JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

(DIGESTED CASES)

SECTION 5
DRILON V. LIM
FACTS:
Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil
companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void
for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain
provisions contrary to law and public policy.
In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary’s
resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More
importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the
Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy
mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only
the power of supervision over local governments. The court cited the familiar distinction between control and
supervision, the first being “the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter,” while the second is “the
power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions is accordance with law.”

ISSUES:
The issues in this case are
(1) whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional; and

(2) whether or not the Secretary of Justice can exercise control, rather than supervision, over the local government

HELD:
The judgment of the lower court is reversed in so far as its declaration that Section 187 of the Local Government Code
is unconstitutional but affirmed the said lower court’s finding that the procedural requirements in the enactment of the
Manila Revenue Code have been observed.

Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and,
if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he
is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure.
Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the
Code should be.

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. It they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order
the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such
authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay
down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary
Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision.

Regarding the issue on the non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue
Code, the Court carefully examined every exhibit and agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have
indeed been observed. The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not
affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will
satisfy due process.
 LARRANAGA V. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Petitioner Larranaga was charged with two counts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention before the RTC of Cebu
City. He was arrested and was detained without the filing of the necessary Information and warrant of arrest. The
petitioner alleged that he must be released and be subject to a preliminary investigation. However
p e n d i n g   t h e   r e s o l u t i o n   o f   t h e   C o u r t   f o r   t h e   p e t i t i o n   f o r   c e r t i o r a r i ,   p r o h i b i t i o n and mandamus
with writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction filed by the petitioner, RTC judge issued a warrant of
arrest directed to the petitioner.
Issue:
1. Whether petitioner is entitled to a regular preliminary investigation.
2.Whether petitioner should be released from detention pending the
investigation.
Held:
1.Yes. Our ruling is not altered by the fact that petitioner has been arraigned on October 14, 1997. The rule is that
the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of
entering a p l e a   a t   a r r a i g n m e n t .   P e t i t i o n e r ,   i n   t h i s   c a s e ,   h a s   b e e n   a c t i v e l y   a n d
consistently demanding a regular preliminary investigation even before he
w a s   c h a r g e d   i n   c o u r t .   A l s o ,   p e t i t i o n e r   r e f u s e d   t o   e n t e r   a   p l e a   d u r i n g   t h e arraignment because
there was a pending case in this Court regarding his
right to avail of a regular preliminary investigation. Clearly, the acts of p e t i t i o n e r   a n d   h i
s   c o u n s e l   a r e   i n c o n s i s t e n t   w i t h   a   w a i v e r .   P r e l i m i n a r y investigation is part of procedural
due process. It cannot be waived unless the waiver appears to be clear and informed.

2.No. The filing of charges and the issuance of the warrant of arrest against a person invalidly detained
will cure the defect of that detention or at least
d e n y   h i m   t h e   r i g h t   t o   b e   r e l e a s e d   b e c a u s e   o f   s u c h   d e f e c t . T h e   o r i g i n a l warrantless
arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the
Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by
v i r t u e o f t h e w a r r a n t o f a r r e s t i t i s s u e d o n A u g u s t 2 6 , 1 9 9 3 against him and the other accused in
connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be sure, but it was nonetheless legal.

FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

1.    Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art. 82) and a circular, 1-91 issued by the Supreme
Court which deals with the jurisdiction of courts for appeal of cases decided by quasi-judicial agencies such as the
Board of Investments (BOI).

2.   BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by
changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Oppositor Mariwasa filed a
motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to
reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for
review with CA.

4.   CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. The TRO lapsed by its own terms twenty (20) days
after its issuance, without respondent court issuing any preliminary injunction.

5.    Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order contending that CA does not have jurisdiction over
the BOI case, since the same is exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987.

6.    Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or B.P. 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules
Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-
 Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid
down therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI
shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court.

7.    While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency there may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O.
226 on the question of venue for appeal, has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was
promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case

HELD:
YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of
enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by
statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of
Appeals.

ARUELO V. COURT OF APPEALS

The filing of said pleadings did not suspend the running of the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new five-day
period to file his answer.

Issue:

                Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
it allowed respondent Gatchalian to file his pleading beyond the five-day period prescribed in Section 1, Rule 13, Part
III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure

Held:

                No. Petitioner filed the election protest with the Regional Trial Court, whose proceedings are governed by the
Revised Rules of Court.

Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before the
regular courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing of
motions to dismiss and bill of particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section 2,
Rule 1, Part I provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability — These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings brought before the
Commission. Part VI shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by courts of general or limited
jurisdiction.

It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that motions to
dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protests or quo warranto cases pending before the regular
courts.

Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the
regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on
the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).
JAVELLANA V. DILG

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari involves the right of a public official to engage in the practice of his profession
while employed in the Government.

Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. On October 5, 1989, City
Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed Administrative Case No. C-10-90 against Javellana for: (1) violation of
Department of Local Government (DLG) Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 dated June 10, 1980 in relation to DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2 of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as
the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees," and (2) for oppression, misconduct
and abuse of authority.

Divinagracia's complaint alleged that Javellana, an incumbent member of the City Council or Sanggunian Panglungsod
of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession, has continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing authority
for that purpose from the Regional Director, Department of Local Government, as required by DLG Memorandum
Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of the same department; that on July 8, 1989,
Javellana, as counsel for Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang, filed a case against City Engineer Ernesto C.
Divinagracia of Bago City for "Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with Damages" putting him in public ridicule; that
Javellana also appeared as counsel in several criminal and civil cases in the city, without prior authority of the DLG
Regional Director, in violation of DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 which provides:

MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 80-38

TO ALL: PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS, CITY AND MUNICIPALITY MAYORS, KLGCD

REGIONAL DIRECTORS AND ALL CONCERNED

SUBJECT: AMENDING MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 80-18 ON SANGGUNIAN

SESSIONS,PER DIEMS, ALLOWANCES, STAFFING AND OTHER RELATED MATTERS

In view of the issuance or Circular No. 5-A by the Joint Commission on Local Government Personnel
Administration which affects certain provisions of MC 80-18, there is a need to amend said
Memorandum Circular to substantially conform to the pertinent provisions of Circular No. 9-A.

xxx xxx xxx

C. Practice of Profession

The Secretary (now Minister) of Justice in an Opinion No. 46 Series of 1973 stated inter alia that
"members of local legislative bodies, other than the provincial governors or the mayors, do not keep
regular office hours." "They merely attend meetings or sessions of the provincial board or the city or
municipal council" and that provincial board members are not even required "to have an office in the
provincial building." Consequently, they are not therefore to required to report daily as other regular
government employees do, except when they are delegated to perform certain administrative functions
in the interest of public service by the Governor or Mayor as the case may be. For this reason, they may,
therefore, be allowed to practice their professions provided that in so doing an authority . . . first be
secured from the Regional Directors pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 74-58, provided, however,
that no government personnel, property, equipment or supplies shall be utilized in the practice of their
professions. While being authorized to practice their professions, they should as much as possible attend
regularly any and all sessions, which are not very often, of their Sanggunians for which they were
elected as members by their constituents except in very extreme cases, e.g., doctors who are called upon
to save a life. For this purpose it is desired that they always keep a calendar of the dates of the sessions,
 regular or special of their Sanggunians so that conflicts of attending court cases in the case of lawyers
and Sanggunian sessions can be avoided.

As to members of the bar the authority given for them to practice their profession shall always be subject
to the restrictions provided for in Section 6 of Republic Act 5185. In all cases, the practice of any
profession should be favorably recommended by the Sanggunian concerned as a body and by the
provincial governors, city or municipal mayors, as the case may be. (Emphasis ours, pp. 28-30,Rollo.)

On August 13, 1990, a formal hearing of the complaint was held in Iloilo City in which the complainant, Engineer
Divinagracia, and the respondent, Councilor Javellana, presented their respective evidence.

Meanwhile, on September 10, 1990, Javellana requested the DLG for a permit to continue his practice of law for the
reasons stated in his letter-request. On the same date, Secretary Santos replied as follows:

1st Indorsement
September 10, 1990

Respectfully returned to Councilor Erwin B. Javellana, Bago City, his within letter dated September 10,
1990, requesting for a permit to continue his practice of law for reasons therein stated, with this
information that, as represented and consistent with law, we interpose no objection thereto, provided that
such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his official functions.

LUIS T.
SANTOS
Secretary.

(p. 60, Rollo.)

On September 21, 1991, Secretary Luis T. Santos issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 setting forth guidelines for
the practice of professions by local elective officials as follows:

TO: All Provincial Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, Regional Directors and All
Concerned.

SUBJECT: Practice of Profession and Private Employment of Local Elective Officials

Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees), states, in part, that "In addition to acts and omission of public officials . . . now prescribed
in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of
any public officials . . . and are hereby declared to be unlawful: . . . (b) Public Officials . . . during their
incumbency shall not: (1) . . . accept employment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel, broker,
agent, trustee or nominee in any private enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by their office
unless expressly allowed by law; (2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized
by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their
official functions: . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Under Memorandum Circular No. 17 of the Office of the President dated September 4, 1986, the
authority to grant any permission, to accept private employment in any capacity and to exercise
profession, to any government official shall be granted by the head of the Ministry (Department) or
agency in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which provides,in
part, that:
 No officer shall engage directly in any . . . vocation or profession . . . without a written
permission from the head of the Department: Provided, that this prohibition will be
absolute in the case of those officers . . . whose duties and responsibilities require that
their entire time be at the disposal of the Government: Provided, further, That if an
employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, the time so devoted
outside of office should be fixed by the Chief of the agency to the end that it will not
impair in anyway the efficiency of the officer or employee . . . subject to any additional
conditions which the head of the office deems necessary in each particular case in the
interest of the service, as expressed in the various issuances of the Civil Service
Commission.

Conformably with the foregoing, the following guidelines are to be observed in the grant of permission
to the practice of profession and to the acceptance of private employment of local elective officials, to
wit:

1) The permission shall be granted by the Secretary of Local Government;

2) Provincial Governors, City and Municipal Mayors whose duties and responsibilities
require that their entire time be at the disposal of the government in conformity with
Sections 141, 171 and 203 of the Local Government Code (BP 337), are prohibited to
engage in the practice of their profession and to accept private employment during their
incumbency:

3) Other local elective officials may be allowed to practice their profession or engage in
private employment on a limited basis at the discretion of the Secretary of Local
Government, subject to existing laws and to the following conditions:

a) That the time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the
local chief executive concerned to the end that it will not impair in any
way the efficiency of the officials concerned;

b) That no government time, personnel, funds or supplies shall be utilized

in the pursuit of one's profession or private employment;

c) That no conflict of interests between the practice of profession or

engagement in private employment and the official duties of the concerned
official shall arise thereby;

d) Such other conditions that the Secretary deems necessary to impose on

each particular case, in the interest of public service. (Emphasis supplied,
pp. 31-32, Rollo.)

On March 25, 1991, Javellana filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative case against him on the ground mainly that
DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 are unconstitutional because the Supreme Court has the sole and
exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law.

In an order dated May 2, 1991, Javellana's motion to dismiss was denied by the public respondents. His motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied on June 20, 1991.

Five months later or on October 10, 1991, the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) was signed into law, Section
90 of which provides:
 Sec. 90. Practice of Profession. — (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from
practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as
local chief executives.

(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools
except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall
not:

(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit
or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national
or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official; and

(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member
concerned is defending the interest of the Government.

(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on
occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation
therefrom. (Emphasis ours.)

Administrative Case No. C-10-90 was again set for hearing on November 26, 1991. Javellana thereupon filed this
petition for certiorari praying that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 and Section 90 of the new Local
Government Code (RA 7160) be declared unconstitutional and null void because:

(1) they violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts andquasi-judicial  bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

(2) They constitute class legislation, being discriminatory against the legal and medical professions for only sanggunian
members who are lawyers and doctors are restricted in the exercise of their profession while dentists, engineers,
architects, teachers, opticians, morticians and others are not so restricted (RA 7160, Sec. 90 [b-1]).

In due time, the Solicitor General filed his Comment on the petition and the petitioner submitted a Reply. After
deliberating on the pleadings of the parties, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

As a matter of policy, this Court accords great respect to the decisions and/or actions of administrative authorities not
only because of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed knowledgeability and expertise in the
enforcement of laws and regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction (Santiago vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, 192
SCRA 199, citing Cuerdo vs. COA, 166 SCRA 657). With respect to the present case, we find no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondent, Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), in issuing the
questioned DLG Circulars Nos. 80-30 and 90-81 and in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the administrative
charge against him.

In the first place, complaints against public officers and employees relating or incidental to the performance of their
duties are necessarily impressed with public interest for by express constitutional mandate, a public office is a public
trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a
complaint against the City Government of Bago City, their real employer, of which petitioner Javellana is a
councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer Divinagracia would actually be a judgment against the City
Government. By serving as counsel for the complaining employees and assisting them to prosecute their claims against
City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner violated Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of
RA 6713) prohibiting a government official from engaging in the private practice of his profession, if such practice
would represent interests adverse to the government.

Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-
81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular
trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local
Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to
avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in
those instances where the law allows it.

Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It applies to all provincial
and municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian
members "may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools expect during session hours." If
there are some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of law is
more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of public service.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

SECTION 6
MACEDA V. VASQUEZ
Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner
RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of
service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days
have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew
that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent
Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.

Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SC’s
constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts

Held: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and
under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his
felonious act.
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates of service, the
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of administrative supervision over
all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power,
it is only the SC that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the
Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said judge or
court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.

RAQUIZA V. JUDGE CASTANEDA JR.

BARREDO, J.:

Petition to order the transfer of Special Proceedings No. 6824 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Testate
Estate of the late Don Alfonso Castellvi) from the sala of respondent judge, Hon. Mariano Castañeda to another branch
and administrative complaint against the same judge for "(1) violation of the Anti-Graft Law; (2) rendering decision
knowing it to be unjust and illegal (3) extortion by means of oppression; and (4) bribery.

After respondent judge had filed his comment on said petition and administrative complaint, the Court resolved on
August 3, 1976 to refer the a administrative complaint to Justice Jose G. Bautista of the Court of Appeals for
investigation, report and recommendation. Under date of September 1, 1977 and after duly hearing the parties, Justice
Bautista submitted the following report:

Complainant Antonio V. Raquiza charges the dent Hon. Mariano Castañeda Jr., under four counts,
namely:

I. Violation of the Anti-Graft Law;

II. Decision knowing it to be unjust and illegal;

III. Extortion by means of oppression; and

IV. Bribery.

I — Under Count I. complainant charges respondent of giving Mrs. Natividad Castellvi Raquiza and
Mrs. Nieves Toledo-Gozun unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in violation of paragraph (e),
Section 3, Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti- Graft Law. which reads:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public

officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

 (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
hisofficial administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, respondent
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.

These two parties according to complainant are not entitled to get any share from the second release of
P1,000,000.00 for the Castellvi Estate and yet they were able to receive P200,000.00 and P500,000.00,
respectively. Complainant further claims that Mrs. Raquiza has no more share or participation in the
Castellvi Estate and in the case of Mrs. Gozun she has no right to be given a share of the second release
as it is intended solely for the Raquiza children.

Complainant also charges respondent under paragraph (f), section 3 of Republic Act 3019 which
provides:

(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to
act within a reasonable time on any matter Pending before him for the purpose of
obtaining, directly or indirectly from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary
or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving
undue advantage in favor of discriminating against any other interested party.

in having allegedly neglected or refused after several motions and oral demands, the release of the
amount of P1,000,000.00 (Treasury Warrant No. D-04,231,948) to the Raquiza children thereby giving
undue advantage to both Mrs. Raquiza and Mrs. Gozun discriminating against the Raquiza children.

II — Under Count II, complainant charges respondent with a violation of Article 204 of the Revised
Penal Code for knowingly and deliverately issuing his illegal orders of February 25, and 26, 1976
allowing Mrs. Raquiza to obtain a loan of P200,000.00 from the Philippine Veterans Bank using the
equivalent amount in the second release of P1,000,000.00 deposited in the bank in the name of the
Castellvi Estate as collateral. Complainant contends that respondent Judge knows that Mrs. Raquiza has
no more participation or interest in or any rights to the Castellvi Estate since according to the records in
Civil Case No. 2761 entitled "Pobre vs. Natividad Castellvi Raquiza," both parties agreed to give all the
properties subject matter of the suit to the Raquiza children.

III — Under Count III, complainant alleges that respondent committed attempted extortion by
oppression in that after Mrs. Raquiza got the total of P330,000.00 from the Philippine Veterans Bank in
connection with the first release of P1,000,000.00, he visited the respondent Judge in his house asking
that he would also release the balance of P300,000.00 to the Raquiza children because part of the money
would be used by complainant in going to the United States for his eye treatment; and that respondent
promised to give the necessary order the following day. Complainant went to Pampanga the following
morning per advice of respondent and saw the judge in his private chamber; that the judge invited
complainant to a corner of the room and told him that he needed money, that taken aback by such
alleged act of graft and corruption, complainant shouted in a very loud voice, "You are corrupt." There
is graft and corruption in this office and then left the room; but that following the saying, "a man in need
is a beggar", complainant called the judge a few days later and assistant. that they were reconciled but
nonetheless. the respondent despite several requests from Atty. Yuzon, counsel for the complainant,
consistently failed to comply with his promise that he would release money for the Raquiza children;
that after the reconciliation, complainant visited the respondent Judge in his house and the latter
promised to give the order the following day; that it was only after repeated trips of Atty. Yuzon or his
assistant. Mr. Gracio Dacutan, to Pampanga that the respondent Judge released the total amount of
P350,000.00 to the Raquiza children; that as the Raquiza children urgently needed some of the money
for themselves, the balance was not enough anymore to finance the trip of the complainant to the United
States; hence, he asked again the President to release another P1,000,000.00; that the complainant
brands the imposition of this hardships by respondent Judge, which is supposedly a case of extortion by
means of oppression where respondent subjected complainant, his counsel Atty. Yuzon and his assistant
Gracio Dacutan, had to shuttle everyday for a period of about one month between Manila to Pampanga
to get the promised order of release which never came up to the present.

IV — As to the fourth count, the complainant charges the respondent of bribery, in that "he (respondent)
gets bribe money from Mrs. Raquiza and surely from all other parties;" that on the first release of
P1,000,000.00, respondent Judge extorted P70,000.00 from Mrs. Raquiza out of the release of about
P330,000.00.

In his comment or answer to the charges, respondent alleged that those indictments are devoid of factual
and/or legal basis because:

As to Charge I (Violation of Anti-Graft Law) and II (knowingly rendering unjust and illegal judgment),
respondent Mrs. Raquiza still has a share in the Castellvi Estate because by testamentary provision
approved by final judgment, Natividad Castellvi Raquiza as instituted heir, is entitled to 2/8 share of the
estate although one-half (1/2) of said 2/3 had been transferred to her children by virtue of a compromise
agreement submitted by Urbane Pobre in Civil Case No. 2761 entitled Urbano Pobre vs. Natividad
Castellvi-Raquiza (Exhs. 2 & 3, Orders of Judge Honorio Romero dated March 29, 1971 and May 26,
1971 in Sp. Proc. No. 6824). Note that a case for reconveyance was filed by Natividad Castellvi Raquiza
(Civil Case No. 3509 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against her children. Said case is still
pending hearing and decision according to respondent. Respondent avers that it was only after careful
study of the records (16 big volumes) of Special Proceeding No. 6824 that he granted on June 19, 1975
the motion of Mrs. Raquiza filed on January 23, 1975 for authority to obtain loan believing that Mrs.
Raquiza still has a share, interest and participation in the subject estate.

Respondent also explained that the testate estate of Alfonso Castellvi is still on liquidation when the first
release of 1 million was made by the government in partial payment of the expropriated property of the
estate; that as several claim of creditors have not been paid, respondent was not inclined at the outset to
allow any Cash release; and that the second release of 1 million could not have been intended solely for
the Raquiza children, much less for the use of the complainant in his trip to the United States for his eye
treatment as claimed; that the reason given in complainant's request to the President dated December 29,
1975 for the release of the P1 million out of the P2,600,000.00 was that the money would be used "in
patenting the Super-Gas Reducer in all car manufacturing countries in the world" (Exh. 5); that
complainant's representative capacity as attorney-in-fact of his children as well as the purpose for
seeking the withdrawal of the entire second release of P1 million is questionable because Lily Raquiza,
one of the complainant's children, denied having signed or granted any power of attorney (p. 32, Rollo);
that in view of the foregoing, respondent judge could not properly be charged with having knowingly
rendered an unjust judgment or interlocutory order.

As to Charge III (IX) by Means of Oppression):

Respondent states that the commission of attempted extortion against complainant is highly improbable;
that complainant did not describe the' shouting spree' incident faithfully because:

Respondent does not approve of being approached in his house in connection with his official functions
and without promising complainant anything, advised the latter to see respondent in his office; that the
following morning when complainant went to his court chamber, Atty. Celia Macapagal and other
lawyers and two or three of the court's personnel were inside the chamber; that complainant then pleaded
for help that he would be able to go to the United States for his eye treatment, saying that after all the
first release was authorized by the President precisely for that purpose; that complainant wanted in the
corresponding order to be issued by respondent that so much amount of his children's shares in the
second release should be specifically ordered paid or given to complainant; that in a nice way,
respondent explained to complainant of the unsettled claims of creditors of the late that even more
complainant was not the movant but his children and what his children would want to lend him is a
matter between him and his children; that complainant then replied, "Judge, if you would not give me
the small amount I need, I will be your number one enemy ... you chut"; that respondent stood up to
reach for his crutches (respondent then had swollen foot due to his arthritis) and ordered 'Arrest that
man' but complainant had already left; that complainant's accusation is the height of absurdity since
respondent would not be that stupid and careless to choose his court chamber (barely 2-1/2 x 3-1/2
meters) and in the presence of many listeners and viewers to attempt an extortion against complainant, a
man of known stature, an ex-Governor. Congressman, Cabinet member and a delegate to the
Constitutional Convention.

As to Charge IV - (Bribery): —

Respondent explains this is unthinkable because

Petitioner should surely admit that Mrs. Raquiza is even hard to converse
with. To talk to her, one has to speak loud or shout. She could much less
be whispered to. This considering, one could not ask something from her
without being heard. Write her a note, for evidence in order to be caught
This is absurd.

that authority was given Mrs. Raquiza only on June 19, 1975 almost 5 months of study of her motion
filed on January 23, 1975; that the authority was for P500,000.00, which was even reduced to only
P333,000.00 or 1/3 of P1,000,000.00 when such release was known.

As the letter complaint and the answer or comment of respondent are both verified, they were adopted as
part of the respective evidence of the parties. They also introduced additional oral and documentary
proofs. Besides complainant, his counsel Atty. Manuel Yuson and the latter's assistant. Gracio Dacutan,
testified. For the respondent, Atty. Celia Macapagal, Atty. Vicente Sicat and respondent Judge offered
testimonial and documentary evidence.

After a careful study of all the evidence on record, I find the charges not substantiated. There is factual
and legal basis for respondent's conclusion that Mrs. Raquiza has still a share or participation in the
Castellvi estate and that Mrs. Gozun has likewise a right to be given a share of the second release. As to
the first (Mrs. Raquiza,' her right as instituted heir of 2/3 of the estate is recognized by final judgment
although by compromise agreement, 1/2 was transferred by her to her children (Exh. 2). The Raquiza
children sought a reconsideration of the order of Judge Romero (Exh. 2), but the motion was denied by
the same Judge (Exh. 3). There appears no appeal from said order.

Moreover, the Raquiza children subsequently respected the remaining share of their mother by expressly
agreeing to her request to the Philippine Veterans Bank president for additional loan (Exh. 4).

It is not also rebutted that several claims chargeable against the estate has not been completely settled
for which reason respondent at the outset refused to grant any release. However, for humanitarian
considerations and

... mainly on the basis of the President's handwritten note on complainant's letter, dated
July 16, 1975 (Exh. 8), respondent authorized the withdrawal from the funds of the
Castellvi Estate in the Philippines Veterans Bank derived from the first release of P1
million, for the delivery to the Raquiza children Daisy, Antonio. Jr.. Levy and Douglas,
in the amount of P248,000.00, and an additional amount of P20,000.00, under his orders,
dated August 20, 1975 and November 24, 1975 respectively; and a separate amount of
P60,000.00 to complainant's daughter Lily Raquiza (Exh. 9 and 19); and after the said
Raquiza children were granted their aforementioned shares, respondent ordered the
 immediate payment of Mrs. Raquiza's loan by the said bank, in the amount of
P330,000.00;

19 — That under his letter, dated December 29, 1975, (Exh. 5),
complainant requested again the President to release P1 million from the
funds of the Castellvi Estate to the Raquiza children to be used by them in
patenting the Super-Gas Reducer in all car manufacturing countries in the
world', and after the President authorized the release of PI million by the
Government subject to the availability of funds, the Treasurer of the
Philippines, following the recommendation of the TJAG of the AFP,
issued Treasury Warrant No. D-281-948 for payment to the Castellvi
Estate, which was actually released to the Phil. Veterans Bank, by the
Army, on February 11, 1976;

As regards the payment to Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun it appears that of the three expropriated
properties, one parcel belongs to the Castellvi Estate while two parcels are owned by Maria Nieves
Toledo, who at the time when payment was ordered, had not yet received any partial payment and had
filed a motion for execution (Civil Case No. 1623 or G.R. No. L-20620) praying for partial payment. As
respondent correctly argues, '... for reasons of justice and equity (he) just followed the mandate of the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-20620, August 15, 1974, for payment of the corresponding just
compensation to both owners of the properties condemned.' Thus, in sharing landowner Maria Nieves
Toledo Gozun in the second release, respondent had factual and legal basis and can hardly be branded as
giving "unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference" under paragraph (e), section 3 of the Anti-Graft
Law.

Similarly, considering that Mr. Raquiza has a sham in the Castellvi estate which is still on liquidation;
that the second release could not have been intended solely for the Raquiza children nor for
complainant's trip to the United States for his alleged eye treatment; and that complainant's authority to
represent all his children had been questioned by no less than one of his children, I find it hard to
respondent Judge knowing that they unjust and illegal.

Relative to the charge of extortion by means of oppression, the undersigned believes as more probable
the version testified to by the respondent at the investigation as well as in his verified comment. Indeed,
it would be stretching credibility to its b point to believe that in a small room (2-1/2 x 3-1/2 meters) the
respondent would have thrown all precautions to the winds and demand bribe money in the presence of
Atty. Celia Macapagal, Atty. Sicat, Atty. Yuzon, Fiscal Macalino, Messrs. Yalong and Dacutan-
Complainant's version cannot stand the test of common experience and the ordinary instincts of human
nature and therefore should be disbelieved. There is no evidence presented by complainant that when he
visited that respondent in the latter's residence in Quezon City, the respondent asked for money. There is
more privacy in respondent's home rather than in his small office and yet respondent in a place of
absolute privacy never asked or demanded for bribe money.

One salient fact also denies the veracity of the version of the complainant relative to the "shouting
incident." It is not denied that at the time the respondent could hardly stand and walk without crutches.
He could not have stood therefore on a corner of the court chamber during the incident. What is more, as
he was seated on a chair at the end of his desk to the right and that since complainant was only one
meter away from him, the conversation naturally would have been audible and the witnesses inside the
court chamber never testified that the respondent was asking money from the complainant. The evidence
also remains unrebutted that a few days after the said incident, the complainant apologized to the
respondent for what he had done. On top of it all, it is difficult to believe that the respondent would have
committed extortion or attempted extortion against the complainant, who is reputedly of high stature, not
counting that he was a former provincial governor, congressman, cabinet member and delegate to the
Constitutional Convention and it could have taken so much nerve and daring to do such an act.
As regards the fourth charge of bribery, complainant claims that Mrs. Raquiza had told him that out of
the P300,000.00 she obtained as loan from the first release of P1 million, she gave P70,000.00 to the
respondent, the undersigned also finds that this charge was not substantiated. In the first place, the
testimony is purely hearsay. As the complainant testified on cross-examination:

Q Your other charge is bribery. You mentioned that the Judge extorted P70,000 from
Mrs. Raquiza, what is your basis ?

A It was told to me by Mrs. Raquiza.

Q I thought you are a widower?

A I am separated from her, but she comes to the house very often.

INVESTIGATOR:

May the Investigator inquire, is that separation legal

A I filed a divorce in the States.

xxx xxx xxx

Q So you are not a widower?

A I am a widower.

Q I cannot understand that?

A Yes, I am married to another woman.

Q You said you were told by Mrs. Raquiza?

A She told me she practically spent 1/2 of what was given to her.

xxx xxx xxx

Q So, your basis is what you got from Mrs. Raquiza

A Yes.

Q Of your own personal knowledge, you don't know that?

A I have not seen Mrs. Raquiza giving the money to him. (pp. 16 17,18, tsn., Feb. 2,
1977)

Mrs. Raquiza was not presented to testify on the matter. The rules even in an administrative case
demands that if the respondent Judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense,
the evidence presented against him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. The
judiciary, to which respondent belongs, no less demands that before its member could be faulted, it
should be only after due investigation and based on competent proofs, no less. This is all the more so
when as in this case the charges are penal in nature.

The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable
doubt. Such is the rule where the charges on which the removal is sought is misconduct
 in office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. The general rules in regard to
admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply (33 C.J. 945, see. 47); also National
Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA) vs. Martinez, 62 SCRA 411; Castral vs.
Bullecer 64 SCRA 289; Melquiades Udani Jr. vs. Pagharion 65 SCRA 549)

Parenthetically, under Count I and II, 'misconduct' also implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error
of judgment' (Buenaventura v. Hon. Mariano V. Benedicto, 38 SCRA 71). It results that even if
respondent were not collect in his legal conclusions, his judicial actuations cannot be regarded as grave
misconduct, unless the contrary sufficiently appears. And undersigned finds, as above discussed, that
complainant's evidence is wanting in this respect.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the charges against the respondent be dismissed for
lack of merit.

We have reviewed the record, including the pt of the testimonies of the witnesses and the other evidence submitted by
the parties. After careful consideration thereof, We find the conclusions of fact and the recommendations of the
Investigator in the above report to be well taken and fully sup. ported by the evidence o n record.

ACCORDINGLY, the above-quoted report of Justice Bautista is approved, the respondent judge is exonerated and the
administrative case against him is dismissal The petition to transfer Special Proceedings No. 6824 to another judge is
denied.
SECTION 7

Kilosbayan vs. Ermita, Ong G.R. No. 177721 July 3, 2007 Citizenship, Naturalization

DECEMBER 4, 2017

FACTS:

Respondent announced an appointment in favor of respondent Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
to fill up the vacancy created by the of Associate Justice R. J. Callejo, Sr. Petitioners claim that respondent Ong
is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable, and that his own birth certificate indicates his
Chinese citizenship. Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to respondent Ong through respondent
Executive Secretary is patently unconstitutional and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Is Sandiganbayan Justice Ong a natural born Filipino citizen?

RULING:

No. It is clear from the records of the Court that respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged
subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the
final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his
father. Furthermore, no substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil register can be made without a
judicial order, and, under the law, a change in citizenship status is a substantial change.

The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of respondent Ong’s ancestors, by
various births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial
proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence would have
to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong’s mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in
the records of this Court. Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well
as his citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an
appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented
by injunction from doing so.
SECTION 8

FAMELA R. DULAY v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., AS EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY.

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated JULY 3, 2012, which reads as follows: 

"G.R No. 202143 (Famela R. Dulay v. Judicial and Bar Council and Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., as Executive
Secretary.). - This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with Prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, filed by petitioner Famela R. Dulay against the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC) and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., raising the following issues:

A. Whether the respondent Honorable JBC can legitimately, validly and constitutionally accepts (sic)
application for nomination and interview of nominees for the position of a Chief Justice of the Honorable
Court and, thereafter, submits (sic) short list of nominees to the President of the Republic of the
Philippines for the appointment of a Chief Justice of the Honorable Court;
 
B. Whether the President of the Republic of the Philippines may legitimately, validly and constitutionally
appoint a Chief Justice of the Honorable Court, in replacement of the removed and impeached
Honorable Renato C. Corona;
 

C. Whether the respondent Honorable JBC can constitutionally be headed by a retired Associate Justice of
the Honorable Court, instead of an incumbent Chief Justice of the Honorable Court. [1]

Petitioner claims that the President of the Republic of the Philippines cannot legitimately, validly, and
constitutionally appoint the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, because the 1987 Constitution only empowers
him to appoint members or Justices but not the Chief Justice.[2] She adds that the Chief Justice should be
replaced and designated exclusively from among their peers.[3] Petitioner also contends that the JBC cannot be
validly, legally and constitutionally headed by a retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, because the
Constitution specifically provides that it be headed by the incumbent Chief Justice and no other. [4]

We dismiss the petition.

At the outset, we look into the locus standi of petitioner to institute the present petition.

As held in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council:[5]  

xxx In public or constitutional litigations, the Court is often burdened with the determination of the locus
standi of the petitioners due to the ever-present need to regulate the invocation of the intervention of the Court
to correct any official action or policy in order to avoid obstructing the efficient functioning of public officials
and offices involved in public service. It is required, therefore, that the petitioner must have a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy.[6]
Indeed a liberal approach had been adopted in several notable cases. Petitioner may not be as adversely affected
by the action complained against as are others provided that she sufficiently demonstrates in her petition that
she is entitled to protection or relief from the Court in the vindication of a public right. The assertion of a public
right as a predicate for challenging an official action rests on the theory that the petitioner represents the public
in general.[7]

In this case, however, petitioner has not shown in her petition that she is entitled to protection or relief from the
Court. She did not even explain her capacity in instituting the present special civil action for  certiorari and
prohibition. Nowhere in her petition did she assert her right either as citizen or taxpayer filing her petition on
behalf of the public who are directly affected by the issues. Accordingly, she is wanting in legal standing to
institute the instant petition. Outright dismissal of the present petition is, therefore, warranted.

Even if we ignore the technical defect and we look into the merits of the case, the petition is still bound to be
dismissed.

Simply stated, petitioner seeks the resolution of two substantive issues: (1) whether or not the President of the
Philippines has the constitutional power to appoint the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; and (2) whether or
not the JBC can validly be headed by a person other than the incumbent Chief Justice.

We answer in the affirmative to both questions.

Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, provides for the appointment of Justices and Judges, to wit: 

Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court  and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President
from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such
appointments need no confirmation. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

In interpreting the above-stated constitutional provision, petitioner considers only the Associate Justices as the
"members of the Supreme Court" thereby excluding the Chief Justice from the President's appointing power.
Said interpretation is baseless.

A plain reading of the constitutional provisions on the Judicial Department in Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution clearly shows that the phrase "Members of the Supreme Court" and the words "Members" and
"Member" are repeatedly used to refer to the Justices of the Supreme Court without distinction whether he be
the Chief Justice or any of the Associate Justices or all fifteen Justices.

Section 4 (l),[8] Article VIII thereof defines the composition of the Supreme Court, namely, "a Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate Justices" who may sit en banc  or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or
seven Members; Section 4 (2)[9] and (3)[10] describe the manner of conducting business in the Court whether it
be En Banc  or in division; Section 7 (1)[11] enumerates the qualifications of the Members of the Court and the
other members of the Judiciary; Section 11[12]  provides for the security of tenure in the Judiciary; Section
12[13] states the prohibition on non-judicial assignments of the Members of the Supreme Court and of other
courts; and Section 13[14]  lays down the process of decision-making. In all of these provisions, the phrase
"Members of the Supreme Court" was repeatedly used to refer not only to the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court but includes the Chief Justice. Thus, in Section 9 of the same Article VIII on the appointment of Justices
and Judges, the phrase "Members of the Supreme Court" clearly refers to the fifteen Justices of the Court - one
Chief Justice and fourteen (14) Associate Justices - who are within the appointing power of the President.
Although decided under a different Constitution, we reiterate the Court's pronouncement in Vargas v.
Rilloraza[15] that "there can be no doubt that the Chief Justice and Associate Justices required x x x to compose
the Supreme Court are the regular members of the Court."[16] 

We, likewise, do not agree with petitioner that the JBC can only be headed by the incumbent Chief Justice and
no other. Petitioner, in effect, argues that the JBC cannot perform its task without an incumbent Chief Justice.
To follow this logic would lead to an eventuality where a vacancy in the Judiciary will not be filled if a vacancy
occurs in the JBC. We can likewise infer from this argument that if the Office of the Chief Justice is vacated, the
same will not be filled because there will be no "incumbent Chief Justice" to act as Chairman of the JBC.

We definitely cannot sustain these arguments. The principal function of the JBC is to recommend appointees to
the Judiciary.[17] For every vacancy, the JBC submits to the President a list of at least three nominees and the
President may not appoint anybody who is not in the list.[18] Any vacancy in the Supreme Court is required by
the Constitution to be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof.[19]  This 90-day period is mandatory. It
cannot, therefore, be compromised only because the constitutionally-named Chairman could not sit in the JBC.
Although it would be preferable if the membership of the JBC is complete, the JBC can still operate to perform
its mandated task of submitting the list of nominees to the President even if the constitutionally-named ex-
officio Chairman does not sit in the JBC. This intention is evident from the exchanges among the Commissioners
during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, viz.: 

MR. DE CASTRO. I understand that our justices now in the Supreme Court, together with the Chief Justice,
are only 11. 

MR. CONCEPCION. Yes. 

MR. DE CASTRO. And the second sentence of this subsection reads: "Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety
days from the occurrence thereof." 

MR. CONCEPCION. That is right. 

MR. DE CASTRO. Is this now a mandate to the executive to fill the vacancy? 

MR. CONCEPCION. That is right. That is borne out of the fact that in the past 30 years, seldom has the Court
had a complete complement. 

MR. DE CASTRO. By that time, upon ratification of this Constitution, the Judicial and Bar Council shall be in
operation. 

MR. CONCEPCION. We hope so. 

MR. DE CASTRO. And one of the members thereof is a Member of Congress. 

MR. CONCEPCION. That is right. 

MR. DE CASTRO. An ex officio member. By the time this is ratified, Congress is not yet convened and there
will still be an election; so there will still be a delay of more than 90 days. Maybe before the vacancies occur in
the Supreme Court, they will be filled up by the President. 

MR. CONCEPCION. That is possible. 

MR. DE CASTRO. Therefore, it will take perhaps until November or December before the four other justices
will be appointed, if we follow the Judicial and Bar Council. Or can the Judicial and Bar Council function
without the presence yet of a member of Congress who is an  ex-officio member? 

MR. CONCEPCION. It can operate without the ex-officio member because a majority would be enough,
although it would be preferable if it were complete. 

MR. DE CASTRO. So that upon ratification of this Constitution, it is possible, and the President may do it by
appointing the members of the Judicial and Bar Council without first a representative from Congress. 

MR. CONCEPCION. That is correct. 

MR. DE CASTRO. So that we can immediately fill up the four vacancies in the Supreme Court. 

MR. CONCEPCION. That is correct. 

MR. DE CASTRO. I am asking this just for the record, that the vacancies in the Supreme Court be immediately
filled up so that our backlog of cases can be immediately attended to. 

x x x (Emphases supplied)[20]

Considering, however, that complete membership in the JBC is preferable and pursuant to its supervisory
power over the JBC, this Court should not be deprived of representation. The most Senior Justice of this Court
who is not an applicant for the position of Chief Justice should participate in the deliberations for the selection
of nominees for the said vacant post and preside over the proceedings in the absence of the constitutionally-
named  Ex-Officio  Chairman, pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 296, or the Judiciary Act of 1948, to
wit: 

Section 12. Vacancy in office of Chief Justice.  - In case of vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, or of his inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they shall devolve upon the
Associate Justice who is first in precedence, until such disability is removed, or another Chief Justice is
appointed and duly qualified. This provision shall apply to every Associate Justice who succeeds to the office of
Chief Justice. (Emphasis supplied.)

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we DISMISS the petition." (Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion,
Abad and Sereno, JJ., no part, Peralta, J., presiding, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza,
Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., present)
CHAVEZ VS JBC

Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council

Facts: 

In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eight member was added to the JBC as two representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each
having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to
allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis
Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents
argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory that the
two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of
“Congress,” such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the
Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their
respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article
VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one representative each
from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.

Issue:

1.  Are the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been met in this case?

2. Is the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives making 8 instead
of 7 sitting members unconstitutional?

3. What is the effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of the JBC is unconstitutional?

Held: 

1. Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have
“standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are present, especially
when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue.

The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is not an
official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a “personal stake” on the case is imperative to
have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court
and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other
members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the
nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the
country may be affected by the Court’s ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations
to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is
illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens
who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

2.  Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed
of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex
officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court,
and a representative of the private sector.

From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that the provision is clear and
unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and places the same under the supervision of
the Court. Then it goes to its composition where the regular members are enumerated: a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the Court and a representative from the private sector.
On the second part lies the crux of the present controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or special members of
the JBC composed of the Chief Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and “a representative
of Congress.”

The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for
any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that
is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one
(1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so
provided.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain,
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is
a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the
Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of
the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words
of a statute there should be no departure.

Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article
VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on
whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.

It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide
a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single
vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting
members of the JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually
muddle the JBC’s voting process, especially in the event a tie is reached. The aforesaid purpose would then be
rendered illusory, defeating the precise mechanism which the Constitution itself createdWhile it would be
unreasonable to expect that the Framers provide for every possible scenario, it is sensible to presume that they
knew that an odd composition is the best means to break a voting deadlock.

The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word “Congress” in Section 8(1),
Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including both the Senate and the House of Representatives.
They theorize that it was so worded because at the time the said provision was being drafted, the Framers
initially intended a unicameral form of Congress. Then, when the Constitutional Commission eventually
adopted a bicameral form of Congress, the Framers, through oversight, failed to amend Article VIII, Section 8
of the Constitution.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government –
to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the
process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is
necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount.
This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists
in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department.

3. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is not
absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are
legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair play.

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair
play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a
declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law.
Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double
jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.3

Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that notwithstanding its
finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless
valid. (Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012)
 SECTION 10
NITAFAN V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
FACTS: Nitafan and some others seek to prohibit the CIR from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their
salaries or compensation for such would tantamount to a diminution of their salary, which is unconstitutional. On June
7 1987, the Court en banc had reaffirmed the directive of the Chief Justice.

ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the judiciary are exempt from the payment of income tax.

HELD: What is provided for by the constitution is that salaries of judges may not be decreased during their
continuance in office. They have a fix salary which may not be subject to the whims and caprices of congress. But the
salaries of the judges shall be subject to the general income tax as well as other members of the judiciary.

SECTION 11
DE LA LLANA V. ALBA
Constitutional Law – Political Question – if there is no question of law involved – BP 129
In 1981, BP 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes”,
was passed. De la Llana was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be
removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision
which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts, He averred that only the SC can remove judges NOT
Congress.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP 129).
HELD: The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover, this Court is empowered “to discipline judges of inferior courts
and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal.” Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges.
Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power.  Removal is, of course, to be
distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office.
After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would
thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of
security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of
separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is
devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation,
therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent
justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No
fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render
advisory opinions.  No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say
prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case
where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant
positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There
is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this
liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of
reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or
disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible
except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the
basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a
statute, the former is to be preferred.”
 

PEOPLE V. JUDGE GACOTT JR.

Facts: For failure to check the citations of the prosecution, the order of respondent RTC Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr.
dismissing a criminal case was annulled by the SC. The respondent judge was also sanctioned with a reprimand and a
fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. The judgment was made by the Second Division of the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the Second Division of the SC has the competence to administratively discipline respondent
judge

Held: To support the Court’s ruling, Justice Regalado relied on his recollection of a conversation with former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion who was the Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission of which Regalado was also a member.

The very text of the present Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the Constitution clearly shows that there are actually two situations
envisaged therein. The first clause which states that “the SC en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower
courts,” is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise
thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and
decided by the whole Court since it would result in an absurdity.

The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is intentionally separated from the
first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en banc can “order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of
the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted therein.” In this instance,
the administrative case must be deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself.

Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the Court en banc, a decision en banc is
needed only where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the Judiciary,
disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than 1 year or a fine exceeding
P10, 000.00 or both.

Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters or cases regardless of
the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in
the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require
action by the Court en banc. 

SECTION 12
IN RE: MANZANO
Facts:
Judge Manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the appointment by Ilocos Sur Governor Rodolfo Farinas as the
member of Ilocos Norte provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to a Presidential Order. He petitioned that his
membership in the Committee will not in any way amount to an abandonment to his present position as Executive
Judge of Branch XIX, RTC, 1st Judicial region and as a member of judiciary.
Issue:
What is an administrative agency? Where does it draw the line insofar as administrative functions are concerned?
Ruling:
The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the Judiciary to any agency
performing Quasi-Judicial or Administrative functions (Sec.12, Art.VIII, 1987 Constitution).
Quasi-Judicial has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in the work of any
Administrative Agency which adjudicates disputes & controversies involving the rights of parties within its
jurisdiction.
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct & affairs of individuals
for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the Legislature or
such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.
“Administrative functions” as used in Sec. 12 refers to the Government’s executive machinery and its performance of
governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they
administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or
control.

In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez:

Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals
for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or
such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence “we can readily see that
membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve any regulation or control over the
conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise
any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. A member of the judiciary joining any study group which
concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy
disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants-or detainees, pools the expertise and
experiences of the members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who have
the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation.
PRUDENTIAL BANK V. CASTRO (SECTION 13)
Facts:The case at bar relates with the disbarment of Atty. Grecia (resp).
Contentions c/o Resp:
• CJ Claudio Teehankee should have voluntary inhibited himself from the proceedings. CJ was prejudicial against
Grecia that he rendered a decision against Grecia (disbarment).
• The Court’s decision violates the Constitution in that it lacks certification by the CJ that the conclusions of the Court
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion of the Court.
Held & Ratio:
As to CJ Teehankee’s voluntary inhibition. Petition denied for lack of legal and factual basis. After a member has given
an opinion on the merits of a given case, he may not be disqualified from participating in the proceedings because a
litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the Court and raise an objection of this sort after decision
has already been rendered. It should be made of record that at no time during the deliberations on the case did the CJ
show any ill will nor any sign of vindictiveness much less any attempt to exact vengeance for past affront against
Grecia. As to the lack of certification. This requirement is only present in judicial
decisions, not in administrative cases, like a disbarment proceeding. Even if such certification were required,
it is beyond doubt that the conclusions of the Court in its decision were arrived at after consultation and deliberations
and voted attest to that. Per curiam decision – opinion of the court as a whole; there is no ponente. For cases where the
court does not want to expose the identity of the ponente. Resolution v Decision Resolution – does not decide the case;
dilatory; i.e. dismissal of a case for lack of merit Decision – when the court has given due course; must state facts and
law.

CONSING VS CA

FACTS:
Santos filed with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) a complaint for specific performance with
damages against the Consings. The CFI ruled in favor of Santos. Thus, The Consings
interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the CFI with
modification as to the computation of the amount to be deducted from the purchase price.
Hence, from the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner-spouses filed this petition for review.
They contend that the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals inn this case does not comply
with the requirements of Article VIII, section 13, of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals must comply with the certification requirement under Article
VIII, Section 13, of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING:
The absence, however, of the certification would not necessarily mean that the case submitted
for decision had not been reached in consultation before being assigned to one member for the
writing of the opinion of the Court since the regular performance of official duty is presumed
[Sec. 5 (m) of Rule 131, Rules of Court]. The lack of certification at the end of the decision would
only serve as evidence of failure to observe the certification requirement and may be basis for
holding the official responsible for the omission to account therefor. Such absence of
certification would not have the effect of invalidating the decision
 SECTION 14
NICOS INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS

CRUZ, J.:

We are asked once again to interpret the constitutional provision that no decision shall be rendered by any court
without stating therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, 1 this time in connection with an
order of the trial court sustaining demurrer to the evidence. 2 The order has been affirmed by the respondent Court of
Appeals, 3 and the appellant has come to this Court in this petition for review on certiorari, invoking the said provision
and alleging several reversible errors.

In the complaint filed by the petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, it was alleged that on January 24,
1980, NICOS Industrial Corporation obtained a loan of P2,000,000.00 from private respondent United Coconut
Planters Bank and to secure payment thereof executed a real estate mortgage on two parcels of land located at Marilao,
Bulacan. The mortgage was foreclosed for the supposed non-payment of the loan, and the sheriff's sale was held on
July 11, 1983, without re-publication of the required notices after the original date for the auction was changed without
the knowledge or consent of the mortgagor. UCPB was the highest and lone bidder and the mortgaged lands were sold
to it for P3,558,547.64. On August 29, 1983, UCPB sold all its rights to the properties to private respondent Manuel
Co, who on the same day transferred them to Golden Star Industrial Corporation, another private respondent, upon
whose petition a writ of possession was issued to it on November 4, 1983. On September 6, 1984, NICOS and the other
petitioners, as chairman of its board of directors and its executive vice-president, respectively, filed their action for
"annulment of sheriff's sale, recovery of possession, and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory injunction."

Golden Star and Victorino P. Evangelista, as ex officio sheriff of Bulacan, moved to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction, prescription, estoppel, and regularity of the sheriff's sale. Co denied the allegations of
the plaintiffs and, like the other defendants, counterclaimed for damages. In its answer with counterclaim, UCPB
defended the foreclosure of the mortgage for failure of NICOS to pay the loan in accordance with its promissory note
and insisted that the sheriff's sale had been conducted in accordance with the statutory requirements.

The plaintiffs presented two witnesses, including petitioner Carlos Coquinco, who testified at three separate hearings.
They also submitted 21 exhibits. On April 30, 1986, Golden Star and Evangelista filed a 7-page demurrer to the
evidence where they argued that the action was a derivative suit that came under the jurisdiction of the Securities and
Exchange Commission; that the mortgage had been validly foreclosed; that the sheriff's sale had been held in
accordance with Act 3135; that the notices had been duly published in a newspaper of general circulation; and that the
opposition to the writ of possession had not been filed on time. No opposition to the demurrer having been submitted
despite notice thereof to the parties, Judge Nestor F. Dantes considered it submitted for resolution and on June 6, 1986,
issued the
following —

ORDER

Acting on the "Demurrer to Evidence" dated April 30, 1986 filed by defendants Victorino P. Evangelista
and Golden Star Industrial Corporation to which plaintiff and other defendants did not file their
comment/opposition and it appearing from the very evidence adduced by the plaintiff that the Sheriff's
Auction Sale conducted on July 11, 1983 was in complete accord with the requirements of Section 3,
Act 3135 under which the auction sale was appropriately held and conducted and it appearing from the
allegations in paragraph 13 of the plaintiff's pleading and likewise from plaintiff Carlos Coquinco's own
testimony that his cause is actually-against the other officers and stockholders of the plaintiff Nicos
Industrial Corporation ". . . for the purpose of protecting the corporation and its stockholders, as well as
their own rights and interests in the corporation, and the corporate assets, against the fraudulent ants and
 devices of the responsible officials of the corporation, in breach of the trust reposed upon them by the
stockholders . . ." a subject matter not within the competent jurisdiction of the Court, the court finds the
same to be impressed with merit.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed. The Defendants' respective counterclaims are
likewise dismissed.

The Writ of Preliminary Injunction heretofore issued is dissolved and set aside.

It is this order that is now assailed by the petitioners on the principal ground that it violates the aforementioned
constitutional requirement. The petitioners claim that it is not a reasoned decision and does not clearly and distinctly
explain how it was reached by the trial court. They also stress that the sheriff's sale was irregular because the notices
thereof were published in a newspaper that did not have general circulation and that the original date of the sheriff's
sale had been changed without its consent, the same having been allegedly given by a person not authorized to
represent NICOS. It is also contended that the original P2 million loan had already been paid and that if there was
indeed a second P2 million loan also secured by the real estate mortgage, it was for UCPB to prove this, as well as its
allegation that NICOS had defaulted in the payment of the first quarterly installment on the first loan.

The petitioners complain that there was no analysis of their testimonial evidence or of their 21 exhibits, the trial court
merely confining itself to the pronouncement that the sheriff's sale was valid and that it had no jurisdiction over the
derivative suit. There was therefore no adequate factual or legal basis for the decision that could justify its review and
affirmance by the Court of Appeals.

Rejecting this contention, the respondent court held:

In their first assignment of error, appellants faults the court for its failure to state clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which the order of dismissal is based, as required by Section 1, Rule 36, of the
Rules of Court and the Constitution.

An order granting a demurrer to the evidence is in fact an adjudication on the merits and consequently
the requirements of Section 1, Rule 36, is applicable. We are not however prepared to hold that there is a
reversible omission of the requirements of the rule in the Order appealed from, it appearing from a
reading thereof that there is substantial reference to the facts and the law on which it is based.

The Order which adverts to the Demurrer to the Evidence expressly referred to the evidence adduced by
the plaintiff as showing that the Sheriff's auction sale conducted on July 11, 1983, was in complete
accord with the requisites of Section 3, Act 3135 under which the auction sale was apparently held and
conducted. It likewise makes reference to the allegations in paragraph 13 of plaintiff's pleadings and
plaintiff Carlos Coquinco's own testimony that the case is actually against the other officers and
stockholders of plaintiff NICOS Industrial Corporation and concludes, rightly or wrongly, that the
subject matter thereof is not within the competent jurisdiction of the Court.

We hold that the order appealed from as framed by the court a quo while leaving much to be desired,
substantially complies with the rules.

This Court does not agree. The questioned order is an over-simplification of the issues, and violates both the letter and
spirit of Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution.

It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation
of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is
rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The
losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the
decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is
based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is
unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.

It is important to observe at this point that the constitutional provision does not apply to interlocutory orders, such as
one granting a motion for postponement or quashing a subpoena, because it "refers only to decisions on the merits and
not to orders of the trial court resolving incidental matters." 4 As for the minute resolutions of this Court, we have
already observed in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals 5 that —

The Supreme Court disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and
executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where
the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the
case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petitions were filed merely to
forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying
due course or dismissing a petition always gives the legal basis.

xxx xxx xxx

The Court is not duty bound to render signed decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate
decisions and/or minute resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a
case.

The order in the case at bar does not come under either of the above exceptions. As it is settled that an order dismissing
a case for insufficient evidence is a judgment on the merits, 6 it is imperative that it be a reasoned decision clearly and
distinctly stating therein the facts and the law on which it is based.

It may be argued that a dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction is not considered a judgment on the merits and so is not
covered by the aforecited provision. There is no quarrel with this established principle. However, the rule would be
applicable only if the case is dismissed on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction and not when some other additional
ground is invoked.

A careful perusal of the challenged order will show that the complaint was dismissed not only for lack of jurisdiction
but also because of the insufficiency of the evidence to prove the invalidity of the sheriff's sale. Regarding this second
ground, all the trial court did was summarily conclude "from the very evidence adduced by the plaintiff" that the
sheriff's sale "was in complete accord with the requirements of Section 3, Act 3135." It did not bother to discuss what
that evidence was or to explain why it believed that the legal requirements had been observed. Its conclusion was
remarkably threadbare. Brevity is doubtless an admirable trait, but it should not and cannot be substituted for substance.
As the ruling on this second ground was unquestionably a judgment on the merits, the failure to state the factual and
legal basis thereof was fatal to the order.

Significantly, the respondent court found that the trial court did have jurisdiction over the case after all. This made even
more necessary the factual and legal explanation for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff's
evidence was insufficient.

In People v. Escober, 7 the trial court in a decision that covered only one and a half pages, single spaced found the
defendant guilty of murder and sentenced him to death. Holding that the decision violated the constitutional
requirement, the Court observed through then Associate Justice Marcelo B. Fernan:

The above-quoted decision falls short of this standard. The inadequacy stems primarily from the
respondent judge's tendency to generalize and to form conclusions without detailing the facts from
which such conclusions are deduced. Thus, he concluded that the material allegations of the Amended
Information were the facts without specifying which of the testimonies or the exhibits supported this
conclusion. He rejected the testimony of accused-appellant Escober because it was allegedly replete with
contradictions without pointing out what these contradictions consist of or what "vital details" Escober
could have recalled as a credible witness. He also found the crime to be attended by the aggravating
 circumstances of cruelty, nighttime, superior strength, treachery, in band, "among others" but did not
particularly state the factual basis for such findings.

While it is true that the case before us does not involve the life or liberty of the defendant, as in Escober, there is still no
reason for the constitutional short-cut taken by the trial judge. The properties being litigated are not of inconsequential
value; they were sold for three and a half million pesos in 1983 and doubtless have considerably appreciated since then,
after more than eight years. These facts alone justified a more careful and thorough drafting of the order, to fully inform
the parties and the courts that might later be called upon to review it of the reasons why the demurrer to the evidence
was sustained and the complaint dismissed.

In Romero v. Court of Appeals, 8 the Court, somewhat reluctantly, approved a memorandum decision of the Court of
Appeals consisting of 4 pages, single-spaced, which adopted by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law of
the Court of Agrarian Relations. While holding that the decision could be considered substantial compliance with PD
946, Section 18, 9 and BP 129, Section 40, 10 Justice Jose Y. Feria nevertheless expressed the misgiving that "the
tendency would be to follow the line of least resistance by just adopting the findings and conclusions of the lower court
without thoroughly studying the appealed case."

Obviously, the order now being challenged cannot qualify as a memorandum decision because it was not issued by an
appellate court reviewing the findings and conclusions of a lower court. We note that, contrary to the impression of the
respondent court, there is not even an incorporation by reference of the evidence and arguments of the parties,
assuming this is permitted. No less importantly, again assuming arguendo that such reference is allowed and has been
made, there is no immediate accessibility to the incorporated matters so as to insure their convenient examination by
the reviewing court. In Francisco v. Permskul, 11 which is the latest decision of the Court on the issue now before us,
we categorically required:

. . . Although only incorporated by reference in the memorandum decision of the regional trial court,
Judge Balita's decision was nevertheless available to the Court of Appeals. It is this circumstance, or
even happenstance, if you will, that has validated the memorandum decision challenged in this case and
spared it from constitutional infirmity.

That same circumstance is what will move us now to lay down the following requirement, as a condition
for the proper application of Section 40 of BP Blg. 129. The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot
incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only byremote reference,
which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading
the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide
for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a
statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision authorized under
Section 40 of BP Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the
lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.

It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the decision of the
lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and the
law on which it was based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement should suggest that such an
examination has been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision being adopted
should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or adoption
will rectify its violation.

In Escober, the Court observed that the flawed decision "should have been remanded to the court a quo for the
rendition of a new judgment" but decided nevertheless to decide the case directly, the records being already before it
and in deference to the right of the accused to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. However, we are not so
disposed in the case now before us.

It is not the normal function of this Court to rule on a demurrer to the evidence in the first instance; our task comes
later, to review the ruling of the trial court after it is examined by the Court of Appeals and, when proper, its decision is
elevated to us. In the present case, we find that the respondent court did not have an adequate basis for such
examination because of the insufficiency of the challenged order. It must also be noted that we deal here only with
property rights and, although we do not mean to minimize them, they do not require the same urgent action we took in
Escober, which involved the very life of the accused. All things considered, we feel that the proper step is to remand
this case to the court a quo for a revision of the challenged order in accordance with the requirements of the
Constitution.

Review by the Court of the other issues raised, most of which are factual, e.g., the allegation of default in the payment
of the loan, the existence of a second loan, the nature of the newspapers where the notices of the sale were published,
the authority of the person consenting to the postponement of the sale, etc., is impractical and unnecessary at this time.
These matters should be discussed in detail in the revised order to be made by the trial court so that the higher courts
will know what they are reviewing when the case is appealed.

In one case, 12 this Court, exasperated over the inordinate length of a decision rife with irrelevant details, castigated the
trial judge for his "extraordinary verbiage." Kilometric decisions without much substance must be avoided, to be sure,
but the other extreme, where substance is also lost in the wish to be brief, is no less unacceptable either. The ideal
decision is that which, with welcome economy of words, arrives at the factual findings, reaches the legal conclusions,
renders its ruling and, having done so, ends.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE for lack of basis. This case is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 10, for revision, within 30 days from notice, of the Order
of June 6, 1986, conformably to the requirements of Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution, subject to the appeal
thereof, if desired, in accordance with law. It is so ordered.
KOMATSU INDUSTRIES (PHILS.) INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS

BELLOSILLO, J.:

PETITIONER KOMATSU INDUSTRIES (PHIL.), INC., obtained from private respondent Pilipinas Bank on 16
October 1978 credit facilities amounting to P3,000,000.00 secured by a Chattel Mortgage executed by its Executive
Vice-President and General Manager Edmundo S. Silverio and its Treasurer E. N. Capulong covering pieces of heavy
equipment such as bulldozers, payloader, air compressor and generating units. 1 The loan was restructured on 29
February 1980 and converted to a term of two (2) years in the amount of P7,633,245.52 to mature on 12 February 1982,
as evidenced by Promissory Note No. TL-109/80. 2 As securities for the loan both parties agreed that the previous
Chattel Mortgage would remain in full force and another one would be executed. Thus on 9 April 1980 another Chattel
Mortgage was executed by petitioner over certain bulldozers and graders. 3

Subsequently, in consideration of petitioner's payment of ten percent (10%) of its principal obligation and of the
outstanding interest thereon, the loan was once again restructured and converted to a term of three (3) years, as
evidenced by Promissory Note No. TL-693 executed on 24 December 1981 and secured by the same Chattel
Mortgages. 4 The second Promissory Note had a face value of P6,869,266.08 with twenty-three percent (23%)
interest  per annum  payable in four equal semi-annual installments of P1,717,316.52. The first installment fell due on
24 June 1983 and the succeeding installments on or before the 24th day of every succeeding semester thereafter.

Petitioner failed to pay a single installment despite repeated demands. Neither did it deliver the properties subject of the
Chattel Mortgages to private respondent. Thus, on 28 September 1984 private respondent filed a complaint for replevin
and damages with an alternative prayer for money judgment in the event that the mortgaged properties could not be
seized. Subsequently, private respondent filed an amended complaint and posted a bond. On 5 November 1984 the trial
court issued a seizure order directing its Deputy Sheriff to take the properties subject of the two (2) Chattel Mortgages
into his custody until further orders. On 22 November 1984 the Deputy Sheriff submitted a partial return stating that a
more extensive effort was needed to implement the writ of seizure.

Private respondent later filed a motion to recall the writ and to cancel the bond on the ground that recovery of subject
properties was futile. This was granted on 1 August 1986.

On 20 January 1989 the trial court rendered judgment ordering petitioner to pay private respondent: (1) P6,869,266.08
representing the principal obligation on the Promissory Note of 24 December 1981 with interest thereon at the rate of
twenty-three percent (23%) per annum from 24 December 1983 until fully paid; (2) three percent (3%) of
P6,869,266.08  per annum  as penalty and collection charges in the form of liquidated damages from 24 December 1983
until fully paid; (3) fifteen percent (15%) of the total amount due or P1,030,389.91 as attorney's fees; and, (4)
P17,848.00 and P178.00 as filing and research fees, and P24,119.25 as premium, documentary stamps, notarial fees and
other charges. 5

On 18 June 1993 the decision was affirmed with modification by respondent Court of Appeals as regards the reckoning
date when the interest and charges would commence. 6 According to respondent court the sums of money involved were
bound to earn legal interest from the time of judicial demand, i.e., filing of the action on 28 September 1984 and not on
24 December 1983. 7

On 26 August 1993 the motion for reconsideration was denied. 8

Petitioner imputes error on the appellate court in: (1) failing to consider the doctrine of no default for unliquidated and
unascertained sum due; (2) not considering the assignment of receivables from the accounts of Quezon Transport,
Inc./Jose Zubiri, Davao Stevedores Terminal, Inc., Emil Gaston, and a special time deposit; (3) not considering the
amount of P250,000.00 which was credited by private respondent to the wrong account; (4) holding that there was no
promissory estoppel; and, (5) holding that both Chattel Mortgages were valid and subsisting.
Petitioner does not deny its indebtedness to private respondent but claims that it was still in the process of
reconciliation when the case was filed by private respondent, and that prior to the due date of the first installment it
offered its receivables to private respondent from Quezon Transport, Inc./Jose Zubiri, Davao Stevedores Terminal, Inc.,
Emil Gaston, and a special time deposit. This assignment was accepted by private respondent which credited the
amount of P250,000.00 to the deed of assignment instead of to the Promissory Note of 24 December 1981. Respondent
appellate court should have ruled that the doctrine of no default for unliquidated and unascertained sum due was
applicable to this case. There were negotiations for the complete settlement of the obligation. Petitioner offered real and
personal properties as dacion en pago Pursuant to this offer and by way of giving its implied consent private
respondent sent investigators and appraisers to evaluate the properties. Aside from the fact that the Chattel Mortgages
of 16 October 1978 and 9 April 1980 involved different amounts, it was admitted that the Chattel Mortgage of 16
October 1978 was already novated by the Promissory Note of 29 February 1980. Only the Chattel Mortgage of 9 April
1980 remains valid and subsisting.

It is apparent at once that the issues raised are mainly factual, and the Court finds no circumstance of weight or
significance that would impair the correctness and validity of the findings of fact and conclusions of the trial court. 9No
reversible error was committed by respondent appellate court in affirming with modification the decision of the trial
court.

The lack of merit in the first three (3) assignments of error can easily be discerned from the testimony of petitioner's
own witness, Mr. Ernesto S. Angeles, Finance Manager of petitioner; who said that petitioner offered/assigned its
accounts and/or receivables from Quezon Transport, Inc., and Davao Stevedores Terminal, Inc., which were worth
approximately P5,000,000.00 as embodied in the letter of 7 June 1983 addressed to Mr. Stephen del Rosario, Assistant
Vice President of private respondent. But the offer did not materialize. In the credit memo of private respondent dated 5
September 1983 it was stated that the special time deposit of petitioner in the amount of P250,000.00, which already
matured, was to be credited to the account of Quezon Transport, Inc./Jose Zubiri, per authorization of petitioner dated 7
June 1983. 10 During the re-cross examination, Mr. Angeles affirmed that petitioner obtained a copy of the memo way
back in September 1983. From the time of receipt petitioner did not question the application; it did so only during the
hearing of the case. 11

Estoppel may arise from the making of a promise even without consideration if it was intended that the promise should
be relied upon, and in fact it was relied upon, and if a refusal to enforce it would be to virtually sanction the
perpetration of fraud or would result in another injustice. 12 There is no showing that private respondent assured
petitioner that it was agreeable to the payment of the obligation by way of dacion en pago. If private respondent caused
the appraisal of the properties offered, that could not be considered as a commitment on its part to enter into dacion en
pago. At most it would only indicate that private respondent wanted to study petitioner's proposal but found the
properties unacceptable. Thus the principle of promissory estoppel does not apply.

Having thus concluded we find it futile to resolve the issue as to whether the two (2) Chattel Mortgages are valid and
subsisting since the trial court has instead chosen to grant the alternative prayer of private respondent for money
judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 18 June 1993 as well as its
resolution of 26 August 1993 is AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
PRUDENTIAL BANK V. CASTRO (SECTION 13)
Facts:The case at bar relates with the disbarment of Atty. Grecia (resp).
Contentions c/o Resp:
• CJ Claudio Teehankee should have voluntary inhibited himself from the proceedings. CJ was prejudicial against
Greciathat he rendered a decision against Grecia (disbarment).
• The Court’s decision violates the Constitution in that it lacks certification by the CJ that the conclusions of the Court
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion of the Court.
Held & Ratio:
As to CJ Teehankee’s voluntary inhibition. Petition denied for lack of legal and factual basis. After a member has given
an opinion on the merits of a given case, he may not be disqualified from participating in the proceedings because a
litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the Court and raise an objection of this sort after decision
has already been rendered. It should be made of record that at no time during the deliberations on the case did the CJ
show any ill will nor any sign of vindictiveness much less any attempt to exact vengeance for past affront against
Grecia. As to the lack of certification. This requirement is only present in judicial
decisions, not in administrative cases, like a disbarment proceeding. Even if such certification were required,
it is beyond doubt that the conclusions of the Court in its decision were arrived at after consultation and deliberations
and voted attest to that. Per curiam decision – opinion of the court as a whole; there is no ponente. For cases where the
court does not want to expose the identity of the ponente. Resolution v Decision Resolution – does not decide the case;
dilatory; i.e. dismissal of a case for lack of merit Decision – when the court has given due course; must state facts and
law.

OIL AND NATURAl GAS COMMISSION V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, India in
favor of the petitioner, against the private respondent, PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY, INCORPORATED. The
petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the Government of India while the private respondent is a
private corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. 

The conflict between the petitioner and the private respondent rooted from the failure of the respondent to deliver
43,000 metric tons of oil well cement to the petitioner even it had already received payment and despite petitioner’s
several demands. The petitioner then informed the private respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator
pursuant to Clause 16 of their contract which stipulates that he venue for arbitration shall be at Dehra dun. 
The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in favour of the petitioner setting forth the arbitral
award. To enable the petitioner to execute the above award, it filed a Petition before the Court of the Civil Judge in
Dehra Dun. India praying that the decision of the arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India. This was objected by
the respondent but foreign court refused to admit the private respondent's objections for failure to pay the required
filing fees. Despite notice sent to the private respondent of the foregoing order and several demands by the petitioner
for compliance therewith, the private respondent refused to pay the amount adjudged by the foreign court as owing to
the petitioner. 

The petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City for the enforcement
of the aforementioned judgment of the foreign court. The private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint. RTC
dismissed the complaint for lack of a valid cause of action. The petitioner then appealed to the respondent Court of
Appeals which affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. In its decision, the appellate court concurred with the RTC's
ruling that the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties, thus, the foreign court could not
validly adopt the arbitrator's award. The petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari, 

ISSUE:
Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent under
Clause 16 of the contract. 

RULING: 

The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein dearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions" which
adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.

Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the
procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of the
country in which the judgment is relied on. If the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court
becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction cannot
invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise. 

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals  sustaining the trial
court's dismissal of the OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION's complaint before Branch 30 of the RTC of
Surigao City is REVERSED.

ATTY. ODCHIGUE-BONDOC V. HENRY TAN

Facts: Respondent filed a complaint for estafa against Fil-Estate officials including its Corporate Secretary, herein
respondent. Petitioner denies the allegations.
The DOJ, by resolution signed by the Chief State Prosecutor for the Secretary of Justice, motu proprio dismissed the
petition on finding that there was no showing of any reversible error.

The CA set aside the DOJ Secretary’s resolution holding that it committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its
Resolution dismissing respondent’s petition for review without therein expressing clearly and distinctly the facts on
which the dismissal was based, in violation of Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution (No decision shall be rendered by
any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based).

Petitioner asserts in this present petition for review on certiorari that the requirement in Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the
Constitution applies only to decisions of “courts of justice”, and it does not extend to decisions or rulings of executive
departments such as the DOJ.

Respondent counters that the constitutional requirement is not limited to courts as it extends to quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies, as well as to preliminary investigations conducted by these tribunals.

Issue:
1. Whether or not a prosecutor exercises quasi-judicial power.
2. Whether or not the DOJ Secretary exercises quasi-judicial power.
Held:
1. No. A prosecutor does not exercise adjudication or rule-making powers. A preliminary investigation is not a
quasi-judicial proceeding, but is merely inquisitorial since the prosecutor does not determine the guilt of innocence
of the accused. While the prosecutor makes the determination whether a crime has been committed and whether
there is probable cause, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass
judgment on the accused.
2. No. The Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutor’s order or resolution via appeal or petition for review
cannot be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body. Sec 14, Art. VIII of the
Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary.