Analysis

April 5, 2011

Summary: Across its neighbor- Turkey’s Neighborhood Policy:

hood and in policy areas as
diverse as security, trade, energy, A European Perspective
and migration, Turkish foreign
policy has fundamentally trans- By Nathalie Tocci
formed. In some cases, such
as Turkish policies in Eastern
Europe or in the fields of trade
and migration, the change since Turkey’s Neighborhood Policies: in to populist instincts.2 Last but not
the end of the Cold War has been Successes, Pending Challenges, least, the Justice and Development
incremental. In other areas, such and Flashpoints Party (AKP) has developed its own
as in the Middle East and in The transformation in Turkey’s foreign distinctive foreign policy “ideology,”
the realm of security policy, the policy can be read as a mix of external characterized by the concepts of “zero
shift has been more abrupt and geopolitical as well as internal polit- problems” with neighbors and “stra-
visible. But the transformation of ical, economic, and societal changes. tegic depth,” elaborated by current
Turkey’s neighborhood policies Externally, the end of the Cold War, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet
is undeniable. This article briefly
the ensuing 1990-91 Gulf War, and, Davutoğlu. The doctrine of strategic
recounts the major transforma-
more recently, the 2003 war in Iraq depth has synthesized the plethora of
tions in Turkey’s neighborhood
policies over the last decade, induced Turkey to engage more state and non-state interests that have
to Turkey’s north and south. It actively in its neighborhood, both to pushed Turkey into deeper ties with its
highlights the principal achieve- the north and south. Yet changes in neighbors. It conceptualizes a foreign
ments as well as the pending Turkey’s domestic set-up fundamen- policy trend that has been in the
challenges and flashpoints. The tally altered the nature and style of making since the end of the Cold War
purpose of this account is to that involvement. Internally, Turkish under the leadership of former Turkish
assess European perceptions of foreign policy is no longer the exclu- Prime Minister and President Turgut
and reactions to Turkey’s neigh- sive domain of the military and the Özal in the late 1980s.3
borhood policies, with an eye to ministry of foreign affairs. Not only
drawing out the implications for have these two actors changed, but The upshot of this transformation is
Turkey’s tortured accession path Turkey’s increased eagerness to engage
others have acquired a growing role in
to the European Union. the neighborhood and to pursue
foreign policy-making, ranging from
sectoral ministries, the under-secre- an independent foreign policy. This
tariat for foreign trade, and the devel- increasingly open, active, and indepen-
opment agency TIKA, to NGOs and dent foreign policy has achieved some
businesses associations.1 In addition, notable successes, but is also plagued
Turkish democratization has made with challenges.
the government more accountable to
public opinion, entailing both a greater
responsiveness to public demands as 2
Kirişci, K., Tocci, N. and Walker, J. (2010) “A Neighbor-
Offices
well as a greater inclination to give hood Rediscovered: Turkey’s Transatlantic Value in the
Middle East,” Brussels Forum Working Paper, Washington,
German Marshall Fund of the United States.
Washington, DC • Berlin • Paris • Brussels
1
Kirişci, K. (2009) “The transformation of Turkish foreign 3
Altunışık, M. (2009) “Worldviews and Turkish foreign
policy: The rise of the trading state,” New Perspectives on policy in the Middle East,” New Perspectives on Turkey,
Belgrade • Ankara • Bucharest Turkey, No. 40, pp. 29-57. No. 40, pp. 171-194.
Analysis

Amongst the major successes, we can mention Bosnia, to Turkey in January 2004, reciprocated by Prime Minister
Syria, and Iraq. The roots of Turkish activism in the Erdoğan in December 2004, when he visited Damascus to
Western Balkans were laid in the 1990s. Beyond partici- sign a bilateral free trade agreement. In recent years, rela-
pating in NATO interventions in the Balkans,4 Ankara tions have continued to improve, leading to the signing of
a bilateral visa-free agreement and the establishment of a
Strategic Cooperation Council in October 2009, and the
Turkish foreign policy is no longer commitment to forge a trade and visa-free zone including
Turkey, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon in June 2010.
the exclusive domain of the
Relations with Iraq, hampered since the first Gulf War by
military and the ministry of foreign mutual suspicions between Ankara and Erbil, also improved
markedly, giving rise to a burgeoning relationship between
Turkey and Iraq, and in particular the Kurdish Regional
affairs. Government (KRG).6 With the elimination of the PKK as
a serious military threat and Turkey’s growing acknowl-
also played a critical role in brokering a constitutional edgement that its Kurdish problem could not be solved by
agreement between Bosnian Muslims and Croats in 1993, military force alone, the continued stability offered by the
which culminated in the Washington Agreement in 1994. KRG in Northern Iraq has become a major opportunity
Following this trail, more recently, following the failure for Turkey. Since 2007-8, Turkey has come to accept Iraqi
of the constitutional reform effort in Bosnia in 2006, Kurdish autonomy, has opened official ties with the KRG,
Turkey has once again stepped into the Balkan quagmire, and has deepened its social, political, and economic influ-
attempting to mediate between Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs ence in Iraq. Bilateral trade reached $5 billion in 2008, with
within the faltering Dayton set-up. In 2009-2010, Turkish Turkey predicting a rise to $25 billion over the next three to
Foreign Minister Davutoğlu held a series of trilateral meet- four years. As much as 80 percent of foreign direct invest-
ings with Bosnian and Serb, and Bosnian and Croat leaders. ment in the region comes from Turkey.7 The creation of a
One of the most visible successes was the Serbian parlia- High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council in 2009 between
ment’s apology for the Srebrenica crimes in 1995. Turkey and Iraq is a further indicator of just how far these
two former enemies have come in recent years.
In the case of Syria, the transformation of Turkey’s foreign
policy has been stark. In the 1990s, relations between the
two countries were marred by historical Syrian grievances The continued stability offered by
over the Turkish province of Hatay, the long-standing
dispute over the Euphrates River and, most acutely, Syria’s the Kurdish Regional Government
support for the PKK and harboring of its leader, Abdullah
Öcalan.5 Relations plummeted to the point of a near war
between the two countries in October 1998. Since the
in Northern Iraq has become a
1998 Adana agreement establishing direct telephone links,
appointing special representatives to each other’s country, major opportunity for Turkey.
and establishing bilateral security mechanisms, and Syria’s
expulsion of Öcalan, bilateral relations have steadily
improved. Turkish President Sezer attended Syrian Presi- Turning from successes to pending challenges and flash-
dent Hafez al-Assad’s funeral in 2000. This was followed points in Turkish foreign policy, worth mentioning are the
by the historical visit of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad festering Cyprus conflict, the stalled rapprochement with
6
Barkey, H. J. (2010) “Turkey’s New Engagement in Iraq,” Special Report, No. 237, Wash-
4
Oğuzlu, T. and Güngör, U. (2006) “Peace Operations and the Transformation of Turkey’s ington, United States Institute for Peace.
Security Policy,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 472-488. 7
Malka, H. (2009) “Turkey and the Middle East: Rebalancing Interests,” in Turkey’s Evolv-
5
Altunışık, M. and Tür, Ö. (2006) “From distant neighbours to partners? Changing Syrian- ing Dynamics, Final Report of the CSIS US-Turkey Strategic Initiative, Washington, CSIS,
Turkish relations,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 37, No.2, pp.229-48. March.

2
Analysis

Armenia, the deterioration of relations with Israel and the

divergences between Turkey and the West over Iran. As for
A few miles away from the Turkish
Cyprus, in its early years in office, the AKP distinguished
itself for U-turning Turkey’s traditional dictat that no solu- coastland, Cyprus continues to
tion is the solution in Cyprus. Not only did the Turkish
government accept a bi-zonal and bi-communal federal escape the activism of a Turkish
settlement in Cyprus, but also embraced the detailed Annan
Plan, set forth by the United Nations. As is well known, the foreign policy intent in pursuing
Plan foundered upon the Greek Cypriot “No” in the 2004
referendum. Following the 2004 debacle, bi-communal
negotiations in Cyprus resumed after the election of Deme- zero problems with neighbors.
tris Christofias in February 2008. In this ongoing saga,
Turkey has taken a backseat. Resting on the laurels of the the Israeli-Arab conflict and Israeli rhetorical retaliation.9
Annan Plan and arguing that the burden of proof regarding The crisis escalated in May 2010 into a bilateral problem,
a genuine commitment to a federal solution rests on the when the Israel Defense Forces killed eight Turkish citizens
Greek Cypriot side, Ankara has supported the talks, without on board a Turkish vessel, part of an international flotilla
going out of its way to spur an agreement. A few miles away carrying humanitarian goods to Gaza. The Turkish-Israeli
from the Turkish coastland, Cyprus continues to escape the relationship seems to have undergone a structural turn. This
activism of a Turkish foreign policy intent in pursuing zero does not mean that Turkish-Israeli relations will always and
problems with neighbors. necessarily be bad, let alone that the manifold ties between
Turkey and Israel at the political/diplomatic, economic and
Equally unresolved remain Turkey’s ties with Armenia. movement of people levels will be broken. But with the
Again, under the AKP government, Turkey made unprec- magic of the Oslo years over and with Turkey’s relationship
edented steps to restore relations with Yerevan, brought to a with Syria no longer marked by the tensions of the past, it
standstill after Turkey closed its border with Armenia in the does mean that the Turkish-Israeli relationship is unlikely to
context of the Nagorno Karabakh war in 1993. Following have the military-strategic flavor of the 1990s.
the football diplomacy between Turkish President Abdullah
Gül and his Armenian counterpart Serg Sarkisian in 2008, A last flashpoint regards the distancing between Turkey
the two countries moved towards reconciliation, culmi- and the West over Iran’s nuclear program. In the 2000s,
nating with the signature of two protocols in October 2009.8 brought together by joint concerns over the PKK and Iraq,
Since then, relations have foundered, as Turkey insisted that Turkey and Iran have cooperated in the security realm.
ratification of the protocols hinged on movement on the Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan visited Iran in 2004 to sign
Nagorno Karabakh peace process. To date, the protocols, an agreement branding the PKK as a terrorist organization
while not officially withdrawn, remain pending ratification. and the two countries stepped up efforts to protect their
common border against the PKK and its affiliates through
Finally, Turkish foreign policy has also been marked by new intelligence-sharing and joint operations. Alongside secu-
problems. Critical amongst these is the sharp deterioration rity cooperation, Turkey and Iran have also been bound
of Turkish-Israeli ties. Gone are the days of the strategic by an increasingly close economic relationship, driven by
alliance between Turkey and Israel, based on the realpo- Turkish energy imports from Iran, and the Turkish desire to
litik bedrock of the Turkish-Syrian rivalry and legitimized penetrate the Iranian market in order to compensate for the
(in Turkey) by the Oslo process. Particularly since 2009 notable trade imbalance in Iran’s favor. Improving Turkish-
– i.e., well after the rise of the AKP – relations have been Iranian ties explain Turkey’s position regarding the Iranian
hampered by Turkish accusations of Israel’s conduct in nuclear question. Turkey does not feel as threatened as its

8
The two protocols signed by Turkey and Armenia in October 2009 provide for the devel-
opment of bilateral relations (including the establishment of diplomatic relations and of a 9
Öktem, K. (2009) “Turkey and Israel: ends and beginnings,” Open Democracy, 10
commission of historians) and for the opening of the border between the two countries. December 2009, www.opendemocracy.net

3
Analysis

With the magic of the Oslo years across the Atlantic on Turkey’s lamentable “axis shift.”
German Christian Democrat Wolfgang Schäuble dubbed
Turkey’s overtures to the Middle East as “suspicious.”12
over and with Turkey’s relationship Several observers in France, Germany, the Netherlands, and
the U.K. have been outspokenly skeptical of Turkey’s criti-
with Syria no longer marked by the cisms of Israel, its warmth towards Iran, and its rejection of
UN Security Council sanctions in June 2010 on the grounds
tensions of the past, it does mean of a Turkish-Brazilian mediated deal with Tehran. Whether
openly stated or silently suspected, the belief is that Europe
may be “losing” Turkey and Turkey’s EU vocation,13 as
that the Turkish-Israeli relationship Turkey becomes increasingly “Islamic” and abandons the
Kemalist tenet of “Westernization.”14
is unlikely to have the military-
Turco-skeptics also point to the fact that despite Ankara’s
overtures, the two neighborhood questions that lie closest
strategic flavor of the 1990s. to the heart of Turkey’s accession process – Armenia and
Cyprus – remain unsolved. The EU has not made the
partners in the West by Iran’s nuclear program.10 But Turkey opening of the Turkish-Armenian border and the normal-
is concerned about a nuclear arms race in its neighborhood. ization of bilateral relations a condition for Turkey’s EU
Hence, Turkey’s calls for a nuclear-free region and its vote membership. Notwithstanding, Armenia often features in
against United Nations Security Council sanctions against EU criticism of Turkey. The EU calls for all accession candi-
Iran, which would hinder burgeoning relations with its dates to resolve outstanding difficulties with their neighbors
neighbor without necessarily bringing about a nuclear-free before acceding to the EU. The 2008 Accession Partnership
Middle East any closer.11 document stated that Turkey should “unequivocally commit
to good neighborly relations; address any sources of friction
with neighbors.”15 The Cyprus conflict instead has already
Turkey’s Neighborhood Policy Viewed from Brussels
led to the freezing of 14 chapters in Turkey’s protracted
How do Europeans respond to these developments in
accession talks in view of Turkey’s non-implementation of
Turkey’s neighborhood and in Turkish foreign policy? What
the Additional Protocol extending the EU-Turkey Customs
are the implications for European perceptions of Turkey
Union Agreement to Cyprus. In everything but name, a
and its place in Europe? Perhaps unsurprisingly, European
solution in Cyprus has become a condition for Turkey’s
reactions to Turkey’s neighborhood policies are filtered
EU membership. Not only is this the case, but, with the
through a priori European views of Turkey and Turkey’s EU
fading memory of the Annan Plan, Turco-skeptic EU actors
accession prospects. Simply put, reactions differ markedly,
are beginning to point their fingers at Turkey for Cyprus’
depending on whether the European subject in question is
persisting stalemate. In a January 2011 statement, which did
supportive or critical of Turkey and its EU future.
little to help the peace process, German Chancellor Merkel
Turco-skeptics in Europe have lambasted Turkey’s neigh- in a joint press statement with her Greek Cypriot counter-
borhood policy, viewing it as the ironclad proof of Turkey’s part declared that “while you [i.e., the Greek Cypriot side]
un-European vocation. Many Europeans, particularly on 12
Wolfgang Schäuble, homepage, http://www.wolfgang-schaeuble.de/ (accessed June
the center-right of the political spectrum, have been critical 2010).
of Turkey’s policies in the Middle East, echoing the chorus Barysch, K. (2010) “Can Turkey Combine EU Accession and Regional Leadership,” Jan-
13

uary, London, Centre for European Reform; Kramer, H (2009) “Turkey’s Accession Process
to the EU: The Agenda behind the Agenda,” SWP Comments, October, Berlin, SWP, p. 4.
10
Transatlantic Trends 2010 Topline Data, http://www.gmfus.org/trends/doc/2010_Eng- 14
Interviews with French scholar and French journalist, Paris, March 2010. Interview with
lish_Top.pdf, p. 43. Spanish diplomat, Washington, March 2010. Conversation with British diplomat, Washing-
11
As argued by Foreign Minister Davutoğlu (2009), the fallout for Turkey of an Israeli ton, March 2010.
nuclear attack on Iran or an Iranian nuclear attack on Israel would be equally disastrous. 15
Council of the EU (2008) “Council Decision of 18 February 2008 on the principles,
Hence, Turkey’s repeated calls for a nuclear-free region and its objections to sanctioning priorities, and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of
Iran, which would hinder burgeoning commercial relations with its neighbor without ac- Turkey and repealing Decision 2006/35/EC,” (2008/157/EC), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
complishing the desiderata of a nuclear-free Middle East. LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:051:0004:01:EN:HTML

4
Analysis

are ready for an honorable compromise, we have noticed broadly, Turkey’s cooperation with its southern neighbors
that the Turkish side did not respond to your steps.”16 reflects both the EU’s own vision embodied in the European
Neighborhood Policy19 and the norms of a “European-
The European tune is remarkably different when listening ized” Turkish foreign policy.20 Even on the Iranian nuclear
to Turco-philes. When it comes to Cyprus and Armenia, dossier, U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron deemed
while hoping for a speedy resolution, supporters of Turkey’s Turkey the European country “with the greatest chance of
accession highlight the steps forward made by Turkish persuading Iran.”21 More broadly, at an informal meeting
in September 2010, EU Foreign Ministers, recognizing
In everything but name, a solution Turkey’s increasing clout in the neighborhood, proposed to
their Turkish counterpart to establish an EU-Turkey “stra-
tegic dialogue” on foreign policy matters.
in Cyprus has become a condition
However, European appreciation of Turkey’s foreign policy
for Turkey’s EU membership. activism in the neighborhood has not necessarily entailed a
clear-cut increase in support for Turkey’s EU membership
overall. For some, Turkey’s efforts to promote peace and
authorities. In the case of Armenia, the Council of Minis- stability abroad are praiseworthy but do not constitute a
ters “welcomes the significant diplomatic efforts made to reason to back Turkey’s EU membership. Muslim countries
normalize relations with Armenia, resulting in the historic may be inclined to listen to Ankara more than Brussels,
signature of protocols for the normalization of relations yet this proves that Turkey can be a useful ally rather than
in October 2009. It looks forward to the ratification and
implementation of the protocols as soon as possible.”17 In
the case of Cyprus, with the advent of the UN Annan Plan European appreciation of
and the entry of the Republic of Cyprus in the EU in 2004,
EU-Turkey-Cyprus dynamics have changed. In the eyes of Turkey’s foreign policy activism
many, Turkey is no longer the chief culprit of the enduring
Cyprus stalemate and Greek Cypriot tactics within EU in the neighborhood has not
institutions stalling Turkey’s accession talks and the
Commission’s Direct Trade Regulation to lift the isolation of
northern Cyprus are silently considered as evidence that in
necessarily entailed a clear-cut
2004, the EU made a mistake to accept a divided Cyprus in
to the EU’s fold. increase in support for Turkey’s EU
Turning elsewhere in the neighborhood, Turkey’s efforts in
the Balkans have been appreciated by many as an important
membership overall.
contribution to the stabilization of Europe. They have lent
credibility to the arguments of those highlighting the assets
that Turkey’s security and defense capabilities would bring member of the EU. Others have questioned the implications
to bear on the fledging CSDP. In the Middle East, Turkey’s of Turkey’s neighborhood activism for Turkey’s readiness to
improving relationships with Syria and the KRG have been comply with EU positions in foreign policy matters. Heinz
openly appreciated by the European Commission.18 More Kramer posed a rhetorical question: “how much suprana-
16
“Merkel’s remarks on Cyprus stemmed from a mistake or wrong briefing, Turkish MFA tionalism is compatible with the idea of Turkey as repre-
says,” Trend, 13 January 2011, http://en.trend.az/regions/met/turkey/1810626.html
17
Council of the EU (2009) 2984th Council meeting, General Affairs, Brussels, 7 Decem- 19
Aydın Düzgit, S. and Tocci, N. (2009) “Transforming Turkish foreign policy: The quest for
ber 2009, 17217/09 (Presse 370). regional leadership and Europeanization,” Commentary, November, Brussels, CEPS.
18
Commission of the EC (2009) Turkey 2009 Progress Report, Communication from the 20
Özcan, M. (2008) Harmonizing Foreign Policy: Turkey, the European Union and the
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Enlargement Strategy and Main Middle East, Aldershot, Ashgate.
Challenges 2009-2010, Brussels, COM(2009) 533, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/ 21
International Crisis Group (2010) “Turkey’s Crisis over Israel and Iran,” Europe Report,
candidate-countries/turkey/key-documents/index_en.htm, p. 30. No. 208, 8 September, Brussels and Istanbul, p. 14.

5
Analysis

sented by the concept of ‘strategic depth’?”22 The contrast

between Turkey’s visa liberalization policy and the EU’s About the Author
restrictive Schengen system is a stark case in point.
Nathalie Tocci is the deputy director of the Istituto Affari Internazion-
In conclusion, Turkey’s increased activism in the shared ali (Rome, Italy), head of the Institute’s department, The EU and the
EU-Turkey neighborhood has not gone unnoticed in Neighborhood, and associate editor of The International Spectator.
Europe. Predictably, it has been used to bolster and legiti-
mize pre-existing views of Turkey and its prospects of EU About GMF
accession. Opponents of Turkey’s EU membership have
tended to echo voices across the Atlantic lamenting Turkey’s The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a non-par-
drift to the East, while criticizing the fact that “zero prob- tisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated
lems” has so far escaped the two most pressing neighbor- to promoting better understanding and cooperation between North
hood issues for the EU: Cyprus and Armenia. Supporters America and Europe on transatlantic and global issues. GMF does this
of Turkey’s accession course have heralded Turkey’s by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic
new activism and its increasing reliance on soft power sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business
tools, both emphasizing the strategic assets embedded in communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic
Turkey’s EU entry and arguing that Turkey’s foreign policy topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed
is becoming quintessentially “European.” Yet on balance, commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF
whereas European praise has outweighed the criticism, this supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded
has not translated into a net increase in support for Turkey’s in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to
EU membership. Strategic considerations have never repre- Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both
sented the make-it-or-break-it of Turkey’s EU future. More sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington,
important, however, supporters of Turkey’s EU membership DC, GMF has six offices in Europe: Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade,
have yet to mount a convincing argument explaining why Ankara, and Bucharest. GMF also has smaller representations in
Turkey’s strategic assets can only be reaped with Turkey Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.
sitting with full rights and obligations at the EU’s decision-
making table. About the On Turkey Series

GMF’s On Turkey is an ongoing series of analysis briefs about Turkey’s

current political situation and its future. GMF provides regular analy-
sis briefs by leading Turkish, European, and American writers and
intellectuals, with a focus on dispatches from on-the-ground Turkish
observers. To access the latest briefs, please visit our web site at www.
gmfus.org/turkey or subscribe to our mailing list at http://database.
gmfus.org/reaction.
22
Kramer, H. (2010) “AKP’s ‘new’ foreign policy between vision and pragmatism,” Work-
ing paper, 1 June 2010, Berlin, SWP, p. 31.