Equal Protection

1. Meaning. The guarantee of equal protection means that “no person or class of persons shall
be deprived of the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in the same place and in like circumstances.”[11] It means that “all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed.” The guarantee does not provide absolute equality of rights or indiscriminate operation
on persons. Persons or things that are differently situated may thus be treated differently.
Equality only applies among equals. What is prohibited by the guarantee is the discriminatory
legislation which treats differently or favors others when both are similarly situated.
2. Purpose. The purpose of the guarantee is to prohibit hostile discrimination or undue favor to
anyone, or giving special privilege when it is not reasonable or justified.
3. Reasonable Classification. Well established is the rule that reasonable classification does not
violate the guarantee, provided that the classification has the following requisites:[12]

(a) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;

(b) It must be germane to the purpose of the law;

(c) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(d) It must apply equally to all members of the class.

1. Serrano vs Gallant Maritime

Facts

Antonio Serrano (serrano for brevity) was a Filipino sea fairer employed as Chief Officer by
Gallant Maritime Services Inc and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc (respondents for brevity) under a
12- month contract with Basic Monthly Salary of US$1400. However, when he departed on
March 19. 1998, Serrno was constrained to accept a downgraded employment of Second
Officer with monthly salary of US$1,000 with the assurance that he would be made Chief Officer
by the end of April 1998. However, respondents failed to keep their promise so Serrano refused
to stay as Second Oficer and was repatriated to the Philippines, having served only 2 months
and 7 days fot eh 12 month contract.\

Serrano filed a complaint before the Labor arbiter for constructive dismissal and payment of
money claims (total US$26442.73), moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees

ABOR ARBITER: Serrano was declared illegally dismissed and was awarded monetary
benefits, representing Serrano’s salary for three (3) months of the unexpired portion
of his employment contract (total USD8,770) at the exchange rate of USD45 and
attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of total amount awarded. LA’s basis was Serrano’s
basic pay (USD1,400), fixed overtime pay (USD700), vacation leave pay (USD490).

Serrano appealed to the NLRC, arguing that he is entitled to his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his contract pursuant to Tripe Intefrated Services Inc vs. NLRC.

NLRC: NLRC modified the monetary awards and ordered respondents to pay only
USD4669 which is equivalent to 3 months salary (USD1400 x 3); Salary differential of
USD45 and 10% attorney’s fees of USD424.5, reasoning that R.A. No. 8042 "does not
provide for the award of overtime pay, which should be proven to have been
actually performed, and for vacation leave pay. Other findings were affirmed.

Serrano questioned the constitutionality of said provision.

Court of Appeals: The CA affirmed the NLRC’s ruling on the reduction but skirted the
constitutional issue.

Respondents argue that respondent cannot belatedly question the constitutionality of

the said law on appeal.

The Sol Gen (OSG) argues that since the law preceded Serrano’s contract, it
(especially the monetary claims) is deemed incorporated therat sans stipulation. The
OSG further contends that there is a reasonable and valid basis to differentiate OFW
from local workers; and therefore the provision does not violate the equal protection
clause nor sec. 18 Art. II of the Constitution.

Issue

 Whether or not Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 8402 is constitutional.

Held
Substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
differently from another

The subject clause VIOLATES the Equal Protection Clause and Right of an

individual to due Process(Sec 1, Art III), recognizing their rights as a protected
Sector (Sec 18, Art II; and Section 3 of Article XIII)

The Court declared the provision unconstitutional clause  VIOLATES the Equal Protection Clause
and Right of an individual to due Process(Sec 1, Art III), recognizing their rights as a protected
Sector (Sec 18, Art II; and Section 3 of Article XIII).
Prior to R.A. 8042, all OFWs who were illegally terminated were subjected to a uniform
rule of monetary benefits computation: basic salary times the entire  unexpired portion
of their employment. However, upon the enactment of R.A. 8042, illegally dismissed
employees with unexpired portion of 1 year or more are singled out and subjected to the
disadvantageous monetary award of 3 months of their unexpired portion; as opposed to
those illegally terminated OFWs with unexpired contracts of less than one year who are
entitled to their salaries for the unexpired period; and illegally dismissed local workers
with fixed-term employment who are not subjected to the 3-cap limitation.

Filipino workers are protected and afforded certain rights under the Constitution subject to the inherent
power of Congress to incorporate a system of classification into its legislation. 

There is a valid classification if the classification is

1.) based on substantial distinction,
2.) germane to the purpose of law,
3) it is not limited to existing conditions; and
4) it applies equally to all members of the class.

Setion 3 of Article XII is not a self-executing provision and it cannot on its own, be a source of enforceable
right. What it does is recognize labor as a protected sector; otherwise, it will lead to a broad interpretation
would suggest a blanket shield in favor of labor.

In declaring the subject clause unconstitutional, the Court reasoned that since the same deprived Serrano
of property and money benefits without an existing valid and definitive governmental purpose, it violated
not only Serrano’s right to equal protection but as well as his right to substantive due process under
(Section1, Art. III of the Constitution); thus, entitling Serrano to his salaries for the entire unexpired period.

Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., 582 SCRA 254 (2009): There is a substantial
distinction between overseas Filipino workers and Filipinos who work in the
Philippines.

Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles

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Agency v. Cabiles

2014 CASE DIGEST: SAMEER OVERSEAS

PLACEMENT AGENCY V. CABILES
Published by admin on February 21, 2015 | Leave a response

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., Petitioner,

vs.

JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.

 G.R. No. 170139               August 5, 2014

PONENTE: Leonen

TOPIC:  Section 10 of RA 8042 vis-a-vis Section 7 of RA 10022

FACTS:

                Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and

placement agency.

                Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year employment contract
for a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co.
Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged that in her employment contract, she
agreed to work as quality control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a
cutter.

                Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal
informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that “she should
immediately report to their office to get her salary and passport.” She was asked to
“prepare for immediate repatriation.” Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to
July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.15 According to her,
Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.

                On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC
against petitioner and Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed LA’s
decision. CA affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission finding
respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three months’ worth of salary, the
reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and attorney’s fees

ISSUE:

WON PETITIONER JOY WAS ILLEGALY DISSMISED

HELD

YES. The Court held that the award of the three-month equivalent of respondent’s

salary should be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the
employment contract.
                In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc.,
this court ruled that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less” is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and
substantive due process.

                A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It

“confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is
inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.”

                The Court said that they are aware that the clause “or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” was reinstated in Republic Act No.
8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.

Ruling on the constitutional issue

                In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the
government may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution,
regardless of the existence of any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution
cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light of the Constitution.
Any law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity.

                Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is

inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by
reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision.
A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such
unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.

                The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as provided

in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal
protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General
have failed to show any compelling change in the circumstances that would
warrant us to revisit the precedent.

                The Court declared, once again, the clause, “or for three (3) months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in Section 7
of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is
declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK), et al. Vs. Quezon City, as represented by Mayor
Herbert Bautista, et al.
G.R. No. 225442. August 8, 2017

State has broader authority over the minors’ activities than over similar actions of adults, and
overall, reflect the State’s general interest in the well-being of minors. Thus, the State may impose
limitations on the minors’ exercise of rights even though these limitations do not generally apply to
adults.

Facts:
Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for
minors, several local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew
ordinances on minors through police operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody."
Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances were respondents: (a) Navotas
City, through Pambayang Ordinansa Big. 99- 02, 4 dated August 26, 1999, entitled "Nagtatakda ng
'Curfew' ng mga Kabataan na Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas,
Kalakhang Maynila," as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Big. 2002-13, 5 dated June 6, 2002
(Navotas Ordinance); (b) City of Manila, through Ordinance No. 80466 entitled "An Ordinance
Declaring the Hours from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00 A.M. of the Following Day as 'Barangay Curfew
Hours' for Children and Youths Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age; Prescribing Penalties Therefor;
and for Other Purposes" dated October 14, 2002 (Manila Ordinance); and (c) Quezon City, through
Ordinance No. SP- 2301, 7 Series of2014, entitled "An Ordinance Setting for a [sic] Disciplinary
Hours in Quezon City for Minors from 10:00 P.M. to 5:00 A.M., Providing Penalties for
Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof and for Other Purposes" dated July 31, 2014 (Quezon City
Ordinance; collectively, Curfew Ordinances).
Petitioners, spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) - an association
of young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of
the rights and welfare of the youth and minors 10 - filed this present petition, arguing that the Curfew
Ordinances are unconstitutional because they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,
and thus, fall under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or
impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours; ( c) deprive minors of the right to
liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process; and ( d) deprive parents of their natural
and primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due process. 11 In addition, petitioners
assert that the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional?
RULING:
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the first prong of the
strict scrutiny test - that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote
juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon City
Ordinance has passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the
three which provides for the least restrictive means to achieve this interest.
In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that enable minors to
freely exercise their fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly
drawn to achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied
by their parents or guardian", has also been construed to include parental permission as a constructive
form of accompaniment and hence, an allowable exception to the curfew measure; the manner of
enforcement, however, is left to the discretion of the local government unit.
In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus, null and void,
while the Quezon City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid in accordance with this
Decision. For another, the Court has determined that the Manila Ordinance's penal provisions
imposing reprimand and fines/imprisonment on minors conflict with Section 57-A of RA 9344, as
amended. Hence, following the rule that ordinances should always conform with the law, these
provisions must be struck down as invalid.

Void for Vagueness. The assailed pieces of ordinance are NOT void for
being vague.
"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to
accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion
in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.

In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is

improper, considering that they do not properly identify any provision in any of
the Curfew Ordinances, which, because of its vague terminology, fails to provide
fair warning and notice to the public of what is prohibited or required so that one
may act accordingly.[49] The void for vagueness doctrine is premised on
due process considerations, which are absent from this particular claim.

Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide

the local authorities in the proper apprehension of suspected curfew
offenders. They do not assert any confusion as to what conduct the
subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the
ordinances' lack of enforcement guidelines. The mechanisms related to
the implementation of the Curfew Ordinances are, however, matters of policy
that are best left for the political branches of government to resolve. Verily, the
objective of curbing unbridled enforcement is not the sole consideration in a void
for vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners must show that this perceived danger
of unbridled enforcement stems from an ambiguous provision in the law that
allows enforcement authorities to second-guess if a particular conduct is
prohibited or not prohibited.