consent of
the owners, and to the prejudice of the owner's interest." (Sec. 171, U.S. Insurance Law,
quoted in Vance, Handbook on Law of Insurance, 1951, p. 929.)

Barratry necessarily requires a willful and intentional act in its commission. No honest error of
judgment or mere negligence, unless criminally gross, can be barratry. (See Vance on Law of
Insurance, p. 929 and cases cited therein.)

In the case at bar, there is no finding that the loss was occasioned by the willful or fraudulent
acts of the vessel's crew. There was only simple negligence or lack of skill. Hence, the
second assignment of error must likewise be dismissed.

Anent the third assignment of error, we agree with the petitioners that the amount of
P8,000.00 representing the amount of the salvaged logs should have been awarded to them.
However, this should be deducted from the amounts which have been adjudicated against
Manila Bay Lighterage Corporation by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the modification that the
amount of P8,000.00 representing the value of the salvaged logs which was ordered to be
deposited in the Manila Banking Corporation in the name of Civil Case No. 86599 is hereby
awarded and ordered paid to the petitioners. The liability adjudged against Manila Bay
 2. That the said spouses Catalino Bas and Cristeta Niebres during their lifetime possessed and owned,
and, after their deaths, left to their six aforenamed children, eight (8) parcels of land, situated in Talisay,
Cebu, and known as Lots Nos. 2464, 2467 (the lots in question), 2528, 2535, 2542, 2549, 2552 and
4041 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate;

3. That the plaintiffs: Zacarias Bas is the only surviving child and only heir of Miguel Bas; Juana,
Domingo, Dolores and Dulce all surnamed Bas, are the only surviving children and heirs of Alberto Bas;
Cipriano, Numeriana Eleuteria, Marcial, Faustina, Agustin and Moises, all surnamed Bas, and Victoria,
Isidro, Gil, and Fausta, all surnamed Obejero, are the only surviving grandchildren and heirs of
Diogracias Bas, by his son Rufino Bas and daughter Eulogia Bas-Obejero, respectively, both deceased;
and Fortunata, Demetria, Jose, Osmundo, Petrona and Andres, all surnamed Bas, and Vivencia,
Estelita, Buenaventura and Francisco, all surnamed Bas, are surviving children and/or grandchildren
and heirs of Andres Bas;

4. That defendant Petro Fabrica is the surviving widow of Pedro Bas, who died in 1948, and the other
defendants are their only surviving children and heirs;

5. That Lot 2528 was partitioned among the six (6) children of Catalino Bas and Cristeta Niebres, who
received their respective portions, which were given new lot numbers 2528 New, 8498, 9494, 8495,
8496 and 8497;

PETRA FABRICA, EUGENIO BAS, PETRONA BAS, ANTONIO BAS, VICENTE BAS, FLAVIANA 6. That Catalino Bas and Cristeta Niebres did not leave any last will and testament;
BAS, JOSEFINA BAS, NUMERIANA BAS, PASCUAL ZAFRA, MARCIAL BAS, RUFINA LAREGO,
FAUSTA OBEJERO, TEOFILO TABAY, VICTORIA OBEJERO, PEDRO GAHUM, ARSENIO
CANEDA, FAUSTINA BAS, MOISES BAS, and GIL OBEJERO, petitioners,  7. That the six surviving children and heirs of Catalino Bas and Cristeta Niebres, and their (children)
vs. successors in interest the plaintiffs and defendants herein, have during their lifetimes, continuously
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ZACARIAS BAS, CIPRIANO BAS, ELEUTERIA BAS, resided either in Dumlog or Pook, Talisay, Cebu, except the children and widow of Alberto Bas who
AGUSTIN BAS, ISIDRO OBEJERO, DEMETRIA BAS, JOSE BAS, OSMUNDO BAS, ANDREA BAS, moved to Cotabato a few years ago;
VIVENCIA BAS, FRANCISCO BAS, ESTELITA BAS, BUENAVENTURA BAS, JUANA BAS,
DOMINGO BAS, DOLORES BAS and DULCE BAS, respondents. 8. That Lots 2464 and 2467 in question were originally sold on installments payable in 10 and 18
regular yearly installments by the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate to spouses Catalino Bas and
This is a petition to review on certiorari 1) the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Cristeta Niebres, and patents Nos. 40190 and 40191, respectively were issued on November 24, 1936
No. 54374-R, which ordered that the records be remanded to the Court a quo, holding that the judgment and December 23, 1936 respectively, the "The Legal Heirs of Catalino Bas, Pooc, Talisay, Cebu";
of the latter court is merely interlocutory and 2) the resolution which denied the motion for
reconsideration, 9. That Restituta Bas died single and without issue in 1966 at Barrio Dumlog, Talisay, Cebu;

The parties before the hearing in the trial court, submitted the following: 10. That the total assessed value of the above described lots in question is P1,640.00;

AGREED STIPULATION OF FACTS Cebu City, Philippines, November . . . 1970.

COME NOW the plaintiffs and defendants in the above-entitled case, accompanied by their respective The trial court ruled that the only issue to be resolved in this case is whether Lots Nos. 2464 and 2467,
counsels, and to his Honorable Court, most respectfully submitted the following Agreed Stipulation of which are covered by TCT Nos. 17900 and 18122, respectively, registered in the name of the legal
Facts: heirs of Catalino Bas, are still owned in common pro-indiviso by the heirs of Catalino Bas, and Cristeta
Niebres, or whether the said lots belong exclusively to Pedro Bas or his heirs. After trial, the lower court
1. That, except for defendant Petra Fabrica who is the surviving spouse of Pedro Bas, all the plaintiffs rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
and the other defendants are the grandchildren and/or great grandchildren of spouses Catalino Bas and
Cristeta Niebres, who died in 1916 and 1930, respectively, leaving six (6) children, namely: Alberto, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Lots Nos. 2464 and
Andres, Diogracias, Miguel, Pedro and Restituta, all surnamed Bas, now all deceased. 2467 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 17900 and 18122, respectively, in the name of the Legal Heirs of Catalino Bas, as
 properties still owned in common by the heirs of Catalino Bas and Cristeta Niebres, and partition the same, thereby depriving the plaintiffs of their shares in the products of the said land
ordering their partition among the children of Catalino Niebres, Alberto, Andres, Deogracias, notwithstanding the fact that deeds of conveyance over Lot No. 2464 on November 24, 1936 and over
Miguel, and Pedro, all surnamed Bas and or their heirs; and further ordering the defendants Lot No. 2467 on December 23, 1936 were made in favor of the legal heirs of Catalino Bas as shown in
Petra Fabrica, Eugenio Bas, Antonio Bas, Flaviana Bas, Vicente Bas, and Josefina Bas, to pay the records of the Office of the District Land Officer of Cebu under Patents Nos. 40190 and 40191,
to the plaintiffs the sum of P1,000.00 by way of attorney's fees, plus the costs of this action. respectively. The defendants in their answer as their affirmative defenses alleged among other things
(Decision, Printed Record on Appeal, p. 86).<äre||anº•1àw> that Pedro Bas took possession of lots Nos. 2464 and 2467 in 1929 after Cristeta Niebres and her
children orally and extrajudicially partitioned the estate left by Catalino Bas, and that Lots Nos. 2464
From said judgment, defendants (petitioners herein) appealed to the Court of Appeals which ruled that and 2467 were given to Pedro Bas while Lot 2528 was given to the six children, subject to the usufruct
the judgment of the court a quo in the partition case is not appealable, it being interlocutory, and of Cristeta Niebres during her lifetime, and Lots Nos. 2542, 2549, 2552 and 4041 were given to Alberto,
ordered the remanding of the case to the lower court. Petitioners now come to Us alleging the following: Andres, Deogracias, Miguel and Restituta Bas; and that since 1929 up to the present, they have been in
the actual physical, material and exclusive possession and dominion of the lots in question, declaring
same for taxation and paying the taxes thereon in the name of Pedro Bas, planting them to corn and
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS coconuts and enjoying the fruits thereof to the exclusion of Restituta Bas and of all others.

I The records of the case clearly reveal that the main purpose of the complaint is to determine who
between the parties are the true owners and entitled to the exclusive use of the disputed properties.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT LOTS NOS. 2464 and 2467, WERE NOT While it is true that the complaint is one for partition, it is one which is premised on the resolution of the
PARTITIONED AND WERE RESERVED FOR CRISTETA NIEBRES AND RESTITUTA BAS WHICH issue on the validity of the oral partition allegedly made in favor of defendants and the two deeds of
CONCLUSION WAS BASED ON A LACK OF COMPREHENSIVE APPRECIATION OF THE conveyance executed in the names of the heirs of the deceased spouses Catalino Bas and Cristeta
ENVIRONMENTAL CIRCUMSTANCES EXPOSED BY THE EVIDENCE OF RECORD, AND CLEARLY Niebres. Unless this issue of ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect
POINTED OUT IN DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM. a partition of the disputed properties. Thus, when the trial court rendered its judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs, rejecting defendants' claim of exclusive ownership of the properties by oral partition, it
II rendered a final or definitive judgment on the merits from which the party adversely affected can make
an appeal. (See Miranda, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 71 SCRA 295 and Valdez v. Bagaso, 82
SCRA 22, superseding the principles enunciated in Zaldariaga vs. Enriquez, 1 SCRA 1188.). We held in
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN BASING ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE LOTS IN QUESTION WERE the Valdez case that-
NOT PARTITIONED IN THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANTS' WITNESSES, WHOSE TESTIMONIES
SHOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN THE PROPER CONTEXT BASED ON THE EVIDENCE AS A
WHOLE. ... Contrary to the holding of the Appellate Court, the decision of the trial court declaring null
the aforesaid conveyances and granting recovery of the properties for the purpose of ordering
their partition is a definitive judgment because it decided the rights of the parties upon the
III issue submitted. It was not, therefore, an interlocutory order. As this Court enunciated in
Miranda, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. supra, a judgment which grants recovery of the
THE COURT A QUO ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT FIND THAT PEDRO BAS HAD ACTUALLY BEEN ownership and possession of property in favor of one party as against the adverse claim of title
ALLOTTED THE LOTS IN QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF THE PARTITION OF THE LANDS OF of the other is in effect a final judgment which is appealable. In Miranda, this Court considered
CATALINO BAS AND CRISTETA NIEBRES, BECAUSE IT HAD OVERLOOKED THE SIGNIFICANCE as the better rule the one enunciated in H.E. Heacock Co. vs. American Trading Co., 3 to wit;
AND OR HAD MISINTERPRETED THE TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE OF RECORD SHOWING THE that where the primary purpose of a case is to ascertain and determine who, as between
JUSTNESS OF SUCH PARTITION. plaintiff and defendant, is the true owner and entitled to the exclusive use of the disputed
property, the judgment rendered by the lower court is a judgment on the merits as to those
questions, and that the order for an accounting is merely incidental to such judgment. We
IV
explained therein that if said judgment is merely considered interlocutory subject to the control
of the judge, there would be as many decisions to be taken up on appeal as there were
THE COURT A QUO ERRED WHEN IT RENDERED JUDGMENT AGAINST THE HEREIN successor judges inclined to review or reverse his predecessor's judgment. "With none of the
DEFENDANTS AND IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS. parties adversely affected able to appeal from any of the fluctuating decisions for as long as
the accounting has not been terminated." Such unbriddled power of the Court to change at will
Petitioners' contentions merit our consideration. The instant case is for partition of properties left by the its judgment does violence to the very purpose for which courts are organized which is to put
deceased spouses Catalino Bas and Cristeta Niebres filed with the lower court by private respondents an end to controversy. This Court adverted to the fact that "imperative considerations of public
against petitioners. In their amended complaint for partition filed with the trial court plaintiffs (private policy and of sound practice in the courts and adherence to the constitutional mandate of
respondents herein) alleged among other things that after the death of Restituta Bas the defendants simplified, just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action call for considering such
(Petra Fabrica, surviving spouse of the late Pedro Bas, and her children, private respondents herein) judgments for recovery of property with accounting as final judgments which are duly
took possession of the two (2) parcels of land in question and claimed that they are the owners thereof; appealable (and would therefore become final and executory if not appealed within the
and despite repeated demands for partition made upon them, the defendants refused and still refuse to reglementary period) with the accounting as a mere incident of the judgment to be rendered
 during the course of the appeal as provided in Rule 39, section 4 or to be implemented at the construction. He alleged that he had in fact filed a complaint for unsound real estate business practice
execution stage upon final affirmance on appeal of the judgment ... and that the only reason in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB Case No. REM-07-9004-80) against
given in Fuentebella for the contrary ruling, viz, "the general harm that would follow from petitioner. Private respondent prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay P500,000.00 as moral damages,
throwing the door open to multiplicity of appeals in a single case' is of lesser import and P500,000.00 as exemplary damages, P75,000.00 as attorneys fees and that he be given all other
consequence. " 4 We reiterate the validity of that doctrine and find it clearly applicable in this remedies just and equitable.
case. Indeed, it would be more conducive to the speedy and inexpensive determination of the
case, if the issue of the validity of the two deeds of sale is first finally resolved by the Appellate In its resolution dated February 24, 1993, the MTC ruled that the answer was filed out of time on
Court before the question of partition can be taken up by the trial court. (Emphasis supplied) the ground that it was filed more than ten days after the service of summons.[2] On March 17, 1993,
however, it dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The MTC held that the case was cognizable
by the HLURB. But it also ordered petitioner to pay private respondent P10,000.00 as moral damages,
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING ASIDE the assailed decision of the respondent P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, P3,000.00 as attorneys fees, and to pay costs.
Court of Appeals and ordering the same to give due course to petitioners' appeal and to decide the
appeal on the merits. Let the records of the case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further On appeal the Regional Trial Court affirmed the decision of the MTC. It held that the case was
proceedings. exclusively cognizable by the HLURB which had jurisdiction not only over complaints of buyers against
subdivision developers but also over actions filed by developers for the unpaid price of the lots or units.
SO ORDERED. Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals, alleging that:

(a) The amounts of damages prayed for by the private respondent in his Answer are enormous and way
beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior court; and

(b) Since the inferior court and the respondent court ruled that it has no jurisdiction over this case, then
it has no reason, much more jurisdiction to award damages in excess of the P20,000.00 jurisdiction of
the inferior Court.[3]
FRANCEL REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.  COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO T.
SYCIP, respondents. The appellate court dismissed the petition, holding that the MTC had jurisdiction over cases of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer, regardless of the amount of damages on unpaid rentals sought to
DECISION be recovered in view of 1A(1) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.[4]

MENDOZA, J.: Petitioner moved for reconsideration. It contended that since the MTC had ruled that it had no
jurisdiction over this case, then it had no jurisdiction either to grant the counterclaim for damages in the
total sum of P23,000.00. Its motion was, however, denied for lack of any cogent reason to reverse the
Petitioner Francel Realty Corporation filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against private appellate courts resolution of June 15, 1994.[5]
respondent Francisco T. Sycip. The case was filed in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bacoor, Cavite.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
In its complaint, petitioner alleged that it had executed a Contract to Sell to private respondent Lot
16, Building No. 14 of the Francel Townhomes, at 22 Real Street, Maliksi, Bacoor, Cavite, for It is important to first determine whether the MTC has jurisdiction over petitioners complaint. For if
P451,000.00. The Contract to Sell provides inter alia  that in case of default in the payment of two or it has no jurisdiction, then the award of damages made by it in its decision is indeed without any basis. It
more installments, the whole obligation will become due and demandable and the seller will then be is only if the MTC has jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action that it is necessary to determine the
entitled to rescind the contract and take possession of the property; the buyer will vacate the premises correctness of the award of damages, including attorneys fees.
without the necessity of any court action and the downpayment will be treated as earnest money or as
rental for the use of the premises. Petitioner alleged that private respondent failed to pay the monthly Petitioners complaint is for unlawful detainer. While generally speaking such action falls within the
amortization of P9,303.00 since October 30, 1990 despite demands to update his payments and to original and exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC, the determination of the ground for ejectment requires a
vacate the premises, the latest of which was the demand made in the letter dated September 26, 1992, consideration of the rights of a buyer on installment basis of real property. Indeed private respondent
and that because of private respondents unjust refusal to vacate, petitioner was constrained to engage claims that he has a right under P.D. No. 957, 23 to stop paying monthly amortizations after giving due
the services of counsel. Petitioner prayed that private respondent be ordered to vacate the premises notice to the owner or developer of his decision to do so because of petitioners alleged failure to
and pay a monthly rental of P9,303.00 beginning October 30, 1990 until he shall have vacated the develop the subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time for
premises, and P25,000.00 as attorneys fees plus appearance fee of P 1,000.00 per hearing and complying with the same. The case thus involves a determination of the rights and obligations of parties
expenses of litigation. in a sale of real estate under P.D. No. 957.  Private respondent has in fact filed a complaint against
petitioner for unsound real estate business practice with the HLURB.
On November 9, 1992, private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint but his motion was
denied by the MTC. On January 20, 1993 he filed his answer, [1] in which he alleged that he had stopped This is, therefore, not a simple case for unlawful detainer arising from the failure of the lessee to
paying the monthly amortizations because the townhouse unit sold to him by petitioner was of defective pay the rents, comply with the conditions of a lease agreement or vacate the premises after the
expiration of the lease. Since the determinative question is exclusively cognizable by the HLURB, the
question of the right of petitioner must be determined by the agency.
Petitioners cause of action against private respondent should instead be filed as a counterclaim in
HLURB Case No. REM-07-9004-80 in accordance with Rule 6, 6 of the Rules of Court which is of
suppletory application to the 1987 HLURB Rules of Procedure per 3 of the same. In the case of Estate
Developers and Investors Corporation v. Antonio Sarte and Erlinda Sarte [6]  the developer filed a
complaint to collect the balance of the price of a lot bought on installment basis, but its complaint was
dismissed by the Regional Trial Court for lack of jurisdiction. It appealed the order to this Court. In
dismissing the appeal, we held:

The action here is not a simple action to collect on a promissory note; it is a complaint to collect
amortization payments arising from or in connection with a sale of a subdivision lot under PD. Nos. 957
and 1344, and accordingly falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the
real estate trade and industry, and to hear and decide cases of unsound real estate business
practices.Although the case involving Antonio Sarte is still pending resolution before the HLURB Arbiter,
and there is as yet no order from the HLURB authorizing suspension of payments on account of the
failure of plaintiff developer to make good its warranties, there is no question to Our mind that the matter
of collecting amortizations for the sale of the subdivision lot is necessarily tied up to the complaint
against the plaintiff and it affects the rights and correlative duties of the buyer of a subdivision lot as
regulated by NHA pursuant to P.D. 957 as amended. It must accordingly fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the said Board, and We find that the motion to dismiss was properly granted on the
ground that the regular court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint.

Accordingly, we hold that the MTC correctly held itself to be without jurisdiction over petitioners
complaint. But it was error for the MTC to grant private respondents counterclaim for damages for
expenses incurred and inconveniences allegedly suffered by him as a result of the filing of the
ejectment case.[7]
Pursuant to Rule 6, 8 a party may file a counterclaim only if the court has jurisdiction to entertain
the claim. Otherwise the counterclaim cannot be filed.[8]
Even assuming that the MTC had jurisdiction, however the award of damages to private
respondent must be disallowed for the following reasons:
(1) The MTC decision itself stated that the answer with its counterclaim was filed out of time or
more than 10 days from private respondents receipt of summons. In effect, therefore, private
respondent did not make any counterclaim.
(2) Moreover, a reading of the MTC decision showed no justification for the award of moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees. As held in Buan v. Camaganacan,[9]  an award of attorneys
fees without justification is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation
and conjecture. It should accordingly be stricken out. With respect to the award of moral and exemplary
damages, the record is bereft of any proof that petitioner acted maliciously or in bad faith in filing the
present action which would warrant such an award.[10]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and the complaint against
private respondent is DISMISSED. The private respondents counterclaim is likewise DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
 2. The further sum of P3,000.00 per day, by way of damages for his failure to turn over peacefully the
three (3) commercial spaces to the plaintiff from July 1, 1993 until such time the defendant and all
persons claiming rights under him vacate the premises;

3. The further sum of P5,000.00 by way of attorneys fees; and,

4. The cost of this suit.

The counter-claim of the defendant is hereby Dismissed, for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner now comes to the Court via the instant petition not to contest his ouster from the leased
premises nor the amount of monthly rental he was adjudged to pay until he vacates the same, but only
to take particular exception to respondent CAs decision insofar as it affirmed the municipal trial courts
award of P3,000.00 per day as damages (sub-paragraph 2 of the dispositive portion just quoted). It is
petitioners claim that such award, in addition to the fair rental value or reasonable compensation for the
use and occupation of the premises (sub-paragraph 1), is improper in the light of the doctrine
enunciated in the cases of Felesilda v. Villanueva,[1]  Shoemart, Inc. v. CA[2] and Hualam
Construction and Development Corp. v. CA[3]  cited by petitioner, that the only damages that can be
recovered in an ejectment suit are the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the real property. Other damages must be claimed in an ordinary action.
MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
Petitioners reliance on such doctrine is misplaced, inasmuch as the Felesilda,
DECISION Shoemart and Hualam  cases dealt with additional damages and charges other  than liquidated
damages, defined as x x x those agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to be paid in case of breach
FRANCISCO, J.:
thereof.[4] Here, the municipal trial court, in making the P3,000.00 per day award, was merely enforcing
what was stipulated upon in black and white by private respondent-lessor and petitioner-lessee
Under a one (1) year lease contract commencing on July 1, 1992 and ending on June 30, 1993 appearing in paragraph 10 of the lease contract which reads:
but renewable upon agreement, herein petitioner Azcuna, Jr., as lessee, occupied three (3) units (C, E
and F) of the building owned by private respondent Barcelonas family. Came expiration date of the
That after the termination of the lease, the LESSEE shall peaceably deliver to the LESSOR the leased
lease without an agreed renewal thereof and coupled by petitioners failure to surrender the leased units
premises vacant and unencumbered and in good tenantable conditions minus the ordinary wear and
despite private respondents demands, private respondent filed before the Municipal Trial Court an
tear.In case the LESSEEs failure or inability to do so, LESSOR has the right to charge the LESSEE
ejectment case against petitioner. Judgment of that inferior court, affirmed in its entirety by the Regional
P1,000.00 per day as damages without prejudice to other remedies which LESSOR is entitled in the
Trial Court and herein public respondent Court of Appeals on subsequent appeals taken by petitioner,
premise. (Italics supplied)
favored private respondent, the decretal portion of which reads:

This is clearly an agreement for liquidated damages - entitling private respondent to claim a
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Ernesto E. Barcelona,
stipulated amount by way of damages (correctly totalling P3,000.00 per day as there were three [3]
ordering the defendant Melquiades D. Azcuna, Jr., and all persons claiming rights under him to vacate
units being leased by petitioner) over and above other damages still legally due him, i.e., the fair rental
the premises known as Units C,  E and F, in the building owned by plaintiffs family located along
value for the use and occupation of the property as provided for in Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Congressional Avenue, Quezon City. Defendant is likewise ordered to pay the following:
Court. The freedom of the contracting parties to make stipulations in their contract provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy is so settled, and the Court finds
1. The sum of P25,000.00 monthly as rental for continued use by defendant of the three (3) units of nothing immoral or illegal with the indemnity/ penalty clause of the lease contract (paragraph 10) which
leased premises in question starting July 1, 1993 less the amount that have been deposited or given by does not appear to have been forced upon or fraudulently foisted on petitioner. Petitioner cannot now
the defendant to the plaintiff up to such time the defendant and all persons claiming rights under him evade further liability for liquidated damages, for after entering into such an agreement, petitioner
finally vacate the aforesaid premises; cannot thereafter turn his back on his word with a plea that on him was inflicted a penalty shocking to
the conscience and impressed with iniquity as to call for the relief sought on the part of a judicial
tribunal.[5]
 The controlling case here is, as correctly invoked by private respondent, Gozon v. Vda. de After trial, the MTC rendered judgment 2 on January 16, 1984 dismissing the complaint on the ground
Barrameda[6] which involved similar facts and the same issue raised by herein petitioner.There, the that private respondents "failed to support their causes of action with substantial evidence."3
then Court of First Instance of Rizal affirmed the judgment of the then justice of the peace court of
Caloocan in a detainer case ordering defendant-appellant Barrameda to pay complainant Gozon the Private respondents then filed an appeal with the Regional Trial
sum of P 1,622.43 as rentals due up to July 3, 1958 plus P5,000.00 as liquidated damages, and Court (RTC) of Quezon City. On March 29, 1985, respondent Judge George C. Macli-ing rendered a
costs. Appellant Barrameda likewise assailed the propriety of the P5,000.00 award in addition to the well-written decision reversing the MTC judgment. Respondent Judge ruled that petitioners' non-
rentals. The Court upheld the then CFIs affirmatory decision by disposing of appellant Barramedas payment of rentals for more than three months and private respondents' genuine need for the leased
protestation in this wise: premises are sufficient causes for petitioners' ejectment. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision
reads:
This Court has often stated that inferior courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry
and detainer regardless of the value of damages demanded. It has also ruled that the damages that WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed from is hereby
may be recovered in actions for ejectment are those equivalent to a reasonable compensation for the REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and in lieu thereof, another one is rendered and
use and occupation of the premises by defendant. Nonetheless, this latter legal proposition is not entered in favor of the appellants and against the appellees:
pertinent to the issue raised in the instant case because here, the damage sought to be recovered had
previously been agreed to by lessee (in the contract of lease) and imposed by lessor by way of
damages. Besides, nobody can affirm that the liquidated amount of damages stipulated in the lease 1. Ordering the defendants-appellees and all persons claiming rights under them to
contract was not due to occupation or loss of possession of the premises and non-compliance with the vacate the premises, identified as the Ground Floor of No. 56 Liberty Avenue,
contract. (Italics supplied) Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City, and restore possession thereof to plaintiffs-appellants.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review by way of certiorari is hereby DENIED. 2. Ordering defendants-appellees to pay rental arrearages from June, 1981, at the
rate of P150.00 per month, until such arrearages shall have been fully paid and the
SO ORDERED. premises vacated and possession thereof restored to plaintiffs-appellants.

3. Ordering defendants-appellees to pay P2,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and to

pay the costs.
G.R. No. 76656 December 11, 1992
SO ORDERED.4
SPOUSES EUTIQUIANO CLUTARIO and ARACELI CLUTARIO, petitioners, 
vs. It was then petitioners' turn to impugn this judgment by filing a petition for review before the Court of
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GEORGE C. MACLI-ING, RTC Judge of Quezon City, Branch C Appeals. In a decision dated September 18, 1986,5 the respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
(100), and SPOUSES MELQUIADES GANDIA and MARIA V. GANDIA, respondents. judgment but deleted the award of attorney's fees to private respondents. Petitioners elevated the case
before this Court, on a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of
 Private respondents, the Spouses Melquiades Gandia and Maria V. Gandia, are the owners of a two- the Court of Appeals' decision affirming the RTC ruling that they can be ejected by their lessors, the
storey residential apartment located at No. 56 Liberty St., Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City. Since 1961, private respondents.
while private respondents have been occupying the upper storey of the house, petitioners have been
staying on the ground floor by virtue of a verbal lease agreement for a monthly rental of P150.00. The petition is without merit.

On May 9, 1980, private respondents, through their counsel, wrote a letter to the petitioners giving them B.P. Blg. 25 (1979), which was the governing law at the time of the filing of the complaint and which the
ninety (90) days to vacate the premises. According to them, due to their advanced age and failing parties had to rely on, provides, in section 5, six (6) grounds for ejectment.6 In seeking to oust
health, they have decided to occupy the entire apartment, including the ground floor leased to petitioners from the leased premises, private respondents invoke two of those six grounds, namely: (1)
petitioners. Because petitioners did not heed the demand letter, private respondents brought the matter arrears in payment of rent for three (3) months at any one time;7 and (2) need of the lessors to
to the Katarungan Pambarangay for settlement, but this did not meet with success. Another demand repossess their property for their own use or for the use of any immediate member of their family as
letter was sent by private respondents to petitioners on January 20, 1981. residential unit. 8 Petitioners contend that private respondents cannot avail of either ground.

In the meantime, it appears that from August 1980, petitioners were in arrears in the payment of their No longer disputed is the rule that non-payment of rentals is a sufficient ground for ejectment.9 Under
rentals. On March 4, 1981, private respondents filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioner Araceli sec. 5 (b) of B.P. Blg. 25 (1979), the arrears in rent payment must be for at least three (3) months.
Clutario1 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Quezon City citing the following two grounds: (1) Petitioners started defaulting on their payments in August 1980. On May 15, 1981, they paid P1,500.00
their need for the premises; and (2) non-payment of rentals by petitioners from August 1980. Pending for their rents for the period August 1980 to May 15 1981 at the rate of P150.00 per month. By then,
the proceedings before the MTC, petitioners paid the back rentals from August 1980 until May 1981. they had been in arrears for nine (9) months. However, petitioners contend that private respondents, by
accepting the payment of the back rentals, waived their non-payment of rentals for more than three (3) apartments of private respondents were tenanted." 18 The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb this
months as a ground for ejectment. finding.

The contention is without merit. The MTC, in deciding in favor of petitioners, ruled that private respondents did not need the disputed
premises which is the ground floor of the apartment unit leased to petitioners, because they were
Case law is to the effect that the acceptance by the lessor of the payment by the lessee of the rentals in already occupying the upper floor of the unit. The relevant portion of the MTC decision reads:
arrears does not constitute a waiver of the default in the payment of rentals as a valid cause of action
for ejectment.10 The Court notes that when petitioners paid the back rentals on May 15, 1981, private On this score, the evidence is clear that the plaintiffs, though owners of the residential
respondents had already filed the complaint for ejectment earlier, to be specific, on March 4, 1981. The house identified as No. 56 Liberty Avenue, Murphy, Quezon City, occupying the
conduct of private respondents subsequent to their acceptance of the back rentals belies any intention upper floor thereof, are the only persons living on this upper floor of the house. The
to waive their right to eject petitioners as a result of the latter's failure to pay the rent for more than three only reason advanced by them for needing to repossess the ground floor or lower part
(3) months. They did not enter into an amicable settlement with petitioners. Neither did they notify the of the house occupied by the defendant, is because the plaintiffs are aging and sickly,
trial court of their intention to have the complaint dismissed. Instead, they participated actively in the as according to the plaintiffs' letter (Exh. "B") to the defendant, plaintiffs "personally
proceedings before the MTC during all the time that the case dragged on for almost three need that lower portion of the house for personal use and occupancy since they are
years. 11 When the MTC decided adversely against them, private respondents appealed the judgment to getting older and aggravated by their poor health, they get easily tired in going up and
the RTC. Not only have they participated earnestly in all subsequent proceedings even after they downstairs." Obviously, plaintiffs' need of the lower portion of the house is for
obtained favorable judgments from the RTC and the Court of Appeals, but they have likewise been convenience. It is the view of this Court that when the framers of Batas Pambansa
consistent in their position that petitioners should be ejected, not only because they need the leased Blg. 25 included "need of the premises" as a ground for judicial eviction, personal
premises, but also because of petitioners' default in the payment of rentals for more than three (3) convenience is not intended, because the law states clearly that the repossession of
months. the property for the use of the owner/lessor (or immediate member) must concur with
the other requisites, one of which is that the owner / lessor does not own any other
In light of the surrounding circumstances of the case, as well as the prevailing jurisprudence, the Court residential unit.
rules that the acceptance by private respondents of the petitioners-lessees' back rentals did not
constitute a waiver or abandonment of their cause of action for ejectment against the latter. Plaintiffs' position therefore, on this ground, is not only weak but more so not in
accord with the spirit, intent and letter of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25. It may be true that
Proof of any one of the factors enumerated in section 5 of B.P. Blg. 25 (1979) is sufficient cause for plaintiffs are sickly and aging but their physical condition is not a legal argument to
judicial ejectment of a lessee. Having proved one of such grounds, i.e., arrears in payment of rent for effect eviction of the-defendant. 19
three (3) months at any one time, private respondents may legally eject petitioners without having to
prove the other grounds for ejectment. Nevertheless, to bolster their action for ejectment, private The need for the leased premises by the lessor as a valid ground for ejectment has already been given
respondents invoked in their complaint a second ground for ejectment, namely, their need for the leased a liberal interpretation in Caudal v. Court of Appeals, 20 where it was held that the conversion of the
premises. 12 leased property into a servants' quarters was a legitimate need within the purview of sec. 5 (c) of B.P.
Blg. 25 (1979). The Court, speaking through then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, made the following
Petitioners are bound by the established jurisprudence that under B.P. Blg. 25 (1979), the need by the statements:
lessor of the leased premises for his own use or that of his immediate family is a valid ground for
ejectment. 13 They, however, submit that this ground for ejectment is not available to private Observe that the law does not strictly confine the meaning of the word "residence"
respondents who own, apart from the disputed premises, three other apartment units located at Nos. mainly for habitation purposes as restrictedly interpreted by petitioner. In a way, the
56-A, 56-B and 56-C Liberty St., Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City, at least one of which is allegedly definition admits a measure of liberality, albeit limited, since a residence may also be
available for occupancy by private respondents. the site of a home industry, or a retail store or be used for business purposes so long
as it is principally used for dwelling purposes. The law in giving greater importance to
Indeed, for the lessor to be able to validly eject the lessee on the ground of need for the leased the abode being used principally for dwelling purposes, has set the limitation on the
property, it must be shown that there is no other available residential unit to satisfy that need. 14 The maximum amount of capitalization to P5,000.00, which is small by present standards.
non-availability must exist at the time of the demand by the lessor on the lessee to vacate the
property. 15 In the instant case, petitioners allege that the other apartment units of private respondents Thus, if an abode can be used for limited business purposes, we see no reason why
are vacant and available to the latter for occupancy.16 Private respondents deny this allegation, claiming it cannot be used as an abode for persons rendering services usually necessary or
that the other units were occupied when they gave notice to the petitioners to vacate the disputed desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment of a home and who personally minister
premises, and remain so occupied until now.17 None of the three courts which have already adjudicated to the personal comfort and convenience of the members of the houses. 21
on the controversy gave credence to petitioners' allegation. The MTC which decided in petitioners' favor
did not make a finding that the other apartment units of private respondents were available for In the case at bar, it appears that the decision of private respondents to occupy both the lower and
occupancy by the latter. On the contrary, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled that "the other upper portions of the property sprang not only from mere convenience, but from necessity as well, due
to their advanced age and the poor health of respondent Melquiades Gandia. While the upper portion of SO ORDERED.
the premises may have been sufficient to satisfy private respondents' residential needs in 1961 when
they leased the lower portion to petitioners, it no longer sufficed in 1980 or nineteen (19) years later,
when they served the notice to vacate, their personal circumstances having drastically changed.
Also impugned is the Court of Appeal's Resolution, dated October 19, 1993, denying
petitioner's Motion For Reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
Petitioners' father, Jose R. Acab was the owner of the subject residential lot located on 128
SO ORDERED.
Rodriguez St., Kalookan City. In 1942, he entered into a verbal lease agreement with private
respondent and her now-deceased husband. Under the agreement, the Villanueva spouses
were obliged to pay Acab a monthly rental of fifty pesos (P50.00).

On April 10, 1991, petitioner's counsel, wrote private respondent and her husband the
following letter:

April 10, 1991

SPS. FRANCISCO VILLANUEVA

128 Rodriguez Street,
(also known as F. Acab St.)
Kalookan City

SIR & MADAM:

G.R. No. 112285 February 21, 1995
My clients, LOIDA S. ACAB, CARINA S. ACAB, BIENVENIDO S. ACAB,
LOIDA, BIENVENIDO & JOSELITO, all surnamed ACAB, CARINA VALERIO &
JOSELITO S. ACAB & ESMERALDA S. ZAPANTA, instructed me to inform
ESMERALDA ZAPANTA, petitioners, 
you that they are now the registered owners of the parcel of land where you
vs.
reside, they having purchased the same from their father JOSE ACAB on
COURT OF APPEALS and AMPARO C. VILLANUEVA, respondents.
July 3, 1989, for which reason TCT No. 231261 was issued in their favor.
They also instructed me to inform you that they are no longer interested in
renewing your lease contract over the property in which case, since you pay
your rent monthly, then the contract should be deemed terminated by the end
PUNO, J.: of the month or 30 days from today. The reason for the termination is the
need of my clients to repossess the property for their own personal use.
This is a petition for review from the decision of the Court of Appeals, 1 dated July 26, 1993,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: Notice, therefore, is hereby given you that three months from today my
clients have the intention to repossess their property and demand is hereby
WHEREFORE, the respondent court's (referring to the Regional Trial Court, made upon you to vacate the same on or before the said period of time.
Branch 121, Kalookan City) decision, subject of review, is hereby SET Should you fail to do that then my clients shall be forced to bring this matter
ASIDE and another judgment is entered DISMISSING the ejectment case in to the barangay and eventually to the court without further notice.
Civil Case No. 20091 in the Metropolitan Trial Court, Kalookan City, Branch
49. All the other orders of the respondent court relating to the implementation Your compliance herewith will save you . . . inconvenience and expense that
and enforcement of the said decision of the respondent court are likewise a court . . . usually entails.
ORDERED SET ASIDE.
Very trul
No pronouncement as to costs.
 (sgd)agreement; and (4) ejectment based solely on termination of a month-to-month lease contract
is not justified.
Jose F. Manacop
Dissatisfied with the Court of Appeal's Decision and its Resolution denying their Motion For
Despite receipt of the letter, private respondent, then already widowed, refused to vacate the Reconsideration, petitioners filed this petition for review, alleging that the respondent court
subject premises. did not decide the case at bench in accordance with law and applicable decisions.

On October 18, 1991, petitioners, armed with a Certification to File Action from the proper We agree with petitioners.
Barangay Lupon Tagapayapa, filed their complaint for ejectment with the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Kalookan City.3 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 20091 and raffled to The sole issue in the case at bench is whether private respondent may legally be ejected
Branch 49 of said court. from the subject property on the sole basis of the expiration of the verbal lease agreement
under which rentals are paid monthly.
At the end of the trial, the MTC held, inter alia, that:
Section 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 877, which is exactly the same as Section 6 of Batas
xxx xxx xxx Pambansa. Blg. 25, provides that:

There is no question that the lease of the lot in question is from month to Sec. 6. Application of the Civil Code and Rules of Court of the Philippines. —
month considering the monthly payments. The defendant's (referring to Except when the lease is for a definite period, the provisions of paragraph (1)
private respondent's) month-to month lease of the premises is a lease with a of Article 1673 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, insofar as they refer to
definite period, terminable at the end of each month at the option of the residential units covered by this Act, shall be suspended during the effectivity
plaintiff-lessor (referring to petitioners). of this Act, but other provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court on
lease contracts, insofar as they are not in conflict with the provisions of the
Act shall apply.
xxx xxx xxx

In a long line of cases,7 beginning with Rivera v.  Florendo, 143 SCRA 278 (1986),
The Plaintiffs (petitioner herein) acquired possession when the property was
this Court has held that said provision does not suspend the effects of Article 1687 of
sold to them by their father and the torrens title thereof was transferred in
the new Civil Code which provides as follows:
their name. Defendant (private respondent herein) having lost her right to the
possession of the premises upon the termination of their contract of lease,
her refusal to vacate the lease premises despite demands constitutes a Art. 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be
sufficient cause of action for her ejectment. from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it
is monthly; from week to week, if its is weekly; and from day to day, even if
the rent is to be paid daily. However, even though a monthly rent is paid, and
xxx xxx xxx4
no period for the lease has been set, the court may fix a longer term for the
lease after the lessee has occupied the premises for over one year. If the
It rendered judgment in favor of herein petitioner. On appeal, the Regional Trial rent is weekly, the court may likewise determine a longer period after the
Court, Branch 121, Kalookan City found no "cogent and compelling reason to disturb lessee has been in possession for over six months. In case of daily rent, the
the findings of the lower court,"5 and affirmed the MTC's decision. courts may fix a longer period after the lessee has stayed in the place for
over one month.
On December 9, 1992, private respondent elevated the case to the respondent Court of
Appeals by petition for review on certiorari.6 Said court reversed the metropolitan and regional Thus, We have held that lease agreements with no specified period, but in which
trial courts of Kalookan City and dismissed petitioner's complaint for ejectment using the rentals are paid monthly, are considered to be on a month-to-month 
following line of reasoning: (1) petitioners failed to prove that they do not own any other basis.8 They are for a definite period and expire after the last day of any given thirty-
available residential units within Kalookan; (2) consequently, petitioner's claim that they need day period, upon proper demand and notice by the lessor to vacate.9
the subject premises is unsubstantiated; (3) therefore, private respondent's ejectment from
the subject premises may only be based on the termination of the month-to-month lease
In the case at bench, it was found by all three lower courts that the lease over the subject (1) When the period agreed upon, or that which is fixed for the duration of
property was on a month-to-month basis, and that there was proper notice for non-renewal of leases under Articles 1687 has expired;
contract and demand for vacation of premises made by petitioners on private respondent.
Unquestionably, therefore, the verbal lease agreement enterred into by private respondent x x x           x x x          x x x
and petitioners' father and predecessor-in-interest has been validly terminated, in which case
there is sufficient cause of ejectment under Section 5(f) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 877 which applies to the case at bench. Thus, ejectment of private respondent by petitioners is justified.
reads:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
Sec. 5. Grounds for Judicial Ejectment. — Ejectment shall be allowed on the G.R. SP No. 29457, dated July 26, 1993, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decisions of
following grounds: the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 49, Kalookan City, dated April 29, 1992, end of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 121, Kalookan City, dated October 30, 1992, are REINSTATED.
xxx xxx xxx No costs.

(f) Expiration of the period of the lease contract. SO ORDERED.

This is in line with Our holding in the case of Palanca v. Intermediate Appellate

Court, 180 SCRA 119 (1989), that:

In the recently decided case of Uy Hoo and Sons Realty Development

Corporation v.  Court of Appeals and Thomas Kuan, 10 . . . , this Court ruled
that a month to month lease under Article 1687 is a lease with a definite
period, the expiration of which upon previous demand by the lessor to
vacate, can justify ejectment.

The Court noted, that notwithstanding the fact that the Miranda 11 case and
the  Rivera 12 case quoted therein involved a need for the lessor to re-
possess the leased premises for his own use, (which fact is not present in
this case), the Court applied the ruling therein on the ground that:

. . . the thrust of the decision is said cases appears to be that "the

determination of the period of a lease agreement cans still be made in
accordance with said Article 1687, and that in a month to month lease
situation, when petitioner (lessor) gave private respondent (lessee) notice to
vacate the premises in question, the contract of lease is deemed to have
expired as of the end of the month."
A.M. No. MTJ-93-892 October 25, 1995
Furthermore, it must be noted, that since the moth-to-month lease in the case at bench is
SAN MANUEL WOOD PRODUCTS, INC., complainant, 
considered one with a definite period, it falls within the exception provided in Section 6 of
vs.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 877. In other words, the first paragraph of Article 1673 of the New Civil
JUDGE RAMON B. TUPAS and CITY SHERIFF FIDEL CASUYON, both of 2nd Municipal
Code which provides that:
Trial Court in Cities, Davao City, respondents.
Art. 1673. The lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any of the following
causes:

PUNO, J.:
In a sworn Complaint,1 dated October 29, 1993, San Manuel Wood Products, Inc., charged On September 3, 1993, complainant deposited with the clerk of court the sum of Eight
Judge Ramon B. Tupas and City Sheriff Fidel Casuyon, both of the 2nd Municipal Trial Court Thousand Pesos (P8,000.00), the rentals due from June 6, 1993 to October 5, 1993.7
in Cities (Branch II), Davao City, with grave partiality, serious misconduct, abuse of authority
and/or ignorance of the law. The records disclose that the plaintiffs filed a "Supplemental Motion for Execution Pending
Appeal," dated June 30, 1993, in the MTCC. The supplemental motion was opposed by
Complainant is the defendant in an unlawful detainer case, docketed as Civil Case No. 424- complainant in its "Comment or Opposition to Supplemental Motion for Execution Pending
B-92.2 Appeal," dated July 14, 1993.

On June 3, 1993, respondent judge rendered a decision3 in Civil Case No. 424-B-92, in favor On August 11, 1993, respondent judge issued a special order,8 granting plaintiffs' motion for a
of the plaintiffs therein and against herein complainant. The parties received their copies of writ of execution pending appeal. The impugned special order reads:
the decision on June 14, 1993.4
This has reference to the Motion for Immediate Execution and Supplemental
Within the reglementary period to appeal, the plaintiffs filed a "Motion for Immediate Motion for Execution Pending Appeal filed by plaintiffs within the period to
Execution," dated June 21, 1993, of the MTCC decision. The motion was opposed by appeal, citing among others, the compelling reasons why immediate
complainant. execution be granted. Copies of plaintiffs' motions were furnished to counsel
for defendant and the latter filed its opposition thereto.
On June 24, 1993, while the motion for immediate execution was pending in the MTCC,
complainant filed a "Notice of Appeal and Approval of Cash/Supersedeas Bond"5 to stay the xxx xxx xxx
execution of the June 3, 1993 Decision. The notice of appeal and the supersedeas bond were
approved by respondent judge in an Order,6 dated July 16, 1993, thus: Plaintiffs alleged in their motion for immediate execution, supplemental
motion for execution pending appeal and supplemental allegations on the
ORDER motion for immediate execution the following reasons, to wit:

Notice of Appeal in the above-entitled case having been filed within due time, That lessor is authorized by law, upon the expiration of the
let the records of this case be forwarded to the Regional Trial Court of Davao lease, to eject the tenant, to repossess his property for his
City, in degree (sic) of appeal. own use, or for the use of any members of his families,
under paragraph (c) of BP Blg. 877 (Rental Law). Similarly, a
The supersedeas bond in the sum of Forty-One Thousand Pesos land-owner bonafide intention to cultivate the land personally
(P41,000.00) in cash executed to the plaintiff is hereby APPROVED to enter thru employment of machineries, section 50 (a) RA 1149, as
action (sic) in the Regional Trial Court to pay the rents covering the period of amended by RA 2268, and that defendant, which already
thirteen (13) months from May 6, 1992, up to June 6, 1993, and the sum of owned more than ten hectares, is prohibited from acquiring
Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) for attorney's fees, damages, and the lot in question. That renders defendants' appeal dilatory.
costs accruing down to the time of judgment appealed from. During the
pendency of the appeal, defendant shall deposit with the Court the further xxx xxx xxx
amount of monthly rental due from time to time for the reasonable value of
the use and occupation of the premises. To hold that, in the present case, the mere filing of the notice
of appeal, and the filing or deposit of cash bond with the
The supersedeas bond is ordered transmitted with the records of this case to clerk of court has automatically deprived the trial court of its
the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, to which the action jurisdiction over this case, would be to practically nullify the
is appealed from (sic). discretionary power granted said court by section 2, Rule 39,
to order, upon good reasons, the execution of its judgment
SO ORDERED. before the expiration of the time to appeal; because in all
cases, the judgment debtor may, on the very day the
judgment is rendered or notified to him, file notice of appeal
 and deposit of P60.00 as cash bond with the clerk of Complainant now accuses respondent judge of grave partiality, serious misconduct, abuse of
court . . . . authority and/or ignorance of the law for issuing the August 11, 1993 Special Order and the
September 8, 1993 Order.
b) plaintiffs as shown in the complaint are badly in need of
the land for legitimate needs as they are only renting lots Complainant contends that, upon perfection of its appeal on July 16, 1993, (sic) respondent
and houses where they are presently residing, as per the judge lost its jurisdiction over the case. Thus, the Special Order, dated August 11, 1993,
affidavit of merit attached to plaintiffs' motion. ordering the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal, is null and void. Complainant
argues, further, that the issuance of the July 16, 1993 Order should be considered as a denial
After a careful perusal of plaintiffs' motion for execution pending appeal and of the motion for execution pending appeal filed by the plaintiffs.
the opposition thereof (sic), the Court is of the view that, indeed, the special
reasons alleged by plaintiffs are meritorious. Furthermore, complainant points out that the rule governing execution of judgment in
ejectment cases is Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, not Section 2 of Rule 39, the
The filing of the Notice of Appeal by the defendant has no other justifiable provision relied upon by respondent judge. Complainant also assails the immediate
reasons than to frustrate the decision of the Court and that the defendant's implementation of the writ of execution by respondent City Sheriff.
continued stay in the premises renders the decision illusory.
In their joint Comment, 11 dated March 10, 1994, respondents aver that the motion for
Premises considered, let, therefore, issue a writ of execution pending appeal execution pending appeal was filed on June 21, 1993, three (3) days before the filing of the
under Section 2 of Rule 39, upon plaintiffs' filing of a bond which this Court Notice of Appeal and Approval of Cash/Supersedeas Bond. Hence, respondent judge insists
fixed at One Hundred Thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to answer for any he had not lost jurisdiction to act on the motion for execution. Allegedly, complainant
lawful obligations that maybe (sic) adjudged against plaintiffs, if any, later on. deposited the supersedeas bond but not the accruing rentals as directed in the judgment. In
(emphasis supplied) view of complainant's failure to deposit the rentals due, respondent judge claims that the
appeal had not been perfected.
Resolution of plaintiffs' supplemental allegations on motion for immediate
execution filed on August 11, 1993, on the ground that defendant has failed Respondents aver, further, that complainant refused to sign the writ and even constructed
to pay or deposit the rentals for the periods from June 7, 1993 to July 6, three (3) houses on the subject lot despite the issuance of the writ of execution. They charge
1993, and from July 7, 1993 to August 6, 1993, is hereby withheld as the that the appeal is a dilatory tactic of the complainant. Finally, they claim that complainant is
matter can be appropriately addressed to the appellate court for its guilty of forum shopping when it filed an action before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
consideration and resolution. assailing the validity of the respondent judge's August 11, 1993 Special Order and the
September 8, 1993 Order.
SO ORDERED.
Considering the allegations in the joint comment of the respondents, we required complainant
to file its reply. 12 It did not file any reply. We referred the present administrative complaint at
The foregoing special order was received by complainant on September 7, 1993. The
bar to the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. 13 In a
plaintiffs received their copies on September 7 and 8, 1993.
Memorandum, dated May 5, 1995, the Office of the Court Administrator found the complaint
meritorious. The relevant portion of the memorandum reads:
In compliance with the August 11, 1993 Special Order, the plaintiffs posted a bond of
P100,000.00. The bond was approved by respondent judge in an Order, dated
xxx xxx xxx
September 8, 1993.9 On its part, complainant moved for a reconsideration of the
August 11, 1993 Special Order and the September 8, 1993 Order and requested the
clerk of court to hold in abeyance the implementation of the writ of execution. It is well settled that to stay the immediate execution in an ejectment
Respondent judge failed to act on the motion for reconsideration. proceeding, it is required that the defendant must (a) perfect his appeal; (b)
file the supersedeas bond and (c) periodically deposit the rentals falling due
during the pendency of the appeal.
On September 10, 1993, respondent City Sheriff Fidel Casuyon served the writ to
complainant. It was returned unsatisfied. 10
As to the perfection of the appeal, with the advent of BP 129, it is now settled
that the perfection of appeal is upon the expiration of the last day to appeal
by ANY party contrary to Judge Tupas' thinking that he has to approve the As for Sheriff Casuyon, it appears that the writ was returned unsatisfied.
Notice of Appeal. Complainant's general manager refused to sign the same. While he may
have agreed to a formal delineation of the boundaries, this was because the
Since both plaintiffs and defendant (complainant in this case) received their complainant was buying time as it had planned to purchase the lot in
respective copies of the decision on June 14, 1993, the last day to appeal question but failed.
was June 29, 1993 and, by operation of law, the appeal of complainant was
perfected on June 30, 1993, it having filed its Notice of Appeal on June 24, In view of all the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that: (a) Retired
1993. Judge Ramon B. Tupas, MTCC, Branch 2, Davao City, be FINED the amount
of P10,000.00, for Gross Ignorance of the Law; (b) the said amount be
The complainant deposited with the Clerk of Court, MTCC, Davao City the TAKEN from the P20,000.00 withheld from his terminal leave credits by
correct amount of P41,000 to cover the rentals for thirteen (13) months at virtue of Resolution of the Court, dated February 2, 1994, and (c) the charges
P2,000.00 a month and (a)ttorney's fees of P15,000.00. . . . . against Sheriff Casuyon be dismissed the same being without merit.

It is clear that immediate execution was thus stayed. We agree with the legal disquisition of the Office of the Court Administrator.

Complainant, however, did not deposit periodically — in this case, monthly — This is an ejectment case, hence, the applicable rule is Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of
(the) P2,000.00 a month (rental) with the Clerk of Court. This is clear from Court. It states:
complainant's own Annex "C" which shows that the amount of P8,000.00 was
paid only on September 3, 1993 to the Clerk of Court, RTC, Davao City to Sec. 8. Immediate execution of judgment. How to stay the same. — If
cover the rental due from June 6, 1993 to October 5, 1993. judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue
immediately, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant, to stay
The rule is: execution, files a sufficient bond, approved by the municipal or city court and
executed to the plaintiff to enter the action in the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) and to pay the rents, damages and costs accruing
Should the defendant fail to make the payments above
down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the
prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the
pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of
appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, of
rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as found by the
which the defendant shall have notice, and upon proof of
judgment of the municipal or city court to exist.
such failure shall order the execution of the judgment
appealed from with respect to the restoration of possession,
but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its All money so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited in the provincial
course until the final disposition thereof on its merits. or city treasury, and shall be held there until the final disposition of the
(emphasis supplied) appeal, unless the court, by agreement of the interested parties, or in the
absence of reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for
justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make
Judge Tupas had, therefore, NO jurisdiction and authority to issue his
the payments above prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the
Special Order of August 11, 1993; He should have dismissed all of the
appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, of which the
plaintiffs' motion for execution pending appeal because Section 8, Rule 70
defendant shall have notice, and upon proof of such failure, shall order the
and not Section 2, Rule 39 is what is applicable as this is an ejectment case.
execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of
possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal from taking
It is only the appellate court — the RTC for ejectment cases — which can its course until the final disposition thereof on its merits. . . . (emphasis
order the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal but only for the supplied)
EXPLICIT reason that the periodic rentals as found in the inferior court
decision were not paid, with notice and hearing mandated.
Respondent judge missed the foregoing rule when it applied Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court. It reads:
It does not appear that Judge Tupas acted out of malice or a corrupt motive
but rather a misapprehension of the law on ejectment.
 Sec. 2 Execution pending appeal — On motion of the prevailing party with sheriff should be sternly warned for his infraction to avoid a repetition of similar arbitrariness
notice to the adverse party the court may, in its discretion, order execution to on his part. 20
issue even before the expiration of the time to appeal, upon good reasons to
be stated in a special order. If a record on appeal is filed thereafter, the IN VIEW WHEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered:
motion and the special order shall be included therein.
1. Holding respondent Judge Ramon B. Tupas administratively liable for gross ignorance of
It ought to be mentioned that Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, applies to the rules. Accordingly, he is ordered to pay a fine of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00); and
execution pending appeal in ordinary civil actions. This rule requires good reasons
before a writ of execution can be issued in favor of the prevailing party. Its issuance 2. Warning respondent Sheriff Fidel Casuyon against committing similar violations of the rules
is subject to the sound discretion of the court and is usually not favored because it in implementing the writ of execution.
affects the rights of the parties which are yet to be ascertained on appeal.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to the personal records of Sheriff Fidel Casuyon.
In stark contrast, under section 8 of Rule 70, it is not necessary to show good reasons for the
immediate execution of the judgment against the
defendant. 14 The judgment is executed immediately in favor of the plaintiff, as a matter of SO ORDERED.
right, to prevent further damage arising from the loss of possession. 15

It is settled that to stay the execution of judgment of an inferior court, the losing defendant in
an ejectment case must: (a) perfect his appeal; (b) file a supersedeas bond; and (c) make a
periodic deposit of the rentals due or the reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the property during the pendency of the appeal. These requisites must
concur. 16

In the case at bar, complainant filed his appeal on time and deposited the required
supersedeas bond in the inferior court, but it failed to comply with the third requisite as related
above. As borne by the records, the rentals accruing for the months of June, July and August
were deposited only on September 3, 1993. Upon its failure to meet the third requisite
prescribed under the rules, the plaintiffs have the right to move for execution of the judgment
appealed from. The order of execution, however, has to be issued by the appellate court, in
this case the Regional Trial Court, since the respondent judge had lost his jurisdiction over
the ejectment case after the appeal to the RTC had been perfected. 17 In disregarding the
rules and settled jurisprudence, the respondent judge showed gross ignorance, albeit without
any malice or corrupt motive.

We now come to the immediate implementation of the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 424-
B-92 by respondent Sheriff Fidel Casuyon. The records show that the August 11, 1993
Special Order, granting the motion for immediate execution, was received by complainant on
September 7, 1993. The writ of execution was issued on September 9, 1993. 18 The following ALUD D. LOPEZ, REMEDIOS LOPEZ-MARZAN, ROSE LOPEZ-CO, AMADO D. LOPEZ,
day, the writ was served by respondent sheriff against the complainant. CYNTHIA LOPEZ-PORTUGAL, JOSE D. LOPEZ JR., and MAY LOPEZ RUEDA
represented by SALUD D. LOPEZ, petitioners, vs.  ROBERT P. DAVID JR. and
We have ruled that "the immediate enforcement of a writ of ejectment execution is carried out CLEOPATRA DAVID CAMPO-RUIZ, respondents.
by giving the defendant a notice of such writ and making a demand that defendant comply
therewith within a reasonable period, normally from three (3) to five (5) days, and it is only DECISION
after such period that the sheriff enforces the writ by the bodily removal of the defendant and
his personal belongings. 19 This was disregarded by respondent sheriff. Thus, respondent PANGANIBAN, J.:
 Ejectment proceedings must observe jurisdictional requirements to complement their August 10, 1995 demanding of them to vacate the same on or before September 15, 1995,
summary nature. Among them is the one-year bar within which to bring the suit. After the which [respondents] did not heed.
lapse of this period, plaintiffs can no longer avail themselves of the summary suits in the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) or the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), but must litigate in the In their defense, [respondents] alleged that the subject property is owned in common by
Regional Trial Court in an ordinary action to recover possession. Cirilas children, Salud, Robert S. David, Sr. (father of [respondent] Robert P. David) and
Celestina S. David (mother of the other [respondent]); that the subject property was placed in
the name of Lopez upon the agreement that it would be held in trust for Cirilas children; and
The Case that Salud, Ligaya S. David (mother of [respondent] Robert P. David) and Celestina S. David
built a three-door apartment on the subject property which equally belongs to them.

Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set On August 15, 1997, the [MeTC] rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
aside the April 26, 2001 Decision[2] and the February 5, 2002 Resolution[3] of the Court of reads:
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 59724. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [petitioners]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The appealed decision of the Regional and against [respondents]. Accordingly, the latter is hereby ordered as follows:
Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 95) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another
rendered DISMISSING the ejectment case.[4] a) To vacate the disputed property, specifically located at No. 174 Sct. Fuentebella St.,
Diliman, Quezon City and completely surrender possession thereof to [petitioners];
On the other hand, the challenged Resolution denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. b) To pay [petitioners] the amount of P10,000.00 as a reasonable amount of compensation or
rental for the use and occupancy thereof per unit each month, to be reckoned from
September 15, 1995 until they shall have vacated the same;
The Facts
c) To pay [petitioners] the sum of P10,000.00 as and for attorneys fees; and

The facts of the case are narrated by the CA as follows: d) To pay the costs of suit.

Subject of an action for ejectment before the Metropolitan Trial Court [MeTC] of Quezon City The counter-claim of [respondents] is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
(Branch 38) was a 540 square-meter land (or subject property), located at No. 174 Sct.
Fuentebella, Quezon City and covered by TCT No. RT-109698 (26613) in the name of Jose
SO ORDERED.
C. Lopez (or Lopez).

Petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court (or RTC) of Quezon City (Branch 95)
The action was instituted on October 2, 1996 by Salud D. Lopez, Remedios Lopez-Marzan,
which, on December 17, 1999, rendered a decision affirming en toto  that of the [MeTC]. x x
Rose Lopez-Co, Amado D. Lopez, Cynthia Lopez-Portugal, Jose D. Lopez, Jr. and May
x."[5]
Lopez-Rueda [or petitioners] against Robert P. David and Cleopatra David Campo-Ruiz [or
respondents]. It was predicated on the averments that [petitioners] are the owners of the
subject property which was purchased from the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation
by Lopez, deceased husband of [petitioner] Salud D. Lopez (or Salud) and father of the rest Ruling of the Court of Appeals
of the [petitioners]; that in 1954, upon her request, Cirila Sadsad Vda. De David (or Cirila),
Saluds mother and [respondents] grandmother, was allowed by Salud to build a residential
house on the subject property and to stay thereon until she could find a suitable residence of The CA found that the MeTC erred in taking cognizance of the ejectment suit, since the
her own; that upon Cirilas death, [respondents] continued her occupancy of the subject case had been filed beyond one year from the withholding of possession. [6] The appellate
property; that the possession of Cirila and [respondents] of the subject property, without court ruled thus:
paying rentals and a written contract, was upon tolerance of Salud; that [petitioners] withdrew
their consent to [respondents] occupancy of the subject property per their lawyers letter dated
It appears that pursuant to the demand letter dated August 10, 1995 of [petitioners] lawyer, Sole Issue:
[respondents] were given until September 15, 1995 within which to vacate the subject Jurisdiction
property and surrender possession thereof to [petitioners]. Under the situation, [respondents]
possession became unlawful on September 16, 1995, or upon expiration of the grace period,
when they continued occupying the subject property. However, the ejectment suit was only Petitioners contend that, having participated in the trial of the case and having belatedly
instituted on October 2, 1996, or more than one year from expiration of the period given raised the issue of jurisdiction for the first time on appeal with the CA, respondents are
[respondents] to vacate the subject property. estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the MeTC.

The one-year period provided for in Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
commences from accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of Jurisdiction Lies
possession of the realty. In an action for unlawful detainer, as in the case at bench, it is with the RTC
counted from the last letter of demand to vacate.

Since the ejectment suit was instituted after a year from the demand to vacate, it is an accion Well-settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court and the nature of the action are
publiciana which is cognizable by the RTC. Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover determined by the averments in the complaint.[12] To give the court jurisdiction to effect the
the right of possession when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year. ejectment of an occupant or a deforciant from the land, it is necessary that the complaint
should embody a statement of facts that brings the party clearly within the class of cases for
Consequently, the MTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. And in which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature.[13] On its
affirming the decision of the MTC, the RTC had committed a palpable error and/or had acted face, the complaint must show enough ground for the court to assume jurisdiction without
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[7] (Citations omitted) resort to parol testimony.[14]
Pertinent allegations in petitioners complaint are as follows:
In denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration,[8] the CA noted that among the
affirmative defenses pleaded in the Answer was that this Honorable Court does not have any 3. That [petitioners] x x x are co-owners of a parcel of land located at Diliman, Quezon City x
jurisdiction over the case because the real issue is ownership, while in the [pretrial] brief, x x;
[respondents] posed the issue of whether the court of origin has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case considering that there is no lessor-lessee relationship between the parties.
[9] 4. That sometime in 1954, [petitioner] SALUD D. LOPEZs mother, CIRILA SADSAD Vda. DE
DAVID, requested herein [petitioners] to allow the former to temporarily build a residential
Hence, this Petition.[10] house at [petitioners] property and stay in the premises until her mother shall [have] found a
suitable residence of her own;

5. That since then, [petitioners] allowed said Cirila David to occupy the premises without
The Issue
paying monthly rent and without the benefit of a written contract but thru sheer tolerance of
the [petitioners];
In their Memorandum, petitioners raised this sole issue for our consideration:
6. That upon the death of [petitioner] Salud D. Lopezs mother, [respondents] continued to
Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the case for ejectment [on] the occupy the subject premises without paying any rentals and were allowed to continue to
ground of lack of jurisdiction despite the submission of respondents to the MTC and RTC and occupy two (2) separate units thru sheer generosity and mere tolerance of herein
all the proceedings therein.[11] [petitioners];

7. That subsequently, [petitioners] withdrew their consent and repeated demands were made
upon [respondents] to vacate the subject premises but [respondents] refused and failed to
The Courts Ruling heed the demand violative of [petitioners] preferential right of possession over the subject 2
units;
The Petition is bereft of merit.
8. That on August 4, 1995, [petitioners] were constrained to refer the matter to their previous the failure to raise the question of jurisdiction at an earlier stage barred the party from
lawyer for appropriate legal action, to which a letter of demand was sent to [respondents] to questioning it later. We explained:
vacate the premises but x x x the latter refused x x x to vacate the subject premises; x x x[15]
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
To summarize, petitioners aver that (1) they are the owners of the property; (2) they reasons. Thus, we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of
allowed respondents to occupy it by tolerance; (3) they withdrew their consent; and (4) they estoppel by laches.
demanded that respondents leave the property, but the latter refused to do so.
Based on the foregoing averments, the case at bar involves unlawful deprivation or Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
withholding of possession. Hence, it could either be one for unlawful detainer cognizable by of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier;
the MeTC under Rule 70 or one for accion publiciana, which is cognizable by the regional it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
trial court.[16] presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The Complaint filed by petitioners alleges that the demand letter required respondents to The doctrine of laches or of stale demands is based upon grounds of public policy which
leave on September 15, 1995. The ejectment case was filed on September 24, 1996.[17] Thus, requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute
the MeTC had no jurisdiction to hear the case. of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.[29]
Under Section 1 of Rule 70,[18] the one-year period within which a complaint for unlawful
detainer can be filed should be counted from the date of demand, because only upon the
lapse of that period does the possession become unlawful. [19] In the present case, it is We have applied this doctrine to succeeding cases by denying allegations of lack of
undisputed that petitioners Complaint was filed beyond one year from the time that jurisdiction if the question was not raised at an earlier stage, but brought up only after an
respondents possession allegedly became unlawful. adverse decision.[30] We have also stressed, however, that this doctrine is merely an
exception to the general rule and time-honored principle that jurisdiction is not lost by waiver
We have ruled that forcible entry and unlawful detainer are quieting processes and the or by estoppel.[31]
one-year time bar to the suit is in pursuance of the summary nature of the action. [20] Thus, we
have nullified proceedings in the MeTC when it improperly assumed jurisdiction of a case in Considering these established facts, we find that the Tijam  doctrine is inapplicable.
which the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession had exceeded one year.[21] As defined in that case, estoppel by laches occurs when a party fails -- through
After the lapse of the one-year period, the suit must be commenced in the RTC via negligence or omission -- to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
an accion publiciana.[22]  Accion publiciana  is a suit for recovery of the right to possess. It is an that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned or declined to assert it.
ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of Herein, respondents cannot be perceived to have warranted the presumption that they
title.[23] It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual were abandoning or declining to assert the right to question the jurisdiction of the
of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.[24] The CA MeTC. From the beginning, they have been challenging its jurisdiction and asserting that the
was thus correct in declaring that jurisdiction belonged to the RTC. RTC, not the MeTC, had jurisdiction over the case. Thus, in their Answer with affirmative
defenses and counterclaim,[32] they challenged the MeTCs jurisdiction over the Complaint.
[33]
 The same objections were alleged and presented as issues in their pretrial Brief. [34]
Estoppel Does Not Apply
We also note that respondents consistently allege that they have been in peaceful
possession of the premises since 1951.[35] Their argument is that the MeTC has no
It is settled that any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be jurisdiction, since the unlawful withholding of possession has already exceeded one year. In
struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court. [25] Indeed, the general rule is that their Memorandum[36] submitted on appeal to the RTC, respondents argued:
a question of jurisdiction may be raised at any time, provided that doing so does not result in
the mockery of the tenets of fair play.[26] An exception to this rule arises when the party is 10. It is also an undisputed fact that [respondents] have been in continuous and uninterrupted
barred by estoppel, in which case the issue of jurisdiction may not be raised.[27] possession of the premises from 1951 up to present time or [for] a period of forty seven years
(47).
In bringing up the issue of estoppel, petitioners principally anchor their argument
on Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.[28] Applying the rule on estoppel by laches, we declared therein that
x x x x x x x x x
Even if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from
another who had been in the physical or material possession of the same for more than one
year by resorting to a summary action for ejectment. x x x[37]

x x x x x x x x x

Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession when dispossession
has lasted for more than one year or when dispossession was effected by means other than
those mentioned in Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.[38]

It is apparent that respondents have been questioning the jurisdiction of the MeTC and
alleging that the controversy was originally cognizable by the RTC, contrary to the contention
of petitioners. Thus, we cannot countenance petitioners position that respondents are already
estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction or of whether the ejectment case was filed
within the one-year period after the withholding of possession.
With regard to the lapse of the one-year period from the date of demand, even assuming
that respondents raised the issue only for the first time on appeal with the CA, the foregoing
argument can be considered without violating fair play. This position is consistent with the
theory adopted and constantly raised by respondents in the lower courts: that the MeTC had
no jurisdiction.
Finally, we find it necessary to apply the strict interpretation of the jurisdiction rule, given
the fact that (1) respondents have been in possession of the property since 1954; (2)
proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature; and (3) the one-
year time bar to the suit is consistent with the summary nature of the action.[39]
WHEREFORE, this Petition is DENIED and  the assailed Decision and
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

ROSA DELOS REYES, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES FRANCISCO ODONES AND ARWENIA
ODONES, NOEMI OTALES, AND GREGORIO RAMIREZ, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N 

NACHURA, J.:

This petition for certiorari  under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks the reversal of the February 19,
2007 Decision[1] and the May 22, 2007 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming the June 20,
2006 decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac, which in turn set aside
the March 28, 2006 decision[4]  of the Municipal Trial detainer, and the MTC had no jurisdiction over the same.[16]

Court (MTC) of Camiling, Tarlac, in a complaint for unlawful detainer, disposed as follows: In its June 20, 2006 decision,[17] the RTC set aside the MTC's judgment and dismissed the complaint.
The RTC held that the complaint failed to aver acts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against defendants, ordering since it did not state how entry was effected or how and when the dispossession started. Hence, the
defendants, spouses Arwenia Odones and Francisco Odones, their heirs and assigns and all persons remedy should either be accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria in the proper RTC.
acting in their behalves to vacate the premises and to surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff.
Defendants are likewise ordered to pay One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos as reasonable compensation Aggrieved, petitioner sought recourse with the CA, asseverating that the RTC misappreciated the
for the use of the land and Attorney's fees in the amount of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos. allegations in the complaint and that respondents were estopped from assailing the MTC's jurisdiction
because they did not raise such issue in the proceedings before that court. Petitioner insisted that, as
SO ORDERED.[5] the registered owner of the lot, she has a preferential right of possession over it.[18]

The Facts On February 19, 2007, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC, adding that, as pronounced in Go, Jr.
v. Court of Appeals,[19] in order to justify an action for unlawful detainer, the owner's permission or
This case emanated from a complaint for Unlawful Detainer with Preliminary Injunction[6]  filed by tolerance must be present at the beginning of the possession.[20]  Petitioner moved for reconsideration,
[21]
petitioner Rosa delos Reyes (petitioner) against respondents spouses Arwenia and Francisco Odones,  but the motion was denied in a Resolution dated May 22, 2007.[22]  Hence, the instant
Noemi Otales, and Gregorio Ramirez (respondents) before the MTC of Camiling, Tarlac, on July 12, petition[23]ascribing the following errors to the CA:
2005. The complaint alleged these material facts:
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE CASE OF GO, JR. v. COURT OF
3. That [petitioner] is the owner of a parcel of land covered x x x by Transfer Certificate of Title No. APPEALS.
392430, of the Land Records for the Province of Tarlac, located at Pao, Camiling, Tarlac, x x x.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE HON. MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
4. That even before the document upon which the title was based, [petitioner] has long been the owner OF CAMILING, TARLAC NEVER ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
thereof;
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS ARE
5. That [respondents] are staying on the said property with a house/improvements therein, with the ALREADY ESTOPPED FROM RAISING THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION.
mere tolerance of [petitioner] only without any contract whatsoever and for which there is an implied
understanding to vacate upon the demand; THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF STARE DECISIS.
[24]

6. That [petitioner] previously demanded verbally upon [respondents] to vacate which they refused and
for which a written notice was sent advising them to vacate the said property within fifteen (15) days The petition is meritorious.
from receipt of the letter to vacate x x x.
Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which has
7. That the said letter was sent by registered mail on June 17, 2005, which was duly received x x x.[7] jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the complaint.  In ejectment cases, the complaint should
embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the
In their Answer with Counterclaim,[8] respondents claimed that they are the owners of the lot, having statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show
purchased the same by virtue of an Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale[9] dated January 29, enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.[25]
2004, executed by the heirs of Donata Lardizabal, the land's original owner. Respondents denied that
their occupancy of the property was by virtue of petitioner's tolerance.[10] Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds
possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract,
Respondents further argued that the basis of petitioner's Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT), which is a express or implied. The possession by the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became
Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 18, 1972,[11] was a forgery because the purported vendors therein, illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.[26]  The proceeding is summary in
Donata Lardizabal and Francisco Razalan, died on June 30, 1926[12] and June 5, 1971,[13] respectively.  nature, jurisdiction over which lies with the proper MTC or metropolitan trial court. The action must be
Incidentally, the said TCT and Deed of Absolute Sale are the subject of a pending case for annulment of brought up within one year from the date of last demand, and the issue in the case must be the right to
title before the RTC, Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac.[14] physical possession.[27]

In a decision dated March 28, 2006, the MTC ruled in favor of petitioner, and ordered respondents to A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
vacate the property and to pay rent for the use and occupation of the same, plus attorney's fees.
1. initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
Respondents appealed[15] to the RTC, arguing that since the complaint failed to allege how respondents plaintiff;
entered the property or when they erected their houses thereon, it is an improper action for unlawful
 2. eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the This notwithstanding, the determination made herein as regards petitioner's ownership of the lot by
termination of the latter's right of possession; virtue of TCT No. 392430 is only  prima facie and only for purposes of resolving the issue of physical
possession. These pronouncements are without prejudice to the case of annulment of the deed of sale
3. thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of and TCT filed by respondents against petitioner.[33]  Lastly, these pronouncements are not binding on
the enjoyment thereof; and respondents Noemi Otales and Gregorio Ramirez over whose persons no jurisdiction was acquired by
the MTC.[34]
4. within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.[28] WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 19, 2007 Decision and the May 22, 2007
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The March 28, 2006
decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
Contrary to the findings of the RTC and the CA, petitioner's allegations in the complaint clearly makes SO ORDERED.
out a case for unlawful detainer, essential to confer jurisdiction over the subject matter on the MTC.
Petitioner alleges that she is the owner of the lot, as shown by TCT No. 392430, issued by the Registry
of Deeds of Tarlac; that respondents are occupying the lot by virtue of petitioner's tolerance; and that
petitioner sent a letter to respondents on June 17, 2005, demanding that they vacate the property, but
they failed and refused to do so. The complaint was filed on July 12, 2005, or within one year from the
time the last demand to vacate was made.

Firm is the rule that as long as these allegations demonstrate a cause of action for unlawful detainer,
the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter.

The CA misapplied the ruling in Go[29] that tolerance must be present right from the start of possession,
which possession is sought to be recovered. The CA, in affirming the RTC, likewise erroneously applied
the rule that jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint for ejectment, such that when
the complaint fails to faithfully aver facts constitutive of unlawful detainer, as where it does not state
when and how entry was effected, or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either
be accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria in the proper RTC.

The requirement that the complaint should aver, as jurisdictional facts, when and how entry into the
property was made by the defendants applies only when the issue is the timeliness of the filing of the
complaint before the MTC, and not when the jurisdiction of the MTC is assailed because the case is one
for accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC.[30]  This is because, in forcible entry cases, the prescriptive
period is counted from the date of defendants' actual entry into the property; whereas, in unlawful
detainer cases, it is counted from the date of the last demand to vacate.  Hence, to determine whether
the case was filed on time, there is a necessity to ascertain whether the complaint is one for forcible
entry or for unlawful detainer; and since the main distinction between the two actions is when and how
defendant entered the property, the determinative facts should be alleged in the complaint.[31]

In Go, there was evidence that the possession by the defendant was illegal at the inception and not
merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint. No such similar finding is extant in this case.  Further, one
of the factual issues raised in Go was whether the action was filed within one (1) year from the date the
last demand was made.  Here, it is beyond dispute that the complaint for unlawful detainer was filed ALPA-PCM Inc, vs Bulasao
within one (1) year from the date the demand letter was sent on June 17, 2005.
 
Based on the foregoing, the MTC validly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint and we agree with its
conclusion that petitioner is entitled to the physical possession of the lot, she having been able to prove
RESOLUTION
by preponderance of evidence, through the TCT registered in her name, that she is entitled to
possession of the property as owner. The countervailing evidence presented by respondents that
sought to dispute the authenticity of petitioner's TCT cannot be given weight in this case. Settled is the The petitioner, ALPA-PCM, Inc. (ALPA-PCM), filed with the Court a petition for review
rule that the validity of a certificate of title cannot be attacked in an action for ejectment.[32]
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying for the reversal of the
decision[1] dated January 6, 2011 and the resolution[2] dated May 19, 2011 of the Court of In a decision dated January 6, 2011, the CA dismissed ALPA-PCMs petition,[8] finding
Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 102417. On July 6, 2011, the Court denied the petition for no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in granting the Bulasaos motion for
failure to find any reversible error in the assailed CA rulings. [3] ALPA-PCM filed the present execution. The CA declared that the RTC had power to grant execution pending appeal as
motion seeking a reconsideration of the Courts Resolution. part of its residual jurisdiction under Section 8, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.

BACKGROUND FACTS As stated earlier, ALPA-PCM took exception from the CAs ruling by filing a petition
for review on certiorari with this Court. It argued that there must be good reasons to justify
In 2004, the private respondents, Vincent, Juliet and Susana, all surnamed Bulasao
execution pending appeal and cited as basis Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. It
(the Bulasaos) filed an action for unlawful detainer against ALPA-PCM before the
pointed out that the RTC failed to state good reasons that justified the writ of execution. We
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet.[4] The MTC ruled in favor of the
denied ALPA-PCMs petition in our Resolution of July 6, 2011.
Bulasaos and ordered ALPA-PCM to vacate the subject property in a decision dated May 31,
2006.[5] On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 62, In support of its motion for reconsideration of the Courts Resolution, ALPA-PCM
affirmed the MTCs ruling in a decision dated July 31, 2007.[6] reiterated the above arguments and added that the RTC acted with undue haste in granting
the Bulasaos motion for writ of execution. It alleged that the filing of a motion for execution by
 
the Bulasaos (August 13, 2007) preceded its filing of a motion for reconsideration of the RTC

On August 13, 2007, the Bulasaos filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of decision (August 16, 2007); hence, the motion for execution was premature since the

execution. Three days after or on August 16, 2007, ALPA-PCM filed its motion for decision sought to be executed was still for further review by the RTC. It cited the Courts

reconsideration of the RTC decision dismissing its appeal, which the RTC denied on October ruling in JP Latex Technology, Inc. v. Ballons Granger Balloons, Inc.,[9] which said that

25, 2007. Intending to seek recourse against the RTC rulings via an appeal, ALPA-PCM [w]here there is a pending motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision, an order execution

initially filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition/Appeal  on November 13, 2007.[7] (sic) pending appeal is improper and premature.

  THE COURTS RULING

In the meantime, the RTC granted the Bulasaos motion for execution through an The Court fails to find any substantial argument raised by ALPA-PCM that merits a

order dated November 21, 2007. ALPA-PCM sought reconsideration of the November 21, reconsideration of our earlier Resolution.

2007 order, but the RTC denied the motion in an order dated February 5, 2008. The RTC Execution pending appeal of decisions in
subsequently issued a writ of execution on February 12, 2008. ALPA-PCM questioned the ejectment cases

RTC orders granting execution of the decision, as well as the writ of execution itself,
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court governs the appeal of a decision of the RTC rendered in the
before the CA by filing a separate certiorari  petition. ALPA-PCM alleged that the RTCs
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; the appeal is made by filing a petition for review with the
orders authorizing the execution of the decision in favor of the Bulasaos are null and void,
CA.[10] Despite the filing of a petition with the CA, however, Rule 42 grants the RTC residual
since the filing of its appeal with the CA deprived the RTC of jurisdiction to issue the orders.
jurisdiction to order execution pending appeal, so long as (1) the CA has not yet given due
course to the petition, and (2) the requirements of Section 2, Rule 39 are observed. The judgment. The RTC, however, is precluded from acting on the motion for execution until it has
relevant portion of Section 8, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court states:  resolved the motion for reconsideration. In the present case, the RTC heeded this rule, as it

Section 8. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof (a) x x x granted the Bulasaos motion for execution only after it has resolved to deny ALPA-PCMs
motion for reconsideration of its decision.
However, before the Court of Appeals gives due course to the
petition, the Regional Trial Court may issue orders for the protection and Immediate execution of the RTC decision on
preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter appeal to CA or SC
litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent
litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 After affirming the RTCs power to allow execution, we now consider ALPA-PCMs
of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal. 
claim that the RTC must nonetheless cite good reasons justifying execution, citing as basis

Under Section 6, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, the CA can give due course to a petition for Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

review when it finds prima facie that the lower court has committed an error of fact or law that
The Court reminds ALPA-PCM, particularly its counsel, Atty. Guillermo R. Bandonil,
will warrant a reversal or modification of the appealed decision.[11] This initial determination by
Jr., that this case originated from the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the Bulasaos
the CA can take place only when the proper pleadings have actually been filed before the CA,
against it. Actions for unlawful detainer are governed primarily by the Revised Rules on
enabling it to study the facts of the case and the alleged errors of the assailed ruling. In other
Summary Procedure[13] and suppletorily by the Rules of Court.[14] Section 21 of the Revised
words, the CA can give due course to an appeal of the RTC decision only (1) after the filing of
Rules on Summary Procedure states that:
a petition for review, and (2) upon the filing of the comment or other pleading required by the
Sec. 21. Appeal. The judgment or final order shall be appealable to
CA, or the expiration of the period for the filing thereof without such comment or pleading the appropriate regional trial court which shall decide the same in
having been submitted. accordance with Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The decision of
the regional trial court in civil cases governed by this Rule, including
When the RTC granted the Bulasaos motion for execution pending appeal on forcible entry and unlawful detainer, shall be immediately
executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken
November 21, 2007, ALPA-PCM has not yet filed its petition for review with the CA; what
therefrom. Section 10 of Rule 70 shall be deemed repealed. [emphasis and
ALPA-PCM filed on November 13, 2007 was only a motion for extension of time to file its underscoring ours]
petition. In the absence of any petition for review actually filed with the CA, the CA could
 
clearly not have given due course to ALPA-PCMs appeal. The RTC, thus, retained its
residual jurisdiction over the case to authorize execution of the decision. The above rule, without any qualification whatsoever, has decreed the immediately executory
nature of decisions of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, involving
The Court also fails to find anything irregular in the filing by the Bulasaos of a motion
cases falling under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. It requires no further
for execution ahead of the filing by ALPA-PCM of its motion for reconsideration of the RTC
justification or even good reasons for the RTC to authorize execution, even if an
decision. ALPA-PCM misconstrues our ruling in JP Latex Technology, Inc. v. Ballons
appeal has already been filed before the CA. Indeed, the provision does not even require a
Granger Balloons, Inc.[12] The ruling does not prevent the prevailing party from filing a motion
bond to be filed by the prevailing party to allow execution to proceed. [15] The rationale for this
for execution until after the adverse party has filed a motion for reconsideration of the
is the objective of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure to achieve an expeditious and
inexpensive determination of cases governed by it. This objective provides the good
reason that justifies immediate execution of the decision, if the standards of Section 2,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on execution pending appeal, as what ALPA-PCM insists, are
considered.

Notwithstanding the rules objective and clear mandate, losing litigants and their
lawyers are determined to stall execution by misusing judicial remedies, putting forth
arguments that, by simple logic, can easily be resolved by a basic reading of the applicable
laws and rules. When judicial remedies are misused to delay the resolution of cases, the
Rules of Court authorizes the imposition of sanctions. Section 3, Rule 142 of the Rules of
Court states: 

Sec. 3. Costs when appeal frivolous.Where an action or an appeal is

found to be frivolous, double or treble costs may be imposed on the plaintiff
or appellant, which shall be paid by his attorney, if so ordered by the court.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DENY the ALPA-PCM, Inc.s motion for

reconsideration of our Resolution dated July 6, 2011. For instituting a frivolous appeal
manifestly intended for delay, the Court imposes treble costs against ALPA-PCM, Inc., to
be paid by its counsel, Atty. Guillermo R. Bandonil, Jr.

SO ORDERED.

ATTY. TEODORO V. CABILAN & ALEJANDRO A. PARALISAN, Petitioners, v. HON.

JUDGE JOSE R. RAMOLETE & PROVINCIAL/CITY JAIL WARDEN of Cebu
City, Respondents.

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction seeking the

annulment of the April 2, 1976 Judgment of Hon. Jose R. Ramolete in Criminal Case No. CU-
1388 declaring herein petitioners guilty of direct contempt of court sentencing them to suffer
the penalty of ten (10) days imprisonment.

Herein respondent judge is the presiding judge in Criminal Case No. CU-1388, and herein
petitioner Atty. Teodoro V. Cabilan is the private prosecutor. Petitioner Alejandro A. Paralisan
is the husband of Norma Yap Paralisan, one of the prosecution witnesses who was ordered demonstrated to me as above-stated, he is not only fond of issuing illegal order but is
arrested by respondent judge for failure to attend the scheduled hearing of the said case, tyrannical, oppressive, whimsical and capricious when he feels like tilting the scales of justice
Mrs. Paralisan wrote a letter to respondent judge, explaining her failure and attached an in favor of a party in the case adverted to under trial.
unverified medical certificate.chanrobles law library : red
"8. I feel that taxpayers of this province wherein the Honorable Presiding Judge is sitting
At the hearing of March 29, 1976, the prosecution presented an illegible xerox copy of a should at least be respected in their rights. We tax payers expect fairness in the dispensation
supposed Deed of Sale of a truck executed by the complainant in favor of the accused. of justice." (Rollo, p. 13)
Consequently, petitioner Cabilan, as private prosecutor, moved for the production of the
original which is being kept in the same building. Respondent judge granted the motion and Respondent judge, finding the allegations in the said affidavit contemptuous, prepared the
ordered a ten minute recess. The prosecuting fiscal, petitioners and Mrs. Paralisan went to herein questioned judgment, but on April 2, 1976, the same was promulgated only to
the Notarial Division to search for the original of the document. Thereafter, upon instruction of petitioner Paralisan because petitioner Cabilan was then in Ozamis City. Petitioner Paralisan
the fiscal, petitioner Paralisan returned to the courtroom to watch their exhibits. Shortly was escorted to the City Jail and had already served the sentence.chanrobles virtual
thereafter, respondent judge allegedly approached him and a heated exchange of words lawlibrary
transpired between them, the details of which are contained in an affidavit Annex "A" filed
later on March 30, by petitioner Cabilan attached to a motion to disqualify respondent judge On April 7, 1976, petitioners filed the instant petition in this Court, and on the same date, the
from further hearing the case. The pertinent portions of the said affidavit, Second Division of this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order, and to order the
read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph immediate release of the petitioners (Ibid., p. 36-A).

"4. The Honorable Presiding Judge, upon seeing the affiant sitting on the bench walked back The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent judge erred in declaring herein
and forth towards said affiant and then, with a pointed finger directed to affiant said, ‘you, you petitioners guilty of direct contempt of court and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of ten
where is your wife? I will have her arrested. I do not accept that kind of medical certificate she (10) days imprisonment.
submitted. I will order the Sheriff right now to detain your wife,’ in a voice so loud as if affiant
were his notorious enemy. Drowned by extreme humiliation, shame and amazed by the The answer is in the negative.
violent attitude of said judge, the affiant rushed up to the Judge and in a loud voice also
asked, ‘Judge do you have personal grudge against my wife and my family and why? Why do It is the contention of the petitioners that respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in
you shout at me? I am not a party to the case. Your show of partiality is conduct unbecoming ordering the incarceration of the petitioners without preferred charges, considering that
of a Judge. Are you interested personally in this case? I have not seen a Judge acting like respondent judge implied in his order that the charges of the petitioners were unsubstantiated
this.’ I further told him that his partiality is very apparent.’Since the start of the trial in this (Par. 2, Judgment, Annex "E"); that it may be that the contempt contemplated by respondent
case, you have been threatening witnesses for the prosecution.’ After uttering those words, I judge was an indirect contempt; that it was next to impossible to substantiate the charges in
left out of the court room and the Honorable Presiding Judge followed me and threatened me the motion for disqualification because petitioner Paralisan was immediately placed under
with arrest and called the Sheriffs available in the vicinity. arrest and sentenced to jail without charges; and that the acts of respondent judge were
highly arbitrary and derogatory to his oath to hear before he condemns and to render justice
"5. Since the start of the trial of this case almost a year ago, I noticed suspicious behavior of to anyone regardless of his station in life.
the Honorable Presiding Judge like allowing counsel for the accused and even the accused
himself to enter his chambers without the presence of the Fiscal and/or private prosecutor. Petitioners’ contention is untenable.

"6. Personally, I have no intention of intervening or appearing as witness in this case although At the outset, it should be stated that this Court has repeatedly declared that the power to
I know the facts hereof I also know the questionable acts of accused especially Romeo punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in
Ceniza. But after reading in the papers that the Honorable Presiding Judge is fond of issuing judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court,
illegal orders like that Tanhu Case as enunciated by our Supreme Court, I got interested in and consequently, to the due administration of justice (Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations,
said Judge because my wife was also ordered arrested by her failure to attend the hearing of 136 SCRA 112, 135 [1985]), citing the cases of Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil.
this case as a mere witness. I believed that the order of arrest is another illegal order 271; In re Kelly, 35 Phil. 944; Commissioner of Immigration v. Cloribel, 20 SCRA 1241; and
because I believe that my wife’s failure to attend a trial as a witness is NOT direct contempt Montalban v. Canonoy, 38 SCRA 1). Under the Rules of Court, contempt is classified into
but an indirect one instead of arrest, she should merely be cited for contempt. direct and indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a
court or judge and can be punished summarily without hearing. Indirect contempt is not
"7. In my observation, by the conduct of the Honorable Presiding Judge which he committed in the presence of the court and can be punished only after hearing (People v.
Navarro, 121 SCRA 707, 710 [1983]). In the case of Ang v. Castro (136 SCRA 453, 458
[1985]), this Court ruled that if the pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious
statements is submitted in the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending, it is
direct contempt because it is equivalent to a misbehaviour committed in the presence of or so
near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. This ruling was reiterated in
the case of Ante v. Pascua (162 SCRA 780 [1988]), where it was held that contemptuous
statements made in the pleadings filed with the court constitute direct contempt.

In the instant case, the basis of the judgment for contempt of court is petitioner Paralisan’s
affidavit which was attached and made as an integral part of the motion for disqualification
filed by petitioner Cabilan which therefore falls squarely under the above
ruling.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

As to the claim of petitioner Cabilan that the affidavit was modified by petitioner Paralisan and
that he discovered the insertion of the derogatory remarks only upon his return to Cebu City
from Ozamis City, suffice it to say that aside from the arguments presented by respondent
judge to the contrary, petitioner Cabilan, as counsel of record, has control of the proceedings.
Whatever steps his client takes should be within his knowledge and responsibility (Surigao
Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1, 23 [1970]).

Nevertheless, considering that petitioner Cabilan has been practicing for nineteen (19) years
and this is the first time that he is charged with contempt of court, and considering that the
power to punish contempt should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle with the corrective rather than the retaliatory idea of punishment (Baja v. Macandog,
158 SCRA 391 [1988]), imposition of a fine of P500.00 without imprisonment would be
enough (Caniza v. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]).

On the other hand, petitioner Paralisan having already served his sentence, this case is moot
and academic insofar as he is concerned.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED, but the questioned
judgment of April 2, 1976 is MODIFIED by changing the sentence often (10) days
imprisonment to a fine of P200.00 without imprisonment.
JOEBERT SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF
SO ORDERED. THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The prosecution has the burden of proof. It must rely on the strength of its own evidence,
not upon the weakness of the evidence submitted by the defense. Failure of the prosecution
to discharge this obligation will result in the mandatory acquittal of the accused.

The Case
 Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the signed by counsel instead of Waquez or Lozada; (3) Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of
September 27, 1996 Decision and the March 11, 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in Court was not complied with; (4) the petition was filed late on October 1, 1997 the due date
CA-GR No. 17646, affirming petitioners conviction for cattle rustling. being August 27, 1997; and (5) said petition was improperly verified in violation of Section 4,
Rule 7 in relation to Section 1, Rule 45 of the said Rules.[12]
Petitioner Joebert Santiago -- together with Nonilon Waquez, Roger Lozada and John
Dagohoy[1] - was charged with violating Presidential Decree 533, the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law Noting that the clerk of court erroneously accepted the deposit for costs paid on
of 1974. On June 24, 1991, Provincial Prosecutor Romeo S. Fernandez filed before the February 11, 1998 by Atty. Sillano, the Court in a Resolution dated April 11, 1998 directed the
Regional Trial Court of Mambusao, Capiz the Information, the accusatory portion of which refund of such amount, considering that the petition was denied on October 15, 1997.
reads:
In its July 1, 1998 Resolution, the Court denied with finality the Motion for
That in or about the evening of March 17 and early morning of March 18, 1991 in Reconsideration of Waquez and Lozada. Hence, only Joebert Santiagos Petition remains to
Brgy. Maninang, Sapian, Capiz, Philippines, in the jurisdiction of this Court, the be resolved.
above named accused conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with
intent to gain, willfully and [feloniously] [stole] and [carried] away one male carabao
valued at [t]en [t]housand [p]esos (P10,000.00) belonging to and without the The Facts
knowledge and consent of Rodrigo Belorio[2] to the damage and prejudice of the said According to the Prosecution
owner in the amount aforementioned.[3]
The petitioner, together with Waquez and Lozada, entered a plea of not guilty when
arraigned[4] on August 6, 1991.[5] After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its April 25, The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Pfc. Efren Felizardo, a member
1994 Decision which disposed: of the Philippine National Police stationed in Sapian; [13] (2) Police Sergeant Sergio Urdelas,
who intercepted the jeep driven by Lozada and thereupon arrested him;[14] and November 17,
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing and finding the evidence of the 1992, pp. 2-4; records, pp. 341-344 and 400-402, respectively.14 (3) Pat. Gualberto
prosecution to have sufficiently established the guilt of the accused beyond Salomeo, administrative officer and police blotter clerk;[15] and (4) Rodrigo Veloria, the owner
reasonable doubt, the court hereby imposes upon the accused Joebert Santiago, of the stolen carabao.[16]
Nonilon Waquez and Roger Lozada an indeterminate sentence of TEN (10) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor in its maximum as the minimum to FOURTEEN Adopted by the Court of Appeals in its Decision and by the Office of Solicitor General in
(14) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS of reclusion its Comment was the trial courts summary of the above witnesses testimonies, which we
temporal in its medium as the maximum, and to pay the private offended party quote:
Rodrigo Beloria the sum of P10,000.00 by way of moral damages and P5,000.00 as The evidence of the prosecution has established the fact that on the evening of
exemplary damages, and to pay the costs of the proceedings, with subsidiary March 17, 1991, until the early morning of March 18, 1991, at around 2:30 in the
imprisonment in case of insolvency. morning, Pfc. Efren Felizardo, Pfc. McArthur dela Cruz and Patrolman Victoriano
The case of accused John Dogohoy is hereby ordered archived and can be revived were on foot patrol inside the town proper of Sapian, Capiz, because of the rampant
only upon proper motion.[6] cattle rustling in the area when they tried to flag down a suspected passenger
jeepney with Plate No. UVH-PFH-406, owned b[y] Elizane Waquez, but instead of
On appeal, Respondent Court[7] affirmed the Decision of the lower court thus: st[o]pping, the driver stepped on the gas pedal where Pfc. McArthur dela Cruz was
almost hit by the accelerating jeepney; that they radioed the Ivisan Police Station
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 1862 is
where the latter intercepted the passenger jeepney and apprehended inside the
hereby AFFIRMED by this Court, with costs against accused-appellants.[8]
driver Roger Lozada, one of the herein accused, who, when investigated, told the
In its March 11, 1997 Resolution, the appellate court denied, for lack of merit, the police that his companions were Nonilon Waquez, John Dagohoy and Joebert
separate Motions for Reconsideration[9] filed by the petitioner and his co-accused.[10] Santiago; Waquez and Santiago admitted that they were with their co-accused
when they were flagged down by the Sapian PNP[;] and when their jeepney was
Undaunted, Joebert Santiago filed this petition before us. intercepted by the Ivisan PNP, they e[s]caped.
Through Counsel Luis C. A. Sillano, Nonilon Waquez and Roger Lozada belatedly filed The prosecution further solidif[ied] its position when it presented Rodrigo Veloria
their Petition for Review on October 1, 1997.[11] On October 15, 1997, this Court issued a who reported to the Sapian Police Station in the morning of March 18, 1991, that his
Resolution denying their petition for the following reasons: (1) the prescribed legal fees were male carabao was stolen and [that] when they proceeded to the Ivisan Police
not paid within the reglementary period; (2) the certification against forum-shopping was
 Station, he identified his male carabao and showed his Creden[t]ial No. 836465-A, oclock of the same morning, he saw Roger Lozada and Nonilon Waquez in Roxas
Exhibit B signed by Sapian Mayor Rodel Obordo, Exhibit B-1.[17] City and therefore told them of the request of Ledonio. (pp. 3-4, t.s.n., July 23,
1992). Thereafter, he and his employer went home to Sapian from Roxas City[;]
after washing the car of his employer they had an accounting because he had
According to the Defense earlier told his employer that he was going to Mindanao to work as a driver for a
certain Roblito Cenica. (p. 4, t.s.n., Ibid). After their accounting at about 3:00 oclock
p.m., petitioner proceeded to his house at Barangay Dapdapan, Sapian,
Consistent with his avowal of innocence, Petitioner Santiago in his Petition for Capiz. From the time he arrived at this house up to 3:30 p.m. he packed his clothes
Review[18] offered a different story:[19] and other things to be brought to Mindanao. (p. 5, t.s.n., Ibid). At about 6:30 p.m. to
10:00 p.m., he played domino in his house with Santiago Andaya, Romarico
In the early morning of March 18, 1991 at [about] 2:30 oclock in the morning some Dalmacio and Ramon Bonales. (p. 5, t.s.n., Ibid). After playing domino, petitioner
members of the Sapian, Capiz Police Force were on foot patrol inside the poblacion went to sleep. However, the above-mentioned co-players of the petitioner continued
of the said town because of the rampant cattle rustling in the area. While patrolling playing domino. The wife of petitioner woke him up at about 4:00 a.m. the following
the said area the police officers composed of Pfc. Efren Felizardo, Pfc. McArthur morning of March 18, 1991. Thereafter, at about 4:30 p.m., petitioner and his cousin
dela Cruz and Patrolman Victoriano tried to flag down or stop a passenger jeepney, were able to ride a vehicle going to Sitio Talaba, Sapian, Capiz, and eventually were
suspected of transporting stolen carabaos, with Plate No. UVH-PFH-406 owned by able to ride a bus from Talaba to Iloilo City. They arrived [in] Iloilo City at about 7:30
a certain Lizanie Waquez. But instead of stopping, the driver of the said jeepney a.m. of March 18, 1991 [from where] they proceeded to Marbel, (Koronodal) South
accelerated going to the direction of Ivisan, Capiz. (pp. 4-5, 9, t.s.n., September 23, Cotabato (pp. 3-6, t.s.n., Ibid.).
1991).
Romarico Dalmacio, a co-player of petitioner in the game of domino, attested that at
Thereafter, the police officers immediately informed the Ivisan Police Force thru two about 10:00 p.m. of March 17, 1991, he saw petitioner Santiago [go] upstairs to the
way radio about the incident with the request to intercept the said jeepney. At second floor of their house (his father-in-laws) to sleep and did not leave the said
around 3:30 [a].m. of the said morning, the Ivisan Police Force radioed back the house until 4:00 a.m. of March 18, 1991 whe[n] appellant and his cousin left the
Sapian Police Force informing them that they ha[d] intercepted the subject jeepney house and rode a bus to the direction of Talaba, Sapian (pp. 3-4 and 9-10, t.s.n.,
and apprehended its driver, one of the herein accused-appellant, Roger September 17, 1992). In fact, he further stated that before petitioner left, he served
Lozada. During that time, the jeepney was transporting one (1) male carabao which them coffee while they continued playing domino. (p. 4, t.s.n., Ibid.).
was found out later to be stolen. (p. 12, t.s.n., Ibid.).
During that same morning of [March] 18, 1991, Pfc. Efren Felizardo of the Sapian
The Rulings of the Trial
Police Department, together with Rodrigo Veloria, the owner of the stolen carabao,
and the Appellate Courts
proceeded to the Ivisan Police Station. Rodrigo Veloria after identifying the carabao,
showed his proof of ownership of the same. Roger Lozada, the jeepney and the
carabao were thereafter brought to the Sapian Police Station.Later, on the same
morning, the other occupants of the jeepney, herein other co-accused, Nonilon Giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the trial court convicted
Waquez and John Dagohoy surrendered to the Sapian Police Force. (p. 5, petitioner, together with his co-accused, of cattle rustling. It disbelieved his defense of alibi,
t.s.n., Ibid; pp. 6-7, t.s.n., September 24, 1991). as (1) he was positively identified, and (2) he failed to prove that it was physically impossible
for him to have been at the crime scene while the offense was being committed. The trial
During their investigation, accused-appellants Roger Lozada and Nonilon Waquez court concluded:
both claimed that on the early morning of March 18, 1991, while on board the
subject jeepney going to Bilao, Sapian, Capiz, they were stopped by petitioner Accused Joebert Santiago was one of the persons inside the jeepney with the
Joebert Santiago who together with a certain Ledonio offered P1,500.00 for them to carabao and his other co-accused when the jeep they were riding [in] was flagged
transport a carabao to Roxas City. (pp. 3-5, t.s.n., May 20, 1991). down by the Sapian PNP[;] they continued at high speed proceeding to the
Municipality of Ivisan, Capiz, where they were intercepted by the Ivisan PNP in the
Petitioner Joebert Santiago testified that at around 8:00 oclock in the morning of early morning of March 18, 1991.[20]
March 17, 1991 while he was at Poblacion, Sapian, Capiz, Rolando Ledonio
approached him and asked him, if he was going to Roxas City. After he answered in Further, in ruling that petitioner acted in concert with Lozada and Waquez, the RTC
the affirmative, Ledonio requested him to tell Roger Lozada that he (Ledonio) held:
[would] load something in the latters jeepney. He further testified that at about 10:00
 Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof as it can be inferred from the without violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things. It includes the
acts of the appellants. It is enough that at the time the offense was committed killing of large cattle, or taking its meat or hide without the consent of the owner/raiser.[25]
participants had the same purpose and were united in its execution as maybe [sic]
inferred from the attendant circumstances. (People vs. Montealegre, G.R. 67948, 31 Section 7 of the said law creates a prima facie presumption of cattle rustling upon failure
May 1988)[21] to exhibit documents of ownership, viz.:

In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that: first, Santiago failed to prove Every person having in his possession, control or custody of large cattle shall, upon
with convincing evidence his defense of alibi; second, he was positively identified by his demand by competent authorities, exhibit the documents prescribed in the
cohorts; and last, he fled after the incident took place. preceding sections. Failure to exhibit the required documents shall be prima
facie evidence that the large cattle in his possession, control and custody are the
fruits of the crime of cattle rustling.
Assignment of Errors Petitioner Santiago was not caught stealing the carabao. He was not seen by the Sapian
PNP inside the jeep used in transporting the carabao subject of the offense. He was not even
seen having possession, custody or control of the carabao. He was not in the company of
In his Memorandum, Santiago sets forth the following issues: Lozada when the latter was caught by the members of the Ivisan PNP. However, he was
identified and indicted by virtue of the declarations of Lozada and Waquez during the
I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals as well as the trial court erred in investigation. On the basis of the evidence adduced, can Santiago be held guilty of cattle
declaring that Petitioner Joebert Santiago conspired with the other accused in rustling?
committing the crime charged.
We have consistently ruled that the prosecution has the obligation of proving beyond
II. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals as well as the trial court erred in reasonable doubt the identity of the malefactor and his participation in the commission of the
outrightly disregarding Petitioner Joebert Santiagos defense of alibi and denial. crime or offense charged.[26] In its discharge of such duty, the prosecution presented the
III. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals as well as the trial court erred in policemen as witnesses. Relying on the testimonies of the policemen as well as those of
considering Petitioner Joebert Santiagos departure [for] Mindanao an indication of petitioners co-accused, the trial court convicted Santiago.
petitioners guilt.
IV. Whether or not the prosecutions evidence against Petitioner Joebert Santiago Testimonies of the Policemen
failed to stand the crucible test of reasonable doubt to overthrow the constitutionally
guaranteed presumption of innocence petitioner has in his favor.[22]
Briefly stated, the issue in this case is whether there is sufficient evidence to prove the It is elementary that a witness may testify only on facts of which he has personal
guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. knowledge; that is, those derived from his perception, except in certain circumstances
allowed by the Rules.[27]Otherwise, such testimony is considered hearsay and, hence,
inadmissible in evidence.[28]
This Courts Ruling In this connection, Pfc. Efren Felizardo testified:
Q Mr. Witness, would you please tell us where you were on March 17, 1991?
The petition is impressed with merit. A We were on patrol at Poblacion, Sapian, Capiz together with Pfc. McArthur de la Cruz
and Pat. Victoriano Homer.

Main Issue:
Q Why were you on patrol on that evening of March 17, 1991?
Sufficiency of the Prosecution Evidence
A We were on preventive patrol and to monitor persons like robbers and suspected
vehicle[s] wherein stolen carab[a]os were loaded because at that time cattle rustling
was rampant
Presidential Decree 533 penalizes[23]cattle rustling, which it defines as the taking away
by any means, method or scheme, without the consent of the owner/raiser, of any of the Q And in the early morning of March 18, 1991 where were you then?
abovementioned animals[24] whether or not for profit or gain, or whether committed with or
A We were at Poblacion, Sapian, Capiz at around 2:30 in the morning, March 18, 1991 A We ran towards the Sapian Police Station and radioed the Ivisan Police Station telling
[when] we spotted [the] suspected jeep. them to intercept the said vehicle.
Q And what did you do when you spotted [the] spotted suspected vehicle? Q And what happened after that?
A We flagged down the suspected vehicle [but] it did not stop. [T]he driver even made it A At around 3:30 in the morning, [the] Ivisan Police Station radioed us telling [us] that they
r[u]n faster and Pfc. de la Cruz [was] nearly hit. had intercepted said vehicle carrying [a] male carabao.
COURT: Q What did you do after that?
Q Were you then [in] uniform when you [stopped] the jeep? A The following morning, we went to the Ivisan Police Station and we saw Roger Lozada
who was the driver of the jeep and during that time Rodrigo Veloria was with us and
A Pfc. McArthur de la Cruz and Pat. Victoriano were [i]n police uniform and I was [i]n [he reported] to us that the night before, he had lost a carabao.
civilian because I am the head of the Intelligence and Investigation Section.
Q And what did you do next?
Q You said that you saw [the] suspected jeep to be used in gathering the lost
carabao. Why did you suspect? A We investigated Roger Lozada and he told us that his companions [who escaped] were
Nonilon Waquez, Joebert Santiago and Jhon Daguhoy and according to him, it was
A It was because we ha[d] received reports that [the] jeep was being used as a vehicle Joebert Santiago who rented said jeep and they were planning to bring the carabao
[for] transporting stolen carabao. [S]o for several months that jeep was on to Roxas City but unfortunately, they were caught.
surveillance.
COURT
Q How many reports did you receive before March 17, 1991 about carabao[s] that [were]
being stolen? Q [Were] these accuseds [sic] Nonilon Waquez, Joebert Santiago and Jhon Daguhoy xxx
also apprehended during that evening?
A In my personnel report, I ha[d] already received [reported] ten (10) lost carabaos.
A No, [we] were not able to apprehend these three (3) persons but the following morning,
Q And the report include[d] the jeep which [was] being used? Nonilon Waquez and Joebert Santiago, surrendered to the Sapian Police Station and
A It [was] included but we [did] not officially enter the jeep in the blotter book. told me that it was Joebert Santiago who rented the jeep.

COURT: Proceed. Q Why did you not ask, why did they rent?

PROSECUTOR VARON A I have asked them that, your Honor, and [they] told me that it was not Roger Lozada
who [drove] the jeep but it was Joebert Santiago.
Q What was the Plate Number of the jeep that you tried to flag in the morning of March 18,
1991? Q The Court wanted to know why they ran when they were intercepted by the Police[,
w]hy Roger Lozada was caught and the other was not.
A UVH-PFH-406.
ATTY. POTATO: The jeep was taken by Joebert Santiago so, only Roger Lozada was left
COURT in Ivisan.
Q When you flagged down the jeep and [it] did not stop, did you not fire [a shot] ? A During the time when we flagged down the jeep at Sapian, it was Jobert Santiago who
was the driver and along the way these Nonilon Waquez and Jhon Daguhoy
A We did not do it because we were afraid that there [would] be a commotion or when
escaped.
somebody [would] hear [he or she] might have [a] heart attack since we were in the
Poblacion and it [would] cause anxiety to the people. Q And when the vehicle was intercepted in Ivisan it was Roger Lozada who remained in
the jeep[;] did you ask Jhon Daguhoy and Nonilon Waquez why did they leave the
COURT: Proceed.
jeep?
PROSECUTOR VARON
A During the course of my investigation with Nonilon Waquez and Jhon Daguhoy, they
Q So, what did you do instead? told me that they escaped because [of] the fact that the carabao which was loaded in
 the jeep was a stolen carabao. I was not able to investigate Joebert Santiago A They did not say that, they only told me that the carabao which was inside the jeep was
because he did not surrender in the Police Station. a stolen carabao.
Q You said that you were able to meet Roger Lozada at Ivisan because he was being Q They informed you that it was Joebert Santiago who rented the jeep for the purpose of
apprehended by the Police of Ivisan[;] if this Roger Lozada is inside the courtroom loading the carabao?
could you point to him?
A Yes.
(Witness pointed to a person and when asked his name answered that he is Roger
Lozada.) Q Did they inform you where Joebert Santiago, in what place he rented the jeep of Lizanie
Waquez?
x x x x x x x x x
A They did not say that, they only told me that Joebert Santiago rented the jeep.
Q When it passed by the three of you, you said that it did not stop. Did you see who was
driving? Q Did they tell you how much Joebert Santiago rented the jeep?

A No. A What was necessary on my part was to apprehend the robber.

Q Why not[?] Q Yes, but you were conducting [an] investigation and you were ascertaining the fact[;]
why did you not ask them how much did they rent the jeep?
A Because it was running so fast.
A That I did not think necessary, what [was] important was to apprehend criminals and to
Q When you say it was running fast [do you mean] that you did not see who was driving? put them in prison.
A Yes, Sir. I did not recognize the driver. x x x x x x x x x
Q It was running so fast that you did not even see the Plate No.? Q Did you not call for Joebert Santiago to find out from him x x x if it [was] really true that it
was he who hired the jeep?
A The Plate No. could not be seen.
A Joebert Santiago could no longer be found, in fact, he was apprehended in Mindanao.
Q Why not?
Q So, the moment you were investigating the case, this Joebert Santiago was not given a
A The Plate No. was scraped off. chance to explain if it [was] true that he was the one who hired the jeep?
Q But can you recognize the jeep? A He was not given a chance because he could not be found anymore.
A Yes. Q But notwithstanding that fact that his name was only mentioned by two suspects, you
Q Because almost everyday you saw that jeep? Yes. filed a case including him?

Did you recognize the persons on board the jeep when it passed by you? A Yes, Sir.

A On that night, I only recognize[d] Nonilon Waquez who was hanging at the back of the Q You also stated here that during their trip from the place where they came from down to
jeep. Sapian where you flagged them to stop, it was Joebert Santiago who was driving the
jeep?
Q And why only Nonilon Waquez?
A According to Roger Lozada it was Joebert Santiago who was driving the jeep.
A Because the rest were inside.
Q Roger Lozada is another suspect in this case am I right?
Q You also stated that when you investigated Nonilon Waquez and John Daguhoy after
they surrendered, they informed you that they escaped because they did not want to A Yes, Sir.
be involved in the matter of [the] stolen carabao. Q And you included accused, Roger Lozada (Joebert Santiago) on the basis of the
Q They did not want to be implicated? declaration of his co-accused and one of the suspects in this case?
A Yes.
Q You dont have personal knowledge of the fact regarding [the] accused, Joebert A The jeep did not turn back but it just moved backward.
Santiago?
Q So, what did you see when the jeep moved backward?
A Yes, Sir.
A When the jeep made a final stop we saw that there was a carabao inside.
Q And when you reached there you inquired who was driving the people at that time?
Q You said that you were able to apprehend this Roger Lozada[;] what happened?
A Yes, Sir.
A We introduced ourselves as policemen and asked for the person inside the jeep to
Q What did they tell you? come down and it was Roger Lozada who alighted.
A The jeep was apprehended in Ivisan, it was Roger Lozada who was the driver of that Q And who was with him at that time?
jeep.
A I do not know.
Q As a matter of fact, Roger Lozada was alone in the jeep when he was apprehended?
Q But he ha[d a] companion?
A Yes, Sir.
A According to him he had a companion.
Q You also stated that you have received reports of cattle rustling and that you were
suspected that the rustlers are one of them, Joebert Santiago? [sic] Q Did you not inquire where was his companion?

A The reports stated that the jeep owned by Lizanie Waquez was being hired to transport A I asked him who were his companion[s] but he told us that they had already escaped.
stolen cattle. Q They have escaped right and when you apprehended the jeep? [sic]
Q But you do not as yet received from any particular persons who was pinpointed to you A When we apprehended the jeep they were no longer there.
as cattle rustlers, Am I correct? [sic]
x x x x x x x x x
A In my own personal knowledge, it was Pepito Flores whom I suspected and I was even
surprised why this Joebert Santiago was involved. Q When this Roger Lozada informed you, [what] were the names of his companions who
escaped?
Q You were surprised [when] this incident happened that this Joebert Santiago was not
reported as involved in cattle rustling, am I right? A They only informed me, Nonilon Waquez, Godo Santiago and alias Jojo Waquez.

A Yes.[29] Q Did he not inform you that Jojo Santiago was with him?

Police Sergeant Sergio Urdelas likewise narrated in court: A He only mentioned Godo Santiago.[30]

Q And you said you apprehended the jeep[;] who was there in that jeep you He further admitted that he did not see the petitioner during the encounter, as this
apprehended? portion of his testimony shows:

A I apprehended Roger Lozada who was the driver. Q Did you recognize those persons who were running away?

Q And what was inside that jeep then? A No sir.

A There was one carabao inside the jeep. Q You could not recognize those persons who were running away because it was dark?

COURT A Yes.

Q How did you apprehend the jeep? Q Did you see how many persons were running?

A We [had] a checkpoint and we spotted an approaching vehicle which was about 200 A No.
meters away from us and xxx later we saw that the jeepney moved backward and we
Q You could not say whether there were five persons who were running because it was
ran after [it] with our patrol car.
dark?
Q When you saw that the jeep was turned about what did you do?
 A Yes.[31] Third, the identification of the petitioner as the malefactor was not sufficiently
established. Lozada did not identify the petitioner in open court, but merely mentioned his
Clearly, the testimonies of Pfc. Felizardo and Police Sergeant Urdelas, linking Santiago name. True, Waquez pointed to Santiago, but the probative weight of his identification of the
to the crime, are inadmissible in evidence for being unabashedly hearsay. Neither one of latter as the culprit is attenuated by his admission that, on the night of the incident, he could
them saw Santiago having possession, custody or control of the carabao. They had no not really determine that he is Joebert and that he did not recognize him.[45]
personal knowledge that Santiago participated in the commission of the crime. Petitioner was
implicated solely and purely on the policemens recollection of statements given by Lozada Lastly, the testimonies of Waquez and Lozada were not corroborated. There are no
and Waquez while under interrogation. other pieces of evidence that support their testimonies and that tend to show or establish the
guilt of the petitioner.[46]Of the four original accused, only Waquez was positively identified by
We also agree with petitioner that the entries in the police blotter [32] should not be given Prosecution Witness Felizardo as the one who was hanging at the back of the jeep. Urdelas,
significance or probative value, as they do not constitute conclusive proof of the truth thereof. who apprehended Lozada, did not see anybody except the latter. Only Lozada and Waquez
[33]
 These entries are usually incomplete and inaccurate, as [s]ometimes they are taken from testified that Santiago rented the jeep they were plying and was with them while they were
either partial suggestion or inaccurate reporting and are hearsay, untested in the crucible of a transporting the carabao.
trial on the merits.[34]
Testimonies of Co-Accuse
We agree with the solicitor generals recommendation to acquit Santiago:

d
x x x the facts obtaining in the case engender reasonable doubt on petitioners
During their custodial investigation, Lozada and Waquez both implicated Santiago as complicity which, should, therefore, tilt the scale of justice in his favor. x x x where
the person who allegedly rented the jeep. They said he was with them when they transported the peoples evidence fails to meet the quantum required to overcome the
the carabao. However, such declarations, being extrajudicial, are inadmissible in evidence constitutional presumption of innocence, the accused is entitled to acquittal
against Santiago. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or regardless of the weakness of his defense of denial and uncorroborated alibi.[47]
omission of another, except as may be allowed by the Rules of Court.[35] Verily, the admission
of such declarations will violate the right of the petitioner to due process, specifically his right For insufficiency of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, this Court is constrained to
to confront and cross-examine his co-accused.[36] acquit the petitioner. It is axiomatic that the accused is entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt is
proven beyond reasonable doubt.[48] The prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own
A different rule applies with respect to testimonies given during the trial. In a number of merit; it cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense.[49]
instances, we have held that the testimonies of particeps criminis may be admissible against
the person incriminated.[37] But such rule is not without qualification. We always advise To summarize, the prosecutions evidence is insufficient to convict Santiago. First, the
caution in according probative value to the testimony of an alleged co-conspirator, as the testimonies of the policemen, being hearsay, are inadmissible in evidence. Second, the
latter is deemed a polluted source. His or her declaration must be scrutinized with care and declarations of Lozada and Waquez during the investigation are inadmissible under Section
subjected to grave suspicion.[38] True, such testimony, even if uncorroborated, may be 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and for being violative of petitioners right to due
sufficient to convict a co-accused, provided it is shown to be sincere, unhesitating, process. Third, the testimonies of Lozada and Waquez, as borne out by the stenographic
straightforward and detailed that it could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought. notes, are not worthy of credence. Lastly, there is no other clear, convincing and
[39]
 Otherwise, his testimony would require corroborative evidence[40] which, if strong and corroborative evidence that shows the complicity of the petitioner in the commission of the
convincing, may be given its due weight and force.[41] offense. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Joebert Santiago
is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. No costs.
After a careful and meticulous review of the records, we find the testimonies of Lozada
and Waquez insufficient to convict Santiago of cattle rustling. SO ORDERED.
First, the trial court did not find the testimonies of said witnesses frank, candid and KELLY R. WICKER and ATTY. ORLANDO A. RAYOS, petitioners, vs. HON. PAUL T.
straightforward, or their testimonies worthy of any credit. And our own reading of the ARCANGEL, as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 134, respondent.
transcripts does not lead us to conclude otherwise. In fact, the solicitor general himself
submits that the testimonies of co-accused Lozada and Waquez are insufficient to justify DECISION
petitioners conviction.[42]
MENDOZA, J.:
Second, both Lozada and Waquez deny any participation in cattle rustling. In fact, they
claim to have no knowledge that the carabao was indeed stolen. Being of human nature,
This is a petition for certiorari, assailing the orders dated December 3,
culprits are likely to pin the blame on others rather than on themselves.[43] There is therefore
1993 and December 17, 1993 of respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel of the Regional Trial
no guarantee that petitioners co-accused had testified truthfully.[44]
Court, Branch 134 of Makati, finding petitioners guilty of direct contempt and sentencing each In a pleading entitled Opposition to and/or Comment to Motion to Cite for Direct
of them to suffer imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00. Contempt Directed Against Plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker and his Counsel, Atty. Rayos claimed that
the allegations in the motion did not necessarily express his views because he merely signed
The antecedent facts are as follows: the motion in a representative capacity, in other words, just lawyering, for Kelly Wicker, who
Kelly Wicker, with his wife Wynee Dieppe and the Tectonics Asia Architects and said in a note to him that a young man possibly employed by the Court had advised him to
Engineering Co., brought suit in the Regional Trial Court of Makati against the LFS have the case reraffled, when the opposing counsel Atty. Benjamin Santos and the new judge
Enterprises, Inc. and others, for the annulment of certain deeds by which a house and lot at both failed to come for a hearing, because their absence was an indication that Atty. Santos
Forbes Park, which the plaintiffs claimed they had purchased, was allegedly fraudulently titled knew who the judge may be and when he would appear. Wickers sense of disquiet increased
in the name of the defendant LFS Enterprises and later sold by the latter to codefendant Jose when at the next two hearings, the new judge as well as Atty. Santos and the latters witness,
Poe. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 14048, was assigned to Branch 134 formerly Mrs. Remedios Porcuna, were all absent, while the other counsels were present.[3]
presided over by Judge Ignacio Capulong who later was replaced by respondent Judge Paul Finding petitioners explanation unsatisfactory, respondent judge, in an order dated
T. Arcangel. December 3, 1993, held them guilty of direct contempt and sentenced each to suffer
It appears that on November 18, 1993, Wickers counsel, Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, filed a imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00.
motion seeking the inhibition of respondent judge from the consideration of the case. [1] The Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which respondent judge denied for lack of
motion alleged in pertinent part: merit in his order of December 17, 1993. In the same order respondent judge directed
petitioners to appear before him on January 7, 1994 at 8:30 a.m. for the execution of their
1. That before the Acting Presiding Judge took over, defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. was sentence.
able to maneuver the three (3) successive postponements for the presentation for cross-
examination of Mrs. Remedios Porcuna on her 10 August 1992 Affidavit, but eventually, she In their petition[4] before this Court, Kelly Wicker and Atty. Orlando A. Rayos contend that
was not presented; respondent judge committed a grave abuse of his discretion in citing them for contempt. They
argue that when a person, impelled by justifiable apprehension and acting in a respectful
manner, asks a judge to inhibit himself from hearing his case, he does not thereby become
2. Meantime, Judge [Ignacio] Capulong who had full grasp of this case was eased out of his
guilty of contempt.
station. In one hearing, the Acting Presiding Judge had not yet reported to his station and in
that set hearing, counsel for defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. who must have known that His In his comment,[5] respondent judge alleges that he took over as Acting Presiding Judge
Honor was not reporting did not likewise appear while other counsels were present; of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134 by virtue of Administrative Order No. 154-
93 dated September 2, 1993 of this Court and not because, as petitioners alleged, he was
3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge was personally recruited from personally recruited from the South by Atty. Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-
the south by Atty. Benjamin Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, one time Santos; that he assumed his new office on October 11, 1993 and started holding sessions on
member of the Judicial and Bar Council, against whom plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed October 18, 1993; that when all male personnel of his court were presented to petitioner Kelly
Administrative Case No. 3796, and although said case was dismissed, nevertheless, plaintiffs Wicker he failed to pick out the young man who was the alleged source of the remarks
feel that it was the reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos relief; prompting the filing of the motion for inhibition; that he was not vindictive and that he in fact
refrained from implementing the execution of his order dated December 3, 1993 to enable
4. Plaintiffs have reason to doubt the partiality and integrity of His Honor and to give a fighting petitioners to avail themselves of all possible remedies; that after holding petitioners in
chance for plaintiffs to prove their case, since this will be the last case to recover the contempt, he issued an order dated December 8, 1993 inhibiting himself from trying Civil
partnership property, plaintiffs feel that His Honor inhibit himself and set this case for re-raffle; Case No. 14048; that Atty. Rayos claim that he was just lawyering and acting as the vehicle
or mouthpiece of his client is untenable because his (Atty. Rayos) duties to the court are
more important than those which he owes to his client; and that by tendering their profuse
5. This move finds support in the Rules of Court and jurisprudence that in the first instance
apologies in their motion for reconsideration of the December 3, 1993 order, petitioners
that a litigant doubts the partiality and integrity of the Presiding Judge, he should immediately
acknowledged the falsity of their accusations against him; and that the petitioners have taken
move for his inhibition.
inconsistent positions as to who should try Civil Case No. 14048 because in their Motion for
Inhibition dated November 18, 1993 they asked that the case be reraffled to another sala of
The motion was verified by Kelly Wicker. the RTC of Makati, while in their petition dated November 29, 1993, which they filed with the
Considering the allegations to be malicious, derogatory and contemptuous, respondent Office of Court Administrator, petitioners asked that Judge Capulong be allowed to continue
judge ordered both counsel and client to appear before him on November 26, 1993 and to hearing the case on the ground that he had a full grasp of the case.
show cause why they should not be cited for contempt of court.[2]
 In reply to the last allegation of respondent judge, petitioners claim that although they leads to no other conclusion than that respondent judge was beholden to the opposing
wanted a reraffle of the case, it was upon the suggestion of respondent judge himself that counsel in the case, Atty. Benjamin Santos, to whom or to whose wife, the judge owed his
they filed the petition with the Court Administrator for the retention of Judge Capulong in the transfer to the RTC of Makati, which necessitated easing out the former judge to make room
case. for such transfer.
What is involved in this case is an instance of direct contempt, since it involves a These allegations are derogatory to the integrity and honor of respondent judge and
pleading allegedly containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the constitute an unwarranted criticism of the administration of justice in this country. They
court or judge in which the proceedings are pending, as distinguished from a pleading filed in suggest that lawyers, if they are well connected, can manipulate the assignment of judges to
another case. The former has been held to be equivalent to misbehavior committed in the their advantage. The truth is that the assignments of Judges Arcangel and Capulong were
presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same within made by this Court, by virtue of Administrative Order No. 154-93, precisely in the interest of
the meaning of Rule 71, 1 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, direct contempt.[6] an efficient administration of justice and pursuant to Sec. 5 (3), Art. VIII of the Constitution.
[10]
 This is a matter of record which could have easily been verified by Atty. Rayos. After all, as
It is important to point out this distinction because in case of indirect or constructive he claims, he deliberated for two months whether or not to file the offending motion for
contempt, the contemnor may be punished only [a]fter charge in writing has been filed, and inhibition as his client allegedly asked him to do.
an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel, whereas in case of
direct contempt, the respondent may be summarily adjudged in contempt. Moreover, the In extenuation of his own liability, Atty. Rayos claims he merely did what he had been
judgment in cases of indirect contempt is appealable, whereas in cases of direct contempt bidden to do by his client of whom he was merely a mouthpiece. He was just lawyering and
only judgments of contempt by MTCs, MCTCs and MeTCs are appealable.[7] he cannot be gagged, even if the allegations in the motion for the inhibition which he
prepared and filed were false since it was his client who verified the same.
Consequently, it was unnecessary in this case for respondent judge to hold a
hearing. Hence even if petitioners are right about the nature of the case against them by To be sure, what Wicker said in his note to Atty. Rayos was that he had been told by an
contending that it involves indirect contempt, they have no ground for complaint since they unidentified young man, whom he thought to be employed in the court, that it seemed the
were afforded a hearing before they were held guilty of contempt. What is important to opposing counsel, Atty. Santos, knew who the replacement judge was, because Atty. Santos
determine now is whether respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in holding did not show up in court on the same days the new judge failed to come. It would, therefore,
petitioners liable for direct contempt. appear that the other allegations in the motion that respondent judge had been personally
recruited by the opposing counsel to replace Judge Capulong who had been eased out were
We begin with the words of Justice Malcolm that the power to punish for contempt is to Atty. Rayos and not Wickers. Atty. Rayos is thus understating his part in the preparation of
be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the motion for inhibition.
it be invoked to preserve that respect without which the administration of justice will fail. [8] The
contempt power ought not to be utilized for the purpose of merely satisfying an inclination to Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade responsibility for the allegations in question. As a
strike back at a party for showing less than full respect for the dignity of the court.[9] lawyer, he is not just an instrument of his client. His client came to him for professional
assistance in the representation of a cause, and while he owed him whole-souled devotion,
Consistent with the foregoing principles and based on the abovementioned facts, the there were bounds set by his responsibility as a lawyer which he could not overstep.[11] Even
Court sustains Judge Arcangels finding that petitioners are guilty of contempt. A reading of a hired gun cannot be excused for what Atty. Rayos stated in the motion. Based on Canon 11
the allegations in petitioners motion for inhibition, particularly the following paragraphs of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears as much responsibility for the
thereof: contemptuous allegations in the motion for inhibition as his client.

2. Meantime, Judge Capulong who had full grasp of this case was eased out of his station. In Atty. Rayos duty to the courts is not secondary to that of his client. The Code of
one hearing, the Acting Presiding Judge had not yet reported to his station and in that set Professional Responsibility enjoins him to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
hearing, counsel for defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. who must have known that His Honor and to judicial officers and [to] insist on similar conduct by others [12] and not [to] attribute to a
was not reporting did not likewise appear while other counsels were present; Judge motives not supported by the record or have materiality to the case.[13]
After the respondent judge had favorably responded to petitioners profuse apologies and
3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge was personally recruited from indicated that he would let them off with a fine, without any jail sentence, petitioners served
the south by Atty. Benjamin Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, one time on respondent judge a copy of their instant petition which prayed in part that Respondent
member of the Judicial and Bar Council, against whom plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed Judge Paul T. Arcangel be REVERTED to his former station. He simply cannot do in the RTC
Administrative Case No. 3796, and although said case was dismissed, nevertheless, plaintiffs of Makati where more complex cases are heared (sic) unlike in Davao City. If nothing else,
feel that it was the reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos relief; this personal attack on the judge only serves to confirm the contumacious attitude, a flouting
or arrogant belligerence first evident in petitioners motion for inhibition belying their WHEREFORE, the order of December 3, 1993 is MODIFIED by DELETING the
protestations of good faith. sentence of imprisonment for five (5) days and INCREASING the fine from P 100.00 to
P200.00 for each of the petitioners.
Petitioners cite the following statement in Austria v. Masaquel:[14]
SO ORDERED.
Numerous cages there have been where judges, and even members of the Supreme Court,
were asked to inhibit themselves from trying, or from participating in the consideration of a
case, but scarcely were the movants punished for contempt, even if the grounds upon which
they based their motions for disqualification are not among those provided in the rules. It is
only when there was direct imputation of bias or prejudice, or a stubborn insistence to
disqualify the judge, done in a malicious, arrogant, belligerent and disrespectful manner, that
movants were held in contempt of court.

It is the second sentence rather than the first that applies to this case.
Be that as it may, the Court believes that consistent with the rule that the power to cite
for contempt must be exercised for preservative rather than vindictive principle we think that
the jail sentence on petitioners may be dispensed with while vindicating the dignity of the
court. In the case of petitioner Kelly Wicker there is greater reason for doing so considering
that the particularly offending allegations in the motion for inhibition do not appear to have
come from him but were additions made by Atty. Rayos. In addition, Wicker is advanced in
years (80) and in failing health (suffering from angina), a fact Judge Arcangel does not
dispute. Wicker may have indeed been the recipient of such a remark although he could not
point a court employee who was the source of the same. At least he had the grace to admit
his mistake both as to the source and truth of said information. It is noteworthy Judge
Arcangel was also willing to waive the imposition of the jail sentence on petitioners until he
came upon petitioners description of him in the instant petition as a judge who cannot make
the grade in the RTC of Makati, where complex cases are being filed. In response to this, he
cited the fact that the Integrated Bar of the Philippines chose him as one of the most
outstanding City Judges and Regional Trial Court Judges in 1979 and 1988 respectively and
that he is a 1963 graduate of the U.P. College of Law.
In Ceniza v. Sebastian,[15]  which likewise involved a motion for inhibition which described
the judge corrupt, the Court, while finding counsel guilty of direct contempt, removed the jail
sentence of 10 days imposed by the trial court for the reason that

Here, while the words were contumacious, it is hard to resist the conclusion, considering the
background of this occurrence that respondent Judge in imposing the ten-day sentence was
not duly mindful of the exacting standard [of] preservation of the dignity of his office not
indulging his sense of grievance sets the limits of the authority he is entitled to exercise. It is
the view of the Court that under the circumstances the fine imposed should be increased to TRINIDAD DE LEON VDA. DE ROXAS, Petitioner, v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
P500.00. and CARLOS FAUSTINO, Respondents.

Abraham F. Sarmiento Law Office for Petitioner.

The same justification also holds true in this case.
Justino Z. Benito for Private Respondent.
 rental demanded is clearly exorbitant or unreasonable would the courts intervene as a matter
SYNOPSIS of fairness and equity. The burden of proof to show that the rental demanded is exorbitant
and unreasonable rests upon the lessee. He does not discharge this burden where he
Petitioner entered into a contract of lease with private respondent for three years renewable presents no evidence in substantiation of his claim other than the original cost to the owner of
for another three years at the former’s option. At the end of the contact, petitioner decided not the property.
to renew the contract although she allowed private respondent to continue occupying the
premises, with an increased monthly rental of P3,000.00. After two years petitioner
demanded another increase to P5,000.00. Upon private respondent’s failure to pay said DECISION
rental, petitioner sued for ejectment in the municipal court, which dismissed the complaint and
ordered petitioner to return alleged overpayments. Both parties appealed to the Rizal Court of
First Instance, which ordered private respondent, among other things, to vacate and to pay The Court sets aside the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals and in lieu thereof
the monthly rental of P5,000.00 until possession of the premises is restored to petitioner. On reinstates the judgment of the court of first instance of Rizal. The three-year lease of
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. On review, the Supreme Court reversed respondent had clearly not been renewed for another three years by petitioner-owner who
the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated that of the Court of First Instance, and had the sole option under the lease contract to grant or deny such renewal. The appellate
held that the parties’ agreement for payment of an increased rental not being contrary to court itself so ruled and therefore there is no valid justification for it — contrary to its own
prohibitory laws, public order, public policy or morals as the law between the parties cannot ruling — to set at naught the valid agreement between the parties for payment of an
just be set aside. increased monthly rental of P3,000.00 (as against the P1,000.-monthly rental fixed for the
three-year lease period) upon the expiration of the lease, much less to order petitioner to
Appealed decision set aside and judgment of the Court of First Instance reinstated. return or pay back the "excess" of P2,000.00 monthly which respondent had religiously paid
for over two years without protest.

SYLLABUS Absent any prohibitory or regulatory statute, it is the owner-lessor’s prerogative to terminate
the lease at its expiration and to demand a new rate of rental as it is the lessee’s prerogative
either to accept the new rent or to avoid paying the increased rent by vacating the premises.
1. LEASE; LEASE FOR A DETERMINATE TIME; TERMINATION. — Article 1669 of the Civil As to the further increase of the monthly rental to P5,000.00 as demanded by petitioner after
Code provides that "if the lease was made for a determinate time, it ceases upon the day the two years, the Court finds that the trial court correctly assessed that the evidence amply
fixed, without the need of a demand."cralaw virtua1aw library justified the increase. Respondent presented no evidence to discharge his burden of
substantiating his gratuitous claim that the increase was exorbitant and unreasonable and the
2. ID.; ID.; AGREEMENT FOR PAYMENT OF INCREASED RENTAL MAY NOT BE SET appellate court’s reduction of the monthly rental to P2,000.00 (P1,000.00 less per month than
ASIDE. — The parties’ agreement for payment of an increased monthly rental is the law what respondent had been paying for the previous two years) was untenable and arbitrary.
between the parties and cannot be simply set aside unless it is shown to be contrary to
prohibitory laws, public order, public policy or morals. The case concerns petitioner’s action for illegal detainer against private respondent Carlos
Faustino (as owner-operator of the Hi-Ball Night Club established by him on petitioner’s
3. ID.; ID.; CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING INCREASE OF RENTAL IN INSTANCE CASE. 1,032-square meter corner lot at Roxas Boulevard) and for the payment of monthly rentals of
— The following circumstances may justify the increase of monthly rentals; the area of the P5,000.00 from April 1, 1968 until restoration of the premises, with P2,000. - attorney’s fees
leased property, its original purchase price, its classification as a "corner property," its present and costs, as originally filed by petitioner on August 23, 1968 in the Municipal Court of
value, its location, the business to which it has been devoted by lessee, and the length of Parañaque, Rizal.
time lessee has occupied it.
There is no dispute as to the material facts (with the parties having submitted a stipulation of
4. ID.; ID.; FIXING OF RENTALS IS OWNER’S PREROGATIVE. — It is the owner’s facts in the court of first instance besides entering trial), 1 which may be briefly restated as
prerogative to fix the rental for which he wishes to lease his property and the occupant or follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
lessee has the option of accepting the rent as fixed or negotiating with the owner and in the
event of failure to come to an agreement to leave the property so as not to be liable for the Sometime in May, 1963, petitioner and respondent entered into a written contract of lease on
rental fixed and demanded by the owner. petitioner’s above-mentioned parcel of land with the building constructed thereon, for a term
of three years from the execution of said contract, "renewable for another three (3) years at
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN COURT MAY INTERFERE; BURDEN OF PROOF. — Only where the the option of the LESSOR and under such other terms and conditions as she may impose."
The lease contract thus provided as to the period and rentals as P5,000.00.
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
In August, 1968, petitioner filed her suit for ejectment and recovery of rentals in the
"1. That the term of this lease shall be for a period of three (3) years, renewable for another Parañaque municipal court.
three (3) years, at the option of the LESSOR, and under such other terms and conditions she
may impose; Both parties appealed to the Rizal court of first instance the inconclusive judgment of the
Parañaque municipal court of February 20, 1969, which favored more the respondent, as it
"2. That the rentals for the period beginning March 1, 1963 until December 31, 1963, shall be dismissed the complaint and ordered petitioner to return an alleged rental overpayment of
at the rate of Six Hundred (P600.00) Pesos, monthly, and thereafter until the termination of P13,000.00.
the three (3) year period of the lease, the rental payments shall be One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos, monthly, and that said rental price shall be payable in advance on or Upon a stipulation of facts and after trial, the Rizal court found from petitioner’s testimony that
before the 15th day of each month, at the residence of the Lessor, Provided, however, that if she "simply refused to exercise her option under said contract. She did not want to renew the
the Lessor after the first day of March, 1965 will construct a residential house on the said contract for another three years," 5 that the fixed 3-year lease period therefore terminated in
property then the period of this lease contract shall terminate and the Lessee and/or Sub- May, 1966, and thereafter respondent occupied the leased premises on a month-to-month
lessee shall return the property to the Lessor, otherwise, the lease period as contained in the basis under Article 1687 of the Civil Code for which he agreed to pay an increased monthly
document shall prevail. (Exh. 1)." 2  rental of P3,000.00 and that "there is not the least competent, sufficient and credible
evidence" to support respondent’s counter-claim of rental overpayment and that such
From March 1, 1963 to December 31, 1963, respondent paid petitioner the monthly rentals of increased P3,000.-rental "was forced upon him by (petitioner)." 6 The trial court found also
P600.00 as stipulated. Likewise for the remainder of the fixed three-year period of the lease "based on the evidence, enough justification for the increased monthly rental of P5,000.00"
contract from January 1, 1964 to May 31, 1966, respondent paid the monthly rentals of and thus rendered its judgment of August 3, 1970 in favor of petitioner, as
P1,000.00 as stipulated. follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

After the expiration of the fixed contractual three-year period of the lease, petitioner exercised "(1) Ordering Defendant and all persons claiming title under him to vacate the subject
her contractual option not to renew the lease for another three years, notwithstanding premises and to surrender complete possession thereof to Plaintiff, with all the permanent
respondent’s request for renewal. Petitioner however allowed respondent to continue improvements introduced thereon by Defendant;
occupying the leased premises on the basis of his agreement to pay an increased rental on a
monthly basis of P3,000.00 per month, beginning June, 1966. "(2) Ordering Defendant to pay Plaintiff the monthly rental of P5,000.00 from April 1, 1968,
until possession of the premises is restored to Plaintiff, with legal interest thereon until fully
Respondent according to his own brief in the appellate court "grudgingly and involuntarily paid;
paid P3,000.00 as monthly rental to [petitioner]. The P3,000.00 as monthly rental was paid by
[him] from July 4, 1966 to August 16, 1968 (par. 8, Stipulation of Facts, pp. 37-39, R.A.). He "(3) Ordering Defendant to pay Plaintiff the amount of P2,000.00 as reasonable attorney’s
feared to be ejected because his investment — P150,000.00 has already been defrayed for fees;
the construction, remodelling and building of a supper club in said leased premises." 3 Under
paragraph 3 of the lease contract, it had been expressly agreed that "such construction and "(4) Ordering Defendant to pay the costs of the suit;
improvements shall belong to the LESSOR upon termination of the lease, without any
obligation, whatsoever, on her part to reimburse the LESSEE for such constructions or "(5) Ordering Plaintiff to allow Defendant such reasonable time for said Defendant to remove
improvements." 4  from the subject premises all the personal properties mentioned in paragraph 4 of the ‘LEASE
CONTRACT’ (Exhibit ‘B’ for Plaintiff, Exhibit ‘I’ for Defendant); and
From June, 1966 to March, 1968, respondent duly paid the monthly sum of P3,000.00 as
rental for the leased property to petitioner. On March 17, 1968 and on two other occasions in "(6) Dismissing Defendant’s Counterclaim."cralaw virtua1aw library
April, 1968, petitioner through counsel wrote respondent and demanded an increase in the
monthly rental from P3,000.00 to P5,000.00 beginning April, 1968. Respondent refused to Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. 7 In its judgment of May 16, 1974, the
pay the increased rental nor to vacate the leased premises as demanded. Respondent, appellate court expressly upheld the trial court’s finding of termination of the lease after three
however, continued to remit to petitioner the sum of P3,000.00 monthly from April to August, years and "overruled-the contention of [respondent-appellant] that the lease was impliedly
1968 and petitioner applied the payments totalling P15,000.00 as payment for three months’ extended by [petitioner] for another three years." Yet, it found contradictorily that "until March
rentals corresponding to the months of April, May and June, 1968 at the monthly rate of 31, 1968 the defendant was only liable to pay a monthly rental of P1,000.00 in accordance
with the contract of lease which was impliedly extended." And despite the lack of legal and contention of the appellant [respondent] that the lease was impliedly extended by plaintiff
factual bases, it preferred the Parañaque municipal court’s determination fixing the amount of [petitioner] for another three years."cralaw virtua1aw library
rental at P2,000.00 monthly rather than that of P5,000.00 monthly fixed by the Rizal court of
first instance as "just and reasonable under the circumstances," and rendered its judgment It is evident, then, as the record amply shows, that upon the expiration of the fixed three-year
reversing the trial court’s judgment, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph period of the lease, petitioner allowed or acquiesced to respondent’s continuance on the
premises on a month-to-month basis as provided in Articles 1670 and 1687, Civil Code, on
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the plaintiff is ordered to the basis of respondent’s agreement to pay an increased rental at a monthly rate of
return to the defendant the amount he paid in excess of P1,000.00 from July 4, 1966 up to P3,000.00 beginning June, 1966. Respondent religiously paid such monthly rental of
March 31, 1968 and said defendant is declared liable to pay plaintiff a monthly rental of P3,000.00 for over two years "from July 4, 1966 up to and including August 16, 1968" as per
P2,000.00 from April 1, 1968 until he vacated the premises in question, the amounts due to paragraph 8 of the parties’ stipulation of facts. 10 
be determined by the trial court, without pronouncement as to costs."cralaw virtua1aw library
In respondent’s own brief filed in the appellate court as cited in its decision, 11 respondent
It appears undisputed that as noted by the appellate court in its decision, respondent had admitted that "after the three-year period expired, defendant Carlos Faustino continued
vacated the leased premises in August, 1970. 8 Hence, the principal question in this present staying or occupying the property (t.s.n. p. 22, deposition) but paid the monthly rental of
petition is the correctness of the appellate court’s judgment reversing that of the trial court P3,000.00 (id.)."cralaw virtua1aw library
and instead ordering petitioner "to return to [respondent] the amount he paid in excess of
P1,000.00 from July 4, 1966 up to March 31, 1968" and declaring said respondent liable to There is therefore no valid justification for the appellate court’s judgment setting at naught
pay plaintiff only "a monthly rental of P2,000.00 from April 1, 1968 until he vacated the and disregarding the perfectly valid agreement between the parties for the payment of an
premises in question."cralaw virtua1aw library increased monthly rental of P3,000.00 upon the expiration of the fixed three-year lease
period, much less to tie down petitioner to the original P1,000.00 monthly rental
The Court resolved per its resolution of November 8, 1974 to treat the present appeal by way (notwithstanding its own express ruling that there was no implied extension or renewal of the
of review on certiorari as a special civil action in view of the simple issues involved and to lease) and to order petitioner to return or pay back the "excess." 
avoid the unnecessary expense and delay of filing briefs.
The parties’ agreement for payment of an increased monthly rental of P3,000.00 not being
The appeal is meritorious and must be sustained. contrary to prohibitory laws, public order, public policy or morals is the law between the
parties and cannot be simply set aside. Petitioner was but exercising her prerogative as
I. On the question of the monthly rental of P3,000.00 from the expiration on May 31, 1966 of owner to terminate the lease at its expiration and to demand a new rate of rental. Respondent
the fixed three-year period of the lease contract: — The only basis on which respondent could on the other hand as the occupant whose lease had expired had the option either to accept
claim to continue being liable only for a monthly rental of P1,000.00 after May 31, 1966 the new rent (which he did, although "grudgingly" to use his own expression) or avoid paying
notwithstanding the expiration of the fixed three-year period of the lease instead of the the increased rental by vacating the premises. 12 
monthly rental of P3,000.00 that he admittedly paid thereafter is in case his tenuous
contention that petitioner had acquiesced to an implied renewal or extension of the lease Respondent’s contention that his agreement to pay the increased monthly rentals of
contract for another three years at the same rental of P1,000.00 should be factually and P3,000.00 "was vitiated with fear" because he had disbursed P150,000.00 for the remodelling
legally upheld. and improvements of the premises is manifestly untenable. This was a matter of a business
decision on his part. He was as free to agree (which he did) beginning June 1966 to pay an
But such is clearly not the case. increased monthly rental of P3,000.00 for his continued occupancy of the premises on a
month-to-month basis as he was also free to agree or refuse (as he did refuse) to pay the
The trial court expressly found that under the express contractual stipulation which is the law further increased monthly rental of P5,000.00 beginning April 1968 as fixed and demanded by
between the parties, the renewal of the lease for another three years depended upon the sole petitioner and in lieu thereof to vacate the premises.
option of petitioner as lessor and she had flatly refused to grant such renewal. The trial court
thus ruled that "the ‘lease contract’ . . .terminated three years from May, 1963, that is to say, II. On the question of the increased monthly rental of P5,000.00 demanded by petitioner
the lease terminated in May, 1966." 9 This is but in consonance with the specific provisions of beginning April, 1968: — The appellate court found that "After March 31, 1968 (which it
Article 1669, Civil Code that" (I)f the lease was made for a determinate time, it ceases upon erroneously considered the expiration of the implied new lease for another three years in
the day fixed, without the need of a demand."cralaw virtua1aw library contradiction to its own express ruling that there was no such implied extension for another
three years), the plaintiff [petitioner] as lessor, had the right to increase the rental." 13 It
The appellate court expressly upheld this finding of the trial court thus: "we overrule the however rejected the increased monthly rental of P5,000.00 as fixed by petitioner and found
to be fair and reasonable by the trial court and adopted the much lesser monthly rental of P150,000.00 for remodelling and improvements on the premises, which under the lease
P2,000.00 fixed by the Parañaque municipal court notwithstanding that for over two years up contract were to revert to petitioner’s ownership without right of reimbursement at the end of
to March 1968 respondent had agreed to paying a higher monthly rental of P3,000.00, the three-year lease in May, 1966. This amounted to an additional monthly cost-rental of
rationalizing that" (W)e find the amount fixed by the Municipal Court of Parañaque as just and P4,166.00 on respondent’s part (P150,000.00 divided by 36 months comprising the three-
reasonable under the circumstances. The plaintiff acquired the leased premises for only year lease period) or in effect a total monthly rental of P5,166.00 during the said three-year
P15,151.81 on April 26, 1950. And when the lease contract commenced on March 1, 1963 lease period. (Tax-wise, this provided respondent a corresponding advantage also, as he
the monthly rental was only P600.00." 14  could deduct the entire P5,166.00 monthly as operating cost of his nightclub establishment
and quickly write off the entire expense of P150,000.00 in the space of three years).
The Court finds the appellate court’s criterion and conclusion to be arbitrary and wholly
untenable. Upon expiration of the three-year lease period on May 31, 1966, notwithstanding that the
remodelled building and improvements thereon had already passed to petitioner’s ownership,
As correctly assessed by the trial court, "it cannot be seriously asserted that in fixing the the parties agreed on a P3,000.00 monthly rental, as already stated.
present monthly rental, the amount of P15,151.81 paid 20 years ago should be made the
basis to obtain a fair 10% return for an investment. Present prevailing values must be When petitioner fixed and demanded P5,000.00 as the monthly rental beginning April, 1968,
utilized." Petitioner cited the evidence of record that" (A)s of 1968, the market value of the she was in fact merely going back to the previous level of a P5,000.-monthly rental-cost that
leased premises was P800.00 per square meter, or a total of P825,600.00. In view thereof, respondent actually was paying during the three-year period of their lease contract (May,
the realty assessment and the corresponding realty tax thereon was likewise increased 1963 to May, 1966). Manifestly, then, the P5,000.00 monthly rental fixed by petitioner for the
(t.s.n., pp. 18-19, October 29, 1969)," as well as the prevailing rentals on Roxas Boulevard, premises beginning April, 1968 could not be deemed exorbitant or unreasonable.
such as a 200 square-meter lot of Mrs. Maria Aragon being rented for P2,000.00 monthly,
and the Gabaldon property adjacent to petitioner’s with a lesser area of 800 square meters ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby set aside and in
being rented by Luau Restaurant for a monthly rental of P4,000.00 for the first five years and lieu thereof the judgment of the court of first instance of Rizal of August 3, 1970 is hereby
an increased monthly rental of P5,300.00 for the next five years. reinstated. With costs in all instances against private Respondent.

Many other factors were correctly cited by the trial court in support of its conclusion "based on
the evidence (as) enough justification for the increased monthly rental of P5,000.00. The area
of the leased property, its original purchase price 20 years before, its classification as a
‘corner property,’ its present value, its location along Roxas Boulevard, the business to which
it has been devoted by defendant, the length of time Defendant has already occupied it which
is now already even beyond the period of the ‘LEASE CONTRACT’ if renewed — all these,
considered together, justify the increase." 15 

Furthermore, as already indicated, it is the owner’s prerogative to fix the rental for which he
wishes to lease his property and the occupant or lessee has the option of accepting the rent
as fixed or negotiating with the owner and in the event of failure to come to an agreement to
leave the property so as not to be liable for the rental fixed and demanded by the owner.

Only where the rental demanded is clearly exorbitant or unreasonable would the courts
intervene as a matter of fairness and equity. The burden of proof to show that the rental
demanded is exorbitant and unreasonable rested upon respondent, and since respondent
presented no evidence in substantiation of his claim other than the original cost to petitioner
of the property, he has manifestly failed to discharge his burden.
RAMON D. MONTENEGRO, petitioner, vs. MA. TERESA L. MONTENEGRO, for herself
An objective look at the figures suffices to show the fairness and reasonableness of the and as the mother and natural guardian of the minors, ANTONIO AMELO and
P5,000.-monthly rental fixed by petitioner. While petitioner charged a low monthly rental of ANA MARIA PIA ISABEL, both surnamed MONTENEGRO, respondents.
P1,000.00 for the fixed three-year period of the lease (with a grace rental of P600.00 for the
first ten months of 1963), this was in consideration of respondent having defrayed the sum of DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: judgment obligor. The trial court gave her 30 days within which to file the appropriate motion
and informed petitioner that he would have 30 days to file a comment or reply to the motion.
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil On 14 March 2002, respondent Teresa filed a motion to examine petitioner as judgment
Procedure, petitioner Ramon D. Montenegro seeks the reversal of the 8 November 2002 obligor under Sections 36 and 38 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In her motion, she alleged
Order[1] in Civil Case No. 94-8467 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Bacolod City, that there is an urgency for the examination to be conducted at the earliest time since
holding him guilty of indirect contempt for his repeated failure to appear at the scheduled petitioner was about to migrate to Canada. Acting on the said motion, the trial court issued
hearings for his examination as judgment obligor and imposing on him the penalty of three (3) on 19 March 2002 an Order granting the motion for examination of petitioner as judgment
months imprisonment and a fine of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000), and of the subsequent obligor and setting his examination on 22 March 2002. On the same day the motion for
3 January 2003 Order[2] denying his motion for the reconsideration of the 8 November 2002 examination was granted, petitioner filed with the court a Manifestation alleging that the grant
Order. of the motion for examination was premature because he still would have 30 days from
On 14 June 1994, respondent Ma. Teresa V. Lizares-Montenegro (hereinafter, receipt of the motion, or until April 14, 2002, within which to file a comment or opposition
respondent Teresa), for herself and as mother and guardian of her two minor children thereto as agreed upon during the conference on 6 March 2002.
Antonio Amelo and Ana Maria Pia Isabel, filed with the trial court below a complaint for On 22 March 2002, neither petitioner nor his counsel appeared for the scheduled
support against her husband, herein petitioner Ramon D. Montenegro. The case was hearing. On that date, the trial court issued an order re-scheduling the hearing to 10 April
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-8467. Four years after the filing of the complaint, petitioner 2002 and requiring the petitioner to explain why he should not be held in contempt of court for
and respondent Teresa executed a compromise agreement which was submitted to the trial disobeying the 19 March 2002 Order.
court for approval on 13 October 1998. On the same date, the trial court rendered a Decision
approving the compromise agreement and ordering the parties to comply with it. The parties On 26 March 2002, petitioner filed a Compliance with Motion to Re-schedule
did not appeal from the Decision; hence, it became final and executory. Proceedings. He explained that he did not attend the 22 March 2002 hearing because he was
under the impression that he still had 30 days from the filing of the motion to examine him as
Under the terms of the compromise agreement, petitioner obligated himself to: judgment obligor within which to respond to the motion; besides, his counsel was not
(1) Pay the respondent the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000) representing available on 22 March 2002 due to previously scheduled hearings.
her entire share in their conjugal partnership of gains, Five Hundred Thousand At the hearing on 4 April 2002 of the Compliance with Motion to Re-schedule
(P500,000) of which is payable upon signing of the compromise agreement Proceedings, counsel for petitioner manifested that his client already left for Canada on 26
while the remaining balance of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000) must be March 2002 and will be unable to attend the 10 April 2002 hearing, and that petitioner would
paid within one (1) year from the execution of the compromise agreement. be available for examination on the last week of July or first week of August 2002. Counsel
(2) Establish a trust fund in the amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000) in favor prayed that the hearing be thus reset accordingly. The trial court denied the motion and
of his children Antonio Amelo and Ana Maria Pia Isabel within sixty (60) days informed the parties that the hearing scheduled on 10 April 2002 will proceed as scheduled.
from the approval of the compromise agreement. On 5 April 2002, petitioner filed a manifestation reiterating that he would be unable to
(3) Obtain an educational plan or an investment plan to cover tuition and other attend the 10 April 2002 hearing because he was already in Canada. Counsel for petitioner
matriculation fees for the college education of Ana Maria Pia Isabel within one likewise manifested that he would also be unavailable on the said date because he would be
(1) year from the approval of the compromise agreement. in Manila to attend to his other cases.

Since petitioner failed to comply with his obligations under the compromise agreement On 17 June 2002, the trial court issued an Order directing the petitioner to
despite the lapse of the periods provided therein, respondent Teresa filed a motion for the show cause why he should not held in contempt of court for failure to appear on the 10 April
execution of the judgment. The trial court granted the motion and issued a writ of execution 2002 hearing for his examination as judgment obligor. In his Compliance and Explanation
on 15 February 1999. filed on 28 June 2002, petitioner alleged that he was unable to attend the 10 April
2002 hearing because he was in Canada and had no intention to abscond from his obligation.
A second writ of execution and a notice of garnishment, issued by the trial court on 21
May 2001 and on 28 May 2001, respectively, were returned unsatisfied. On 13 June 2002, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for the examination of
the petitioner on 3 July 2002. A subpoena was issued against the petitioner and served at his
In several conferences[3] called by the trial court, petitioner admitted his failure to comply address of record. Respondent Teresa also caused the service of the subpoena at 8051
with his obligations under the compromise agreement but alleged that he was no longer in a Estrella Avenue, San Antonio Village, Makati City where petitioner is allegedly residing.
position to do so as he was already insolvent. In the conference held on 6 March 2002,
respondent Teresa manifested that she would file a motion for examination of petitioner as
 The 3 July 2002 hearing did not push through as the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash The Rules of Court penalizes two types of contempt, namely, direct contempt and
Subpoena Ad Testificandum[4] on 28 June 2002. In the motion, petitioner admitted that 8051 indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court as to
Estrella Avenue, San Antonio Village, Makati City, is his present address obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, and includes disrespect toward the
but alleged that Makati City is more than 100 kilometers away from Bacolod City; thus, he court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness,
may not be compelled by subpoena to attend the 3 July 2002 hearing in Bacolod City. In this or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so.[9]
motion, petitioner did not allege that he was still in Canada.
On the other hand, Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court enumerates particular acts
In its Order of 2 September 2002, the trial court denied the Motion to Quash which constitute indirect contempt, thus:
Subpoena Ad Testificandum, but re-scheduled the hearing to 23 October 2002. On 22
October 2002, the day before the scheduled hearing, petitioner filed a manifestation informing (a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in
the trial court that he was still in Canada and would not be able to attend the 23 October his official transactions;
2002 hearing; however, he would be in Manila on the first week of December 2002. He (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a
moved that the hearing be re-scheduled on 9 December 2002. The manifestation, however, court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected
did not contain a notice of hearing. from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent
On 23 October 2002, petitioner did not appear at the scheduled hearing, prompting the jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real
trial court to issue an order citing him in contempt of court. property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any
manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled
In its Order of 8 November 2002, the trial court declared petitioner in contempt of court thereto;
under Section 38 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court[5] and imposed on him the penalty of
imprisonment for three months and ordered him to pay a fine of P20,000. His motion for (c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of
reconsideration of the Order having been denied by the trial court in its Order of 3 January a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
2003, petitioner filed the petition in the case at bar. (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
The petition raises pure questions of law. After the issues were joined, we resolved to degrade the administration of justice;
give due course to the petition. (e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without
Having raised only questions of law, petitioner is bound by the trial courts findings of authority;
fact. (f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
The core issue to be determined is whether, based on the facts found by the trial court, (g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an
the latter erred in holding the petitioner guilty of indirect contempt for willfully disobeying the officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.
orders of the trial court requiring him to appear for examination as a judgment obligor at the
hearings scheduled on 22 March 2002, 10 April 2002, and 23 October 2002. In relation to the foregoing, Section 38 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court also provides
that a party or other person may be compelled, by an order or subpoena, to attend before the
We rule in the negative. court or commissioner to testify as provided in the two preceding sections, and upon failure to
The totality of petitioners acts clearly indicated a deliberate and unjustified refusal to be obey such order or subpoena or to be sworn, or to answer as a witness or to subscribe his
examined as a judgment obligor at the time the examination was scheduled for hearing by the deposition, may be punished for contempt as in other cases. This provision relates
trial court. His acts tended to degrade the authority and respect for court processes and specifically to Section 3(b) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
impaired the judiciarys duty to deliver and administer justice. Petitioner tried to impose his will Indirect contempt may either be initiated (1) motu proprio by the court by issuing an
on the trial court. order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not
Contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a be punished for contempt or (2) by the filing of a verified petition, complying with the
manner as to create an affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed. requirements for filing initiatory pleadings.[10] In the present case, the trial court initiated the
[6]
 It is defined as disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and proceedings for indirect contempt by issuing two orders[11] directing the petitioner to
dignity.[7] The power to punish contempt is inherent in all courts, because it is essential to the show cause why he should not be punished for indirect contempt.
preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders Contempt, whether direct or indirect, may be civil or criminal depending on the nature
and mandates of the courts; and, consequently, to the due administration of justice.[8] and effect of the contemptuous act. Criminal contempt is conduct directed against the
authority and dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the
administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. [12] On the Sec. 36. Examination of judgment obligor when judgment unsatisfied. When the return of a
other hand, civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or a writ of execution issued against property of a judgment obligor, or any one of several obligors
judge for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is therefore, an offense against the in the same judgment, shows that the judgment remains unsatisfied, in whole or in part, the
party in whose behalf the violated order was made.[13] If the purpose is to punish, then it is judgment obligee, at any time after such return is made, shall be entitled to an order
criminal in nature; but if to compensate, then it is civil.[14] from the court which rendered the said judgment, requiring such judgment obligor to appear
and be examined concerning his property and income before such court or before a
In the present case, the contemptuous act was the petitioners refusal to attend a hearing commissioner appointed by it, at a specified time and place; and proceedings may thereupon
for his examination as judgment obligor, upon motion by the respondent Teresa. It must be be had for the application of the property and income of the judgment obligor towards the
pointed out that the purpose of Section 36 of Rule 39 is to provide the judgment obligee a satisfaction of the judgment. But no judgment obligor shall be so required to appear before a
remedy in case where the judgment obligor continues to fail to comply with its obligation court or commissioner outside the province or city in which such obligor resides or is found.
under the judgment. Petitioners refusal to be examined, without justifiable reason, constituted (Emphasis supplied)
indirect contempt which is civil in nature.
Thus, the trial court committed no abuse of discretion in scheduling the examination of
Petitioners deliberate willfulness and even malice in disobeying the orders of the trial petitioner on 22 March 2002. On the contrary, it acted with utmost judiciousness to avoid a
court are clearly shown in the pleadings he himself had filed before the trial court. miscarriage of justice because petitioner was reported to be about to leave for Canada, a fact
In his Manifestation of 19 March 2002 petitioner insisted on his right to file a reply or which petitioner did not refute in his Manifestation of 19 March 2002.
comment on the Motion to Examine Defendant as Judgment Obligor until 14 April 2002 solely It is noteworthy that while petitioner insisted that he still had until 14 April 2002 to file a
on the basis of the purported agreement at the conference on 6 March 2002. Petitioner reply or comment on the motion for examination, he also manifested through counsel on 5
merely brushed aside the Order of the trial court requiring him to appear on 22 March April 2002 that he already left for Canada on 26 March 2002 and will not be back until the last
2002 for the hearing by not appearing in court. Petitioner cannot simply assume that his week of July or the first week of August 2002. It is obvious then that petitioner wanted to gain
manifestation would suffice for the trial court to re-schedule the 22 March 2002 hearing. That time to avoid being examined.
portion of the manifestation filed by petitioner on 19 March 2002, which reads:
With respect to the 10 April 2002 hearing, it is established that petitioner was already
3. In the meantime, we have no other option but to cancel the setting on March 22, 2002 until in Canada at the time of the scheduled hearing. Nonetheless, it must be stressed that the re-
Respondent shall have submitted his Reply/Comment and the issue is finally laid to rest by scheduling of the hearing to 10 April 2002 was brought about by his unjustifiable failure to
the issuance of a final Order for that purpose. attend the 22 March 2002 hearing.
demonstrates beyond doubt arrogance, haughtiness and disrespect. While petitioner Subsequently, despite petitioners 19 March 2002 and 5 April 2002 manifestations that
apparently disagrees with the 19 March 2002 Order of the trial court, he did not file a motion he would return to the Philippines sometime during the last week of July or first week of
for its reconsideration. Neither did he file a motion to reset the scheduled hearing on 22 August 2002, petitioner did not attend the 23 October 2002 hearing. Again, instead of filing a
March 2002. We have ruled that a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of motion to reset the hearing, petitioner filed a manifestation the day before the scheduled
right but is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. [15] Petitioner sought to deprive the hearing, informing the court that he will be unable to attend the hearing and suggesting the
trial court of the discretion; he took it upon himself to cancel or to order the court to cancel hearing to be reset to 9 December 2002. Such manifestation to re-schedule the 23 October
the 22 March 2002 scheduled hearing. 2002 hearing was, for all intents and purposes, a motion to postpone the hearing, but the
Petitioner makes a belated claim in the present petition that his failure to attend the 22 pleading did not contain a notice of hearing.
March 2002 hearing was due to the fact that he was already on his way to Manila on 22 It is of no moment that petitioner was eventually examined as judgment obligor on 17
March 2002 in preparation for his 26 March 2002 trip to Canada. However, such explanation December 2002, nine months after the original setting. His subsequent appearance at the
was not stated in the 19 March 2002 Manifestation and 5 April 2002 Compliance and Motion hearing did not wipe out his contemptuous conduct.
to Re-schedule Proceedings. The explanation is either a delayed afterthought or an
unguarded confession of a deliberate plan to delay or even avoid his examination as a We shall now take up the penalties imposed by the trial court.
judgment obligor.
Under Section 7 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person found guilty of contempt of
Neither can petitioner rely on the alleged irregularity in the trial courts grant of the motion court against a Regional Trial Court may be punished with a fine not exceeding thirty
to examine him as judgment obligor before he was able to file a reply or comment. Section 36 thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. The penalties of
of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court allows, as a matter of right, the plaintiff who is a judgment imprisonment for three months and a fine of twenty thousand pesos are within the allowable
obligee to examine the defendant as judgment obligor, at any time after the return of the writ penalties the trial court may impose. However, the penalties of imprisonment and fine may be
of execution is made. Section 36 reads as follows: imposed one at a time, or together.
 In the present case, the nature of the contemptuous acts committed are civil in nature.
Section 7 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides for indefinite incarceration in civil
contempt proceedings to compel a party to comply with the order of the court. This may be
resorted to where the attendant circumstances are such that the non-compliance with the
court order is an utter disregard of the authority of the court which has then no other recourse
but to use its coercive power.[16] It has been held that when a person or party is legally and
validly required by a court to appear before it for a certain purpose, when that requirement is
disobeyed, the only remedy left for the court is to use force to bring such person or party
before it.[17]
The reason for indefinite incarceration in civil contempt proceedings, in proper cases, is
that it is remedial, preservative, or coercive in nature. The punishment is imposed for the
benefit of a complainant or a party to a suit who has been injured. Its object is to compel
performance of the orders or decrees of the court, which the contemnor refuses to obey
although able to do so.[18] In effect, it is within the power of the person adjudged guilty of
contempt to set himself free.
In the present case, however, the act which the trial court ordered the petitioner to do
has already been performed, albeit belatedly and not without delay for an unreasonable
length of time. As such, the penalty of imprisonment may no longer be imposed despite the
fact that its non-implementation was due to petitioners absence in the Philippines.
We are not unmindful of the nature of the judgment from which the present controversy
arose. Six years have elapsed from the time the compromise agreement for the support of
the children of petitioner and respondent was executed. We take judicial notice of the amount
of expenses which a travel outside the country, particularly to Canada, entails, much more so
when the person traveling to Canada is trying to establish himself in the said country as an
immigrant. Petitioners claim for insolvency is negated by his frequent travels to Canada. We
thus exhort the parties, specifically the petitioner, to resort to all reasonable means to fully
satisfy the judgment for support based on the compromise agreement, for the paramount
interests of their minor children.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The 8 November
2002 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Bacolod City in Civil Case No. 94-8467 is
modified. As modified, the penalty of imprisonment is deleted therefrom, while the penalty of
fine of P20,000 is affirmed.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

AVELINA ZAMORA, EMERITA ZAMORA-NICOL, SONNY NICOL, TERESA ZAMORA-

UMALI, CLARENCE UMALI, ROBERTO ZAMORA, ROLANDO ZAMORA, MARY
ANN ZAMORA, MICHELLE ZAMORA and RODRIGO
ZAMORA, petitioners, vs. HEIRS of CARMEN IZQUIERDO, represented by their
attorney-in-fact, ANITA F. PUNZALAN, respondents.
 DECISION Consequently, on October 2, 1997, respondents, represented by Anita Punzalan, filed
with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 49, Caloocan City, a complaint for unlawful
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: detainer and damages against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 23702.[6] Forthwith,
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss[7] the complaint on the ground that the controversy was
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of not referred to the barangay for conciliation. First, they alleged that the barangay Certification
Appeals dated September 12, 2000 and its Resolution dated December 1, 2000 in CA-G.R. to File Action is fatally defective because it pertains to another dispute, i.e., the refusal by
SP No. 54541, entitled Avelina Zamora, et al., petitioners, versus Heirs of Carmen Izquierdo, respondents attorney-in-fact to give her written consent to petitioners request for installation
represented by the executrix, Anita F. Punzalan, respondents. of water facilities in the premises. And, second, when the parties failed to reach an amicable
settlement before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, the  Punong Barangay (as Lupon Chairman),
The records show that sometime in 1973, Carmen Izquierdo and Pablo Zamora entered
did not constitute the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo before whom mediation or arbitration
into a verbal stipulation whereby the former leased to the latter one of her apartment units
proceedings should have been conducted, in violation of Section 410(b), Chapter
located at 117-B General Luna Street, Caloocan City. They agreed on the following: the
7 (Katarungang Pambarangay), Title One, Book III of Republic Act No. 7160 [8] (otherwise
rental is P3,000.00 per month; the leased premises is only for residence; and only a single
known as the Local Government Code of 1991), which reads:
family is allowed to occupy it.
After the death of Carmen (lessor) in 1996 her attorney-in-fact, Anita Punzalan, SECTION 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement.
representing the heirs, herein respondents, prepared a new contract of lease wherein the
rental was increased from P3,000.00 to P3,600.00 per month.[3] However, petitioners refused (a) x x x
to sign it.
In January 1997, Pablo (lessee) died. His wife, Avelina Zamora, and their children (two (b) Mediation by lupon chairman Upon receipt of the complaint,
of whom have their own families), herein petitioners, continued to reside in the apartment the lupon  chairman[9] shall, within the next working day, summon the respondent(s), with
unit. However, they refused to pay the increased rental and persisted in operating a notice to the complainant(s) for them and their witnesses to appear before him for a
photocopying business in the same apartment. mediation of their conflicting interests. If he fails in his mediation effort within fifteen (15)
days from the first meeting of the parties before him, he shall forthwith set a date for the
Meanwhile, petitioner Avelina Zamora applied with the Metropolitan Waterworks & constitution of the pangkat in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.
Sewerage System (MWSS) for a water line installation in the premises. Since a written (Underscoring supplied)
consent from the owner is required for such installation, she requested respondents attorney-
in-fact to issue it. However, the latter declined because petitioners refused to pay the new
Respondents opposed the motion to dismiss,[10] the same being prohibited under Section
rental rate and violated the restrictions on the use of the premises by using a portion thereof
19 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. They prayed that judgment be
for photocopying business and allowing three families to reside therein.
rendered as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint, pursuant to Section
This prompted petitioner Avelina Zamora to file with the Office of the Punong 6[11] of the same Rule.
Barangay  of  Barangay 16, Sona 2,  District I, Lungsod ng Caloocan, a complaint against
On July 9, 1998, the MTC issued an Order[12] denying petitioners motion to dismiss and
Anita Punzalan (respondents attorney-in-fact), docketed as Usaping Bgy. Blg.  1-27-97,  Ukol
considering the case submitted for decision in view of their failure to file their answer to the
sa: Hindi Pagbibigay ng Pahintulot sa Pagpapakabit ng Tubig.
complaint.
On August 24, 1997, during the barangay conciliation proceedings, petitioner Avelina
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,[13] contending that a motion to dismiss the
Zamora declared that she refused to sign the new lease contract because she is not
complaint on the ground of failure to refer the complaint to the Lupon for conciliation is
agreeable with the conditions specified therein.
allowed under Section 19 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, which partly
The following day, Anita Punzalan sent Avelina a letter [4] informing her that the lease is provides:
being terminated and demanding that petitioners vacate the premises within 30 days from
notice. SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings, motions, or petitions
shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
Despite several barangay conciliation sessions, the parties failed to settle their dispute
amicably. Hence, the Barangay Chairman issued a Certification to File Action dated
September 14, 1997.[5] (a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the
preceding section [referring to Section 18 on referral of the complaint to the Lupon for conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat  as a precondition to filing a
conciliation]; complaint in court, thus:

x x x. SECTION 412. Conciliation. (a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court. No complaint,

petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be
On August 26, 1998, the MTC rendered a Judgment[14] in favor of respondents and filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there
against petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads: has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat,
and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by
the lupon or pangkat secretary and attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman x x x.
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
(Underscoring supplied)
defendants, ordering defendants and all persons claiming right under them:

In the case at bar, the Punong Barangay, as Chairman of the Lupong Tagapamayapa,

1)      To vacate the leased premises located at No. 117-B General Luna
conducted conciliation proceedings to resolve the dispute between the parties herein.
Street, Caloocan City and to surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff;
Contrary to petitioners contention, the complaint does not only allege, as a cause of action,
the refusal of respondents attorney-in-fact to give her consent to the installation of water
2)      To pay the amount of three thousand six hundred (P3,600.00) pesos per facilities in the premises, but also petitioners violation of the terms of the lease, specifically
month starting January, 1997 until the premises being occupied by them is their use of a portion therein for their photocopying business and their failure to pay the
finally vacated and possession thereof is restored to the plaintiff; increased rental. As correctly found by the RTC:

3)      To pay plaintiff the sum of five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos as and for The records show that confrontations before the barangay chairman were held on January
attorneys fees; and 26, 1997, February 9, 1997, February 23, 1997, February 28, 1997, July 27, 1997, August 3,
1997, August 10, 1997, August 17, 1997 and August 24, 1997 wherein not only the issue of
4)      To pay the costs of this suit. water installation was discussed but also the terms of the lease and the proposed execution
of a written contract relative thereto. It appears, however, that no settlement was reached
SO ORDERED. despite a total of nine meetings at the barangay level.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 125, Caloocan City, rendered its It is of no moment that the complaint was initially made by defendant-appellant Avelina
Decision[15] dated February 15, 1999 affirming the MTC Judgment. Subsequently, it denied Zamora because herein plaintiff-appellee was given by the Sangguniang Barangay the
petitioners motion for reconsideration.[16] authority to bring her grievance to the Court for resolution. While it is true that the
Sertifikasyon dated September 14, 1997 is entitled Ukol Sa Hindi Pagbibigay Ng Pahintulot
Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed as CA- Sa Pagpapakabit Ng Tubig, this title must not prevail over the actual issues discussed in the
G.R. SP No. 54541. On September 12, 2000, it rendered a Decision [17] affirming the RTC proceedings.
Decision.
Thereafter, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate Hence, to require another confrontation at the barangay level as a sine qua non for the filing
Court in its Resolution dated December 1, 2000.[18] of the instant case would not serve any useful purpose anymore since no new issues would
be raised therein and the parties have proven so many times in the past that they cannot get
Hence, the instant petition. to settle their differences amicably.[20]
I
We cannot sustain petitioners contention that the Lupon conciliation alone, without the
The primordial objective of Presidential Decree No. 1508 (the Katarungang proceeding before the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo, contravenes the law on Katarungang
Pambarangay Law), now included under R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of Pambarangay. Section 412(a) of R.A. No. 7160, quoted earlier, clearly provides that, as a
1991), is to reduce the number of court litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality precondition to filing a complaint in court, the parties shall go through the conciliation
of justice which has been brought about by the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts. process either before the Lupon Chairman (as what happened in the present
[19]
 To attain this objective, Section 412(a) of R.A. No. 7160 requires the parties to undergo a case), or the Pangkat.
 Moreover, in Diu vs. Court of Appeals,[21] we held that notwithstanding the mandate in
Section 410(b) of R.A. No. 7160 that the Barangay  Chairman shall constitute a Pangkat if he
fails in his mediation efforts, the same Section 410(b) should be construed together with
Section 412(a) of the same law (quoted earlier), as well as the circumstances obtaining in
and peculiar to the case. Here, while the Pangkat  was not constituted, however, the parties
met nine (9) times at the Office of the Barangay  Chairman for conciliation wherein not only
the issue of water installation was discussed but also petitioners violation of the lease
contract. It is thus manifest that there was substantial compliance with the law which does not
require strict adherence thereto.[22]
II
We hold that petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint for unlawful detainer is
proscribed by Section 19(a) of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, quoted
earlier. Section 19(a) permits the filing of such pleading only when the ground for dismissal of
the complaint is anchored on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure by the
complainant to refer the subject matter of his/her complaint to the Lupon for
conciliation prior to its filing with the court. This is clear from the provisions of Section 18 of
the same Rule, which reads:

SEC. 18. Referral to Lupon. Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under

the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 where there is no showing of compliance
with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only
after such requirement shall have been complied with. This provision shall not apply to
criminal cases where the accused was arrested without a warrant. (Underscoring supplied)

As discussed earlier, the case was referred to the Lupon Chairman for conciliation.

Obviously, petitioners motion to dismiss, even if allowed, is bereft of merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54541 sustaining the Decision of the RTC which upheld
the MTC Judgment is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.