Confucian Terrorism: Phan Bội Châu and the Imagining of Modern Vietnam

By

Matthew A Berry

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor Wen-hsin Yeh, Chair

Professor Peter Zinoman
Professor Emeritus Lowell Dittmer

Fall 2019
 Abstract

Confucian Terrorism: Phan Bội Châu and the Imagining of Modern Vietnam

by

Matthew A Berry

Doctor of Philosophy in History

University of California, Berkeley

Professor Wen-hsin Yeh, Chair

This study considers the life and writings of Phan Bội Châu (1867-1940), a prominent
Vietnamese revolutionary and nationalist. Most research on Phan Bội Châu is over forty years
old and is contaminated by historiographical prejudices of the Vietnam War period. I seek to re-
engage Phan Bội Châu’s writings, activities, and connections by closely analyzing and
comparing his texts, using statistical and geographical systems techniques (GIS), and
reconsidering previous juridical and historiographical judgments. My dissertation explores
nationalism, modernity, comparative religion, literature, history, and law through the life and
work of a single individual. The theoretical scope of this dissertation is intentionally broad for
two reasons. First, to improve upon work already done on Phan Bội Châu it is necessary to draw
on a wider array of resources and insights. Second, I hope to challenge Vietnam’s status as a
historiographical peculiarity by rendering Phan Bội Châu’s case comparable with other regional
and global examples.

The dissertation contains five chapters. The first is a critical analysis of Democratic Republic of
Vietnam and Western research on Phan Bội Châu. I challenge claims that Phan Bội Châu should
be interpreted solely as a ‘transitional figure.’ The second chapter investigates Phan Bội Châu’s
near-obsession with martyrdom. In it, I explore how Phan weaves together narrative and
symbolic strands from Confucian and Catholic repertoires to justify martyrdom on behalf of the
Vietnamese nation. The third and fourth chapters provide a detailed account of the famous trial
of Phan Bội Châu by the Criminal Commission of Hanoi in 1925. By evaluating the case against
Phan Bội Châu in comparison with the research agendas presented in chapter one, I show that
both history and law offer flawed ways of interpreting the legacy of a national hero. The fifth
chapter presents Phan Bội Châu’s 760-page commentary to the Book of Changes, a classical
Confucian text that Phan Bội Châu re-interprets as a structural framework for understanding
time, morality, and the inevitability of revolution.

1
For Donna, Sophia, and Michele

With Love

i
 Confucian Terrorism: Phan Bội Châu and the Imagining of Modern Vietnam

Table of Contents

Introduction iii-viii

Chapter One Phan Bội Châu and National Historiography in Vietnam 1-22
Phan Bội Châu’s Martyrs: Vietnamese Revolutionary
Chapter Two 23-51
Martyrdom and Nationalist Hagiography
Security, Legality, and Secrets: The Capture, Transport,
Chapter Three 52-80
and Incarceration of Phan Bội Châu, June-August, 1925
Competing Legitimacies and Courtroom Drama: The
Chapter Four Trial of Phan Bội Châu in Hanoi, August-December, 81-144
1925
Time, Morality, and Revolution: Phan Bội Châu and the
Chapter Five 145-189
Book of Changes

Bibliography 190-199

ii
 Introduction
Kim Liên village lies 15 kilometers due west from the center of Vinh, the capital of Nghệ
An province, Vietnam. The central (and really only) attraction of Kim Liên village is a lively
mix of rustic, thatched-roof dwellings and imposing red-brick pagodas set apart by several large,
square lotus ponds. Hundreds, if not thousands, of Vietnamese arrive daily to pay homage to
“Bác Hồ,” for this is the hometown of Nguyễn The Patriot, better known to the occasional
international visitor as Hồ Chí Minh. A military jeep, which Uncle Hồ rode back to his village
on June 16, 1957, sits in what would otherwise be mistaken for a Buddhist temple. The
meticulously arranged traditionalistic decor and relentlessly earnest staff of this nationalist theme
park leave little doubt it is a site of significance for Vietnamese visitors.
Drive eight kilometers further west to where national route 46 meets the Cả river, and
you will find, with a little difficulty, another anachronistic national historical site. Here,
overlooking the river some two hundred yards away, stands a statue of a Vietnamese mandarin
that bears a striking resemblance to Vladimir Lenin. At his right lies a small, clean museum with
a rather bored staff of one. This is the site of the “Phan Bội Châu Memorial House” and where
Mr. Phan Văn San, later to become the namesake of the memorial house, lived from the age of
two until the age of five (1869-1872). Visitors, Vietnamese or otherwise, are rare. Quite unlike
Kim Liên village, this site is not on tour bus routes.
Any literate Vietnamese living in or near a major city in 1925 would have been shocked
to learn how little attention is now paid to the great patriot Phan Bội Châu. For a brief but
momentous period in French Indochina, Phan Bội Châu's name was on the lips of anyone able to
read a newspaper. If the reader was French, that name would likely have been uttered with no
small degree of trepidation, if not anger, for Phan Bội Châu was known to be a most dangerous
terrorist. However, if the reader was Vietnamese, the name Phan Bội Châu conveyed a different
meaning entirely: this was the Vietnamese revolutionary who stood up to the colonial
administration and won. As a symbol of dignified resistance, Phan Bội Châu had brought
Vietnamese students, scholars, and secretaries into the streets for the first time, thus forcing the
French governor general to grant clemency for the old patriot in the wake of a guilty verdict
handed down by the Criminal Commission of 1925.
A close contemporary of Sun Yatsen and Mahatma Gandhi, Phan Bội Châu had earned
his reputation as Vietnam's foremost nationalist revolutionary by escaping French Indochina
disguised as a Chinese merchant in 1905. Setting up shop in Japan with the help of the famous
Chinese journalist Liang Qichao, Phan Bội Châu quickly became a major nuisance for the
French colonial administration by sending thousands of printed pamphlets back to Indochina
encouraging young men to come join him abroad. By 1908, over two hundred, including the
cadet-branch royal Prince Cường Để, had done so in what later become known as the Đông Du
(Eastern Travel) movement. Thousands of other Vietnamese took part in clandestine
organizations, such as the Duy Tân hội (Modernization Association), which provided financial
and logistical support for those heading abroad. Money and youth left Indochina, while Phan
Bội Châu's pamphlets flooded in, contributing to growing domestic activism in Hanoi, Saigon,
and the protectorate of Annam.
While many degree-holding members of the Modernization Association encouraged a
revitalization of Vietnamese education, other members who had fought against the French
protectorate forces during the Cần Vương (Save the King) period (1885-1895) took a more
aggressive stance. A series of tax protests throughout Annam and parts of Tonkin in 1908
encouraged members of the “militant-action group” such as Nguyễn Thành, Đặng Thái Thân,

iii
and Đội Quyên to link up with the guerilla leader Để Thám in preparation for attacks on French
military targets. When plotters very nearly succeeded in poisoning French troops stationed at the
citadel of Hanoi in June 1908, colonial security forces were obliged to respond with extreme
prejudice. The 1908 Criminal Commission of Tonkin sentenced thirteen of the Hanoi plotters to
death, in whose possession Phan Bội Châu's pamphlets had been found. Moreover, certain
pamphlets, such as Việt Nam vong quốc sử (History of the Loss of Vietnam) and Hải ngoại huyết
thư (A Letter from Overseas Written in Blood), took particular issue with the French taxation
policies now targeted by angry protesters as far south as Bình Định province. Recognizing a
colony-wide conspiracy at work, the security officers of the Bureau of Political Affairs identified
Phan Bội Châu as public enemy number one, and took steps to dismantle the Modernization
Association and arrest its membership.
French security services did not distinguish between the “militant-action” and “peaceful
action” wings of the Modernization Association. For that matter, neither did their collaborators,
the mandarins who still administered the provinces and districts of Annam and Tonkin on behalf
of the Nguyễn court in Huế. Degree-holders primarily interested in educational and political
reform, such as Phan Châu Trinh, Lương Văn Cần, and Trần Quý Cáp faced arrest,
imprisonment, and even execution. Dynastic tribunals in Hà Tĩnh and Vinh sentenced Phan Bội
Châu to death in absentia. Meanwhile, diplomatic overtures to the Japanese government,
brought an end to the Đông Du movement and to Phan Bội Châu's residency. Many of the
Cochinchinese students, whose parents had bankrolled the movement, were forced to testify
upon their return.
In disarray, the Vietnamese revolutionary movement shifted decisively toward militancy.
While much of the older Cần Vương generation inside Indochina had been destroyed, a small
cohort of militant northern students who remained close to Phan Bội Châu moved their
operations to Hong Kong, Canton, and Siam. Many in this northern cohort, including Hoàng
Trọng Mậu, Phan Bá Ngọc and the brothers Trần Hữu Lực and Trần Hữu Công, hailed from the
the same hardscrabble Nghệ Tĩnh region as Phan Bội Châu. Others, such as Đặng Tử Mẫn,
Đặng Đoàn Bằng, and Nguyễn Hải Thân, hailed from the provinces surrounding Hanoi in
Tonkin. Now being pursued by French intelligence services across East Asia, these young men
learned the arts of subterfuge, bomb-making, and assassination, especially for application to real
or suspected informers. Phan Bội Châu did his best to offer these young men moral, and, when
possible, financial support.
The Xinhai Revolution of 1911 opened up a wide new range of options for Phan Bội
Châu and his network of young revolutionaries. Chinese contacts who Phan Bội Châu had met
previously in Japan, Hong Kong, Canton, or Shanghai now rose to positions of political and
military power. Some, such as Hu Hanmin, Huang Xing, and Chen Qimei, held out the
possibility of significant assistance for the Vietnamese revolutionary movement, which was now
reconstituted as the Việt Nam Quang Phục hội (Vietnam Restoration Society). Whereas Phan
Bội Châu and his partisans had previously tolerated Prince Cường Để as their “useful idiot,” the
depletion of most of the movement's Cochinchinese meant a political shift from monarchism to
republicanism was in order. Though Cường Để was “elected” president of the Quang Phục hội,
he began to detach himself from Phan Bội Châu's increasingly radical organization, first leaving
Canton for Saigon, then leaving Asia for Europe.
In 1913, the conflict between Phan Bội Châu's partisans and French intelligence services
reached a fever pitch. Phan Bội Châu's proteges murdered several informers, complicating
French efforts to keep tabs on the movement. Others picked up new skills in Chinese military

iv
schools. Đặng Tử Mẫn lost three fingers in an accidental bomb explosion in Kowloon. In April
1913, a pair of high-profile assassinations rocked French colonial society. Having received
funds and grenades from Chen Qimei, the governor of Shanghai, Phan Bội Châu sent operatives
into French Indochina with a plan to assassinate Governor General Sarraut during the triennial
examinations in Nam Định. The intended assassin Nguyễn Hải Thân lost his nerve, but others
were successful at killing the tuần phủ (governor) of Thái Bình and two French military officers.
The second attack took place in broad daylight on the terrace of the Hanoi Hotel, sending French
living in Hanoi into a state of panic.
French intelligence and diplomatic services redoubled their efforts to capture Phan Bội
Châu and his lieutenants. In January 1914, it seemed they had succeeded when Phan Bội Châu
was placed under arrest by the incoming military governor of Canton, Long Jiguang. However, a
combination of intelligence failures and pressure from Beijing meant Phan Bội Châu remained in
the custody of Long Jiguang for the next three years. Released by his captor on Hainan island in
1917, Phan Bội Châu reconnected with several of his compatriots, discovering that during his
time in prison, the French had managed to dismantle the Quang Phục hội and kill a number of his
followers.
Phan Bội Châu entered a period of relative quiescence, moving his base of operations to
Hangzhou, where he joined the editorial staff of the Chinese-language Military Affairs magazine
where another of his former students Hồ Học Lãm worked. Over the following two years, Phan
Bội Châu took a number of long trips to Yunnan, Japan, Peking, and even Harbin. During this
period of reflection and reassessment, Phan Bội Châu undertook a pair of seemingly
contradictory projects. First, with Đặng Đoàn Bằng, he contributed to and edited Việt Nam nghĩa
liệt sử (The History of Vietnam's Martyrs), a series of patriotic hagiographies recounting the
lives and deaths of many of the young men who had flocked to his banner. Second, with his dear
companion Phan Bá Ngọc, son of the Cần Vương resistance leader Phan Đình Phùng, Phan Bội
Châu composed a brochure entitled Pháp Việt đề huề chính kiến thư (A Proposal for a Franco-
Vietnamese Collaboration Policy). This brochure, later published in the journal Nam Phong,
resulted in a July 1919 visit from Sûreté officer Victor Néron, who offered Phan Bội Châu a
pardon for his crimes and the possibility of a position and pension, provided he agree to submit
to the French protectorate. Although Phan Bội Châu rejected Néron's proposal, made on behalf
of Governor General Sarraut, Phan Bội Châu, Phan Bá Ngọc, and Hồ Học Lãm continued to
occasionally correspond with Néron.
While living in Hangzhou, Phan Bội Châu published a number of serial novels in the
Military Affairs magazine under Chinese pseudonyms. These Chinese novels are decidedly Phan
Bội Châu's most creative, thematically complex, and conceptually rich works. Many, such as
Ape Land, The Righteous Cat, and The Chronicle of the Pig King use animals to explore and
critique human weaknesses. Others grappled with the unintended effects of dehumanizing
ideologies. After the assassination in Hangzhou of his friend and fellow editor Phan Bá Ngọc at
the hand of Cường Đẻ's hired gun Lê Hồng Sơn in 1922, Phan Bội Châu wrote deeply reflective
stories questioning racism, the desire for violence, and nationalist warfare.
The reflectiveness of this period gave way to renewed glorification of revolutionary
terrorism in the wake of Phạm Hồng Thái's attempted assassination of Governor General Martial
Merlin on Shameen island in Canton in 1924. This event also renewed French interest in
capturing Phan Bội Châu, who demonstrated his renewed commitment to revolutionary violence
by taking a photograph with Phan Bá Ngọc's killer Lê Hồng Sơn. In late 1924 and 1925, Phan
Bội Châu also began communicating with Nguyễn The Patriot (later Hồ Chí Minh), whose father

v
had been Phan Bội Châu's neighbor and friend.
French efforts to monitor, track, and capture Phan Bội Châu finally paid off on June 30,
1925. The capture of Phan Bội Châu, which was still rather haphazardly arranged and carried
out, presented the French colonial administration with a number of serious legal and diplomatic
issues. One of these was already quite obvious: the May 30 Movement had unleashed a wave of
Chinese indignation against foreign concessions and foreign colonial actions on Chinese
territory. Since Phan Bội Châu's capture had taken place on Chinese sovereign territory without
an accompanying arrest warrant, the French consul simply placed Phan Bội Châu on a ship
headed to Indochina. Thus Phan Bội Châu became the problem of les grand commis Maurice
Monguillot, Rene Robin, and Émile Jeanbrau. A cascading series of security errors, legal
interventions, and information leaks revealed how utterly unprepared the French administration
was for the one thing it had sought most.
As Phan Bội Châu sat in Hỏa Lò Central Prison in Hanoi during the hot month of July,
the news of his capture and detention sent shockwaves throughout and beyond French Indochina.
The colonial and foreign press coverage elicited growing support for the old revolutionary, who
now took on the guise of an anodyne patriot. In the face of this and the recent nomination of
radical socialist Alexander Varenne as governor general of Indochina, the security services and
administrators of French Indochina resolved to have justice done. Phan Bội Châu was to go on
trial for having inspired and ordered the 1913 attacks. The responsibility for carrying out this
trial was assigned to Jules-Joseph Bride, now president of the Criminal Commission of 1925.
Bride was a uniquely appropriate adversary for Phan Bội Châu, who decided to fight the charges
by every means he could think of. Bride, intent on proving Phan Bội Châu's guilt well beyond a
reasonable doubt, assembled a massive archive of documents, including testimonies, letters,
reports, and printed works. Bride's zealousness even got him into trouble with his superiors
Robin and Monguillot who, while they did want Phan Bội Châu brought to justice, were also
keenly aware that events outside of the courtroom might well play a role in the ultimate outcome.
The trial of Phan Bội Châu, which began August 29 and culminated in a dramatic day of
sentencing on November 23, proved to be a maddening affair. Phan Bội Châu developed
increasingly creative methods of denying the facts presented against him, driving Bride to
expand his document collection, thereby extending the length of the trial. The results of the trial
were as conclusive as they were contradictory. Bride's court proved Phan Bội Châu guilty, but
Phan Bội Châu's epic defiance at the day of sentencing won him the support of the press and the
Vietnamese public. Meanwhile, the sheer amount of time Bride had taken to reach a verdict,
meant that Governor General Varenne arrived in time to reverse the verdict with an order of
clemency. Thus it was that a revolutionary terrorist was absolved of his crimes and made into a
national hero.
In the 15 years that followed, Phan Bội Châu grappled with the consequences of his
choices and the story of his life. His years living in Huế were not easy, but they did afford him a
steady stream of visitors, correspondence, and living companions. Among those who came to
share ideas and partake of the old man's wisdom were Trần Huy Liệu, Ngô Đình Diệm, Đào Duy
Anh, and, in 1937, former Governor General Alexander Varenne. His days were often spent
with his friend and publisher Huỳnh Thúc Kháng.
Phan Bội Châu managed to keep up a very active writing schedule, producing three-
quarters of his entire corpus during the final fifteen years of his life. Much of this work involved
writing and publishing poetry offering sly criticism of the French colonial administration. He
also addressed issues of social and cultural concern, thereby burnishing his reputation as a

vi
scholar and dignified politician. After writing his second autobiography, the Phan Bội Châu
Niên Biểu, the old scholar-patriot undertook two extended reflections on the classical Chinese
texts the Analects and the Book of Changes. These works demonstrated that despite his age,
Phan Bội Châu remained a brilliant thinker capable of expressing deep philosophical insights.
Phan Bội Châu died on October 29, 1940, after constructing his own tomb of concrete in
the courtyard of his home. In the decades that followed, Phan Bội Châu's home in Huế would
see solemn memorial services, the light of a postcolonial sun, and finally the terrible thunderings
of violent conflict he had come to abhor in conflicted ways. These decades saw Phan Bội Châu's
reputation as Vietnam's most dangerous man eclipsed by others far more deserving of the title.
Phan Bội Châu's revolutionary legacy was also convincingly overshadowed by that of Hồ Chí
Minh, who represented revolutionary Marxism, an ideology Phan Bội Châu came to view with a
certain degree of unease.
The Contents of this Study
In composing this study of Phan Bội Châu's life, writings, and legacy, I have sought to
explore how competing narratives are resolved into history writ large. Historical resolution is
often similar to the kind of resolution that takes place in literature. An author must make
choices, and therefore so must an historian. However, the historian is granted the one advantage
of allowing conflicting viewpoints to sit uncomfortably alongside one another, without
resolution. That much I have attempted to do here.
In chapter one, I review North Vietnamese and Western historical treatments of Phan Bội
Châu, with the aim of pointing those histories back toward the conditions under which they were
created. The argument is simple: most historians have seen what they wish to see in Phan Bội
Châu's life and work. For historians such as Tôn Quang Phiệt, Trần Huy Liệu, and Chương
Thâu, this means establishing Phan Bội Châu's character as unimpeachably good, while
accepting that his worldview was deeply affected by his Confucian and even “feudal”
upbringing. These historians are thus able to explain away contradictions in Phan Bội Châu's
actions and writing as the lasting negative effects of ideology.
Western anti-war historians Georges Boudarel, William Duiker, and David Marr find the
historiographical perspective of their North Vietnamese predecessors and colleagues an attractive
means of explaining Vietnamese resilience in the face of French and American aggression. For
these historians, Phan Bội Châu represents a millenia-long tradition of violent resistance to
outside rule. The fact that Phan Bội Châu consistently drew on the Confucian repertoire
throughout his life and neglected to ever identify “China” as a permanent existential threat to
Vietnam in his histories is just one of the problems with this historiographical conceit. I end this
chapter with a critique of those historians who would see contradictions as the result of
ideological failures. To be understood, contradictions need to be embraced and explored, not
resolved. I argue that in this way, it becomes possible to conceptualize the complexity and
nuance of thinking and acting during uncertain, dangerous, and changing times.
The second chapter offers a deep reading of the 1917 hagiographic compendium Việt
Nam nghĩa liệt sử (The History of Vietnam's Martyr's). Using digital and analog techniques of
textual analysis, this chapter explores the contradictions inherent in a work that claims to be
nationally representative in scope, yet in practice valorizes the sacrifices of a distinct minority at
the expense of Cochinchinese. I also explore the manifold ways Phan Bội Châu and his fellow
author Đặng Đoàn Bằng draw upon elements of the Confucian repertoire to establish the
significance of deaths on behalf of the nation. This chapter finally considers how the biographies
and actions of individuals can be appropriated, recontextualized, or claimed by nationalist

vii
histories - something that, ironically or not, happened to the author himself.
The third and fourth chapters, intended to be read as a pair, provide a detailed narrative of
the personally and nationally significant events of Phan Bội Châu's life from June until
December 1925. For these chapters, I rely on the wide variety of documents contained in the six
dossiers pertaining to Phan Bội Châu available in the Centre nationale d'outre-mer. In particular,
I use telegrams, notes, reports, and press clippings to reconstruct a week-by-week account of the
individuals responsible for capturing, prosecuting, and ultimately granting clemency to Phan Bội
Châu. I seek to explain how and why the trial ended up immortalizing Phan Bội Châu's
courageous defense, despite herculean efforts to ensure Phan Bội Châu would be revealed as a
duplicitous, manipulative, and power-hungry political operator. These chapters also provide
evidence showing how Vietnamese people and their allies were able to thwart the goals and
actions of French colonial officials, and how those colonial officials worked at cross-purposes,
despite having similar goals. Finally, in chapter four, I consider the legacy of the trial, which did
achieve a form of justice, only to have the verdict overturned for entirely political reasons.
The fifth and final chapter presents a close reading of Phan Bội Châu's nearly 700-page
exegesis on the Book of Changes, a classical Chinese cosmological divination text. In this
chapter, I consider the uniquely modern and revolutionary approach taken by Phan Bội Châu,
based on his conception of ethical temporality. By comprehending and harnessing the ethics of
time, Phan Bội Châu valorizes the work of the individual, something quite unusual to find in a
commentary on a Confucian text. Because the work addresses aspects of philosophy and
ideology, I argue that Phan Bội Châu's efforts represent his discursive resolution of his
overlapping personal contradictions.

viii
 Chapter One
Phan Bội Châu and National Historiography in Vietnam
It is difficult to imagine a twentieth-century non-communist patriot who is thought of
more fondly in a communist country than Phan Bội Châu. His name adorns major boulevards
and important streets in the centers of nearly every Vietnamese city. Numerous articles and
books have been written about him and his twenty-year career as an overseas revolutionary.1 In
the roster of ardent Vietnamese patriots, his name comes second only to Hồ Chí Minh.2 Yet,
strangely, it is commonly acknowledged that he failed in nearly every endeavor he undertook
during his lifetime.3 Why should a traditional Confucian scholar with little to show in the way
of success receive such acclaim, admiration, and praise from all levels of Vietnamese society?
Furthermore, why should he prove to be such a popular subject in radical antiwar scholarship in
the United States?
To be sure, Phan sought and created a reputation for himself as being a fiery, outspoken
opponent of the French colonial regime. He wrote scathing tracts and volumes exposing the
brutality and illegitimacy of the French regime. These critical writings began prior to his initial
escape to Japan in 1904 at the age of 37, and continued in secret even while he was under house
arrest after his capture in 1925. Phan’s writings circulated covertly and aroused widespread
enthusiasm throughout Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina, the three protectorates comprising the
“Vietnamese” portion of French Indochina.4 Word of bombing attempts and uprisings
orchestrated by Phan further enlivened his image among his contemporaries in the colony even
more. Nevertheless, Phan’s highly respected place in both North Vietnamese communist and
Western antiwar historiography is only partially explained by these activities.
In the 1960s and 1970s, parallel projects with clear political goals were proceeding in
Hanoi, the capital of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (henceforth DRV) and on college

1
A bibliography in a recent collection of essays concerning Phan Bội Châu lists no fewer than 50
Vietnamese language volumes analyzing and interpreting Phan’s life story, activities, ideology, philosophy, and
connections with contemporary individuals and groups. Another 92 articles are mentioned as well.. Chương Thâu,
ed.. Nghiên Cứu Phan Bội Châu (Researching Phan Bội Châu) (Hanoi, VN: Nhà Xuất Bản Chính Trị Quốc Gia,
2004), 759-773. An older edited collection of essays about Phan and the Đông Du (Go East) Movement lists 22
Western language, 161 Vietnamese language, and 33 Japanese language books and articles written about Phan and
his activities. Vĩnh Sính, ed., Phan Bội Châu and the Đông-Du Movement (New Haven, CT: Yale Southeast Asia
Studies, 1988), 193-213. These bibliographies are but the tip of the iceberg. I have discovered numerous additional
independent essays, articles, books, commemorations, and poems written about Phan.
2
William Duiker points out that, “it is significant that even communist historians today give Phan high
marks as the greatest Vietnamese patriot for the first quarter of the present century.” Later he states, “If Ho Chi
Minh is the paragon of all revolutionary virtues, Phan Bội Châu was his flawed but still revered predecessor.”
William Duiker The Rise of Nationalism in Vietnam 1900-1941( Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976), 97,
100.
3
Phan himself readily admits this fact. In his second autobiography Phan writes, “Alas! My history is a
history of countless failures without one single success.” Phan Bội Châu, The Autobiography of Phan Bội Châu.
Trans. Vĩnh Sính and Nicholas Wickenden (HI: University of Hawai’i Press, 1999) 43.
4
Christopher Goscha points out that the term ‘Vietnam” is relatively recent. Even up until the Geneva
accords many communists still though in terms of “Indochina” or “Annam (Pacified South).” Goscha points to the
rise of the Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng (Vietnamese Nationalist Party) leading up to its violent insurrection at Yen Bay
in 1930 as the most important event propelling the popularity of “Vietnam” as opposed to alternatives. Christopher
Goscha, Vietnam Or Indochina?:Contesting Concepts of Space in Vietnamese Nationalism, 1887-1954
(Copenhagen, Denmark: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 1995), 65-66.

1
 campuses in the United States, notably the University of California, Berkeley. In 1971, DRV
“historian cadres” led by Trần Huy Liệu, a high-ranking member of the Communist Party, finally
published the first volume of Lịch Sử Việt Nam (The History of Vietnam).5 It was the capstone of
a long and contested effort to establish a national narrative that would both employ Marxist
dialectics and symbolize the Vietnamese people’s deep-rooted and enduring spirit of resistance.
At the same time, across the Pacific Ocean, David Marr published Vietnamese Anticolonialism
1885-1925, a history of patriotic Vietnamese resistance to foreign rule intended to dissuade the
US government from continuing to prosecute what had become the Vietnam War.6 Marr, like
many of his fellow antiwar scholars at the time, relied upon communist scholarship for much of
his evidence and theories.
In both narratives, Phan Bội Châu receives pride of place as the transitional figure
bestriding the gap between a traditionalist, feudal, Confucian society dominated by elites, and a
modern, socialist nation led by the Communist Party. It is my contention that the distinct
political and ideological imperatives driving these narratives cause their authors to willfully
overlook the complexity and subtlety of Phan’s life and thought. Rather than seriously
considering Phan’s distinct and compelling vision of a Vietnamese nation, Vietnamese
communists as well as the American antiwar scholars claimed him to be yet another a standard
bearer for a primordial Vietnamese identity perpetually deployed in opposition to foreign
aggressors.
In this paper I will briefly describe the construction of a Vietnamese national narrative
by the DRV during the 1950s, and show why it proved so seductive for radical US historians
writing in the 1960s and 1970s. By then analyzing Vietnamese communist writings about Phan
Bội Châu and comparing them to Western historiography, I seek to demonstrate why Phan came
to function as the fulcrum between two time periods. I do not intend to downplay Phan’s
importance as a nationalist, but rather to suggest that current articulations of his importance are
inadequate.
Wartime Political Ideology and the Writing of History
Serious conflict between states is likely to produce hardline interpretations within them
of history, culture, and the relationship with their enemies. In order to support its own war
effort, North Vietnam needed to produce a coherent, uncomplicated framework within which
enemies could be clearly identified and positions clearly staked out. Kim Ninh has already
demonstrated the chilling effect such an imperative had on the culture and intellectual stratum
of the DRV.7 However, it proved more difficult to create a clear and consistent historical

5
Trần Huy Liệu Lịch Sử Việt Nam (The History of Vietnam), vol. 1. (Hà Nội, VN: Khoa Học Xã Hội, 1971).
The first volume, “begins with the prehistoric kingdom of Văn Lang and concludes in 1854 with the Locust Revolt
led by Cao Bá Quát against the Nguyễn Emperor Tự Đức.” Patricia Pelley, Postcolonial Vietnam: New Histories of
the National Past (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 40. Volume 2, which actually includes information
about Phan Bội Châu, was not published until 1985. Nevertheless, as indicated above, numerous monographs,
articles, and books had already determined his place in the national narrative.
6
David G. Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism 1885-1925 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
1971).
7
In A World Transformed, Ninh describes the effects of the communist party’s decision that all culture was
in fact political. Working from Trường Chinh’s 1943 “Theses on Culture,” communist ideologues attacked the notion
of “art for art’s sake.” Dissent against doctrinaire communist policies culminated in the Nhân Văn Giai Phẩm period
during which intellectuals protested on behalf of intellectual freedom. By 1958, the party had subdued such dissent
and reasserted control over cultural expression. See especially Ninh, 121-163.

2
 narrative for Vietnam. As Patricia Pelley shows in Postcolonial Vietnam, efforts to determine
the “truth” of such important “facts” as the foundation of the nation, the mechanisms of socio-
economic progress, and the role of the communist party within history gave rise to years of
fractious debate and infighting. The final result was a peculiar jumble of Marxist dialectics and
descriptions of a timeless multi-ethnic national polity arranged unmistakably around a
historical vision of a recurrent spirit of resistance against foreign invasions.
US servicemen turned scholars likewise felt it was necessary to define and explain their
enemy, even if only to suggest that this particular enemy should not be fought. In a concise and
informative state of the field essay, Tuong Vu evaluates the “adolescent” period of English-
language scholarship on Vietnam.8 Whereas earlier scholarship had doubted the strength or
even the existence of a Vietnamese national identity and claimed that communism was an
aberrant development, Tuong Vu finds that in the late 1960s “radicalized academia,” which had
been influenced by social science paradigms, began to generate an entirely new perspective on
Vietnam and its history.9 Although they had been funded or otherwise assisted by the US
government, quite ironically, many of these new studies were “sympathetic to communist
movements,” and sought to portray the NLF (National Liberation Front)/DRV as the inheritors
of a “national tradition of resistance.”10
Creating a National Narrative – Vietnamese Communist Scholarship during the
Wars against Imperialism
In the 1960s, the DRV faced the most powerful nation on earth in a battle for its survival.
For North Vietnam this was total war, and total war necessitated the marshaling of all available
forces to rally and sustain the national will, including Vietnam’s own history. As Pelley writes,
“To dispel the fear (and the realization) that they were embroiled in a situation they did not
control…they concocted narratives of unassailable coherence.”11 Initially, this meant producing
substantive reactions against colonial scholarship, which had emphasized Vietnam’s inability to
govern itself, and thus its need for a guiding hand.12 Pelley states, “Postcolonial narratives
shifted the emphasis so that the history of Vietnam was structured not by defeat and submission
but by resistance and opposition…Postcolonial productions stressed the strength and vitality of
Vietnam and its history of unity.”13
The creators of Vietnam’s new national narratives were not faceless communist
bureaucrats. Many had previously been activists and most had been pressured out of positions
within the party’s political leadership. The following section includes short biographies of
those who played important roles in situating Phan Bội Châu within the history of national

8
Tuong Vu, “Vietnamese Political Studies and Debates on Vietnamese Nationalism,” Journal of
Vietnamese Studies, Vol. 2, Issue 1 (2007): 175-230.
9
Tuong Vu in particular mentions the work of Bernard Fall, Hoàng Văn Chí, and Joseph Buttinger. For
Fall, “the territorial basis of the modern Vietnamese nation [was] shaky,” and, “the Vietnamese also lack[ed] a
political basis.” Hoàng Văn Chí did see“recurrent patterns of resistance to foreign invasion in Vietnamese history,”
yet he nonetheless felt that the communists had betrayed the national cause and thus did not represent or embody a
putative tradition of resistance. Buttinger argued that Vietnam’s identity as a nation was based not on ethnic ties but
on communal ones. Buttinger suggested that South Vietnam best “represented the national aspirations of Vietnam,”
and as such required and deserved US support. ibid., 177-187.
10
Ibid., 188-189.
11
Pelley, 5.
12
Ibid., 7.
13
Ibid,, 8.

3
 resistance. Trần Huy Liệu (1901-1969) was the historian par excellence of North Vietnam.14 He
was born in the north of Nam Định province, but travelled to Saigon in 1924 to work as a
reporter for the Vietnamese language newspaper Đông Pháp Thời Báo (The French Indochina
Times).15 In this capacity, Trần Huy Liệu covered Phan Bội Châu’s 1925 trial in Hanoi. Later,
while in Saigon, he compiled and published a pamphlet entitled “Việc Phan Bội Châu” (“The
Phan Bội Châu Affair”).16 In 1926, he joined Đảng Thanh Niên (Jeune Annam), one of many
organizations formed in impromptu fashion to demand amnesty for Phan Bội Châu after Phan
had been sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labor.17
Trần Huy Liệu joined the Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng (Vietnamese Nationalist Party) in
1928 and served as the chairman of the party’s southern regional committee.18 In 1930,
following the failed Yen Bay uprising, the French completely destroyed the organizational
capacity of the VNQDĐ. By this time, Trần Huy Liệu had already been arrested, having been
sent to the Poulo Condore Penitentiary in 1929.19 He converted to communism while in prison,
and continued to work clandestinely for the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) while officially
employed as a journalist through the 1930s.20 During the August Revolution of 1945, Trần Huy
Liệu made history himself by going to Huế to claim the imperial seal and imperial regalia from
the former emperor of the Nguyễn dynasty, Bảo Đại.21 From 1953, Trần Huy Liệu served as
chairman for the Research Committee on Literature, History, and Geography. From 1959, he
served in top positions in the Institute of History.22 He was incredibly prodigious, writing articles
on numerousof historical matters, organizing conferences, and playing a key role in determining
both the national origins and the broader national narrative that would include Phan Bội Châu as
its penultimate capstone.
Tôn Quang Phiệt (1900-1973) was born in Phan Bội Châu’s home province of Nghệ An.
In 1924, while studying at the Normal School in Hanoi, he was inducted into the Phục Việt
(Vietnamese Restoration) Party during a reorganization drive.23 Previously, members of the Phục
Việt Party had sought to forge an alliance with Phan’s Quang Phục Hội (Restoration League), but
this effort failed in 1917 when the main leaders were arrested. Tôn Quang Phiệt himself was
arrested in 1926, and was shuffled through ten separate prisons, finally ending up in Buon Ma
Thuot.24 In 1930, the Phục Việt Party, and Tôn Quang Phiệt along with it, were absorbed into the
ICP.25 In the mid 1930s, Tôn Quang Phiệt was invited to become the principal of the private

14
Pelley calls him “The leading figure in the postcolonial historiographical project.” Pelley, 21.
15
Hue-Tam Ho Tai. Radicalism and the Origins of the Vietnamese Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1992), 122.
16
David Marr, Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 1920-1945 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
1981), 16.
17
Huynh Kim Khanh, Vietnamese Communism 1925-1945 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982),
46.
18
Ibid., 91.
19
Peter Zinoman, The Colonial Bastille: A History of Imprisonment in Vietnam, 1862-1940. ( Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 2001), 248.
20
Ibid., 248-249.
21
Pelley, 237.
22
Ibid., 20-21.
23
Tai, 84-85.
24
Zinoman, 68.
25
Tai, 148. Huynh Kim Khanh notes that Tôn Quang Phiệt had belonged, perhaps in addition, to the Tân
Việt (New Vietnam) Party, which was also absorbed into the ICP in 1930. Huynh Kim Khanh furthermore cites

4
 Thuan Hoa school in Huế.26 In that capacity, he pushed a leftist education platform while
continuing to act as a clandestine ICP member.27 In 1946 he served as a representative to the
first Vietnamese National Congress, while also holding other important party positions.
Beginning in 1954, Tôn Quang Phiệt joined the Research Committee on Literature, History, and
Geography and became a full-time academic. In 1954 he published, “Phan Bội Châu trong lịch
sử chống thực dân Pháp của dân tộc Việt Nam” (Phan Bội Châu in the Vietnamese People’s
History of Resistance to French Colonialism), a key statement on Phan’s significance in the
Vietnamese national narrative.28
Chương Thâu, about whom there is comparatively little available information, was born
in 1935 and thus belongs to an entirely different generation of scholars. Chương Thâu
nevertheless established his reputation as the foremost scholar writing on Phan Bội Châu, his
life, his ideas, and his importance. A limited collection of Chương Thâu’s essays on Phan was
published in 2004, and is 777 pages in length.29 In the foreword, his contemporary Vũ Ngọc
Khánh remarks upon Chương Thâu’s enthusiasm for his subject, depth of understanding, and
professionalism.30 Chương Thâu’s numerous articles and books have played a significant role
in thoroughly defining Phan’s place in Vietnamese history.
In 1956, Trần Huy Liệu published an article on the Hùng kings, claiming that “if there had
been no Hùng kings, then there would be no Đinh, Lê, Lý, Trần, Hồ, Lê, or Nguyễn [dynasties],
and also no Democratic Republic of Vietnam.”31 This statement perfectly captures the North
Vietnamese communist interest in establishing a coherent national narrative in which the Party
itself is the end result. Nevertheless, in order to firmly ground this supposedly historical
tradition, Trần Huy Liệu and his colleagues first needed to prove that the Hùng kings had actually
existed, and then to establish a logical chronology within which to situate them. To do this, they
relied on the DRV’s small but growing collection of archaeologists.
In a fascinating analysis of North Vietnamese communist archaeological efforts and
scholarship on prehistory, Haydon Cherry explains how internationally accepted theories on the
Bronze Age in Vietnam were thoroughly conflated with the mythic tradition of the Hùng kings
and their kingdom of Văn Lang. Communist archaeologists and historians had described the
Vietnamese Bronze Age as consisting of a sequence of four periods: (1) The Phùng Nguyên, (2)
Đồng Đậu, (3) Gò Mun, and (4) Đông Sơn cultures. By doing so,they provided a material anchor
for what was essentially a totally legendary period. As Cherry states, “The only true sources for
this period are prehistoric relics: bronze drums, weapons, tools, ornaments, and household items,
among others. They tell us much about the technological sophistication and economy of the early
inhabitants of northern Vietnam. They tell us nothing about the Hùng kings and the kingdom of

Nhuong Tong’s contention that Tôn Quang Phiệt provided the VNQDĐ with ideas for regulations and an action
program. Huynh, 92.
26
Marr, Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 41.
27
Ibid, 180.
28
In 1958, Tôn Quang Phiệt expanded on his statements in a book entitled Phan Bội Châu và một giai
đoạn lịch sử chống Pháp của nhân dân Việt Nam (Phan Bội Châu and a Period of the Vietnamese People’s History of
Resistance to French Colonialism) ( Hanoi, VN: Nhà Xuất Bản Văn Hóa, 1958).
29
Chương Thâu, ed. Nghiên Cứu Phan Bội Châu. See above.
30
Ibid., 9-13. Vũ Ngọc Khánh states, “the rays of [Chương Thâu’s] accumulated research make Phan Bội
Châu’s image glisten more brightly every day.”
31
Trần Huy Liệu, “Giỗ tổ Hùng Vương” (The Commemoration of Our Ancestors the Hùng Kings). Tạp san
Nghiên cứu Văn Sử Địa (Journal of Literary, Historical, and Geographical Research) 17, 1 (May 1956): 3.

5
 Văn Lang.”32
Furthermore, dynastic histories that had previously dismissed as “feudal” were later
readmitted into the national canon of statist histories. This was part of a larger attempt to
“establish a new chain of succession” that seemed to stretch ever farther back into time.33 This
revived statist historical tradition shifted toward the Northern perspective, as opposed to the
Southern viewpoint, which was closely associated with the former Nguyễn dynasty that had
been based in Huế and drew support from the Mekong delta region.34 This narrative also
sought to redefine all rebellions as essentially directed against foreigners or their internal
collaborators.35 All rebels and resistance leaders that could be consolidated into a national
narrative of resistance were stripped of any extraneous elements and brought into the fold.
Those that were either too difficult or too strange to co-opt were either labeled “feudal”
or “reactionary” - or else ignored altogether.36 For instance, Phan Đình Phùng was declared to
be “patriotic,” while religious sects such as the Cao Đài and Hòa Hảo were conveniently
whitewashed or ignored entirely.
In 1955, Trần Huy Liệu broached the question of the date of the origin of the Vietnamese
nation.37 Using dynastic histories, myths, legends, Engels, and Stalin, DRV historians postulated
various dates for Vietnam’s national origins. These ranged from 1945 (the August Revolution,
during which Hồ Chí Minh claimed independence from France), to 939 CE (the year the Ngô
dynasty broke away from China), to 2879 BCE (the legendary beginning of the reign of the
Hùng kings). Despite many carefully argued Marxist analyses that refused to extend Vietnam’s
national origins beyond the historical era, the appeal of exceeding even the antiquity of China’s
Xia dynasty (2070-1600s BCE) won out.
This unjustified projecting of Vietnam’s national origins more than four millennia into the
past reveals what was in fact a deeper historiographical issue. Pelley points out, “Historical
materialism…is famously opaque; even though official historians were eager to innovate, they
were often uncertain about how to read the national past according to Marxist structures and
categories.”38 As a result, they either developed bizarre mixtures of Marxist dialectical theory
and narratives of timeless resistance, or simply “refused to see class conflict or other forms of
internal division as the motor of history.”39 Many national histories written by Vietnamese
communists were thus not authentically Marxist at all. Nonetheless, the word “Marxism” carried

32
Cherry, 131. Cherry’s revelations make reading Keith Weller Taylor’s The Birth of Vietnam a real treat.
Taylor, liberally citing Trần Quốc Vượng and other North Vietnamese archaeologists, tells the story of the Hùng
kings and their society. Although he is careful to point out that Đông Sơn culture and the Hùng legends are distinct,
his narrative suggests that parts of the myths originated from an actual historical polity. For instance, Taylor writes,
“A modern Vietnamese linguist has associated Van-lang, the traditional name of the Hung kingdom, with
phonetically similar words in the languages of minority peoples throughout the region bounded by the Yangtze and
Mekong rivers that mean ‘people’ and, by extension, ‘nation.’” Keith W. Taylor, The Birth of Vietnam (Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1983), 3.
33
Ibid., 29.
34
Ibid., 31.
35
Ibid., 38.
36
George Dutton explains this historiographical conceit in an unpublished paper.
37
Haydon Cherry, “Digging Up the Past: Prehistory and the Weight of the Present in Vietnam.” Journal of
Vietnamese Studies, Vol. 4, Issue 1 (2009): 84-144. 107.
38
Pelley, 10.
39
Ibid.

6
 with it the suggestion that a work was “scientific.”40 This made it possible, “to codify the ‘laws
of historical development,’” and in turn appear, ‘disinterested, objective, and impartial.’41 By
labeling works as “Marxist” or “historical materialist” that clearly were not, Pelley argues that
Vietnamese historian cadres deprived these terms of “of any precise conceptual content.”42
Pelley describes how DRV historian cadres engaged in long running debates about how
to apply Stalin’s Marxism and the National Question to Vietnamese history. Interestingly, none
of them seemed to have registered the fact that Stalin was expressly opposed to the ideas of
nations or nationalism, and had written this text so as to better critique such concepts. Rather,
they struggled for over a decade to determine if and when Vietnam had gone through periods of
primitive communism, slavery, feudalism, capitalism, and communism. They also considered
and rejected the possibility of applying the concept of the Asiatic Mode of Production to
Vietnamese history.43 Nevertheless, when the History of Vietnam was finally published in 1971,
“the models had simply vanished.”44 In other words, once Marxist analyses had proven too
cumbersome for the Vietnamese national narrative, they were abandoned. Faced with a choice
of internally driven change motivated by internal tensions or an original and authentic essence
based on demonstrable examples of courageous resistance, DRV historians usually opted for a
qualified version of the latter.45
Another term, “quốc túy” (national essence), received a whole new set of meanings.
Pelley describes how Vietnamese borrowed the concept of national essence from Japan.46 DRV
historians and cultural cadres rejected attempts made in the 1920s and 1930s to link national
essence to language and literature, and instead aligned the notion with “the fighting spirit of the
Vietnamese.”47 Having thus defined national essence, “official historians discerned the ‘spirit
of resistance against foreign aggression’ all around them in the present and throughout the
past.”48 This concept of national essence, which linked the present with the past, offered a
powerful way to justify the suffering of the Vietnamese people during the war with the United
States.49 Furthermore, it brushed notions of internal conflict under the rug and refocused
attention on the underlying unity of the Vietnamese people.
Coming to Terms with the Enemy: American Scholarship during the Vietnam War
US scholarship on Vietnam in the late 1960s and 1970s is widely considered to have been
of a substantially higher quality than that of previous generations. More scholars entered the
field than ever before, and brought with them new techniques of analysis, interpretation, and

40
Ibid., 43.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid., 44.
43
Ibid., 54-58.
44
Ibid., 61.
45
As Pelley explains: “Official historians sometimes presented the Vietnamese past as transcendent and
essential, as having escaped the surface contingencies of social life and as standing outside the world of mere events.
When they translated the past into pure essence, official historians tended to dwell on what they regarded as the
distinctly Vietnamese tradition of resistance to foreign aggression. Or, still rejecting the linear view of history, they
conceived of history as a process – but a process of repetition, not development, in which exemplary moments from
the past were periodically restaged.”
46
Ibid., 141.
47
Ibid., 143.
48
Ibid.
49
Ibid., 146.

7
 conceptualization.50 Where scholars had previously doubted the resilience and durability of the
Vietnamese national polity, largely because of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN)’s increasing
dysfunction and authoritarian tendencies, American and European academics now believed that
“the Vietnam[ese] nation has been able to act as a political community with a distinct
independent identity at countless times in history and has survived at great odds.”51 Legitimacy
shifted from the ailing South Vietnamese regimes to the DRV and its tenacious, dedicated leaders
who seemed to enjoy popular support.
Among those leading this new charge were David Marr, William Duiker, Trương Bửu
Lâm, and Huỳnh Kim Khánh. David Marr, currently professor emeritus at Australian National
University, served as, “a US Marine Corps intelligence officer in Vietnam in 1962-63.’52 After
his tour, during which he been “struck by the ability of the National Liberation Front to conduct
complex political and military operations amidst some of the most difficult conditions
imaginable,” Marr entered graduate school at UC Berkeley.53 As a result of his research, he
became “convinced that the communists were going to win, largely because they were heirs to a
strong national and anticolonial tradition.”54 He thus felt it was imperative to “convince fellow
Americans that our actions in Southeast Asia were both disastrous and inhumane.”55 In order to
do so, Marr examined the revolutionary career of Phan Bội Châu and other anticolonial activists,
all the while assuming “a linear and uninterrupted relationship between history and current
events in the idea of a unified, ultimately unstoppable force sweeping through Vietnamese
history over two thousand years.”56 As Tuong Vu puts it, Marr’s research and arguments thus
played a powerful role in “nationalizing Vietnamese history.”57
Marr fought his battle on several fronts. First, in Vietnamese Anticolonialism, Marr
introduced the concept of “anticolonialism,” as opposed to “nationalism.” This allowed him to
evade the issue of tradition versus modernity. According to Tuong Vu, “anticolonialism,” as a
discursive device, allowed “the Cần Vương, Đông Du and Việt Minh (the front organization for
the Indochinese Communist Party during the war years) to be lumped together and a straight line
be drawn from Phan Đình Phùng, a Cần Vương leader, to Hồ Chí Minh, the modern
communist.”58 Such a line connecting the two necessarily included Phan Bội Châu.
In addition, Marr introduced the English-speaking world to Nguyễn Khắc Viện, a
communist intellectual with ties to France and the DRV.59 Nguyễn Khắc Viện stressed “the
similarities between Confucianism and Marxism (e.g. a secular frame of reference and high
moral standards).”60 According the Nihn, Nguyễn Khắc Viện’s views, , “were often quoted as
exemplifying the uniqueness of Vietnamese Marxism’s seemingly comfortable connection with

50
Tuong Vu writes, “The approaches and techniques employed in these studies were extremely diverse,
ranging from statistical analyses to mathematical modeling to historical and literary studies. Theory was no longer
marginalized; instead, most works now contained some theory, at least implicitly.” Tuong Vu, 188.
51
Ibid., 189.
52
Marr, Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, vii.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid,, viii.
55
Ibid.
56
Tuong Vu, 190.
57
Ibid. Italics in original.
58
Tuong Vu, 191-192.
59
See Nguyễn Khắc Viện, Tradition and Revolution in Vietnam. Ed. David Marr and Jayne Werner. Trans.
Linda Yarr, Jayne Werner, and Tran Tuong Nhu. (Berkeley, CA: Indochina Resource Center, 1974).
60
Ninh, 4.

8
 the country’s past.”61 Nguyễn Khắc Viện’s conceptual contention was reinforced by the French
colonial scholar Paul Mus’s emphasis on the “mandate of heaven.” Mus had suggested that
Vietnamese peasants would be more likely to accept communists because they would be seen
simply as the next dynasty, having provided for the material needs of the people.62
Theoretical explanations such as these that glossed over distinctions between
Confucianism and communism in favor of an almost functional transition from one to the other
served the interests of politically inspired scholars on both sides of the Pacific. William Duiker,
professor emeritus at Pennsylvania State University, served as a Foreign Service officer in South
Vietnam in the mid 1960s.63 Like his colleague Marr, Duiker was intrigued by the communists’
“ability to maintain their determination, sometimes in the face of great odds.”64 However, in
contrast to Marr, Duiker saw the communists as something new, a modern force that owed as
much to the changes wrought by French colonialism as it did to a legacy of anticolonial
resistance.65 Nevertheless, Duiker did see a “primitive” consciousness prior to the twentieth
century, “based on cultural and ethnic distinctiveness.”66 Drawing upon many of the same North
Vietnamese communist sources as had Marr (including articles and books by Trần Huy Liệu, Tôn
Quang Phiệt, and Chương Thâu), Duiker emphasized arguments more akin to “Marxist” ones
published in the DRV, which focused upon the theoretical value of class-based analysis and the
strategic importance of creating a cohesive, disciplined vanguard party. Duiker’s discussion of
Phan thus targets his theoretical immaturity and inherent gullibility, yet nonetheless reinforces
the idea of Phan as, “the hero, the apostle, and the martyr of independence, venerated by 20
million slaves.”67
Two Vietnamese scholars who studied and wrote in the United States, Trương Bửu Lâm,
and Huỳnh Kim Khánh, made further contributions to the notion of a pattern or tradition of
national resistance.68 Trương Bửu Lâm translated a great number of Vietnamese works into
English “that appeared to assert an independent Vietnamese identity…dating back to the eleventh
century.”69 Trương Bửu Lâm went so far as to claim that all traditional resistance movements
were in fact “nationalist.”70 Taking perhaps a slightly more tactful approach, Huỳnh Kim Khánh
claimed, “what has motivated the masses throughout history is patriotism, the social and
institutional bases of which include ancestor worship and the ‘communal cult.’”71 Huỳnh Kim
Khánh noted the effect of Chinese aggression over centuries, indicating that Vietnam had
developed under the rather unique condition of perpetually facing an aggressive and immensely
powerful neighbor.
All of these scholars were responding intellectually and creatively to events on the
ground. They were seeking to determine why the United States was losing to a small and
61
Ibid.
62
See Ninh 4-5.
63
William Duiker, Ho Chi Minh: A Life, (New York, NY: Hyperion, 2000). ix.
64
William Duiker, The Rise of Vietnamese Nationalism, 9.
65
Tuong Vu, 195.
66
Ibid.
67
William Duiker, The Rise of Vietnamese Nationalism, 100. The statement is quoted from Hồ Chí Minh.
68
The relevant text for Trương Bửu Lâm is Patterns of Vietnamese Response to Foreign Intervention:1858-
1900 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1967). For Huỳnh Kim Khánh, see Vietnamese
Communism above.
69
Tuong Vu, 190.
70
Ibid.
71
Ibid., 192.

9
 undeveloped country. With so much money, men, and weaponry being mobilized against the
DRV, satisfying reasons for a lack of success were needed. As Ninh writes, “A number of
influential academic works were authored by those who came to believe that the U.S.
involvement in Vietnam could not succeed because it took into account so little of the political
historical, and social impulses driving the Vietnamese.”72 Resolving to redress this critical
oversight, American antiwar scholars turned to those who now seemed most knowledgeable
about revolutionary Vietnam: Revolutionary Vietnamese. In his preface to Vietnamese
Anticolonialism, Marr states:
Some readers may feel that I have relied too heavily on publications from Hanoi. This
is mainly because scholars in North Vietnam have moved far ahead of their
contemporaries in the South in the patient collection, annotation, and publication of
primary data on anticolonial activities…In secondary and interpretive works,
historians in Hanoi appear to have been somewhat more attentive to modern scholastic
practices.73
Marr’s statements suggest that communist scholarship was indeed succeeding in its goal of
being scientific, meticulous, and most importantly credible. This nevertheless begs the question
of the degree to which Marr and his cohort drew on Vietnamese communist theories in addition
to evidence.
Communist adulation of an enduring four-millennia old national spirit corresponded
uncannily well with the theoretical needs of US antiwar scholars. If they could prove that an
ethnic Vietnamese consciousness had existed throughout history and, even more importantly,
that it had naturally culminated in the leadership of the communist party, then arguments for
retaining a military presence in Vietnam would lose legitimacy. The “scientific” scholarship
of the DRV thus offered an apparently credible body of knowledge that confirmed for Marr,
Duiker, and their colleagues all of their hypotheses regarding the strength of communism in
Vietnam.
Although the efforts of antiwar scholars indeed revealed a legacy of resistance to foreign
invasion, it has subsequently been demonstrated that they overstated their case to no small
degree. As Marr admits in a later book, one byproduct of their project, “has been to downgrade
the historical significance of major transformations occurring during the colonial period in
Vietnam (1859-1945).”74 Once a tradition of resistance had been isolated and defined, continuity
took precedence over change. Great intellectual shifts and significant socioeconomic changes
were condensed into the phrase “transitional period.” Tuong Vu furthermore blames a tendency
toward “historical reductionism [in which] complex historical relationships were reduced to the
‘patterns of Vietnamese resistance’ to foreign powers, and complex historical actors were
simplified to two kinds, ‘resisters’ (or ‘patriots’) and ‘collaborators.’”75 Among the things shared
by Vietnamese communist historians and US antiwar scholars was a desire to explain that which
was essentially complicated in easy, clear terms. What had been gained in immediate

72
Ninh, Kim N.B, A World Transformed: The Politics of Culture in Revolutionary Vietnam, 1945-1965 (
Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2002), 2.
73
Marr qualifies these statements by offering that, “those in Saigon often have proved to be superior in
capturing the ‘sense’ of the period, emphasizing more perhaps with traditionalist attitudes and values.” Marr, xvi.
Nonetheless, Marr draws comparatively little from Southern scholars for his book. That which he does mostly
concerns events that took place in the South.
74
David G. Marr, Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, x.
75
Tuong Vu, 192.

10
 intelligibility ultimately came at the cost of subtlety, circumspection, and true comprehension.
The Many Faces and the One Face of Phan Bội Châu
Vietnamese communist historian cadres faced one other difficult problem. How could the
timeless, essentialized spirit of Vietnamese patriotic resistance transcend the divide between
traditional feudal society, where it had supposedly originated, and the modern communist party
state, which now, it seems, embodied it? The existence of a codified lineage of national protectors
and heroes frustrated efforts to establish a sequence of transformations informed by Marxist
dialectics. Dedicated efforts to make theory apply even where it had no logical basis created a
seemingly unique combination of historically productive socioeconomic revolutions alongside a
Carlylean series of patriotic heroes stretching back into antiquity.76
For Vietnamese communists in need of a hero capable of fulfilling the requirements of
this bizarre schema, Phan Bội Châu offered almost everything. He embodied the best aspects of
the Confucian tradition: Courage, loyalty, dedication, tenacity, and acuity. n addition, as an
individual Phan was quite likeable. He made friends easily and made a significant effort to
provide for those who followed him. At the same time, it was easy to claim Phan to be a product
of his times and thus not responsible for various negative attributes: Gullibility, unsystematic
thinking, political opportunism, and elite detachment. It was both possible and necessary to
explain such unwanted elements away using selectively applied Marxist analyses.
In contrast, US historians could afford far more leeway with regard Phan, and therefore
engaged in critical analysis, interpretation, and evaluation of sources. Once they had
demonstrated Phan’s transitional role in carrying the Vietnamese resistance movement from
traditional royalism to modern nationalism, they could take whatever tact they wanted
concerning his activities, connections, and intellectual development. Nevertheless, although
antiwar scholars did take up some unorthodox issues, their reliance on North Vietnamese
scholarship seems to have skewed their presentations of Phan toward the,“great man” style of
analysis. Indeed, Marr and Duiker’s accounts of Phan often seem like DRV accounts with the
awkward Marxist frameworks removed.
One critical question that DRV historian cadres needed to answer concerned Phan’s class
background and ideological position. As elsewhere, opinions differed. The theoretical analyses
produced by Tôn Quang Phiệt and Chương Thâu provide examples of the types of Marxist
analysis employed. In 1954, Tôn Quang Phiệt wrote an essay entitled “Phan Bội Châu Trong
Lịch Sử Chống Thực Dân Pháp Của Dân Tộc Việt Nam” (Phan Bội Châu in the Vietnamese
People’s History of Resistance to French Colonialism). Throughout this essay, he emphasizes the
importance of economic and historical conditions when explaining Phan’s thoughts and actions.
Tôn Quang Phiệt writes that Phan was, after all, “a product of his times.”77

76
The Chinese revolution makes for an interesting comparative case. On this subject, David Elliot has
written, “China’s revolution was, in essence, a search for a political formula that could integrate its wide diversity
while simultaneously pursuing a policy of social transformation that would increase its ‘wealth and power’ and
restore a position of international respect and prestige. Vietnam’s goals were more modest, and its revolution aimed
at re-integrating a society that had been disrupted by colonial occupation, and re-affirming the traditional ideals of
the scholar patriots who fought to maintain Vietnam’s independence.” David Elliot, “Revolutionary Re-integration:
A Comparison of the Foundation of Post-liberation Political Systems in North Vietnam and China.” Ph.D.
Dissertation, Cornell University, 1976), 8.
77
Tôn Quang Phiệt, “Phan Bội Châu Trong Lịch Sử Chống Thực Dân Pháp Của Dân Tộc Việt Nam” (Phan
Bội Châu in the Vietnamese People’s History of Resistance to French Colonialism). In Phan Bội Châu. Tự Phê

11
 Tôn Quang Phiệt claims that following the French invasion, the feudal class, to which
Phan belonged, split into collaborationist and resistance sections.78 The French hold on the
economy undermined the feudal class and gave rise to both a collaborationist bourgeoisie and an
independent bourgeoisie. Although the former had not the inclination, nor the latter the power to
eject the French, together they produced an equally weakened proletariat class that toiled in their
factories. Tôn Quang Phiệt argues that Phan’s family came from the very lowest echelon of the
feudal class, which was closest to the people. As such, Phan attempted first to rally the feudal
class to oppose the French and then to call upon the entire country to rise up.
Phan conceived of the country as composed of ten classes.79 Tôn Quang Phiệt points out
that Phan nevertheless failed to determine which class was the most revolutionary, or which class
actually had the capacity to eject the French. Tôn Quang Phiệt thus argues that Phan only saw
individuals driven to hate the French for emotional reasons and failed to conceive of classes that
might resist the French because of their interests. In Tôn Quang Phiệt’s estimation, Phan simply
could neither figure out which class he represented, nor which class he should have represented.
Chương Thâu’s treatment of Phan’s class background is far more thorough. In “Thời Đại
và Nhà Tư Tưởng Phan Bội Châu” (The Era of the Thinker, Phan Bội Châu), written in 1967,
Chương Thâu claims that colonialism spurred capitalism while restraining agriculture.80 Vietnam
thus became “half colonized and half feudal,” which led to the general impoverishment of all.
French policies and excessive taxation precipitated a social catastrophe in the countryside.
French political, social, cultural, and economic policies created even greater divisions and
contradictions within the Vietnamese body politic, leading to what Chương Thâu calls the,
“revolutionization” of the people.81 By this, he means, history impressed upon the people the
mission of national liberation. By using categories and theories of historical change drawn from
Marxism and the National Question in such a haphazard way, Chương Thâu produces a
productive theory of nationalism utterly at odds with Stalin’s original intent.
Chương Thâu then evaluates the various classes to determine which would be able to
take on this mission of national liberation. He feels that the peasantry, although imbued with
revolutionary capability, lacked consciousness. The proletariat was of insufficient size and
strength. The feudal class had been neutralized following the failure of the Cần Vương
movement. Both the capitalists and the collaborators had risen under the wing of colonialism
and had weak spirits. The petty bourgeoisie and urbanites were dependent on the colonial
regime – and both groups were feeble and ineffective Furthermore, all of these groups lacked
ways to represent their implicit ideologies.
This left only the progressive patriotic scholars. According to Chương Thâu, scholar
patriots were in essence, using capitalist ideology borrowed from Europe via Chinese

Phán (Self Criticism) . Phạm Khang. Thanh Hóa, VN: Nhà Xuất Bản Thanh Hóa, 2008. 12. This is a typically
Marxist method of historical analysis. Individuals are understood to be created by their social and historical
conditions. This works both to absolve certain individuals of failures and mistakes and also to deny historical actors
of agency unless, paradoxically, they are in line with the progressive forces of history.
78
Ibid., 15.
79
These included local notables, students, children of officials, Catholics, indigenous troops under the
French, materialists (hội đảng dụ đồ), secretaries and servants, women, the children of families with a grievance
against the enemy, and overseas students. ibid,, 21.
80
Chương Thâu,“Thời Đại và Nhà Tư Tưởng Phan Bội Châu” (The Era of the Thinker, Phan Bội Châu).
Chương Thâu. Nghiên Cứu Phan Bội Châu(Hà Nội, VN: Nhà Xuất Bản Chính Trị Quốc Gia, 2004), 24-25.
81
Ibid., 24.

12
 reformers and revolutionaries based in Japan as a weapon. However, Phan mixed their ideas
with his revitalized version of Confucianism. Phan rejected the old teaching methods and
sought a Confucianism imbued with notions of “transformation.”82 Chương Thâu calls this a
semi-bourgeois viewpoint, and claims it had been determined wholly by Phan’s economic
position in society.
Chương Thâu goes on to claim that Phan’s theoretical standpoint was “immature.”83
Furthermore, his actions were “out of season.”84 This was because the bourgeois ideology that
Phan relied upon emanated from Europe and was informed by Social Darwinism, and had
become a weapon in the hands of the “executioners of nationalities” (i.e. colonialists and
imperialists).85 Chương Thâu claims that all around the world , bourgeois nationalism was
growing stale and becoming incapable of effectively opposing colonialism. Meanwhile, within
Vietnam, contradictions were developing between socio-economic relations and the means of
production. However, these contradictions went unnoticed and were thus invisibly generating a
national revolutionary consciousness. Thus, Chương Thâu asserts, Phan’s ideology was
reflective of the indomitable and unyielding spirit of the people at that time. Almost by
default, Phan came to represent the national will that transcended particular interests.
Furthermore, his revolutionary ideology represented the traditions of the people. According to
Chương Thâu’s description, Phan was modern, traditional, bourgeois, Confucian, and patriotic
- all at the same time. This bizarre use of Marxist theory to explain the development of a
symbolic national will reflects the inventiveness and unorthodox character of Vietnamese
communist historiography.
Another example of Chương Thâu’s fanciful use of Marxist theory occurs in his essay
written in 1962 entitled “Ảnh Hưởng của Cách Mạng Trung Quốc đối với Sự Biến Chuyển Tư
Tưởng Phan Bội Châu” (The Influence of the Chinese Revolution on Changes in the Ideology
of Phan Bội Châu).86 This essay explores connections between Phan and Chinese intellectuals
such as Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, and Sun Yatsen. Chương Thâu. It begins by tracing the
path of bourgeois revolution from the West to Meiji Japan, and from there on to Chinese
revolutionaries and reformers in exile in Japan during the first decade of the twentieth century.
Their writings served to transport the ideas of the revolution to Vietnam and to Phan.
Chương Thâu claims that a new social class arose in scattered patches at the end of the
nineteenth century in the form of patriotic scholars who founded trading companies. He refers
to such people as the nationalist bourgeoisie. Their ideology had just begun to develop and was
taken directly from Japan via the writings of Kang and Liang.. Chương Thâu argues that Kang’s
ideology “Reflected and represented the intentions and policies of the upper advanced section
within contemporary feudal society and mainly the liberal faction of the bourgeoisie landlord
class then rising, along with the demands and realistic political-economic interests of that
class.”87 At the same time, along with these typical and stereotyped class labels:

82
Ibid., 28.
83
Ibid., 28.
84
Ibid., 29.
85
Ibid., 29.
86
Chương Thâu, “Ảnh Hưởng của Cách Mạng Trung Quốc đối với Sự Biến Chuyển Tư Tưởng Phan Bội
Châu” (The Influence of the Chinese Revolution on Changes in the Ideology of Phan Bội Châu). Chương Thâu.
Nghiên Cứu Phan Bội Châu,(Hà Nội, VN: Nhà Xuất Bản Chính Trị Quốc Gia, 2004), 584-625.
87
Ibid., 586. Both this and the subsequent citation are quoted from Lý Trạch Hậu. “Tư Tưởng Triết Học:
Khang Hữu Vi.” Triết Học Nghiên Cứu, (Beijing, 1957).

13
 Kang Youwei’s ideology was also the manifestation of the thousand-year old
feudal ideological system that finally dissipated into the scholar intellectual class and
melded with the bourgeoisie ideological line arising in that generation. This was an
example reflecting clearly the class nature and incomplete ideology of people in the
‘new-old party’ during a moment when old and new were mixed together at the end of
the Qing dynasty.88
Through this uncritical forceful merging together of classes, traditions, and ideological
directions, Chương Thâu is able to claim Kang, like Phan after him, to be both modern and
traditional, bourgeois and feudal, as well as progressively idealistic and the product of socio-
economic conditions - all at the same time. In trying to make his Marxist framework cover
everything, Chương Thâu depletes it of any theoretical value.
It is possible to see a progression from Tôn Quang Phiệt’s staid analysis that essentially
admits Phan had no class identity or ideological position to Chương Thâu’s creative assertion that
Phan somehow embodied the national will. It makes much more sense if we recognize that
Chương Thâu is in fact abandoning Marxist class analysis at the last possible moment by
collapsing it into a patriotic populist tradition dependent on an entirely different set of
imperatives unique to the Vietnamese circumstance. Where Tôn Quang Phiệt is stymied by his
own Marxist logic, Chương Thâu simply leaps beyond it.
For Western scholars, Phan’s class background was decidedly less important.
Unencumbered by the necessities of a Marxist framework, Marr simply notes that Phan was born
to, “relatively poor scholar-gentry parents…[who were] careful to instill in him the Confucian
virtues.”89 Duiker provides somewhat more information along the same lines. He notes that
Phan’s father, “had little money, [but] he was determined to give Phan a traditional education.”90
Duiker goes on to recite standard biographical information for Phan, including playing bình Tây
(suppress the Westerners) with bamboo rods as a child and his organization of a “candidates
army” in 1885 as a response to the Cần Vương edict.91 Marr and Duiker’s discussions of Phan’s
early years follow his two autobiographies, and thus have a Confucian flavor.92
By 1982 Chương Thâu was writing along the same lines as Marr and Duiker. Chương
Thâu’s “Thân Thế và Sự Nghiệp Cứu Nước của Phan Bội Châu” (The Life and Patriotic Career
of Phan Bội Châu) covers Phan’s early life in 38 pages, yet scarcely mentions “class” or
“ideology.”93 Rather, Chương Thâu’s focus has shifted to another important question: Phan’s
connections. Chương Thâu begins by describing the character of the Nghệ Tĩnh region (Nghệ An
and Hà Tĩnh provinces). Its people are “poor,” “generous,” and fiercely patriotic.94 Phan absorbs
this character himself and in addition takes inspiration from the righteous uprisings of Phan Đình
Phùng and the Cần Vương movement.95 Chương Thâu emphasizes Phan’s connections to former

88
Ibid., 587.
89
Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 83.
90
Duiker, The Rise of Vietnamese Nationalism, 32.
91
Ibid., 33.
92
These are available in English as The Autobiography of Phan Bội Châu, mentioned above, and Phan Bội
Châu. “Prison Notes” In Reflections from Captivity. Trans. Christopher Jenkins, Tran Khanh Tuyet, and Huynh
Sanh Thong. Ed. David Marr. (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1978). In particular 10-13.
93
Chương Thâu.,“Thân Thế và Sự Nghiệp Cứu Nước của Phan Bội Châu” (The Life and Patriotic Career
of Phan Bội Châu). (Hà Nội, VN: Nhà Xuất Bản Chính Trị Quốc Gia, 2004), 34-72.
94
Ibid., 34-37.
95
Ibid., 48.

14
 Cần Vương participants and his ability organize them and obtain their support for his own
activities at home and abroad.96 Doing so helps Chương Thâu solidify Phan’s association with the
prior resistance tradition that was completely royalist in character.
Another connection Chương Thâu establishes is between Phan and the common people of
Nghệ Tĩnh. Chương Thâu writes, “Phan Bội Châu also had ‘empathetic’ friends amongst the
ragged common people all over in poor villages and hamlets.”97 Chương Thâu furthermore
describes Phan’s participation in local “opera singing” events during which he would sing
patriotic songs and the common people would reciprocate.98 Chương Thâu thus not only
reaffirms Phan’s reputation in popular culture, but also demonstrates his deep understanding and
complex linkages with the peasantry of Vietnam. Marr picks up on this as well, noting, “Phan
Bội Châu loved folk singing, especially the form of semi-competitive, extemporaneous rounds
that were exchanged between groups of men and women.”99
Even so, this is not the extent of it. Chương Thâu identifies Phan as one of the “Four
Tigers of Nam Đàn.”100 Nam Đàn was the locality where Phan grew up, and the four tigers were
all authors distinguished in their literary capabilities. One of the other tigers was none other than
Nguyễn Sinh Sắc, the father of Nguyễn Ái Quốc, better known as Hồ Chí Minh.101 Chương
Thâu writes, “The friendship between Phan Bội Châu and Nguyễn Sinh Sắc was of the utmost
loyalty.”102 This connection is part of a larger historiographical attempt to link Phan with
directly with Hồ Chí Minh. Tôn Quang Phiệt claims that prior to his capture in 1925, “Phan Bội
Châu was on his way to Guangdong to meet some revolutionaries, amongst whom was [Hồ Chí
Minh]. Thus Phan would definitely have become a revolutionary.”103 The demonstration of a
clear link between Phan and Hồ Chí Minh would make it much easier to claim that continuity
existed between traditional scholar patriots and the communists. By 1982, it was this sort of
connection, and not Phan’s class background or particular ideological motivations, that
communist historians sought to prove.
Westerners were also intrigued by possible connections between the two men. Marr, for
instance, notes that “nine-year old Nguyen Ai Quoc had listened to [Phan] quoting lines of
poetry which Nguyen never forgot.”104 Duiker, on the other hand, introduces another possible
connection: That it was Hồ Chí Minh who betrayed Phan to the French in 1925.105 Duiker
rejects this hypothesis, writing, “[Phan] was an ideal figure from the communist point of
view…He would in all probability have posed little obstacle to communist control of the
movement.”106 Antiwar scholars cared less about the necessity of a direct connection. It was
enough to prove that Phan served as an inspiration to communists and that he approved of their
96
Ibid., 52.
97
Ibid., 44.
98
Ibid., 43, 51.
99
Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 85.
100
Ibid., 42.
101
Ibid., 43.
102
Ibid., 44.
103
Tôn Quang Phiệt, 29. Tôn Quang Phiệt also makes note of Phan’s discussions with representatives of
the Soviet Union. Tôn Quang Phiệt writes, “Phan was one of the first Vietnamese that introduced [a relationship of]
love and friendship between Vietnam and the Soviet Union.” Ibid.
104
Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 209. Marr recounts further connections between the two men on
253-255.
105
Duiker, The Rise of Vietnamese Nationalism, 86.
106
Ibid., 87.

15
 activities. Nguyễn Khắc Viện, the elder communist voice speaking directly to American scholars,
was happy to promote such an understanding. He wrote, “The great patriotic scholars Phan Bội
Châu and Huynh Thuc Khang were attracted to the new doctrine (communism) as soon as it
appeared in Vietnam. Unswerving enemies of the colonial regime, they felt a deep affinity with
the new revolutionary cadres who were devoted body and soul to the national cause, as the
scholars had been.”107
As a final note on connections, we should consider a short article written by Trần Huy
Liệu in 1962 entitled, “Nhớ Lại Ông Già Bến Ngự” (Remembering the Old Man of the Imperial
Quay [indicating Phan]).108 In this oft-cited article, Trần Huy Liệu acknowledges Chương
Thâu’s numerous scholarly contributions and offers a more off-the-cuff remembrance of Phan
based an actual meeting Trần Huy Liệu had with him in 1935. Trần Huy Liệu compares Phan
favorably to Phan Chu Trinh, who he also met, claiming that Phan was far more congenial and
worthy of admiration. However, Trần Huy Liệu pointed out that Phan was far too trusting and
easily duped. Whereas he had a sense of nationalism, his understanding of socialism was
“utopian” and verged on “familism,” Trần Huy Liệu writes that he advised Phan not to write
anything about socialism as he had no training in scientific Marxism, and instead to concentrate
on writing an autobiography.109 Trần Huy Liệu concludes that Phan could not have succeeded
because he lacked a, “scientific foundation that would allow [him] to believe that his actions
followed historical laws.”110
Marr specifically compares Phan with Trần Huy Liệu, claiming the difference between
them lay in Trần Huy Liệu’s ability to, “turn vague impressions into organized knowledge.”111
Marr thus concurs with communist assertions that Phan’s thinking lacked a certain theoretical
undergirding necessary for success. Hue-Tam Ho Tai likewise compares Phan to Tôn Quang
Phiệt, noting that both, “cared more about group rights than individual liberty and thought of
liberation as a predominantly political process.”112 Tai’s observation is largely confirmed in
Tôn Quang Phiệt’s analysis of Phan, in which again the key difference is suggested to be in the
application of theory to practice.
The Issue of Franco-Vietnamese Collaboration
In 1918, Phan wrote an article addressed to the Governor General of Indochina, Albert
Sarraut, offering the possibility of Franco-Vietnamese collaboration (đề huề).113 In it Phan
suggested that he might cease violent activities if the French would help to develop Vietnam’s
economy and cultural level. The article was translated from Chinese into Vietnamese and
subsequently published in Tạp Chí Nam Phong (Southern Wind).114 Although Phan quickly
retracted his statements, claiming that he had been duped by French agents117 and that the
107
Nguyen Khac Vien, 46.
108
Trần Huy Liệu. “Nhớ Lại Ông Già Bến Ngự” (Remembering the Old Man of the Imperial Quay).
Nghiên cứu Lịch sử (Historical Research) 47 (1962): 40-44.
109
Ibid., 43.
110
Ibid., 44.
111
Marr, Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 53.
112
Tai, 86.
113
The article was titled either “Pháp Việt đề huề chính kiến thư” (A Political Opinion Concerning Franco-
Vietnamese Collaboration) or “Pháp Việt đề huề luận” (Essay on Franco-Vietnamese Collaboration). For a relatively
complete account see The Autobiography of Phan Bội Châu, 242-245.
114
Chương Thâu,“Phan Bội Châu qua một số sách báo miền Nam hiện nay” (Phan Bội Châu [as seen]
through some current publications in South [Vietnam]). Nghiên Cứu Lịch Sử (Historical Research) 67 (1964): 14.

16
 translation of his article into Vietnamese contained serious misrepresentations of his ideas,118
the damage had been done.115 The article understandably caused communist historians and, to
a lesser extent, their American counterparts, no small amount of grief. How was such an
article that so obviously contradicted Phan’s image as a die-hard revolutionary to be
explained?
The representative communist response is given by Chương Thâu. In an article attacking,
“so-called ‘researchers’ and ‘theorists’ using misinterpretations of Phan Bội Châu in order to
serve vile political goals (here indicating researchers in South Vietnam),” Chương Thâu brings
up the collaboration article.116 In particular, Chương Thâu mocks one Phan Xuân Hòa for
claiming both that the article was written in 1912 (instead of 1918) and that, “the Franco-
Vietnamese collaboration [article] was like a wind blowing onto a pile of revolutionary coal and
thus lighting once again the flame.”117 In Chương Thâu’s mind, collaboration and revolution are
absolutely incompatible.118 By suggesting that they might be in some way complementary, Phan
Xuân Hòa was proving himself to be a “lackey of the American imperialists.”119
Instead, Chương Thâu claims that the article was a “lamentable mistake” and a “misstep
in the revolutionary journey of Phan Bội Châu.”120 Quoting Phan’s own retraction, Chương Thâu
claims that Phan Bá Ngọc, the individual responsible for convincing Phan to write the article, had
plotted from the beginning to trick Phan. Phan Bá Ngọc and his companion Lê Dư deceived
Phan by claiming, “The policies of Governor General Sarraut are different from the policies of
previous Governor Generals. Sarraut is a socialist and socialism greatly contradicts the policies
of French colonialism.”121 Furthermore, Phan Bá Ngọc intimated to Phan that a friendly French
administration would allow the revolutionary movement to engage in espionage within the
colony. Four or five months after having left with the article, Phan writes of Phan Bá Ngọc, “The
beloved son of Phan Đình Phùng [Phan Bá Ngọc] brazenly came out as an obedient running dog
of the bushy haired gang [the French].”122
If Phan Bá Ngọc’s perfidy was not explanation enough, Chương Thâu continues. He
reminds readers that Phan had just been released from prison in Guangdong after four years of
captivity, and thus had little understanding of contemporary geopolitical or intra-colony events.
As such, Chương Thâu concludes, “The event was a blemish on the glorious history of a
courageous warrior.”123 Chương Thâu’s argument lacks any distinguishable Marxist features.
Rather, his biting attacks on Phan Xuân Hòa for “misrepresentation” and Phan Bá Ngọc for
treachery reveal Chương Thâu’s interest in defending a particular conception of Phan as a
paragon of national revolution and honest patriotism.
Marr handles the issue of Phan’s support for Franco-Vietnamese collaboration by

115
Phan was convinced to write the article by one Phan Bá Ngọc, the son of none other than the famous
Cần Vương, the leader Phan Đình Phùng, and a man named Lê Dư. Both were later discovered to be working for the
French Sûreté. The Autobiography of Phan Bội Châu, 242-245. Chương Thâu. “Phan Bội Châu qua một số sách
báo miền Nam hiện nay,” 14.
116
Ibid., 10, 14-15.
117
Ibid.
118
Chương Thâu calls Phan Xuân Hòa’s suggestion “painfully ridiculous.” Ibid.
119
Ibid.
120
Ibid.
121
Ibid., 15.
122
Ibid.
123
Ibid.

17
 refusing to pass judgment on it. He characterizes it in a pair of short paragraphs as “something
that has puzzled many Vietnamese ever since.”124 In his footnotes, Marr offers the communist
and national arguments that present the episode as, “a bad mistake or else [they] explain it away
with elaborate, rather unconvincing theoretical discussions.”125 Marr also presents a Trotskyite
alternative.126 However, by declining to explain the implications of the article for either group,
Marr effectively renders it a non-issue. Marr offers his own lackluster explanation that more or
less follows Chương Thâu’s: “We may surmise that Phan Bội Châu’s deep depression, his feeling
of having accomplished absolutely nothing in more than once decade, left him open to such
personal entreaties.”127 Quickly returning to his narrative of anticolonial resistance, Marr then
describes how other leaders of Phan’s Quang Phục Hội (Restoration League) grew outraged by
Phan Bá Ngọc, and conspired to have him assassinated in 1922.128 Marr thus manages to gloss
over the article’s importance while simultaneously reemphasizing the anticolonial movement’s
preference for violence.
Duiker seems more aware of the significance of the. Article. He writes, “Not surprisingly,
there has been considerable controversy over the meaning and implications of the entire
incident.”129 In addition to the arguments of Trần Huy Liệu and Chương Thâu, Duiker also
presents the “pro-French” position.130 For his own part, Duiker attempts to explain Phan’s actions
in light of the increasingly “passive role” that Phan played in the nationalist movement.131 This
explanation parallels that of Tôn Quang Phiệt, who also sees a shift in Phan’s attitude in his later
years toward “civilized revolution.”132 Both Duiker and Tôn Quang Phiệt make note of two other
works by Phan written in 1920. The first of these was entitled “Y Hồn đơn tán dương chính sách
bất động của Găng- đi” (A Medical Prescription for the Soul – In Praise of Gandhi’s Nonviolence
Policy), and the second was entitled “Dư cửu niên lai sở tri chi chủ nghĩa” (My Contentions for
the Last Nine Years). Both of these articles advocate reform as opposed to revolution.133
Duiker blames this amelioration of political ferocity on depression, while Tôn Quang
Phiệt claims it is necessary to investigate the historical conditions before coming to a
conclusion. Both scholars feel that Phan somehow betrayed his true cause by demonstrating
openness to possible peaceful solutions, and are eager to explain away any such apparent shift .
Upon asking rhetorically whether Phan’s postwar writings indicate significant changes in his
ideas, Duiker answers, “For the most part, they appear to reflect ideas current in China at that
time and give little indication of any real intellectual growth. Most provocative of the new ideas
to affect his own thought was Marxism.”134 Duiker finds Phan to be essentially a patriotic

124
Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism 1885-1925, 239.
125
Ibid.
126
Ibid. Marr interviewed Nguyen Duc Quynh, who claims the article was a “painfully honest recognition
of the error of his early attempts to get help from Japan, China, and Germany – all of them, countries which would
prove to be as dangerous to Vietnam as France itself.” Marr’s interview with Nguyen Duc Quynh in Saigon, April
24, 1967.
127
Ibid., 240.
128
Ibid.
129
Duiker, The Rise of Nationalism, 80.
130
This view contends that Phan, “had been converted to a policy of cooperation with France.” Duiker
offers Nguyen Khac Hanh as holding a representative opinion. Ibid.
131
Ibid.
132
Tôn Quang Phiệt, “Phan Bội Châu trong lịch sử chống thực dân Pháp,” 12.
133
See Ibid and Duiker, The Rise of Nationalism, 81.
134
Duiker, The Rise of Nationalism, 82.

18
simpleton blundering from ideology to ideology until he might happen upon the correct
one.138
Likewise, Tôn Quang Phiệt claims Phan’s intellectual foundations to be a hodgepodge of
Confucianism, idealism, knight-errantry, and Daoism, all of which are the product of his class
background and times. Tôn Quang Phiệt notes that Phan shifted in his political opinions and
ideology quite often, and asserts that emotions played a far more powerful role in Phan’s
decision-making than did reason.135 He furthermore points out that Phan eventually saw the evil
intentions of the French clearly and reasserted his strong patriotic will. Interestingly, Tôn Quang
Phiệt never mentions the duplicity of Phan Bá Ngọc as a means of explaining Phan’s actions.
Tôn Quang Phiệt writes that Phan’s “collaboration” and “civilized revolution” theories “were
nothing more than groping about, and Phan did not believe in them.”136 Duiker and Tôn Quang
Phiệt thus both denigrate Phan’s intellectual ability while simultaneously emphasizing his
patriotism. In doing so, they resolve the conundrum of the collaboration letter by dismissing it as
a thoughtless mistake by a well-meaning and dedicated but easily misguided revolutionary
patriot.
Summations: Communist and Western Appraisals of Phan Bội Châu
In his final analysis, Tôn Quang Phiệt finds Phan to be a patriot who contributed
significantly to the national liberation movement. Tôn Quang Phiệt claims that Phan had a
strong will to resist the enemy and, although restrained by Confucian ethics and traditional
ritualism, he had a great and positive influence on the Vietnamese revolutionary movement.
Tôn Quang Phiệt writes that although he failed to achieve success, “As a result of his
enduring search Phan grasped the revolutionary path toward a promising future.”137
According to Phiệt, Phan’s value lies in the legacy he left that encouraged people to follow the
path of revolution, and as a leader who connected the two revolutionary periods of
Vietnamese history.
Nevertheless, Tôn Quang Phiệt is quick to point out Phan’s many errors. Tôn Quang
Phiệt argues that Phan’s lack of a solid class viewpoint led him to waste effort on “ineffective
actions” that had “little effect” and that could almost unanimously be considered “failures.”138
Phan was furthermore too “trusting,” and when faced with stalemates and failures, easily
gravitated toward fatalism and foolhardiness.139 Tôn Quang Phiệt suggests that Phan’s
emphasis on emotion, rather than logic, led him to foolishly consider Franco-Vietnamese
collaboration, but then also later led him to reject it. The implication is that Phan’s heartfelt
devotion to the cause of resistance must be wedded to a logical, scientific understanding of
class, economic conditions, and the laws of history in order for success to be achieved.
Many of the themes and conclusions in Tôn Quang Phiệt’s article served as guidelines
for later communist historiographical interpretations of Phan. An attempt to align and compare
Phan’s actions and ideas with a putatively correct “revolutionary path” or “movement” is visible
throughout the entire article. The supposition that such a “movement” existed apart from the
Duy Tân Hội or Quang Phục Hội, or that there was a single “path” weaving its way through
loosely connected narratives of various individuals or groups indicates the contemporary
135
Tôn Quang Phiệt, “Phan Bội Châu trong lịch sử chống thực dân Pháp,” 23.
136
Ibid.
137
Ibid., 29.
138
Ibid., 21.
139
Ibid., 22-23.

19
 political objectives Tôn Quang Phiệt and others hoped to fulfill. In order to make the DRV
appear to be the “natural” product of both the scientific process of historical materialism and the
much lauded revolutionary tradition of Vietnam, Phan needed to serve both as a link backward
to a heroic Confucian history of resistance and forward to a modern class-based spirit of
revolution.
Chương Thâu, having devoted his life to studying Phan, offers a slightly more
sentimental portrait. Chương Thâu is obviously enamored with Phan’s personal characteristics,
and routinely comments positively on Phan’s willingness to endure hardship, his ardent tenacity
in the face of the enemy, and even his expressions of filial piety towards his father.140 It is to
Chương Thâu’s credit that he manages never to address the contradiction between material
determinism and Phan’s voluntaristic patriotism. Nevertheless, it is obvious that Chương Thâu is
attached to the former theoretically and the latter emotionally. The notion that Phan can serve as
a national symbol who represents the collective consciousness of the people is similarly placed
directly alongside a complex analysis of various class- consciousnesses. We are left to assume
that nationalism somehow transcends both class and
Trần Huy Liệu, a well-respected intellectual and revolutionary in his own right, takes a
broader view in his remembrance of Phan.141 Trần Huy Liệu praises Phan for his friendly
character, his willingness to provide for those around him (while living under house arrest Phan
took in many older revolutionaries after they were released from prison), and his cheerfully
optimistic nature. However, these traits were to be contrasted with Phan’s uncritical, almost
superficial attitude toward people and ideas. Trần Huy Liệu notes that Phan did not even “see the
evil” of the Constitutionalists, a quasi-collaborator party of capitalists and landlords based in the
south.142 According to Trần Huy Liệu, his understanding of socialism was uninformed and highly
idealistic.143
As such, Trần Huy Liệu seems to thank Phan for his contributions to the resistance
movement, yet also suggests that it is time for Phan to retire and allow more competent activists
handle the business of real revolution. Commenting on Phan’s passing, Trần Huy Liệu quotes
Phan himself, “The sea is not yet filled, Jingwei still carries a pebble in her mouth.”144 Phan had
written this as an epitaph for Phan Chu Trinh; but Trần Huy Liệu finds that it applies better to
Phan himself. Trần Huy Liệu furthermore suggests that Phan might have been better off dying in
1926 along with Phan Chu Trinh, so that he would not have had to live out his last years in
captivity at a time when the prospects for liberation seemed weakest.
For Marr, Phan was truly a transitional figure. He was the last of a generation of
Confucian scholars propelled by an enduring tradition of resistance and loyalty to one’s king and
country. Yet he was also one of the first Vietnamese to look out across the seas in search of new
techniques, symbols, and values with which to bolster their fight against a formidable enemy. It
is Phan’s ability to meld these two worlds that gives him such significance in Vietnam’s history
of resistance. Marr asserts, “Most important, [Phan and his compatriots] succeeded in creating

140
Chương Thâu, “Thân Thế và Sự Nghiệp Cứu Nước của Phan Bội Châu,” 48.
141
Zinoman, who is no communist sycophant, calls Trần Huy Liệu a “brilliant journalist, revolutionary
activist, and historian.” Zinoman, 10.
142
Trần Huy Liệu, “Nhớ Lại Ông Già Bến Ngự,” 43.
143
Ibid.
144
This reference is to an ancient legend. After the mythical emperor Yan’s daughter drowned in the ocean,
she turned into the Jingwei bird who flew back and forth dropping pebbles into the sea in an effort to fill it up. The
phrase indicates a person absolutely determined to achieve a task especially against seemingly insurmountable odds.

20
and re-creating resistance symbols and ideals for subsequent generations. Without this, who can
say that the men who came after them would have had the sense of continuity and historical
purpose to act as they did?”145 Nevertheless, Marr faults Phan for failing to “define himself and
his movement.”146 Phan, according to Marr, was simply reacting rather than offering a distinct
alternative to colonial rule. To overcome the French, the Vietnamese would have to fashion for
themselves a new identity and a new way of defining themselves in the world. Marr’s assertion
actually prefigures aggressive attempts by Vietnamese communists in the 1950s to refashion the
culture, history, and national essence of Vietnam.
Duiker’s critique of Phan copies those of communist historiographers almost point for
point. Duiker argues that Phan’s ideas were “old-fashioned” and his actions “adventurous.”147
Furthermore, Duiker points out, “[Phan] had little comprehension of how to go about organizing
and building a highly disciplined revolutionary movement.”148 As such he “squandered” his
strength and that of his compatriots on ineffective and counterproductive actions. Duiker writes,
“Lacking the sense of certainty that the materialist dialectic provides the Marxist, the scholar-
patriots under Phan Bội Châu could not rely on historic inevitability.”149 Duiker also claims, “A
relative weakness in Phan’s approach was his failure to utilize the potential force of the
peasantry.”150 Though Duiker does not cite communist historians for any of these assertions,
their influence is clear. Duiker assumes, as they do, that the preconditions for success would
necessarily take the form of a dedicated, well organized revolutionary party with a firm grasp of
the Marxist dialectic and deep connections with the lower classes. Duiker sums up his critique of
Phan like this: “Phan’s gallants were more in the image of the knight-errants of old, slashing like
Vietnamese Don Quixotes at colonial windmills, and spending more time glorying in their
dashing image of sacrifice and revolutionary heroism than in the tough, day-to-day work of
educating the populace and winning support at the village level.”151 In other words, Phan was
not a member of the NLF in Southern Vietnam in 1965.
However, like Tôn Quang Phiệt, Duiker finds much to value in Phan’s legacy. Duiker
states that Phan“managed to grasp some important truths which served to move the Vietnamese
resistance movement a significant step toward its final goal – a Vietnam strong and prosperous,
its citizenry united and stubbornly determined to protect its identity as Vietnamese.”152 We have
already noted the problems with imputing a “final goal” to a trans- historical resistance
movement. What is most important is the incredibly close alignment of Duiker’s final appraisal
with those of the communist historians. Duiker states, “Phan Bội Châu and his colleagues…left
behind a spirit of indomitability, a consciousness of the greater duty of the Vietnamese people to
unite behind the great idea of national independence, and this image is sufficiently vital even
today for the communists of North Vietnam to call upon the old scholar-patriot as a model for
young Vietnamese to emulate.”153 In Duiker’s mind, Phan was nothing less than the spiritual
godfather of Vietnamese communism.

145
Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 275.
146
Ibid., 276.
147
Duiker, The Rise of Nationalism, 97.
148
Ibid.
149
Ibid., 98.
150
Ibid.
151
Ibid., 99.
152
Ibid., 100.
153
Ibid.

21
 Conclusion: A Symbol or a Patriot?
US scholars who were amazed by the tenacity, organizational capability, and
effectiveness of the NLF and DRV came not unreasonably to the conclusion that their opponents
represented something much stronger and more durable than simply another wing of
international communism. Drawing on the very same communists for evidence and ideas,
antiwar academics developed a parallel narrative of enduring, even timeless, Vietnamese
resistance. Phan Bội Châu stood out as an exemplar of this tradition, but also an exemplar of
Vietnam’s turn toward modernity. Conveniently, he knew Hồ Chí Minh’s father, and had written
about socialism. It thus became easy to see him as a stepping-stone on the path to a communist
future.
A decade or so after the war, the idea of a primordial Vietnamese spirit of resistance
began to receive serious re-examination. Communism no longer appeared heroic or natural, and
many of the assumptions made by the historian cadres no longer appeared credible. However,
Phan’s reputation remains largely untouched. He is still presented as the simple, emotional
patriot and the unsystematic revolutionary. Indeed, this is how he is still presented in most
literature published in Vietnam. Nevertheless, more separates Phan from Hồ Chí Minh than the
ideological certainty provided by Marxist dialectical theory. Phan inhabited a different world
than did Trần Huy Liệu, Tôn Quang Phiệt, and Chương Thâu. Phan saw himself as part of a
tradition of resistance, but one that had only come into existence after the French invasion.
Phan’s vision for the Vietnamese nation also differed considerably from that of the
communists. Rather being a simple or confused theorist, Phan’s developing concept of the nation,
like that of Liang Qichao, was derived from a Confucian worldview within which hierarchy and
morality played important and meaningful roles. Yet nonetheless, this vision was that of a modern
nation.154 By carefully working through the Confucian tradition to determine what needed to be
preserved and what should be rejected, Phan demonstrated a capacity for complex and nuanced
thinking.155 Phan’s own ideas were easily as sophisticated as were the attempts to portray him as
the enthusiastic predecessor of the communist party in Vietnam.

154
Marr discusses one of many books written by Phan concerning his vision of a modern Vietnamese
nation entitled Tân Việt Nam (New Vietnam). In it, Phan set out in detail “ten great joys” that would characterize an
advanced, civilized Vietnam: Independence, no exploiting class, social welfare, veteran’s services, equitable
taxation, justice, progressive education, full exploitation of resources, a well-developed industrial base, and a
flourishing economy. In addition, he advocated six personal characteristics that all citizens ought to cultivate: A
progressive spirit, brotherly love, a desire for modern civilization, patriotism, public virtue, and a sense of the
commonweal. Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 137-139. While these ideas may have seemed utopian at the time,
it is worth noting that such a vision is fully in line with both those of Phan’s contemporaries around the globe and
also that of the DRV’s leaders themselves since đổi mới (renovation) in the 1980s.
155
In his later years, during which Trần Huy Liệu had visited him, Phan wrote two exceedingly long and
complex analyses (700 pages each). One of these dealt with one the Analects, entitled Khổng Học Đăng (The Light
of Confucianism), and the other dealt with the Book of Changes, and was entitled Chu Dịch (The Changes of Zhou).

22
 Chapter Two
Phan Bội Châu’s Martyrs: Vietnamese Revolutionary Martyrdom and Nationalist
Hagiography
Shortly after being freed from nearly four years of imprisonment in Guangdong province
in 1917, Phan Bội Châu rejoined some of his former proteges in Hangzhou. Together they
published two editions of A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs (HVM) in 1918. Phan served as the
overall compiler and editor of the project. The principal author was one Đặng Đoàn Bằng.156
Other contributors included several of Phan’s most ardent supporters: (1) His second-in-
command Nguyễn Thượng Hiền (pseudonym Đỉnh Nam); (2) a Catholic monk named Lưu Song
Tử: and (3) a mysterious figure by the name of Trần Quốc Duy, who wrote 25 of the 100 poems
included in the volume.
Originally published as a short 91-page booklet in classical Chinese, HVM includes one
preface, four introductions, fifty biographies of martyrs, and three “collective biographies”
dedicated to all those who perished in three key events. The fifty biographies range from terse
one-line statements indicating the places of birth and death to elaborate stories accompanied by
poems and remembrances. The shortest biography is 13 characters long, and the longest is 2909
characters long.
In compiling A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs, Đặng Đoàn Bằng and Phan Bội Châu
sought to present an idealized picture of the Vietnamese nation. Borrowing from Vietnamese
patriotic and Confucian traditions, they told the stories of unimpeachable patriots: men (and one
woman) who had given their lives for Vietnam. Though the scholarly elite and their children
dominate the volume, other social groups are represented as well, including farmers, ethnic
Chinese, and even “traitors” who converted to the cause of the revolution. Most of the
biographies are of Northerners, which is not a surprising since most of Phan Bội Châu’s social
circle came from the North, but individuals from the Center and South are included as well.
The message articulated in various forms throughout the text is clear: Vietnamese of all
stripes can find a common purpose through self-sacrifice. Many of the stories contained in the
text follow similar plot lines and repeat certain formal choices. This is because the retelling itself
is intend to serve as a crucial means of linking those stories to a larger history of resistance. The
construction of an eternal Vietnamese spirit of resistance was essential to the evangelizing
mission that lay behind the publication of A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs. However, in order to
determine the success of this mission, we must evaluate the content of the text in reference to its
own claims.
Success is not defined solely by the overarching message a text delivers, but also by the
aggregate character of its content. While the overall message of A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs
is unambiguous, the structure and content of the biographies betray a much more complicated
picture of the Vietnamese revolutionary movement from 1906 to 1918. Rather than depicting a
unified group with a single goal, the text resembles a patchwork quilt of different groups, each of

156
There are few references to Đặng Đoàn Bằng independent of A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs and Phan
Bội Châu’s Autobiography. Chương Thâu devotes a fair portion of his introduction to A History of Vietnam’s
Martyrs to determining Đặng Đoàn Bằng’s identity and backstory. Chương Thâu asserts that Đặng Đoàn Bằng, who
also went by the names Đặng Xung Hồng and Đặng Hữu Bằng, was a nephew of revolutionary Đặng Tử Mẫn and
son of Đặng Hữu Dương, a doctoral graduate of the 1889 exams. Đặng Đoàn Bằng came from Hành Thiện village
in Xuân Trường county, Nam Định province. He studied at the school of veteran revolutionary Nguyễn Thượng
Hiền, who arranged for him to join the Đông Du movement. Phan Bội Châu Toàn Tập 5 “Việt Nam Nghĩa Liệt
Sử”. 11-17.

23
which seems to have been included for different reasons and treated in different ways. In order
to compare the content of the text with its ideological message, I employ digital methods to
evaluate both data concerning the lives of the martyrs and the language used in different portions
of the text. This digital methodology produced results which contradicts those derived from an
“analog” reading of the A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs, to which I now turn.
Four Introductions: The Discursive Orientations of A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs
The four Introductions to the text provide a solid foundation for understanding the
political intentions and the historiographical stances of those who created A History of Vietnam’s
Martyrs. The two “original” introductions to the first 1918 edition were written by Đặng Đoàn
Bằng and Trần Quốc Duy, both of whom were junior members of Phan Bội Châu’s retinue and
principal authors of the text. These introductions place the martyred individuals represented in
the text firmly within a national history of resistance, make strong claims as to the objectives of
those individuals and the political significance of each. Two additional introductions, written for
the second 1918 edition by the former titular head of the Vietnamese Modernization Society and
royalist Marquis Cường Để and veteran revolutionary Nguyễn Thượng Hiền, broaden and
reaffirm these claims.
Đặng Đoàn Bằng’s introduction opens with a phantasmagorical depiction of ghosts
appearing as furious natural forces. He writes, “I can hear nothing but the chanting of spirits and
the crying of ghosts. The shrieking wind and howling rain tears into my ears. I see the flash of
lightning amidst the rumbling thunder. The running mountain and the walking sea whirl into my
eyes.”157 These furious natural forces convey the unresolved anger of Đặng Đoàn Bằng’s fallen
comrades.158 Furthermore, he claims these spirits have “forced” him to write A History of
Vietnam’s Martyrs.159 Đặng Đoàn Bằng thus presents himself as the conduit for ghostly grief as
well as a chronicler of martyred lives. Đặng Đoàn Bằng’s introduction emphasizes the emotional
significance of the History. It is a text written to commemorate individuals whom the author
knew personally and cared for intimately.
However, this text is not simply a historical record of fallen comrades. Đặng Đoàn
Bằng’s introduction reveals another purpose of text: to serve as a political validation of collective
sacrifice. Đặng Đoàn Bằng’s ghosts do not appear as individuals in the introduction, but rather
as a spiritual force embodying a corporate will. He writes, “Though they had taken different
paths, they all came together to achieve the same goal…Though the ways they died were many,
their objective was singular.”160 Đặng Đoàn Bằng informs his readers that this objective was
none other than “to die on behalf of the nation.”161 The image Đặng Đoàn Bằng presents is one
of young diehard revolutionaries encouraging each other to die heroic deaths to demonstrate their
commitment to one another and to their nation. This image is furthermore intended to inspire
and pressure those still living, and presumably the readers of the text, into dedicating themselves

157
VNNLS, 25
158
Ibid.
159
Later in the introduction, Đặng Đoàn Bằng writes, “Deep in the night it is still. The rain patters and the
wind whispers sadly. Suddenly I see my comrades under the light next to the sword. They pace back and forth
fretfully, unable to leave. I cannot stop my tears from pouring down. I cannot but take up my brush and write my
tears into words.” Ibid.
160
Ibid.
161
Complete citation: “They knew that the spilling of blood is what gives value to civilization. They knew
that death is the measure of life. The cock crows every time it storms. They sat close and shared their feelings,
encouraging each other while waiting for a chance to die on behalf of the nation.” Ibid.

24
to the cause of national liberation.162
While Đặng Đoàn Bằng frames the text primarily in spiritual and emotional terms, Trần
Quốc Duy’s introduction seeks to connect it to a larger national history of anti-foreign resistance.
Trần Quốc Duy begins by criticizing the inability of the Vietnamese people to successfully resist
French colonization. He writes, “In these past few years, the war in Europe broke out and waves
of bullets swept across the continent. The French, finding themselves on the defense, had to take
care of their motherland; they had no time to worry about their colonies. Still, the five sections
and three regions of our country heard nary a shot. The world believes that our people are unfit
for independence. How terrible!”163 Trần Quốc Duy argues that this deplorable failure stood in
sharp contrast to the historical victories of the Trần and Lê dynasties.164
In the next section, Trần Quốc Duy complicates this contrast by introducing famous
figures of the early anti-French resistance period. He writes,
In the fifteenth year of Tự Đức’s reign, the French captured the South. Nguyễn Huân,
Trương Định, and our brothers in the South and center fought fiercely with the enemy,
but they were killed defending the country and many names had to be recorded as lost. In
the thirty-fifth year of Tự Đức’s reign, the enemy took the North. Nguyễn Quang Bích,
Vũ Hữu Lợi, and Nguyễn Thiện Thuật raised the army to protect the King and attacked
the enemy across fourteen provinces. Most glorious was General Hoàng Hoa Thám, who
fought the enemy for close to twelve years.165
The figures Trần Quốc Duy mentions represent the perennial spirit of Vietnamese patriotic
resistance to foreign occupation and the indefatigable vitality of the Vietnamese national spirit.
However, immediately after saying this, Trần Quốc Duy reaffirms that “For around fifty years
the French have propped up their pillow and slept soundly. If we examine this situation, how can
we claim the Vietnamese people are fit for independence?”166 This juxtaposition of ongoing
resistance and demonstrated failure to thwart French colonial designs points to a seemingly
irreconcilable contradiction: Vietnamese resistance is both inevitable and ineffectual. It is
obligatory yet inadequate.
In the final section, Trần Quốc Duy resolves this contradiction by addressing the text
directly. After reading A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs, he claims:
Tears began pouring down my face. I felt great anguish watching so many men ready for
independence struggle hard yet achieve nothing at all. How could this be? Alas! The
answer I already know. When the heads of our valiant scholars roll uselessly onto
hundreds of battlefields, our gallant actions provoke the enemy’s running dogs. This
increases French oppression and brings our people closer together.167
162
Đặng Đoàn Bằng indicates that the mutual obligations of the living and dead are difficult to balance. He
writes, “The dead have died, but what of the living? To follow the path of those who have died who be to die as well
- how could the dead want that? To betray the dead by living uselessly - how could the living bear to do that?.”
Ibid.
163
VNNLS, 26.
164
Trần Quốc Duy writes, “Long ago our country was invaded by the Yuan dynasty; thanks to the Trần
kings our country was twice regained in bloody battle. Later we were invaded by the Ming dynasty; thanks to the
Lê king’s fifteen years of waging war our country again achieved independence.” Ibid.
165
Trần Quốc Duy continues, “In the first year of Hàm Nghi’s reign, the French invaded the capital Thuận
Hóa and occupied the center. Phan Đình Phùng and Nguyễn Hiệu called on the people of Nghệ An, Hà Tĩnh, Quảng
Nam, and Quảng Ngãi to rise up, and they did for over ten years.” Ibid.
166
VNNLS, 27.
167
My emphasis. Ibid.

25
 Trần Quốc Duy thus reveals a dialectical process at work: revolutionary actions provoke
repression, repression stimulates Vietnamese indignation, and the entire country moves closer to
violent insurrection. Trần Quốc Duy ends his introduction with the following powerful
statement:
I am anguished for the martyrs, but I feel hope for the future of our country. My pain is
endless, but my hopes will one day be realized. From Côn Đảo up to the North, from the
Mekong over to the East, from Lạng Sơn down to the South, the Five-Star Flag will fly
in the wind. The ochre blood of our valiant scholars, our righteous warriors, and our
gallant martyrs will coagulate and form a foundation [for our independence].168
A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs, then, is a political testament that claims the martyred dead as the
embodiment of total national revolution.
The second pair of introductions follow the same discursive contours as the first pair, but
deepen and solidify the national claims of the text as they go. Marquis Cường Để opens with a
brief history lesson emphasizing a thousand years of Vietnamese independence and imperial
legacy of expansion.169 However, despite its geographical size and substantial population,
Vietnam was unable to prevent French colonization. The thought that thehard-won territorial
gains of his ancestors have been completely overtaken by another race distresses the Marquis,
and forces him to consider the causes. Regrettably, he writes, “I can only blame our poor talent,
weak thinking, and inadequate strength.”170 Remarking sadly that many have died, Cường Để
nevertheless points out that Vietnam’s revolutionaries have fought and died proudly and without
complaint. This legacy of determined, (even if unsuccessful) resistance is for Cường Để a source
of strength and national hope. He then echoes Trần Quốc Duy’s patriotic declaration in a more
sanguinary tone: “[We await] a day when purple clouds float over Thăng Long, when red waves
flow through Cần Giờ. [We await a day] when we can turn our heads toward the spirits on the
horizon and pour the blood of our enemies onto the ground. I dream of such a day. Not for
moment will I ever forget this ambition.”171 Cường Để thus blends Đặng Đoàn Bằng’s haunting
appeal to the spirits of the dead with Trần Quốc Duy’s political dream of independence into a
violent revolutionary vision of spiritually empowered anti-colonial vengeance.
Nguyễn Thượng Hiền, who was the committed and experienced second-in-command of
Phan Bội Châu’s, contributes the final Introduction. It is a piece of higher literary quality and
greater conceptual sophistication than the other three introductions, and serves as a guiding
manifesto for the entire text. Opening with poetic hyperbole, Nguyễn Thượng Hiền states:
Upon the crests of waves, from seventy-thousand leagues over the sea, a great whale and
a huge crocodile speed toward the East. After four-thousand years of silk and satin, we
children of the dragon have sunk to serving as buffalo and horses. We are filled with

168
Ibid.
169
Cường Để writes, “Since the time of Đinh Tiên Hoàng, our country has consisted of the regions of
Rinan, Jiuzhen, Xiangjun, and Jiaozhi, which combined to form Đại Cồ Việt. It is clearly recorded that this state
was established after breaking away from the Northern Song, which means our country has been independent for a
long time. After the Lý dynasty and the Trần dynasty came the Lê dynasty, which attacked Champa numerous times
and occupied all of Lin-yi. Our saintly forebears expanded our territory, taking Quảng Nam, Quảng Ngãi, Bình
Định, Phú Yên, and areas further south, including the six provinces of Zhenla and some Ai-Lao territory, to reach
the borders of our frontier today.” VNNLS, 22.
170
Ibid.
171
Thăng Long is another name for Hanoi. Cần Giờ refers to the area surrounding Saigon - the area with
the largest population of French colonists. VNNLS, 23.

26
 righteous indignation upon realizing our plight! How could we suffer knitting our brows
and doffing our hats in order to live a single day alongside these bloodthirsty bandits?172
Nguyễn Thượng Hiền incorporates Cường Để’s thousand years of independence and expands his
historical scope into hoary antiquity, claiming continuity with a Vietnamese national legacy that
predated the Chinese occupation (111 BCE-938 CE). In doing so Nguyễn Thượng Hiền
implicitly attributes the sacrifices of the martyred dead not just to a lengthy tradition of patriotic
resistance, but also to a timeless national spirit embodied in all ethnic Vietnamese.
Nguyễn Thượng Hiền’s next move is to historiographically separate the fifty-year anti-
French resistance era into two periods. The first of these periods dates from the fall of Saigon up
to the complete French colonization of Vietnam. Nguyễn Thượng Hiền likens this to, “the sun’s
last rays fading into darkness of dusk,” and claims it brought the Vietnamese race to the brink of
extinction.173 The second period dates from the inception of the Eastern Travel (Đông Du)
movement in 1905, whereupon “the people’s rage has begun to seethe for revenge.”174 Nguyễn
Thượng Hiền claims this period is like, “the light of dawn rising out of the inky blackness of
night.”175 By associating the anti-colonial movement as a whole with the natural rhythms of time
and space, Nguyễn Thượng Hiền imputes a sense of inevitability and naturalness to Vietnam’s
national revolution.
The periodization serves another purpose as well. Whereas the first wave of resistance,
led by such famous individuals as, “Nguyễn Tri Phương, Hoàng Diệu, Phan Đình Phùng, Tống
Duy Tân, Võ Hữu Lợi, and Trương Định…has already been carefully recorded,” those who died
in the second period remain largely unacknowledged.176
Nguyễn Thượng Hiền claims it is precisely for this reason that A History of Vietnam’s
Martyrs was written and published. After all, he writes, “If we do not do everything we can to
find out and relate what happened, how will we be able to inspire future generations with the
names and true stories of those we have lost?”177 Here, then, Nguyễn Thượng Hiền makes clear
the practical objective of the text’s producers: To employ the life stories of martyrs as
pedagogical tools for inspiring Vietnam’s youth to fight and die as part of a collective campaign
seeking independence through revolution.
Returning to grand national history, Nguyễn Thượng Hiền brings together all of the
themes raised in the four introductions. Evoking a spirit of resistance both timely and timeless,
Nguyễn Thượng Hiền writes:
For eons our predecessors have died for our country and our comrades now continue to
rise, spear in hand. Though they die for the country in great numbers, our patriots within
the country and abroad continue to tread in their footsteps, ever forward. They rise up
throughout the countryside. Wherever they are stamped out, they rise up once again.
Though the French are fiendish, they truly fear the invincible spirit of our country. Our
country will not stay lost forever.178
Thus, through sacrifice eventually comes salvation.

172
The great whale and huge crocodile likely refer to Britain and France. Nguyễn Thượng Hiền claims
Vietnamese to be descendants of Lạc Long Quân, the “Dragon Lord of Lạc,” himself a descendant of dragons. Ibid.
173
Ibid.
174
Ibid.
175
Ibid.
176
Ibid.
177
Ibid.
178
Ibid.

27
 Bringing his introduction to a resounding conclusion, Nguyễn Thượng Hiền then writes:
We must try hard, making use of our wits and our courage near and far to recover our
country, to exterminate the enemy, and to purge the shame of those who died. Shall we
only lament and shed tears on behalf of the country? Shall we only take up the pen and
record these rays of light cast over the earth? This history of Vietnam’s martyrs that we
write now is the history of Vietnam’s independence that will be written in the future!
Only when this dream is fulfilled will our task be complete.
According to this perspective, A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs is a blueprint for revolution - a
collective guidebook for sacrifice on behalf of the nation. It is both a commemoration of
righteous deaths and a call to the living to emulate the spirit of patriotic martyrdom.
It is difficult to miss a naive sense of political utopianism enfolded with the discourse of
these four introductions. All four authors admit that the sacrifices of the martyrs failed to yield
any notable successes, yet they all nevertheless contend that the stories of the lives of the martyrs
- and their deaths - are worth retelling. None of the introductions offered an idea of when a
reader and prospective revolutionary might expect to enjoy the fruits of their efforts and the
sacrifices of the martyrs. The liberation lies somewhere in the hazy future - a patriotic lodestar
rather than a graspable reality.
The distance found in the pages of A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs between the actuality
of death and the illusory promise of salvation lends the text a sense of inescapable anguish. That
pain appears in the introductions embodied as apparitions, ghosts still wracked with shame and
guilt for having failed to bring about revolutionary progress. The ghosts serve as the spectral
counterpart of the martyrs - still present -but no longer recognizable as individuals. Instead, they
mass together as an eidolic collectivity able to register its anger through harsh weather and
irruptive landscapes. In death, the martyrs come to represent the national soul, serving as an
object of patriotic commemoration while also challenging the living to continue fighting a war
without end.
Biographical Narratives
A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs is neither triumphalist, nor especially bloodthirsty.
Rather, the martyrs are celebrated and revered for their traits and intentions. Most of these
biographies begin with a series of cliches which established that the martyr was intensely
serious, loyal to a fault, and perspicacious. The authors often recall the classic trope of the
fledgling genius who is so intent upon reading books that he, “forgets to eat or sleep.” Of
course, from there, the subject of the biography has no need to grow or come to terms with
themselves in any way. Indeed, they do not.
Instead, their determination and capability encounters colonial reality. The biographies
have plenty of unpleasant things to say about the French and their Nguyen quislings. The French
are devious, cruel, and relentless. Their Vietnamese collaborators are venal, small-minded, and
utterly untrustworthy. Standing against such enemies, the qualities of the revolutionaries appear
all the more praiseworthy. A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs thus paints a dichotomous picture of
virtue and vice, the just and the cruel. Then, using one emotionally compelling story after
another, the authors define the Vietnamese nation through its paragons of virtue: the martyrs.
In order for this narrative to work, each selected individual must be pure and they must
die. They must appear as a series of waves, each unique in their moment, but ultimately
indistinguishable from the tide. A variety of deaths are acceptable: execution is a favorite, but
starvation, exhaustion, illness, and an assortment of creative suicides work just as well. The

28
deaths are moments of intensity in which their blood mixes with that of their spiritual fellows.
Separated by time and space, the martyrs’ deaths are brought together textually within the
volume. The authors thus make the deaths and the martyrs meaningful by placing them
alongside one another. What would otherwise be isolated and unfortunate events become
glittering waves in a sea of national revival.
The many poems appended to the biographies offer another kind of national
representation. Each poem begins with two to four lines depicting the landscape of Vietnam,
either geographically or topographically. Specific mountains, rivers, or liminal boundaries are
indicated, as if the poet sought to demarcate the body of the nation. The remainder of the poem
then describes how the body of the martyr was destroyed. The parallelism is clear: in sacrificing
one’s individual body, one reconstitutes the national body. In his introduction, Nguyễn Thượng
Hiền explicitly draws a connection between the two: “A country is like a person; the character of
a country cannot be destroyed just as the spirit of a person cannot. Although both can be
submerged in peril up to their necks, they can also hope to rise again.”179 The poems often draw
parallels between the vibrant blood of the martyr smeared across the battlefield and the persistent
waterways of Vietnam. As long as both flow, the spirit of resistance can remain strong and the
nation will live on.
An Example Biography: Tăng Bạt Hổ
Tăng Bạt Hổ (1858-1906) was the sort of intrepid adventurer one might expect to
encounter in a Joseph Conrad novel. By the time Phan Bội Châu met him in 1904, he had
already fought with the Cần Vương movement, travelled to Port Arthur via Guangdong, and
joined Liu Yongfu to battle the Japanese on Taiwan. He was knowledgeable about the world. He
could speak Cantonese, and had worked as a merchant seaman all over East Asia. For these
reasons, Tăng Bạt Hổ was selected to guide Phan Bội Châu on his first trip abroad, which took
him first to Hong Kong and then to Japan.180 He served as the interpreter between Phan Bội
Châu and Liang Qichao in Yokohama. In the summer of 1906, Cường Để arrived in Japan, so
Phan Bội Châu sent Tặng Bát Hổ back to Vietnam to conduct party business there. The journey
was strenuous and, suffering from exhaustion, Tặng Bát Hổ contracted dysentery and died in
Huế.
The biography on Tặng Bát Hổ provides an excellent model for understanding A History of
Vietnam’s Martyrs as a whole: nearly every characteristic in the other biographies can be found
in this one. Tặng Bát Hổ’s biography nevertheless exceeds all others in the text in terms of
character count, number of poems, and hyperbole.
In many ways, Tặng Bát Hổ’s biography sets the tone for the entirety of A History of
Vietnam’s Martyrs. The authors use powerful, vivid language to immediately convey the story of
a great hero and evoke the larger collective will he is subsumed within. Đặng Đoàn Bằng
describes Tặng Bát Hổ as, “the crest of the first wave in a now growing tide, the first spark
within a bomb now exploding outwards.”181 The choice of imagery is deliberate and
consequential. The “revolutionary tide” is referred to again and again throughout the text. It is
the ordering principle for the anti-colonial movement: enough individuals moving together can
sweep away any manmade structures that stand in their path. However, the movement is also a
“bomb” insofar as it is modern, it is unstoppable, and it is potentially deadly. As the crest of the

179
VNNLS, 24.
180
Phan Bội Châu, Overturned Chariot, 74-75.
181
VNNLS, 29.

29
first wave, Tặng Bát Hổ literally led the movement overseas. As the first spark within a bomb,
he burned as a bright model for all those who come after.
Using the same format that nearly all of the subsequent biographies would follow, Đặng
Đoàn Bằng next introduces Tặng Bát Hổ’s character traits. He was, “magnanimous, thoroughly
knowledgeable, and resolute in his sense of purpose.” Furthermore, he was, “affable and
easygoing to talk to.”182 Many of the same adjectives would later be used for other martyrs, but
this kindly persona is most representative of the Annamese. By contrast, the Nghệ Tĩnh martyrs
are often described as fierce and indomitable. This distinction likely draws on regional
stereotypes even while reproducing them. Despite his apparent kindliness, the next two things
Đặng Đoàn Bằng describes Tặng Bát Hổ doing are rejecting marriage (he would remain a
bachelor who was too concerned with the woes of his nation to marry), and served as a substitute
for his older brother as a military recruit. These actions demonstrate two key characteristics
every martyr should have: patriotic fidelity and courageous voluntarism. Such traits led Tặng
Bát Hổ to quickly become a local commander of Cần Vương forces in Bình Định, and thereafter
to leave the country in search of foreign assistance.
By presenting the list of each martyr’s character traits first, then describing what they did,
Đặng Đoàn Bằng and Phan Bội Châu implicitly make the claim that heroes are born, not made.
Almost all of the individuals are described as thinking and acting the way they do from an early
age. Their later lives are simply a playing out of their innate senses of righteousness and justice.
Indeed, Phan Bội Châu’s own Autobiography follows this same format. On this point, the
biographies presented in A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs differ considerably from the European
bildungsroman style of biography, in which an individual is described as slowly but surely
becoming an autonomous adult through a series of challenging life experiences and difficult
moral decisions. In A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs, there is no such thing as character
development. The individuals it describes already fully understood the moral exigencies of the
situation from the beginning - colonialism offers little ambiguity. Instead, the question is simply
what could - and should - be done about it. Relating the lives of martyrs both confirms the
validity of a righteous moral stance and offers a measure by which to gauge one’s own patriotic
contributions. Just as Phan Bội Châu writes in his Autobiography, it is apparent that Đặng Đoàn
Bằng writes for pedagogical purposes: each biography is simultaneously a testament to the
martyrs personal moral integrity and a record of failure that the reader is expected to study so
that they might do better.
In the section that follows, Đặng Đoàn Bằng narrates Tặng Bát Hổ’s return to Vietnam
from abroad and his participation in the nascent revolutionary movement. He travelled to Quảng
Nam and met with Nguyễn Hàm, who introduced him to Phan Bội Châu, Đặng Thái Thân, and
Lê Võ. Tặng Bát Hổ then met Cường Để, who is described in a long aside. Đặng Đoàn Bằng
thereafter describes the great meeting in November 1904, at which representatives from all over
Vietnam selected Tặng Bát Hổ to officially serve as the “guide” responsible for taking Phan Bội
Châu and Đặng Thái Thân’s nephew Đặng Tử Kính to Japan. Đặng Đoàn Bằng describes how
Tặng Bát Hổ smuggled all three men across the border at Quảng Yên by masquerading as
Chinese merchants, and how he then took them to Hong Kong in search of the Cần Vương
leaders Nguyễn Thiện Thuật and Tôn Thật Thuyết. Failing to find these leaders, Đặng Đoàn
Bằng relates how Tặng Bát Hổ escorted Phan Bội Châu to Yokohama and served as his translator
for a momentous conversation with the Chinese reformer Liang Qichao.
182
Ibid.

30
 Tặng Bát Hổ’s death comes suddenly in the very last section of the biography. After
describing how Đặng Tử Kính returned to Vietnam and how Cường Để made it to Japan, Đặng
Đoàn Bằng relates that Tặng Bát Hổ contracted dysentery upon returning to Vietnam, traveled to
Huế, and died there. He laments the death of Tặng Bát Hổ:
Alas! What a tragedy! Heavens! How terrible! After making it over so many treacherous
peaks and through so many poisonous mists, making the jungle and mountains his home,
making the waves and rivers his friends, he lost his life to an illness on a small boat
floating on the Perfume River. Has heaven no respect for his great will? Alas! In his
youth he left home, never married, risked his life for our country for twenty years, and
roamed East, West, North, and South. His hair went grey and his eyes became dim, but
his great will remained as strong as ever. Gold can go through the fire a hundred times -
if this does not describe Tăng Bạt Hổ, then who? He died at the age of forty-nine.183
The abruptness shown in this ending is repeated in almost every biography which follows. That
is to say, the narrative focus of the biographies is the story of each individual’s life, rather than
their death. Indeed, there is little actual heroism on display throughout the text (there are only
about three notable exceptions). Much more textual space is devoted to efforts to demonstrate
how an individual participated in the revolutionary movement. Indeed, to a large extent, Tặng
Bát Hổ’s biography reads like recounting of party history. In each biography, when it comes
time for the martyr to die, the ending is often brief and perfunctory, with the age of death
typically being the last statement. This disjuncture between life and death mirrors the distance
between the repeated performance of patriotic will and the utter failure of that performance to
have any significant effect on the colonial state. There is a sense, then, that A History of
Vietnam’s Martyrs registers deaths more than it commemorates them. What is truly
commemorated in this text are traits and the actions taken as a result of those traits.
In an appended narrative section, Nguyễn Thượng Hiền repeats the biography from the
author’s personal perspective, and describes his anguish upon discovering Tặng Bát Hổ was sick
and possibly dying. Desperate to save him, Nguyễn Thượng Hiền describes his efforts to procure
cassia(a medicine) and sending it to Tặng Bát Hổ via the post, only to discover afterwards that
Tặng Bát Hổ had rented a small boat, gotten in, and passed away while floating on the Perfume
River. At the end of the remembrance, Nguyễn Thượng Hiền writes, “Examining his actions and
demeanor, I can see there was never a time that the words ‘destroy the enemy and save the
country’ weren’t imprinted in his mind. Sư Triệu [Tặng Bát Hổ]’s accomplishments represented
the end of an old group of righteous warriors and the inauguration of a new one. With these
words I praise a man who truly deserves it.”184 Again we see a celebration of the unshakable will
visible in Tặng Bát Hổ’s personal characteristics and mannerisms, and an attempt to embed his
story into that of the larger revolutionary movement.
Uncovering Mixed Messages: Digital Approaches to A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs
Whereas the introductions, the poetry, and especially the style and tone of the biographies
communicate a powerful and cohesive message, close examination of the content and language
of the text reveals a rather different picture. Contrary to the model of perennial patriotic sacrifice
put forth in the introductions and alluded to throughout the text, while conducting a
prosopographical analysis, I discovered that the martyrs presented in the text belong to two
distinct and quite different generations. While the older generation fits the patriotic martyr

183
Ibid, 32.
184
Ibid., 39.

31
model quite well, the younger generation diverges from it enough to call into question the usage
of “martyrdom” itself as a term with which to understand the lives and deaths of those who
participated as students in the Eastern Travel movement.
Two complementary digital techniques were used to investigate the text. First, I
conducted a prosopographical analysis using statistical techniques in which multiple factors were
selected from all fifty biographies and, where possible, converted to quantifiable data. This
allowed me to determine which factors were most commonly co-associated, thereby revealing
blocks of individuals with similar traits. Second, I applied textual analysis software to a corpus
composed of the fifty biographies to reveal the frequency and relative appearance of specific
topics over the range of the text.185 This data was then cross-referenced with my
prosopographical results to generate additional data and conclusions.186

Table 1 Birthdates
Older Generation 1850-1878
Younger Generation 1880-1894

185
The text analysis software I used is called Voyant. Voyant allows for word count, frequency analysis
and comparison, and multiple modes of data export. I intend to use text mining and topic modeling libraries in R to
yield further results as I continue to explore this text.
186
All prosopographical data was entered into and manipulated within an Excel spreadsheet.

32
33
34
35
36
 The most significant finding was the text depicted a distinct set of two generations, each
defined by a common set of characteristics (see Tables 1 and 2). The older generation, composed
of twenty individuals born between 1850 and 1878, were more likely to be degree holders
competent in Chinese with connections to the Cần Vương movement.187 They were far less
likely to have left Indochina, though many travelled in and amongst the three regions comprising
Vietnam (Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina). A far greater proportion of the older generation
came from the central region of Annam (see Table 3), and those who did included some of the
most famous martyrs of the revolutionary cause, such as Tăng Bạt Hổ, Trần Quý Cáp, and
Nguyễn Hàm.188 Of the older generation, 85% were imprisoned and many died in prison or

187
The dividing line between generations was, in part, arbitrarily drawn at the median age of death for all
individuals included in A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs: 36 years old. However. as my data will show, there is good
cause for treating 1879 as a watershed between the two groups. Those born after 1879 grew up almost entirely under
colonial conditions. They came from different areas of the country, and had different life experiences and
revolutionary careers.
188
Tăng Bạt Hổ, Trần Quý Cáp, and Nguyễn Hàm also figure prominently in Phan Bội Châu’s

37
exile, either of illness or by execution (see Tables 5 and 6). Overall, the older generation was
considerably more involved in events on the ground in Vietnam and suffered considerably more
negative consequences as a result. Most of them fit the classic definition of “martyrs.”
The younger generation differed in numerous significant ways from the older. Composed
of 23 individuals born between 1880 and 1894, the younger generation was far more likely to
have attended a modern educational institution, whether civil or military (see Table 8). Nearly
all came from the North or Nghệ Tĩnh regions, and a majority died abroad (see Table 4). In
contrast to the older generation, most died of illness or suicide, while only two were executed
(see Table 6). Overall, the younger generation was far less engaged in actual conflict with the
French and Nguyễn dynasty authorities, but much more widely travelled than the older
generation.
By cross-referencing multiple factors, it is possible to sketch a more complete picture of
the life stories contained in A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs. First, we analyze the generational
split in greater depth. One difference that is immediately noticeable is the average age of death
for members of each generation: 26.7 years of age for the younger group compared to a 46.6
years of age for the older (see Table 2). Simply stated, the older generation were old men when
they died. The younger generation, being, on average, almost twenty years younger, were youth
and young adults.
The individual biographies reveal the kind psychological and cultural differences that this
age gap engendered. For example, consider the types of suicide committed by each group (a
meaningful comparison, for each group included five suicides). Four out of five members of the
older generation committed suicide under conditions of immediate imprisonment and duress.
Two of them did so by undergoing hunger strikes, one by poisoning, and one by biting her
tongue and bleeding to death. In contrast, only one out of five members of the younger
generation committed suicide while in captivity - by poisoning. Three of the others committed
suicide because they were ill, and the last one doing so because his father refused to send money
to him in Japan. Overall, the text presents the suicides of the older generation as powerful moral
stands worthy of emulation. By contrast, the suicides of the younger generation are simply
referred to as “unlucky” and “unfortunate.”189
A comparison of the two generations also reveals a significant geographical shift in
revolutionary participation and activity. First, the older generation included a much higher
proportion (35%) of individuals from the central region of Annam than did the younger
generation (4.3%). Conversely, the younger generation was far more likely (52%) to be from the
North than the older generation (25%). Both generations contained a significant number of
individuals from the two provinces of Nghệ An and Hà Tĩnh (the birthplace of Phan Bội Châu
and later Hồ Chí Minh). Second, as already noted, the older generation almost completely died

Autobiography, and it is not surprising that they would be included in a collection surveying the lives of significant
martyrs. Đặng Thái Thân,from Nghệ An, is another a unsurprising addition who also appears in the Autobiography.
Together, these four men constitute a revolutionary “old guard:” individuals with compelling personal narratives
who could be turned into models for future generations of revolutionaries. It is nevertheless interesting to find that
these four men, while sharing certain traits in common, led considerably different lives and participated in “the
revolution” in substantially different ways.
189
VNNLS, 150. The suicide of Phan Lại Lương is described as particularly pathetic. Having refused to
obtain medical treatment after becoming ill while abroad a ship bound for Guangdong in 1910, Phan Lại Lương
jumped overboard. He was pulled out of the water, but died soon afterwards at the hospital from his injuries and the
damage to his already weakened constitution. Ibid., 144.

38
within the borders of Vietnam (95%), whereas most of the younger died abroad (72%).190 Taken
together, these proportionately significant differences indicate a transition from an older
Annamese-led movement of active domestic resistance to a much younger Tonkinese-dominated
expatriate community of political exiles and agitators.
The older and younger generations underwent two very different kinds of institutional
experiences. The older group largely received a traditional Chinese-language education (80%),
whereas only a few of the younger generation did so (22%). By contrast, the younger generation
was more likely (74%) to attend a modern institution. Such institutions included the two schools
serving the Eastern Travel movement - the Dobun Shoin (Đồng Văn Thư Viện, Common Culture
Academy) and the Shimbu Gakko (Military Preparatory Academy), as well as several institutions
in Guangdong and Beijing, including the famous Baoding Military Academy. Five individuals
attended some form of French educational institution. Overall, thirteen of the younger generation
took part in the Eastern Travel movement, while ten went to school or trained in China.191
Meanwhile, the older generation was conspicuous for having attended a quite different sort of
institution: the colonial prison or work camp. Seventeen of the older group were imprisoned,
fifteen of whom died while in custody. These clear-cut institutional distinctions reinforce the
social and cultural differences between generations and indicate just how much of a sociological
transition had taken place between 1905 and 1915.192

190
In addition, the one older individual who died abroad, Lê Văn Tập, did so in Lông Châu, just across the
border with China. Ibid., 108.
191
Note that these groupings are not mutually exclusive, for six individuals attended institutions in both
Japan and then China.
192
1915 was the year the last member of the older generation (Nguyễn Đức Công) died. Ibid.,126.

39
 A final important distinction between the generations can be found in the very language
used to tell their stories. The differences in textual treatment of the generations begins simply
with the amount of space allocated to each martyr. Whereas the authors wrote a total of 22,366
characters about the older generation, an average of 1,118 characters per individual, they only
wrote 11,315 characters about the younger generation, an average of only 492 characters per
individual, which is less than half (see Table 7, Parts One and Two). The number of characters

40
written about each individual declined over time: on average, the later an individual died, the less
lengthy biography they received . Likewise, the younger an individual was, the less attention
they received (see Tables 11 and 15). Members of the older generation were also more likely to
have poems appended to their biographies (an average of 2.45 poems per individual compared to
1.52 for the younger generation, see Table 19). No doubt this was at least partially the result of
the older generation simply living longer lives, and thus having more biographical information
available. Another explanation may be that the authors simply knew less about the younger
revolutionaries. However, this explanation is not entirely convincing, for both Đặng Đoàn Bằng
and Trần Quốc Duy were members of the younger generation and claimed to be close personal
friends with many of the deceased.
There were significant spatial differences as well. Textually speaking, the Tonkin lost out
to the regions. Though Northern individuals accounted for 40% of the entire collection, they
received only 26% of the collection’s total character count. In contrast, individuals from the
Annam, despite accounting for only 20% of the martyrs in the collection, received 30% of the
text’s total character count. Annam, with only seven biographies, punched well above its weight
in numbers. Meanwhile, individuals from Nghệ Tĩnh took the lion’s share of authorial attention:
on average, they received biographies nearly twice as long as individuals from the North. Thus,
an important distinction can be drawn between Nghệ Tĩnh and Tonkin. This indicates that while
Tonkin was emerging as a new source of revolutionaries, the authors were not nearly as familiar
with them as they were with the more famous activities of the older Annamese revolutionaries
and at least a portion of the Nghệ Tĩnh martyrs.

41
 An analysis of the topics dealt with in each biography reveals even more divergence. In
order of frequency, the top five topics for the entire corpus were: (1) France/Puppet Government,
(2) Martyrdom/Death, (3) Heroic Traits, (4) Party Affairs/Organization, and (5) Foreign
Affairs/Locations. This list overlaps with but does not correspond completely with the most
common topics across all fifty biographies. The most common topics for the older generation
were France/Puppet Government (50%) and Martyrdom/Death (20%).193 In contrast, Illness
(26%), followed by Foreign Affairs/Locations (22%) proved to be the most common topics in the
biographies of the younger generation.194 This distinction is even more significant due to the fact
that, throughout the corpus, the occurrences of words related to France/Puppet Government (259
instances) and Martyrdom/Death (215 instances) far outweighed words related to Illness (71
instances) and Foreign Affairs/Locations (144 instances).195
That illness figures so prominently as a top-ranked topic despite its overall paucity in the
corpus at large reveals that a large subsection of the younger generation both led significantly
different lives and were treated textually in significantly different ways. Indeed, many of the
biographies of the younger generations contained little else besides a description of their foreign
travels and their death from illness. In contrast, the biographies of the older generation included
many topics, and were often much richer in literary and emotional content as well. Two charts
comparing the raw frequency of the term “France” and the term “Illness” over the range of the
corpus further demonstrate this divergence (see Table 13).

193
Only three of the biographies of younger individuals ranked France/Puppet Government first. None
ranked Martyrdom/Death first.
194
Only two biographies of older individuals ranked Foreign Affairs/Locations first. None ranked Illness
first.
195
The high number of characters/words pertaining to France/Puppet Government is noteworthy, and I will
address this issue separately below.

42
43
 The next factor I considered is age at death. While the following results largely reinforce
my previous argument concerning the existence of two distinct generations, they do not take the
date of birth into consideration as a primary metric. Nevertheless, since all of those born before
1879 died at an age of 36 years old or more and all those born after 1879 died at an age of 32
years old or less, this metric implicitly reproduces an identical generational split. The purpose of
using it is to evaluate other metrics without considering generation per se (see Table 14). One of
the results is that this reveals certain patterns of overlap between generations as well as other
important distinctions between martyred individuals.
Several useful alternative metrics also affirm the existence of two generations. First,
comparing the average age of death to birthplace reveals Annam to be the source of considerably
older martyrs (47.4 years old) than both the Tonkin and Nghệ Tĩnh regions (32.8 and 32.9 years
old respectively, see Table 17). The four martyrs from Cochinchina display a slightly higher

44
average age of death: 38.3 years. This confirms the conclusion drawn previously about Annam
having been a primary source of the older generation. It also reveals that despite producing a
number of members of the older generation, Nghệ Tĩnh, was still quite youthful in character.
Judging exclusively from this data, one would predict that Nghệ Tĩnh and Tonkin would be the
source of the next generation of revolutionaries.
Second, an analysis of the average age of death by location of death confirms that those
dying within the country tended to be much older (see Table 18). Interestingly, the average age
of those dying in a different region from where they were born (domestic distant) was quite high
(46.6 years old), while the average age of those dying in their home region (domestic local, 39.3
years old) was closer to the median of 36 years old. I interpret this to be an indication that the
older an individual was, the greater was the probability of them participating in national as
opposed to purely regional resistance activities. By comparison, the average age of those dying
in Japan (23.5 years old), Siam (27.3 years old), and China (28.6 years old) was considerably
younger. This metric confirms the generational argument.
A Complication: Time or Space?
I will now consider several metrics that complicate the concept of two distinct
generations – at least to some degree. First, an analysis of age of death by date of death presents
a muddled picture (see Table 14). The younger generation began dying early (two in 1908),
whereas the older generation continue to live for some time (the last died in 1915). This means
that no clear dividing line can be drawn according to when individuals died. Rather, it seems
that the most useful means for making a social distinction between networks or groups is not a
temporal analysis, but a spatial analysis. In other words, even though the generations overlapped
temporally, this does not necessarily mean that they had significant communication or
intercourse with each other.
Second, while analysis of character count and number of appended poems by age of
death confirms the contention that older individuals received significantly more authorial
attention, it also reveals some interesting outliers within the younger generation. Another chart
detailing character count by date of death also suggests an overall trend which nevertheless
contains several exceptions and outliers (see Table 19). Certain younger individuals did receive
longer biographies and a greater number of poems. This complicates the picture for the younger
generation, and demands an explanation: what was distinctive about the particular members of
the younger generation who received longer biographies?

45
46
47
 In order to answer this question, we will turn to the final metric to be considered: the
manner of death. A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs presents five categories of death: (a) Illness
(19), (b) suicide (9), (c) execution (9), (d) battle (5), and (e) exhaustion (2). For ease of
reference, I have combined illness with exhaustion (natural causes), and combined execution
with battle (execution/battle). Examining this metric by birthplace reveals Tonkin and Nghệ
Tĩnh to be the primary sources of those killed by the French and their allies (executions/battle,
see). Conversely, those who died of natural causes were split almost evenly between regions
(see Table 20). Suicide displayed similar spatial diversification, though none of the four
Cochinchinese committed suicide. Initially, this finding struck me as quite strange, for I had
come to assume that the Annamese were primarily responsible for actually fighting with the
French. In fact, only two of the ten Annamese were executed, while five died of natural causes.
Does this indicate the generational argument is flawed?
In a word, no. Contrasting the manner of death with the average age of death confirms.
The average age of death from illness was 31.1, consistent with earlier findings about the
younger generation. In contrast, the average age of death by execution and suicide was 40.6 and
40.8, respectively (see Table 23). This indicates the generational argument was accurate,
although it points to a greater willingness on the part of the older generation to take their own
lives. The reader will remember that four out of five older suicides were committed while in
prison or in custody. An analysis of the manner of death by location of death further reinforces
the generational argument (see Table 22). Most deaths from illness (74%) took place abroad,
whereas nearly all (94%) deaths resulting from execution or combat happened within Vietnam.
If the older Annamese did not account for more than two of these deaths, then who was dying at
the hands of the enemy?
It turns out the answer is different for executions and deaths in battle (see Table 24). ,
Excluding the problematic Annamese, those executed were most likely to be from the older
generation, and hailed from either Nghệ Tĩnh or Tonkin (78%). However, those who died in
battle, while also split between Nghệ Tĩnh or Tonkin, were almost all younger (80%). This small

48
group of four young men was responsible for skewing the scatter plots and frustrating the
previously outlined “sick student” model. However, the most interesting metric of all concerns
the relative proportion of text dedicated to them.
The four younger martyrs who died in battle, along with the two who were executed,
receive considerably more attention than their peers who died of illness or suicide. The
individuals who suffered “violent deaths” averaged 984 characters per biography, compared to
only 318 for their contemporaries. A quick check of the older generation reveals no such gap:
the average character count for deaths in battle or by execution was 1029, in contrast to 1178
characters per biography for those dying of natural causes or taking their own lives (see Table
21). This indicates that for the younger generation “violent deaths” came at an editorial premium
– such a violent death was almost a sufficient qualification for those six individuals to achieve
parity with their elders. They constitute an important subgroup within the younger generation -
one I will examine in greater detail below. Of course, It is also highly significant that their peers
hardly merited attention at all. Indeed, the next question is why were they included in a
compendium of “martyrs” in the first place?
Conclusion
This statistically informed prosopographical analysis reveals that the individuals included
in A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs can be usefully divided along several important metrics.
Drawing together the results of these metrics, we find the text contains four distinct subgroups.
First came an older generation of Annamese scholar-patriots with considerable name recognition.
This group travelled significantly within the country and nearly all spent time in colonial prisons.
They were classically educated and had many personal connections to the Cần Vương
movement. For the most part, they are described as dedicated yet reserved individuals. The
authors of the text hold them in high regard and use their stories to create archetypes for model
patriots.
The second group consisted of older patriots from Tonkin and Nghệ Tĩnh. This group
enjoyed slightly less fame than the Annam group, but was far more likely to have been captured
and killed or executed by the French. They were classically educated and many had close
connections with Phan Bội Châu. The life stories of this group are the most interesting of the
entire text, and their stories often suggest these individuals were strong-willed loners driven to
revolutionary activity by their conscience and sense of righteous indignation. Where the
Annamese are presented as purposeful and prudent patriotic models, this older generation of
northerners are depicted as ardent revolutionaries - angry men willing to die in defense of their
principles.
The third group is that of the “sick students.” This group was mostly from Tonkin and
Nghệ Tĩnh. They spent considerable time abroad, and many of them were trained at modern
educational or military institutions. Many participated in the Eastern Travel movement, and
several of them served in a junior capacity in Phan Bội Châu’s various political organizations.
The principal authors of the text, Đặng Đoàn Bằng and Trần Quốc Duy, belonged to this third
group. yet strangely, these authors have far less to contribute about this group than they do
about the other groups. For this group, their editorial comments are often wistful, complaining
about wasted talent and a general unluckiness. Most of this group died of illness or suicide while
abroad.
This group of “sick students” presents a challenge to the very concept of martyrdom. In
both the Catholic and Confucian traditions, martyrdom is specifically associated with violent

49
death at the hand of an enemy. The Confucian tradition admits suicide in particular cases,
especially if an individual is under duress or captured and commits suicide strategically to deny
an advantage to the enemy. However, in cases in which suicide was unprovoked, the application
of the term “martyr” seems doubtful. Its use for cases of death by illness stretches the meaning
of the term considerably. This may be a function of translation. For such cases, perhaps it is
more appropriate to employ the phrase “righteous dead,” which lacks the sanguinary
connotations of “martyr” but still maintains the (fictive) notion that the individual died on behalf
of a cause.
The fourth group consists of those members of the younger generation who died a
“violent death.” These individuals received comparatively more of the authors’ attention than
their peers. They were less likely to have travelled abroad. Only three of six participated in the
Eastern Travel movement. However, they represented, the nucleus of a new generation of
radicalized martyrs. It was this group - and not the “sick students” - who could and were
legitimately presented as the inheritors of a violent anti-colonial legacy perpetuated by the
second group.
A final group to consider, mostly for its relative absence throughout the text, are the
Cochinchinese. Despite the fact, noted in the text itself, that two-thirds of participants in the
Eastern Travel movement came from the south, only four southerners are included in this
compilation. Of those who are, two belong to the older generation and two to the younger. Their
biographies are comparatively short compared to those of the other three regions as well.
Overall the treatment of Cochinchinese fails to substantiate the text’s claim to national
representativeness. However, what this absence does point to is a social disconnect between
northern and southern revolutionaries. Either the overweighted proportion of southern Eastern
Travel movement participants simply did not become martyrs to the same degree that the
northerners did (unlikely), or the authors and editors of the text failed to develop many
meaningful relationships with southern activists, and likewise failed to maintain the relationships
they did cultivate.
Having evaluated A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs as an aggregated collection of
biographies and as a corpus of texts, I will now reconsider the overall message and discursive
function of the text. The text purports to present recent significant moments in national history.
The four Introductions claim the text to be both a commemoration of the dead and a political
testament to the perennial potency of Vietnamese patriotic resistance. The text bears these
claims out, but only to a certain extent. The authors provide moving accounts of selected
individuals which certainly qualify as commemorations of the dead. However, they fail to
successfully integrate these accounts into a larger national narrative. Instead, the accounts fall
haphazardly into four groups defined by their common attributes.
The text is regionally fragmented and historiographically discontinuous. Instead of a
national history, we have here several loose historical narrative clusters which correspond to
generationally and regionally defined groups. Some of these biographical clusters are much
closer to the language and intent of the introductions, specifically those of individuals of both
generations from Tonkin and Nghệ Tĩnh who died “violent deaths.” The Tonkinese and Nghệ
Tĩnh fighters exhibit the characteristics of patriotic martyrs alluded to in the introductions:
determination, selflessness, and righteous anger.
In contrast, the “sick students” are conspicuous for their lack of these traits. This large
group, comprising almost half of the individuals contained in A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs,

50
confusingly muddles the message the text hopes to deliver. It is not clear whether many of these
individuals were in fact acting on behalf of the national cause while they trained in educational
and military institutions abroad. The biographies of these individuals fail to adequately explain
their motivations or how their deaths fit into a larger national narrative.
Meanwhile, the Annamese appear as important agents of national communication and
integration. More than those of the Tonkinese, their efforts served to bring the northern region
into dialogue with the south. They were instrumental in developing the first nationwide
organizational infrastructure, and suffered considerably as a result. Meanwhile, in terms of
national integration, it seems their efforts were only partially successful. Cochinchinese barely
appear in this volume, and the younger generation contains only one individual from Annam.
Overall, A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs presents a series of snapshots of a national
movement still in its formative stages. Although its language might differ from its content, it is
decidedly nationalist in intent and scope. The text positions its authors, martyrs, and readers
against the French colonial state, and uses “the loss of the country” as a foil for constituting
exactly that country. Through sacrifice the nation is realized. This utilitarian approach to death
may partly explain the inclusion of so many “sick students.” If every death reinforces the life of
the nation, then the manner, location, and specific circumstances of each death do not matter.
What does matter is that each deceased individual can be claimed on behalf of the nation. To at
least a certain extent, quantity eclipses quality.
At a certain point, the calculus between commemoration of the dead and the creation of a
model for patriotic emulation would shift in favor of the latter. The greater the quantity of
deaths, the more likely this shift was to take place. Whether he intended to or not, Phan Bội
Châu had produced an especially somber and bloody national legacy. By commemorating deaths
on behalf of the nation, no matter their provenance, he set a dangerous precedent. Of course, it
was exactly this precedent that would later be invoked by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
when it encouraged hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of young Vietnamese to go to their
deaths in 33 years of war against France, the United States, Cambodia, and China.

51
 Chapter Three
Security, Legality, and Secrets:
The Capture, Transport, and Incarceration of Phan Bội Châu, June-August, 1925
The morning train from Hangzhou pulled into Shanghai’s North Railway Station at noon
on June 30, 1925. Phan Bội Châu exited the train and caught a tram that would take him to the
center of the International Concession. Once there, Phan Bội Châu intended to mail four
hundred yuan and a letter to Trần Hữu Công in Germany. After their exhausting journey together
through the Chinese interior to Yunnan and back in 1918, Trần Hữu Công had wearied of the
revolutionary cause. After winning a scholarship from the Peking government in 1922, he left to
study medicine in Berlin. Phan Bội Châu dutifully collected the award when it arrived each
month and, after depositing a portion of it into a savings account, sent the balance on to the
young man. Once this was done, Phan Bội Châu planned to board a ship bound for Canton,
where Nguyễn Ai Quốc and the grave of Phạm Hồng Thái awaited him.
Although Phan Bội Châu did not know it, a woman by the name of Zao-Wang-Ze had
followed him on the train from Hangzhou. Her husband, Zao-Zeng-Gning, worked in Shanghai
at the Grand Monde casino, but he was also an informer in the payroll of Brigadier-Detective
Sou-Zah-Seu of the French Police’s Bureau of Political Affairs. The informer Zao-Zeng-Gning
was originally from Hangzhou and still had family living there. Brigadier-Detective Sou-Zah-
Seu was determined to succeed where many French agents had failed, and thus had organized a
sophisticated surveillance operation to keep track of Phan Bội Châu’s movements and
activities.196
This surveillance team consisted of eight individuals. In Hangzhou, Zao-Zeng-Gning’s
wife Zao-Wang-Ze obtained messages from an unnamed “boy” living with Phan Bội Châu. She
then communicated the information she obtained from him to her husband’s two brothers Zao-
Ching-Tching and Zao-Keng-Ling. Zao-Ching-Tching transmitted information to Sergeant Wou
and an agent named Wang, who were both employed at the Shanghai South Railway Station
police, who then passed it on to Zao-Zeng-Gning in the French Concession. A final police agent
named Zao-Ki-Ziang, likely another family member, worked at the Songjiang station between
Hangzhou and Shanghai.197
As a result of the coordinated efforts of this team, by nine o’clock on the morning of June
30, Brigadier-Detective Sou-Zah-Seu and Sergeant J. Giamarchi knew Phan Bội Châu was
coming to Shanghai’s North Railway Station. Accompanied by Brigadier-Detectives Emilianoff
and Dulinatz of the French Police and Inspector Conduit of the International Concession Police
Force, Sou-Zah-Seu and Giamarchi arrived by automobile at the North Railway Station at
approximately 11:30 AM. Sou-Zah Seu and Giamarchi entered the station and waited until the
train from Hangzhou arrived and its passengers had disembarked. As Phan Bội Châu now
moved through the station, Zao-Wang-Ze followed and signaled his identity to the two officers,
who then moved in on their target. Just as Phan Bội Châu was about to get on to a tram,
Giamarchi approached Phan Bội Châu and asked him to follow. The stunned old man attempt to
escape, but Giamarchi motioned him toward the waiting vehicle and pushed him inside. The
ensemble departed immediately for the Jules Ferry, which was waiting at the wharf.198
The Security State Takes Action

196
SPCE 355, Le Sergent Giamarchi à M. le Chef de la Garde, 19 juillet 1925.
197
Ibid.
198
Ibid.

52
 Tensions had been building throughout the entire month of June, following the shooting
of a Chinese demonstrator by Japanese police in Shanghai on May 30, 1925. This incident
triggered protests across Shanghai and Canton. On June 23, 1925 the tiny French concession
located on Shameen Island in Canton came under fire, leading to the death of a French citizen
and an atmosphere thick with fear that more attacks were imminent. The consulate manager,
Madame Leurquin, indicated that the attacks, “oblige us to use all the means of repression at our
disposal.”199 Shameen Island was under siege and cut off from cable service. Acting Governor
General Monguillot later indicated the attack was carried out by Whampoa cadets, led by
Russian officers.200
Several Vietnamese revolutionaries were known to be cadets at Whampoa, including Lê
Hồng Phong, Lê Quang Đạt, and Lê Hồng Sơn (aka Lê Tản Anh, aka Lê Văn Phan). Phan Bội
Châu and the veteran revolutionary operative Nguyễn Hải Thần had arranged for their admission
to Whampoa during his stay in Canton the previous year (August-October 1924).201 Since
returning to Hangzhou in December 1924, Phan Bội Châu continued to correspond with his
contacts in Canton, especially Hồ Tùng Mậu.202 Thanks to their network of spies, the
Indochinese security services of the Sûreté Générale were privy to much of Phan Bội Châu’s
correspondence. As of April 22, 1925, Georges Nadaud, head of the third bureau of the Sûreté
Générale, knew Phan Bội Châu planned to return to Canton for the anniversary of Phạm Hồng
Thái’s June 19, 1924 assassination attempt on Governor General Martial Merlin on Shameen
Island, Canton.203 The Sûreté intelligence services had an even better source, however, namely
the “boy” living with Phan Bội Châu in Hangzhou, who would be able to specify the precise date
Phan Bội Châu would be travelling.204 Nadaud coordinated with Captain Fiori of the French

199
Mdm. Leurquin - “Are you informed yesterday by Admirality of serious incidents in which Mr. Eugene
Pasquier was found died. It is absolutely proved that the fire was opened by Chinese troops and an ensemble of
irrefutable facts establish that this attack on Shameen was premeditated. Machine guns were used, but not cannons.
The Chinese were students. While claiming the English, Portuguese, and French were responsible for this
“buchery,” the civil governor called on the American consul to negotiate. I tell you, repeating myself, that
yesterday’s attacks oblige us to use all the means of repression at our disposal. The French concession is defended
by marines, volunteers, Annamese police, and the guard of the Portuguese consulate general (composed of Russians)
and all valiantly did their duty. The majority of women have evacuated to HK.” - Leurquin. SPCE 355,
Telegramme Officiel, Altair (Leurquin, Hong Kong) to GGI Hanoi (Monguillot), No. 12, 24 juin 1925.
200
Monguillot reported by cable to the Minister of Colonies, André Hesse: “June 28, Shameen completely
isolated. Consul Canton confirmed that responsibility for the serious incident, wherein Eugene Pasquier was found
dead, lies with the Cantonese alone. Attack on Shameen by Whampoa cadets led by Russian officers.” SPCE 355,
GGI à Colonies, 30 juin 1925.
201
Phan Bội Châu. Overturned Chariot, translated by Vinh Sinh and Nicholas Wickenden (Honolulu:
University of Hawai’i Press, 1999), 259.
202
Agent Emile indicates Phan Bội Châu returned to Hangzhou on December 4, 1924. SPCE 355, Agent
Emile, Lettre adressée problablement de Canton, peut-être par Ho Tung Mau, à Phan Bội Châu, à Hangtchéou, 26
décembre 1925 [?].
203
This information was provided by Agent Pinot (aka Lâm Đức Thụ, aka Nguyễn Công Viễn, aka Hoàng
Chấn Đông). SPCE 355, Note Noel No. 154 du 23 Mai 1925 (Annexe No. 1), Traduction d’un rapport de Pinot à
Noel du 22 avril 1925.
204
Yves Le Jariel presents evidence that the traitor who provided the Sûreté with Phan Bội Châu’s travel
information was Lưu Trọng Quế (aka Lưu Yên Đơn, aka Lý Trọng Bá), a Catholic student from Hà Tĩnh who had
participated in the Đông Du movement and who Agent Pinot confirmed was living with Phan Bội Châu in
Hangzhou in June 1925. Based on archival documents, Le Jariel suggests Lưu Yên Đơn was in fact Agent Emile.
Le Jariel argues that Nguyễn Thượng Huyền, who Phan Bội Châu later suspected to be the traitor, and who was
suspected for the rest of his life as a result, was very likely innocent. Le Jariel’s claim that Lưu Trọng Quế was a

53
concession police in Shanghai, linking up the Sûreté’s spy in Hangzhou with Brigadier-Detective
Sou-Zah-Seu and Sergeant J. Giamarchi’s team.205 With their pieces in place, Nadaud and Fiori
had only to wait for Phan Bội Châu to make his move.
On June 24, the French Consul Meyrier at Shanghai anxiously cabled the governor
general’s office in Hanoi to share a rumor obtained by local intelligence: Annamese
revolutionaries in Hangzhou intended to commit attacks against the French concession in
Canton, in order to support the revolutionary movement in Indochina.206 Maurice Monguillot,
recognizing that the French in Canton were isolated, reached out to French Consul Yves du
Courthial in Hong Kong, to alert him to the possibility of another attack.207 The next day, June
25, Etienne Fiori, captain of police for the French concession at Shanghai sent a coded telegram
to Nadaud at Hong Kong suggesting Phan Bội Châu himself, on the orders of the “Revolutionary
Committee of Hangzhou,” planned to “attack all French subjects in Canton and to prepare a
movement against Indochina.”208
Alarmed, Consul Courthial at Hong Kong cabled Louis Paul Jeanbrau, the head of the
Sûreté Générale. Courthial indicated that, while he was unable to decipher the telegram from
Shanghai (namely, Fiori’s telegram from earlier that day), he assumed it pertained to the arrest of
Phan Bội Châu in Shanghai. Courthial therefore asked Jeanbrau to contact Consul Meyrier in
Shanghai with (1) an arrest warrant for Phan Bội Châu, (2) a warning to be careful and identify
any people arrested with Phan Bội Châu, and (3) confirmation that 5,000 piastres would be paid
for the arrest of Phan Bội Châu.209 Jeanbrau responded the next day (June 26), indicating
Courthial’s assumption was unlikely.210 He further advised Courthial to contact Meyrier directly,
should the telegram actually pertain to the arrest of Phan Bội Châu. This strongly suggests that
Jeanbrau was not entirely up to date on Nadaud’s intelligence mission. Monguillot, it appears,
knew even less, because he sent a cable of his own to Shanghai in which he asked if Nadaud had
returned Japan yet.211

spy, like his claim that Nguyễn Thượng Huyền was innocent are both supportable by available evidence. However,
as I indicate below, I believe the source of Phan Bội Châu’s travel information was neither of these individuals. Le
Jariel, Yves. Phan Bội Châu (1867-1940): Le Nationalisme Vietnamien Avant Ho Chi Minh (Paris: L’Harmattan,
2008), 264-269, 308, 313.
205
SPCE 355, Chang Hai (Fiori) à Fransulat [sic] (Hong Kong, Nadaud), 30 juin 1925.
206
SPCE 355, Consul francaise Shanghai Meyrier à GGI Monguillot 24 juin 1925. Meyrier followed up
his report on Phan Bội Châu’s intentions on the morning of June 30, indicating that “Phan Bội Châu came to
Shanghai with two goals: 1) to direct Chinese protests toward the French concession and 2) to spread propaganda
amongst the Annamese officers in the French concession.” The provenance of this information is unclear. Meyrier à
GGI Monguillot 30 juin 1925.
207
Monguillot asked Courthial to contact Canton by “voice” (likely meaning telephone or radio) “as
rapidly as possible.” SPCE 355, Hanoi (Monguillot) à Francsulat Hong Kong (Courthial), 25 juin 1925.
208
SPCE 355, Fiori à Nadaud 25 juin, 1925. Fiori cabled, “Spy indicates Annamese, probably Phan Bội
Châu, [will depart] July 7 with instructions received from revolutionary committee of Hangzhou to commit attacks
on French subjects in Canton to prepare movement against Indochina - redouble surveillance after verifying
information.”
209
Courthial gave the name of the mission as “CUONG DE NADAUD,” suggesting that intelligence
service hoped to capture Prince Cường Để, still based in Japan, after Phan Bội Châu had been successfully brought
in. SPCE 355, Telegramme Officiel, Francsulat (Courthial, Hong Kong) à Gougal, Hanoi, Pour Directeur Sûreté
Generale, No. 84, 25 juin 1925.
210
SPCE 355, Telegramme Officiel, Hanoi (Jeanbrau) à Francsulat Honkong [sic], No. 1263-SG, 26 juin
1925.
211
SPCE 355, Hanoi (Monguillot) à Francsulat Changhai, No. 1888-SG, 26 juin 1925.

54
 On June 29, Consul Meyrier cabled Monguillot with far more precise details concerning
what was taking place in Hangzhou. According to Meyrier, the information concerning Phan Bội
Châu’s plan to attack French in Canton came from a Chinese domestic working for Phan Bội
Châu. The informer had listened to Phan Bội Châu’s conversations and had read his letters
addressed to Canton. Meyrier further indicated that Phan Bội Châu intended to return to Canton
on July 5, passing through Shanghai on his way. Though Nadaud had asked Meyrier to arrest
Phan Bội Châu as he passed through, Nadaud never sent the arrest warrant as he had promised.
Thus, Meyrier asked Monguillot to confirm the arrest by sending a warrant by cable.212
It was too late for that. Phan Bội Châu was not returning to Canton on July 5; he was
leaving the very next day! At 5:20 AM on June 30, Meyrier frantically cabled Monguillot to
relay the news. Not only would Phan Bội Châu be coming to Shanghai that very morning, he
apparently planned to (1) attend the Chinese May 30th protests and attempt to direct them against
the French concession, (2) spread propaganda amongst the Vietnamese guards policing the
French concession. In the light of the ongoing unrest in Shanghai, Meyrier considered Phan Bội
Châu’s presence “a grave danger to the concession.” Thus, he planned to arrest him in secret, put
him on board the Jules Ferry, and put him on the Angkor under a false name on July 4, bound for
Saigon.213
The foregoing telegrams indicate that the top administrative and security officials of
French Indochina had little idea Phan Bội Châu was about to be arrested. Jeanbrau seemed
generally unaware of Nadaud’s mission, or his coordination with Fiori in Shanghai. Monguillot
did not even know where Nadaud was. In any case, Monguillot’s attention was centered on
Canton, where another attack by Whampoa cadets on Shameen Island appeared imminent.214
Neither Nadaud nor Fiori were themselves in Shanghai at the time.215 The decision to arrest
Phan Bội Châu thus fell to Consul Meyrier, who, lacking an arrest warrant, elected to have Phan
Bội Châu “secretly arrested” due to security concerns. Since there was little chance Phan Bội
Châu would enter the French concession, it fell to Sergeant Giamarchi and Brigadier-Detective
Sou-Zah-Seu to stage what looked an awful lot like a kidnapping of a Vietnamese resident of
China in broad daylight within Chinese sovereign territory.
The news of the arrest of Phan Bội Châu in Shanghai spread quickly within the French
Far East cable network. It quickly became apparent that there was no clear plan about what to do
with Phan Bội Châu now that he had been captured. In fact, even as the French security forces

212
Meyrier also indicated that the assassin of Phan Bá Ngọc was now a cadet at Whampoa. This was
correct: Lê Hồng Sơn (whose name Meyrier does not mention) was indeed a cadet at Whampoa since September
1924. SPCE 355, Shanghai (Meyrier) à GGI Hanoi (Monguillot), Personnel et Confidentiel, No. 38, 29 juin 1925.
Meyrier’s cable suggests that the unnamed “boy” may not have been Lưu Trọng Quế, as proposed by Yves Le Jariel.
In a September 3 letter to comrades in Hangzou, Trần Hữu Công pointed to one Ngô Mậu Lâm (吳茂林), as the
prime suspect (see note below). There are other reasons to doubt Lưu Trọng Quế was the informer responsible for
Phan Bội Châu’s arrest. Le Jariel reasonably discounts the possibility that Lâm Đức Thư could have been
considered Phan Bội Châu’s “boy” on account of his age (born 1894, 31 years old in 1925). By this reasoning, Lưu
Trọng Quế is an even less likely candidate (born 1883, 42 years old in 1925). This does not mean, of course, that
Lưu Trọng Quế may not have also been an informer for the French. Le Jariel, Phan Bội Châu, 264, 308.
213
SPCE 355, Telegramme Officiel, Francsulat Shanghai (Meyrier) à GGI Hanoi (Monguillot), No. 39,
5h20, 30 juin 1925.
214
Monguillot’s two-page telegram to the Ministry of Colonies on June 30 addressed events in Canton,
Yunnan, and Langson. Phan Bội Châu’s name does not appear at all. SPCE 355, Telegramme Officiel, Gougal
(Monguillot) à Colonies Paris, No. 889, Réponse à 533, 30 juin 1925.
215
Le Jariel, Phan Bội Châu, 262.

55
congratulated one another, their diplomatic and administrative counterparts pointed out the
distinct dangers presented by the capture. Anxious to avoid public recriminations, Meyrier had
Phan Bội Châu taken directly from the North Railway Station to the waiting warship the Jules
Ferry. There he would wait for the next ship, the Angkor, which was due to depart for Saigon on
July 4. Meanwhile, top officials sought to make the arrest at least appear legal. On June 30,
Meyrier signed a Consular Ordinance citing Articles 16 and 17 of the Law of July 8, 1852, along
with Articles 82 and 83 of the Edict of June 1778.216 The ordinance simply stated that Phan Bội
Châu was arrested and sent to Saigon, and that the Municipal Guard was charged with carrying
out the arrest. This was the best that could be done on such short notice. On July 1, Acting
Governor General Monguillot, hoping to offer a shinier veneer of legality should Phan Bội
Châu’s presence aboard the Jules Ferry become known to the Chinese authorities, offered to
send Meyrier a copy by post of the original 1913 Criminal Commission’s verdict of death in
absentia.217
As Phan Bội Châu lay chained in the Jules Ferry, the magnitude of the arrest began to
dawn on French security officials. On July 3, the Sûreté Chief Louis Paul Jeanbrau and Agent
Georges Nadaud first emphasized the need for secrecy.218 A day later (July 4), Jeanbrau sent
multiple cables to the Sûreté offices in Huế and Saigon requesting agents there “keep this matter
secret as long as possible.”219 Jeanbrau’s caution bordered on paranoia. Concerns about the
diplomatic implications of the arrest seemed to have play a large role. In a letter to the consulate
in Hong Kong, where the Angkor was to dock later that day, Jeanbrau warned of the possibility
the British authorities there might not consent to guard Phan Bội Châu.220 The same day, Martel,
the plenipotentiary minister of France in Peking, signaled his awareness of the matter and
demanded the news of Phan Bội Châu’s capture not be publicly announced “to avoid provoking
the Chinese.”221
It soon became clear that Meyrier’s off-the-cuff plan to send Phan Bội Châu to Saigon
was not going to work.222 Deciding that Saigon, the eventual destination of the Angkor was too
dangerous, on July 4, Jeanbrau had Gilles, the head of the Sûreté in Tonkin, instead dispatch two
Sûreté inspectors and two additional Annamese agents aboard the Amakusa Maru. Their orders
were to take hold of Phan Bội Châu in Hong Kong and return him directly to Hanoi.223 The next
day, July 5, Jeanbrau explained to the French consul in Hong Kong that he preferred Phan Bội
Châu be transferred directly to Hanoi “to avoid probable Cochinchinese indiscretions.”224
Jeanbrau briefly floated the idea of having Phan Bội Châu first tried in Huế, but Sogny, the head

216
SPCE 355, Correspondance relative a son arrestation et documents saisis sur lui, Ordonnance
Consulaire, 30 juin 1925.
217
SPCE 355, Monguillot à Meyrier 1 juillet 1925.
218
Captain Louis Paul Jeanbrau (1879-1946) was the son-in-law of Albert Sarraut. While serving as
governor general of Indochina in 1917, Sarraut appointed Jeanbrau head of the Information Service of the Sûreté
Générale of Indochina. Patrice Morlat, , Les Affaires Politiques de L’Indochine (1895-1923). (Paris: L’Harmattan,
1995), 247.
219
SPCE 355, Dirsurge (Jeanbrau, Hanoi) à Sûreté Hue (Sogny), No. 1323-SG, 4 juillet 1925. Dirsurge
(Jeanbrau, Hanoi) à Sûreté Saigon (Arnoux), No. 1324-SG, 4 juillet 1925.
220
SPCE 355, Hanoi (Jeanbrau) à Francsulat Hongkong, No. 1326/SG, Poste, 4 juillet 1925.
221
SPCE 355, Telegramme Officiel, Pékin (Martel) à Gouverneur General Hanoi, No. 26, 4 juillet 1925.
222
SPCE 355, Hanoi (Jeanbrau) à Francsulat Hongkong, No. 1326/SG, Poste, 4 juillet 1925.
223
SPCE 355, Hanoi à Francsulat Hongkong, No. 1332-SG, 4 juillet 1925. See also Note Confidentielle
No. 3772, Hanoi (Gilles) à M. le Chef du S.C.R. et S.G. (Jeanbrau), 6 juillet 1925.
224
SPCE 355, Gougal (Jeanbrau) à Francsulat Hongkong, No. 1334-SG, 5 juillet 1925.

56
of the Sûreté in Annam, flatly dismissed the idea on July 7.
While security officials worked out a plan, French diplomats and administrators curiously
occupied themselves with determining whether to pay (and if so how) Nadaud and Fiori’s
informer the $5,000 Indochinese piastres promised for the capture of Phan Bội Châu. Meyrier,
Monguillot, and Courthial, the French consul at Hong Kong, discussed this issue over several
cables beginning on June 25, five days before the capture.225 Apparently not content with just
one arrest, Courthial raised the possibility of paying an informant in Canton 10,000 piastres,
presumably for the capture of Lý Thụy (aka Nguyễn Ái Quốc) or possibly Lê Hồng Sơn.
Paradoxically, the Governor General and French consular officials focused on playing
intelligence officers, while French security officials made choices about to do with their famous
prisoner - choices that had real diplomatic and political significance.
Phan Bội Châu, Prisoner of the French
Phan Bội Châu had exited his train from Hangzhou expecting to send a letter along with
funds to his dear friend and former traveling companion Trần Hữu Công (aka Nguyễn Thức
Canh, aka Trần Trọng Khắc), who was studying in Berlin.226 Instead, Phan Bội Châu found
himself brusquely thrust into a coach, which sped off to the Shanghai docks where the Jules
Ferry waited. According to Phan Bội Châu’s later account, the police of the French concession
in Shanghai placed him in irons and hid him in the lowest deck of the ship. The concession
police took an inventory of Phan Bội Châu’s belongings. Phan Bội Châu’s suitcase contained
brochures, letters, enveloppes, receipts, a daily planner covering the first half of 1925, and much
else besides. In his carrying tote were enough clothes for a trip to Canton.227
At 4:00 PM the following day (July 1), Phan Bội Châu was interrogated by three
individuals from the French concession: Pierre Crépin, chief interpreter for the Consulate
Général of France in Shanghai, Barthélémy Tchang, Chinese-language interpreter, and J.
Yvonnou, clerk.228 Phan Bội Châu told them that his name was P’an Che Han (潘是漢), aka
[Phan] Boi Chau (潘佩珠), and he was 59 years of age, originally from [Nghệ An], Indochina.
He stated further that he was a journalist, he lived in Hangzhou in the hotel Si-Ou on Tchai-

225
SPCE 355, Hanoi (Monguillot) à Francsulat Changhai No. 1972, 3 juillet 1925.
226
In his autobiography, Trần Hữu Công expresses his great distress at learning of Phan Bội Châu’s capture
from their mutual friend Hồ Học Lãm. Trần Trọng Khắc. Năm mươi bốn năm hải ngoại [Fifty-four years overseas]
(Saigon: Cơ sở Ấn loát Xây Dựng, 1971), 71. In a letter written to comrades in Hangzhou on September 3, Trần
Hữu Công offers a new possibility for who might have sold out Phan Bội Châu: “I remember that at the moment of
the [Phan] Bá Ngọc affair, an inspecteur from the French police in Shanghai came to Hangzhou and was invited to
lunch by Ngô Mậu Lâm (吳茂林), who knew the Sûreté personnel in Shanghai. Hạng Tôn Vũ (項宗宇) is current
on this fact: Ngô Mậu Lâm had instructed, out of vanity, to give me the policeman's business card and to let me
know that he had invited him to lunch. When I saw this card, I cried to myself: ‘How this individual must be valued
by the French!’ …Ngô incontestably played a villainous role in what happened to Mr. Phan. Here is the proof: Mr.
Phan was arrested before he sent the money [to me]. This proves he was taken upon his descent from the train. If
the person was not following him, they warned the French of his arrival time in Shanghai. Otherwise they never
would have been able to arrest him.” I have not yet found an furthermore information on Ngô Mậu Lâm (most
likely a Chinese individual, given his name). It is quite possible this individual is the “Chinese domestic” mentioned
by Meyrier. SPCE 355, Mission Noel, Envoi 230, Annexe No. 7, 3 septembre 1925.
227
SPCE 355, Correspondance relative a son arrestation et documents saisis sur lui, Garde Municipale
Francaise, Bordereau des pièces adressées à M. le Consul Général de France à Shanghai, 3 juillet 1925.
228
SPCE 355, Correspondance relative a son arrestation et documents saisis sur lui, “L’an mil neuf cent
vingt cinq et le premier Juillet à seize heures.”

57
Kouan Hang (?官巷) street, and he worked at the bureau of the Military Affairs magazine (軍事
雜誌). Phan Bội Châu explained that he had come to Shanghai to send $400 to his friend Tch’en
Tchong-Ko (陳仲克) [aka Trần Trọng Khắc], who was studying medicine in Germany. He had
intended to go to Canton on the invitation of his friend Lin Te-Chou 林德樹 (Lâm Đức Thụ), but
after failing to hear from his friend, he’d given up on this idea. Phan Bội Châu stated that he
knew Prince Cường Để very well. In his suitcase they could find brochures he intended to send
to a friend in Guangxi named Teng Tzeu-Min 鄧子敏 (aka Đặng Tử Mẫn), who is missing a
hand. Phan Bội Châu then signed the deposition form.229 This deposition is remarkable as in it
Phan Bội Châu freely admits to many facts he would later vehemently deny.
This was not the only revealing act Phan Bội Châu took. On the same day (July 1), Phan
Bội Châu wrote a letter addressed to the government of Tonkin.230 In this letter, seven pages
long in translation, Phan Bội Châu admitted to having written revolutionary works, but claimed
to have switched to “peaceful revolution” beginning in 1915. After this point, he claimed to have
supported Franco-Vietnamese collaboration in cooperation with Governor General Albert Sarraut
and his bureau chief Mr. Néron, who came to Hangzhou. Unfortunately, Phan Bội Châu
explains, Mr. Phan Bá Ngọc died and it was no longer possible to engage in the politics of
cooperation.
In a striking passage, Phan Bội Châu then addressed how the “fad of Russian
communism” has quickly taken over the Vietnamese nationalist movement.231 He continued:

Examining the intellectual level of the Vietnamese people and their way of life, I finally
understand that if we use the murderous cannons of such a revolution to bombard
Vietnam, we would only destroy the harmony and the order which reign, without
bringing about the political reform desired. I speak here sincerely and seriously, without
having any idea of deception. The greatest trouble is, that by living abroad, my
supporters and I must necessarily rely on strangers. Among the foreigners on whom we
can rely, there are only the Chinese and Soviet communist parties. By sheltering behind
them to live, we cannot help but associate ourselves with their policies and allow them to
employ us as their avant-garde soldiers.

In an incredibly fatalistic turn, Phan Bội Châu then explained that his shame at having
allowed communism to “poison my county” led him to “return to my country to seek death there,
in order to atone for my faults and deliver myself at the same time from a parasitic life that
always obliges me to lean on others for survival.”232 By seeking death, Phan Bội Châu argued,

229
The copy was certified on July 3 1925. SPCE 355, Correspondance relative a son arrestation et
documents saisis sur lui, “L’an mil neuf cent vingt cinq et le premier Juillet à seize heures.”
230
SPCE 355, Traduction (Traduction des caractères souscrits sur l’enveloppe: “Lettre adressée au
Gouvernement du Tonkin - écrite par Phan Bội Châu, lors du premier jour de son arrestation - le 1er Juillet!!).
231
Phan Bội Châu writes, “For four to five years, the wave of communism in Russia has spread very
quickly. The young ardent Annamites associated themselves with the Chinese students, who allowed themselves to
be swept away by the current of communism in Russia.” Ibid.
232
Phan Bội Châu continued: “As I said earlier, I no longer want to rely on the communists to live. By
ceasing to rely on them, the work of revolution will necessarily stop and will no longer be able to advance; because
all the strength of our party lies entirely in their hands, Now, wanting to deliver me from their support, I will

58
he could demonstrate his sincerity and pay back the debt he owed to his comrades who had died
before him.233 Therefore, he wrote: “By coming to seek death. I find it now. I therefore ask the
French Government to do me a courtesy: carry out [my death] to the last. I will not complain.”234
Phan Bội Châu’s fatalistic attitude lasted for several days, causing Jeanbrau to suggest
special surveillance to ensure against a possible suicide.235 On July 4, Phan Bội Châu was
moved from the Jules Ferry to the Angkor, which would stop at Hong Kong so that Phan Bội
Châu could be handed over to the two agents coming from Tonkin. On this trip, Phan attempted
to pass a note to his assigned guard, Agent Bardy, who promptly turned the note over to the
Sûreté agents when they arrived in Hong Kong on July 7. At Hong Kong, Phan Bội Châu was
transferred to the Altaïr and placed in the custody of Agent François, who had also arrived from
Indochina on July 7 with his partner Christiani and two Vietnamese agents. Phan remained
sequestered aboard the Altaïr for two days, cursing loudly at anyone who attempted to interact
with him. On July 9, Phan Bội Châu was transferred to the Tonkin under the name Nguyen Ngoc
Dong. The Tonkin departed at 2:00 PM, heading for Haiphong. Agents François and Christiani
stayed in the same cabin with Phan Bội Châu. Agent Bardy from Shanghai and Agent Le Roy
from Shameen were also aboard.236
Phan Bội Châu seems to have warmed to Inspector François (aka Trần Tứ Quí), who was
a naturalized French citizen, but ethnically Vietnamese.237 According to Inspector François’s
report, Phan Bội Châu revealed a considerable amount of incriminating information in a single
extended conversation, although in an incoherent, rambling manner. Phan Bội Châu began by
explaining to Inspector François that he had left Nghệ An in 1903 and travelled to Moncay,
whereupon he took a boat to Hong Kong. Upon arriving, he discovered fifty Vietnamese
building “anarchistic devices” to be used in Indochina to create a Republic. One of these bombs
blew up, mutilating his friend Đặng Tử Mẫn’s hand, whereupon everyone split up, going either
to Canton, Shanghai, Japan, England, or America. Phan Bội Châu continued mixing up events
and meetings with individuals, jumping back and forth in time in a narrative that depended more
on his stream of consciousness than on anything resembling an accurate chronology. Finally, the
stream of consciousness led Phan Bội Châu up to his very conversation with Inspector François.
Phan Bội Châu then told François, “I tell you, I have been mistreated. I haven’t eaten for six
days. I await my death. I will be avenged by my friends…”
François, perhaps realizing that his prisoner was badly malnourished and mentally ill,

necessarily have to strive to find the means to provide for my individual life, by ceasing to continue the work of the
revolution. By doing this, my conscience no longer allows me to live quietly. Why that ? Because I have nothing to
pay my debt to my colleagues who died.” Ibid.
233
Phan Bội Châu then described the arc of his revolutionary career: “I was, in Vietnam, the first person
who proclaimed the idea of the revolution. Later, many people joined, and over the past twenty years, thousands of
followers have sacrificed their lives for the sake of their revolutionary faith. If now, regretting my life, I drag on my
old days needlessly, renouncing the labors of the revolution, I will be ashamed before those who died, having
nothing to discharge my debt to them.” Ibid.
234
Ibid.
235
SPCE 355, Dirsurge (Jeanbrau, Hanoi) à Sûreté Saigon, No. 1324-SG, 4 juillet 1925.
236
SPCE 355, L’Inspecteur François de la Sûreté à M. le Commissaire Spécial Chef de Service à
Haiphong, 13 juillet 1925.
237
The documents contained in SPCE 355 offer no indication that Inspector François was in fact ethnically
Vietnamese, but born in Cambodia. François (aka Trần Tứ Quí) became a naturalized French citizen in 1905. His
personnel file clarifies this. See FR ANOM RM 102, Tran Tu Qui Dit François.

59
removed Phan Bội Châu’s manacles and convinced him to eat, drink, and sleep.238 François gave
Phan Bội Châu Cinchona and red wine for his colic. Even after this, Phan Bội Châu continued
rambling, relating additional incriminating information to François. For example, Phan Bội
Châu claimed:

If I am sentenced to death, my friends, namely Cường Để…he’s an officer in Japan…

Nguyễn Thượng Hiền can be found in “An Se.” The third is Tú Đại Từ [Nguyễn Hải
Thân] can be found in Canton…he was the organizer of the Shameen Affair. Sadly, it
failed. The fourth, I forgot his name… Another group of my friends can be found in
Canton, in a society called Công Hóa, under a Russian president. They are ready to
march against the French and massacre them…239

Though Phan Bội Châu had been in a furious mood while held aboard the Altaïr, François
claimed that he calmed down considerably on the Tonkin. Though Phan Bội Châu continued to
curse the French, by the end of the trip he agreed to sign the fans of Agents François and Le Roy.
For Le Roy, he wrote, “French and Vietnamese, are of the same house.” And for François, “Two
family names form the same heart.”240 François ended his report by noting that as the ship sailed
from Hòn Dáu island along the coast to Haiphong, he had pointed a number of economic
improvements to Phan Bội Châu, including the zinc factory at Quảng Yên, a cup workshop
managed by a Vietnamese, and the maritime production facilities of Bạch Thái Bưởi. François
also told Phan Bội Châu that many professional schools now existed in Haiphong for boys and
girls. Phan Bội Châu responded that none of this had existed when he left.241 The Tonkin arrived
in Haiphong on July 11, whereupon Phan was transported to Hanoi by automobile and placed in
the European section of the Central Prison of Hanoi.
Having resolved how to get Phan Bội Châu to Hanoi, the attention of security officials
now turned to legal questions. On July 8, Paul-Louis Arnoux, the head of the Sûreté in Saigon,
shared with Jeanbrau the details of his meeting with an unnamed prosecutor general (probably
Jean Colonna) concerning the proper juridical procedure for dealing with Phan Bội Châu, who he
referred to as “Revolutionary X.”242 Arnoux advised that, in order to ensure the incarceration
was legal, a prosecutor of the republic would need to interrogate Phan Bội Châu within forty-
eight hours of the prisoner’s arrival. In other words, once he entered the jurisdiction of
Indochina, Phan Bội Châu could not legally be held longer than forty-eight hours unless a crime
had been specified. However, depending on the result of the interrogation, the prosecutor of the
republic could produce a new order legitimizing the incarceration. This meant “we would
therefore be obliged to make known the nature of the offense or attributable crime.”243 Arnoux

238
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu, Interrogatoires, 279-282.
239
SPCE 355, L’Inspecteur François de la Sûreté à M. le Commissaire Spécial Chef de Service à
Haiphong, 13 juillet 1925.
240
Ibid.
241
Ibid.
242
8. SPCE 355, SSG à Dirsurge, 8 juillet 1925. We know Toussaint was absent from Hanoi at the time
because of the legal debacle his attaché Albert-François-Raymond Roche would create shortly. For information on
the officials and the positions they occupied at the time, see Annuaire général de l'Indo-Chine française 1925.
(Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrême-Orient, 1925), 29. A Governor General’s Note typed the following day (July 9)
indicates that Toussaint had provided advice, though it is not clear where Toussaint was at the time or why he was
unable to write a new order himself. SPCE 355, Note de GGI, 9 juillet 1925.
243
SPCE 355, SSG à Dirsurge, 8 juillet 1925.

60
relayed the prosecutor general’s recommendation: Phan Bội Châu should be arrested upon
disembarking in Haiphong and the nature of the crime should be specified at that time so that the
prosecutor of the republic would know how to complete the new order.
There were two rather serious problems with the prosecutor general’s advice. First,
Gustave-Frédéric-Charles Toussaint, the prosecutor general attached to the Court of Appeals in
Hanoi, a member of the Protectorate Council of Tonkin, and a legal authority upon whom the
Sûreté could rely, was out of town.244 His immediate subordinate, Louis-Emile Bourayne, was ,
for unknown reasons, also unavailable. Some temporary legal expedient would thus need to be
devised to justify holding Phan Bội Châu in detention. The solution ended being expedient
indeed: Dupuy, the resident-mayor of Hanoi, would be tasked with signing Phan Bội Châu’s
incarceration order using a false name for the new inmate.
The second serious problem was the nature of the charge itself. Surely Phan Bội Châu
was guilty. But of what? Phan Bội Châu certainly opposed the French colonial government, but
he was also technically a subject of the Annamese emperor. Allowing the Nguyễn court to try
Phan Bội Châu for treason might seem an easy solution. However, the Nguyễn dynastic
administration, which the French colonial state continued to tolerate because it retained some
symbolic authority, was, in eyes of the French, a fickle instrument. There was no guarantee a
dynastic court would produce the right verdict in a manner that the swiftly modernizing
Vietnamese intellectual class would accept. Moreover, the Nguyễn courts still relied in some
cases on the outdated Gia Long Emperor’s legal code, which had been largely borrowed from the
Qing legal code. A Nguyễn court might well be viewed internationally as a “kangaroo court”
created to produce a forgone conclusion on the basis of little or no evidence. Phan Bội Châu
had, after all, already been convicted by two different Nguyễn courts for different offenses, both
in absentia. First came Phan Bội Châu’s trial held on May 27, 1908, in Hà Tĩnh under the
authority of the Nguyễn court. Nguyễn officials, including the lieutenant governor of Hà Tĩnh,
found Phan Bội Châu and a number of his close friends guilty of violating Article 204 of the Gia
Long Code for “having consorted with foreigners or hid out on the border in order to cause
trouble.”245 Second came the trial held on February 7, 1910, in Vinh, the capital of Nghệ An
province. At this trial, led by the governor of Nghệ An and Hà Tĩnh, Phan Bội Châu and several
others were found guilty under an 1813 Nguyễn law (Article 224), which prohibited “conspiracy
to commit sedition.”246 In both cases, Phan Bội Châu was sentenced to death in absentia.
Phan Bội Châu’s third guilty sentence came following the trials on September 5, 1913, of
the terrorist bombers Phạm Văn Tráng and Nguyễn Văn Túy. Unlike the previous two trials, this
trial was conducted by a colonial Criminal Commission set up in Hanoi expressly for the purpose
of trying the 84 individuals captured following Phạm Văn Tráng and Nguyễn Văn Túy’s attacks
in April of 1913. In addition to the 84 suspects who were tried and received sentences ranging
from one year imprisonment to death, 13 other individuals, including Phan Bội Châu, were tried,
found guilty, and sentenced to death or life imprisonment in absentia. All were convicted based
on the Criminal Commission’s belief they had participated in planning or carrying out the April
244
On April 8th, 1925, Toussaint had been temporarily appointed Director of the Administration of Justice
in Indochina, replacing M. Habert. It is not clear whether or not Toussaint’s absence was related to this temporary
appointment. “Principaux changements pendant la impression.” Annuaire général de l'Indo-Chine française 1925.
Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrême-Orient, 1925. P. IV-V.
245
Chuong Thâu, Ed. Hồ sơ vụ án Phan Bội Châu (Documents Related to the Trials of Phan Bội Châu)
(Hanoi: Nhà xuất bản Văn hóa - Thông tín, 2002), 25.
246
Ibid, 27.

61
1913 bombings. To prove the various charges, the 1913 Criminal Commission relied on a
staggering number of documents, primarily testimonies given by prisoners on trial themselves.
Testimonies of one suspect were used to incriminate other suspects, and were often used to
advance intelligence operations domestically and abroad. If the French colonial state hoped to
convict Phan Bội Châu yet again in 1925, surely this was most easily accomplished by relying on
the sentence and body of evidence already produced in 1913. Or would it?
A “Governor General’s Note,” dated July 9, 1925, offers a window into what Monguillot
and Robin were thinking, both regarding how to handle Phan Bội Châu’s legal situation and
about how to convey their decision to the Ministry of Colonies.247 This note is significant for
several reasons. First, it indicates that the Ministry of Colonies may not yet have known of the
capture. Monguillot and Robin simply had not conveyed this crucial information to the
metropole. Since the departure of Governor General Martial Merlin in April 1925, Monguillot
and Robin had effectively overseen the administration of French Indochina independent of Paris.
The Cartel of the Left, a parliamentary alliance of radical socialists and republicans, had come
into power in June 1924. The Cartel was now on its second cabinet, the first having fallen in
April 1925 as a result of a fiscal crisis. No new governor general had yet been appointed (this
would come only at the end of July 1925), so Monguillot and Robin would important handle
matters themselves, such as what to do about Phan Bội Châu. Second, the note suggests its
authors had agreed upon a legal strategy through discussions with Toussaint, the absent
prosecutor general. Finally, the note weighs the pros and cons of several “solutions” before
selecting one, providing a rare window into French considerations of Phan Bội Châu’s legal fate.
Of the note’s three potential solutions, “A” would be to void the 1913 sentence of death
in absentia, then retry Phan Bội Châu for the same crimes. Monguillot and Robin worried this
path would lead to a great deal of publicity and internal and external agitation, even if the
proceedings were “conducted behind closed doors.”248 Solution “B” would be to commute a
sentence of death (whether old or new), and send Phan Bội Châu to prison on Poulo Condore.
Monguillot and Robin worried this solution would “appear weak to some and frightening to
others.”249 Either of these solutions, they added, could lead to retaliatory violence from
Annamese revolutionaries abroad. Solution “C,” which the authors preferred, would be to
abandon the 1913 case entirely and instead try Phan Bội Châu only for acts committed since that
time. Monguillot and Robin tempered this proposal by recognizing that it could invite polemic
attacks in the press, “for arresting someone who was convicted in absentia, but not then trying
them [for those same crimes].”250 Ironically, these two disliked solutions proved better guides
for Phan Bội Châu’s trial, and these led to precisely the reactions Monguillot and Robin had
feared.
Monguillot’s direct subordinate, Rene Robin, was a career civil service agent with
considerable experience in intelligence and security work, and since 1920 had served as the

247
SPCE 355, Note de GGI, 9 juillet 1925. This document contains no clear indication of its author, which
was likely either Monguillot or Robin. Monguillot’s final signed telegram appears on July 3rd, 1925. It is rather a
mystery why Monguillot did not participate in inter-government communication after this date. Robin decisively
stepped in on July 16th, 1925 and remained the final authority over the Trial of Phan Bội Châu until the arrival of
Governor General Alexander Varenne on November 24, 1925. For the sake of narrative cohesion, I take the note to
be the result of acting Governor General Monguillot’s conversations with his secretary general, Robin.
248
SPCE 355, Note de GGI, 9 juillet 1925.
249
SPCE 355, Note de GGI, 9 juillet 1925.
250
SPCE 355, Note de GGI, 9 juillet 1925.

62
secretary general of Indochina in the capacity of a Resident Superior (of Tonkin). Robin was a
formidable administrator whose interests in the matter of Phan Bội Châu aligned with those of
Sûreté Chief Jeanbrau. Robin understood that if the dangerous terrorist Phan Bội Châu was to be
prosecuted, it needed to take place quickly, quietly, and in a manner that demonstrated the
juridical efficacy of the French colonial state.
Colonial Clumsiness: Indiscrete Agents and the Roche Incident
Despite the best efforts of Jeanbrau and Robin, the incarceration of Phan Bội Châu was a
difficult matter to keep secret. On July 11, the Tonkin arrived at Haiphong. Inspectors François
and Cristiani, who had closely guarded Phan Bội Châu from Hong Kong, now took him to Hanoi
by automobile. With them was Agent Bardy from Shanghai who, thanks to Nadaud’s extreme
caution, was instructed to continue on from Hong Kong to Hanoi as well as for extra security.
This may well have been a mistake on Nadaud’s part. After depositing Phan Bội Châu at the
central prison in Hanoi (in the section reserved for Europeans), Bardy, Cristiani, and a man
named Versini decided to blow off steam at a restaurant called the Golden Cock. According to a
report filed July 17 by Edgard Gilles, the head of the Sûreté in Tonkin, the agents became drunk
and began boasting to other patrons that they had just brought Phan Bội Châu back from abroad,
and that he was now in the central prison of Hanoi.
As it turns out, drunken agents were the least of Jeanbrau and Robin’s problems.
Seeking to accomplish the twin goals of keeping Phan Bội Châu’s identity secret and meeting the
forty-eight hour deadline identified by Arnoux, on July 12 Robin sent Resident-Mayor of Hanoi
Dupuy to the prison to ensure the prisoner was properly registered under the name “Ngoc,”251
and to notify the prisoner of the standing September 5, 1913 verdict against him, thereby legally
confirming the arrest and incarceration. Dupuy’s efforts apparently did more harm than good,
because on July 13 the prison clerk, perplexed by Dupuy’s registration attempt, brought the
prisoner from his cell to the registration desk and asked his name. Phan Bội Châu announced
that he was known by two names, neither of which was “Ngoc,” as Dupuy had claimed. Phan
then signed using his Chinese pseudonym “Truong Van Duc,” but verbally provided his other
name: “Phan Bội Châu.” This was overheard by the Vietnamese secretary of the prison clerk, a
man named Hung.252 Later that evening, secretary Hung met a Vietnamese Sûreté agent named
Nha at a party and told him, “Phan Bội Châu has been arrested; he is now at the prison.” If we
counting Agent François, Secretary Hung, and Agent Nha, this means at least three Vietnamese
working for the French colonial state were now aware that the Sûreté’s secret prisoner was Phan
Bội Châu.
Agent Nha, Robin later surmised, and must have informed the acting prosecutor general
Albert Roche that the mysterious Vietnamese individual being held at the central prison in Hanoi
under the name of “Ngoc” was none other than Phan Bội Châu. Roche was standing in for
Prosecutor General Toussaint, who was in Saigon on business. It is unclear whether Roche was

251
Inspector Francois’s report indicated that Phan Bội Châu had been transported under the name “Nguyen
Ngoc Dong,” which partially matches the name Dupuy provided: “Ngoc.”
252
According to an account entitled “Tôi ghi tên Trần văn Đức vào sổ (I recorded Trần Văn Đức’s name in
the register)” published in the literary journal Cải Tạo in 1950, the author, who used the name Hy Lạp, had been the
secretary responsible for recording Phan Bội Châu’s false name when he entered Hỏa Lò Central Prison in Hanoi. It
is possible, though unlikely that Hy Lạp is a pseudonym used by this same secretary Hung, as Hy Lạp claims to have
been a convict himself. If so, “Hy Lạp” likely means “the Greek,” which would make sense as Phan Bội Châu was
held in the European section of the prison. This account was republished in Bùi Đình, Vụ Án Phan Bội Châu
(Hanoi: Nhà xuất bản tiếng Việt, 1950), 27.

63
simply uninformed about Robin and Jeanbrau’s plans or had decided to make the most of his
temporary authority by thwarting what he saw as a perversion of justice. In either case, Roche
angered the security officials by sending Agent Nha to extricate Phan Bội Châu from prison on
the morning of July 14. In a rather astonishing breach of security, Agent Nha alone walked Phan
Bội Châu down the street to Roche’s office, arriving at 9:30 AM. Roche then questioned Phan
Bội Châu for forty-five-minutes with the help of a Vietnamese translator, and in the presence of
even more Vietnamese clerks. At 10:15 AM, Roche instructed Agent Nha to walk Phan Bội
Châu back to the Central Prison and re-incarcerate him.
Alarmed by what Phan Bội Châu related to him, Roche spun into action. By 10:30 AM,
Roche sent for the chief warden of Central Prison, Mr. Bareteau, before telephoning Resident-
Mayor Dupuy to demand an explanation for why “a Mr. Ngoc, arrested in Shanghai for a plot
against state security was imprisoned in a central prison by an order delivered by the Resident-
Mayor of Hanoi when there is already here a French Justice and the prison lies under the control
of the Prosecutor of the Republic.” Dupuy attempted to forestall Roche by claiming
arrangements were underway, that the detention was of a political nature, and had in any case
been ordered in agreement with the Prosecutor General. Roche was not to be deterred. At 10:50
AM, Roche telephoned the office of Gilles, the head of the Sûreté in Tonkin, and berated his
secretary, Mr. Levilain, with the same questions Roche had asked Dupuy twenty minutes
previously. This time, Roche upped the ante by asserting that Phan Bội Châu’s detention was
arbitrary and demanding a response by noon, lest he be forced to “pose the question in writing.”
Apparently, the fear of documentation was enough to send Mr. Levilain immediately over to
Sûreté Chief Gilles’s home in person.
Meanwhile, Chief Warden Bareteau, responding immediately to Roche’s summons, found
himself berated by Roche for allowing the irregular incarceration of a political detainee on July
12 by the order of the resident-mayor (Dupuy). Bareteau defended himself by claiming Phan Bội
Châu had been appropriately detained by the orders of the 1913 Criminal Commission, and that
the prosecutor general was first to be informed. Roche pushed back, telling Bareteau that he
should not have received the prisoner without an expressed order from the Prosecutor of the
Republic, who, as a member of the Criminal Commission, had sole authority to deliver such an
order. Roche then informed Bareteau that his actions were irregular, the arrest was arbitrary, and
the detention of Phan Bội Châu was therefore illegal.
Bareteau realized he had no choice but to invoke the authority of the Governor General,
under whose authority, he claimed, both he and the Criminal Commission had acted. Even this
did nothing to dissuade Roche, who now saw the issue as one not only of jurisdiction, but of the
upholding the law of the French Republic by thwarting what he saw as an extralegal rendition of
a political prisoner. Roche demanded Bareteau hand over two documents. These documents
were the order of confidentiality, which had been written up by Dupuy, and the provisional
incarceration request, which had been verified by the Prosecutor General. Finally, Roche
advised Bareteau that it was his responsibility to release Phan Bội Châu without delay.
Bareteau hurried back to the Central Prison, where he discovered to his horror that Roche
had extracted Phan Bội Châu for questioning earlier that morning. Meanwhile, Gilles, the head
of the Sûreté in Tonkin, received his flustered secretary Levilain at his home. Levilain conveyed
Roche’s demand that Gilles respond by noon that day with an explanation for the “arbitrary
detention.” Gilles quickly realized the incredible danger Roche posed not only to the secrecy of
Phan Bội Châu’s incarceration, but also to the very ability of the security services to keep him

64
incarcerated at all.
In his confidential report sent two days later (July 16) to Jeanbrau, head of the Sûreté
General of Indochina, Gilles wrote, “I thought it useless to answer the summons of Mr. Roche,
and reserved for myself [the option of] immediately making the Prosecutor General aware of the
incident which violated his instructions [to keep the affair secret].” However, Gilles did not go
to the office of the Prosecutor General on July 14. Instead, he contacted Dupuy, thereby learning
that Roche had contacted him as well. Dupuy too had clearly been flummoxed by Roche’s
sudden intervention, and conveyed to Gilles, “his great surprise at the intrusion of Mr. Roche and
the tone with which his observations were formulated.” Gilles and Dupuy, representing,
respectively, the security forces and Hanoi’s civic administration, realized they had a meddling
Young Turk on their hands. Left unchecked, Roche might well undermine the authority of the
Governor General and the whole colonial edifice.
Alarmed by this possibility, Gilles resolved to shore up the juridical justification for Phan
Bội Châu’s incarceration. Apparently unable to contact Roche’s superiors, Toussaint and
Bourayne, Gilles may an effort locate the administrative director of the Sûreté General (it is
unclear who Gilles is referring to). Together, they went immediately to meet with the Governor
General’s Chief of Staff (likely Le Fol) to “discover whether the order designating a new
president of the Criminal Commission had yet been signed, which would have allowed us to
replace the existing detention order with one bearing the signature of the new president.”
Gilles’s plan was straightforward: if a new Criminal Commission could be quickly created, then
the newly appointed president of that Criminal Commission could sign a fresh, unquestionably
legal order, thereby replacing Dupuy’s order and ending the threat from Roche for good.
The next morning, at 8:00 AM on July 15, Chief Warden Bareteau showed up at Gilles’s
office to relate the story of his encounter with Roche the previous day. In no uncertain terms,
Bareteau complained to Gilles about, “the [terrible] manner in which [he] had been treated by
Mr. Roche.” Not only had the upstart Roche reproached Bareteau, he had done so in the
presence of his Indian clerk, who Roche had allowed to attend the entire interview. For Gilles,
Roche’s shameful treatment of Bareteau was the final straw. Gilles immediately went to see
Prosecutor General Bourayne, who returned to Hanoi that afternoon, and explained to him the
legal mess Bourayne’s subordinate Roche had caused in his absence. Horrified, Bourayne called
Roche into his office and dressed him down in front of Gilles. Bourayne demanded Roche return
the copy of the incarceration order he had taken from Chief Warden Bareteau. By the end of the
day, a new Criminal Commission would be authorized by the office of the governer general,
thereby legalizing Phan Bội Châu’s detention. Roche’s impromptu uprising was over.
The “Roche Incident,” as Gilles referred to it, reveals just how unprepared the French
colonial security services were to handle the aftermath of Phan Bội Châu’s capture. No one had
bothered to sort out the seemingly simple decision about where Phan Bội Châu could be held, so
the heads of the Sûreté ended up playing a game of hot potato while their prisoner was enroute to
Indochina. Arnoux feared Phan Bội Châu’s presence in Saigon would upset anti-colonial
elements there. Sogny, surely uninterested in acting as referee between the Governor General,
the Vietnamese court, and Phan Bội Châu’s supporters, flatly refused to allow Phan Bội Châu to
pass through Huế. Thus it came to be that Phan Bội Châu was placed on a ship bound for
Haiphong, brought in the middle of the night by hired automobile to Hanoi, and held under a
secret identity in the European section of the Central Prison.
Gilles, the head of the Sûreté Tonkin, who played almost no role in the correspondence

65
concerning the arrest and transport of Phan Bội Châu until he was unexpectedly dragged into the
affair by Roche, had made little effort to prevent security breaches. This is clearly demonstrated
by the sequence of events that took place after Phan Bội Châu’s incarceration. The indiscretions
of agents Cristiani, Versini, and Bardy on the night of July 11, in which the identity and details
concerning the capture of Phan Bội Châu were drunkenly revealed to patrons of the Golden
Cock, could perhaps be excused as an aberrant breach of secrecy. More likely, the agents were
never given specific instructions that the identity of their prisoner needed to remain secret for
security reasons. Gilles’s report on their misadventure would almost certainly have noted if the
three men had violated orders, yet it does not.253
The Sûreté’s poor planning is further demonstrated by the events precipitating the Roche
Incident. Though Gilles and Dupuy had the foresight to place Phan Bội Châu in the European
section, they failed to consider the presence of Vietnamese staff there, such as Secretary Hung.
Hung, whether under orders to keep quiet or not, saw fit to share the information about Phan Bội
Châu’s incarceration with Agent Nha. It is not difficult to read between the lines of Gilles’s
reports on the matter to figure out that Agent Nha was likely the person who informed Roche,
then moonlighting as prosecutor of the republic, that a travesty of justice was taking place. The
most astonishing evidence of Sûreté incompetence lies in the fact that Agent Nha, under Roche’s
orders, was able to, extract Phan Bội Châu by himself, and walk him two blocks to the Palace of
Justice. Had strict secrecy and control procedures been in place, this surely could not have
happened. Even more embarrassing for Gilles was the fact that Nha was one of his own Sûreté
agents, a fact he admitted in passing. The confidential reports Gilles sent to Jeanbrau on July 16
and 17 reveal a colonial security administrator scrambling to keep up with events and desperate
to retain a semblance of his own authority.
However, Roche’s mini-revolt in the name of justice had done more than damage Gilles’s
reputation. By directing Agent Nha to extract Phan Bội Châu from prison and march him to the
Palace of Justice, Roche had compromised the secrecy and security of the colonial state. As
Gilles put it, “this incident is especially regrettable, in my opinion, because it has considerably
reduced our efforts and plans to keep the arrest as secret as possible.” Soon, Gilles feared, the
native elites would know Phan Bội Châu was being held prisoner.254 Gilles did not feel the need
to explain the potential consequences of Phan Bội Châu’s arrest and detention becoming
common knowledge, and thus becoming a potential rallying point for disaffected Vietnamese in
Hanoi and beyond. The state needed to take action. Bringing his report to Jeanbrau to a close,
Gilles made it clear what he thought the state needed to do and why: “It is very necessary for the
Criminal Commission to meet and render its definitive sentence with the briefest possible delay.
Under the present circumstances, any interruption, any delay will only make the personality of
Phan Bội Châu become the cause of unnecessary and dangerous agitation.” Were the news of
Phan Bội Châu’s detention to get out - and this was less a question of “if” than “when” - a new
Criminal Commission would be needed to legitimize French juridical authority. It was not long

253
The report, pertaining to events that took place on the night of July 11, was not written until July 17, the
day after Gilles delivered his report on the Roche Incident. This suggests Gilles was eager to produce scapegoats,
should his poor planning and questionable decision-making fall under scrutiny. SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle
3991, 17 juillet 1925. Head of Sûreté Tonkin (Gilles) to RST, DirAffPol, and Dirsurge.
254
Gilles writes, “I am, under these conditions, obliged to note the consequences of this untimely
intervention from the point of view of keeping the secret character of this affair from the native circles of the city.”
SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle 3983, 16 juillet 1925. Head of Sûreté Tonkin (Gilles) to RST, DirAffPol, and
Dirsurge.

66
in coming.
The Criminal Commission of 1925
At this point, Rene Robin, the resident superior of Tonkin and secretary general of the
government general of Indochina, stepped in to decisively take charge. On July 16, Robin cabled
the Ministry of Colonies, finally relaying the news of Phan Bội Châu’s capture and detention.
Robin went on to state that Phan Bội Châu had been imprisoned in Hanoi since 13 of July, and
now awaited, “his next appearance before the new criminal commission.”255 As far as charges
went, Robin stated only that Phan Bội Châu had been arrested for “the intention of orienting
Chinese xenophobia against our concession [in Shanghai] and spreading revolutionary
propaganda amongst the Annamese guards in the concession’s police force.”256 The minister of
colonies might be forgiven for assuming that the new Criminal Commission would investigate
and charge Phan Bội Châu for these recent activities. However. Robin almost certainly knew
that little proof existed for these charges, and that the new Criminal Commission would perforce
reprise the work of the previous 1913 Criminal Commission. Robin finished his short telegram
by indicating that he would keep the Ministry of Colonies apprised by cable of any new
developments and, if applicable, any news regarding indigenous public opinion concerning the
arrest, “which has not yet been revealed within the colony.”257 The tone of Robin’s telegram was
clear: he was not going to ask the Ministry of Colonies for permission to do anything.
Robin indeed seems to have been pulling wool over the eyes of the Ministry of Colonies.
Immediately after Robin sent his telegram to Paris, Jeanbrau cabled Sogny in Huế. In his “very
urgent,” coded telegram, Jeanbrau provided Sogny with the full text of Robin’s telegram to Paris.
Jeanbrau followed this with two rather telling sentences:

As a result of successive blunders due to the somewhat inopportune zeal of Mr Roche,

who substituted by visiting the prison in the absence of the prosecutor of the republic, the
incarceration of PBC is now known in Hanoi. Given the procedure for creating a
Criminal Commission, however, there does not seem to be much disadvantage in
Indochina knowing of the arrest.258

Jeanbrau’s cable reveals three important things. First, Robin and Jeanbrau were working
together closely, and Sogny was clearly considered part of the “in-crowd.” The French
Indochinese administration was effectively being run by “les grand commis.”259 Second,
Jeanbrau blamed Roche for revealing Phan Bội Châu’s arrest and detention. This directly
contradicted Robin’s claim to the Ministry of Colonies that the news of the arrest had not yet
leaked. The Sûreté’s leaders had no interest in sharing such pertinent information with Paris.
Third, Jeanbrau, and probably Robin as well, saw the new Criminal Commission as a means of
neutralizing any public relations problems that might come from further leaks about the arrest.
If a new Criminal Commission had the power to forestall unrest, its assistance could not

255
SPCE 355, Télégramme Officiel, No. 971, Gougal à Colonies, 16 juillet 1925.
256
SPCE 355, Télégramme Officiel, No. 971, Gougal à Colonies, 16 juillet 1925.
257
SPCE 355, Télégramme Officiel, No. 971, Gougal à Colonies, 16 juillet 1925.
258
SPCE 355, Télégramme Officiel, No. 1422, Dirsurge à Sûreté Hue, 16 juillet 1925.
259
This term, meaning “the great clerks” is used by Patrice Morlat to describe the men in charge of the
Indochinese security state. Rene Robin, who later became governor general of Indochina himself, plays a large role
in Morlat’s book. Patrice Morlat, Les affaires politiques de l’Indochine (1895-1923) - Les grand commis: du
savoir au pouvoir (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1995).

67
come soon enough, because the news of Phan Bội Châu’s arrest, transportation, and incarceration
in the Central Prison of Hanoi had indeed begun to spread. Interestingly, the big news break
came not in Hanoi, but from the port city of Haiphong. On July 16, the same day Gilles
submitted his first report and Robin sent his telegram, the Courrier d’Haiphong carried an article
announcing a “Sensational Arrest!” This article was followed by several reports sent to Gilles by
Special Commissar Xavier Leandri of the Sûreté Tonkin, based in Haiphong. On the basis of
information provided to him by “trustworthy informers,” Leandri offers several clues as to how
the press in Haiphong beat Hanoi to the punch. First, rumors began circulating among the
Chinese community in Haiphong to the effect that an Annamese man disguised as a Chinese man
had been brought by the Sûreté aboard the “Tonkin” on the night of July 11.260 Second, one of
two drivers hired by the Sûreté to convey their agents and prisoner from Haiphong to Hanoi,
upon reflection, realized that the prisoner in their car was an Annamese revolutionary who had
lived in China for many years. Third, a man named Mai Huu Van claimed to have known about
the arrest of Phan Bội Châu prior to the publication of this news in the Courrier d’Haiphong.
Leandri’s reports also describe the reaction of several Vietnamese and Chinese residents of
Haiphong to the July 16 article.
Gilles would not have found these reports encouraging. One of Leandri’s informers
reported a conversation he had with a tailor on Paul Bert Street in Haiphong in which the tailor
had asked the informer to read to him the article in the Courrier d’Haiphong. Upon learning the
news of Phan Bội Châu’s capture, the tailor exclaimed, “It’s the end for him! He will be killed!
But he will not have died without first having accomplished some things in China.” When the
informer read the final sentence of the article indicating that “the arrest would be to the
satisfaction of the majority of Annamese,” the tailor simply retorted, “That’s a joke.” Others
praised Phan Bội Châu as a “great hero,” and despaired of his certain death. The streetside
reactions of a public schoolteacher and a bank secretary were even more sobering:

He may be shot, but not publicly, no doubt, because, you know, the punishment executed
in public, such a man will not fail to provoke a painful sensation in our compatriots. But
in any case, we will not let our old man go free. His death is certain. To hope that it will
not be tortured before killing by any means whatsoever. Its end is a dungeon for our
country. The more he is tortured, the more he will die a martyr. Let's wait and see the
decision of the meeting that will decide on him...

Such reports underscored the problems that Phan Bội Châu’s arrest and detention posed
for the French colonial administration. Not only were the security forces clearly unable to keep
the matter secret, the French administration now faced an uphill battle to convince the
Indochinese public that Phan Bội Châu was indeed a dangerous criminal.
Assembling an Archive: The Inquiries of President Bride
The man chosen to lead the new Criminal Commission was another career civil servant
who had previously worked in the Sûreté’s Directorate of Political Affairs: Jules-Joseph Bride.261
To build the Criminal Commission’s case against Phan Bội Châu, Bride soon began to marshal
the archival resources at the Sûreté’s disposal. Beginning on July 22, Bride initiated a search for

260
SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle No. 155-P, juillet 18 1925, Special Commissar Leandri to Head of
Sûreté Tonkin Gilles. Contains reports from several unnamed informers.
261
Bride had previously been serving as an administrator for the office of the resident superior of Tonkin.

68
and collection of documents that lasted well into the trial period itself. Bride’s first letter is to
the governor general requesting 64 of a total of 297 documents related to the Hoang Trong Mau
affair of 1916.262 Marked “very urgent,” the missive offers a vivid picture of the eventual scope
and refinement of Bride’s archival effort. Rather than request the entire dossier, Bride took care
to enumerate and list individual files he needed. Bride’s language offers a glimpse of his
officious personality: “As this file is to be submitted to the discussions of the Criminal
Commission, to be communicated to the defense, it is indispensable to complete it.”263 With the
attitude of a punctilious librarian, Bride intended to track down exactly what he needed to prove
beyond any doubt that Phan Bội Châu was guilty.
A week into the project, Bride seemed quite taken with his new powers of documentary
request. Writing to Monguillot on July 29, who was concurrently serving as acting governor
general and as the resident superior of Tonkin, Bride pointedly emphasized that the archives of
the 1913 Criminal Commission, which he had sent to Sûreté, were incomplete.264 This, Bride
made quite clear, simply would not do:

After having first conducted the job of reclassifying the documents, I realized that many
pieces of form, information and information have been removed since 1914. The absence
of slips and inventories of certain files does not allow to give details of documents which
have been removed but annotations leave no doubt on this point. As a result of the
research carried out, the information files of PBC and CD were removed from the
archives and handed over to the Secretary General in 1914. I will be very grateful to you
for making the two files available to me.265

Apparently unafraid of offending anyone, Bride soon had the heads of each Sûreté branch
and bureau scrambling to fulfill his document requests. Gilles, Nadaud, and especially Néron
went to work throughout August 1925 tracking down letters, testimonies, photos, subscription
lists, original writings, translations, and various other documentary proofs, all to “satisfy the
demands of the President of the Criminal Commission.”266 Bride’s punctilious pursuit of a
perfectly ordered archive seemed to be infectious. On July 30, Jean-Félix Krautheimer, the
acting resident superior of Tonkin, warned the office of the governor general:

The President of the Criminal Commission has indicated the dossiers you sent are
incomplete…It is of paramount importance that all of the aforementioned dossiers
concerning the affairs of Phan Bội Châu and his collaborators be delivered fully intact
and in their originals…Please kindly provide useful instructions to this effect so that the
Criminal Commission can continue its work with all the documents necessary to bring
forth the truth. I ask furthermore that the translations of documents written in [Chinese]
262
SPCE 355, L’Inspecteur des Affairs politiques et administratives, President de la Commission
Criminelle à le Gouverneur General de l’Indochine, 22 juillet 1925.
263
SPCE 355, L’Inspecteur des Affairs politiques et administratives, President de la Commission
Criminelle à le Gouverneur General de l’Indochine, 22 juillet 1925.
264
SPCE 355, L’Inspecteur des Affairs politiques et administratives, President de la Commission
Criminelle à Monsieur le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, 29 juillet 1925.
265
SPCE 355, L’Inspecteur des Affairs politiques et administratives, President de la Commission
Criminelle à Monsieur le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, 29 juillet 1925.
266
This phrase appears in many communications. An example can be found in SPCE 355, Résident
Supérieur au Tonkin à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine, 13 août 1925.

69
 characters or quoc-ngu…be attached to avoid lengthy work which would unhelpfully
delay the process of justice.267

Krautheimer’s letter illustrates the diligence and determination guiding Bride and those
assisting him. It also indicates two of the most serious challenges they faced: bureaucratic
inefficiency and an extremely compressed timetable. The sheer number of documents required
meant hours of searching for, collating, notating, copying, transcribing, translating, and
transporting files. Misplaced or damaged files only further complicated this effort, as did the
requirement that all files appear in French translation as well as their originals. It was a tall
order.
Despite these challenges, Bride valiantly pressed ahead. On August 12, a busy day, Bride
simultaneously reached out to the Resident Superior of Tonkin for files pertaining to the events
of 1908,268 to the French Consul at Longzhou for any documents related to Phan Bội Châu from
1906 through 1913,269 and finally to Saigon for the dossiers on Gilbert Chieu and a number of
other individuals.270 By August 14, Bride was able to report that his inventory of the 1913
Criminal Commission’s archives, containing 5333 files, was complete. In the same message,
however, Bride made it quite clear that he refused to be limited in his purview to what the
previous commission’s archive contained.271 By the end of the day, Bride had sent out at least
seven additional requests.272
Unfortunately, the demands of the President of the Criminal Commission were often

267
SPCE 355, Résident Supérieur au Tonkin à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine, 30 juillet
1925.
268
The list of dossiers in this request further illustrates Bride’s zealous collection efforts: “The Attack on
Dai Loc,” “The Revolt of Thanh Binh,” “The Siege of Tam Ky District,” “The Troubles in Quang Ngai and Thua
Thien,” “The Troubles in Binh Dinh” and “The Attack on the Citadel [of Binh Dinh],” and “Seditious
Manifestations in Phu Yen, Nha Trang, Quang Tri, and Quang Binh.” SPCE 355, L’Inspecteur des Affairs politiques
et administratives, President de la Commission Criminelle à Monsieur le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, No. 37, 12
août 1925.
269
For this request, which Bride asked the Resident Superior of Tonkin to facilitate, Bride specified, “To
facilitate the task of the Criminal Commission, I would be very grateful to you to ask our French Consul in Long-
Tcheou to send me all documents to establish the presence of PBC in Long-Tcheou from 1906 to 1913: dates of his
stays, the houses he lived in, all the information about his guests, the relations he had with the Chinese reformists,
and anything else that might surround this rebel such as stamps, leaflets, bank notes, photographs, patents, etc ... /.”
SPCE 355, L’Inspecteur des Affairs politiques et administratives, President de la Commission Criminelle à
Monsieur le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, No. 36, 12 août 1925.
270
This request was facilitated by the Resident Superior of Tonkin, who advised the Governor of Saigon
that Bride sought records for Gilbert Chieu’s 1907-1908 Tribunal in My Tho, as well as individual dossiers for Phan
Bội Châu, Cuong De, [Nguyen] Tan Thuat, Hoang Trong Mau, Nguyen Thuong Hien, Nguyen Cam Giang, and
Dang Huu Bang. SPCE 354 BIS, Résident Supérieur à Goucoch Saigon, No. 30, 17h35, 12 août 1925.
271
Bride thereafter identified the individual dossiers he required from the Information Service of the
Gougal: “Cuong De, Phan Bội Châu, Gnuyen Hao Vinh, Bui Chi Nhuan, Nguyen Ngoc (aka Tran Van Ngo), Dinh
Huu Thuat (aka Dang Huu Thanh), Nguyen Quang Dien, Nguyen Thanh Hien, Nguyen Van Truyen, Nguyen
Thuong Hien, [Nguyen] Tan Thuat, Hoang Trong Mau, Nguyen Cam Giang, Dang Huu Bang, Nguyen Quynh Chi
(aka Hai Thac), [and] Gilbert Chieu.” SPCE 355, L’Inspecteur des Affairs politiques et administratives, President
de la Commission Criminelle à Monsieur le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, No. 42, 14 août 1925.
272
The dossier does not include copies of all seven requests, but Bride’s sequential numbering system and
repeated references to earlier requests allow a basic reconstruction. On August 14, Bride sent out requests No. 42
through No. 49. SPCE 355, L’Inspecteur des Affairs politiques et administratives, President de la Commission
Criminelle à Monsieur le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, No. 49, 14 août 1925.

70
difficult to satisfy. A letter sent on August 18 from Bride to Monguillot could not have pleased
its recipient:

You have kindly sent me, thanks to the head of the Sûreté, the documents which are the
subject of request I680-SG of August 14, 1925. These documents are, for the most part,
copies or extracts of letters, but they are not certified (identical) copies. You will certainly
agree with me that they can not be added as they are on the Criminal Commission's file
and that their authenticity must be affirmed by the signature of the Director of Political
Affairs and General Security. It seems that this official could not delegate his signature
for that purpose. In the event that this formality does not appear to him as necessary for
him to do, I should be grateful if you would ask the opinion of the Director of the Judicial
Administration. It is important to prevent the work of the Criminal Commission from
being vitiated by vices that could lead to their invalidity.273

While this letter is an amusing indication of Bride’s overzealousness, it also demonstrates

the intense seriousness with which the leaders of the French Indochinese security state had
committed themselves to preparing for Phan Bội Châu’s trial.
However, this seriousness did have its limits. When Bride’s obsessive drive to marshal
the resources of the French Indochinese security state began to infringe on the state’s ability to
safeguard its day-to-day operations, Bride’s colleagues finally stood up to him. Néron, who had
worked harder than any other Sûreté official to fulfill Bride’s documentary requests, left a
handwritten note on an August 3 transmission indicating, “In the absence of any indication of the
nature of documents pertaining to PBC…the Central Information Service will extract from
individual dossiers only the pieces which would interest the Criminal Commission.”274 Bride,
furious that anyone might try to arbitrarily reduce the scope of his requests, retorted:

Allow me to point out that Mr. Néron, whom I recognize for his professional valor and
competence with regard to all questions within his purview, may very well consider to be
uninteresting documents which are, on the contrary, of a great importance that the
President of the Criminal Commission is alone in a position to appreciate.275

Néron knew that two could play at this game. In an undated note to Robin, Néron
complained that while “the Central Information Service and the Sûreté General will send to this
Commission everything that might be useful for the administration of Justice,” Bride’s never-
ending demands were nevertheless taxing the security state and causing “huge
inconveniences.”276 Néron pointed out that Bride was requesting files that could not possibly
interest the Criminal Commission and that, if circulated, could present a real danger to “certain
individuals under surveillance” - undoubtedly a reference to Vietnamese informers working for

273
SPCE 355, L’Inspecteur des Affairs politiques et administratives, President de la Commission
Criminelle à Monsieur le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, 18 août 1925.
274
SPCE 355, L’Inspecteur des Affairs politiques et administratives, President de la Commission
Criminelle à Monsieur le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, 14 août 1925.
275
SPCE 355, L’Inspecteur des Affairs politiques et administratives, President de la Commission
Criminelle à Monsieur le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, 14 août 1925.
276
SPCE 355, Service Central de Renseignements et de Sûreté Generale Note pour Monsieur le Secretaire
General, undated.

71
the Sûreté. Néron therefore demanded that Robin curtail Bride’s document requests for dossiers
examined during the 1913 Criminal Commission. If, during the trial of Phan Bội Châu, Bride
began delving into files dated after 1914, Néron was concerned the safety of ongoing intelligence
and security operations might well be compromised.
Rene Robin was beginning to get anxious. On one hand, he was reading Néron’s
concerns about Bride’s overzealousness compromising state security. On the other, Robin was
all too aware that the window of opportunity to successfully prosecute Phan Bội Châu quickly
closing. On August 28, Robin himself intervened to ensure Néron’s request to limit the Criminal
Commission’s purview was in fact carried out. In this letter, Robin’s parallels that of Néron’s
undated note, demonstrating a similar annoyance with Bride’s administrative overreach:

It would be improper to submit for examination reports and other documents from the
files of the PBC and his accomplices produced after 1913. In addition, releasing certain
documents from the archives of SCR & SG would be a reckless act that could have
serious consequences.277

Robin’s letter accepted the logic of Néron’s request, thereby officially limiting the 1925
Criminal Commission to documents related to the 1913 Criminal Commission. In practice, the
1925 Criminal Commission could look at anything prior to 1913, but hardly anything after that
date. Néron and Robin were worried Bride’s legalistic officiousness would threaten the day-to-
day functioning of the Sûreté’s intelligence gathering and security enforcement operations. The
imperatives of running the security state thus placed a hard limit on the ability of the state to
pursue a legal case, even against its number one enemy.
Despite the curbs placed on his requests, by the start of the trial on August 29, Bride’s
efforts resulted in a truly massive collection of documents. As of August 22, shortly before the
trial began, Bride had sent a total of 57 official letters of request, each detailing the need for
multiple dossiers, files, and telegrams.278 In addition to the 5,333 files associated with the
Criminal Commission of 1913, Bride had called up individual dossiers on hundreds of
individuals and events, the originals and translations of all of Phan Bội Châu’s writings then
available, and numerous diplomatic telegrams sent by French consular officials from posts
throughout East Asia.279 Bride continued to request documents throughout the trial. By the time
the trial ended on November 23, Bride had sent out over 125 letters of request, bringing in 5476
files related to the 1913 Criminal Commission, 1898 files related to the 1915-1916 Council of
War, and an additional 6201 files unique to the 1925 Criminal Commission, for a staggering total
of 13,575 files arranged into 53 distinct dossiers.280
For Bride, who had not been a member of the 1913 Criminal Commission, making use of
this documentary haul must have been a monumental undertaking. Bride’s fellow commission

277
SPCE 355, Robin à Commandeur de la Légion d’Honneur, Monsieur le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin,
28 août 1925.
278
SPCE 355, Le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine, No.
358 CCB, 24 août 1925.
279
For Bride’s consular document requests, see SPCE 355, L’Inspecteur des Affairs politiques et
administratives, President de la Commission Criminelle à Monsieur le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, No. 54, 55, 22
août 1925.
280
SPCE 355, RST, Commission Crimnelle de 1925, Bordereau des pièces adressées le 26 novembre 1925
à M. le Gouverneur General de l’Indochine, Dossier de Phan Bội Châu.

72
members included Dupuy, the resident-mayor of Hanoi, Bellier, a captain of the colonial infantry,
and Boyer, a prosecutor of the republic for the Court of First Instance in Hanoi. Arnoux served
as the commission’s clerk and Gombaud Saintonge as its interpreter. Saintonge was the only
individual who had previously served the 1913 Criminal Commission. Just how much these
individuals assisted Bride in preparing for the trial is not clear.281 However, regardless of how
much time would be needed to properly review and prepare such a large amount of documentary
evidence, by the end of August 1925, Bride knew that the clock was ticking. Events outside the
courtroom were looking increasingly problematic. Each passing day tipped the scales farther
from the need for completeness and closer to an expedient start for the trial.
The View from Outside the Courtroom
Before the month of August even began, three important shifts started to take place
relative to Indochina’s political climate. First, the news of Phan Bội Châu’s arrest spread
domestically, awakening a new political consciousness amongst the urban Vietnamese
population. Second, the same news quickly spread internationally, making the French colonial
state the unwelcome target of critical foreign journalists and revolutionary Vietnamese groups
based abroad. Third, and perhaps most worrisome, the appointment of the radical socialist
politician Alexander Varenne as governor general of Indochina threw the future of the security
state into question. The combination of these three shifts hastened the need to prosecute Phan
Bội Châu in as expedient (but also juridically defensible) manner as possible.
The news of the arrest and detention of Phan Bội Châu spread through the urban spaces
of Indochina at an incredible pace. An account by a Mr. “N.V.H.” entitled “Tôi vào tận trong
Hỏa Lò Hà Nội dò xem Trần Văn Đức là ai? (I entered Hỏa Lò [Prison] in Hanoi to see who Trần
Văn Đức was),” published in the literary journal Cải Tạo in 1950, demonstrates the lengths to
which some Vietnamese went to acquire information about Phan Bội Châu’s situation.282 Mr.
N.V.H. tells a lively tale of derry-do involving the bribing of guards and secretaries and a very
near-miss with none other than Bride himself. The story of Mr. N.V.H. begins on a Saturday at
the house of Quang Minh on Hàng Bông street in Hanoi, where the author was informed of a
rumor that none other than Phan Bội Châu was being held in Hỏa Lò Central Prison in Hanoi.
Quang Minh was a member of the Phục Viẹt party and had many connections to revolutionaries
throughout Hanoi. On Quang Minh’s introduction, Mr. N.V.H. received a mission from “the
manager of Trung Bắc tân văn” to infiltrate the prison and determine whether the rumor was
true.283 Once inside the prison, Mr. N.V.H. was assisted by two secretaries, Mr. X and Old B.,
both who allowed him to see the register containing Phan Bội Châu’s actual information. Rather
amusingly, Mr. X recounted to Mr. N.V.H. the moment Phan Bội Châu stated clearly for all to
hear exactly who he was.
The sudden and unexpected arrival of Bride marks a moment of genuine terror for the
author, who writes, “I confess to you, my body was like a sack without rice, unsteady and ready

281
The interrogatories that constitute a transcript of the Criminal Commission’s work do not identify who
asked Phan Bội Châu particular questions, except in a very limited number of instances. However, it is clear, that
Bride alone represented the Criminal Commission in all of its external communications with the rest of the French
Indochinese government, and the names of the other commission members rarely appear in this external
correspondence.
282
This account was republished in Bùi Đình, Vụ Án Phan Bội Châu (Hanoi: Nhà xuất bản tiếng Việt,
1950), 29-42.
283
Ibid, 30. This most likely was Dương Bá Trặc.

73
to collapse!”284 The author identifies Bride as one of the “Four Red Hairs,” the others being
Darles, Eckert, and Delamarre. Holding back an urge to sneeze, an act that would surely draw
the wrong kind of attention, Mr. N.V.H. finally escaped the presence of Bride, to hide in the
rafters with Mr. X. There, he overheard Bride angrily admonish another clerk, stating, “We must
keep this information confidential, so no one will know!”285 Mr. N.V.H. also learned that Old B,
who hailed from Reunion Island, took pity on Phan Bội Châu and brought him eyeglasses. After
making it out of the prison, Mr. N.V.H. returned to the house of Quang Minh to make his report:
Phan Bội Châu was in Hỏa Lò Central Prison and the French wanted to keep the information
secret. According to Mr. N.V.H., the revolutionaries began to spread this information around
right away via secret transmissions throughout Hanoi, to Haiphong, Hải Dương, and Nam Định.
However, Mr. N.V.H. stated, bringing his story to a close, “because the telegram was accidentally
sent in black envelopes, it went to clerical workers throughout the southern part of Indochina.”286
Though the story as a whole reads like an tale of adventure, several aspects align well
with other available evidence. Phan Bội Châu’s declaration of his own identity matches Gilles’s
report, as does the fact that prison secretaries played a major role in revealing Phan Bội Châu’s
incarceration. Mr. N.V.H.’S description of Bride as a fearsome, self-assured individual matches
the tone of Bride’s communications with other French officials. The utter inability of French
security officials to keep Phan Bội Châu’s identity and presence from quickly leaking out rings
true. One interesting discrepancy concerns the fake name attributed to Phan Bội Châu: "Trần
Văn Đức," which appears to be a misreading of the Chinese name Phan Bội Châu had entered
into the register: "Truong Van Duc." The false name Resident-Mayor Dupuy had incarcerated
Phan Bội Châu under was entirely different ("Ngoc," possibly an abbreviation of "Nguyen Ngoc
Dong"). Taken altogether, however, Mr. N.V.H's story fits well with archival evidence, as we
shall we. Finally, the presence in the story of a newspaper manager is quite telling.
The press of French Indochina played a crucial role in disseminating the news of Phan
Bội Châu’s capture, transportation, and incarceration. The French-language trade journal
Courrier d’Haiphong first broke the news on July 16, to the dismay of security officials.287 The
news was by no means restricted to readers of French, however. On July 18, Special Commissar
Léandri reported that the Chinese and Vietnamese communities of Haiphong were already aware
a Vietnamese revolutionary of repute had landed the night of July 10.288 On July 24, Léandri
shared his informer’s report stating that Dương Tử Nguyên, brother of the former revolutionary
Dương Bá Trạc, had read the Courrier d’Haiphong article, which had been translated into quốc
ngữ (romanized Vietnamese script), and republished in both the Trung Bắc tân văn and the Đồng
Pháp Bảo.289 According to the informer, Dương Tử Nguyên regretted the incident had taken
place. Now that the news had been translated into vernacular Vietnamese, it was only a matter of
284
Ibid, 38.
285
Ibid, 40.
286
Ibid, 42.
287
SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle No. 155-P, (Le Commissaire Spécial Leandri) à M. le Chef de la Sûreté
au Tonkin, 18 juillet 1925. Philippe Peycam writes, without indicating his source, that an announcement came on
June 18 stating Phan Bội Châu had been arrested and would be transported to Hanoi. Peycam further states that the
trial of Phan Bội Châu began on June 30. Both dates are inaccurate. Phan Bội Châu was arrested on June 30, while
the trial did not begin until August 29. Peycam, Philippe, The Birth of Vietnamese Political Journalism: Saigon
1916-1930 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 133.
288
SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle No. 154-P, (Le Commissaire Spécial Leandri) à M. le Chef de la Sûreté
au Tonkin, 18 juillet 1925.
289
SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle No. 164-S, Léandri à Chef de la Sûreté au Tonkin, 24 juillet 1925.

74
time before new of the detention of Phan Bội Châu would become common knowledge
throughout Indochina. Dương Tử Nguyên’s reaction to the news was possibly even more
alarming. His brother, Dương Bá Trạc (and the editor of Trung Bắc tân văn!), had come over to
join collaborationist intellectuals such as Phạm Quỳnh in supporting the French government, and
the family was seen as being reliably moderate. If an anodyne member of the elite such as
Dương Tử Nguyên took issue with Phan Bội Châu’s imprisonment, the Sûreté could expect far
worse from a rabble-rousing radical such as Nguyễn An Ninh, editor of La Cloche Fêlée, or A.
Clementi, editor of L’Argus Indochinois.
The next day, July 25, Léandri telephoned Gilles with even more disturbing news: around
8:00 PM the previous evening (July 24), a Vietnamese man had been spotted distributing poly-
copied tracts on the streets of Haiphong. These tracts, printed in quốc ngữ, extolled the virtues
of Phan Bội Châu and deplored his current situation. Even more alarming, that morning the
director of financial control brought a $0.04 cent envelope to Léandri, which had been sent from
Haiphong, and addressed to “Mr. Indigenous Personnel of the Financial Control, Hanoi.” The
envelope contained five tracts, which Léandri assumed to be of the same origin.290 Each tract,
printed on a half sheet of cheap brown paper in purple ink, began by addressing its reader as
“Fellow Countryman!” It went on to relate that Phan Bội Châu, the great hero, had been
captured by the French government and thrown into the Hỏa-lồ Prison in Hanoi. This, the tract
announced, “was a great hardship for Mr. Phan Bội Châu, who had left twenty years previous in
order to find a way to retake the country.”291 The tract suggested that since Phan Bội Châu had
fought so hard for the country, “we countrymen owe him a great deal.” Gilles and Léandri
immediately began parallel investigations in Hanoi and Haiphong to determine the source of
these tracts.
Meanwhile, around 4:20 PM on the same day (July 25), Sogny, the head of the Sûreté in
Annam, telegrammed with disturbing news of his own. One of his spies, a former political
prisoner on a mission in Vinh, the capital of Nghệ An province, informed the French Resident
that an armed band led by Ngo Quang and “Cam” had been spotted in the mountainous Hương
Sơn region of Hà Tĩnh province. The spy warned that the band were in possession of four
bombs sent to them from Siam by the Phan Bội Châu’s partisan [Đặng] Tú Hứa (aka Tú Ngọ, aka
Đặng Thúc Hứa). The band had heard of Phan Bội Châu’s arrest and wanted to send someone to
Haiphong to demand the latest news from China concerning the arrest.292 Three days later, on
July 28, Joseph Alberti, the governor general’s chief of staff, relayed Sogny’s message to Saigon,
further advising that all services exercise high alertness in light of the information.293 If the
report were true, security officials had good cause to fear potential reprisals for Phan Bội Châu’s
arrest and ongoing detention.
On July 29, Gilles reported on the progress of his search for the origins of the poly-
copied tracts in Hanoi.294 His informers suggested that the source might be located in Hanoi,

290
SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle No. 4233, Le Chef de la Sûreté au Tonkin à RST et S.C.R. et S.G., 25
juillet 1925.
291
SPCE 355 (Retentissement dans les milieux indigènès), Quốc-dân ta đi! The dossier contains multiple
copies of this polycopied tract, suggesting it was indeed widely distributed.
292
Sogny indicated that the band’s contact in Haiphong was located at a restaurant called Duyet Lai Khach.
SPCE 355, Chef Sûreté Annam à Dirsurge Hanoi, No. 798, 16h20, 25 juillet 1925.
293
SCPE 355, Alberti (Hanoi) à Gougal Saigon, 28 juillet 1925, No. 87H.
294
SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle No. 4303, Le Chef de la Sûreté au Tonkin à S.C.R. et S.G., 29 juillet
1925.

75
though the word on the street was that the Sûreté police themselves were responsible. Some of
the individuals his informers had spoken to felt the tracts were an underhanded police strategy
intended to gauge public support for Phan Bội Châu. This rumor was not the only one going
around. The same day, Gilles also reported that a persistent rumor was now circulating among
Vietnamese nationalists that the individual being held in the Central Prison was not Phan Bội
Châu at all, but rather an impostor pretending to be Phan Bội Châu as part of a government plot
to make trouble amongst the nationalists.295 It seemed that Hanoi was a cauldron of gossip.
However, something altogether different was taking place in Haiphong. On August 3,
Léandri reported that one of his agents, named Vu Dinh Mau, had discovered a 16-year-old
domestic servant in possession of a Phan Bội Châu tract. Vu Dinh Mau took the teenager to the
Sûreté office for interrogation, whereupon it was revealed that a slightly older teenager who
looked to be from outside the city of Haiphong had handed him the tract while he was standing
in front of the home of his employer.296 Léandri sent another report on August 21 indicating two
additional distribution operations pertaining to the same poly-copied tracts advocating on behalf
of Phan Bội Châu.297 On this occasion,, Vietnamese employees of the Treasury in Haiphong had
295
Gilles further suggested that some nationalists would continue to reject the identity of the prisoner as
Phan Bội Châu, even if the prisoner were put to death. SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle No. 4302, Chef de la Sûreté
au Tonkin à Chef du S.C.R. et de S.G., 29 juillet 1925.
296
Léandri’s report continues in full: “That day, around 11 AM, Agent Vu-Dinh-Mau, passing Bd
Chavassieux, and seeing a young native who seemed suspicious and who put a paper in the pocket, went and
searched him. The agent found a bag in which, among other papers, was a pamphlet concerning Phan-Boi-Chau.
The agent brought him to the Sûreté office where he was questioned and made the following statements:
“I am Le VAN MON, 16 years old. I’ve worked as a domestic for about four years, at the home of M. Tran-Van-
Tu, an entrepreneur, located at 103 Bd Chavassieux. I am originally from the village of Hoanh-Nha, Hai-Hau
district, (Nam-Dinh province).
"About ten days ago, without my being able to specify, at nightfall, I was on the pavement, in front of my boss's
house, when a native came to pass who had many papers in his hand, and who gave me one, I folded it and put it in
one of the pockets of my cai-ao, returned to the house, and knowing how to read the quoc-ngu, I became acquainted
with it, having never heard of the person mentioned in this paper, I did not pay attention to this reading and put the
paper back in my pocket, where I always kept it and where it was with other papers, when your agent stopped and
searched me.”
Upon questioning: "I did not show anyone the paper in question, just as I did not give it to anyone".
Upon questioning: "The person who gave me this paper appeared to be between 16 and 18 years old, he is of
medium height, wore canvas clothes (his cai - ao was very short), he was wearing a hat made of latanier leaf, like
those worn by the young people of the countryside and not used by the inhabitants of the city, which makes me think
that the distributor is a stranger to Haiphong. I cannot report any more about him as he passed quickly, I could not
stare, and it was around dusk.
Mr. Tran-Van-Tu, Le-Van-Mon's employer, told me that he did not know about the existence of this leaflet and that
he was satisfied with the conduct of his servant, who surely did not understand the contents of the incriminating
tract, because of his young age, first, and the inadequacy of his education, second.
[Léandri]: I thought it necessary to carry out my investigations further and, with the consent of Tran Van Tu and his
servant, I went with Mr. PHUONG, in the capacity of an interpreter, to their home, at No. 103 Boulevard
Chavassieux, where we did not find anything suspicious.
I will add that the tract seized is absolutely the same as those we already know and that the other papers which the
young MON was a carrying were of no consequences and have been returned to him.
SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle 183-S, Commissaire Spécial Léandri à Le Procureur de la Republique et Chef de la
Sûreté au Tonkin, 3 août 1925.
297
Léandri’s report read: “Continuing my investigations concerning the distribution of leaflets relating to
Phan-Boi-Châu, I was led to question:
1. The two cashiers, one of whom also provides postal services, and the 5 secretaries of the treasury, each
of whom had received by mail an envelope bearing the following address: "Mr. Indigenous Treasury Personnel of

76
been targeted by mail. In addition, two youth were discovered handing out tracts downtown on
Strasbourg Street. Both claimed to have been paid 10 cents to distribute packets of thirty tracts
apiece. Clearly a relatively large-scale and well-organized publicizing effort was taking place on
the streets of Indochinese cities. The Sûreté could not help taking notice.
As concern over the tracts was reaching a fever-pitch, Gilles broke the news that the
perpetrator had been uncovered. On August 20, Gilles sent a report to Néron indicating that
information obtained in Hanoi had revealed the tracts had in fact been produced in Haiphong by
a courrier who had previously worked for the Resident of Nam Dinh, but had since moved to
Haiphong. The courrier, named Ca-Tieu, had hired a sampan and had printed the tracts out on
the river. When he was finished, Ca-Tieu had thrown the gelatin paste used during the
polycopying process into the river.298 If this information is accurate, Ca-Tieu was able to make a
dramatic impact, at the very least on the Sûreté, with a very modest investment in basic copying
tools. The fact that Ca-Tieu was a former employee of the French government and he or his
associates were targeting secretaries and clerks then working in government offices suggests that
the Sûreté now had good reason to suspect the loyalties of the very class of Vietnamese on whom
French relied on a daily basis. If the Phan Bội Châu affair provoked the ire of government
clerical staff, then French Indochina might quickly become ungovernable.
While unrest inside Indochina was rattling the nerves of Gilles and his colleagues, their
counterparts abroad had their own share of concerns. Nguyễn Thế Truyền, head of the
Vietnamese section of the l’Union Intercoloniale, received a petition dated July 23, 1925, from a
group calling itself Jeune Annam (Young Annam). This petition, which Nguyễn Thế Truyền later
published on September 4 and distributed widely thereafter, accused the colonial administration
and the Sûreté specifically of an attempt to carry out a “scandalous death sentence!”299 The

Haiphong.” [The envelopes] contained several copies of said leaflet. Nothing of interest has been collected from
their statements; both groups confined themselves to saying that they had taken note of the libel, to which they had
attached no importance, and that they had destroyed these papers, with the exception of the named Nguyen-Van-
Ngan, a 62-year-old cashier. This cashier, who had set aside the envelope with two of the leaflets it contained, and,
on the 18th of this month, on hearing that the native Treasury employees were summoned to the local Sûreté
[office], had been taken with fear and handed them over to his boss.
Mr. Bayeur has indeed given me this envelope and the two leaflets, which are exactly similar to those
distributed on public roads and which we have already seen.
2- Two young natives who were reported to me as having distributed flyers on public roads.
Respectively 15 and 17 years old, they told me that they were on Strasbourg street one evening around 8
o'clock (they could not remember the date) when an Annamese appearing to be about thirty years, wearing a white
cloth shirt with a "Danton" collar and cut in the European style and no hat (who they only saw this one time), gave
them ‘each to 10 cents and a small packet of papers (about thirty in each package). He told them to distribute the
papers to passers-by, adding that these papers were leaflets. The two youth immediately separated to make their
distribution. They later met in front of the booth installed in the vacant lot along the Boulevard Amiral Courbet,
where one of them passed the remainder of his papers to the other. The latter was admonished by another Annamese
who, having read the leaflet’s contents, suggested the lad go to the Canal Bonnal to throw away the remaining
copies.
It has not been possible to learn anything more about these two young natives, whose good faith can be
assumed because of their age and lack of education.
SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle No. 197-S, Commissaire Spécial Léandri à M.M. le Procureur de la
République à Haiphong et le Chef de la Sûreté au Tonkin à Hanoi, 21 août 1925.
298
SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle 5029, Chef de la Sûreté à le Chef du S.C.R. et de S.G. Hanoi, 20 août
1925.
299
SPCE 355, Union Intercoloniale, Association des originaires de toutes les colonies, Nguyen The Truyen
à le Directeur de “France Indochine,” 4 septembre 1925. The dossier contains many copies of this letter and the

77
“Criminal Commission,” the petition continued, would base its judgments solely on police
reports. This is exactly what people in Indochina could expect from “French justice,” backed by
those “creatures of the French administration,” namely the mandarins of the Court in Huế. The
petition ended by appealing to the solidarity of French and Indochinese people to “save Phan Bội
Châu.”300 Though Nguyễn Thế Truyền’s propaganda campaign in support of Phan Bội Châu
would take longer to reach Indochina, when it did in October 1925, the heads of all five Sûreté
branches in French Indochina began to report copies of the letter and its attached petition.
Meanwhile, journalists and activists closer to Indochina began to take action. By July 27,
Courthial, the French Consul in Hong Kong, telegrammed on behalf of Nadaud to complain that
the Hongkong Telegraph, a journal affiliated with the government of Canton, had reproduced the
Courrier d’Haiphong article. By divulging precise details of the Indochinese political service’s
yearlong investigation, as well as information about Phan Bội Châu’s arrest and transportation to
Indochina, Nadaud griped,“this useless publicity has drawn unwanted attention to me in Hong
Kong and has disturbed those who aid me or who might have aided me in Canton.” Nadaud
demanded measures be taken to ensure no further news leak, lest it “definitively compromise the
success of my mission.”301 The news of Phan Bội Châu’s capture was not only deeply
embarrassing for the Sûreté, it also negatively affected ongoing intelligence operations and put
the lives of agents and informers at greater risk.
The news from China would only worsen. On July 31, the Canton-based bulletin
Gongren zhi lu (The Worker’s Path, 工人之路) forcefully protested Phan Bội Châu’s arrest by
publishing a telegram sent the previous day by the League of Oppressed People and an article
excoriating French actions. Gongren zhi lu was started in June 1925 by the Strike Commission of
the General Union of Workers, anti-imperialist labor movement closely affiliated with the
Chinese Communist Party.302 The League of Oppressed People (in Vietnamese: Bị áp bức dân
tộc Liên hiệp Hội, in Chinese: 被壓迫民族聯合會) had also been founded one month prior, on
June 30, 1925, as a pan-Asian anti-colonial organization. Led by Canton’s governor Liao
Zhongkai, the League included Vietnamese, Korean, and Indian activists, notably Nguyễn Ái
Quốc (aka Lý Thủy, aka Hồ Chí Mính).303 The League’s telegram explained the conditions of
Phan Bội Châu’s arrest, suggesting that the French must have obtained the tacit approval of
Zhang Zuolin prior to the capture. The telegram took particular issue with French violations of
Chinese territorial sovereignty, as the North Railway Station was decidedly outside of the French
Concession. The League called on Chinese and other Asians to unite against French
imperialism.304 An accompanying article provided further details on Phan Bội Châu’s capture,

attached July 23 petition.

300
Ibid.
301
SPCE 355, Francsulat HK (Courthial) à Gougal Hanoi, No. 92, 27 juillet 1925.
302
See Horrocks, Robert James. The Guangzhou-Hongkong Strike, 1925-1926 (PhD Dissertation,
University of Leeds, 1994), 162-165.
303
See Quinn Judge, Sophie. Ho Chi Minh: the Missing Years (1919-1941) (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 2002), 83.
304
SPCE 355, “Télégramme du Congrès des Peuples Opprimes objet de l’arrestation de Phan Sao Nam, 被
壓迫民族聯合會為法領事在華境內逮捕潘巢南君之通 (Telegram from League of Oppressed Peoples regarding
French Consul’s Arrest of Mr. Phan Sao Nam inside Chinese territory),” 工人之路 (The Worker’s Path), No. 37, 31
juillet 1925.

78
including the names of the ships on which he had been transported. The most shocking part,
however, was a poem the Gongren zhi Lu claimed Phan Bội Châu had composed aboard the
Angkor and thrown onto an adjacent boat, whereupon it was successfully retrieved by a Chinese
student. The Gongren zhi Lu raised the issue again in another article the following day (August
1).305
An informer’s report arriving August 3 confirmed the Vietnamese revolutionaries in
Canton had played a key role in supplying the Congress of Oppressed Peoples with information
and documents. The agent, code-named “Pinot” (aka Lâm Đức Thụ), reported that since his
previous report on July 15, the revolutionaries based in Canton had learned of Phan Bội Châu’s
capture and were actively searching for the “traitor” who had made the arrest possible. Agent
Pinot explained that thanks to “an intermediary,” Phan Bội Châu had managed to write letters to
Hồ Tùng Mậu in Canton and Hồ Học Lãm in Hangzhou.306 This was likely a reference to the
poems Phan Bội Châu managed to throw off of the Angkor to an adjacent boat. The next day, on
August 4, Martel, the French Minister in Peking, wrote to alert the governor general’s office that
the account published in the Courrier d’Haiphong was now being republished in the Chinese and
foreign press there. Martel expressed his deep regret at the publicity the Phan Bội Châu affair
was causing, and the difficulties it created for him in his dealings with the Chinese
government.307
As the news stirred up anger in China, it also began to spread elsewhere. In Bangkok, on
August 10, at a meeting at the Pagoda of Que Duong, the Buddhist monk Thien Hoi read a letter
written in Chinese from [Đặng] Tú Ngọ (aka Đặng Thúc Hứa) and Co Khon announcing the
arrest of Phan Bội Châu. The letter called on all Vietnamese compatriots to contribute 50 Tx
each, to be given to Cu Nhon (another name for Thien Hoi), who was the representative of Tú
Ngọ and Co Khon in Bangkok. Other attendees suggested that subscription lists be drawn up
and that collectors be sent to other Vietnamese colonies in Siam.308
The news continued to roil stakeholders in China. On August 12, a report from agent
“Pipo” warned that Vietnamese rebels located in Guangxi and affiliated with the Black Flags
were enraged at the news of Phan Bội Châu’s capture and now claimed to be planning
simultaneous attacks on Dong-Trieu and Langson with 10,000 men. They also claimed to have
drawn in subscriptions worth two million [yuan?] and that Germany stood by to assist their
attacks. Though Pipo stressed that this news was quite exaggerated, it contributed to a sense that
French Indochina was under siege, with more attacks possible at any time.309 On August 13, the
Gongren zhi lu published yet another letter from the League of Oppressed Peoples addressing the
arrest of Mr. Phan Thi Han (aka Phan Bội Châu). The letter claimed that though “the mission of
Mr. Phan is over,” “the republican partisans of Annam must carry out the struggle without being
discouraged by the death of Mr. Phan.” Raising the spectre of a global anti-imperialist backlash,
the letter pointedly noted that “3 million Moroccans had managed to defeat the Spanish and

305
SPCE 355, “La Chine et l’Annam,” 工人之路 (The Worker’s Path), No. 38, 1 août 1925.
306
SPCE 355, Envoi No. 209 - Activité de l’agent PINOT, Annexe - Rapport du 3 août 1925. Yves Le Jariel
covers the activities of agent Pinot (aka Lâm Đức Thụ), especially those related to Phan Bội Châu. See especially
Yves Le Jariel. Phan Bội Châu (1867-1940): Le Nationalisme Vietnamien avant Ho Chi Minh (Paris: L’Harmattan,
2008), 191, 198-200, 203, 208, 231, 281, 338. Sophie Quinn-Judge covers Lâm Đức Thụ’s actions more generally
in Ho Chi Minh: the Missing Years (1919-1941).
307
SPCE 355, Telegramme Officiel, Legatfrance à Gougal, Pekin 4 août 1925.
308
SPCE 355, Report of Agent Kok, Une Reunion dans la pagode de Que Duong, Bangkok, 10 août 1925.
309
SPCE 355, Rapport Pipo, 12 août 1925.

79
would soon defeat the French as well. Would 20 million Vietnamese remain ever fearful as the
eternal slaves of the French?”310 While the communists and anti-imperialists in Canton
presented a serious threat, at least they were a known quantity. Concerns about Phan Bội Châu’s
capture, however, came from farther to the right in the Chinese political spectrum. An August
29 letter to Commander Lemoigne from Captain Sabatier, the commander of Tonkinese Riflemen
in Shanghai, reported that none other than “the Chinese Christian general Feng Hong Siang [Sic:
Feng Yuxiang]…is in Shanghai to inquire about the conditions under which the Annamese
reformer Phan was arrested.”311 The involvement of top-ranking Chinese officials on the eve of
Phan Bội Châu’s trial demonstrated that the actions of the Criminal Commission could easily
pose geopolitical and well as internal political challenges.
While domestic unrest and foreign agitation were certainly on the minds of Robin and
Monguillot, these issues may well have taken a back seat to an even more pressing issue: the
arrival of newly appointed Governor General Alexander Varenne. The selection of Varenne had
elicited praise from the radical left and a storm of indignation from the conservatives on the
right. The rightist periodicals La Victoire, Le Figaro, and L’Éclair voiced their strident
opposition to the choice.312 Conservative publications in Indochina, such as France Indochine
agreed, while expressing their regret that Monguillot, a dedicated career civil servant, had not
been given the post.313 By contrast, radical papers such as Malraux and Monin’s L’Indochine
enchaînée, expressed their “real pleasure” at the decision.314 However, the truth was that no one
really knew what Varenne would do once he arrived in Saigon come November 1925. As the
weeks passed, both sides of the Indochinese political spectrum notice aspects of Varenne that
unnerved them. The left discovered that Varenne was perhaps less of a socialist and more of a
rehabilitated conservative.315 Conservatives saw not another conservative, but a progressive
reformer in the mold of Albert Sarraut, whose legacy in French Indochina was mixed at best.
Varenne himself recapitulated Sarraut’s reform agenda. At a dinner in on October 14, prior to
leaving France for Indochina, Varenne declared that fixing the problems between the French and
the Vietnamese required the development of “public education, hygiene, public assistance,
learning the ‘native’s’ belief, respecting his habits, and building up his milieu.”316 What this
meant for the outcome of Phan Bội Châu’s trial was anyone’s guess, but Robin and Monguillot
had good reason to be concerned. It was therefore imperative that the trial begin soon, and that
the result be juridically unimpeachable.

310
SPCE 355, “被壓迫民族聯合會敬告越南國民書 (A Letter from the League of Oppressed People’s to
the Vietnamese People),” 工人之路 (The Worker’s Path), No. 50, 13 août 1925.
311
SPCE 355, Extrait d’une lettre addressee au Commandant Lemoigne par le Capitaine Sabatier
Commandant le Detachment autonomede Tirailleurs Tonkinois a Shanghai, 29 août 1925.
312
Morlat, Patrice. Indochine années vingt: Le Proconsulat “Socialiste” d’Alexander Varenne (Paris: Les
Indes savantes, 2018), 52-53.
313
Patrice Morlat,. Indochine années vingt: Le Proconsulat “Socialiste” d’Alexander Varenne (Paris: Les
Indes savantes, 2018), 104-105.
314
Patrice Morlat, Indochine années vingt: Le Proconsulat “Socialiste” d’Alexander Varenne (Paris: Les
Indes savantes, 2018), 105.
315
Patrice Morlat, . Indochine années vingt: Le Proconsulat “Socialiste” d’Alexander Varenne (Paris: Les
Indes savantes, 2018), 122.
316
Patrice Morlat, Indochine années vingt: Le Proconsulat “Socialiste” d’Alexander Varenne (Paris: Les
Indes savantes, 2018), 70.

80
 Chapter Four:
Competing Legitimacies and Courtroom Drama:
The Trial of Phan Bội Châu in Hanoi, August-December, 1925
Over a six-month period from the end of June through the end of December 1925, Phan
Bội Châu was hurtled from a life of relative obscurity as the editor of the Military Affairs Review
in Hangzhou to the center of attention for all of Indochina. Between his arrest at the hands of
French Concession police in Shanghai on June 30 and the pardon granted by incoming Governor
General Alexander Varenne on December 24, Phan Bội Châu found himself confronted by the
full force of the French colonial security apparatus, whose leaders were determined to
demonstrate the power of French security and legal institutions by proving him guilty of murder,
incitement to violence, and sedition. The interrogation and trial of Phan Bội Châu, which began
on August 29 and ended in a dramatic and very public courtroom showdown on November 23
ironically demonstrated that in French Indochina, politics counted for more than facts.
This chapter will show how the leaders of the French colonial security state instigated
Herculean efforts to quickly build an airtight criminal case against Phan Bội Châu in the face of
metropolitan disquiet, foreign protest, and domestic political agitation. It will further argue that
the Criminal Commission of 1925, the juridical body responsible for prosecuting Phan Bội Châu,
despite the defiant intransigence of the accused and an astounding self-imposed clerical burden,
was ultimately successful in proving the charges inherited from its predecessor. The
Commission’s legal victory, a testament to the power of the colonial archive, soon turned sour as
Phan Bội Châu recognized and took advantage of something new and even stronger that had
risen suddenly in the wake of press reports concerning his capture and trial: Indochinese public
opinion.317
The Trial Begins
The Criminal Commission of 1925 began its proceedings on Saturday, August 29, 1925.
The Commission was headed by President Bride, a first-class civil service administrator and
inspector for the Tonkin Bureau of Political and Administrative Affairs. The Commission also
included the resident-mayor of Hanoi (Paul Justin Hippolyte) Dupuy, Captain of the First
Regiment of Tonkinese Riflemen Bellier, and the Attorney General of the Republic at the Court
of First Instance of Hanoi Boyer. Also present were (Edouard Auguste) Arnoux, the Criminal
Commission’s clerk,318 and Gombaud Saintonge, its interpreter. An additional Vietnamese
interpreter named Bùi Bằng Đoàn was brought in later to assist.
Between the beginning of the Commission’s inquiry on August 29 and its completion on
November 9, Phan Bội Châu faced off against Commission members in sixty-four interrogation
sessions held on thirty-six separate days. Only the testimony from one additional witness
appears in the Interrogatoires: that of Inspector François (aka Trần Tứ Quí) of the Sûreté, who
had guarded Phan Bội Châu on the Altaïr in Hong Kong and aboard the Tonkin during the trip to
Haiphong. A handful of times, the Commission also called on the interpreters Gombaud
Saintonge and Bùi Bằng Đoàn to repeat testimony. Bùi Bằng Đoàn was also called upon twice
called to verify the authenticity of Phan Bội Châu’s handwriting.

317
For this chapter, I have drawn primarily on files, intelligence and press surveillance reports, and internal
security and administrative communications found in ANOM, SPCE 351-355. The transcript of the trial’s lengthy
interrogation sessions, on which my discussion of the trial’s internal workings is based, may be found here: SPCE
352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu Interrogatoires.
318
Note - This is not the same individual as Paul Louis Marius Arnoux, head of the Sûreté in Cochinchina.

81
 Aside from these brief, infrequent interruptions, the 440-page Interrogatoires constitutes
a two-month dialogue between Commission members and Phan Bội Châu that was often
combative. Over the course of the inquiry, Criminal Commission members, who are not
identified by name, asked 1,896 questions, nearly all of which Phan Bội Châu answered. For the
vast majority of their questions, the Commission members cited documents, typically testimonies
and texts attributed to Phan Bội Châu. They then challenged Phan Bội Châu to account for the
contents of those documents. Lacking any legal representation or any documents of his own to
present, Phan Bội Châu had no choice but to devise strategies to counter the Criminal
Commission’s unrelenting deluge of documents. In a very real sense, the trial of Phan Bội Châu
was a trial by archive.
Despite a sincere desire to conduct the trial in the most rapid possible manner, the
Criminal Commission members found themselves flummoxed by Phan Bội Châu’s initial
defense strategy: deny or mislead whenever possible. This strategy began immediately, even
before the first question was asked.
Day One (8/29/1925): Testing Strategies
Presenting himself before the court on the morning of August 29, Phan Bội Châu stated
simply: “I forget the name of my second wife. I had one child by each of my wives.”319 The
first part of this comment, ridiculous on its face, served two purposes. First, it allowed Phan Bội
Châu to protect the identity of his second wife Nguyen Thi Em. Second, it revealed Phan Bội
Châu’s central defense strategy of claiming complete ignorance of any potentially incriminating
facts. The latter part of comment, also blatantly untrue, was probably intended to protect the
identity of Phan Bội Châu’s daughter Phan Thi Cuong. To the members of the Criminal
Commission, the message was clear: Phan Bội Châu was ready to play games with the truth.
Asking for Phan Bội Châu to be handed a copy of his sentencing by the 1913 Criminal
Commission, the prosecutor fired his opening salvo: “Do you have any comments on this order?”
Undeterred, Phan Bội Châu responded, “I have been aware, while abroad, that a judgment was
rendered against me, but I do not know what grievances I am reproached for. I am very happy
that the investigation has resumed and I will answer frankly and clearly all the questions that will
be asked.”
The first day was largely spent arguing over dates. Members of the Criminal
Commission were hoping to confirm certain biographical details pertaining to the period before
Phan Bội Châu first left Indochina (1905), and found Phan Bội Châu quite willing to supply
dates. Unfortunately for them, many of the dates Phan Bội Châu provided did not match their
files. In many cases, neither did Phan’s dates correspond to each other! Asked when he had
passed the triennial regional examination in Nghệ An, Phan Bội Châu claimed it was the
thirteenth year of Thành-Thai, in other words, “1901, I believe.”320 This intentional inaccuracy
marked a crucial component in Phan Bội Châu’s evolving defense strategy: a deliberate

319
Although the Interrogatory does not specify who spoke first, the content suggests it could only have
been Phan Bội Châu. The declaratory statements about his wives both begin with the first person pronoun. In
addition, whereas in Phan Bội Châu’s administrative files, his profession is always indicated to be “professor of
[Chinese] characters,” in the Interrogatory Phan Bội Châu’s profession is declared to be “student.” This claim
corresponds to Phan Bội Châu’s initial defense strategy of minimizing responsibility by claiming to lack significant
authority.
320
61. Phan Bội Châu actually passed the Nghe An regional examination in the twelfth year of Thanh Thai,
1900. Phan Bội Châu provides the correct date in his Autobiography, and, in any event, could hardly have forgotten
the year he had achieved first rank, thereby receiving accolades within his district and from friends in the capital.

82
confusion of dates. Asked at which examination he had been banned for life, Phan continued to
obfuscate, claiming “It was in the year 1900 (the tenth year of Thành-Thai).” Not only had Phan
actually been banned in 1897, the eighth year of Thành-Thai, but the year 1900 was the year
Phan Bội Châu had famously taken first place in the regional exams. Phan himself stated this
fact only two months previous upon his arrest. Moreover, with this response, Phan Bội Châu
had just effectively made two consecutive years by the Western calendar (1900 and 1901) the
equivalent of three full years apart by the Vietnamese regnal calendar (the tenth and thirteenth
years of Thành-Thai, which would actually correspond to 1899 and 1902). Asked again to state
the year he had passed the triennial regional exams, Phan Bội Châu again confirmed, “I received
my ban in the tenth year of Thành-Thai and my cử-nhân degree in the thirteenth year.”
The chronological confusion had only just begun. Later that same morning, the
prosecutor asked Phan Bội Châu when Mr. Trần Đình Phát had served as tổng đốc (provincial
governor) of Nghệ An. Phan Bội Châu demurred, “I cannot answer you because Trần Đình Phát
was not nominated tổng đốc until after I left the country.” The prosecutor then asked Phan to
confirm when he had left Nghệ An. He replied, “1905.” The prosecutor, apparently having
caught Phan lying, challenged him, “In 1903, Mr. Trần Đình Phát was the tổng đốc of Nghệ An.”
Phan Bội Châu pushed right back, insisting instead that Tôn Thất Hân had been the tổng đốc in
1903. However, he continued, “I prefer not to specify because I no longer remember.”
Appearing to move on to another topic, the prosecutor then asked Phan Bội Châu when he had
published Lamentations sur Formose (Letter from the Ryukyus Written in Tears of Blood)321.
When Phan Bội Châu replied “1903,” the prosecutor sprang his trap: “In 1903, were you not
summoned before a tổng đốc who agreed to ’forget’ about you because your actions had become
known to the [French] Resident?” The prosecutor then launched into a long series of accusations,
alleging that the Resident of Nghệ-an, whose name was Trần Đình Phát, had covered up Phan
Bội Châu’s partisan activities and asked him to leave the province in 1903, whereupon Phan Bội
Châu then travelled to Huế, composed Lamentations sur Formose, and was inducted as a rebel
alongside his former students, such as Võ Bá Hợp, who was sentenced in 1908 by the Criminal
Commission.322
Phan Bội Châu heatedly denied all of this. Directly addressing the prosecutor’s claims,
Phan Bội Châu objected:

That’s a completely erroneous account! I never knew Mr. Trần Đình Phát as the tổng đốc
of Nghê-An, because I was no longer in the province [when he assumed the position]. I
never met this mandarin, so he could not have summoned me. It is also wrong that this
mandarin told me to leave the country. The only fact that is correct concerns the pamphlet
I wrote entitled Lamentations sur Formose. I distributed it amongst the ministers of the
court, knowing full well that they would inform the Resident Superior. But this work was
not a revolutionary writing! As for me being inducted as a rebel, it may have happened,
but without my knowledge. As for Bá Hợp, he was my student, but he was never
sentenced. There is an error in his name. I affirm that I have never been summoned by

321
In Vietnamese: Lưu Cầu Huyết Lệ Tân Thư. In Chinese: 琉球血淚新書.
322
Presumably the “Criminal Commission” the prosecutor refers to here is actually one of the Nguyễn
court tribunals held in 1908. The first French Criminal Commission to address the actions of Phan Bội Châu’s
partisans was the 1913 Criminal Commission in Hanoi.

83
 any native authority to receive observations on anti-French conduct.323

So ended the first interrogatory session on the morning of August 29. If Bride had any
illusions that Phan Bội Châu would bend easily to the apparently well-substantiated charges put
forward by the Criminal Commission, the first day’s combative confrontation surely dispelled
them.
The second session began later in the evening of the same day, August 29, with both sides
seeming to have calmed down. The prosecutor continued to ask Phan Bội Châu about his
activities prior to going abroad for the first time in 1905. Phan Bội Châu continued to exercise
selective memory of events. Phan Bội Châu was forthcoming with many details about his
journey to Tonkin, which he claimed coincided with the opening in 1903 of the Paul Doumer
Bridge in Hanoi. He also freely reported having briefly met the collaborationist official Hoàng
Trọng Phu (the son of Phan Đình Phùng’s nemesis Hoàng Cao Khải). However, Phan Bội Châu
claimed to have forgotten the names of the “twenty or thirty people” who travelled with him on
this trip.
After describing his trip, Phan Bội Châu suddenly offered a rather surprising admission:
in 1898, he had sold a fraudulent composition to a student taking the examinations in Nam Dinh.
The prosecutor asked if this was the only time. It was not. Phan Bội Châu stated that he had
sold fraudulent exam compositions many times in Annam and Huế, earning twenty or thirty
piastres for each. However, because the students buying these exams were unable to understand
the themes Phan Bội Châu wrote about, so they did not pass. The prosecutor immediately took
advantage of this unexpected opening: “Do you have some special conception of the honesty
required during the examinations?” Phan Bội Châu blithely replied that the payoffs that
routinely took place during the examinations were even worse. “All the examiners,” he quipped,
“touch the money.” Still sizing his adversary up, Phan Bội Châu was freely offering what he
thought to be useless information.
Taking advantage of Phan Bội Châu’s willingness to talk, the prosecutor began to
question Phan Bội Châu about his connections with the bandit leader Để Thám, the rebellious
mandarin Nguyễn Thượng Hiền. Phan Bội Châu denied having had any relations with Để Thám,
while he admitted having met Nguyễn Thượng Hiền “completely by accident.” As the
prosecutor continued to press ahead, clearly hoping to catch him in a lie, Phan Bội Châu began to
dissimulate and dodge. Asked about the peripatetic warrior Tăng Bạt Hổ, Phan Bội Châu
claimed only to know him as an Cantonese-speaking medical practitioner, but not by name.
However, Phan Boi Châu at first flatly denied knowing Nam Thịnh and Sơn Tẩu (aka Đỗ Tuyển),
both prominent resistance leaders from Quảng Nam. The prosecutor, incredulous, asked again,

323
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 5. Interestingly, French records for 1903 list
neither Trần Đình Phát nor Tôn Thất Hân as tổng đốc of Nghê-An. Rather, French administrative records and Phan
Bội Châu Niên Biểu (NB) both indicate the tổng đốc of Nghê-An at the time was Đào Tấn. In NB, Phan Bội Châu
indeed claims Đào Tấn helped to protect him. Trần Đình Phát does appear in French administrative records, but
only in 1911 and 1912 as the minister of finances for the court in Huế. Tôn Thất Hân, on the other hand, is listed as
the tổng đốc of Faifoo in 1903, but he did indeed become the tổng đốc of Nghê-An in 1904. Based on French
administrative records, therefore, Phan Bội Châu’s statement was closer to the truth than that of the prosecutor,
though Phan Bội Châu wisely did not volunteer the name of his actual protector, Đào Tấn. Phan Bội Châu,
Overturned Chariot: The Autobiography of Phan Bội Châu (Honolulu: SHAPS Library of Translations, University
of Hawai’i Press, 1999), 61. See also Annuaire général de l'Indo-Chine française 1903, 1904, 1911, 1912 (Hanoi:
Imprimerie Typo-Lithographique F.H. Schneider, 1903, 1904, 1911, 1912).

84
this time indicating that Nam Thịnh was also called Nguyễn Hàm (aka Tiểu La) and that Sơn Tẩu
(aka Đỗ Tuyển) had held the position of chủ sự (secretary). Backtracking, Phan Bội Châu
admitted to knowing Nguyễn Hàm and to knowing a chủ sự by the name of Trình Hiền (another
of Đỗ Tuyển’s names). However, Phan Bội Châu claimed Nam Thịnh was a lieutenant of the
arch-collaborationist Nguyễn Thân, while Trình Hiền was little more than “a former mandarin
who retired to his home to work the fields.”
At this statement, the prosecutor pounced: “The information given to the Criminal
Commission does not agree with what you just said to us.” The prosecutor went on to specify
that Nam Thịnh had worked under the resistance leader Nguyễn Hiệu as early as 1885, while Sơn
Tẩu, aka Đỗ Tuyển, had also followed Nguyễn Hiệu and remained a virulently anti-French
partisan. Both men had hid in the mountains waiting for their chance to revolt, but were both
captured. Nam Thịnh had died on Poulo Condore island and Sơn Tẩu had died at Lao Bảo prison.
Recognizing that the prosecutor clearly knew the stories of both men, Phan Bội Châu simply
responded that he had known nothing of either man’s fate after having met them in Huế and, as
far as he knew, Nam Thịnh had submitted to Nguyễn Thân and obeyed him thereafter. In an
effort to distance himself from such an incriminating figure, Phan Bội Châu claimed that he had
known Nam Thịnh only because of the examinations. But, he hastened to add, that because Nam
Thịnh had often needed his help to study for the examinations, the two of them could have been
found together quite often during that period. Such a remarkably quick series of self-corrections
revealed just how badly the prosecutor had rattled Phan Bội Châu.
This testy exchange brought the first day of interrogatories to an end. Each side had
played their hand and revealed their primary strategies for trial. Bride would rely on his
voluminous records to challenge Phan Bội Châu’s claims. In response, the accused would feign
ignorance, deliberately confuse facts, and outright deny anything incriminating, all the while
providing information he considered to be inconsequential. Each side also got the measure of
their adversary. Bride saw in Phan Bội Châu yet more proof of the French stereotype that all
Annamese were inveterate liars. With a vast archive of messages, reports, and translations at
hand, Bride felt sure he could not just prove Phan Bội Châu lied, but also force him to admit it.
Phan Bội Châu, meanwhile, realized that Bride meant serious business. If he wanted to survive
the trial, Phan Bội Châu needed to take much more care with his words. Henceforth, every
answer would require tactical consideration and verbal talent. It would be a duel of wits and
words between the bureaucratic and the revolutionary.
Day Two (8/31/1925): Establishing Positions
When they met again two days later, on the morning of August 31, Phan Bội Châu came
ready to make the first move. Before any questions had been aksed, he declared spontaneously:

During my last interrogation, it is possible I was inaccurate in my designation of the

years. I was counting them according to the Chinese calendar, which is possibly different
by one year from the Annamese calendar. I received my cử-nhân degree in the Chinese
year Ti [Tí, 子, the Year of the Rat, 1900]. I went to the exposition in Hanoi in the
Chinese year Dân [Dần, 寅, the Year of the Tiger, 1902]. I went to Saigon in the year
Mao [Mão, 卯, the Year of the Cat, 1903], and I left Indochina in the year Ti [Tị, 巳, the
Year of the Snake, 1905].

85
 If I did not respond to you immediately when, at the end of my last interrogation, you
mentioned the names of Nam Thịnh and Sơn Tẩu, it was because these two individuals
took those names after I departed Indochina. While I was in Annam, I know those
individuals by the names Âm Hàm and Ông Chủ Ô Gia (Sơn Tẩ).

In this prepared statement, Phan Bội Châu managed not only to explain his chronological
discrepancies and apparent ignorance of his good friends’ names, but he also introduced
preliminary justifications for any future obfuscations. If the prosecutor wanted to catch him
providing the wrong dates for events, Phan Bội Châu could simply he was using one of four
different chronological systems: the Chinese calendar, the Vietnamese calendar, the Western
calendar, or the Vietnamese regnal year. If the prosecutor wanted to catch him lying about his
relations with a particular person, Phan Bội Châu could simply claim to know that person by a
different name or pseudonym.
The second full day of interrogation witnessed Phan Bội Châu energized, confident, and
ready to parry any of Bride’s thrusts. The prosecutor jabbed at Phan Bội Châu with questions
about Nam Thịnh and Sơn Tẩu; Phan Bội Châu blocked these by maintaining that his
relationship with both men was purely academic. The prosecutor lobbed other names at Phan
Bội Châu, who skillfully dodged each one, refusing to incriminate himself. Phan Bội Châu
denied knowing or ever meeting the one-time revolutionary Tôn Thất Toại.324 More improbably,
he claimed to have made friends with Prince Cường Để solely because, “I was curious about the
items his ancestor Đông Cung [Prince Nguyễn Phúc Cảnh] had brought back from France and
Cường Để kept at his house.”325 Phan Bội Châu even described his May 1904 encounter with
Auvergne, the Resident Superior of Annam, in such a way that made the French official seem an
easy mark: “I told him I went to Cochinchina to see the Statue of Monseigneur Adran and the
Botanical Garden. The Resident Superior told me ‘that’s all fine.’ But he never asked me
anything about anti-French activities.”326 Phan Bội Châu was effectively telling Bride that his
fellow countryman Auvergne was incompetent, while at the same time refusing to incriminate
himself by admitting that he was in fact participating in anti-French activities.
Unable to pin Phan Bội Châu down on any of his domestic activities, the prosecutor
turned to the one event not in question: Phan Bội Châu’s first trip abroad in February 1905. Here
again, Phan Bội Châu carried on with his verbal trickery. First, he described returning to his
hometown of Đan Nhiễm to “arrange my family affairs.” Phan Bội Châu revealed that he had
entrusted his domestic duties to an adopted son named Am and also that he had a daughter by his
second wife. He had not mentioned his daughter previously because, he explained, “according to
Vietnamese custom, girls are not entitled to property.” The only people in the entire village who
knew of his plan to leave the country, Phan Bội Châu explained, were his first wife Nguyễn Thị
Huyên and his adopted son, Am. While Phan Bội Châu’s daughter certainly existed, “Am” may
well have been an on-the-spot invention to deflect any further interest on the part of French
intelligence in his actual family members or fellow villagers.
Phan Bội Châu then related the story of his secret departure from Đan Nhiễm village
northward to Nam Định province. With him, he claimed, were just two individuals: his guide

324
In NB, Phan Bội Châu indicates that Tiểu La introduced him to Tôn Thất Toại in 1903, though Phan Bội
Châu was unimpressed by the man. Overturned Chariot, 63.
325
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 13.
326
Ibid.

86
Tăng Bạt Hổ and his temporary porter Nguyễn Điển. By mentioning Nguyễn Điển’s name, Phan
Bội Châu attempted to pull off two dazzling tricks at the same time. The first was to capture the
attention of Bride, who certainly would have known Nguyễn Điềm as the earliest informer the
French had within Phan Bội Châu’s revolutionary organization. Nguyễn Điềm came from Xuân
Liễu village, very close to Đan Nhiễm, and had in fact passed fifth in the very same examination
Phan Bội Châu came in first, in 1900. Nguyễn Điềm, who may have turned informant as earlier
as 1902, was later murdered by Phan Bội Châu’s close collaborators Trần Hữu Lực and Hoàng
Trọng Mẫu in Canton in December 1912. Perhaps anticipating that Bride would eventually ask
about the murder, Phan Bội Châu teased the Criminal Commission, stating: “Nguyễn Điềm was
very dedicated and he proved that dedication to the French government. It was he who arrived in
Canton alongside French functionaries in an attempt to get Cường Để to give himself up. I
believe that Cường Để had Nguyễn Điềm assassinated in Canton. I did not have a chance to see
him in China because Cường Để, I think, had him killed shortly after his arrival.”327 Not only
was Phan Bội Châu mocking the French security services for the death of their agent, he had
done so quite out of context and conveniently pinned the blame for the murder on Cường Để. As
galling to Bride as this statement likely was, it was doubly false. Not only had he
enthusiastically endorsed the assassination of his former student Nguyễn Điềm in 1912, Nguyễn
Điềm also had not served as Phan Bội Châu’s porter in 1905. Rather, this was Phan Bội Châu’s
second trick: a lie designed to obscure the identity of his actual travel companions Đặng Tử Kính
and Trần Bỉnh.328 Bride’s reaction is not indicated in the transcript. The members of the
Criminal Commission seemed willing to allow Phan Bội Châu to talk unchallenged, perhaps
hoping he would contradict himself, or one of their many documents. In any case, the morning
interrogatory session ended after Phan Bội Châu finished his story.329
For the evening session of August 31, the prosecutor asked Phan Bội Châu why he had
left Indochina, then allowed him to address the topic at length. Phan Bội Châu took the
opportunity to recast his early motives as reformist, and even potentially collaborationist. Phan
Bội Châu explained that he had planned to become a tri huyện (district magistrate) after
327
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 15, 96. The name “Nguyễn Điềm is the source of
no small amount of confusion because it is very similar to three other named individuals: Nguyễn Điển of Hà Đông,
Nguyễn Điển of Cao Điền, a village in Thanh Chương district, adjacent to Nam Đàn district, where Nguyễn Điềm’s
home village of Xuân Liễu lies, and finally Nguyễn Huy Điển (aka Bat Bieu), who also served as a spy for the
French.. In a footnote to NB, Chương Thâu incorrectly identifies the Nguyễn Điềm (阮 恬) as Nguyễn Điển (阮典)
of Cao Điền. Chương Thâu, ed., “Phan Bội Châu Niên Biểu,” Phan Bội Châu Toàn Tập, Vol. 6, 268-269. See also
Le Jariel, Yves, Phan Bội Châu, 42, 115, 258, 302, 318. Vinh Sinh confuses Nguyễn Điềm with Nguyễn Huy Điển,
who were definitely two different individuals, and who were both spies killed by Trần Hữu Lực, the former inside
Indochina in 1908, the latter in Canton in 1912. This is the only way to resolve an apparent contradiction: in NB,
Phan Bội Châu claims Trần Hữu Lực “stabbed the cử nhân Nguyễn Điềm…after he killed Nguyễn Điềm, Ngư Hải
was concerned for his future and therefore pressed him to go abroad.” Ngư Hải (aka Đặng Thái Thân) died in 1910,
therefore he could not have given instruction to Trần Hữu Lực to flee Indochina for a murder committed in Canton
in 1912. It is possible that Nguyễn Điển of Cao Điền is the same person as Nguyễn Huy Điển (aka Bat Bieu). See
Phan Bội Châu, Overturned Chariot, 60, 93, 96, 108, 138, 144, 153 (for reference to murder of Nguyễn Điềm), 180
(for reference to murder of Nguyễn Huy Điển).
328
These are, at least, the two companions Phan Bội Châu identifies in NB. Phan Bội Châu claims Tăng
Bạt Hổ went to Tonkin earlier and met them there. Overturned Chariot, 78. In NTT, Phan Bội Châu mentions only
Tăng Bạt Hổ and Đặng Tử Kính. Phan Bội Châu, “Prison Notes,” Reflections from Captivity, translated by
Christopher Jenkins, Tran Khanh Tuyet, and Huynh Sanh Thong (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1978), 26.
329
While there is no clear way to determine if a particular session ended early, it can be inferred from the
number of pages

87
receiving his cử nhân degree in 1900, but became increasingly aware of “an incommensurable
difference between the intellectual levels of French and Vietnamese.”330 This awareness, Phan
Bội Châu claimed, propelled him to compose the short work Lưu Cầu Huyết Lệ Tân Thư (Letter
from the Ryukyus Written in Tears of Blood) in which he “specifically called for the abolition of
the traditional education and examination systems…and the creation of modern schools along
Western lines.”331 However, Phan Bội Châu continued, the mandarins to whom he showed his
work dissuaded him from approaching French authorities. Furthermore, Phan Bội Châu learned
that a Frenchman observing successful candidates had counted them off: “un cochon, deux
cochon…neuf cochons (one piggy, two piggies…nine piggies).” Deciding there was no point
trying to work with the French if that was their attitude, Phan Bội Châu stated, “I therefore came
up with the idea of leaving the country.”332 Whether he intended to or not, Phan Bội Châu had
just played a sour note.
At this point, the tone of the encounter shifted toward acrimony. Perhaps recognizing he
had offended the members of the Criminal Commission, Phan Bội Châu quickly added, “Had I
ever seen with my own eyes examples of Frenchmen such as those who make up this Criminal
Commission, I would never have left.”333 The prosecutor was neither mollified, nor amused by
this naked flattery. He angrily challenged Phan Bội Châu, “We cannot accept that you left your
native country, your wife, your children, the grave of your father, and those of your ancestors
because you learned of a Frenchman counting pigs while watching Annamese! Tell us the real
reason you left!”334 Phan Bội Châu responded that the ‘piggy story’ was just an example; the
real reason he had left was the obvious contempt French held for Vietnamese. Becoming angry
himself, Phan Bội Châu continued, “The Vietnamese people are like an abandoned child adopted
by benevolent strangers. But after twenty years, the French seemed to have abandoned their
adopted child to pursue their own interests.”335 Clearly riled by Phan Bội Châu’s words, the
prosecutor interjected, “We hear that the Vietnamese say mean or injurious things about
Frenchmen every day, but we do not think that because of this all Vietnamese hate the French!”
Phan Bội Châu snapped back, “I did not think all French hated the Vietnamese either! I was
exasperated by the terrible situation in my country and saw the French government doing nothing
whatsoever to fix it. The ‘piggy story’ was simply the drop of water that made the vase
overflow.”336 Still rankled by Phan Bội Châu’s suggestion that the French were bigots, the
prosecutor pointed out, “We have seen in a poem authored by a Vietnamese the phrase ‘the
fattened pig must be slaughtered.’ Though this phrase targets us French, we hold no hatred for
the author, nor do we hate all Vietnamese because of something one of them wrote.”337
The argument was highly revealing: both sides abandoned their strategies and resorted to
yelling as the racial animosities engendered by colonialism were laid bare. For Bride and his
fellow commission members, there could be no questioning French motives. As far as Bride was
concerned, the French colonial administration represented the epitome of justice, humaneness,
and reason. If any French did denigrate the Vietnamese, they were outliers. For Phan Bội Châu,

330
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 15.
331
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 15-16.
332
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 16.
333
Ibid.
334
Ibid.
335
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 17.
336
Ibid. A Vietnamese phrase with entirely the same meaning as ‘the straw that broke the camel’s back.’
337
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 18.

88
who had written exhaustively to analyze and critique the exploitative actions of the colonial
administration and degrading way French treated Vietnamese, the ‘piggy story’ was simply a fact
of life. This argument, which set a divisive tone for the rest of the trial, revealed something very
important to Phan Bội Châu about the mindset of his adversaries: although French colonial
officials were perfectly willing to use their administrative and military power to oppress the
Vietnamese, appearances mattered. The Criminal Commission could embody the republican
principles of justice, equality, and bureaucratic rationality, but never racial prejudice. The
prosecutor’s evident sensitivity about this topic had provided Phan Bội Châu another arrow for
his quiver.
The day’s session sped to a close as the prosecutor delivered a long, chastising rant.
Calling Phan Bội Châu’s purported reasons for leaving Indochina “puerile and futile,” the
prosecutor went on to establish Phan Bội Châu’s true motives: the exploitation of nationalist
sentiments, the establishment of an insurrectionary movement to overthrow French domination,
and the realization of political independence for Vietnam. All of these were just means to an
even great end, however. According to the prosecutor, Phan Bội Châu’s true personal goal was
to become the premier of Vietnam. Everything Phan Bội Châu had done, from rallying former
Cần Vương partisans, to placing Cường Để at the head of the movement, and finally to obtaining
Japanese military and financial support, were steps in his secret master plan to achieve political
power for himself.
Phan Bội Châu vigorously protested against the prosecutor’s claims. Not only was the
suggestion that he personally wanted power untrue, it was ridiculous! He had never sought to
profit personally; he sought only to better his country. “The real reason I left,” Phan Bội Châu
affirmed, “is the one I already exposed to you, namely to contribute to the intellectual
development of my country by writing. But there is one point on which you are absolute correct:
I wanted independence for my country.”338 As for inciting an insurrection, Phan Bội Châu
continued, this was quite impossible because once abroad he had had no further contact with his
countrymen. The prosecutor’s information about Cường Để was also incorrect. There had been
no coordination; Cường Để came abroad on his own, a year after Phan Bội Châu himself.
Moreover, Cường Để was the one who sought Japan’s support to retake the throne of Vietnam.
Finally, Phan Bội Châu concluded emphatically, “I never thought about appealing [to Japan] for
military assistance to fight France; as at that time I felt France was unbeatable.”339
The competing speeches brought the second day of interrogation to a close. The
discursive positions of each side were now clear. Bride intended to prove Phan Bội Châu was a
manipulative, scheming, and unscrupulous politician, happy to dupe, use, or even sacrifice his
countrymen for personal gain. Phan Bội Châu sought to present himself as a nothing more than
an earnest, patriotic writer, uninterested in political power or military affairs. Interestingly, at no
point during the entire two days had either side addressed the specific charges Phan Bội Châu
was being tried, or rather re-tried, for: the 1913 assassinations of Nguyễn Duy Hàn, Montgrand,
and Chapuis. Having worked hard to collect and organize his documents, Bride intended to
proceed methodically and chronologically. Phan Bội Châu saw no reason to hurry the process.
Day Three (September 3) and Day Four (September 4): Into the Weeds
Three days passed before Phan Bội Châu met the Criminal Commission again. Bride had
ceased the interrogatory sessions temporarily while he awaited four additional cases of

338
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 20.
339
Ibid.

89
documents he had requested that finally arrived from Huế on September 2.340 This fresh archival
collection, 1307 new files contained in 88 dossiers, had been sent by the managing director of
justice attached to the Nguyễn Court in Huế. It offered Bride far greater access to information
pertaining to the administration of Annam, including names, dates, and tribunal outcomes. Most
of these files covered events from 1913 or earlier. This shot in the arm increased Bride’s ability
to challenge Phan Bội Châu’s accounts of events from that period.
Beginning September 3, the prosecutor started using a new tactic: citing testimonies and
depositions from other individuals in order to challenge Phan Bội Châu. For the first question of
the morning, the prosecutor addressed Phan Bội Châu’s August 31 claim that the 1,300 piastres
he had carried with him abroad came entirely from selling fraudulent exams:

You told us that the 1,300 piastres you took with you came from fraudulent exams [sales]
and lessons given to students. However, according to the declaration of a Mr. Lê-Văn-Hà,
originating from Cam-Trang in the district of Duc-Tho (Hà Tĩnh province), who was the
object of Judgment No. 11, dated January 11, 1911, which was rendered by the Hà Tĩnh
provincial authorities and which we will read to you now, this money came from thefts
and piracy. What do you have to say about Lê-Văn-Hà’s statement?341

Phan Bội Châu, obviously startled by this new line of questioning, struck back
immediately, declaring the statement to be “absolutely false!” Phan Bội Châu then said he knew
Lê Văn Hà by his reputation as a pirate. Finally, he announced to the prosecutor, “I am not afraid
to confront him if he appears before the Criminal Commission!”342 Bride, of course, had no
intention of bringing any other Vietnamese to testify before the Criminal Commission. Why
should he risk state and personal security by paying to have individuals, many of them criminals,
brought to the Central Prison in Hanoi when he already had their testimony on file? A trial by
archive was much safer, cheaper, and more efficient.
The prosecutor busied himself for the remainder of the morning clarifying Phan Bội
Châu’s statements. He demanded Phan Bội Châu provide accurate dates and locations and asked
him many times if he knew particular individuals. Phan Bội Châu, clearly put off by the
prosecutor’s newfound cockiness, grew increasingly frustrated. After the prosecutor accused him
of always using the same “fraudulent, concealed, crafty, [and] cunning” tricks and maneuvers,
Phan Bội Châu shot back, “I don’t understand the deductions you’ve drawn from my
declarations!”343 Nevertheless, when the prosecutor demanded he provide complete details of
his entire first voyage abroad, Phan Bội Châu did his best to offer a comprehensive (though not
entirely accurate) account, including his now famous meeting with the Chinese reformer and
journalist Liang Qichao.
In the evening session of September 3, Phan Bội Châu struck on a new strategy of his
own: making other people responsible for anything the prosecutor hoped to accuse him of. Phan

340
Sent by the managing director of justice in Huế, the set of 88 dossiers comprised 1307 separate files.
SPCE 355, Le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin à M le Président de la Commission Criminelle, Bordereau No. 600, 2
septembre 1925.
341
I am unable to confirm at this time that this testimony was contained in the four cases delivered to Bride
the previous day, but this seems likely given it took place during a Nguyễn provincial tribunal. SPCE 352, Affaire
Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 20.
342
Ibid.
343
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 22.

90
Bội Châu began by claiming that the work attributed to him Việt Nam Vong Quốc Sử (The
History of the Loss of Vietnam) was in reality the work of Liang Qichao. “I gave [Liang Qichao]
the theme of the work, and he developed it with his own personal ideas,” Phan Bội Châu told the
prosecutor. Not content to stop there, Phan Bội Châu continued, “the advice Liang Qichao
claims to have given me in his preface is really exaggerated. I cannot specify which points are
exaggerated, but I was left with the impression that it was really exaggerated.” Phan Bội Châu
did suggest one part of the preface that was simply untrue: “Liang Qichao represents us as
overwhelmed by afflictions with our faces bathed in tears, while actually we were cheerful and
smiling.”344 The prosecutor, apparently dumbfounded by this new strategy, did not challenge
Phan Bội Châu. Instead, the prosecutor then asked when Phan Bội Châu had published his
biography of Tăng Bạt Hổ. This work too, Phan Bội Châu claimed, was not his, but that of
Nguyễn Thượng Hiền. Yes, he had written a work called Hải Ngoại Huyết Thư (Letter From
Abroad Written in Blood), but it was “very short, only two or three pages long.”345 Phan Bội
Châu’s strategy was clear: if he did write whatever portion of the works attributed to him that the
French found objectionable, then he could not be held responsible.
By this point, Phan Bội Châu had realized just how powerful the strategy of denial could
be, especially for events for which the French administration had few reliable files. In short
order, Phan Bội Châu denied having ever met Count Okuma Shigenobu, denied ever living in
Tokyo (he “always stayed in Yokohama”), and denied ever leaving Japan from 1905 through
1909.346 It was a stunning series of blatant lies, but ones that Phan Bội Châu clearly felt it would
be possible to pull off.
The strategy of denial hit its first snag before the day was out. After Phan Bội Châu
declared having met the former resistance leader [Nguyễn] Tận Thuật in Canton for the first time
in 1918, the prosecutor produced a photograph. He asked Phan Bội Châu to identify the
individuals in the photograph, which included [Nguyễn] Tận Thuật and Phan Bội Châu himself,
then asked Phan Bội Châu what year the photograph had been taken. According to the transcript,
which contains the equivalent of stage directions, this did not go well:

Phan Bội Châu: “It was long ago, either in the year Thi (1917) or in the year Ngo (1918)
in Canton. [He pauses then says]: It was perhaps before 1915. [Another pause, then he
resumes]: It was at the end of 1913, or the beginning of 1914 that this photograph was
taken.”347

The prosecutor immediately pounced, “We catch you once again in the flagrant act of
lying!” To this, Phan Bội Châu lamely responded, “I did not want to lie either time…I
responded without thinking precisely about the date.” Claiming that his memory was no longer
good enough to answer such questions, Phan Bội Châu asked for relief from the requirement of
specifying dates with precision. Perhaps realizing he was not ready to commit to senility, Phan
Bội Châu quickly offered a possible aid for his “poor” memory: while abroad he had recorded
his meetings in a small notebook, which he no longer had. This small notebook, he explained,
“which contains notes of all my comings and goings since 1905…is in the magazine office in

344
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 25-26
345
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 26, 28.
346
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 27-28.
347
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 28.

91
Hangzhou.”348
It had been quite the day for new strategies and dramatic reversals. Bride upped the ante
by introducing documented testimony and a photograph. Phan Bội Châu responded by doubling
down on his initial strategy of obfuscation, turning it into a strategy of outright denial and lying.
This is also the moment the transcript itself reveals itself as a highly biased text. Specifically, the
“stage directions” that indicate when Phan Bội Châu paused appear in this transcript only when
he is caught lying. These rare notes constitute a metatext - they demonstrate the slow yet
inevitable process of a liar coming to justice.
Despite having been “caught” lying the evening prior, Phan Bội Châu continued to rely
on his strategy of denial for the fourth day of interrogation. If anything, he took it even farther.
Cường Để had gone to Tokyo, while he had remained in Yokohama. As such, Cường Để had
been entirely responsible for the students of the Đông Du movement, while Phan Bội Châu
simply worked as a freelance writer for Liang Qichao.349 Phan Bội Châu admitted some
knowledge of Cường Để meetings with Japanese authorities and to having met some of the
students, but essentially described himself as a loosely associated figure who a handful of
students came to visit in Yokohama on occasion. After struggling to combat Phan Bội Châu’s
new account of his time in Japan, Bride ended the interrogatory sessions on the morning of
September 4. They would not resume again until September 16.
A Hiatus (September 4-September 15): Reassessing and Rearming
For nearly two weeks, both sides attempted to consolidate their positions. On September
7, Phan Bội Châu wrote a pair of letters in Chinese, which were duly translated. In the first
letter, sent to the president of the Criminal Commission, Phan Bội Châu formally requested
Bride write to the French Consul in Shanghai so that he might obtain and return Phan Bội Châu’s
small notebook, which remained at the bureau of the Military Affairs journal.350 In the second
letter, addressed to Hồ Học Lãm who still worked at the journal, Phan Bội Châu asked that he
assist the Shanghai Consulate by finding and conveying the small notebook.351 I was unable to
find any further reference to this small notebook, though a daily planner found on Phan Bội
Châu’s person at the time of his arrest suggests he did indeed keep a journal of his activities.352
Bride, meanwhile, was busy requesting yet more documents to bolster his case against
Phan Bội Châu. He now focused on two categories of documents: intelligence files and Phan
Bội Châu’s writings. First, to refute Phan Bội Châu’s falsified account of events from 1903
through 1907, on September 7 Bride requested of the resident superior of Tonkin documents
allowing him to resolve a list of nineteen questions, all of which pertained to topics covered
during the first set of interrogatory sessions.353 As a later response from Sogny reveals, Bride’s
questions were handed off to the Sûreté of Annam, the Resident of Vinh, and the Nguyễn
provincial authorities in Nghệ An.354 The same day, Bride separately requested an report

348
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 29.
349
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 30-31.
350
Dossier contains both original in Chinese and a translation in French. SPCE 355, Phan Bội Châu à M.
le Président de Commission Criminelle, 7 septembre 1925.
351
Dossier contains both original in Chinese and a translation in French. SPCE 355, Phan Bội Châu à M.
Ho-Hoc Lam, 7 septembre 1925.
352
SPCE 355, Bordereau des pièces adressées à Monsieur le Consul Général de France à Shanghai, Effets
et objets dont etait en possession Phang-Boi-Chau [sic] au moment de son arrestation, 3 juillet 1925.
353
SPCE 355, Note Résidence Supérieure au Tonkin, 7 septembre 1925.
354
Rather amusingly, the resident of Vinh confirmed that Phan Bội Châu was correct in claiming that Trần

92
entitled “L’agitation antifrancaise dans les Pays Annamites de 1905 à 1918,” which Louis Marty
had produced for Governor General Albert Sarraut.355 On September 8, Bride requested copies
of several works attributed to Phan Bội Châu in various reports and legal judgments.356 Perhaps
feeling the need to justify his fresh round of document requests, Bride explained to Robin:

I have the opportunity to report how difficult the task of the Criminal Commission has
been made by the attitude of the accused who, to each charge raised against him,
systematically opposes a formal denial, unless evidence is provided to him. Furthermore,
he pretends to ignore the names of the most exiles and important members of his party
until the [Chinese] characters of the names are put before his eyes. Often, he even
quibbles with Annamese pronunciations of surnames and only recognizes them when
given the Chinese translation.

Concerning his works, [the accused] claims that they were only a means of earning a
living. He claims to have had no thought of putting revolutionary propaganda into them
and he refuses to admit ever having called for murders, banditry, or revolts. It cannot
escape you what importance I attach to being able to present him with the aforementioned
works. He will deny their existence if they do not appear in the file, and I will be very
grateful to you for agreeing to order the research been done so that they can be sent to
me.357

Bride’s plaintive request to Robin is triply revealing. First, it was not enough to know
Phan Bội Châu was lying; Bride needed him to admit to facts. This demonstrates the seriousness
with which Bride and the Criminal Commission approached the administration of justice.
Second, Bride was aware of Robin’s impatience and no doubt understood that his superior
needed the trial completed quickly, just as much as he needed it completed lawfully. Third, Phan
Bội Châu’s strategies of obfuscation and denial were indeed highly successful at delaying the
trial, thus forcing the Criminal Commission’s dual imperatives of justice and efficiency into
mutual competition.
For a week, surprisingly little happened. Robin did not respond to Bride’s request, Bride
neglected to restart the interrogation sessions, and Phan Bội Châu sat in his cell. Outside the
Central Prison, however, the case was beginning to draw more and more attention. On August
29, the same day the trial began, the Hanoi anti-colonial magazine L’Argus Indochinois managed
by Amédée Clementi published an article titled “Une grave question: L’arrestation de Phan Bội
Châu et sa mise en jugement.”358 Clementi, who wrote the article himself, called into question

Đình Phát arrived in Vinh after Phan Bội Châu had left the country. SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle No. 1073, Chef
de la Sûreté en Annam (Sogny) à le Directeur des Affaires Politiques et de la Sûreté Générale au Gouvernement
Généeral Hanoi, 1 octobre 1925.
355
SPCE 355, L’Inspecteur des Affaires politiques et administratives, Président de al Commission
Criminelle, à M. le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, No. 82, 7 septembre 1925. For the report Bride requested, see
GGI 65514, “L’agitation anti-française dans les Pays Annamites de 1905 à 1918”
356
SPCE 355, L’Inspecteur des Affaires politiques et administratives, Président de al Commission
Criminelle, à M. le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, No. 86, 8 septembre 1925. The works requested were: “Hoang
Phan Tai,” “Ky Niem Luc,” and “Sung Bai Giai Nhon.”
357
Ibid.
358
SPCE 355, L’Argus Indochinois, “Une grave question: L’arrestation de Phan Bội Châu et sa mise en

93
the French colonial government’s actions and warned that should Phan Bội Châu die in prison,
the entirety of north-central Vietnam could see a firestorm of bloodletting. Clementi also noted
that Phan Bội Châu had been illegally captured on Chinese territory, provided the fake name
Tran Van Duc, under which Dupuy and Jeanbrau had registered Phan Bội Châu in the Central
Prison, and lambasted the authorities for attempting to conceal Phan Bội Châu’s identity.
Finally, Clementi pointed out the hypocrisy of a such measures being taken by a state that
professed to represent the ideals of the French Revolution. It was a damning critique that soon
found a receptive native audience. On September 5, the progressive Vietnamese journalist
Nguyễn Phan Long re-printed a portion of the L’Argus Indochinois article359 in L’Écho
Annamite, a French-language daily he managed in Saigon with a circulation of 3,500. This
marked the beginning of active Saigonese interest in Phan Bội Châu’s fate.
Meanwhile, in Paris, the anti-colonial bimonthly magazine le Paria made the subject into
the front-page headline for its September-October 1925 edition: “Vive Pham-Boï-Chau!”360 The
metropole had come alive to Phan Bội Châu’s arrest and fate. On September 4, the Paris-based
journalist and activist Nguyễn Thế Truyền penned a letter to accompany the July 23 petition sent
to him by Jeune Annam. He then carefully formatted both documents, added the Union
Intercoloniale letterhead, and printed massive numbers of both. Within weeks, this aesthetically
stunning document, often accompanied by copies of le Paria, would begin to appear by post
throughout Indochina and other French colonies.361 If the French colonial authorities wanted to
bring Phan Bội Châu to justice, their time was running out.
What was holding up the trial? Bride and Robin had reached an impasse. Bride wanted
to adequately prepare for his next encounter with the slippery Phan Bội Châu. This meant Bride
needed more documents, and time to review those he already had. His superior Réne Robin,
however, was furious with Bride’s delays and decided to put a lid on Bride’s endless document
requests. On September 18, Robin categorically denied Bride’s request for Louis Marty’s report
“L’agitation antifrancaise dans les Pays Annamites de 1905 à 1918.” According to Robin, the
report had been prepared for security officials’ eyes only and contained nothing of judicial
value.362 The fact that Bride was a first-class inspector of political and administrative affairs
himself did not matter as he had requested the document in his capacity as an officer of the court.

⁠
jugement,” 29 août 1925.
359
SPCE 354BIS, Revue de la presse d’Indochine, ““Une grave question: L’arrestation de Phan Bội Châu
et sa mise en jugement.” L’Écho Annamite, 5 Septembre 1925. For a description of the politics and journalist
practices of L’Écho Annamite, see Peycam, Philippe M. The Birth of Vietnamese Political Journalism: Saigon
1916-1930 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 92-100, 159-164.
360
SPCE 354BIS, Le Paria, Nos. 36 et 37, Septembre-Octobre 1925.
361
SPCE 355 contains dozens of copies of Nguyễn Thế Truyền’s letter with the Jeune Annam petition
attached. An example of many indicating just how widespread Nguyễn Thế Truyền’s mailing campaign was comes
from the head of the Sûreté in Cambodge, who reported on October 13, “Many printed copies of Union
Intercoloniale petitioning in favor of Phan Bội Châu addressed to journal Echo du Cambodge.” SPCE 355, Chef
Sûreté à Chef Sûreté Tonkin en Communication à Chef Sûreté Saigon et Dirsurgé Hanoi, 13 octobre 1925. See also
SPCE 354BIS, M. le Directeur des Affaires Politiques et de la Sûreté Générale du Gouvernement Général, Suite à
mes notes No.s 655-SB, 458-S, 474-S, et 478-S des 20, 28 octobre et 8 novembre 1924, 24 octobre 1925. See also
SPCE 354BIS, Chef Sûreté Annam à M. le Chef du S.C.R. et S.G. Hanoi, Suite à votre note confidentielle 755-SB du
9 courant, 14 octobre 1925. See also SPCE 354BIS, Chef Sûreté Tonkin a Chefs Sûreté Pnom Pneh, Saigon etc.,
No. 6437, 12h10, 12 octobre 1925.
362
SPCE 355, Le Gougal p.i., Commandeur de la Légion d’Honneur à M. le Resident Superieur p.i. au
Tonkin, 18 septembre 1925.

94
Concerned that Bride was spending more time requesting documents than using them, Robin
used the only lever available to him: exercising administrative privilege to force Bride back to
work.
The Trial, Phase 2: (September 16-September 26)
When Phan Bội Châu and the Criminal Commission met again on September 16, both
sides immediately reprised their strategies. The prosecutor began by challenging Phan Bội Châu
on his date of departure from Nghệ An by citing his wife Nguyen Thi Thuyet’s testimony from
the Tribunal of Vinh held in February 1910.363 Phan Bội Châu admitted he had committed an
error regarding the date of departure. Not long passed, however, before Phan Bội Châu claimed
that Liang Qichao had written nine-tenths of Việt Nam vong quốc sử.364 Bride questioned Phan
Bội Châu on his employment history and how much money he had received from Cường Để.
Phan Bội Châu provided perfunctory answers, but generally remained noncommittal until
offering the utterly implausible claim that he had worked for a journal in Shanghai from 1909
uninterrupted through to 1913. “It is exactly correct,” Phan Bội Châu affirmed, “that I was
nothing more than a journalist and that my only source of income came from my work as a
journalist.”365
Unable to make headway concerning Phan Bội Châu’s source of funds, in the evening the
prosecutor questioned him about reputation he had acquired as a fiery writer. To this, Phan Bội
Châu suggested that Liang Qichao had manufactured a reputation for by publishing Việt Nam
vong quốc sử in his name. After this, readers may simply have assumed writings were by him,
but that did not mean he was the true author. When the prosecutor returned to the Đông Du
movement, Phan Bội Châu again made every effort to portray himself as a distant, barely
connected literary figure. He lived in Yokohama, while the Đông Văn Thư Viện school was
located in Tokyo. He visited it, Phan Bội Châu claimed, just two times during his five years in
Japan.366
On September 17, Phan Bội Châu softened his position slightly. He was now willing to
admit to knowing some of the Đông Du students, especially those from Annam. He would admit
to knowing specific names, but entirely reject others. The same applied to pseudonyms
attributed to him. The flabbergasted prosecutor finally addressed Phan Bội Châu’s system of
responses:

How is it that after nearly twenty years away you can give us precise names of the
students from Annam and Tonkin, who you saw only five or six times during your stay in
Japan, and [also] those of Cochinchinese students who [you claim] never came to see
you? Your memory on these points is very faithful, while on the others it is uncertain and
your answers almost always contradictory?367

Yet Phan Bội Châu had an answer for this: he only remembered the names of students for
which he had seen the Chinese characters. The prosecutor, feeling lucky, pointed out that the
Cochinchinese did not know Chinese and thus could not have written their names. Phan Bội
Châu would not be outdone: “When the students from Annam came to visit me, they gave me the
363
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 33.
364
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 35.
365
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 38.
366
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 41.
367
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 44.

95
names of Cochinchinese and Tonkinese for whom they knew the characters.”368
The prosecutor decided to switch back to the technique that had garnered the best results
so far: citing testimony. In quick succession, the prosecutor cited testimony from Nguyễn Cẩm
Giang, Am-Voa, and Ngô Văn Chanh. This time, Phan Bội Châu was ready. To each man’s
testimony Phan Bội Châu now replied “I do not know this person…that is a lie.”369 This was,
essentially, an way of adapting of his strategy of denial to apply to the prosecutor’s strategy of
citing testimony. For the entire evening session, the prosecutor tried in vain to rattle Phan Bội
Châu using testimonies. However, Phan Bội Châu now seemed harder to hit than before. To
ensure the consistency of his story about being a simple journalist, Phan Bội Châu flatly denied
the testimonies of anyone and everyone who stated otherwise. Even a photograph of him and
Cường Để together failed to constitute evidence of their collaboration. “That proves nothing at
all,” stated Phan Bội Châu, “when fellow countrymen meet one another abroad, they take a
photograph!” By the end of the day on September 17, it began to look as though Bride’s massive
archive of documents amounted to little more than a heap of paper.
Alternative Realities: Proofs and Denials
The back-and-forth game of cat and mouse continued for weeks on end as both sides
settled into their routines. When the prosecutor caught Phan Bội Châu inadvertently admitting to
having left Japan for Shanghai,370 Phan Bội Châu nonchalantly dodged: “I thought you meant
long trips! My trip to Shanghai was only for a couple of days.”371 Flustered, the prosecutor
snapped, “Our questions are very precise and contain no ambiguity whatsoever…It is useless to
continue this comedy!”372 A similar exchange took place when the prosecutor attempted to work
out how many times and in which years Phan Bội Châu had met Phan Châu Trinh.373 Frequently,
the exasperated prosecutor incredulously blurted out something on the order of, “How can you,
before such categorical affirmations, always continue to deny [the truth]?”374 Deny he could and
368
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 45.
369
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 46-47.
370
To emphasize the prosecutor’s achievement, the transcript includes stage directions: “(thinking for a
long time, looking embarrassed, then declaring).”⁠ SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 45.
371
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 46.
372
Ibid.
373
Example: Prosecutor: “Which letter did your interview with PCT cover?”
Phan Bội Châu: “It was concerning my brochure Lamentations for Formosa Under Japanese Rule and not my letter
"Advice for Young Men to go Study Abroad.”
Prosecutor: “It is you who are now creating the confusion! Our question concerned the letter written by you from
Japan to your compatriots to engage them to go to school. You replied that you had an interview in Hue with Phan
Chau Trinh regarding this letter. As you have always claimed that you did not return to Annam subsequent to your
departure for Japan, you locate this interview in 1903 and you now say that it was on your pamphlet Lamentations
for Formosa. You are looking for an escape. We understood you very well and your answer concerned only the
teaching, but you immediately realized that it was possible to deduce from this interview with Phan Chau Trinh in
Hue regarding a letter you wrote in Japan and handed over to Tang Bat Ho when he returned from Japan to Annam
in the middle of 1905, that you returned to Annam and especially to Hue in the course of 1905 after having left at
the beginning of the first month of 1905.
Phan Bội Châu: “I maintain that this was my work Lamentation for Formosa that occasioned my interview with
PCT. The confusion that has arisen is due to the fact that I did not sufficiently elaborate on this book that I wanted to
discuss in my previous answer.” SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 79.
374
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 81. Later on, the prosecutor even attempted to list
Phan Bội Châu’s standard reactions: “You have been kept informed, while abroad, of the declarations and
confessions of individuals arrested and brought before the courts, if not completely, at least sufficiently to prepare
your defense. And when the questions embarrass you, you answer: ‘That's false.’ ‘This information is pure

96
deny he did. When the prosecutor pointedly noted that all of the statements Phan Bội Châu had
denied corresponded with one another, despite having been made before different courts on
different dates, Phan Bội Châu flippantly retorted, “These are all hearsay. One could well say
that I was the Emperor of China.”375
Phan Bội Châu was quick to point out any inconsistencies or errors in the testimonies
cited by the prosecutor. After the prosecutor cited one Dang Trung Ngo’s 1915 declaration
before a judge in Phú Thọ that a person named “Dan” had reported receiving orders from “[Li]
Yuanhong and Phan Bội Châu,” Phan Bội Châu immediately fired back, “This declaration is
ridiculous! Li Yuanhong is a great leader of the Chinese Republic. It would be very difficult for
me to approach him. This statement proves that the people playing games with me simply built
stories upon words they heard from here.”376 Having put with the prosecutor repeatedly accusing
him of contradictions, Phan Bội Châu began to do the same back. When the prosecutor cited Le
Duc Nhuan (aka Le Ba Chiet)’s statement that Hoàng Trọng Mậu had served as Phan Bội Châu’s
secretary, Phan Bội Châu gleefully pointed out, “Previously someone had said that I had Phan Bá
Ngọc as a secretary. Now they just said it was Hoàng Trọng Mậu. This is a contradiction.”377
The prosecutor’s attempt to explain that a person could have more than one secretary only
underscored the danger of the trial becoming a farce.
Because Bride’s case was largely dependent upon testimonies, the prosecutor introduced
several names repeatedly over the course of the trial. If only Phan Bội Châu’s relentless denials
could be somehow dealt with, the testimony of these individuals would be damning. One
individual the prosecutor cited frequently was the Ấm Võ (aka Lê Võ), a native of Hà Tĩnh born
1871 who played a major role in the domestic operations of Phan Bội Châu’s Modernization
Association. Ấm Võ was arrested January 16, 1912 in Hanoi and subsequently revealed a
considerable amount of information about the organization’s infrastructure and personnel.378 The
prosecutor used Ấm Võ’s testimony to assert, for example, that Phan Bội Châu and Cường Để
had collaborated to construct an elaborate system of correspondence and subscription-based
funding for the Đông Du movement.379 The prosecutor also drew on Ấm Võ’s words as evidence
for Phan Bội Châu’s secretive dealings with the Chinese leaders Sun Yatsen and Zhang
Binglin.380 Ấm Võ’s statements often elicited furious denunciations from Phan Bội Châu, who

invention.’ ‘It's a pure lie.’ ‘It's a statement to harm me.’ ‘I do not know where such has taken such inventions.’
‘This information is incorrect.’ ‘It's revenge.’ ‘CD said that to my accuser.’ ‘This deposition is meant to cover for
CD.’ SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 88. Still later, the prosecutor argued, “We cannot catch
you on the important points because you only offer denials, but on the whole your lies prove that you do not tell the
truth.” SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 234.
375
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 84.
376
Li Yuanhong (黎元洪) served as vice-president of the Republic of China 1912-1916 and as president of
the Republic of China 1916-1917 and 1922-1923. Phan Bội Châu may have received some support from Li
Yuanhong, but there is nothing to support Dan’s claim that Li Yuanhong was directing rebel activities inside French
Indochina.
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 85.
377
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 84.
378
Despite how forthcoming he had been, Ấm Võ was sentenced to life imprisonment and served 15 years
on Poulo Condore island. Morlat, Patrice, Les Affaires politiques de l’Indochine (1895-1923): Les grands commis:
du savoir au pouvoir (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1995), 135.
379
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 54.
380
Example: “This is what Am Vo said on the 11th of the 3rd month of the 6th year of Duy Tan during his
interrogation (Piece 31, Dossier 1925 B): ‘During my stay in HK, I met PBC at commercial house Ich Sanh. [Phan

97
called them “completely false,” “a pure invention on his part,” and “something he made up in his
own defense.”381
Other figures whose testimonies appear frequently throughout the trial transcript include
Nguyễn Bá Trác, Nguyễn Cẩm Giang, and Phan Bá Ngọc. Nguyễn Bá Trác was arrested in
1914382 and gave testimony in November of that year. He went on to become a collaborator of
the French regime known for his work Louis Marty and Phạm Quỳnh on the conservative journal
Nam Phong.383 Nguyễn Cẩm Giang (aka Nguyễn Hải Thần, aka Võ Hải Thu) made statements to
the French resident of Hà Đông in September 1908, but apparently avoided detention and who
went on to become a key figure in the nationalist movement.384 Phan Bá Ngọc, the son of Phan
Đình Phùng and Phan Bội Châu’s close confidante during much of his time in Japan and China,
offered information to the Sûreté of Tonkin after his arrest in April 1918.385 Phan Bá Ngọc was
murdered in 1922 by Lê Hồng Sơn, at the order of Cường Để.386 Several Cochinchinese
partisans affiliated with Cường Để make numerous appearances, including Bùi Chí Nhuận
(interrogated May 1913)387 and Đặng Bỉnh Thành (interrogated December 1915).388
As Phan Bội Châu continued to deny most of the testimonies produced by the prosecutor,
he nevertheless found it necessary to elaborate an alternative explanation for the preponderance
of evidence. This meant laying the blame at the feet of Cường Để, who Phan Bội Châu
increasingly began to depict as a strategic mastermind. During the evening session of September
18, Phan Bội Châu claimed “Since the majority of the money that Cường Để received in Japan
came from Cochinchina, he had to say to the students from that country who were returning

Bội Châu] told me that he had just made a trip with Sun Yatsen from the Siamese capital to Hong Kong on an
American boat.’ ‘Do you know,’ Sun Yatsen told him while passing by Haiphong and pointing at it, ‘that this place
will later become the subject of the argument?’ ‘Would you also [consider taking],” [Phan Bội Châu] asked Sun
Yatsen, laughing, ‘Tonkin, where there are many fertile plains and a lot of resources?’ ‘No,’ replied SYS, ‘I do not
want the land interests, rather [I want] the maritime interests. Haiphong is a port of the French Protectorate but it is
the throat of the provinces of Guangdong and Guangxi. To have troops ready to embark later on, it will be necessary
to station them in Haiphong and Guangzhouwan. A base will be established in Guangzhouwan, the warships will
be stationed in Haiphong, then even the European torpedoers will not be able to pass. Haiphong is a place that will
be needed to form up armies.”SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 86-87. This is the only reference
I have found to such a journey and conversation. This may have been an invention of Phan Bội Châu, or of Ấm Võ
himself. For additional testimony from Ấm Võ regarding Phan Bội Châu’s interactions with Sun Yatsen and Zhang
Binglin, see Ibid, 55-56.
381
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 55, 77. Ấm Võ’s testimony suggests he played a
much larger role in the Modernization Association than Phan Bội Châu was later willing to admit in his
Autobiography. Ấm Võ’s name appears only twice in NB, though three times in NTT. Phan Bội Châu, Overturned
Chariot, 71, 78. Phan Bội Châu, “Prison Notes,” Reflections from Captivity, 16, 43, 48.
382
In 1917, Nguyễn Bá Trác worked with Louis Marty and Phạm Quỳnh on the conservative journal Nam
Phong.
383
Le Jariel, Yves, Phan Bội Châu, 188-189. After Phan Bội Châu was granted amnesty and the ability to
live in Huế, he was initially placed in Nguyễn Bá Trác’s residence. Disgusted by Nguyễn Bá Trác and unhappy
with these living arrangements, Phan Bội Châu and supporters moved quickly to buy a separate property to move
into in 1926.
384
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 57, 60.
385
On September 26, for example, the prosecutor cited a statement made by Phan Bá Ngọc over 1000
words long covering his activities in Japan during the Đông Du movement. SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu:
Interrogatoires, 91-93.
386
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 51, 57. See Phan Bội Châu, Overturned Chariot,
251. Phan Bội Châu uses an alternative name for Lê Hồng Sơn: Lê Tản Anh.
387
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 48, 78.
388
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 49.

98
home that, ‘If ever you are asked about what I do in Japan, you put it all on Phan Bội Châu.’
Voila! This is the origin of all the accusations against me.”389 Phan Bội Châu further alleged
that students had left Indochina for Japan with the intention of joining Cường Để to obtain
positions in the government the prince would create when he became emperor.390 Phan Bội Châu
also made Cường Để responsible for claiming Phan Bội Châu as his secretary, for using Phan
Bội Châu’s name to publish incendiary literature, and for orchestrating the myriad testimonies
which he was now being called upon to account for.391 As the interrogations proceeded, it
became clear that Phan Bội Châu was either the target of an absolutely colossal conspiracy
organized by Cường Để, or simply lying through his teeth.
It is not hard to see why Phan Bội Châu wanted to deny the mounting testimonies. The
story woven by the prosecutor out of many threads of testimony was decidedly unfavorable to
Phan Bội Châu. The prosecutor cited testimony from former students who claimed Phan Bội
Châu had taken from them their parents’ money, supposedly to pay for living and educational
expenses, but later refused to give it back when the director of the Đông Văn school expelled
them for failure to pay tuition.392 After taking the students’ money, the prosecutor affirmed, “All
declare that you [Phan Bội Châu] then completely lost interest in them.”393 Many former
students testified they either never met Cường Để, or encountered him only once or twice.394 In
contrast, many former students emphasized the role of Võ Mẫn Kiến, who facilitated the
movement of students, money, and pamphlets through a boarding house he managed in Hong
Kong.395 Cochinchinese also pointed to Gilbert Chieu’s efforts to send them abroad.396 The

389
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 62.
390
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 66.
391
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 85.
392
Examples include the testimonies of Phạm Dat Tam, Trần Tiên Dong, Nguyễn Vân Nghiên, Nguyễn
Văn Tai, and Nguyễn Thanh Liêm. The transcript indicates all of these testimonies were found in the Gilbert Chieu
dossier (Nos. 1288-1296) . SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 64-65. After numerous testimonies
of this sort, the prosecutor recapped: “From this statement and those preceding, we know that young people who
wanted to go to Japan stole their parent's money, but they were then driven away from school in Tokyo because their
tuition was not paid. Pham Van Yen (File 1283), Luu Quan Bac (File 1282), Nguyen Van De (File 1281), Truong
Van Chi (File 1281) made identical declarations before the Investigating Judge of Mytho (File MPc / Gilbert Chieu).
They were taken to the Dong Van School in Tokyo. PBC took their money from them: 250 piastres for Pham Van
Yen, 70 piastres for [Luu Quan] Bac, 150 piastres for [Nguyen Van] De, which his parents gave him, 200 piastres
for [Truong Van] Chi, which he stole from his father.” Ibid, 71.
393
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 71.
394
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 61-62, 72.
395
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 64. Phan Bội Châu alludes to Võ Mẫn Kiến’s role
as a “local agent” in NB, but provides no indication of just how significant he was for the Modernization
Association and Đông Du movement. Phan Bội Châu, Overturned Chariot, 116.
396
Example: “In his interrogation of October 29, 1908 (Cote 1314, File MPc / Gilbert Chieu) one named
Chau Van Qui declared the following concerning the house in HK where the emigres gathered. ‘Arriving at HK, I
handed this letter to a Tonkinese by the name Vo Man Kien. This Tonkinese runs a kind of halfway house in HK
(Kowloon) under the sign of the nine dragons. It is to the home of this Tonkinese fellow that the Annamites come to
change their clothes and hairstyles for their journey to Japan. To get there you have to show a letter signed by
Chieu, and when you go to Japan the proprietor also stamps your letter. If I had not done so, they'd have kicked me
out. Moreover, Vo Man Kien received formal orders from Chieu. He must confiscate money and the letters of those
who would turn back without going to Japan. It would indeed be too easy to ask Chieu for money for the restoration
of the throne of Annam and to take advantage of it to simply pay for a leisure trip to HK with funds for the
education and recruitment of Annamites of good will. It was to avoid this that Chieu had this measure taken.
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 68.

99
leader of the Đông Du movement, the students all agreed, was Phan Bội Châu.
Not only had Phan Bội Châu been responsible for the Đông Du movement, the prosecutor
alleged, he had been a poor leader in every sense. On September 21, the prosecutor addressed
Phan Bội Châu’s failure to act morally responsible as a leader:

You would receive the money and leave the students who had been attracted by the
beautiful promises made to them before they left. All those who came to Japan in 1908
are unanimous in saying that they knew only you who received them, took them to
school, and took and kept their money. At that time you were 40 to 42 years old. These
young people were on average 20 years of age, one of them, Nguyen Van Truyen, was
even a child. They were abandoned on the Tokyo pavement. It even happened that some
who immediately expressed the intention of returning to Indochina were prevented from
doing so by all sorts of means, including threats.397

The prosecutor went on to cite testimony from students claiming to have been threatened
with death should they attempt to leave Japan or extorted for more money before being allowed
to return.398 Phan Bội Châu responded by alleging that all of the former students’ testimonies
had been coerced, prepared, or inspired by Cường Để.399
When it came to Phan Bội Châu’s ulterior motives for pursuing the Đông Du movement,
the prosecutor’s picture of Phan Bội Châu darkened even more. The educational goals of the
Đông Du movement were nothing but a smokescreen, the prosecutor alleged. Phan Bội Châu’s
real intention was to train up an army of Vietnamese youth, indoctrinate them with violent, racist,
and revolutionary rhetoric, and send them back to massacre all of the French in Indochina.400 To

397
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 71.
398
Example 1: “Ngo Van Phai, in his declaration of October 13, 1908 (File 1521.18 of the Dossier MPc /
Gilbert Chieu), a statement which you will be able to read and which we will quote you entirely, describes his
travels in Japan. We extract only the following passage : ‘When we arrived, we were asked to hand over all the
money we had in our possession before we started our studies, to prove that we were planning to stay in. I did not
want to consent to being treated that way and I refused to hand over my money. Neither Huynh nor But received
theirs back. Two or three days later I saw the young royal prince of Annam who told me that he intended to replace
the child who had been placed on Annam's throne and was going to reconquer Indochina. Frightened, I consulted
with Huynh and But leaving as soon as possible. When they learned about it, they threatened to assassinate us.
Huynh said we were too old to still be students. Huynh and But left with young Tan, but without me. I was forced to
give them a hundred piastres to let me go. The prince gave me his photograph with a dedication. This photograph is
still at home in a hiding place. I could give it to you.’”
Example 2: “To Van Huynh, November 8, 1908 (File 1114, MPc / Gilbert Chieu) declared, ’12 days later, having
shown the intention to go back to Saigon, my comrades did everything they could to prevent me and to keep me in
Tokyo. They even went so far as to lock my luggage in a room in the Hotel we lived in and which served as a store.
They charged two of them with watching and following me wherever I went, etc. On the 14th day after my arrival in
Tokyo, I succeeded in taking the first train to Kobe.’
The same To Van Huynh, in the same declaration: "At that time I was convinced that I had been dealing in Japan
with members of a secret society and I was convinced that one day or another, we would would try to kill me.’”
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 71-72.
399
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 72.
400
Example 1: “The truth is that to succeed in your projects you needed a name sufficiently well-known in
Indochina to entice both the Annamese of North and South. You alone would have been unable to draw in the
money you needed. That's why you put forth Cuong De, who, in your mind, would only be an instrument in your
hands to attract young people to you. The [ostensible] goal was to have study them in Japan. However, the secret
design, unveiled only to the most diehard, was to inspire in them a hatred of the Protectorate and the Royal

100
support this allegation, the prosecutor cited the testimony of Bùi Chí Nhuận, Lê Văn Hà, and Ấm
Võ, all of whom claimed to have heard Phan Bội Châu explain this secret plan firsthand.401 Phan
Bội Châu denied having taken part in such conversations.
The prosecutor next turned to the Modernization Association’s activities inside Indochina
to further substantiate his representation of Phan Bội Châu as an “unscrupulous
megalomaniac.”402 As he had done for the Đông Du movement, the prosecutor now sought to
prove Phan Bội Châu was the real leader of the Modernization Association. He cited the
testimonies of individuals who claimed Phan Bội Châu, and not Cường Để or any other person,
had called the shots.403 The prosecutor used testimony to connect Phan Bội Châu to both the
Đông Kinh Nghĩa Thục (Dong Kinh Free School) in Hanoi and Gilbert Chieu’s Hotel Minh Tân
in Mỹ Tho.404 To bolster his revolutionary movement, the prosecutor argued, Phan Bội Châu had
also connected with existing secret societies, or else ordered that ones be created.405 Drawing on
testimonies obtained in the aftermath of the 1908 tax protests, the prosecutor alleged Phan Bội
Châu had sought to obtain funding from Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina by any means
necessary. This included encouraging his subordinates and followers to create subscription lists,

Government in Hue by promising them a privileged appointment in the future government once the French were
expelled from Indochina and a new dynasty established on the throne of Annam.”
Example 2: “We have plenty of evidence that the instruction of the emigres focused in particular on their military
training. We have already given you a lot of evidence. We will add the statements of Nguyen Van Chung of
November 16, 1908 before the Investigating Judge of Mytho (Piece 1388, File MPc / Gilbert Chieu). We will quote
that of Duong Minh Thanh of November 17, 1908 before the Investigating Judge of Mytho (Piece 1391, File MPc /
Gilbert Chieu). [Duong Minh Thanh] declares that Bui Chi Nhuan said to him: "This is the instruction that we will
give to the young Annamese in Japan. Sao Nam Tu is there. He is a very capable man and, thanks to him, when the
Annamites have been sufficiently educated, they will come back to Cochinchina to drive out the French." On the
occasion of this interrogation, the Judge in Mytho learned that the word ‘work’ is a conventional term which means
"studies of military art.”
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 66, 77.
401
Example: “Am-Vo declared in March 1912 to the Resident of Hatinh (Piece 26, File B 1925) that the
revolutionary program involved the work of the present, the future and the ‘given moment.’ The task for the present
is to send young people to Japan to learn the military arts, the diplomatic arts, and administration, as well as ‘all the
necessary trades, and finally the language of England.’ The work of the future will be the success of the efforts that
stimulate the present labor. The work of the ‘given moment’ is the publication of books and their distribution in
Annam. Thanks to the Chinese newspapers, this is the reasoning most clearly visible to readers. It is the alliance
with Japan and friendly relations with big and powerful nations. It is the formal notice of the regency council to ask
the Protectorate for the independence of the country. This is why, adds Am-Vo, that PBC wrote to his classmates,
Dang Thai Than, Pham Tinh (aka Cu Tinh), Tu Ngon, Tu Kien, and others, inviting them to form
societies/companies.”
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 77. See also Ibid, 58-59.
402
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 76.
403
Example 1: “Nguyen Quang Hao, on July 5, 1913 in front of the CC of 1913, Cote 345, File F, said:
‘The leader of the revolutionary party is indisputably PBC, who has the upper hand over everything. It is he who
gives instructions to the different groups in China. Then comes CD, etc.’”
Example 2: “You were the real acting leader, with lieutenants to execute your orders. We see this from the
declaration of Nguyen Khac Can made on May 17, 1913 before the CC (Cote 29, Dossier D). He said: ‘The one
who pushed me to act is PBC, who is the leader. Having arrived in Canton, I was not in direct contact with PBC,
but rather with one of his lieutenants whom I do not know.’”
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 81-82.
404
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 100-102 (DKNT), 109-111 (Gilbert Chieu).
405
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 99.

101
commit theft, and even engage in outright banditry and extortion.406 To maintain secrecy, the
prosecutor explained, Phan Bội Châu enforced a code of silence for all members of the
Modernization Association.407 Anyone who violated the code of silence or acted without having
first received orders from Phan Bội Châu, would be marked for death.408 The secret societies,
under Phan Bội Châu’s orders, had disseminated propaganda, created fake businesses to obtain
money, and murdered anyone who resisted or was suspected of spying on the movement.409 As
usual, Phan Bội Châu denied all of this.
Though Phan Bội Châu’s strategy of denying everything was clearly frustrating Bride to
no end, by the end of September 1925 the Criminal Commission was finally beginning to find
ways to rattle the old patriot. First, by citing so many testimonies from former friends and
compatriots, the prosecutor revealed to Phan Bội Châu the information-gathering capacity of the
French colonial security state. For every denial, there was yet another testimony. Second, Phan
Bội Châu was very likely unnerved by just how much information his former students,
companions, and operatives had given up to the French. The most alarming revelation in this
regard were the long, detailed statements made by Phan Bá Ngọc in 1918, which demonstrated to
Phan Bội Châu that his former protege had indeed been working closely with the Sûreté, as
Cường Để had suspected. Though it was taking far longer than Bride expected, the sheer
quantity of documents would eventually begin to weigh on Phan Bội Châu’s mind.
Third, in addition to the quantity of documents, Bride could not have helped but notice
that Phan Bội Châu’s reactions depended significantly on the quality of information. Certain
types of information provoked sincere responses from Phan Bội Châu. In particular, Phan Bội
Châu reacted with horrified repulsion to testimony directly tying him to violence. Phan Bội
Châu’s first reaction of this kind came in response to the prosecutor citing the testimony of
Nguyễn Khắc Cần, one of the bombers responsible for the 1913 attacks for which Phan Bội Châu

406
Example: “In his interrogation of January 18, 1910 conducted by the Resident of Hatinh (Piece No. 68,
File H 1925) the one named Que said that Cu Luong declares that while they were in Japan, CD and PBC often sent
letters to the rebels (of Hatinh). To this day, all the inhabitants of Nghe An send Tu Ngon the money which he then
hands over to Duoc No in HK, who hands it over to PBC. Just recently, PBC sent a letter complaining that so far he
has not received much of the money sent and he announces that many of the students who have finished their studies
can not go home [due to] lack of funds. Que adds that PBC demanded 40,000 piastres to meet the expenses of
weapons manufacture and that he heard from Am-Vo and Long Son that the moneybags in Nghe An have already
offered a lot of money and that it is necessary to open subscriptions in Hatinh.” SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu:
Interrogatoires, 75.
407
Example: “This code of silence must have been followed by the party members. When Nguyen Dao
Nam and Tuong Long met in the Hanoi prison in June 1913 to be heard by the Criminal Commission, the latter
[Tuong Long] made a gesture to his comrade and indicated to him that he had just written in the gravel with his foot.
Nam approached and saw the characters that in quoc ngu translate as ‘nhat tu bat ngon’ [ 一字不言], meaning ‘say
absolutely nothing, or we die’ (letter of June 23, 1913 Nguyen Dao Nam - Piece No. 81 and 82, File J 1913 ).”
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 77.
408
Example: “Nguyen Van Thong (aka Nguyen Van Dao) in his interrogation of November 19, 1915
before the Investigating Judge of Phu Tho (Exhibit 78 of the Phutho file) declared “Following the orders of Phan
Bội Châu, we formed a secret society called ‘Dong Bao’ (Blood Brothers) [with the goal of] helping each other to
reconquer the Annam empire and drive out the French. Anyone who independently attacks a place, a [district], or a
province before being ordered to do so by Phan Bội Châu will be punished with death by the spirits of Heaven and
Earth. Anyone who does not obey the chiefs and betray his oaths will also be punished with the same penalty and
will not have posterity. We will be supported by China and we will receive guns when necessary." SPCE 352,
Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 98.
409
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 99-100.

102
was now on trial. Phan Bội Châu emphatically denied knowing the name Nguyễn Khắc Cần and
stated:

I have told you many times that I never wanted to revolt against the Protectorate
government. If that had been my intention, I would have acted frankly without resorting
to these criminal means employed in part by this individual…I would say that [Nguyễn
Khắc Cần] obeys a group of evildoers who can be found inside the country, who want to
stir up trouble for personal reasons…By criminal means, I mean the savage methods
unworthy of a civilized man, which result in striking blindly. To these means I oppose
those of sound reason, which consist of a combination of efforts both on the Annamese
side and on the French side for the development of the country.410

Phan Bội Châu’s distinction between savage and civilized methods was both unprompted
and highly revealing. This statement amounted to a categorical rejection of the revolutionary
terrorism Phan Bội Châu had enthusiastically endorsed in his preface to Việt Nam nghĩa liệt sử
(A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs), in favor of the Franco-Vietnamese collaborationism he had
proposed in Pháp Việt đề huề (A Proposal for a Franco-Vietnamese Collaboration Policy).411
Not only did Phan Bội Châu now claim to disapprove of “savage methods,” he even appeared
willing to support a harsh government response. When the prosecutor described murders carried
out by the “Dong Bao” secret society in Binh Dinh, Phan Bội Châu protested, “If it was up to
me, all the members of these societies would be put to death.”412 For Bride, Phan Bội Châu’s
responses indicated that the revolutionary leader was happy to inspire or even order others to
undertake violence acts, but could not stomach the results when forced to confront them.413
Finally, Bride had one more trick up his sleeve. On September 26, he revealed for the
first time a new type of document: one of Phan Bội Châu’s own handwritten letters. Rejecting
the testimony of absent individuals was one thing, denying one’s own writing would require
another level of chutzpah entirely. According to the prosecutor, the letter in question, dated
November 1909, was written to Đội Quyên (battalion commander Quyên), and discussed
correspondence and money, Japan’s military strength, and “public vengeance.”414 The letter was

410
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 82.
411
Việt Nam nghĩa liệt sử included hagiographic accounts of two of the 1913 assassins Nguyễn Khắc Cần
and Nguyễn Thế Trung (aka Nguyễn Duy Hàn). See Chapter Two. Việt Nam nghĩa liệt sử and Pháp Việt đề huề
chính kiến thư are available in Phan Bội Châu Toàn Tập, Vol. 5 (Hue: Nhà xuất bản Thuận Hóa, 1999), 11-196,
197-206.
412
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 100. Phan Bội Châu: “I absolutely deny connection
to acts of murder and pillage.” SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 256.
413
In subsequent sessions, the prosecutor continued to provide evidence of terrible violence committed by
some 200 secret society members based in Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai, describing the burning of houses and
pagodas, forced hair-cutting, and murders, all with the intention of causing fear to encourage donations to the
revolutionary cause. SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 102-108, 254 The prosecutor: “The
Commission has determined it necessary for you to hear these facts and includes them in your interrogatory because
it is necessary for you to know why the native tribunals sentenced you.” SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu:
Interrogatoires, 258.
414
Example: “From all these statements, whatever you may say, it turns out that you were actively engaged
in creating and organizing the rebel party and that you were directing it with passion. Letters from you have been
seized, here is one. We read: ‘25th day of the 10th month of the year Ky Dau (November 1909) (Piece 67, File H
1925): "Dear friend Mr. Dai Dan [aka Đội Quyên] and my dear collaborators. For more than two months, I left the
East to arrange a very important affair. It is with great joy that I have received letters from inside the country

103
signed with a personal stamp of the characters “Sào Nam Châu (巢南珠),” a combination of
“Phan Bội Châu (潘佩珠)” and his frequent pseudonym “Sào Nam Tử (巢南子).” Phan Bội
Châu nevertheless denied the letter was his, claiming that he never had a personal stamp and that
someone else must have made a personal stamp with his name.415 If Bride was going to force
Phan Bội Châu to admit to organizing a revolution, he still needed to provide better evidence.
Trial Phase 3: October 2-October 19
The Criminal Commission paused again briefly between the sessions on September 26
and October 2. If Bride wanted more time, he was due for disappointment. Security officials
privy to intelligence and press reports could see that the Criminal Commission was racing
against a clock. On September 29, The Saigonese journalist Nguyễn Phan Long began to address
Phan Bội Châu’s captivity in his own editorials published in L’Écho Annamite.416 On October 8,
Nguyễn Phan Long followed this up by publishing the Jeune Annam petition which Nguyễn Thế
Truyền had mailed to the offices of periodicals throughout French Indochina, including L’Écho
Annamite.417 On October 12, correspondence began pouring in from all five Indochinese Sûreté
offices indicating that Nguyễn Thế Truyền’s letter had arrived at multiple locations.418 The Jeune
Annam petition had come full circle from Indochina to the metropole and now back again.419
Nguyễn Thế Truyền himself, meanwhile, had been very busy in Paris organizing a
meeting of the l’Union Intercoloniale to discuss the situation in Indochina and China. This
meeting, which took place on October 9, brought together 200 anti-colonial activists, including
150 Vietnamese, along with French, Chinese, and North Africans. Nguyễn Thế Truyền had even
invited Governor-General elect Varenne, who did not respond. Phan Bội Châu was named
honorary president of the Union, which voted to send two telegrams. One went to the Chinese
Nationalist Party in Canton addressing Phan Bội Châu’s arrest on sovereign Chinese territory and
calling on the Chinese and Indochinese peoples to unite against imperialism. The other was to be

informing me that you are all loyal, devoted, and striving together to raise money. It is also a pleasure to learn that
your courage is growing in vigor. Thanks to the strength of the war hawks, Japan is very powerful and, as I am
energetic, I asked our "boss" to send you letters of compliments. I beg you to kindly gather more courageous people
to increase our strength, all counsels must be cautious, courage must be constant, and the heart must always be just
and persevering. This is for public vengeance. Our country can be equal to Japan. All yours - signed Sao Nam Chau
(with the personal stamp).”’ SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 89-90. At the trial, Phan Bội Châu
claimed not to know Đội Quyên. Phan Bội Châu mentions Đội Quyên twice in NB, though does not indicate the
large role this individual apparently played in domestic military affairs. Phan Bội Châu, Overturned Chariot, 56,
78.
415
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 90.
416
SPCE 354BIS, Extrait, L’Écho Annamite, No. 391, “Du Communisme au Maboulisme,” 29 septembre
1925.
417
SPCE 354BIS, L’Écho Annamite, No. 492, “En Faveur de M. Phan-Boi-Chau,” 8 octobre 1925.
418
The editor of France-Indochine in Hanoi reported receiving a copy on October 12, along with another
copy addressed to Báo Đông Pháp. SPCE 355, Hand-written note addressed to Director of Cabinet M.Alberti, on
France-Indochine letterhead, 12 octobre 1925. See also SPCE 355, Chef Sûreté Tonkin a Chefs Sûreté Hue, Saigon,
Phnom-Penh, Vientiane, communication Sûreté Haiphong, No. 6432, 12 octobre 1925.
419
A secret cable from the Ministry of Colonies dated December 21, 1925 indicates that colonial security
officials were still trying to figure out the origins of the “Jeune Annam” petition, which purported to come from a
group of that name based in Hanoi. Monguillot had proposed that the petition was actual produced and sent by the
League of Oppressed Peoples, based in Canton. SPCE 355, Le Ministre des Colonies à M. le Gouverneur General
de l’Indochina Hanoi, “Envoi en Indochine par l’Union Intercoloniale d’une petition en faveur de Pham-Boi-
Chau,” 21 décembre 1925.

104
sent to Phan Bội Châu himself at his current address (Central Prison, Hanoi), declaring: “A large
number of your compatriots, together with their brothers from China, France, and different
colonies, having suffered the crimes of colonialism, send you the expression of their sympathy
and promise to do their utmost to tear you away from torture and death. Sino-Indochinese
Meeting, Paris.”420 The spectre of international and especially Chinese interest in Phan Bội
Châu’s detention cast a pall over the trial’s proceedings. Bride had to get moving, and fast.
Bride unfortunately was of precisely the wrong temperament and would not be rushed.
Bride was determined to prosecute the trial the right way: by forcing Phan Bội Châu to confess.
To do this, Bride knew he needed to prove Phan Bội Châu had written letters to known violent
offenders, making him ultimately responsible for their actions. Thus Bride continued to send out
document requests, though the nature of these changed: now he wanted original copies of Phan
Bội Châu’s works, both handwritten and in print. On September 26, Bride reminded Robin and
Monguillot of his request for three letters While Bride had received two, the third, written by
Phan Bội Châu for Néron on August 4 while in detention, was missing.421 Bride had originally
conveyed this letter to Néron, but he now wanted it back so the handwriting could be compared
with other letters purportedly written by Phan Bội Châu. Here again, the security services fought
against Bride’s request in an undated Sûreté note that claimed the letter was of a personal nature
and now constituted a restricted police document.422
Demonstrating the level of official anxiety over the trial’s management, on October 2
Interim Governor General Monguillot himself intervened to quash the rivalry between the
judiciary, represented by Bride, and the security services, represented by Robin, Jeanbrau, Gilles,
and Néron.423 Bride could have the letter, but he was not to include any of its contents in the trial
transcript, and he was required to return it to the archives of the Sûreté immediately after he was
finished with it. The subtext of Monguillot’s letter to Bride was clear: concentrate on the charges
related to 1913 attacks and prosecute the case! Though Bride agreed to return the letter, he
pointedly emphasized the importance of the letters for confirming Phan Bội Châu’s
handwriting.424 Not even Monguillot would be able to rush Bride, who was far from finished
with his requests.
The same day (October 5), Bride sent Monguillot an bigger demand: he needed another
interpreter. The interrogation of Phan Bội Châu, Bride explained, “has been rendered
particularly because of the continual denials which oblige the Commission to read and translate
numerous depositions, documents, and exhibits written in [Chinese] characters.”425 The court’s

420
SPCE 354BIS, Bordereau No. 177-SG du 21 janvier 1926 du S.C.R. & S.G. Hanoi, Note sur la
propagande revolutionnaire Interessant les pays d’outre-mer, “Les milieux coloniaux communistes de Paris.
L’Union Intercoloniale et le Paria.”
421
SPCE 355, L’Inspecteur des Affaires politiques et administratives, Président de la Commission
Criminelle à M. le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine, No. 121, A.s.de 3 lettres de P.B.C. communiquées
confidentiellement & à titre personnel à M. le Gouverneur Général & à M. le Secrétaire Général, 26 septembre
1925.
422
SPCE 355, Service Central de Renseignements et de Sûreté Générale, Note, “Le Président de la
Commission Criminelle…,” undated.
423
SPCE 355, Le GGI de l’IC, Commandeur de la Légion d’Honneur, à M. le Président de la Commission
Criminelle, No. 2573-SG, 2 octobre 1925.
424
SPCE 355, L’Inspecteur des Affaires politiques et administratives, Président de la Commission
Criminelle à M. le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine, No. 124, 5 octobre 1925.
425
SPCE 355, L’Inspecteur des Affaires politiques et administratives, Président de la Commission
Criminelle à M. le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine (Sous le couvert de M. le Résident Superieur au Tonkin), No.

105
interpreter Gombaud Saintonge simply could not keep up with the workload, so Bride asked for
an Vietnamese interpreter. He already knew who he wanted as well: District Magistrate Bùi
Bằng Đoàn, known for his probity and discretion.426 Willing at this point to do anything that
would move the trial forward, Monguillot agreed and appointed Bùi Bằng Đoàn as the court’s
second interpreter on October 9.427
The request to hire Bùi Bằng Đoàn demonstrated the lengths Bride was willing to go to in
his pursuit of justice. It was also a strong indicator of the clerical problems facing the Criminal
Commission as it struggled to prosecute a case dependent on evidence in at least three different
languages. In addition to another interpreter, Bride needed additional institutional support. On
October 7, Bride requested original copies of Việt Nam vong quốc sử (History of the Loss of
Vietnam) and Hải ngoại huyết thư (A Letter from Overseas Written in Blood), as well as certified
copies of translations by Mr. Maybon of the l’Ecole Française d’Extrême-Orient (EFEO). To
ensure there was no confusion, Bride cited long portions of each work in his eight-page
request.428 This request too, was granted.
As the trial entered October 1925, Bride’s strategy of relentlessly throwing documents
and testimonies in Phan Bội Châu’s face began to produce at least one result: Phan Bội Châu
now talked less than before. The prosecutor, meanwhile, began to cite longer and longer
documents, often reading aloud several pages at a time. Phan Bội Châu continued to deny the
prosecutor’s accusations, but his denials now grew more bitter and, increasingly, more legally
adroit. For example, at the end of a very long day on October 2, Phan Bội Châu stated:

You accuse me of lacking courage because I blame Cường Để. I accept this reproach, but
wouldn’t I be more courageous in lying to the Commission? I will tell you things as I
know them. If, after my arrest, the Government had used its authority to execute me
according to the judgment delivered by the Criminal Commission of 1913, I would have
suffered my sentence without protesting. Since you give me the means to defend myself,
I will use them.429

Having recognized that Bride needed to conduct the trial according to rules of evidence
and testimony, Phan Bội Châu began to adapt his arguments into something approximating a
legal defense. This complicated Bride’s approach considerably. Just as the prosecutor was now
getting to the most damning evidence, Phan Bội Châu was refining his defense and becoming
much more careful with his answers. Since Phan Bội Châu refused to simply admit to inciting
revolution or violence, Bride had little choice but to prove his case to the Criminal Commission
itself by citing his way through the archive he had amassed.
The prosecutor began the month with an incredibly long interrogation session on October

125, 5 octobre 1925.

426
According to his son, Bùi Tín, Bùi Bằng Đoàn had previously served as a judge in Ninh Bình and as
governor of Cao Bằng and Bắc Ninh. In 1933, he became Minister of Justice for Emperor Bảo Đại and helped draft
the Criminal and Civil codes of law for Annam. Bùi Tín, Following Ho Chi Minh: Memoirs of a North Vietnamese
Colonel (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1995), 7.
427
SPCE 355, Le Gouverneur General P.I. de L’Indochine, Commandeur de la Légion d’Honneur
(Monguillot), Arrete, No. 3797, 9 octobre 1925.
428
SPCE 355, L’Inspecteur des Affaires politiques et administratives, Président de la Commission
Criminelle à M. le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine (Service Central des Renseignements et de la Sûreté
Générale au Gouvernement Général), Object: demandes communication des brochures de P.B.C., 7 octobre 1925.
429
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 120.

106
2.430 Wrapping up the events of 1908 inside Indochina, the prosecutor addressed the violence
associated with tax revolts in Annam, the 1908 Hanoi Poison plot, and a variety of other
conspiracies.431 On October 3, the prosecutor moved on to address the activities of the Việt Nam
Quang Phục Hội (Vietnam Restoration Society) and several supposedly affiliated organizations
in 1912-1913.432 After this, the prosecutor doubled back to address how and why Phan Bội Châu
had been deported from Japan in 1909.433
After October 5, however, the prosecutor shifted his focus to Phan Bội Châu’s works
written and published during the period he was in Japan (1905-1909.434 These included Khuyến
quốc dân tư trợ du học văn (An Appeal to My Fellow Countrymen to Provide Financial Support
for Overseas Studies),435 Hải ngọai huyết thư (A Letter from Overseas Written in Blood),436 Việt
Nam vong quốc sử (History of the Loss of Vietnam),437 Tân Việt Nam (The New Vietnam),438 Kỷ
niệm lực (A Record of Memories),439 Việt Nam quốc sử khảo (A Study of Vietnamese History),440
Sùng bái giai nhân (A Tribute to Shining Lives)441, Ai cáo Nam Kỳ phụ lão văn (A Sorrowful
Appeal to the Elders of Cochinchina),442 Trần Đông Phong truyện (The Life of Trần Đông

430
The majority of sessions produced between five and eight pages of transcript. The session on October 2
produced twenty-three pages. SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 100-122.
431
These included secret support provided by seditious mandarins, propaganda encouraging domestic
workers to kill their (French) employers, and a a planned massacre of all Europeans in Hanoi. According to the
prosecutor, the organizations involved were the Đông Kinh Nghĩa Thục, the Đông Tân Hưng, the Đông Lợi Tế, and
the Đông Thành Xương. SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 114-115.
432
These included the Tam Thánh (Three Saints [Society]) and the Thiên Địa Hội (Heaven and Earth
Society). SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 123-127.
433
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 132-138.
434
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 138-243.
435
In NB, Phan Bội Châu indicates that he gave several thousand copies of this letter to Tăng Bạt Hổ for
distribution inside Indochina. Phan Bội Châu, Overturned Chariot, 96. A French translation entitled Conseil aux
jeunes gens d’aller s’instruire à l’étranger is included in the Interrogatoires. SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu:
Interrogatoires, 134-138. For the Vietnamese version, see Phan Bội Châu “Khuyến quốc dân tư trợ du học văn,”
Phan Bội Châu⁠ Toàn Tập,Vol 2 (Hue: Nhà xuất bản Thuận hóa, 1999), 253-258.
436
In French Lettre d’outre mer écrite avec du sang. SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires,
145-151, 194, 199-206 (partial French translation). For the Vietnamese version, see Phan Bội Châu “Hải ngọai
huyết thư,” Phan Bội Châu⁠ Toàn Tập,Vol 2 (Hue: Nhà xuất bản Thuận hóa, 1999), 95-168.
437
Already introduced in this chapter. In French Asservisement de l’Annam. SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội
Châu: Interrogatoires, 153-154, 158-163 (French translation of Liang Qichao’s preface). For the Vietnamese
version, see Phan Bội Châu “Việt Nam vong quốc sử,” Phan Bội Châu⁠ Toàn Tập,Vol 2 (Hue: Nhà xuất bản Thuận
hóa, 1999), 11-92..
438
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 167-170, 171-180 (French translation). For the
Vietnamese version, see Phan Bội Châu “Tân Việt Nam,” Phan Bội Châu⁠ Toàn Tập,Vol 2 (Hue: Nhà xuất bản
Thuận hóa, 1999), 171-195.
439
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 183, 186, 188.
440
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 183, 212-221 (French translation).
441
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 186, 188, 195-199, 206-212 (partial French
translation). For the Vietnamese version, see Phan Bội Châu “Sùng bái giai nhân,” Phan Bội Châu⁠ Toàn Tập,Vol 2
(Hue: Nhà xuất bản Thuận hóa, 1999), 199-237.
442
In French Aux habitants de la Cochinchine. SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 222-
223 (French translation). In NB, Phan Bội Châu indicates that he wrote this work at the request of Cường Để. Phan
Bội Châu, Overturned Chariot, 126.

107
Phong),443 and Hà thành liệt sĩ truyện (The History of the Martyrs of Hanoi).444 The prosecutor
included another work that appears not to be written by Phan Bội Châu entitled Sào Nam Tử
khuyến chư tăng thư (Letter from Sao Nam Tu to the bonzes).445 For several of these works, the
prosecutor included in the transcript partial or complete French translations.
For the next week’s worth of sessions (including October 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, and part of
October 13), the prosecutor and Phan Bội Châu repeatedly clashed over the question of
authorship.446 This debate had started on October 2 when the prosecutor sought to explain Phan
Bội Châu’s responsibility for the events of 1908. Lacking sufficient hard evidence to prove that
Phan Bội Châu had indeed ordered many of the violent acts described in cited testimonies, the
prosecutor argued instead that the rebels and bandits had been inspired by Phan Bội Châu’s
propaganda. Phan Bội Châu vehemently rejected the suggestion, drawing a line between his
supposedly lofty discourse and the crude propaganda attributed to him.447 Phan Bội Châu’s
comments foreshadowed the most refined and most unbelievable iteration of his strategy of
denial. The stakes were clear: if Phan Bội Châu could successfully deny authorship of the
propaganda the former rebels claimed to be inspired by, then he could claim innocence of the
acts the French were charging him with. As the prosecutor began to introduce Phan Bội Châu’s
writings one after the other, the old patriot manufactured an incredible defense strategy: he
simply was not the author.
Phan Bội Châu continued to develop his “scapegoat” theory in subsequent sessions into a
remarkably flexible defense mechanism. For works he had already admitted authorship of Phan
Bội Châu would claim that portions had been added or replaced by other people. On October 3,
Phan Bội Châu claimed that three-tenths of the version of Khuyến quốc dân tư trợ du học văn
brought before him by the prosecutor had been "added by other people."448 He added, "I remind
the Criminal Commision that I gave my letter to Tăng Bạt Hổ in the tenth month, whereas this
piece is dated the eleventh month."449 Obviously, following Phan Bội Châu's logic, someone
had taken his version, added several sections (which conveniently contained the language the
Criminal Commission found offensive), and published that copy one month later.
The same logic applied to Việt Nam vong quốc sử. According to Phan Bội Châu, "the
Chinese printers" had added sections on "public education, public works, the native army" and
the phrase "the French are dogs."450 The printers in Japan had also been responsible for printing
a second edition of Khuyến quốc dân tư trợ du học văn at the end of 1908. Phan Bội Châu,

443
In French Histoire d’un homme de haut caractère du nom de Trần. SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu:
Interrogatoires, 235-240 (French translation), 241-243.
444
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 225. For the Vietnamese version, see Phan Bội
Châu “Truyện các liệt sĩ Hà thành,” Phan Bội Châu⁠ Toàn Tập,Vol 3 (Hue: Nhà xuất bản Thuận hóa, 1999), 147-163,
289-291 (partial French translation).
445
In French Lettre adressée par Sào Nam Tu aux bonzes du royaume. SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu:
Interrogatoires, 224.
446
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 138-151.
447
Phan Bội Châu: “These libels are the product of a gross mind. If it was my work, I would have written
with more deference to the French. I would not have called the French ‘dogs.’ Besides, the influence of [this
propaganda] had to have been limited to ordinary people. Cultivated minds would have ignored such things.”
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 115.
448
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 134.
449
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 138.
450
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 155.

108
however, had "left the country in November 1908" and thus never saw the edition.451 Another
anonymous malfeasant was "the amplifier," who Phan Bội Châu held responsible for adding
disagreeable or inconvenient phrases or sections to his work.452 Some common themes added by
"Chinese printers" and "the amplifier" were: the French desire to annihilate the Vietnamese, the
concept of racial extinction, Catholicism, and Nguyễn collaborators.453
When the prosecutor moved on to address Hải ngọai huyết thư, Phan Bội Châu came up
with a procedural version of this same explanation. While he was working at Liang Qichao's
journal, Phan Bội Châu claimed, he would place his works on a manuscript table alongside the
newspapers.454 In 1906, he claimed, he had placed Khuyến quốc dân tư trợ du học văn, Hải
ngọai huyết thư, and Việt Nam vong quốc sử on this manuscript table. Since these works were all
lying out in public, Phan Bội Châu suggested, anybody could copy them and do whatever they
wished with them, including adding material and printing them.
At times, the patience of the prosecutor was incredible.
Prosecutor: "Who could have printed the copies you put out [on the table]?"
Phan Bội Châu: "A student or someone working for Cường Để."
Prosecutor: "How did copies end up in Annam at the beginning of 1906?"
Phan Bội Châu: "I don't know."
Prosecutor: "By depositing a writing of this importance on the manuscript table of the
journal, did you not take responsibility for the work even if it was printed with
modifications?
Phan Bội Châu: "What I write is not my responsibility, provided that it is not
subversive."455
The logic of Phan Bội Châu's comment was, strictly speaking, unassailable. Phan Bội
Châu was sketching an image of himself as a writer who cared absolutely nothing for what
people did with, or because of, his own writings.
Another option, of course, was to deny the entirety of a work.456 After the prosecutor
entered ten pages of Tân Việt Nam into the trial record, Phan Bội Châu simply responded, "There
is nothing of mine in there."457 The same was true for Sùng bái giai nhân. All Phan Bội Châu
had to say of the work was, "I've never written a work with that title and I've never heard of it
either."458 Why did both Sùng bái giai nhân and Kỷ niệm lực (which he also denied authorship
of) bear Phan Bội Châu's name? Phan Bội Châu has his old standby ready: "It's clearly all
Cường Để's doing." In fact, he was ready to push it farther, "The fact that my name was on them
imputes the blame to Cường Để."459 With this, Phan Bội Châu took the logic of his scapegoat
theory into the realm of conspiracy theory: any appearance of Phan Bội Châu's name simply
451
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 165.
452
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 155.
453
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 156-157.
454
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 146.
455
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 147.
456
There was one logical drawback to Phan Bội Châu's tactic of total denial: if he actually had not
composed a work, as seems to be the case with Sào Nam Tử khuyến chư tăng thư, then any member of the Criminal
Commision unconvinced by his blanket denials would simply assume he had. Once Phan Bội Châu had committed
to denying entire works, however, this point became at best trivial. SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu:
Interrogatoires, 224.
457
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 180.
458
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 186.
459
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 187.

109
confirmed that Cường Để, not Phan Bội Châu, was responsible.460
With the prosecutor seemingly willing to follow Phan Bội Châu down any logical path he
wished to tread, the two sides often drifted into pettifoggery. Phan Bội Châu and the prosecutor
had a semantic argument parsing the differences between "a writing (un écrit)," "a work (un
ouvrage)," and "a book (une livre)."461 After this, they had a debate about printing errors.462
Then it was on to the subtle differences in national copyright laws.463 Phan Bội Châu even
devised a way to explain handwritten copies of works that were later printed. Challenged by the
prosecutor with a handwritten copy of Khuyến quốc dân tư trợ du học văn that included all of the
sections Phan Bội Châu claimed other people had added, Phan Bội Châu explained that Tăng Bạt
Hổ had not printed enough copies, so he handcopied more.464
The debate over handwriting samples took Phan Bội Châu's battle with the Criminal
Commission to hilarious new levels.465 After presenting Phan Bội Châu with three letters, all
signed "Phan Bội Châu," the prosecutor asked if Phan Bội Châu had written them. This went
about as well as could be expected.
Phan Bội Châu: "I did not write that. Someone was imitating my handwriting."
Prosecutor: "Who would know your handwriting well enough to imitate you?"
Phan Bội Châu: "I taught my writing style to many students."466
The prosecutor, hoping to make some headway, brought in a "scholar with the rank of cử
nhân" to serve as a handwriting analysis expert.467 The expert confirmed that lettres No. 155,
157, and 158 were written using the same brush by the same individual, which the Criminal
Commission deemed to be Phan Bội Châu. Phan Bội Châu promptly challenging the credibility
of the handwriting expert.
Phan Bội Châu: "The opinion of this cử nhân is not as good as mine. I tell you that is was
not me who wrote those letters. It was not me."
Prosecutor: "On what basis can you affirm that the handwriting in these three letters is an
imitation of your own?"
Phan Bội Châu: "I examined each character singularly. The characters are different than
mine, but all together they resemble my handwriting."468

460
The prosecutor: "Why would Cường Để undertake such a giant conspiracy?"
Phan Bội Châu: "That's easy to explain. The Vietnamese students were obligated to Cường Để for their studies."⁠
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 188.
Phan Bội Châu: “It was ‘ton,’ not ‘tu!’” SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 255.
461
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 181.
462
Phan Bội Châu: “There must have been a printing error. This copy claims ‘the year ất mùi,’ a year
which does not exist. It must have been ‘dinh mùi,’ they just read it wrong.” SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu:
Interrogatoires, 182.
463
Prosecutor: “You really know precise details about the legislation of the press!” Phan Bội Châu:
“Before writing in both China and Japan, I studied their press laws. Japanese press laws are much more precise than
Chinese press laws.” SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 185.
464
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 145.
465
For example, Phan Bội Châu denied having written a text that included chữ nôm (Vietnamese demotic
characters) on the basis that “I can read nôm, but I cannot write it.” SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu:
Interrogatoires, 225.
466
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 127.
467
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 130. After October 10, the Criminal Commission
exclusively relied on its new native interpreter Bùi Bằng Đoàn for handwriting analysis. SPCE 352, Affaire Phan
Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 225.
468
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 130.

110
 A major component of Phan Bội Châu's scapegoat theory concerned the supposed misuse
of his reputation. After all, Phan Bội Châu needed to explain why a veritable army of
anonymous copyists would want to use his name. Phan tried several novel explanations. First,
like the “old legendary Vietnamese humorist called ‘Trạng Quỳnh,’” whose name posthumously
served to designate all humorists in the country, Phan Bội Châu declared that “Phan Bội Châu”
had become the name used by all overseas Vietnamese individuals publishing works abroad.469
Later, Phan Bội Châu argued that Liang Qichao had been responsible for making him
"universally famous."470
Phan Bội Châu identifed Liang Qichao's preface to Việt Nam vong quốc sủ as a
particularly egregious source of unwanted reputational inflation.471 Liang Qichao had written it
for Chinese, especially for the reigning Manchus, Phan Bội Châu argued, "he was using a
Vietnamese voice to attract the attention of his readers."472 The dastardly Liang Qichao had
added many details that never took place. Phan Bội Châu had never compared Emperor Thành
Thái to a marionette. Phan Bội Châu had never claimed one-tenth of the population were
"running dogs." Phan Bội Châu had never told Liang Qichao about an internal passport system.
All of these were, of course, Liang Qichao's additions. Finally (just in case), Phan Bội Châu
stated, "Tăng Bạt Hổ spoke Cantonese, so I don't know what was actually said to Liang
Qichao."473
Who was responsible for editing and printing Phan Bội Châu's works, thus continuing to
inflate his reputation as a racist revolutionary? In addition to Liang Qichao, Phan Bội Châu
came up with a hit list of possible suspects. Cường Để stood at the top of the list, of course.
However, Bùi Chí Nhuận, Đặng Bỉnh Thành, Phan Bá Ngọc, Lê Cầu Tinh, Đinh Doãn Tế, and
even Trần Hữu Công were on the suspect list too.474 Later, Phan Bội Châu added Nguyễn
Thượng Hiền to the list as well.475 If none of these worked, Phan Bội Châu was happy to blame
"Chinese students," who seemed to be lurking every eager to grab, pervert, and print anything he
wrote.476
Flabbergasted after six sessions spent on publications, the prosecutor assessed Phan Bội
Châu's defense strategy:

Your system is always the same: you create a scheme where you expose only general
ideas of a philosophical scope; you put it on a newspaper table; it is copied and the
person attaches to your part something different for each of your works; they denature
your manuscript, amplify it, and have it printed without your knowledge by signing it
annoyingly with your name or one of your pseudonyms?

469
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 117.
470
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 154.
471
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 164.
472
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 164.
473
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 164.
474
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 169, 226. For well-written, but still incriminating
works, Phan Bội Châu did have a problem, however: the only two individuals Phan Bội Châu felt capable of writing
nearly as well as him were Bùi Chí Nhuận and Nguyễn Thượng Hiền.⁠ SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu:
Interrogatoires, 188.
475
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 228-229, 235.
476
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 184, 223.

111
 Phan Bội Châu: "That is exactly right! The parts which I indicate as not being mine, I do
not choose them; I just notice that they are not mine.477

In the battle over his writings, Phan Bội Châu had effectively fought the prosecutor to a
draw. However, because the prosecutor had been unable to land a solid hit on Phan Bội Châu,
despite having expended over a week of the court's time, it was a win for Phan Bội Châu. On
October 13, the prosecutor finally finished his review of Phan Bội Châu’s works. He managed to
make one significant point before finishing up this portion of the trial, however. It was this:
Phan Bội Châu's greatest strength was his masterful ability to adapt his writing to different
audiences.478 Despite Phan Bội Châu's unwillingness to admit to having written the works
covered by the Criminal Commission, the works themselves had received their day in court.
Bride Strikes Back: A Return to Testimonials
Beginning on October 13, the prosecutor shifted from Phan Bội Châu's writings back to
an examination of their concrete effects.479 The prosecutor returned to his previous practice of
citing individual testimonies. This was a more successful strategy insofar as the prosecutor no
longer needed to weight his word against Phan Bội Châu's. Many of the the testimonies
introduced offer fascinating glimpses into how the Modernization Association and later the
Restoration Society actually worked.480 Using document after document, the prosecutor linked
Phan Bội Châu to a variety of events and individuals.481 These included Phan Châu Trinh, Để
Thám,482 Trần Quý Cáp, Cường Để, Đội Quyên,483 Lương Tam Kỳ, Jules Tiet, and Trần Hữu
Công. More than before, the tone often grew dark. The prosecutor delivered testimonies
pertaining to violent attacks on villages and assassinations of informers and even loyal society
members who fell under suspicion.
Then, on October 16, Bride played a winning card: Inspector François's report written
after François had travelled with Phan Bội Châu from Hong Kong to Haiphong. This testimony
Phan Bội Châu was not ready for. Inspector François report not only contradicted many of Phan
Bội Châu's denials, it made Phan Bội Châu sound delerious, if not unhinged. Phan Bội Châu
tried to explain: "I never thought I would stand before a commission. I thought I would be
executed. I was not cheerful."484 The prosecutor pressed: "In this state of depression, could you
not but tell the truth?"485 For the first time in the trial, it seemed as though Phan Bội Châu was
genuinely unsure of how to proceed.
The prosecutor offered his estimation of Phan Bội Châu's though process: "You declared
declared to the president of the Criminal Commission that you at first intended not to answer

477
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 185.
478
The prosecutor: “When writing to mandarins, your writing is quite literary. When convincing Catholics,
you preach as a priest. When glorifying those condemned for the 1908 Hanoi Poison plot, you valorized bravery.”
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 227.
479
The prosecutor: “Your propaganda penetrated all of society.” SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu:
Interrogatoires, 259.
480
For example, Châu Vàn Qui’s testimony on October 29, 1908 before the Mytho Tribunal (File 1313,
dossier Gilbert Chieu) indicated how Phan Bội Châu’s books were distributed within Cochinchina. SPCE 352,
Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 197.
481
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 266-267.
482
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 269, 275.
483
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 268.
484
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 277.
485
Ibid.

112
questions, but having realized you could escape the death penalty, you prepared your defense."
Phan Bội Châu agreed with this statement, but he was still looking for a way out. All of the
testimonies he had previously denied had taken place elsewhere. The only real difference with
this one was that Francois had shown Phan Bội Châu kindness in a moment of true despair. To
find Francois was indeed every bit the Sûreté officer any of his French colleagues were, must
have been a bitter blow for Phan Bội Châu. Francois had abused the trust Phan Bội Châu had
granted him in his weakest moment. Phan Bội Châu became quite sullen, stating simply,
"Francois is a man skilled at disguising the truth."486 Then: "He satisfied all my desires. That is
why I talked to him." Phan Bội Châu went on to claim that Francois had asked him questions,
but Phan Bội Châu was so tired and hungry at the time that he offered only onamatopeic and
monosyllabic responses. Francois, Phan Bội Châu claimed, had reconstructed these into the
claims contained in his report. Here, then, was the answer: Francois, not Phan Bội Châu, was the
truly dishonest one!
On October 17, the prosecutor called his first and only witness: Mr. François (aka Trần
Tứ Quí), inspector of the Sûreté. Inspector François delivered aloud the contents of his report,
then answered the prosecutor's questions. Did Francois speak Vietnamese well? "Very well."
Did Phan Bội Châu offer his statements spontaneously? "Yes." Had Francois been assigned a
mission to interrogate Phan Bội Châu? "No." Was Phan Bội Châu being truthful? Francois was
unequivocal: "In my job I often deal with prisoners. I am persuaded that he spoke the truth based
on his attitude and tone."487 The prosecutor could not have asked for a more perfect witness.
Given the opportunity to cross-examine the witness, Phan Bội Châu threw together what
defense he could: "I never asked Mr. Francois for wine! He interrogated me while I only spoke
in monosyllables!"488 Perhaps realizing that denying the testimony of an individual in person
was quite different than denying the testimony written on paper, Phan Bội Châu backed off a bit.
Phan Bội Châu thanked Francois for showing him kindness, for removing his fetters, and for
helping him to eat. Perhaps Phan Bội Châu could muddle through Francois's testimony with a
few tactful words.
The prosecutor quickly ended any such notions: "It is sad for you that the facts reported
by Inspector Francois are confirmed by many witnesses."489 Recognizing tact was getting him
nowhere, Phan Bội Châu reverted to his scapegoat strategy: "[Francois's] declaration's are the
result of his having knowledge of these declarations prior to testifying!" The prosecutor was
incredulous: "Inspector Francois flipped through all of the files in the prosecutor's office in
Saigon and Hanoi, and those of the military tribunals, and the archives of the residences superior
of Annam and Tonkin and of the Court of Hue all before coming to testify at your
interrogatory??"490 Phan Bội Châu mustered a few more perfunctory challenges, but Inspector
Francois's testimony had taken the wind out of the old patriot's sails.
In the following days, Phan Bội Châu's denials grew shorter and less emphatic. The
prosecutor, meanwhile, was emboldened. Phan Bội Châu was now faced with questions such as
the following:

486
Ibid.
487
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 283.
488
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 284-285
489
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 286.
490
Ibid.

113
 We find a correspondence from the French ambassador to Tokyo n. 20 of November 7,
1909 (Exhibit 227 file I-1925), in another of June 7, 1909 (Exhibit 189 in file A-1925), in
another of July 12, 1909, from the governor general to the minister of colonies (Exhibit
203 file I-1925), in a letter of November 7, 1909 from the ambassador in Tokyo to the
Governor General (Exhibit 56 file H-1925), in letter n. 7 of the resident superior of
Annam of January 28, 1910 (Exhibit 90 file C-1925), in letter n. 25, the ambassador from
France to Tokio to the governor general of November 26, 1909. Does this information
does prevent us from having faith in your statement?491

Phan Bội Châu's response was decidedly muted, compared with the previous month of
interrogations. Bride's archive was finally paying dividends.
At 8:00 AM on the morning of October 19, in following a "very urgent" notice from
President Bride, Victor Néron presented testimony to the Criminal Commission.492 Unlike that
of Inspector Francois, Néron's testimony is not included in the Interrogatoires. However, an
accompanying handwritten note to Jeanbrau from Néron dated the same day indicates that Bride
requested the exterior testimony of Phan Châu Trinh. However, before establishing a Rogatory
Commission for that purpose, Bride wanted first to be sure the governor general (Monguillot)
could look into the "the political drawbacks of this procedure."493 Bride asked Néron to orally
convey this request.
This note indicates that Bride recognized the limits to his requisitional authority, but
sought to expand those limits regardless. Phan Châu Trinh, who had himself returned to
Indochina in June 1925, was staying at a guesthouse on Pellerin street in Saigon.494 Bringing
Phan Châu Trinh before a Rogatory Commission would indeed have posed serious political
problems for Monguillot and Phan Châu Trinh was busy advocating for Phan Bội Châu's release,
despite suffering from worsening tuberculosis. Phan Châu Trinh died March 24, 1926, unable to
reconnect with his old friend and debating partner before the end as he had hoped to do.495
Beginning that same day (October 19), the prosecutor also began to cite a new set of
testimonies from an individual whose statements would henceforth make common appearances
during interrogation sessions: Trần Văn Tuân (aka Hồng Lục, aka Tu Dich). Trần Văn Tuân had
testified before the head of the Sûreté in 1918. The sheer amount of precise information
provided by this individual strongly suggests he was an informer. Trần Văn Tuân seemed to
know information about nearly every aspect of the Restoration society's activities in China,
Siam, and Indochina. Even worse, he knew where Phan Bội Châu had been and when. To Trần
Văn Tuân's testimony, the prosecutor added that of Néron, to whom Phan Bội Châu had sent a
letter on August 4. The cornerstone to the prosecutor's case, however, was letters, hundreds of
letters to and from Phan Bội Châu. It seemed there would be no escaping the trial by archive.
Admission and Acceptance (October 20)

491
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 291.
492
SPCE 355, L’Inspecteur des Affaires politiques et administratives, Président de la Commission
Criminelle à M. Néron, Chef de Bureau au Service Central des Renseignements du Bureau Politique du
Gouvernement Général, RST Cabinet, No. 143.
493
SPCE 355, Note pour M. le Directeur de A.P. et S.G. (Jeanbrau), 19 octobre 1925.
494
Huỳnh Thúc Kháng. Phan Tây Hồ tiên sinh lịch sử (A Biography of Mr. Phan Châu Trinh [Tây Hồ])
(Huế: Anh Minh xuất bản, 1959), 33.
495
Phan Châu Trinh. Phan Châu Trinh and his Political Writings, edited and translated by Vinh Sinh
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2009), 36-37.

114
 By October 20, Phan Bội Châu’s ability to continue denying his involvement, his
knowledge, and his own handwriting was waning. The old patriot nevertheless made a final
attempt to deny it all. Admittedly, this was clever, if not entirely surprising: Phan Bội Châu had
a double. Desperate to find a logical explanation for the Criminal Commission's endless parade
of testimonies and signed letters, Phan Bội Châu claimed that there had been another Phan Bội
Châu, who went by the name Phan Thị Hán (Phan Bội Châu's pen name).
The prosecutor had good reason for focusing on the name Phan Thị Hán in particular. In
a letter from Cường Để to Ta Anh Ba [Xie Yingbo 謝英伯], written January 22, 1913, stated that
he [Cường Để] was leaving for Europe aboard a ship that very day. Furthermore, Cường Để
wrote, "In my absence, Mr. Phan Thị Hán will be in charge."496 Xie Yingbo was one of several
Chinese individuals Phan Bội Châu and Cường Để had been working with to obtain funds and
weapons for the Việt Nam Quang Phục hội (Vietnam Restoration Society).497 It was all well and
good for Phan Bội Châu to claim that Cường Để had abused his name for the sake of publishing
incendiary texts. But it made no sense for Cường Để to put Phan Thị Hán in charge of anything
important, unless there actually was a Phan Thị Hán. Therefore logic required Phan Bội Châu
either give up, or invent another Phan Thị Hán.
Who was the other Phan Thị Hán? One of Cường Để's secretaries, obviously.498 Phan
Bội Châu claimed that when meeting with Chinese or Japanese who did not know what he [Phan
Bội Châu] looked like, Cường Để would one of his secretaries pretend to be Phan Bội Châu.499
Phan Bội Châu tried to explain:

Cường-Để must have had the following conversation with Ta-Anh-Ba [aka Xie Yingbo]:
'During a trip I made in Indochina, I heard that a certain Phan-Boi-Chau had left his
country. Who was this man, do you know him, can you inform me about his character and
his ideas?' Cường-Để pointed to his the secretary Phan-Thị-Hán, who had accompanied
him, and said, 'Here he is! his name is Phan Bội Châu!'500

For a trial already full of tall tales, obfuscations, and denials, this explanation took first
prize. Nevertheless, the prosecutor spent an incredible six pages worth of testimony addressing
Phan Bội Châu's "double," while winking occasionally at how utterly preposterous the

496
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 309. The prosecutor later presented another letter
dated April 5, 1913 letter from Cường Để to one of his "secretaries," the Cochinchinese Đặng Bỉnh Thành. In this
letter Cường Để stated his desire to "offer the French a bomb" as a signal to his compatriotes. Cường Để
furthermore enclosed his January 22, 1913 letter to Xie Yingbo, telling Đặng Bỉnh Thành to "find an explanation"
for why the letter was being delivered three months after he had signed it. Cường Để had not actually left for
Europe (as the January 22, 1913 letter suggested), but instead travelled to the Mekong Delta near Saigon, where he
hid on a boat for a roughly three months period. In April 1913, Cường Để decided to actually head for Europe,
though he was briefly arrested in Hong Kong in May 1913, whereupon the British police found both letters and
turned them over to French intelligence services. See Tran My-Van. A Vietnamese Royal Exile in Japan: Prince
Cưòng Đề (1882-1951) (London, Routledge, 2005), 78-82. Yves Le Jariel identifies Đặng Bỉnh Thành as the
“mysterious Joseph Thanh” who accompanied Cường Để to Europe in 1913. He may also have been in Paris from
1919 assisting Nguyễn Thế Truyền in editing le Paria. Le Jariel, 165-168.
497
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 316-317.
498
Phan Bội Châu suggested Bùi Chí Nhuận. SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 315.
499
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 311.
500
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 314.

115
proposition was.501
Finally, the prosecutor stopped considering the matter of the "double" and barrelled
forward, introducing a letter written to Mr. Chuong-Chu [Nguyễn Thành Hiến] on April 7,
1912.502 The author indicated he had travelled to Nanjing in February 1912 to discuss plans with
"the Chinese revolutionary chiefs" who offered "a good opportunity" for the Vietnamese
revolutionary movement. The author stated that weapons were ready at hand, though funds
remained lacking. A postscript warned Chuong-Chu to show the letter only to trusted
individuals. The letter was signed by by "Phan Bội Châu."503
The prosecutor noted the similarities between this letter and a previously introduced letter
(letter no. 5, dossier E, also sent to "Chuong-Chu," aka Nguyễn Thành Hiến) signed "Châu." He
asked Phan Bội Châu to account for this, which he did in his customary fashion, "Châu could
have been anyone named 'Châu.' This letter, signed 'Bội Châu,' I can now confirm is false."
Phan Bội Châu agreed that both letters, along with a third, had all been written by the same
person. However, Phan Bội Châu denied that person had been him. Clearly, the "double" had
been busy.
The prosecutor, however, had more letters. He introduced a copy of a July 21, 1912 letter
from "Mê Diên" mentioning the transfer of monies, various commercial matters, communication
difficulties, and the location of various agents.504 Was "Mê Diên" a pseudonym for Phan Bội
Châu? Phan Bội Châu confidently replied that he couldn't be sure, because he did not recognize
the copy; he would need the original. The prosecutor had anticipated this: "here is the original."
Now Phan Bội Châu denied the letter entirely. The prosecutor introduced two more letters sent
to Mr. Hoàng Triêu Ha, signed by "Mê Diên." Then another sent to Mr. Chuc Dinh, also signed
by "Mê Diên." The prosecutor asked again, was "Mê Diên" a pseudonym for Phan Bội Châu?
Phan Bội Châu replied that he had never signed a letter "Mê Diên," but confirmed that the name
was indeed one given to him by his students. It meant "the rice paddy which allows the rice to
grow [米田]."505
The prosecutor continued, presenting letters No. 1, 5, 16, and 32 from dossier E, and Nos.
155bis, 156bis, 157bis, and 158bis from dossier C. All eight had been written by the same
person. Finally, he added No. 37 from dossier E. Bride's puzzle pieces were falling into place.
Prosecutor: "Is it not the same individual who, in these nine letters, has signed "Châu,"
"Sào Tu," "Phan Bội Châu," "Sào Nam," "Bội Châu," and "Mê Diên?"
Phan Bội Châu: "Yes, I recognize this."
Prosecutor: "Let us continue to play the comedy. Do you recognize that it is you who
wrote all of these letters?"
Phan Bội Châu: "It is my name that is written on these letters. It was not me who wrote
these letters, but I recognize that the letters have been signed using my names."
[After a long reflection]
501
The prosecutor: “You are well informed about an individual you pretend to have never seen!” SPCE
352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 314.
502
Nguyễn Thành Hiến (1856-1914) was a well-educated half-French Cochinchinese supporter of the Đông
Du movement who died in Hỏa Lò prison on November 26, 1914. Phan Bội Châu, Overturned Chariot, 68. Phan
Bội Châu included him in Việt Nam nghĩa liệt sử. Phan Bội Châu, “Việt Nam nghĩa liệt sử,” Phan Bội Châu Toàn
Tập, Vol. 5 (Huế: Nhà xuất bản Thuận hóa, 1999), 100-103.
503
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 318.
504
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 322.
505
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 323.

116
 Phan Bội Châu: "Since you tell me that all these letters are signed with my name, I accept
them as being from me."
[After a pause, the accused thinks]
Phan Bội Châu: "You tell me the letters are signed by me. Truly, it was not me who
wrote them, moreover I do not know the names of the commercial houses to which they were
sent, but since you are certain they are mine, I recognize them as mine."
[The accused thinks once again]
Phan Bội Châu: "I accept all the names as mine."
...............
[After the accused reflects for a long time and examines all of the letters]
Phan Bội Châu: "Yes, it was indeed me you wrote these letters...[thinks]...I recognize all
of the names on the letters."
...............
[After the accused reflects for a long time over the various letters presented]
Phan Bội Châu: "BECAUSE YOU ARE CONVINCED THAT THESE LETTERS ARE
MINE, I RECOGNIZE THEM AS MINE. IF I AM HESITANT TO RECOGNIZE HAVING
WRITTEN THEM, IT IS BECAUSE THEY ARE VERY COMPROMISING."506
The prosecutor then presented a long series of additional letters, asking if Phan Bội Châu
recognized each one. He replied no to all of them, save one.
Finally, the prosecutor asked, "Will you declare to us that it was indeed you who wrote all
of these letters?"
[The accused reflects for a long time, before examining one by one the members of the
Criminal Commission. He then also examines the various letters presented to him. The accused
hesitates, begins phrases that he does not complete, then hangs his head and says]
Phan Bội Châu: "Yes, I admit having written the first letter. If I now admit having written
the others, then I cannot admit to having written even that one, because the other letters are all
very compromising. I recognize having written the letters while I was overseas to people abroad.
I never wrote to people in Indochina."
Prosecutor: "We give the accused the deposition dated this day, by the testimony of Bùi
Bằng Đoàn."
Phan Bội Châu: "You are certain that all of the letters were written by me. I have nothing
more to say on the subject and I remit myself to your kindness for the rest."507
Thereupon, the day's session ended with Phan Bội Châu dramatically abandoning the line
of defense he had clung to with astonishing resilience for over a month. The trial transcript had
captured in minute detail each moment of Phan Bội Châu's acceptance of responsibility for his
own writing and, thereby, for his own actions. Phan Bội Châu's confession came in the face of
the overwhelming documentary evidence presented by the prosecutor. These documents had
been painstakingly assembled, certified, organized, translated, interpreted, and made available as
evidence by President Bride. The trial by archive had been successful.
Trial Phase 4: (October 23-November 9)
Despite the fact that Phan Bội Châu had admitted to writing the letters presented to him
by the Criminal Commission, the interrogatory portion of the trial continued for an additional

506
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 324-325. The interpellated notes and capitalization
has been retained as they appear in the original.
507
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 326.

117
two and a half weeks. After all, Phan Bội Châu had only admitted to writing letters. He had not
admitted to planning or aiding the 1913 attacks, for which he was being prosecuted. This meant
the Criminal Commission still had plenty of work ahead of it. It also meant Phan Bội Châu had
time and opportunity to reconsider his entire approach to the trial. As the final phase of the trial
got underway, Phan Bội Châu did exactly that, fashioning new lines of defense that exchanged
outright denials for a more subtle distinction between patriotic rhetoric, which he now proudly
admitted having written, and acts of violence, which he continued to deny having been involved
in.
Outside the courtroom, security officials began to realize the scope of Nguyễn Thế
Truyền's mailing campaign. On October 19, Acting Governor General Monguillot wrote to the
Ministry of Colonies to address the Union Intercoloniale packets, including the Jeune Annam
petition, which he traced back to Nguyễn Ái Quốc and the revolutionaries based in Canton. The
security services had seized a great many envelopes by interdicting the mail, though multiple
reports of journal editors and citizens having turned over Union<<!KMB_CMMT_AUTHOR::AGL>>
Intercoloniale packets to the Sûreté suggests the interdiction was only partially successful.
From508 such information as was available, Monguillot was able to report, “a few dispatches,
with the petition inserted, were journals in the colony, however the majority of petitions were
addressed to Vietnamese, many of whom are known for their hostility toward the French
administration.”509
Toward the end of October, some disturbing reports surfaced. On October 21, a special
commissar in Nam Định reported several rumors pertaining to the arrest of Phan Bội Châu.
Residents in the Hanh Thien district believed the person arrested in Shanghai was not Phan Bội
Châu, but rather a Chinese individual. According to this local rumor, the Chinese government
was seeking the repatriation of their citizen. Another source reported the Chinese of Nam Định
were under the impression a long-time resident who had become a naturalized Chinese citizen
had been arrested in error. This rumor held that the Chinese authorities were seeking redress for
the arrest and had demanded the French government rectify its mistake. Thus, a person by the
name of Phan Bội Châu had been sent from Haiphong to Hongkong and the French government
had paid the Chinese government 100,000 piastres in compensation.510 These wildly inaccurate
rumors demonstrate two important features of news communications in French Indochina during
this period. First, outside of the major cities, the likelihood of receiving accurate news declined
considerably. Second, residents of peripheral districts nevertheless shared information related to
matters of significance for the colony at large. Whether rural residents believed Phan Bội Châu
was actually being held or not, the report does indicate that his name and reputation were known
and drew interest beyond urban areas.
Since Vietnamese revolutionaries had already attempted to assassinate two governor
generals of Indochina, Néron's report on October 29 would have definitely raised alarm bells.
Néron conveyed to Sûreté offices throughout Indochina a cable from the Ministry of Colonies
suggesting a Vietnamese by the name of Le Trinh Vuong planned to return to Indochina to take
the life of the new governor general should he fail to release Phan Bội Châu.511 Le Trinh Vuong
508
SPCE 354BIS, Saigon (André) à M. le DirAffPol et S.G., 24, octobre 1925.
509
SPCE 355, Le Gougal, p.i. à M. le Ministre des Colonies, Paris, Objet: envoi en Indochine par l’Union
Intercoloniale d’une petition en faveur de Phan Bội Châu, 19 octobre 1925.
510
SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle No. 6707. Chef de la Sûreté (Gilles) à le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin
et le Chef du S.C.R. et de S.G. Hanoi, 22 octobre 1925. Refers to Note Confidentielle No. 218-C, 21 octobre 1925.
511
SPCE 355, Telegramme Officiel, Gouverneur General à Adchef, Fort-Bayard, Dirsurgé a Sûreté

118
claimed to be a long-time Hanoi resident born in Guangzhouwan who had participated in an
assassination in Canton. He had shared his story and intentions with an informer in Paris. Most
concerning, the Sûreté lacked any information on Le Trinh Vuong, which made it far more
difficult to prevent an attack.512 after another brief
After another brief pause, the Criminal Commission marched on. They followed up on
Phan Bội Châu's riveting confession on October 23. Having had several days to reflect, Phan
Bội Châu provided the Commission members with an explanation for his previous
dissimulations: "I thought it was a matter of rhetoric and a parody of justice. I thought I would
be executed regardless, so I exaggerated my lies."513 The French administration had been
responsible for executing enough of Phan Bội Châu's comrades that this claim was certainly
plausible. However, tt does not explain why Phan Bội Châu freely admitted to incriminating
facts and made compromising statements immediately after his arrest. Presumably, if Phan Bội
Châu believed he would be killed regardless, he would have withheld information so as to
protect his compatriots. In fact, the one thing Phan Bội Châu had done consistently since his
arrest was to incriminate his former comrades (especially Cường Để).
Now that Phan Bội Châu was willing to be more honest, the prosecutor addressed Phan
Bội Châu's activities and movements between 1908 and 1913. The prosecutor addressed various
issues related to how Phan Bội Châu had funded his numerous operations.514 Phan Bội Châu
admitted to receiving some 2,000 piastres from Đặng Thái Thân through emigrating students, but
claimed he did not know the money's provenance.515 He admitted that it was possible Đặng Thái
Thân had relied on violent actors such as Đội Quyên's "band."516 Phan Bội Châu admitted to
taking approximately 20% of the money Đông Du students brought to Japan, but claimed he had
done so to subsidize poorer students.517 Phan Bội Châu maintained that he had played no direct
role in the violent events of 1908, and had not ordered anyone to pillage or extort money.518 The
prosecutor addressed Phan Bội Châu's writings once again. He admitted that most of the works
previously discussed were indeed his. However, he still insisted that Hà Thành liệt sĩ truyền had
been written by Nguyễn Thành Hiến, and that he did not know who was responsible for Sùng bài
giai nhân.519
In the evening, Phan Bội Châu admitted to the truth of his relationships with Japanese
and Chinese people such as Inukai Tsuyoshi, Okuma Shigenobu, and Liang Qichao.520 Phan Bội
Châu admitted to meeting Để Thám and to working with Cường Để. However, Phan Bội Châu
offered his opinion of Cường Để, which remained unflattering: "I found him of ordinary
intelligence and too inferior to have any influence on me. I directed everything; he only wanted
to be king. He would never have revolted against the Protectorate if he had been given the

Saigon, Hanoi, Hué, Vientiane, Phnom-Penh, No. 3200/SG, 29 octobre 1925.

512
SPCE 354BIS, Telegramme Officiel, Dirsurgé a Sûreté Saigon, Hanoi, Hué, Vientiane, Phnom-Penh,
No. 3200/SG, 29 octobre 1925. This cable provides additional information not contained in Néron’s cable.
513
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 326.
514
Example: Nguyễn Hải Thân had been responsible for collecting money in Annam. SPCE 352, Affaire
Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 326.
515
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 325.
516
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 331
517
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 331
518
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 332.
519
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 333.
520
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 335.

119
throne."521 Phan Bội Châu essentially confirmed that he had seen Cường Để as little more than
a temporarily convenient figurehead. He ended his first day of "honesty" by stating "If the
Vietnamese people were clear-eyed about the French, I would pass on Cường Để's support and
act on my own accord."522 Phan Bội Châu was suggesting that, more than any other Vietnamese
leader, he was the most intelligent and therefore the best to work directly with the French
Protectorate administration. It was an unsubtle shift back toward the possibility of Franco-
Vietnamese collaboration.
The next day (October 24), the newfound friendliness between Phan Bội Châu and the
Criminal Commission began to fray. Phan Bội Châu claimed that he had only developed the idea
of opposing the French government in 1909-1910, after the French had targeted his movement.523
The prosecutor's attempt to remind Phan Bội Châu of some of the very unpleasant things he had
written about Frenchmen did not have the intended effect. Phan Bội Châu claimed that his
compatriots had simply misinterpreted his writings. When the prosecutor reprised the accusation
that Phan Bội Châu had written "passionate, violent, and vulgar diatribes against the French,"
Phan Bội Châu again claimed that Cường Để was the one responsible: "Cường Để wrote his own
compositions, but he signed my name."524 Why on earth did he let Cường Để do this? Phan Bội
Châu claimed he had allowed it to happen so that money would continue to flow from
Cochinchina to support the Đông Du students.525 Phan Bội Châu's wilyness, temporarily
eclipsed by his contrition, now reappeared.
On October 26, Phan Bội Châu refined his new line of defense. Every answer seemed
honest, but always involved a large measure of plausible deniability. Yes, he had opposed the
government, "but I never arrived at taking action."526 When violent actions such as the murder
of Nguyễn Huy Điển in Canton in July 1912 had taken place, Phan Bội Châu was conveniently
out of town.527 Had a "batallion of death" existed? Phan Bội Châu had heard that Nguyễn Hải
Thân and Nguyễn Thành Hiến had created such an organization, but he was not sure whether it
actually existed.528 Phan Bội Châu admitted to being "responsible for the education of [students]
in Japan," but he refused to take any responsibility for the actions of those students.529 Even if
he had written unpleasant things about the French government, Phan Bội Châu's only "weapon"
was his brush.530 Most importantly, Phan Bội Châu stressed, "I was not responsible for the 1912-
1913 terrorist campaign."531
The prosecutor was clearly frustrated. The accused had displayed a moment of honesty,
but that had now passed. Phan Bội Châu was ready to play games again and this time around he
had a much better idea of the rules. Yes, he had accepted money, but it was used to pay for
education, not weapons and munitions.532 The Quang Phục hội had existed, but only briefly.
Chinese revolutionaries had hoped their Vietnamese counterparts would strike at the French
521
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 337.
522
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 338.
523
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 340.
524
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 341.
525
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 342.
526
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 345.
527
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 347.
528
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 348, 374.
529
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 349, 371.
530
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 377.
531
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 349.
532
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 349.

120
Protectorate, but a lack of funds prevented anyone from doing anything.533 Other Vietnamese
may have purchased or built bombs, but Phan Bội Châu had never done so.534 Phan Bội Châu
claimed never to have personally known any of the bombers.535 Anyone, such as Ấm Võ,
Nguyễn Văn Tuân, or Lương Ngọc Quyên, who testified that Phan Bội Châu had played a
material role in planning or carrying out terrorist acts was lying.536
Sometimes Phan Bội Châu botched his own defense by making claims the prosecutor
could all too easily disprove. Phan Bội Châu initially claimed he had been arrested by warlord
Long Jiguang "at the end of 1912," which would have absolved him of responsibility for the
1913 attacks.537 There were far too many witnesses and documents for this to work.538 He then
attempted to claim that he had changed his opinion of the French administration in 1913 in
response to Governor General Sarraut's educational reforms.539 This line of defense included a
bold line, "Once I was overseas, I realized many whites had enlightened ideas and that my ideas
were wrong."540
On October 28, the prosecutor returned to using a previously successful strategy:
describing the violence Phan Bội Châu had provoked with his writings. This time, the
prosecutor presented detailed testimonies describing murders and assassinations carried out
against real and suspected informers.541 Đỗ Hữu Tiên had been stabbed and his body was
dumped on the side of the road.542 Thiên Nhi was chopped in the ribs and neck with a machete,
and his body was thrown into the water and disappeared.543 Nguyễn Huy Điển was murdered in
1912 for spying on Phan Bội Châu, Âm Tran was murdered in 1913 for failing to carry out an
attack on Pac Hin Bom.544 In Siam, Ma Kheng had informed Đặng Tử Kính and Đặng Tử Hứa
that Co Bac was a spy, so they had her trapped and murdered in Korat forest.545 In 1911, Đặng
Tử Kính had taken Ba-Ben to a spinnery and threw a brick at him, causing severe injury.546
Đặng Tử Kính was also responsible for the death of a Tonkinese named Quan and Ba-Nho.547 In
1912, Hoàng Trọng Mậu, Âm Giên, and Trần Hữu Lực had stabbed a spy in their house in
Canton. They chopped up the body, rolled the parts up in a carpet, and dumped it in the river.548
Trần Thị Chuyên testified that her husband was paid to bring back severed ears.549 Phan Bội
Châu denounced these grisly events and denied all knowledge and responsibility. Regarding the

533
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 352.
534
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 354.
535
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 367.
536
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 356. At times, Phan Bội Châu really let loose after
hearing particular individuals’ statements: “Ba Nho [Nguyễn Văn Tuân] only speaks lies. He was just some
Italian’s servant.” SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 361.
537
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 362.
538
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 373, 397.
539
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 369.
540
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 370.
541
The prosecutor: “you inspired these acts and dictated the regulations under which they were required to
take place.” SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 385.
542
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 385.
543
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 386.
544
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 386.
545
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 386.
546
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 386.
547
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 387.
548
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 387.
549
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 388.

121
murder of Bat-Biên (aka Nguyễn Huy Điển), which Hoàng Trọng Mậu had testified took place
on Phan Bội Châu's orders, Phan Bội Châu protested, "I deplore the assassination of Nguyễn Huy
Điển. He was one of my most loyal servants. He was assassinated in my absence!"550
Recognizing he had hit a nerve, the prosecutor then portrayed Phan Bội Châu as a corrupt
beneficiary of all this bloodshed. He claimed that the first assassinations "were meant to inspire
confidence in the Chinese officials so you could obtain 300,000 piastres which they offered
you."551 The prosecutor argued that because Phan Bội Châu had admitted to being the one to
meet with the Chinese officials who were making these offers, such as Chen Qimei, he was
ultimately responsible for triggering the wave of bloodshed that took place 1912-1913. The
prosecutor excoriated Phan Bội Châu, "In 1913, you were a vulgar crook who promised things
you knew where impossible, yet you asked anyway. You lived off the money that you duped and
threatened your countrymen to obtain."552 Phan Bội Châu's need for money, the prosecutor
continued, was what prompted the printing and sale in 1912 of "200,000 piastres" in worthless
banknotes carrying Phan Bội Châu's name and signature.553 Bombs were used to threaten
villagers in Indochina to hand over money to the Vietnamese revolutionaries, which Phan Bội
Châu then used to support his lifestyle in Canton.554 According to Hoàng Trọng Mậu's
testimony, "you organized, through intermediaries, a veritable enterprise based on pillaging
entire regions...to support your wasteful appetites."555
This series of moral condemnations and ad hominem attacks again put Phan Bội Châu on
the defensive. Yes, he had printed banknotes, but so had Cường Để, and Cường Để's print-run
was larger.556 Yes, he'd been in charge, but he allowed both Cường Để and Hoàng Trọng Mậu to
do what they wanted.557 The claims he was profiting off of violence were absolutely untrue,
Phan Bội Châu protested, "I had no influence. I had no money."558
On October 30, the prosecutor ratcheted up his accusations. Phan Bội Châu was planning
massive attacks on Tonkin to obtain the 100,000 piastres promised by Germany.559 Phan Bội
Châu played both the Germans and the Chinese for funds, while personally coordinating the
attacks that would have released more funding from his benefactors.560 Cường Để had left Phan
Bội Châu in charge and fled to Europe after Phan Bội Châu's partisans threatened him in
Canton.561 Accoring to Nguyễn Bá Trác, "Phan Bội Châu is the most fervent of the violent
terrorists. Phan Bội Châu is determined, perseverant, and fanatical. He is trapped by his own
promises to the Chinese."562 The prosecutor's accusations were reaching a fever pitch.
Building on his relentless charges, on October 31, the prosecutor introduced testimony
and documentation demonstrating Phan Bội Châu's involvement in bomb-making. Bùi Ngọc
Nhuận was arrested in Bangkok in 1913 with pieces of an encoded letter to Phan Bội Châu that
550
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 386-387.
551
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 389.
552
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 387.
553
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 391-392.
554
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 396.
555
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 396-97.
556
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 392.
557
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 397-398.
558
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 401-402.
559
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 399.
560
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 400.
561
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 401.
562
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 403.

122
intelligence services were able to reconstruct and decode. The letter testified to the fabrication
and tranportation of bombs to Saigon and Hà Tiên.563 Another letter from Lý Định used code to
discuss bombs and bombing.564 The prosecutor went on to introduce four more similar letters.
Then eight more. Then testimony from individuals on bomb-making. Nguyễn Huy Nhuận
testified, "The bombs can kill 1,000 people. The small ones cost 100 piastres. The big ones cost
600 piastres."565 Đặng Kiên called the bombs "egg-shaped people killers."566 And Vũ Văn Thụy
declared, "the revolutionaries started to talk about bombs as an easy way of provoking a
revolution."567
Certain students, such as Đặng Tử Mẫn, became Phan Bội Châu's expert bomb-makers,
capable of creating a variety of deadly explosive devices.568 One type, called a "goose egg" was
equipped with a striker and packed with 500 grams of iron pellets. This was the kind used to
eviscerate the tuần phủ of Thái Bình.569 Another kind was the "pig tail grenades" that used a
wick. Yet another were the "money grenades" that included two internal chambers.570 A bomb
expert examined some of the bombs created by Phan Bội Châu's revolutionaries in China, and
declared them to be of professional quality, made using machines obtained in Japan.571
Rapidly, the prosecutor strung together a long list of documents that, he claimed,
illustrated Phan Bội Châu's vast terrorist network in action.572 The notebook seized from Cường
Để's belongings indicated that Phan Bội Châu was sending money to workshop sites provided by
Kang Youwei where Phan Bội Châu's young men produced the explosives.573 After the
accidental explosion in Kowloon that resulted in the loss of several of Đặng Tử Mẫn's fingers,
the bomb-makers split up. Some went to Longzhou, others to Yunnan, and still others to Siam.574
In Yunnan, Vietnamese revolutionaries were supported by the Chinese warlord Lu Rongting.
Nguyễn Hải Thân (aka Nguyễn Cẩm Giàng) led the Vietnamese in Yunnan.575 Another
contingent made bombs in Nanning in a tailor shop.576
In 1914, the executive committee of the Quang Phục hội moved to demonstrate the
group's potential to Chinese officals. According to the testimony of Nguyễn Quang Hào, bomb-
makers were assigned to each province to carry out attacks.577 The Chinese revolutionary-
turned-official Huang Xing was treated to a banquet where Vietnamese promised to "show the
Chinese their bomb-throwing prowess."578 Nguyễn Hải Thân then undertook a mission to kill
Governor General Albert Sarraut in Nam Định. He returned claiming success, greatly pleasing
the Chinese, until the Chinese learned that this was a lie. Nguyễn Văn Tuân testified that the

563
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 403.
564
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 403-404.
565
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 416.
566
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 417.
567
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 417.
568
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 412.
569
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 412.
570
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 413.
571
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 412.
572
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 405-409, 410.
573
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 413.
574
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 414.
575
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 415.
576
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 417.
577
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 422.
578
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 421.

123
Executive Committee of the Quang Phục hội then replaced Nguyễn Hải Thân with Nguyễn
Trọng Thượng. It was on Nguyễn Trọng Thượng's orders that Tài Xế (aka Nguyễn Văn Thụy)
carried out his attack on the terrace of the Hanoi Hotel on April 26, 1913.
The prosecutor began to tie together his case. Nguyễn Hải Thân, Nguyễn Trọng Thượng,
and the others were all following Phan Bội Châu's direct orders. The prosecutor rattled off
testimonies to build his case. Nguyễn Đạo Nam had declared to the 1913 Criminal Commission,
which had originally sentenced Phan Bội Châu to death, "The revolution is coming. We will
trouble the country and blow up the loyal officials of the French. We intend to frighten the
officials associated with the administration."579 Phạm Hoàng Triêt testified, "The exact date of
the attacks was fixed in advance by Phan Bội Châu himself." Nguyễn Đại testified, "Phan Bội
Châu...recruited partisans from northern Tonkin because they get along with the Chinese pirates."
Phan Bội Châu could offer only weak excuses to wave after wave of evidence. He
claimed, "The only order I gave was to study. If you are claiming my ideas are the cause of the
1913 terrorist campaign, I cannot protest, but they did not act on my orders."580 Continuing,
Phan Bội Châu offered a highly revealing statement: "In my writings, I said bad things about the
French. I exhorted my compatriots to unite against the French. But I never thought they would
actually do it."581 Other statements represented desperate half-measures that only hurt his case
further. Phan Bội Châu disavowed Nguyễn Hải Thân, but then admitted he had been in charge of
bomb production in Longzhou.582 Phan Bội Châu offered desperate, evasive explanations:
"Đặng Tử Mẫn only made powder...Đặng Bỉnh Thành had bought bombs on Cường Để's
orders...I only gave 5 piastres to contribute to the opening of that tailor shop."583 Even worse,
Phan Bội Châu's statements increasingly compromised his own defense: "Our party was against
the French government, not the [native] functionaries...Nguyễn Trọng Thượng was part of my
group, but he did not follow my orders."584 November 4 culminated in descriptions of the April
1913 assassinations.585
Finally, the prosecutor read off multiple pages of Phan Bội Châu's previous incriminating
statements, asking the old man if he stood by his own words.586 The prosecutor then pointed out
contradictions between Phan Bội Châu's statements. Losing ground with each passing day, Phan
Bội Châu grew quieter and less combative. There would be no victory against such well-
substantiated prosecution. Phan Bội Châu weakly clung to the last remaining defense he could
muster: it was all Cường Để's doing. In the evening of November 6, the prosecutor unleashed his
final salvo: a hitherto unmentioned letter written by Phan Bội Châu to Cường Để that proved
Phan Bội Châu had been the sole authority leading the Quang Phục hội at the time the April 1913
attacks were carried out.587
The letter was found in Cường Để’s possession upon his capture in Hong Kong on July 8,
1913. In this letter, dated March 26, 1913, Phan Bội Châu is clearly shown to have given
instructions to Cường Để, not the other way around. Phan Bội Châu indicated that he had

579
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 424.
580
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 409.
581
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 410.
582
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 415.
583
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 416-417.
584
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 425.
585
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 430.
586
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 427.
587
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 435.

124
received a letter from Nguyễn Trọng Thượng in Indochina assuring him the population was ready
to support him and the Quang Phục hội. The prosecutor explained that the letter proved Phan
Bội Châu was marshaling his forces for an imminent campaign of terrorism against the French
Protectorate. Nguyễn Trọng Thượng, son of Nguyễn Tận Thuạt was to lead the attack in Tonkin.
Phan Bội Châu needed Cường Để to return so he could exercise his influence over the
Cochinchinese. Cường Để’s sudden departure in March 1913, apparently for Europe thought
actually for the Mekong Delta, had thrown Phan Bội Châu’s plans for a violent takeover into
disarray by threatening to fragment the movement. Thus Phan Bội Châu demanded Cường Để
return to assist with the “great enterprise,” including the “organization of a provisional
government.” Phan Bội Châu was clearly the one in charge.
Realizing that everything now rested on this letter, which he was clearly shocked to see,
Phan Bội Châu resurrected his old defense strategy:
Phan Bội Châu: "Someone imitated my signature."
Prosecutor: "Are you recommencing the comedy of October 20? If the letter is bogus,
why would Cường Để keep it? He knew your writing well. He would not have interrupted his
voyage on your orders unless it was really you."
Phan Bội Châu: "The person who wrote this letter is very good at imitating my
signature."
Prosecutor: "You continue to mock the Criminal Commission. Why not ask for an expert
as you did for the copy?"
Phan Bội Châu: "It is such a good imitation that an expert would be fooled.
[The letter is presented to interpreter Bùi Bằng Đoàn, who confirms it]
Phan Bội Châu: "The interpreter is wrong."
Prosecutor: "This is proof you organized the 1913 terrorist campaign. You were indeed
the leader because your order made Cường Để interrupt his voyage."588
The interrogatory sessions were over. For the Criminal Commission, there was
absolutely no question: Phan Bội Châu had led the Quang Phục hội at the time that organization's
operatives carried out bombing attacks on government targets inside French Indochina. Phan
Bội Châu was the insidious master of puppets, who used violent rhetoric, ruthless tactics,
sophisticated explosives, and radicalized young men to bring to fruition his plan to eradicate the
French colonial administration, terrify the Indochinese population into submission, and become
the president and ruler of Vietnam.
On November 9, the Criminal Commission met solely to read the charges. Phan Bội
Châu said only that he had nothing to add and that he protested his innocence. The prosecutor
gave Phan Bội Châu three days in which to prepare his defense and asked if he wanted to choose
an attorney. Phan Bội Châu asked that the Commission designate him one. Bride, as president
of the Criminal Commission, then designated Raymond Bona, defense advocate for the Court of
Appeals in Hanoi, and ended the meeting at 4:00 PM.
The Approaching Storm (November 10-November 22)
After 36 days of interrogation, Phan Bội Châu and his designated attorney Raymond
Bona were to be given just three days to prepare a defense. Fortunately for Phan Bội Châu, and
quite unfortunately for administration officials who were anxious have the verdict rendered in
advance of Governor General Varenne's imminent arrival to the colony, the gears of colonial
bureaucray simply could not grind that quickly. On November 15, Jean-Félix Krautheimer,
588
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 438.

125
acting resident superior of Tonkin, wrote Monguillot to report that the preparation of Phan Bội
Châu's defense has been delayed due to difficulties with the designation of Phan Bội Châu's
attorney.589 It had taken until that day (November 15) to hold the new meeting required to allow
a proper designation. Krautheimer estimated that the day of judgment would take place on
November 21.
As it turned out, Phan Bội Châu received not one defense attorney, but two: Raymond
Bona and Joseph Larre, of Haiphong. On November 17, Larre and Bona asked Bride for a
supplementary delay on account of the number of files it was necessary for them to review.590
President Bride granted this, although the extension was still not to exceed three days.591
On November 16, Bride had provided the office of the resident superior of Tonkin a press
release he hoped to have distributed. In the press release, Bride declared the day of judgment
would take place in the hall of the First Chamber of the Court of Appeals, located in the Palace
of Justice, and that it was scheduled for 8:00 AM, Monday November 23.592 Bride followed this
with a self-congratulatory statement:

On this occasion, I would like to recall that the investigation of Phan Bội Châu, during
which nearly 1950 questions were put to the accused, was particularly long because of
the numerous documents it was necessary to gather, sometimes from Cochinchina and
Annam, analyze, translate, classify and inventory. The Criminal Commission with its
auxiliaries, under the direction of its President, has done considerable work which
required two long sessions each day, which were often extended very late in the evening.
This being the circumstance, I wish to pay tribute to the zeal everyone has thrown into
this case so that all the necessary clarifications might be made in the interest of justice.593

Bride requested the press release be sent out on November 21. Robin was not
interested.594 Neither was the Sûreté, which responded in a one-line cable on November 19: "No
press release should be made to the press."595 The security state had thwarted Bride's desire to
pursue his version of French colonial justice a final time. Bride had been so single-mindedly
focused on proving Phan Bội Châu's guilt that he had little conception of how such a verdict
would be received by Vietnamese in the colony. Robin and Jeanbrau, who had been watching a
stream of ever more worrisome cables, recognized that Phan Bội Châu's arrest and trial had
excited public opinion in unprecented and dangerous ways. Bride needed to bring the trial of
Phan Bội Châu to a close with the less fanfare, the better.
A Titannic Duel: The Day of Sentencing (November 23)

589
SPCE 355, Le Résident Supérieur p.i. au Tonkin à M. le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine (Cabinet),
No. 501.CCB, 15 novembre 1925.
590
SPCE 355, Telegramme Officiel, Gougal (Alberti, Hanoi) à Gougal Saigon, No. 2976, 17 novembre
1925.
591
SPCE 355, Telegramme Officiel, Gougal à Gougal Saigon, November (date missing) 1925.
592
SPCE 355, Le Résident Supérieur p.i. au Tonkin à M. le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine (Cabinet),
No. 503.CCB, 16 novembre 1925.
593
SPCE 355, Le Résident Supérieur p.i. au Tonkin à M. le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine (Cabinet),
No. 504.CCB, 16 novembre 1925.
594
According to Alberti, Robin had called Bride’s press release, “not very useful.” SPCE 355, Telegramme
Officiel, Gougal (Alberti, Hanoi) à Gougal Saigon, No. 2976, 17 novembre 1925.
595
SPCE 355, Telegramme Officiel, Gougal (Saigon) à Gougal Hanoi, No. 16-S, 19 Novembre 1925.

126
 By 7:00 AM, it was standing room only outside the gates the Palace of Justice.596 Despite
the lack of a press release, the colonial press turned out in force. The major Vietnamese
language newspapers covering the trial were Thực nghiệp dân báo, Trung Bắc tân văn, both
based in Hanoi, and Đông Pháp thời báo, based in Saigon.597 French-language coverage
appeared in L'Argus Indochinois, Indochine Républicain, and L'Écho Annamite.
Stern-looking guards holding bayonets watched as the crowd continued to grow.598 After
filling the walk-in rooms on the ground floor, the crowd filled out the first floor as well, then
proceeded to fill the corridors as well. It was a scene quite unlike any that had taken place in the
colony. This was the first time a Criminal Commission had been open to the public. The
reporter for Trung Bắc tân văn later mused if this was Bride's idea of "equality."599 The Sûreté
596
My account of the day’s events draws on several published accounts. The most commonly cited
account in Vietnamese is Tập án Phan Bội Châu (The Trial of Phan Bội Châu), which draws on coverage published
in Thực Nghiệp dân báo on November 25-27, 1925. There are several versions of this pamphlet. The fourth
printing of Tập Án Phan Bội Châu, printed in quốc ngữ, is available in ANOM. SPCE 354, Tập án Phan Bội Châu,
(Hanoi: Imprimerie Thực Nghiệp, 1925). In 1950, Bùi Đình re-published the quốc ngữ version of Tập án Phan Bội
Châu in his longer account of the trial. See Bùi Đình, Vụ án Phan Bội Châu (The Case of Phan Bội Châu) (Hanoi:
Nhà xuất bản Tiếng Việt, 1950), 45-79. In 1980, Professor Trần Văn Quý of the Hán Nôm institute discovered a
version entitled Tập án ông Phan (The Trial of Mr. Phan) printed in chữ nôm in November 1925, just after the trial
ended. Trần Văn Quý apparently retains this copy, but his edited version transliterated into quốc ngữ is published in
Chương Thâu, ed. Hồ sơ vụ án Phan Bội Châu (Hanoi: Nhà xuất bản Văn hóa - Thông tin, 2002), 75-114. Trần Văn
Quý’s chữ nôm copy contains editorial criticisms of the French judicial administration as well as Nghệ Tĩnh terms
used by Phan Bội Châu during the trial. These features do not appear in the quốc ngữ versions. Several other nôm
versions are available at the Hán Nôm Institute in Hanoi, including: Phan Bội Châu tiểu sử (printed by Liễu Văn
Đường, 1926), 60 tr. 19,5x14-VNb. 73; Tập án Phan Bội Châu (handwritten copy found with eight other
documents), 138 tr., 17x15, -VHv.224; Tập án cụ Phan (handwritten copy) 37 tr. - VHv.224. In 1925-1926, the
Thực Nghiệp publishing house published selections from Thực Nghiệp dân báo’s November and December
coverage in Những tin tức và dư luận về Ông Phan Bội Châu (News and Opinion about Mr. Phan Bội Châu), which
included a photograph of the old patriot on the cover and sold for 10 cents in Tonkin and Annam, 15 cents in
Cochinchina, Laos, and Cambodia. Đông Hải, Những tin tức và dư luận về Ông Phan Bội Châu trong hai tháng
Novembre và Decembre 1925 (Hanoi: Thực Nghiệp, 1926). A copy is available at Bibliothèque Nationale. A copy
is also available in ANOM. SPCE 353, Những tin tức và dư luận về Ông Phan Bội Châu (Hanoi: Imprimerie Thực
Nghiệp, 1925). A microform copy is available at the National Library in Hanoi (Pièce 163, S 87/3119). ANOM also
holds handwritten French translations of Thực nghiệp dân báo coverage on November 23 and 24, and (separately)
November 27. SPCE 354, Traduction du Thực nghiệp dân báo No. 1529 des 23 et 24 Nov. 1925 and Extrait du
Thực nghiệp dân báo no. 1532 des 27 Nov. 1925. Another useful account draws on coverage published in Trung
Bắc tân văn. Việc Phan Bội Châu tại Hồng đồng đề hình phiên ngày 23 Novembre 1925 (Hanoi: Trung Bắc tân văn,
1925). A microform copy is available at the National Library in Hanoi (Pièce 326, S 87/3273). A third account, by
Trần Huy Liệu, the editor of Đông Pháp thời báo, appeared in January 1926. Trần Huy Liệu, Việc Ông Phan Bội
Châu (The Matter of Phan Bội Châu) (Saigon: Nhà in Xưa nay, 1926). A microform copy is available at the
National Library in Hanoi (Pièce 294, S 87/3242). ANOM also holds a copy in SPCE 352, Phan Bội Châu, Dossier
trasmis par Sûreté Annam, Việc ông Phan Bội Châu, Saigon 1926. The order sentencing Phan Bội Châu, including
a brief description of the day’s events is available in SPCE 352, Arret de la Commission Criminelle, 23 novembre
1925. Finally, Gilles, head of the Sûreté in Tonkin, provided a three-page report on the day’s events which is useful
for comparing with Vietnamese journalistic accounts. SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle, No. 7468, Chef de la Sûreté
du Tonkin (Gilles) à M. le Résident Supérieur, le DirAffPol et de la S.G., le Procureur Général, 24 novembre 1925.
597
Trần Huy Liệu served as the correspondent for Xưa nay. Trần Huy Liệu, Việc Ông Phan Bội Châu (The
Matter of Phan Bội Châu) (Saigon: Nhà in Xua nay, 1926).
598
Gilles reported that the crowd was “very easily contained by the Order Service, who did not
demonstrate, at least apparently, any feeling.” SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle, No. 7468, Chef de la Sûreté du
Tonkin (Gilles) à M. le Résident Supérieur, le DirAffPol et de la S.G., le Procureur Général, 24 novembre 1925.
599
Việc Phan Bội Châu tại Hồng đồng đề hình phiên ngày 23 Novembre 1925 (Hanoi: Trung Bắc tân văn,
1925).

127
commented that the trial had provoked considerable curiosity, "which resulted in an influx of a
very mixed indigenous public."600 Altogether, including a fair number of Europeans, the crowd
had reached around 2,000 people.
At 7:45 AM, Phan Bội Châu exited Hỏa Lò Central Prison between two French soldiers.
He wore a five-paneled aristocratic gown that extended to his heels. His bald forehead lay under
a tangle of hair. The guards sat him in a chair and, as he waited for the court to open, Phan Bội
Châu stroked his beard, looking very deliberate in each action. The journalist from Thực nghiệp
dân báo commented that the old patriot looked like a Chinese gentleman.601
At 8:25 AM, President Bride convened the final meeting of the Criminal Commission,
with members Resident-Mayor Dupuy, Prosecutor General Boyer, and Captain Bellier present.
Alongside, there was the court's clerk Patrick Arnoux and the court's two intepreters Gombaud
Saintonge and Bùi Bằng Đoàn. Saintonge would translate the statements of the Commission into
Vietnamese, while Bùi Bằng Đoàn would translate Phan Bội Châu's words into French. Finally,
appearing before the court were Raymond Bona, Joseph Larre, and Phan Boi Châu.
Bride began by asking Phan Bội Châu to state his name, place of birth, profession, and
parentage. In a loud and nimble voice, Phan Bội Châu answered, stating he was from Đan
Nhiễm village, Nam Đàn district in the province of Nghệ An and that he was formerly a teacher.
Bride then read the eight charges against Phan Bội Châu:

1. To have, in Siamese or Chinese territory at an unspecified time, by donations,

promises, threats, abuse of authority or power, machinations or guilty artifices, been
complicit in the crime of murder with premeditation committed by the convicted Phạm
Văn Tráng (known as Cháng) on April 12, 1913 in Thái Bình, Tonkin on the person of
tuần phủ Nguyễn Duy Hàn. To have provoked this crime and provided instructions for
how to commit it.

2. To have been, in the same circumstances of time and place, made complicit in the
crime of murder with premeditation committed by the convicted Phạm Văn Tráng
(known as Cháng), on April 12, 1913 in Thái Bình, Tonkin on the person of tuần phủ
Nguyễn Duy Hàn, by procuring instruments, in this case bombs, which served for the
action, knowing well what they would do.

3. To have, in the same circumstances of time and place, by donations, promises, threats,
abuse of authority or power, machinations or guilty artifices, been complicit in the crime
of murder with premeditation committed by Nguyễn Văn Tuý (known as Tài Xế) and the
convicted Nguyễn Khắc Cần on April 26, 1913 on the terrace of the Hanoi Hotel in
Hanoi, Tonkin on the persons of Captains Montgrand and Chapuis. To have provoked
this crime and provided instructions for how to commit it.

4. To have, in the same circumstances of time and place, been complicit in the crime of
murder with premeditation committed by Nguyễn Văn Tuý (known as Tài Xế) and the

600
SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle, No. 7468, Chef de la Sûreté du Tonkin (Gilles) à M. le Résident
Supérieur, le DirAffPol et de la S.G., le Procureur Général, 24 novembre 1925.
601
Another version appeared as Đồng Hải, Những tin tức và dư luận vể Ông Phan Bội Châu trong hai
tháng Novembre và Decembre 1925 (Hanoi: Thực Nghiệp, 1926). Yet another appeared as Finally, Chương Thâu a
copy was printed in chữ nôm in 1925 the day after the trial.

128
 convicted Nguyễn Khắc Cần on April 26, 1913 on the terrace of the Hanoi Hotel in
Hanoi, Tonkin on the persons of Captains Montgrand and Chapuis, by procuring
instruments, in this case bombs, which served for the action, knowing well what they
would do.

5. To have, in the same circumstances of time and place, taken part in a conspiracy to
either destroy the Government or to excite citizens or inhabitants to arm themselves
against the authorities within the territories of Annam and Tonkin, with the aggravating
circumstance that said conspiracy was followed by its execution or preparation thereof.

6. To have, in the same circumstances of time and place, taken part in a conspiracy to
either destroy the Government or to encourage citizens or inhabitants to arm themselves
against the authorities within the territories of Annam and Tonkin.

7. To have, in the same circumstances of time and place, taken actions likely to
compromise public security or to cause serious political disturbances.

8. To have, in the same circumstances of time and place, taken part in an association
formed for the purpose of preparing or committing crimes against persons or property.602

Having read the charges, Bride ceded the floor to Phan Bội Châu. It is difficult to guess
exactly what Bride and the other members of the Criminal Commission expected to happen next.
However, little in the previous two months of interrogatory sessions could have prepared them
for what did happen next. In a strong yet genuine voice,603 Phan Bội Châu addressed President
Bride and packed audience of thousands:

Vietnam is a nation, but in days past it fell under harsh rule. The people have long
suffered. The kings kept themselves far from the people and heaped on restrictions, so
the people had no way to move forward. Because the Protectorate also represents a
civilized nation that speaks of progress, I had believed that after thousands of years it was
time for the people of Giao Chỉ [Vietnam] to open their eyes. Little could I have known
that twenty years ago the government would simply stop reforms and not change so much
as a single policy.

Bride's observation that Phan Bội Châu's greatest weapon was his ability to adapt his
message perfectly to his audience must have come back to haunt him at this moment.604 This
was simply not the same Phan Bội Châu Bride had worked so hard to bring to justice. Phan Bội
Châu was ready to deliver a speech and Bride in his desire to demonstrate the grandeur of French
justice had unwittingly given him the perfect audience.
Bride occassionally interrupted Phan Bội Châu to allow Gombaud Saintonge to translate

602
The various Vietnamese accounts provide rough approximations of each charge. For a complete version
in French, see SPCE 354, Affaire Phan Bội Châu, Rapport du Président de la Commission Criminelle, 31-32.
603
Even Sûreté Chief Gilles describes Phan Bội Châu’s voice as “un voix forte mais sans jactance.” SPCE
355, Note Confidentielle, No. 7468, Chef de la Sûreté du Tonkin (Gilles) à M. le Résident Supérieur, le DirAffPol et
de la S.G., le Procureur Général, 24 novembre 1925.
604
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu, Interrogatoires, 227.

129
on his behalf, but Phan Bội Châu did not need a translator for the audience that mattered. He
was now a teacher once again and he had been preparing this lesson his whole life:

Since 1904, Annam and Tonkin have had only two colleges: the University of Hanoi and
the University of Thuận Hóa, but they only teach translation. The people are not allowed
to study abroad. The examination system has remained in place. Penals laws have not
been adapted to match the laws of France. The mandarins are corrupt. You can bribe
them in public.

I am from Vietnam. I love the nation of Vietnam. I want to wake up the people of
Vietnam. Seeing what was happening, I came up with a plan to oppose the government.
If I had at hand a 10,000 man navy and many tens of thousands of troops, guns, and
bullets, along with warships and airplanes, then I would declare war and take down this
government piece by piece.

But I am just a scholar. I have not a single coin in my pocket. Without iron in my hand, I
have no way to acquire weapons to fight back. Thus I use only my words. I use my
voice to encourage the people and to demand the government reform its politics. But the
government was suspicious of me and attacked, so I had to flee overseas to work toward
my goals. I called out to my comrades to give money and send people abroad. I wrote
books and sent them back to stir the people up. What I have done is use my tongue and
my brush. My goal was only to reform the government. What I wanted was only to love
the people and my country. My actions truly were principled.

If I have committed crimes, they are these: First, the government was given over to the
Protectorate. Nobody opposed this except me, because I wanted independence for
Vietnam. Second, before when Vietnam was truly an autocracy, I wanted the country to
become a nation. Third, the state would not allow travel abroad, but I escaped and
encouraged others to follow. Fourth, I wrote and gave speeches to wake up the people, to
demand government reform, and to bring about civilization.605

Phan Bội Châu's speech lasted for over an hour. He had clearly taken careful
observations of the Criminal Commission during the long interrogatory sessions, because his
speech anticipated the main arguments in Bride's report. One by one, Phan Bội Châu employed
refined versions of the counter arguments he had practiced the previous two and a half months.
He was a scholar, not a warrior. He was guilty only of writing to inspire patriotism. He had not
thrown any bombs personally. If Phan Bội Châu had wanted to be a thug, he could have stayed
and joined Để Thám or a group of bandits. He had never killed any Westerners. In fact, his
books encouraged Westerners and Vietnamese to love each other like brothers, like family.606
The crimes he was being charged with were savage and uncivilized. If Vietnam were to achieve
independence, Phan Bội Châu stated as he brought his speech to a conclusion, "The first thing I
would do would be to sentence to death those murderers, because murdering people like those
officials is not a humane act. People who have lost their country are like children who lose their
605
This version of Phan Bội Châu’s speech relies on Tập án Phan Bội Châu, which draws on the reporting
of Thực Nghiệp dân báo.
606
Many of these statements appear in the three main Vietnamese accounts, though in different order.

130
parents. If children can’t follow their parents, who will they follow?"607
Having finished this speech, Phan Bội Châu said no more. Bride asked if he anything
more to say. Phan Bội Châu told Bride he would answer any questions the Commission had,
whereupon Bride replied, "The Council has no more questions, because we asked them all during
the inquiry. This time is only for the accused to say what they will."608 Phan Bội Châu sat down.
It was clear to everyone in the room that something momentous had taken place. Gilles, the
chief of the Sûreté in Tonkin, wrote the next day, "It must be recognized that...the impression this
produced on the native audience, who observed listening with a religious silence, seemed
entirely in his favor."609 Phan Bội Châu had won the room.
At 10:15 AM, Larre and Bona requested a break until 3:00 PM.610 Satisfied with this,
Bride ended the meeting immediately. Phan Bội Châu stayed in the Palace of Justice as Gilles
cleared the corridor and held back the throng of desperately curious Vietnamese hoping to get
another look at the old patriot.611 Guards brought Phan Bội Châu back to Hỏa Lò Central Prison
without incident. The streets were silent.
Vietnamese agents of the Sûreté mixed in with the crowd reported people saying that the
"great patriot Phan Bội Châu" would almost certainly be sentenced to life imprisonment or
deportation by the Criminal Commission.612 In the afternoon, the crowd returned in even greater
numbers than the morning. The corridor needed to be slightly cleared so that Phan Bội Châu, his
attorneys, and the Criminal Commission could get back into the courtroom. The Criminal
Commission then reconvened at 3:00 PM sharp.
President Bride attempted to steal back Phan Bội Châu's thunder. He opened by stating,
"This morning Mr. Phan Bội Châu failed to answer several questions correctly, so the
Commission will give an account of the things Mr. Phan Bội Châu did during the period 1904-
1913 so they can be included in the court’s record."613 Bride proceeded to present a concise and
relatively straightforward account of Phan Bội Châu's life as a revolutionary. However, nothing
he had to say was particularly incriminating. Without the benefit of his vast archive of
documents ready for citation, Bride indictment of Phan Bội Châu had lost a great deal of its
punch.
Bride did attempt to reprise some of his greatest hits from the interrogatory sessions. To
show how dishonest Phan Bội Châu had been, Bride cited Phan Bội Châu's own statements.
Taken out of context, however, the statements Bride cited were hardly incriminating. Bride
noted, for example, that "Phan Bội Châu claimed Liang Qichao’s introduction was incorrect. But

607
Việc Phan Bội Châu tại Hồng đồng đề hình phiên ngày 23 Novembre 1925 (Hanoi: Trung Bắc tân văn,
1925).
608
Việc Phan Bội Châu tại Hồng đồng đề hình phiên ngày 23 Novembre 1925 (Hanoi: Trung Bắc tân văn,
1925).
609
SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle, No. 7468, Chef de la Sûreté du Tonkin (Gilles) à M. le Résident
Supérieur, le DirAffPol et de la S.G., le Procureur Général, 24 novembre 1925.
610
SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle, No. 7468, Chef de la Sûreté du Tonkin (Gilles) à M. le Résident
Supérieur, le DirAffPol et de la S.G., le Procureur Général, 24 novembre 1925.
611
SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle, No. 7468, Chef de la Sûreté du Tonkin (Gilles) à M. le Résident
Supérieur, le DirAffPol et de la S.G., le Procureur Général, 24 novembre 1925.
612
SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle, No. 7468, Chef de la Sûreté du Tonkin (Gilles) à M. le Résident
Supérieur, le DirAffPol et de la S.G., le Procureur Général, 24 novembre 1925.
613
Việc Phan Bội Châu tại Hồng đồng đề hình phiên ngày 23 Novembre 1925 (Hanoi: Trung Bắc tân văn,
1925).

131
Liang Qichao had no reason to make anything up."614 Just what the Vietnamese in the room
were supposed to make of this was unclear. But Bride did not explain. He moved on to another
example. Bride pointed out Phan Bội Châu's fiery rhetoric. He compared Phan Châu Trinh's
writings favorably with Phan Bội Châu's: "The words you've let loose include insults for
Frenchmen. Mr. Phan Châu Trinh opposes us but does not insult anyone."615 No doubt some of
the Vietnamese in the audience felt the French, and probably Bride himself, could stand to put up
with a few insults.
The overall impression of Bride's statement was mixed at best. Gilles claimed that Bride
had left a "deep impression on the audience." Gilles noted in his report, for example, how when
Bride cited Phan Bội Châu's claim that "All the Annamites are liars," "Phan Bội Châu could not
but bow his head without answering."616 None of the Vietnamese accounts mention this
interaction. In fact, Bride appears either as a bit player, in the case of Thực Nghiệp dân báo's
reporting, or as a foil for Phan Bội Châu to debate, in the case of Trung Bắc tân văn's reporting.
And debate Phan Bội Châu did, countering Bride's claims with every bit of confidence he had
shown in the early interrogatory sessions. The only difference was instead of simply denying
claims, Phan Bội Châu was now also supplying a counternarrative: he was a patriot and not a
criminal. Phan Bội Châu had even picked up some new arguments during the interrogation
sessions, to amusing effect: "You all claim I was the leader who ordered the bombing, but who
caught me handing a bomb to anyone? Or took a picture of me giving one to anyone?"617
Indeed, Bride did not have a picture of Phan Bội Châu handing someone a bomb. Bride
did have reams of letters and testimonies, of course, but those could not be revealed in open
court. The strategy of trial by archive, which the Criminal Commission had been able to use
with such success during the interrogatory sessions, worked against Bride now. He could only
make claims; he could not show the evidence necessary to convince the audience those claims
were true. Even Bride's attempt to address the bombing incidents failed to leave an impression
on the journalists in the room. The story they were interested in was not a pair of bombings that
someone other than the accused had commited twelve years prior. There was a far better story to
cover: a Vietnamese patriot who perfectly willing to tell a French official he was wrong.
At 7:00 PM, Bride stopped. It was Larre and Bona's turn to make strong statements on
Phan Bội Châu's behalf. Larre stressed that Phan Bội Châu was "simply an ardent patriot, a
philosopher, a jewel amongst jewels."618 Bona, meanwhile, questioned Bride's evidence as a
whole:

The charges are based on wastepaper and the words of complete criminals. Those papers
are the papers of consuls and emissaries, but everything in them is from the mouths of
spies. What kind of people are spies? Spies are people who are paid to find stuff. If they

614
Việc Phan Bội Châu tại Hồng đồng đề hình phiên ngày 23 Novembre 1925 (Hanoi: Trung Bắc tân văn,
1925).
615
Việc Phan Bội Châu tại Hồng đồng đề hình phiên ngày 23 Novembre 1925 (Hanoi: Trung Bắc tân văn,
1925).
616
SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle, No. 7468, Chef de la Sûreté du Tonkin (Gilles) à M. le Résident
Supérieur, le DirAffPol et de la S.G., le Procureur Général, 24 novembre 1925.
617
Việc Phan Bội Châu tại Hồng đồng đề hình phiên ngày 23 Novembre 1925 (Hanoi: Trung Bắc tân văn,
1925).
618
Việc Phan Bội Châu tại Hồng đồng đề hình phiên ngày 23 Novembre 1925 (Hanoi: Trung Bắc tân văn,
1925).

132
 can’t find stuff they make accusations anyway, so very often there is no story, yet there
are reports. As for the depositions of criminals, these are all accusations that put
everything on PBC while he is not there to refute them."619

Phan Bội Châu was a good man, Bona stressed. Bride had simply misunderstood him.
Bona then turned the tables by citing from a number of Phan Bội Châu's more recent writings.
According to the reporter from Trung Bắc tân van, the audience seemed to be very moved.620
Bona finished his statements at 8:00 PM. After a brief pause, Bride gave Phan Bội Châu the
opportunity to make a final statement. Phan Bội Châu simply said:

I have nothing more to complain about. I believe I have said everything. My resistance
is like that of times past, like ancient times [he pointed his hand into the past], but it is no
longer on my shoulders. Where can I stand now to present everything? Thus I beg to say
one more thing: “If the state will take up the sword and gun to civilize the Vietnamese
people, then I ask to be killed. If the state will take up culture and morals to civilize the
Vietnamese people, then I am without any guilt.621

Bride then called on the Criminal Commission to review the charges and determine their
verdict. Bride read each charge, and to each the Criminal Commission replied in the affirmative.
Phan Bội Châu was guilty of all of the charges. Bride then asked a ninth question: "do there
exist attentuating circumstances in favor of Phan Bội Châu?" To this the majority agreed again.
The Criminal Commission then adjourned briefly to deliberate. Upon return, Bride stated for the
court: "Phan Bội Châu is found culpable of the facts specified. He is sentenced to the
punishment of Forced Labor for Life."622 Phan Bội Châu sat back slightly, but the color of his
face did not seem to change. Bride asked whether Phan Bội Châu wished to appeal the
sentence. He did. At 8:30 PM, the trial of Phan Bội Châu ended.
Colonial Firestorm: Indochina Reacts to the Verdict (November 24-December 9)
The news of Phan Bội Châu’s dramatic day of sentencing quickly exploded throughout
the colony’s major cities. The Sûreté could barely keep up. One of the larger newspaper
operations reporting on the trial, Thực nghiệp dân báo came out with five days of back-to-back
coverage on November 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27.623 Recognizing the incredible demand for its
coverage, the newspaper later republished selections from November 25, 26, and 27 in the form
of a news pamphlet entitled Tập án Phan Bội Châu (The Trial of Phan Bội Châu), which sold for
10 cents.624 This rather conveniently left out most of Bride’s statements, which had appeared on
November 23 and 24, concentrating instead on Phan Bội Châu, Larre, and Bona’s statements.
The news triggered quick responses aboard and at home. At 11:05 AM on November 25,

619
Việc Phan Bội Châu tại Hồng đồng đề hình phiên ngày 23 Novembre 1925 (Hanoi: Trung Bắc tân văn,
1925).
620
Việc Phan Bội Châu tại Hồng đồng đề hình phiên ngày 23 Novembre 1925 (Hanoi: Trung Bắc tân văn,
1925).
621
Việc Phan Bội Châu tại Hồng đồng đề hình phiên ngày 23 Novembre 1925 (Hanoi: Trung Bắc tân văn,
1925).
622
SPCE 354, Affaire Phan Bội Châu, Rapport du Président de la Commission Criminelle, 32.
623
SPCE 354, Traduction du Thực nghiệp dân báo No. 1529 des 23 et 24 Nov. 1925 and Extrait du Thực
nghiệp dân báo no. 1532 des 27 Nov. 1925.
624
The cover indicates that the first print run included 5,000 copies while the fourth included 1,000 copies.
SPCE 354, Tập án Phan Bội Châu, (Hanoi: Imprimerie Thực Nghiệp, 1925).

133
an individual named Nguyễn Pho claiming to represent “Groupe de Jeune Annam” sent a
telegram to the Chamber of Deputies in Paris demanding the French Parliament intervene to
either affirm French sovereignty in Indochina by confirming Phan Bội Châu’s death sentence, or
else give up France’s unique claims [to Indochina], thereby providing Vietnamese an example of
France’s moral grandeur.625 This set off further alarm bells as Nguyễn Pho was known to be a
dangerous operative with many contacts and bomb-making expertise.626
Léandri cabled from Haiphong on November 26 to provide three sample reactions, all of
which expressed unease with the sentence. Better, one respondent stated, that Phan Bội Châu be
given either “liberty or death.”627 Two days later, Léandri cabled again to report that all of the
journals, including Trung Bắc tân văn, Thực nghiệp dân báo, and Khai-hóa had sold out between
10:30 AM and 2:00 PM that day.628 Léandri’s informer had then gone around to different groups
of to discover the same thing taking place all over: the articles were being read aloud all over
Haiphong. At each location, Vietnamese listened with rapt attention to the journalistic
descriptions of “the person of interest, his good looks, and his courageous attitude.”629 The
informer noted that while Vietnamese intellectuals seemed unhappy with the sentence, they were
not provoked to protest, but rather either “awaited the arrival of a new governor general who
they hoped would grant clemency,” or believed that in light of the “Phan Bội Châu’s energetic
defense and his attorneys’ clever arguments, the Superior Council [the Protectorate Council]
would change the nature of the sentence.”630
Hanoi quickly grew restive as well. On November 26 at 8:20 AM, Governor General
Varenne, now in Saigon, received a private telegram from “Vietnamese Students” in Hanoi
expressing their “stupifying sadness” at the verdict against Phan Bội Châu.631 Alarmed by the
possibility that Vietnamese could directly express their feelings electronically to Varenne, the
Sûreté scrambled to find out who was responsible.632 The offending party, a third-year student at
the School of Agriculture by the name of Trần Tiên Ngữ from Nha Trang, claimed he had acted

625
SPCE 354BIS, LCO. Président député Paris, Transmis le 25/11/25 à 11h5, Expédié par NGUYÊN-
PHO.
626
French translation of unnamed informer’s report on Nguyen Pho: “Nguyen Pho is in charge of bombing
plots. He has just hired a new member, Tu-Nho from Tam kỳ (Quảng Nam). [Tu Nho is] a handsome man with a
white complexion, a trimmed beard, short, and over 40 years old. Tu-Nho has been in the service of Europeans. He
has accompanied his bosses to Japan, China, Siam, France, and America. He is thoroughly aware of the actions of
Phan Bội Châu. During his stay in Paris, he often helped Phan Châu Trinh and Nguyễn Ái Quốc. He is a member of
the League for Human Rights and founded the Amicale des Travailleurs manuals in Paris. Nguyen Pho intends to
employ Tu-Nho as the leader of bombing plots so he may hire thugs familiar with the military arts. Tu-Nho knows
many Chinese. During his stay in Paris, he entrusted to his Chinese friends Annamese travelling either to the United
States, the interior of France, or to other foreign countries, without being obliged to pay for their trip.
The Party of Nguyen Pho uses the services of a tu tài from Nghệ An named Tu Con who is a fortune teller and who
is able to render predictions about everything that interests the party. There are still other new members and many
secret projects not yet discovered.” SPCE 354BIS, Traduction, Saigon (illegible), Re:Nguyen Pho.
627
SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle No. 311-S, (Leandri) à M. le Chef de la Sûreté au Tonkin, 26 novembre
1925.
628
SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle No. 314-S, (Leandri) à M. le Chef de la Sûreté au Tonkin, 28 novembre
1925.
629
Ibid.
630
Ibid.
631
SPCE 355, Telegramme Prive, À Varenne, Gouverneur Général, Saigon, 8h20, 26 novembre 1925.
632
SPCE 355, Dirsurge (Saigon) à Dirsurge Hanoi, No. 97/S.

134
alone and apologized for abusing the telegram privileges he enjoyed as a student.633 The Sûreté
soon found out that many more Vietnamese knew how to “abuse” the colonial communication
services. A letter written in French, dated November 27, and signed by “a group of students at
the University of Hanoi affiliated with Jeune Annam” arrived addressed to Jeanbrau, the director
of political affairs and head of the Sûreté Générale. The letter called Phan Bội Châu a “national
hero” and warned that the Vietnamese people were indignant at the “abominable” verdict
delivered by a “despotic” and “tyrannical” government.634
The news from Saigon was offered no comfort for security officials. On November 27,
Arnoux, the head of the Sûreté in Saigon, advised by telegram that the journal La Cloche Fêlée
(The Broken Bell) had reappeared under the leadership of veteran radical journalists Phan Văn
Trường, Eugene De La Batie, and Nguyễn An Ninh. La Cloche Fêlée put out a manifesto calling
on citizens to protest against the conviction of Phan Bội Châu by refraining from joining Nguyễn
Phan Long’s one-hundred strong Vietnamese delegation to meet with Governor General Varenne.
Arnoux further advised that Phan Châu Trinh was taking advantage of the delegation’s presence
to hold a talk entitled “The Republic and the Monarchy.”635 Not only were parallel
manifestations taking shape in both Hanoi and Saigon, there was considerable evidence that
these manifestations were inextricably linked. That same day, a cable from Saigon to Hanoi was
intercepted: an individual named Nguyen Hao Dang messaged Cao Van Hai of the School of
Commerce in Hanoi to let him know La Cloche Fêlée had reappeared and published a
manifesto.636 Arnoux reported again on December 1 that a group of Tonkinese living in Saigon
had planned to meet that day met to discuss the sentence against Phan Bội Châu.637 Other parts
of the country began to take action as well. On December 5, Sogny, head of the Sûreté in
Annam, advised that a number of residents of Annam had sent an appeal to Hanoi on December
3 drafted in quốc ngữ demanding amnesty for Phan Bội Châu.638
Soon Hanoi was abuzz with fervent interest in Phan Bội Châu’s fate. Special Commissar
Bertrand of the Sûreté in Tonkin reported on November 28 that while the Vietnamese masses of
Hanoi had absolutely no interest in Phan Bội Châu, amongst the politicians and intellectuals,
“Phan Bội Châu was the subject of every conversation.” Furthermore, “in the theaters, in the
restaurants, on the trams, and in the street, the interpreters, secretaries, students, and scholars
talked incessantly about the great revolutionary. They all found the sentence too severe.”639
Evidence began to surface suggesting well-organized groups were taking advantage of the trial’s
outcome to drum up support for national independence. On December 3, another round of poly-
copied tracts similar to the purple-inked ones that had circulated in July began to arrive for
Vietnamese clerical workers.640 Signed by the “Phục Việt hội (Society for the Independence of
Vietnam,” the tone of this new set of tracts was considerably more alarmed, and therefore
633
SPCE 355, Telegramme officiel, Dirsurge (Hanoi) à Dirsurge Saigon, 28 novembre 1925.
634
SPCE 355, Le Chef du Service de la Sûreté au Tonkin à M. le Directeur des Affaires Politiques et de la
Sûreté Générale, 30 novembre 1925 (letter enclosed).
635
SPCE 354BIS, Telegramme officiel, Chef Sûreté (Arnoux) à Dirsurge Hanoi, 27 novembre 1925.
636
SPCE 355, Hanoi de Saigon N20W25, le 27-11-15 à 10h45.
637
SPCE 354BIS, Note Confidentielle, Service de la Sûreté à M. le Directeur des Affaires Politiques et de
la Sûreté Généerale au Gouvernment Généeral Hanoi en communication [avec] le Chef du Service de la Sûreté en
Tonkin Hanoi [et] Chef du Service de la Sûreté an Annam Hue, 1 decembre 1925.
638
SPCE 354BIS, Telegramme officiel chiffre, Sûreté Annam à Dirsurgé et Sûreté Tonkin en
communication à Sûreté Saigon, No. 2292, 5 décembre 1925.
639
SPCE 355, Rapport de renseignements (Bertrand), Hanoi, 28 novembre 1925.
640
SPCE 355, (Néron à) M. le Chef de la Sûreté au Tonkin, 4 décembre 1925.

135
alarming for security officials.641
More than any other source, newspapers and magazines were responsible for spurring
interest in the case and driving Vietnamese to take action. Amedée Clementi, owner of L’Argus
Indochinois, led the charge in this regard, publishing numerous articles offering sharp criticism
of the colonial administration, and the security services in particular.642 Clementi understood
that Phan Bội Châu’s best hope was convincing Governor General Varenne that the peace and
security of French Indochina depended upon a clemency order.643 Clearly aware of the colonial
political situation, Clementi argued in L’Argus Indochinois that the Sûreté services wanted to
stop demonstrations by Vietnamese in favor of Governor General Varenne for exactly this
reason. As such, Clementi worked with students affiliated with Jeune Annam to stage a large
public protest to greet Varenne’s arrival on December 7. According to Special Commissar
Bertrand’s report:

The young people who had prepared their flags and banners stood in front of the Hommel
house, Boulevard Gia-Long, as prescribed in the leaflets of Ngac Van Don, having been
dislodged by the music that settled in the same place. Mr. Clementi then took the
demonstrators to the corner of Boulevards Carreau and Gia-Long where he had them set
up again. Because there were Security Service officials around them, some expressed the
desire to leave so as not to be subjected to violence by the police, but Mr. Clementi, who
was accompanied by Mr. Martin, dissuaded them. A few days later, Mr. Clementi wrote
in L'Argus [Indochinois] that he had stood near the demonstrators to protect them against
a police intervention, and that he was carrying photographic equipment and had intended
to take pictures of scenes that might taken place between the police and the
demonstrators.644

Clementi’s plan to shield demonstrators with his camera demonstrates the newfound
power of the colonial press to expose human rights violations. Like Roche, Clementi represented
a member of the colonial elite willing to put his career on the line to defend his values. Bertrand
went on to indicate Clementi had organized protests in Haiphong as well and had collected large
sums of money by calling for donations for Phan Bội Châu’s defense.645 The actions of Clementi
and Jeune Annam in Tonkin, Nguyễn Phan Long and the Cloche Fêlée group in Cochinchina, and
Nguyễn Thế Truyền and L’Union Intercoloniale in France were signs of a rising tide. If Varenne
was unable or unwilling to somehow overturn Phan Bội Châu’s verdict, French Indochina might
well be flooded with urban unrest.
Governor General Varenne vs. the Colonial Deep State
Varenne did not need to be convinced to consider clemency. It was on his mind as soon

641
Example: “Compatriots, whoever you are - civil servants, craftsmen, traders, students, scholars, farmers,
employees all, get together, make requests to the Government and it will have no choice but to free this patriot
without reproach, who is: PHAN BỘI CHÂU. Oh brothers join forces!!! Phục Việt hội (Society for the
Independence of Vietnam). SPCE 355, (Néron à) M. le Chef de la Sûreté au Tonkin, 4 décembre 1925.
642
Clementi, Amedée. “Lettre ouverte d’un Annamite à MM. Clementi, Bona & Larre, et à tous ceux
connus ou inconnus qui ont pris la défense de M. Phan Bội Châu,” L’Argus Indochinois, December 5, 1925.
643
Clementi, Amedée. “L’arrivée de M. Varenne à Hanoi: Nombreuses manifestations annamites en
faveur de Phan Bội Châu,” L’Argus Indochinois, December 12, 1925.
644
SPCE 355, Rapport de renseignements (Bertrand), Hanoi, 30 décembre 1925.
645
Ibid.

136
as he heard the verdict. On November 24, the day after sentencing, Varenne cabled from Phnom
Penh to his subordinates in Saigon and Hanoi, “I intend to consider the possibility of clemency
for the purpose of political conciliation.”646 This much Robin, Jeanbrau, and Bride already
assumed and feared. The real question was whether Varenne would even be given the
opportunity to grant clemency.
Varenne had good reason to send his morning-after cable: his subordinates had tried to
pre-empt him. Earlier that morning, Alberti, the director of cabinet for the office of the governor
general, had already begun sending out telegrams announcing the verdict. One went to Varenne
in Phnom Penh, one went to Rene Robin in Tourane, and one went to the Ministry of Colonies.647
The cable sent to the Ministry of Colonies indicated it was from “Varenne,” but it bore Alberti’s
signature “P.O. (Par ordre, meaning by order).” Before Varenne’s arrival, Robin, Alberti, and
other officials regularly signed telegrams on behalf of one another, so this in itself was not
surprising. The problem was Varenne had not ordered Alberti to send the telegram.
Alberti’s telegram stated simply, “Verdict rendered November 23 by Criminal
Commission Hanoi sentencing Phan Bội Châu [to] forced labor for life. Large calm crowd
regularly followed audience. No demonstration or incident.”648 Alberti’s cable to Varenne was
nearly identical, except he added, “Department advised.”649 Varenne immediately recognized
Alberti was attempting to present him with a fait accompli. He was not going to play allow this.
Varenne cabled Alberti:

ABSOLUTE PRIORITY. In response to your [cable No.] 3051 - Desiring to write myself
cable to Department concerning PBC conviction. Ignoring the number you sent on this
subject. Have prescribed Postal Service to stop all transmissions. Cables priority number
and text sent to allow cable pass all other transmissions.650

Varenne then cabled Saigon, Hue, and Hanoi again for good measure, letting them all
know in no uncertain terms that he was to be the first one informed of any developments related
to Phan Bội Châu and that they were not to take any further actions until he arrived in Hanoi.651
Finally, Varenne replaced Alberti’s cable No. 1545 with two of his own cable No. 1545s.652 The

646
SPCE 355, Télégramme Officiel, Gougal (Varenne, Pnompenh) à Gougal Saigon & Hanoi, 24
novembre 1925.
647
SPCE 355, Télégramme Officiel, Gougal (Alberti, Hanoi) à Gougal Phnompenh (Varenne) (En
communication à Gougal Saigon), No. 3051, 24 novembre 1925. Télégramme Officiel, Gougal (Alberti, Hanoi) à
Secregal et Resuper Tonkin (Tourane, Robin), No. 3052, 24 novembre 1925. Télégramme Officiel, Gougal (Alberti,
Hanoi) à Colonies Paris, No. 1545, 24 novembre 1925.
648
SPCE 355, Télégramme Officiel, Gougal (Alberti, Hanoi) à Colonies Paris, No. 1545, 24 novembre
1925.
649
SPCE 355, Télégramme Officiel, Gougal (Alberti, Hanoi) à Gougal Phnompenh (Varenne) (En
communication à Gougal Saigon), No. 3051, 24 novembre 1925.
650
SPCE 355, Télégramme Officiel, Gougal (Varenne, Pnompenh) à Gougal Hanoi (Alberti), No. 803, 24
novembre 1925.
651
SPCE 355, Télégramme Officiel, Gougal (Varenne, Pnompenh) à Gougal Hanoi (Alberti), En cion
Gougal Saigon, Secrégal et Résuper Tonkin de passage Hué, 11h30, 24 novembre 1925.
652
Alberti’s cable No. 1545 has “Annulé” written in very large blue crayon across the page. SPCE 355,
Télégramme Officiel, Gougal (Alberti, Hanoi) à Colonies Paris, No. 1545, 24 novembre 1925. Varenne let Alberti
know his version had been cancelled and replaced by two of Varenne’s own in another cable sent November 25.
SPCE 355, SPCE 355, Télégramme Officiel, Gougal (Varenne, Pnompenh) à Gougal Saigon & Hanoi, 25 novembre
1925.

137
first, which Varenne also sent to his subordinates within Indochina, stated that he “regretted not
arriving in Tonkin in time to participate in the debate, that he reserved the right to approve the
Criminal Commission’s decision after personally reviewing all of the dossier’s files,” and,
finally, that he was considering granting clemency.653 The second version of cable No. 1545
went out the following day, letting the Ministry of Colonies know that Phan Bội Châu’s appeal
would be heard by the Protectorate Council of Tonkin, which would serve as a Court of
Cassation in accordance with the Order of September 15, 1896.654 On December 4, Minister of
Colonies Léon Perrier responded, informing Varenne, “it is up to you, after advice from the
Protectorate Council, to rule by decree on a PBC appeal.”655 By his flurry of telegraphic activity,
Varenne had preserved his ability to act in concerning Phan Bội Châu’s case. Varenne had also
put the deep state of French Indochina on notice that this governor general knew how to play
their games.
The deep state was far from finished, however. Secretary-General and Acting Resident
Superior of Tonkin Rene Robin recognized that Varenne could quite possibly cause the Sûreté’s
hard work, not to mention that of the Criminal Commission, to evaporate into thin air. Robin
determined this should not happen. But how could he thwart Varenne if the new governor
general was intent to granting clemency to a state terrorist? For this, Robin had an unexpected
ally: Bride. Varenne had stated in his cable that he “reserved the right to approve the Criminal
Commission’s decision after personally reviewing all of the dossier’s files.” Aside from the fact
that Varenne obviously had no idea what that meant, Robin now realized that Bride’s meticulous
diligence might be the verdict’s saving grace.
Fortunately for Robin, on November 26 Bride delivered a distillation of the Criminal
Commission’s laborious efforts in Rapport du Président de la Commission Criminelle.656 In his
letter accompanying the report, Bride offered a compelling justification for the length of the trial
and complexity of the report:

I have the honor to submit to you in this envelope the report on the operations of the
Crime Commission of 1925. Phan Bội Châu had been condemned to death by the decree
of September 5, 1913. The 1925 Commission had to collect all the files kept concerning
the authors of the various anti-French movements or of plots against the safety of the
Protectorate since 1905, to study all the documents one by one and to collect all useful
extracts that would allow its members to render a judgment with full knowledge of the
facts; their conscience would indeed have refused to pronounce any verdict which had
not been motivated by certain and irrefutable evidence. On the other hand, there is no
doubt that this case went beyond the usual framework; it must have had repercussions in
the Annamese community, which cannot leave unmoved any Frenchman concerned with
preserving the justice of his country, his reputation for impartiality, for independence, and

653
SPCE 355, Télégramme Officiel, Gougal (Varenne, Pnompenh) à Gougal Saigon & Hanoi, 24
novembre 1925. Télégramme Officiel, Gougal (Varenne, Pnompenh) à Colonies Paris, No. 1545, 24 novembre
1925. The text of these cables is identical.
654
SPCE 355, Télégramme Officiel, Gougal (Varenne, Pnompenh) à Colonies Paris, No. 1545, 25
novembre 1925.
655
SPCE 355, Télégramme Officiel, Colonies (Perrier, Paris) à Gougal (Varenne, Hanoi), No. 981, 4
décembre 1925.
656
SPCE 354, Affaire Phan Bội Châu, Rapport du Président de la Commission Criminelle.

138
 above all for safeguarding the interests of the accused.

In order to protect the rights of the defense, the Commission considered it necessary also
to allow the accused to present his defense by refuting point by point all the charges
raised against him and [therefore the Commission] decided that a proceeding should be
carried out to allow for additional information. Thus it can be affirmed that the one who
was tried and condemned is indeed the creator, the organizer, and the director of the
Revolutionary Party which has troubled Indochina since 1907. The verdict was greeted
with significant calm and it seems to have satisfied all those who, with various feelings,
impatiently awaited the solution of this affair.657

As far as Bride was concerned, the trial of Phan Bội Châu had been a marvelous
demonstration of French justice at work. The Criminal Commission had proven its case against
the accused by presenting a staggering amount of documentary and testimonial evidence. It had
given Phan Bội Châu opportunities to respond to all of it. Bride and the other Commission
members had shown remarkable forbearance as Phan Bội Châu spun lie after lie for weeks on
end. They had even graciously commuted the old patriot’s sentence in light of his age and
infirmity. Finally, there remained the most significant result of the trial: the accused had
confessed. For Bride, there could be no denying that justice had been properly served.
As President of the Protectorate Council of Tonkin, Robin’s job now was to address Phan
Bội Châu’s appeal, which his attorneys Bona and Larre had indicated would be forthcoming.
Robin formally initiated this process on December 1 by sending a telegram in his capacity as
Acting Governor General Monguillot’s delegate to himself in his capacity as President of the
Protectorate Council.658
Phan Bội Châu delivered his appeal on December 3 via a handwritten note in Chinese.
The appeal read:

The Annamese convict Phan Bội Châu respectfully requests the noble government [貴政]
in Tonkin to listen to his pleas. I'm old today; I will soon be 60 years old. In my cell, I
have reflected a long time. The benevolent manner in which I have been treated deeply
touched me. Having seen the functioning of the Criminal Commission and listened to the
pleadings of my two excellent lawyers, I understand that the noble government has
instituted justice in this country, which [before had employed] barbaric methods of
criminal investigation using torture, the cangue, and the rattan. If I had been brought
before an native court in my country, I would have already lost my head. I also
understand my errors with regard to teaching, because I now know that the noble French
government has opened throughout the country many schools where my compatriots can
be educated in the Western sciences. I also acknowledge all of my past mistakes [愚已醒

657
SPCE 355, L’Inspecteur des Affaires politiques et administratives, Président de la Commission
Criminelle à M. le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine (Sous le couvert de M. le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin),
Objet: Affaire Phan Bội Châu, 26 novembre 1925.
658
SPCE 355, Le Gougal (PIC) à M. le Resident Superieur, President du Conseil du Protectorat du Tonkin,
Objet: Pourvoi Phan Bội Châu devant le Conseil du Protectorat, 1er décembre 1925.

139
 悟昔日一切之所錯誤].

With all my strength, I implore the kindness and leniency of the noble government for all
of my crimes. In this letter, I make a solemn commitment to dedicate the rest of my life to
endeavoring to persuade my compatriots that their happiness, their ease, and their
security will really be assured if they collaborate, completely, confidently, and loyally
with the noble government. I have publicly made the same statements before my judges. I
declare in the same way solemn (that I want) to break all relations with the Vietnamese
who would enter into struggle against the noble government and to separate myself from
them forever and ever. I therefore have no complaints against the judges who have
pronounced their decision on the nature of my faults. Their sentence is fair because they
only had to judge me for the crimes that were committed before the end of 1913. As the
Criminal Commission has inflicted a just punishment on me, I can only implore the pity
and forgiveness of the noble government. I will respectfully receive its just decision with
infinite gratitude. Hanoi, December 3, 1925. The humble supplication of Phan Boi
Châu.659

These were surely difficult words for the old patriot to write. In a textual display of self-
abnegation, Phan Bội Châu outdented each instance of “noble government (貴政),” while he
referred to himself as “this fool (愚).” This was likely the lowest point Phan Bội Châu had yet
experienced in his life. Nevertheless, Phan Bội Châu’s willingness to work with the French
Protectorate government, even playing a role as a collaborator, bore strong similarities to the
proposals he previously made in letters to Néron and Sarraut, and in Pháp Việt đề huề chính kiến
thư (A Proposal for a Franco-Vietnamese Collaboration Policy).660 It cannot be argued that he
was any more sincere in writing this appeal than he had been in those earlier writings.
Phan Bội Châu’s appeal made Varenne’s job slightly easier and Robin’s slightly harder.
Varenne could use it to justify a pardon as the accused had demonstrated contrition and promised
to work faithfully with the government. Robin could use the appeal too, as proof of Phan Bội
Châu’s guilt. Guilt would only allow Robin to confirm the judicial sentence, but it would not
help him convince Varenne that Phan Bội Châu still represented a danger to the colony. Part of
the problem lay in the nature of Phan Bội Châu’s appeal. Instead of challenging the verdict
(guilty) or even the sentence (forced labor for life), Phan Bội Châu simply asked for what
clemency the government could provide.
On December 7, Bride sent Varenne his two final notes as president of the Criminal
Commission.661 Both notes offered Bride’s opinion on Phan Bội Châu’s appeal (which he

659
SPCE 354, 安南罪人潘佩珠敬請 (The Annamese convict Phan Bội Châu respectfully requests),
December 3, 1925. French translation available in SPCE 354, GGI 1955-SG, Bordereau des pièces adresses le Juin
1927 à M. le Directeur du Cabinet et des Affaires Politiques.
660
For Chinese original and French translation of Phan Bội Châu’s July 26, 1919 letter to Albert Sarraut,
see SPCE 354, Lettre de Phan Bội Châu à A. Sarraut, Juillet (et Août) 1919. For Chinese original of Phan Bội
Châu’s 1919 letter to Néron, see SPCE 354, Lettre de PBC à Néron. For French translations of Phan Bội Châu’s
two 1919 letters to Albert Sarraut, see SPCE 353, Lettres de Phan Bội Châu à M. Albert Sarraut, 26 juillet 1919, 25
août 1919. See also SPCE 355, Lettre de P.B.C. à M. Néron, 4 août 1925.
661
SPCE 354, Note, Pour M. le Gouverneur General de l’Indochine transmissive d’une supplique du

140
enclosed) and the possibility or nature of a pardon. To assist Varenne in making a decision,
Bride sought to clearly define the roles and responsibilities. The role of the Criminal
Commission, Bride stressed, had been to determine if Phan Bội Châu was responsible for the
crimes committed in 1913. The Commission members were absolutely certain of Phan Bội
Châu’s guilt. The Commission had considered attenuating circumstances not because it had any
doubt about the guilt of the accused, but rather because of his age. By considering attenuating
circumstances, Bride argued, the Criminal Commission had already provided a pardon, if only a
limited one. Whether Phan Bội Châu deserved a broader pardon or not, was now entirely a
political question for the Protectorate government.662
On the political question of a broader pardon, Bride offered Varenne some legal advice,
though he stressed it was entirely supplementary to his role as president of the Criminal
Commission. If a pardon were politically necessary, according to Bride the best choice would
be partial pardon commuting the sentence of hard labor to “obligatory transport to a specific
locality.” In other words, Bride suggested Varenne exile Phan Bội Châu overseas, in a manner
similar to the rogue Emperors Hàm Nghi, Thành Thái, and Duy Tân. Bride suggested Algeria,
New Caledonia, or the Antilles. The one thing Varenne should absolutely avoid, according to
Bride, would be to offer a full pardon. A conditional pardon would “retain a sanction for the
[criminal] acts for which PBC recognizes himself as the author because he confesses in his plea
of December 3 to have committed the crimes that are imputed to him by the verdict of the
Criminal Commission.”663 Bride’s note was an elegant way of trying to salvage all of his work
as president of the Criminal Commission. If Varenne pardoned Phan Bội Châu, it would send a
message that politics mattered more than justice.
The Protectorate Council met at 9:00 AM on December 9, 1925 to consider Phan Bội
Châu’s appeal.664 Robin read Acting Prosecutor General Bourayne’s letter of December 3
arguing the appeal was without merit and should be rejected. As Phan Bội Châu had not
presented any new evidence, the Protectorate Council, in its capacity as a Court of Cassation,
simply reviewed whether the Criminal Commission had properly observed procedure (it had).
According to Bourayne, “The accused presented his defense and was defended by his co-
counsellors. He had the last word.” Bourayne noted that Phan Bội Châu had been given three
days to prepare his defense, but in the event had enjoyed thirteen days. Having finished reading
Bourayne’s letter, Robin reviewed the facts of Phan Bội Châu’s case, noting that all procedures
had been followed to the letter. Having therefore taken all circumstance into consideration, the
Protectorate Council advised Governor General Varenne that the appeal should be rejected, and

condamné Phan Bi Chau, No. 180, 7 décembre 1925. Note, Pour M. le Gouverneur General de l’Indochine, Au
sujet de l’application de l’article 97 du C.P. aux faits reprochés à Phan Bội Châu, No. 181, 7 décembre 1925.
662
SPCE 354, Note, Pour M. le Gouverneur General de l’Indochine transmissive d’une supplique du
condamné Phan Bi Chau, No. 180, 7 décembre 1925.
663
Ibid.
664
The council members were: Robin, resident superior of Tonkin, Graffeuil, Director of Bureaus for the
Residence Superior, Benoit, division general and commander of the Annam-Tonkin division, Bourayne, acting
prosecutor general for the Court of Appeals of Hanoi, Normandin, chief engineer of public works for the territorial
district of Tonkin, Hilaire, director of operations for the French Company of Railroads, Indochina and Yunnan,
Hoàng Trọng Phu, tổng đốc of Hà Đông, Nguyen Dinh Quy, acting tổng đốc, member of the Court of Appeals of
Hanoi, substitute member sitting in replacement of Tran Van Thong, Delsalle, head administrator of the cabinet of
the resident superior. SPCE 352, Conseil du Protectorat du Tonkin, Proces-Verbal de la Seance du 9 decembre
1925.

141
ended the meeting at 10:00 AM.665
Whether or not Robin knew of Bride’s advice to Varenne concerning conditional pardons,
Robin had no interest in allowing any clemency for Phan Bội Châu. He also did not trust Varenne
to recognize the danger the security officials (and Robin himself) saw in Phan Bội Châu. As
such, Robin now attempted to present Varenne with another fait accompli. On December 11, the
head of the Legislation and Administration Service of the Government General presented a note
to Governor General Varenne.666 The note explained that the Protectorate Council had met under
the leadership of the resident superior of Tonkin (Robin) and advised Phan Bội Châu’s appeal be
rejected. The note then laid out the terms of Article 31 of the Decree of September 15, 1896:
“The Governor General, on the assent of the Protectorate Council, rules on the appeal, by a
simple decree which, in the event of rejection, may order immediate execution.”667 Pursuant to
these regulations, the head of the Legislation and Administration Service had prepared for
Varenne a formal rejection of the appeal ready to be signed.668 The envelope containing both
documents further demanded the attached documents “be submitted, without delay, for signature
by the Governor General.”669
Though he had quite easily steamrolled his way through the deep state’s previous attempt
to force his hand, Varenne now seemed to lose his nerve. On December 11, Varenne sent an
urgent plea to Perrier, the minister of colonies:

Please urgently propose to President of Republic immediate and complete grace for Phan
Bội Châu, sentenced to forced labor for life by Criminal Commission Hanoi. Sentenced
confirmed yesterday by Protectorate Council of Tonkin which provided advice to reject
appeal. Cases dating back to 1913, capital conviction by default. Moral complicity
presumed in various assassinations with no proof of effective participation. The
condemned is an old patriot agitator. Long time unrepentant enemy now older and claims
to recognize errors. Almost entire indigenous population requests pardon on occasion of
new GGI and French liberal political pledge in Indochina. Certain precedents authorize
pardon.670

Varenne, who had only arrived in Hanoi four days prior, was not in a good position to
claim a capital conviction was reached “by default.” Nor was he in a good position to claim there
was “no proof of effective participation.”671 Nevertheless, he made this representation and hoped
President Gaston Doumergue would carry his water for him.
Perrier was content to let Varenne sweat a bit. On December 15, Varenne cabled Perrier
again, expressing his surprise at a lack of response and re-emphasizing the urgency of the

665
Ibid.
666
The signature suggests this was Lucien Giudicelli. SPCE 352, GGI, Note pour M. le Gouverneur
Général, No. 187B, 11 décembre 1925.
667
Ibid.
668
SPCE 352, Le Gouverneur General de l’Indochina, No. 4830, 22 décembre 1925.
669
SPCE 352, Bordereau des pièces adressées à M. le Directeur des Affaires Politiques au Gouvernement
Général Hanoi, 11 décembre 1925.
670
SPCE 352, Télégramme Officiel, Gougal (Varenne, Hanoi) à Colonies Paris, No. 1625, 11 décembre
1925.
671
SPCE 352, Bordereau des pièces adressées à M. le Resident Superieur au Tonkin, President du Conseil
du Protectorat Hanoi, 11 décembre 1925.

142
request, which, he claimed, “will lose its useful effect if delayed too long.”672 Despairing of a
response from Perrier, Varenne then cabled AGINDO to ask Cordonnier to obtain a response
from President Doumergue.673 Perrier finally responded on December 20 informing Varenne that
he and the president of the Council of Ministers had no objection to Varenne offering amnesty to
Phan Bội Châu, as long as there was absolutely no proof of effective participation in the 1913
attacks.674 Perrier added, “this is a decision that belongs to you.”675 Neither the Ministry of
Colonies nor President Doumergue were willing to take responsibility for Phan Bội Châu.
Governor General Varenne signed the order granting clemency on December 23, 1925.676
The previous day Varenne had signed the form rejecting Phan Bội Châu’s appeal, which meant
the clemency order now pardoned Phan Bội Châu for all of the crimes he had been found guilty
of by the 1925 Criminal Commission.677 Notably, however, the pardon did not include the words
“immediate and complete grace” that Varenne had included in his cable to Perrier. Phan Bội
Châu was allowed to move to Huế, however, “The resident superiors of Tonkin and Annam, and
the director of the Judicial Administration of Indochina” were charged with the execution of
Varenne’s order. The pardon did not mean Phan Bội Châu was free to do as he wished.
For Robin, Bride, and the civil servants of Indochina, Varenne’s act was a bitter pill to
swallow, but it did mean the mood in the streets turned from anger to joy. Members of the
Vietnamese educated classes could and did claim the amnesty for Phan Bội Châu as a major
victory. For a moment, lines of communication had connected up and down the country.
Vietnamese had a national hero, he had stood up to a French prosecutor in court and defended
himself. Newspapers and journals revealed the history and demeanor of a Vietnamese patriot
who refused to bow to Indochina’s colonizers.678 Vietnamese had entered city streets united in a
single goal, for what seemed like the first time. December 1925 marked a watershed for
Vietnamese nationalism. Henceforth it would be visible, it would be loud, and it would have a
hero.
Varenne’s pardon turned a potential national martyr into a national hero, but in so doing
Varenne had cleared Phan Bội Châu’s legacy of many complicating features. Varenne’s pardon
retroactively turned the Criminal Commission into a colonial show trial. Phan Bội Châu could
simply walk away from his admissions of guilt. All of the allegations so painstakingly proven by
672
SPCE 352, Télégramme Officiel, Gougal (Varenne, Hanoi) à Colonies Paris, No. 1640, 15 décembre
1925.
673
SPCE 352, Télégramme Officiel, Gougal (Varenne, Hanoi) à AGINDO Paris, No. 5381, 15 décembre
1925.
674
SPCE 352, Télégramme Officiel, Colonies Paris (Perrier) à Gougal (Varenne, Hanoi), No. 1035, 20
décembre 1925.
675
Ibid.
676
SPCE 352, Le Gouverneur General de l’Indochine, No. 4834, 23 décembre 1925.
677
SPCE 352, Le Gouverneur General de l’Indochina, No. 4830, 22 décembre 1925.
678
A number of pamphlets reflecting on Phan Bội Châu’s place in Vietnamese society and history appeared
in 1926. Mai Du Lân of the Thực Nghiệp publishing house in Hanoi published a collection of essays as Mai Du
Lan, ed. Thanh khí nhé hằng: Mãy bài luận thuyết về những vấn đề só quan hệ đến danh dự và quyền lợi của nhân
dân (The Sound of Common Sense: Several essays about the problems related to reputation and rights of our people)
(Imprimerie Thuc-Nghiêp An Quan, 1926). See also Ngô Khâm Trai, Địa vị cụ Phan ở quốc dân ta (Mr. Phan’s
Place Amongst Our People) (Hanoi: Imprimerie Nghiêm Hàm, 1926), available at the Bibliothèque Nationale in
Paris. Also available in microform at the National Library in Hanoi (Pièce 115, S 87/3075). See also Lê Cương
Phụng (aka Tùng Lâm), Phan Bội Châu ngày nay (Phan Bội Châu today) (Saigon: Imprimerie Xưa Nay, 1926),
available at the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris. Also available in microform at the National Library in Hanoi (Pièce
185, S 87/3139).

143
Bride and the Criminal Commission could now be easily written off. Politics had triumphed
over justice.

144
 Chapter Five
Time, Morality, and Revolution: Phan Bội Châu and the Book of Changes
If Phan Bội Châu had been executed in 1925, he would have earned the title of Vietnam’s
“greatest patriotic martyr.” Perhaps recognizing the dangers of such a posthumous moniker, on
December 23, 1925, the governor-general of French Indochina Alexander Varenne acceded to the
demands of thousands of Vietnamese protesters by commuting Phan’s sentence to house arrest in
Huế.679 The ardent patriot with a reputation for advocating violent resistance was forced to
spend the next fifteen years of his life under the watchful eyes of the French colonial
administration and its secret police, the Sûreté.
For decades, Phan had sent tracts back to Vietnam from distant Japan and China, solidifying
his reputation as a nationalist. In works such as A History of the Loss of Vietnam (1905), New
Vietnam (1907), and A Letter from Abroad Written in Blood (1907), Phan laid out his
interpretation of Vietnam’s recent past and offered a vision of its future. These were political
works, designed to arouse strong patriotic and anti-French sentiments. In them, Phan focused on
the oppressive French colonial state with its taxation and punitive policies, and the corrupt local
administration it kept alive to ensure its own legitimacy.680 Phan argued that a Vietnam free of
these illegitimate villains would be able to rise to the heights of modernity. The Vietnamese
people would enjoy trains, airplanes, and skyscrapers - the rewards of living in a civilized
modern society dedicated to science, patriotism, and virtue.681
In a later book, A Study of Vietnamese History (1909), Phan abandoned vitriol for a more
sober presentation of the “objective facts.” Phan’s conception of Vietnam now took on historical
depth. Phan recounted how the nation originated in the near mythical time of the Hung Kings,
then suffered under almost a millennium of Chinese domination despite the efforts of a long line
of national heroes. Phan glossed over a fair portion of Vietnam’s medieval history, only to
refocus his attentions on Lê Lợi, the fifteenth-century general who led a successful rebellion
against Chinese Ming Dynasty invaders. After saving the country of Đại Việt, Lê Lợi founded
the Lê Dynasty (1428-1788).682 Phan held up Lê Lợi as a quintessential patriot laudable for his
ability to rally the Vietnamese people and drive off a mighty invader.683
Educated Vietnamese people who read these texts, which had been printed in Japan and

679
Phan’s “house arrest” actually allowed him to take day trips on the Perfume River in a sampan. This
pratice earned him the sobriquet “Old Man of the Imperial Quay (Ông già Bến Ngự).”
680
French Colonial Indochina was composed of five distinct and separately-administered regions: Tonkin,
Annam, Cochinchina, Laos, and Cambodia. In Tonkin and Annam, the French rulers delegated limited authority to
the Nguyễn dynastic state. The Nguyễn state was responsible for the systems of justice, taxation, and local
administration, and carried out these functions by appointing mandarins selected through the examination system.
Phan had obtained a cử nhân bachelor’s degree in the Nghê An regional examinations of 1900, but chose not to
become a mandarin. David Marr argues this was because Phan denounced those who joined the native
administration as collaborators, and wished only to demonstrate his academic qualifications for revolutionary
purposes.
681
Phan Bội Châu, The New Vietnam, in Colonialism Experienced: Vietnamese Writings on Colonialism,
1900-1931,. trans. Truong Buu Lam (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 2000), 105-124.
682
The state of Đại Việt encompassed the Red River valley and provinces to the south. This name was
used from 1054, during the Lý Dynasty (1009-1225) until 1804, when Emperor Gia Long of the Nguyễn Dynasty
(1802-1954) renamed the country Việt Nam.
683
Phan Bội Châu, “Việt Nam Quốc Sử Khảo.” The Collected Works of Phan Bội Châu (Phan Bội Châu
Toàn tập, Tập 3: Văn Thơ Những Năm ở Nước Ngoài). ed. Chương Thâu. (Hà Nội: Thuận Hóa Publishers, 2000),
9-146.

145
smuggled back into the country, were impressed by the erudition of Phan’s writings and the
comprehensiveness of his vision. Though literati had taken up their brushes in patriotic defense
of king and country before, Phan wrote in a vibrant and approachable style that conveyed his
intuitive statesmanship and addressed Vietnamese of all social classes. His impact became
evident in 1925, when mass protests against a sentence of hard labor for fifty-eight-year-old Phan
brought rickshaw pullers and female stall-owners from the market into the streets alongside
students and scholars.684 The French hand was forced.
This was a clear and dramatic victory, but what could Phan do while under house arrest?
Phan had lost his opportunity for martyrdom and was now restrained from engaging in any kind
of surreptitious revolutionary activities by vigilant guards. Though this must have rankled the
elderly partisan, he kept busy by meeting with visitors, making occasional speeches, and writing
prodigiously. Just as he had done while in the Cantonese prison eleven years before, Phan began
to write. With more comfortable surroundings685 and plenty of free time, Phan’s annual literary
production skyrocketed. According to Trần Anh Vinh, Phan wrote nearly four times as much
during the Huế years as he had in the forty-three years previously.686 Furthermore, he could now
contemplate and carefully consider exactly what and how to write. Soon after his arrest Phan,
composed a considerable number of poems. He later wrote articles that were published by his
friend Huỳnh Thúc Kháng in the journal Tiếng Dân (The Voice of the People).
Perhaps thinking of his legacy, Phan decided to draft his life’s story for the second time. In
1929, through a network of friends and supporters, Phan was able to secretly print The
Autobiography of Phan Bội Châu by using underground presses.687 He had written it at night
using double-ply reversible paper. This allowed him to secretly compose a work that otherwise
would surely have been confiscated by the French authorities.688 This work recounted Phan’s
public career as a revolutionary and nationalist. In it, Phan hoped to impart three lessons to the
youth of Vietnam: (1). Self-conceit leads to disaster; (2) blind trust in people is foolish; (3) lack
of attention to detail causes all ventures to fail. These three lessons represented a shift away
from Phan’s fiery condemnations of colonialism and exuberant glorifications of martyrs. It was
a shift toward thoughtful reflection on his life and on history.
Phan Bội Châu’s later work was that of a man who still held strong patriotic beliefs, but who
now saw that a more thorough understanding of the world and its underlying principles would be
needed for Vietnam to achieve its independence. Feeling he still could offer the next generation
some valuable insight, Phan worked hard to develop a new vision of personal conduct and
political action. The crux of that vision was a technique of personal cultivation that, if used
effectively, would produce revolutionaries armed with perspicacity, determination, and charisma

684
David Marr, Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 1920-1945 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
1981). 18-19.
685
Many Vietnamese sent money to support Phan and the group of elderly patriotic scholars who came to
live with him, ensuring he did not want for his simple material needs.
686
Trần Anh Vinh, Thơ Văn Phan Bội Châu thời kỳ ở Huế (1926-1940). (Hà Nội: Thuận Hóa Publishers,
1987), 16.
687
David Marr, following Chương Thâu, claims the text was written in 1937. Marr, Vietnamese
Anticolonialism, 267. After a more thorough review of sources, Vinh Sinh and Nicholas Wickenden, determined that
Phan wrote the work between 1928 and 1929. Vinh Sinh and Nicholas Wickenden. “Introduction.” Overturned
Chariot: The Autobiography of Phan-Bội-Châu, (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai’i Press, SHAPS Library of
Translations, 1999), 24.
688
Vinh Sinh and Wickenden, 24.

146
sufficient to succeed where Phan had failed. This vision unfolded most profoundly in Phan’s two
longest and most philosophically engaged works: The Light of Confucian Studies and his
unassuming and extensive commentary on The Book of Changes.
At first glance, Phan’s commentary on The Book of Changes is a long and rather mundane
antiquarian musing. It has been duly dismissed as such by numerous historians, both foreign and
Vietnamese. However, upon closer examination, Phan’s commentary on The Book of Changes
reveals a perceptive and motivated mind at work. We find Phan offering to Vietnamese
intellectuals a unique and powerful framework for understanding the very nature of time and
how to harness change itself. In this chapter, I will show how Phan employs The Book of
Changes as a refractive device for ordering the modern world. It is a tool through which he
articulates a coherent Confucian revolutionary ideology that patriotic Vietnamese could use to
overthrow French colonialism and build a modern Vietnamese nation.
Phan Bội Châu’s Commentary on The Book of Changes
The Changes of Zhou (Chu Dịch) by Phan Bội Châu is a 760-page commentary on the
Confucian classic, The Book of Changes. The commentary is a hefty volume that is prefaced by
a two-page foreword, a thirteen-page introduction, and a two-page introduction to the
Hexagrams. All of this is followed by the main body of the work, which consists of 676 pages,
which constitute sixty-four individual chapters covering the hexagrams. All of this is then
followed by an Appendix containing portions of the Great Commentary. This document
accounts for the entirety of Volume Nine of Phan Bội Châu Toàn Tập (The Collected Works of
Phan Bội Châu), edited by Chương Thâu, the preeminent scholar of Phan’s life and work. In a
foreword to the volume, Chương Thâu informs us that Phan completed an original manuscript
exceeding 1,000 pages, which was entitled An Explanation of the Changes of Zhou in Vietnamese
(Quốc Văn Chu Dịch Diễn Giải). This text was hand copied three times in romanized
Vietnamese (quốc ngữ) sometime before the end of 1937, when a publication notice went out in
Huỳnh Thúc Kháng’s periodical entitled The Voice of the People (Tiếng Dân). The original
copies were given to Phan’s close confidantes, including his student Nguyễn Văn Yêm,689 for
safekeeping. This was done because the work could not be published immediately due to
heightened French surveillance of Phan’s house.
In 1943, a short excerpt from Phan’s commentary on The Book of Changes on the topic of
“Wang Yangming studies in Japan” appeared in Wang Yangming (Vương Dương Minh) by Phan
Văn Hùm. According to Chương Thâu, it is not clear whether Phan Văn Hùm held one of the
original copies of Phan’s commentary. After 1945, Nguyễn Văn Yêm provided a number of
Phan’s writings, including the commentary, to the Cultural Office of Nghệ An province. Chương
Thâu claims that he “discovered” these papers in 1967. Unfortunately, sixteen out of thirty
sections had been misplaced.
Serendipitously, the family of Tống Châu Phu (of the Astronomical Service in Huế) sent a
painstakingly-transcribed copy of one of the originals (now lost), which had been borrowed from
the family of Phan Nghi Đệ, Phan Bội Châu’s son, to an exhibition of Phan Bội Châu’s
belongings and works. This exhibition had been organized at the University of Huế in 1967 for
Phan’s birthday centennial. Finally, in 1969, the Khai Trí publishing house in Saigon published
the Tống Châu Phu version in two volumes, which were together entitled Chu Dịch. However,

689
Chương Thâu relates that Nguyễn Văn Yêm was Phan Bội Châu’s student in Huế from 1934 to 1938.
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 10.

147
this version was still missing four chapters.690 Chương Thâu claims that The Collected Works of
Phan Bội Châu contains the most complete version.691
It seems Phan wanted the text published in romanized Vietnamese because he felt this would
more effectively connect with his intended audience - younger Vietnamese who could not read
Chinese. By doing so, Phan was implicitly recognizing that Chinese had fallen out of favor and
indeed out of use.692 However, the use of romanized Vietnamese, presents complications for
anyone reading the text. Phan transliterated the original text of the Book of Changes, which is
written in a terse form of ancient Chinese that included many rare characters. Once transliterated
into romanized Vietnamese, however, these characters became indistinguishable from one
another. A Vietnamese reader with no knowledge of classical Chinese would find the result
nearly indecipherable.
To make up for this, Phan provides careful explanations in colloquial Vietnamese for nearly
every word of the original text, and this exercise comprises the bulk of the commentary. The
result is a hybrid text - primarily Chinese in content, but Vietnamese in form and script. Like
Phan Bội Châu himself, the commentary straddles two languages and two historical repertoires,
drawing freely from both to better reveal the secrets of the Book of Changes to the untrained but
eager Vietnamese reader. Phan’s explanations are colloquial and easy-to-understand. They
demonstrate clearly Phan’s abilities as a communicator, for the Book of Changes is not a simple
or easily-understood text.
The Book of Changes was not a frivolous choice. The Book of Changes is held by many,
including, (it is said), Confucius himself, to be the preeminent classic. The Book of Changes has
enjoyed a level of scholarly and, at times, popular attention, on par with great religious texts such
as the Bible or Quran. The Book of Changes (Yijing 易經) is a complex text with multiple layers
representing separate yet interrelated discourses. The first layer, the Changes of Zhou (Zhouyi 周
易), is a divinatory text from the early Zhou period. The language is cryptic, terse, and often
quite brutal. Richard Rutt calls it, “a royal book of oracles mainly related to warfare, especially
warfare as a means of obtaining captives to be killed in sacrifices.”693 Comprised of sixty four
hexagram sections, which have been variously organized,694 The Changes of Zhou contains
hexagrams (gua 卦), hexagram names (guaming 卦名), hexagram statements (guaci 卦辭), and
line statements (yaoci 爻辭). This primary layer is neither moralizing in content nor does it
provide an explicit holistic cosmological understanding of the world. Instead, it offers a series of
mantic pronouncements on fluid instances or moments in time, alternatively quotidian, historical,

690
It is worth noting that Nghệ An and Huế were on opposite sides of the Vietnam War. Chương Thâu
makes no mention of the fact that the text was first published in the southern Republic of Vietnam.
691
Chương Thâu, “Concerning the Work An Explanation of the Changes of Zhou in Vietnamese” (“Về Văn
Bản Tác Phẩm Quốc Văn Chu Dịch Diễn Giải”). The Collected Works of Phan Bội Châu (Phan Bội Châu Toàn tập,
Tập 9: Chu Dịch), (Hanoi, VN: Nhà Xuất Thuận Hóa, 2000), 9-10.
692
See Woodside, Community, 75-76.
693
Richard Rutt, Zhouyi: The Book of Changes (Surrey, UK: Curzon, 1996). 135.
694
Phan Bội Châu’s commentary abides, as do most commentaries, by the “received order” or the “King
Wen” sequence. Variations include the Mawangdui version and, later, the Shao Yong sequence or the “Fu Xi”
arrangement. For more information, see Richard Smith, Fathoming the Cosmos and Ordering the World: The
Yijing (I-Ching, or Classic of Changes) and Its Evolution in China (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia
Press, 2008), 50-56, 122-124.

148
or archetypal. The content ranges from the natural changing of the seasons to significant points
of transition in the cultural or social life of individuals or communities.695
Philosophers in the later Zhou and Han periods chose The Changes of Zhou as a
foundational text upon which to build a thoroughgoing cosmological explanation for the universe
and the development of human society. These philosophers added a set of conceptual definitions
and practices that thoroughly changed the meaning of The Changes of Zhou, and provided the
basis for a wide variety of theoretical, philosophical, and commentarial discourses from the Han
dynasty forward.696 This second layer was The Ten Wings (Shiyi 十翼), a heterogenous set of
texts purportedly compiled by Confucius. Han dynasty academicians combined the Changes of
Zhou and The Ten Wings, and thereby created the one of the five Chinese classics: The Book of
Changes.
With the addition of the Ten Wings, the text became, as Richard Smith puts it, “a microcosm
of the universe.”697 For example, The Great Commentary (Dazhuan 大傳, one of the Ten
Wings), , states “In [The Book of Changes] are included the forms and the scope of everything in
the heavens and on earth, so that nothing escapes it.”698 The text itself thus claims to represent
all varieties of phenomena and change, offering to the dedicated reader a typology of the
universe and its permutations -:a prism through which the cosmos might be conceptualized,
understood, and ordered.
The typology presented is best explained as an example of “correlative cosmology.” The Ten
Wings describes a universe composed of interrelated and mutually productive properties: light
and dark, the firm and the yielding, motion and rest, the creative and the receptive. This list is
theoretically unlimited, but indicates an essential dualism that permeates the cosmology of The
Book of Changes: that of yin and yang (陰陽). Yinyang cosmology and an affiliated system
known as the five agents, or wuxing 五行, are at the heart of an, “elaborate system of
correspondence and resonance, often described as ‘correlative thinking.’”699 Where Western
style positivistic logic emphasizes logical subordination and external causality, correlative
cosmology emphasizes instead complex patterning, relativistic associations, and analogical
reasoning. Correlative cosmological principles underlie much of East Asian philosophy and
aesthetic theory. A familiarity with this system and how it can be used and repurposed is
essential for understanding Phan’s commentary and his broader political project.
In correlative cosmology, time is not as an abstract substance or theoretical category. Rather,
time is an immanent and continuous flow punctuated by successive moments of change or
695
For an interesting exploration of the content of the Zhouyi, see Smith, Fathoming, 18-24.
696
There are many examples of a Han moral meaning overlaying an earlier connotation. Benjamin
Schwartz describes how the graphic for “correct” or zheng 正 originally involved a cluster of ideas including
“governing,” “punitive action,” and “attacking a settlement with foot-soldiers.” Benjamin Schwartz, The World of
Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 103.
697
Smith Fathoming, 38.
698
Richard Wilhelm, The I Ching or Book of Changes ( New York, NY: Bollingen Foundation, Inc., 1950)
296
699
Smith, Fathoming,32. Benjamin Schwartz provides a helpful explanation: “The essential
preoccupation lying behind the correlative cosmology seems to be that of finding in the homologies between human
and natural phenomena a means of controlling human civilization as well as human individual life by ‘aligning’
them with the cycles, rhythms, and patterns of the natural realm.” Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in
Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985). 355.

149
alteration. This notion of time differs significantly from Western notions of time, as presented in
Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities. Correlative cosmological time differs from
“messianic time” insofar as no divine figure or other external force is understood to be ordering a
simultaneous, eternal time. Rather, correlative cosmology holds that time is continuous change
without beginning or end. Nothing is eternal except change itself and no thing, divine or
otherwise, exists outside of change. Correlative cosmological time is also different from linear
time or “homogenous, empty time” because it is not an abstract quantity.700 In correlative
cosmology, time is the fundamental texture in which events take place. Time is immanent and
suffused with moral force. Ethical precepts derived from correlative cosmology place a much
greater emphasis on when and how to act correctly than it does on what the correct action is - a
perennial concern of Greek and Christian philosophers.
This moral force associated with correlative cosmological time is complemented by a notion
of resonance between things within space. In contrast to the idea, common to Western
philosophy, that objects are discrete phenomena upon which outside forces can act (Newtonian
physics), correlative cosmology contends that “like-things could influence like-things on a
cosmic as well as microcosmic scale.”701 Thus, the most important task for philosophy is to
properly categorize things such that an adept could understand how achieve harmony by the
correct ordering of relationships between objects, people, and social institutions. Thus,
correlative cosmology is inherently a political as well as philosophical mode of thought. Because
The Book of Changes reveals how to bring about cosmological order, it could thus become, in the
hands of the right individual, a device of great political power.
Commentaries on The Book of Changes constitute an important part of the text’s legacy.
From the late Han dynasty onward, additional layers of interpretation accumulated and expanded
the applicable scope of the text dramatically. Commentators approached The Book of Changes
from a wide variety of philosophical, political, and literary points of view. Richard Smith writes,
“not surprisingly, Confucians found Confucian meanings in The Book of Changes, Daoists found
Daoist meanings in it, and Buddhists found Buddhist meanings in it. And, as indicated above,
people in different periods of Chinese history - not to mention at different points in their own
lives - quite naturally used the [Book of Changes] for different purposes and in different ways, in
accordance with the times.”702 The enigmatic character of the original text, the sociopolitically
significant moral layer, and a dazzlingly creative variety of commentarial traditions, ensured The
Book of Changes would have a long-standing and widespread popularity - one that has persisted
into the modern era.703

700
This raises the question of whether Phan’s interpretation of modern nationalism may fall outside of
Anderson’s considerations, but this is a question that will have to wait for future examination. Benedict Anderson,
Imagined Communities (London, UK: Verso, 1983). 24.
701
Richard Smith, The I Ching: A Biography (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 54.
702
Smith, Fathoming, 3.
703
The Book of Changes gained prominence among Vietnamese scholars during the Lê dynasty (1428-
1789), though it was rarely considered a text worthy of specialized study. There were two important exceptions.
The first was Nguyễn Bỉnh Khiêm 阮秉謙 (1491-1585), the “Vietnamese Nostradamus” and an exponent of Shao
Yong’s numerological approach. The second was Lê Quý Đôn (黎貴惇, 1726–1784), who propounded in his An
Explanation of the Classic of Changes for Different Levels on the applications of the Changes to practical statecraft.⁠
Smith, The I Ching,152-3. Lê Quý Đôn was the sort of prolific scholar whose encyclopedic writings remained
influential into the twentieth century. He argued that “the universe was ruled by an unchanging, immanent sense of
moral organization.” All changes that might take place needed to “affirm and reinforce the greater unchanging

150
 The two main schools of interpretation were the “Meanings and Principles School (yili jia 義
理家),” which focused on the moral content of the Book of Changes, and the “Images and
Numbers School (xiangshu jia 象數家),” which explored mathematical and cosmological
correspondences between the text and the wider world. These schools found their most
significant expressions during the Song dynasty in the work of the Cheng brothers, whose
approach to The Book of Changes Smith calls “relentlessly moral,” and Shao Yong 紹雍 (1011-
1077), who devised influential numerological correspondences and created the “Fuxi
Arrangement of the Sixty-four Hexagrams (Fuxi liushisi gu tu 伏羲六十四掛圖).”704 The
famous Neo-Confucian Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200) drew from both schools, contending that “the
ultimate purpose of the Changes was to contribute to self-cultivation.”705 As we will see that
Zhu Xi’s viewpoint was to prove significant for Phan Bội Châu’s interpretation of The Book of
Changes.
Phan’s foreword and introduction, presented in a simple and direct manner, lay out his
reasons for writing the commentary and explain what he considers the most important principles
of The Book of Changes. Phan makes three points. First, The Changes is a text relevant to the
modern global age. Second, the notion of change found in The Changes is coherent, all-
inclusive, and undergirds a cosmological system built on immanence and correlation, rather than
external causality. Third, the most important concept introduced in The Changes is the human
capacity to accord with time itself - what we might call punctuality. These three insights form
the foundation upon which Phan erects his grand vision of The Book of Changes and its
instrumental role in Vietnamese politics. Phan opens in the foreword by separating Eastern
philosophy into three categories: Buddhism, Daoism, and the study of The Book of Changes.706
Buddhism, he contends, is highly idealistic, but pushes an adherent toward an eremitic life.
Meanwhile, Daoism is overly mystical and impractical. Buddhism and Daoism will not suit the
modern world, which demands perception and engagement. By contrast, the study of The Book
of Changes is the most refined, realistic, perceptive, and suitable philosophy for grasping and
contending with modernity, colonialism, and ultimately nation-building.
Phan then injects his commentary into a global discourse by deploring how Westerners and
Japanese busy themselves with The Changes while the Vietnamese, “go begging with a jewel in
[their] pocket.”707 In other words, the “modern” nations of east and west have discovered the
power of The Changes while the Vietnamese ignore it. With these opening lines, Phan makes

moral sense, in order to escape disaster.” Thus it fell upon enlightened individuals to maintain “high standards of
moral stewardship and self-stewardship” so as to ensure that any changes that did happen occurred within proper
bounds.⁠2? As we shall see, Phan took the notion of personal responsibility for change very seriously, while straying
significantly from Lê Quý Đôn’s overall political conservatism. Alexander Woodside, “Conceptions of Change and
of Human Responsibility for Change in Late Traditional Vietnam.” in Moral Order and the Question of Change:
Essays on Southeast Asian Thought, ed. by David K. Wyatt and Alexander Woodside, (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Southeast Asia Studies, 1982), 120-1.
704
Smith, Fathoming,120-130.
705
Smith, Fathoming, 134.
706
Phan’s study presents the three in this order: Buddhism, “yi-ology” (the study of The Book of Changes),
then Daoism.
707
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 14.

151
clear who his intended audience is: young Vietnamese intellectuals seeking to understand the
nature of the world and how they might best take their place in it. For Phan, the point of writing
the commentary is to convince the Vietnamese people they have an incredible tool at their
disposal, one that, if grasped effectively, could change everything.
Phan grumbles that in Vietnam, The Book of Changes has been taken for a prop by blind
soothsayers or as simple exam material by careerist scholars-officials. Phan accuses the
Vietnamese of simply sitting around in their houses and staring at their diplomas while the
sophisticated and abstruse insights of Fu Xi, King Wen, the Duke of Zhou, and Confucius lay
waiting. This statement fits well with the classical trope of a valuable thing lying unused. The
trope usually symbolizes an official ignored or exiled by a thoughtless emperor. In Phan’s
analogy, The Book of Changes takes the place of the official while the Vietnamese people play
the ignorant sovereign. Phan claims that his own lowly contribution is the equivalent of
fathoming the depths of the ocean with a clamshell or peeping at the heavens through a pipe.
Even so, Phan writes, he dare not keep this tasty morsel of food or delicious drink to himself.708
Phan feels he must do what he can to reveal the wisdom contained within the Book of Changes
so that the Vietnamese people may benefit from its epistemological power.
Phan’s introduction provides a basic overview of The Book of Changes, and is broken into
seven sections. The first section concerns the history of The Book of Changes. Here Phan makes
it clear that he values The Book of Changes for its philosophical profundity and not for its
original mantic properties. Phan reaffirms the traditional genealogy of authors (Fu Xi, King
Wen, the Duke of Zhou, and Confucius), but reserves special emphasis for the role of Confucius
in compiling The Ten Wings. Phan writes that before Confucius added this collection, “the
words were too abstruse, the meaning was too profound, and scholars rarely understood its
import.” Phan thus affirms that the moralizing layer of the Ten Wings is a valid representation of
the deeper meaning of The Changes of Zhou. There is no mention of divination methods in the
introduction. Even more telling, the sections ofthe Great Commentary left out of the Appendix
are precisely those having to do with mantic practices.709 From the start, Phan’s commentary
treats The Book of Changes as a text imbued with a moral force derived from its intuitive and
profound expression of correlative cosmological principles.
The second section discusses the concept and reality of change. Phan explains that change
(dịch) has three meanings: non-change (bất dịch), exchange (giao dịch), and ceaseless change
(biến dịch).710 Phan says that ceaseless change is most important for understanding the Changes,
but that all three meanings are mutually constitutive and generative. Phan explains by way of an
analogy: “Take for example the original substance of a male or a female. For a male this
[substance] is definitely yang while for a female it is definitely yin. This [certainty] is the
meaning of ‘non-change.’ When males and females exchange [fluids] with one another they
create a male or a female. This is using ‘exchange’ to create ‘ceaseless change.’ However after
[entering into] ‘ceaseless change,’ a male is still male and a female is still a female. Thus

708
Ibid.
709
In “The Appendix” presenting The Great Commentary, Phan leaves out sections six and nine and
portions of sections eight, ten, eleven, and twelve from “Part One” and portions of all sections, except section seven,
from “Part Two.”
710
This tripartite definition was originally explained in the anonymous work Zhouyi Qianzuodu 周易乾鑿
度. Smith, Fathoming, 78-79. Bent Nielsen notes that the work is attributed to Zheng Xuan 鄭玄 (127-200). Bent
Nielsen, A Companion to Yi Jing Numerology and Cosmology (London, UK: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 304.

152
‘ceaseless change’ returns to ‘non-change.’”711 Phan thus presents change as endless yet
dynamic.712
According to Phan, the ordering principle of any given thing (that which is “non-changing”)
does not exist independently; it is always already a constituent part of that which it orders. Such
“non-changing” ordering principles are inherent within the nature of everything in the universe,
but they are not in any way separate from it. All things can and will interact (or “exchange”)
with other things endlessly. This is what Phan calls “ceaseless change.” Phan provides examples
to help readers understand . Iron melts in fire and presumably hardens again afterwards. The
nature of iron does not change, despite the fact that the iron itself interacts with fire and changes
its form. Likewise, a silkworm transforms into a butterfly, which lays eggs which then become
silkworms. The nature of the silkworm/butterfly remains the same despite the fact that its form
changes over time. Thus, Phan suggests that change is a part of the nature of all things. Phan
says this is still true, even though the exact way things change differs depending on the
circumstances and the nature of the thing in question. All processes of change are thus potential
representations of what Phan calls “invisible principles.”713
Phan’s epistemology is quite clearly a version of correlative cosmology. It is predicated on a
productive dialectic, but not one that assumes the inevitability or even the possibility of
transcendence to a higher level of being or understanding.714 Rather than assuming a unitary or
complete cosmos, Phan presents an infinite universe with infinite variety, in which all things are
potentially related to one another. Phan715 emphasizes this point: “Within the way of all under
heaven, there is only relativity, there are no absolutes. Whenever things have a way to coalesce,
there will be a way for them to disperse. When there is a way for things to disperse, there will
then be a way for them to come together. The only competition is between those two ways.”716
This is a cosmos unlimited in scope, but fundamentally guided by principles of change and
analogical resonance.
In section four of the introduction, Phan introduces the eight trigrams, their characteristics,
and their significance. Phan starts by explaining that The Book of Changes is a mathematical
text.717 Phan claims that by understanding the mathematics of the text and then carefully

711
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 18.
712
This description is consonant with what Chenshan Tian calls “a process of becoming,” in which
continuity is achieved through change. Chenshan Tian, Chinese Dialectics: From Yijing to Marxism (Lanham, MA:
Lexington Books, 2005). 22-23.
713
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 22.
714
Contrast this with Hegelian or Marxian dialectical theory, in which dialectical transformations entail a
movement to a higher level of contradiction.
715
The logic here is of analogy and correlation. Unlike Western philosophy, which since Parmenides and
Zeno, has accepted a split between reason and sense experience and the notion that rest or stasis as the ontological
basis for all further speculations, correlative thinking, as David Hall and Roger Ames contend, “depends upon the
acceptance of ‘images’ and ‘metaphors’ as the primary means of expressing the becoming of things.”⁠ David Hall
and Roger Ames, Anticipating China: Thinking Through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture (Albany,
NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), 32, 40. In the three capacities Phan describes, change can be found
in all things. Phan claims that those things with similar qualities will resonate with one another. He provides as
examples a baby with its mother, cocks crowing together, the tendency of moist things to attract water, the tendency
of dry things to attract fire, and the properties of magnets. Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 62.
716
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 645.
717
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 17.

153
reflecting upon the images, “We can understand the fundamental principle of the universe.”718
The eight trigrams are composed of three broken or unbroken lines. The broken lines correspond
to yin, the principle of dispersion and declination, and the unbroken lines correspond to yang, the
principle of coalescence and coming together. As an interim step, two lines can be placed
together to create old yin, which will become young yang, and old yang, which will become
young yin. Therefore, by doubling the lines, we begin to see how change can be represented
temporally.
By placing yin and yang lines in their eight possible combinations (23 = 8), the trigrams come
to represent the eight basic elemental positions of the universe: Heaven (qian 乾, thiên [vt] ☰),
Lake (dui 兌, đoài [vt], ☱), Fire (li 離, ly [vt], ☲), Thunder (zhen 震, chấn [vt], ☳), Wind (xun
巽, tốn [vt], ☴), Water (kan 坎, khảm [vt], ☵), Mountain (gen 艮, cấn [vt], ☶), and Earth (kun 坤
, khôn [vt], ☷). These trigrams are collectively known as the eight symbols (bagua 八卦). The
trigrams could be seen as stand-alone ideal types, but Phan quickly identifies them as part of
ordered sequences. As Phan explains it, qian through zhen are progressive insofar as they
constitute a process of rising yang, while xun through kun are regressive insofar as they
constitute a process of declining yang.719 The fundamental dialectic between yin and yang is
thus maintained as the lines expand into trigrams to comprise the basic elements and directions.
To help explain the characteristics and order of the trigrams, Phan provides several well-
known pictorial representations of these eight symbols, including the “Fifty-Five Point Yellow
River Chart,” the “Chart of Fu Xi’s Positions of the Eight Trigrams [the “Fu Xi Chart”],” and the
“Diagram of the King Wen Arrangement of the Eight Trigrams [the “King Wen Chart”].” Each
figure presents and orders the trigrams in different ways. The “Fifty-Five Point Yellow River
Chart,” which Phan presents in section four, associates the trigrams with the four cardinal
directions and sets of numbers (which add up to fifty-five, hence the name of the Chart). Phan
explains why each trigram occupies the direction it does and why it is associated with a
particular set of numbers, effectively providing a simultaneously spatial and numerological
conceptualization of the trigrams.

718
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 17.
719
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 22.

154
 Following this in section six, Phan describes two other ways of arranging and understanding
the trigrams in the Fu Xi and King Wen Charts. The “Fu Xi Chart” provides an alternative set of
directional associations, which Phan claims are “ordained by Heaven.”720 Phan explains that the
“King Wen Chart” arranges the trigrams as a family, with qian the father ruling over his sons
called zhen, kan, and gen, and the kun being the mother ruling over her daughters called xun, li,
and dui. Phan draws upon these classical diagrams and charts to demonstrate the vast
associational capacity of these basic building blocks of The Changes, and thus reveals for us the
functional utility of correlative cosmology as a system for organizing knowledge.

By combining two trigrams together, a hexagram (six-line figure) is created. All the possible
combinations of trigrams (82) thus comprise the sixty-four hexagrams of The Book of Changes.
Recapitulating the entire process, Phan explains that thái cực or the Supreme Ultimate produces
yin and yang, which in turn produce the four images (mature yang, young yin, young yang,
mature yin), which thereupon produce the eight trigrams. Each trigram has eight children,
producing the sixty four hexagrams. To depict the entire process visually, Phan presents the
“Diagram of the Fuxi Arrangement of the Sixty Four Hexagrams.” This diagram makes the
binary nature of the Book of Changes clear: each level doubles to accommodate more
associations and ways of more precisely defining the nature of things and the possibilities of
change. Finally, as each line of each hexagram can change independently of all the other lines,
we can see the outer limits of possible types of change in the number 4096 (642).

720
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 22.

155
 Phan thus presents the hexagrammatic system as a totalistic representation of all possible
forms of change, a typology of universal possibility. Significantly, Phan is implicitly claiming
that nothing categorically new can take place that The Book of Changes would not apply to or be
able to explain. If a new challenge were to arise, for instance the colonization of Vietnam by
France, Phan is confident that The Book of Changes contains hexagrams and lines through which
the challenge could be understood and dealt with. A thorough understanding of all sixty-four
hexagrams would allow an individual to immediately understand any given situation and, if they
were perceptive enough, determine the most ethical and timely action to take in response. As
any “new” situation can be properly associated with a particular hexagram or set of hexagrams, it
is more appropriate to think of responses in terms of “creative applications” of hexagrams and
lines than of “innovation.” That is, even the most radical of responses can and should still be
conceived of within the framework of the text.
Since the hexagrams and their lines can be creatively applied to any situation, there are
undoubtedly historical and textual precedents for any given situation or instance of change. It
should therefore be no surprise that Phan fills his Commentary with historical and textual
allusions. For a thoroughgoing examination of the references and citations found in the
Commentary, refer to the Appendix to this chapter. I mention here only the highlights. Phan
provides 551 citations of works and references to historical persons or events. A total of 504 of
these are presented in the hexagram chapters. This works out to an average of 7.875 per
hexagram, though Qian 乾 predominates, with forty-nine citations and references. Most of the
references are to Chinese texts or historical events, though Phan provides Vietnamese, Western,
and other examples as well. Of the citations, the majority are from classical Confucian texts,
especially from the Analects. Most of these citations deal with the ethical requirements for
becoming a virtuous and effective Confucian gentleman, although, as we shall see, Phan uses
these citations to explain hexagrams in a way specific to the process of creating an ideal
Confucian knight-errant.
Phan’s synopsis of The Book of Changes offers a coherent epistemological and ontological
framework for understanding the world. For Phan, The Book of Changes is a guide to ethical
action within a world of ceaseless change, and a prism through which it is possible to understand
all events and processes. As the hexagrams and principles described within The Changes are
“non-changing,” one can apply insights gleamed from a reading of the text to any time period or
situation, including the modern colonial situation in Vietnam. Finally, it is through an
“exchange” or interaction with the book that a reader will gain the perception and ethical

156
intuition necessary to master time and change. Having mastered time and change, a person could
rally the people and save the nation.
Ethical Temporality
Phan asserts that time is at the core of The Changes - it is the single necessary factor for the
movements of all of the hexagrams - and thus for all changes, notional or real. For Phan, time
takes precedence over all persons, events, and concepts. It is ontological prior to all other forms
of ethics or political organization, and thus must serve as the central focus of any individual
seeking to order the world. Time is furthermore directly related to the ethical foundations of
human social organization. According to Phan, time is the medium through which all change
must take place, and thus takes ontological precedence over space and all material and
phenomenon within it. To realize the knowledge-power afforded by a reading of The Changes,
an individual must fundamentally grasp the notion of time this book presupposes.
In section three of his introduction, Phan first quotes and then translates Shao Yong, “There is
only one word that covers the entirety of The Book of Changes and that word is ‘time.’”721 Phan
goes on to explain that time has three principal meanings: “First, time means period, as in the
time one eats and the time one goes to sleep. Second, time means season, as in the summertime
when one must wear lighter clothes and wintertime when one must wear heavier clothes. Third,
time means moment, as in the time you open the door and the time you turn out the light.” These
three definitions of time correspond both to lived reality and to the variable temporal scales
associated with The Book of Changes. Changes can occur quickly or slowly, but they always
occur within time.
Because all things unfold and change in time, every instance is potentially imbued with
ethical meaning. We can see this theme clearly in Phan’s explanation of the Huan 渙 hexagram
(No. 59, Dispersion): “That which is in accordance with time suits the sentiment of man, it is
right for the way of man. When it gathers, it brings prosperity to mankind. That which
contravenes time opposes the sentiment of man, it does not accord with the way of man. When it
disperses this also brings prosperity to mankind.”722 Herein we find an explicit association
drawn between “accordance with time” and “rightness for man.”
Time orients the ethical properties of human existence, making it the necessary focus of
Phan’s epistemological and ontological theorization. Here, morality is relative, but it is
universally relative insofar as nothing stands outside time. To put it another way, in Phan’s
metaphysical conceptualization of the universe, there exists no absolute moral principle or force
outside of time. If spiritual forces exists, they work through time, but not beyond it. To
understand the nature of time is to grasp the central message of The Changes, captured most
effectively in the phrase: “Change accords with time [隨時變易].”723
Phan’s explanation is explicitly this-worldly. He offers no suggestion of a transcendental
realm from which external forces might influence or affect the process or existence of change.724
Instead, all phenomenon are ontologically horizontal, or infinitely relatable to all other
phenomenon. However, they are not ethically equal. Herein the vertical nature of time enters to

721
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 17.
722
Phan Bội Châu. Chu Dịch, 645.
723
Phan Bội Châu. Chu Dịch, 19.
724
Chenshan Tian explains, “Instead of being moved by any transcendental Being, the Chinese world is
ziran or self-so-being, and ziwei or self-so-going or self-so-doing.” Tian, 34.

157
provide the basis for ethics. Since all things could potentially interact with all other things, the
issue of proper hierarchical ordering arises. Timing determines that which is “appropriate” or
ethical and that which is “out of time.” In the world of cosmological correlation “immoral” is
not a fixed or permanent category as in one of Plato’s forms. Rather “unethicalness” is an
attribute that arises from the misalignment of a thing with time itself.
The theoretical implications of such a philosophical perspective are immense. In Phan’s
correlative cosmology, ethics are a function of time. Ethics are not abstract categories. Rather,
the ethical individual or society perceives the nature of change and takes timely action to ensure
they do not end up on the wrong side of time. Clearly, Vietnam, had fallen behind the times.
Thus, to explain history would be to show how the country and its rulers misperceived the
changes in the world and failed to take proper action when it was required. Rather than being a
categorical evil, French colonialism was the inevitable result of a failure to perceive and accord
with changes in the world.
The temporal pressures of modernity - the need to “catch up” to Europe - made finding a
philosophically coherent way to describe and effectively use time a critical part of East Asian
intellectual discourse in the first half of the 20th century. Phan, like other Chinese and
Vietnamese thinkers, developed an acute awareness of the velocity of modernity.725 Phan
himself describes his amazement at the modern transportation and communications systems of
Japan when he first arrived there by steamship in late May of 1905.726 Ships, trains, and
automobiles moved much faster than previous forms of transportation, and the rationalized
bureaucracies employed by modern states and corporations emphasized efficiency as their
primary goal. Vietnamese intellectuals watched these processes unfold and took note.727 Writing
what could easily have been an epigraph to Phan’s Commentary, Alexander Woodside observes,
“The command of time, and of the definition of time, [could] be as significant a part of the
development of power as the command of space or money; in Eastern Asia, historical
modernization timetables, as manipulated by elite figures, practically [became] the substitutes for
religious prophecies.”728
According to Phan, the hexagrams are tools with which to perceive change and ascertain
one’s “place” within time. The hexagrams reveal, line by line, the variety of situations possible
in an infinite world of ceaseless change. That is to say, the hexagrams show what is “non-
changing” within change, or the archetypal moments in time that recur endlessly, though not in
any particular order. Particular hexagrams and particular lines present different alignments or
misalignments between space and time. Phan explains, “A nation or a society can become
‘caught’ in a hexagram or a line - this refers to the timing of that situation.”729 Phan intimates
that Vietnam is indeed caught in a poor position within time. Fortunately, hexagrams eventually
725
However, it would be a mistake to assume that an understanding of the importance of time in the
modern era meant that time itself was understood in the same way as in the West. Modern temporality, that is, could
be conceived in many ways, Anderson’s “empty, homogenous time” being just one. Given the importance of
temporality to conceptions of modernity, it is clear that alternative notions of time that account for and seek to
respond to the velocity of the modern could offer a way of perceiving multiple formulations of “modernity” itself.
That is, in addition to there being multiple characteristics that make up possible “modernities,” the very perceptions
of those modernities can be multiple as well.
726
Phan, Overturned, 84-85.
727
Phan Khoi, for example, agonized over the fact that, as he believed, Vietnamese “lacked flexible variety
in describing time,” Woodside, Community, 76.
728
Woodside, “Territorial,” 191.
729
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 96.

158
change their lines from broken to non-broken or vice-versa, and thus situations can change.
However, whether it changes from bad to good depends on whether or not the individuals
involved are perceptive enough to grasp the seeds of change before they sprout.
A proper reading or use of the hexagrams will allow the perceptive individual to cultivate
their sense of ethical timing and determine right action. Phan writes, “If one understands the
nature of the hexagrams, one will see that the improvement or deterioration of life, the goodness
or evil of people, the small matter of composing oneself and one’s family, and the great matters
of uniting a country and unifying the world, [hinge upon] only one principle.”730 A sensitivity to
the timing of change is what allows an individual choice. Thus, perception is the locus of all
power-knowledge. Phan’s message to his readers is thus: cultivate your perception of time, as it
alone allows you to foresee change and take effective actions.731
By properly perceiving and according with time, one may achieve success. Success here is
simply modernization or “keeping up with the times.” However, it is not the achievement of a
specific goal. Even the achievement of independence is seen here as a functional product of the
mastery of time. This is not ideology so much as it is ideo-praxy - knowing the correct means of
acting in the world. Phan is much more interested in tactics than in strategy. That is to say, he
sees tactics as strategy.
Of course, there is the question of which hexagram is most appropriate to a given situation
or time. Rather than counsel the use of divination, Phan advises that readers focus on the
“complete and perfect numerological system” found in the Changes.732 Phan’s exegesis of the
Great Commentary, which otherwise presents in longer form the same points he makes in the
introduction, omits the sections dealing with mantic practices and divination (section nine and
paragraphs one through four of section ten of part one). In additio, in my review of the body of
the text I found no mentions of divination or any mantic formulas. Although it is possible the
omission is the result of a misplacement of parts of the text, I believe Phan purposefully excised
these portions. This would constitute a decisive break with traditional scholarly and folkloric
conceptions of The Changes and their significance. Phan’s focus is clearly on the hexagrammatic
system as a whole and not the results obtained for any specific hexagram by divination or any
other method.733
An Example: Qian (乾)
Phan’s argument concerning the primacy of time is made forcefully in his explanation of the
Qian 乾 hexagram (No. 1, The Creative). Phan uses the entire Qian hexagram as an archetype
for understanding the relationship between man and time. Unlike many others, the Qian

730
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 25.
731
Phan’s emphasis is similar to Michael Nylan’s here: “The Changes can teach readers to distinguish
significant from insignificant change, thereby enabling them to prioritize their concerns and pursuits. (Without the
Changes, ordinary humans find it difficult to ignore the white noise generated by the ceaseless interaction of
tendencies.) By focusing attention on the limited field of significant change, devotees of the Changes can achieve
mastery over the changes that most affect their quality of life, since, by definition, such mastery is predicated on
anexquisite sensitivity to the ethical implications of each evolving situation.”⁠ , Michael Nylan,, The Five Confucian
Classics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001),232.
732
Phan Bội Châu. Chu Dịch, 19.
733
Phan discusses some basic ways of reading hexagrams, including analyzing upper and lower trigrams
and evaluating correspondences whereby certain lines were yang lines (1, 3, 5) and others were yin (2, 4, 6). These
are standard methods of evaluating hexagrams developed by the Images and Numbers School.

159
hexagram is thematically cohesive. It describes, line by line, a dragon rising from a position of
anonymity to a position of power and influence.
The first line is the crouching dragon (潛龍). This represents a man waiting for an
opportunity. Phan argues that a man in this position must cultivate his virtue and expand his
knowledge. Premature action at this time would fail because the conditions are not yet right.
Phan compares this situation to that of a seed still within the earth.734
The second line is the dragon appearing in the field (見龍在田). This is the time to take
action and make one’s virtue visible. Here Phan stresses the importance of “hitting the time” just
right (chính trung, 正中). Acting too early or too late both lead to failure. Phan’s analogy here is
to cooking rice: “If cooked for thirty minutes the rice will be just right. If cooked for thirty five
minutes, however, the rice will be burnt. If cooked for only twenty minutes, the rice will be
raw.”735 He also brings up the example of a sharpshooter: only a hit dead-center matters.736
Phan’s correlative metaphors are telling. He suggests the import of The Book of Changes applies
equally to quotidian peasant life, basic military matters, and grand cosmological movements.
These are not abstractions, but clear and concise elucidations of how we relate to time in
daily life. Phan suggests the value of The Book of Changes is in allowing an individual to see
how time functions in the same way regardless of circumstance. In correlative cosmology, scale
is not important. One could apply the principle of proper timing to cooking one’s rice or to the
planning of a revolution. This then is an example of analogical enlargement, a principal feature
of correlative cosmology.
In the third line, the superior man works tirelessly day and night (終日乾乾). This is an
unsteady and dangerous position for the superior man. It is critically important to recognize
when one is in such a middle position and to stick to the Way (反復道也). Here, sincerity and
consistency count for everything. It is while explaining this line that Phan introduces the curious
yet perfectly appropriate analogy of planning a train trip from Huế to Hà Nội. To ensure a man
reaches his destination, all manner of things need to be taken into account: purchasing tickets,
handling luggage, checking the schedule, preparing adequate food and water, and having
someone to pick him up at the right time once he arrives. Immediately after, Phan explains the
temporal significance of this analogy:
To reiterate, “knowing the goal and thus reaching it [知至至之]” is related to space.
“Knowing the end and thus completing it 知終終之” is related to time. “According with the
sprouts [可與幾]” means taking advantage of things already revealed in order to consider
those which have not yet been revealed. “According with the preservation of righteousness [
可與存義]” means maintaining secrecy on the outside to preserve that which is on the inside.
The way of the sages is knowing the journey and planning for the goal with consistency from
beginning to end. Because the learning of the sages is this way we must approach things in
accord with the times and circumstances. There is no place this does not apply.737
734
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 53.
735
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 54.
736
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 54.
737
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 59.

160
 This example demonstrates a willingness, even a need, to understand modern life through the
lens offered by The Changes. Phan had lived the life of a revolutionary faced by a modern
colonial state armed with a vast security apparatus, and thus he knew full well the importance of
correctly perceiving and acting in time. Only an individual attentive to dangers and cognizant of
the nature of time could survive in a period when enemies maintained overwhelming force. Only
an individual capable of understanding the ethical principles inherent in time itself could
eventually hope to succeed in achieving their political goals.
The fourth line shows the superior man considering whether to leap over an abyss (或躍在淵
). This is still a dangerous time, like the time of line three, but it offers the possibility of
advancing. However, any advance must be made carefully and gradually. The crux of the line is
the character huo (或), meaning “perhaps.” This, then, is a time of decision. Here Phan
introduces the examples of Zhuge Liang and Yi Yin, both men who considered situations very
carefully before deciding to act.738 Phan is particularly concerned with the historical possibilities
of this line - Phan’s hasty actions while in this type of situation led to disaster in the past. Phan
suggests that a revolutionary who deliberates carefully would be able to succeed where Phan
himself had failed.
The fifth line is the flying dragon (飛龍). Here an individual finally has an opportunity to
rise righteously and achieve great success. Phan explains that this line embodies the central
message of the entire Book of Changes. He thus implores the reader to pay careful attention.
The sage acting with perfect virtue will draw the support of all of the people. Provided the sage
is pure of intent, he becomes an unstoppable force, capable in this moment of achieving
anything. To explain, Phan provides the example of Lê Lợi: “Lê Thái Tổ [The imperial title
taken by Lê Lợi] was farming in Lam Sơn when the rebellion against Ngô739 began. The entire
country responded to him. Truly a sage had appeared and all of the ten thousand things craned
their necks to look upon him.”740
Phan’s rhetorical exuberance makes clear that this line represents the culmination of his
political dreams. Phan’s greatest ideal, then, is not a state of being or a sociopolitical form of
any sort. Rather, it is a moment of dynamic crescendo, a time when the ethical power embodied
in a great man comes shining forth, radiating goodness and eliciting resonant responses in all
virtuous people and things. It is not difficult to imagine Phan identifying Hồ Chí Minh’s
triumphant proclamation of the independence of Vietnam on September 2, 1945, as the perfect
realization of this line.741
The sixth line is the arrogant dragon (亢龍). Here Phan notes that the time of victory

738
Phan Bội Châu. Chu Dịch, 60.
739
The character 吳, here referring to the ancestral homeland of Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋 1328-1398, the
founder of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), which had occupied Đại Việt.
740
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 62.
741
Whether Phan would have had ideological differences with Hồ Chí Minh is without consequence in this
frame of reference. Regardless of Hồ Chí Minh’s intentions after victory, Phan would have likely considered the act
of standing up and for a moment representing the dreams of the Vietnamese nation of paramount significance.
Phan’s doctrine is similar in some ways to that of ‘might makes right’- the strong are respected for their strength -
but Phan’s argument fundamentally holds that only ethical individuals will truly win the hearts and minds of the
people. Ethics and efficiency are not competing concepts in Phan’s worldview. Rather, they are mutually productive
analogues of one another.

161
inevitably passes. Should one continue to advance beyond the point of victory, time itself will
turn against even the most powerful of men. The key is knowing when to stop. In addition to
providing the negative examples of Napoleon and Yuan Shikai, Phan offers exemplars who did
not attempt to exceed their position: Trần Thái Tôn (1218-1277), who abdicated the throne in
favor of his son Trần Thánh Tông (1240-1290), and the husband of Queen Victoria of England
(1819-1901).742 Phan’s choice of a Chinese, a Vietnamese, and two European examples to
explain this line shows his ability and willingness to see all historical events anywhere on the
globe as essentially analogous to one another.
The most important point of the sixth line is that all situations eventually transform into
different situations. To underscore this point Phan, when glossing the Dun 遯 hexagram (No. 33,
Retreat), quotes a Chinese proverb: “There is no never-ending feast.”743 Temporal limits such as
this ultimately contain Phan’s radicalism. While the revolutionary wave is inevitable, so is its
recession. On the other hand, the knowledge that all situations must come to an end would
surely have been a source of comfort to Phan as he daily faced the unpleasant reality of French
colonial power.744

742
Phan here refers to but does not mention the name of Prince Albert of Sax-Coburg and Gotha (1819-
1861) who, without an official power, invested his time in humanitarian ventures such as education and the global
abolition of slavery. Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 64.
743
“下没有不散的宴席” Phan Bội Châu. Chu Dịch, 388.
744
Phan reiterates and expands upon his conception of time in other hexagrams. Through the framework of
The Changes, Phan presents change as inevitable and time itself as irremediably contextual.⁠ Explaining the nature
of the Sui 隨 hexagram (No. 17, Following), Phan writes, “Throughout history the world has had ideologues come
forward touting some ideology or doctrine. Only when the times fit the situation do heaven and earth follow these
[men]. Whether under a constitutional monarchy or a republic, whether statism or socialism, there is often a
promoter. The multitudes of people only follow, however, when the time is right. If you didn’t have an autocratic
monarchy, such as in the time of Lộ Địch, and promoted democracy or if you did not have capitalist war such as
took place at the end of the 19th century and promoted socialism, who would follow you? Thus it pays to know the
phrase “all under heaven follow in accordance with the time 天下隨時.”⁠ Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 237.
“Lộ Địch” refers to a play written by Ưng Bình Thúc Giạ Thị (1877-1961) based on Chinese history and “Le Cid”
by Pierre Corneille (1606-1684). Here time, not political ideology nor the capacity of a particular individual,
determines whether one will be successful in obtaining followers. This sense of the relativity of sociopolitical forms
shows up again his Phan’s discussion of the fifth line of the Heng 恆 hexagram (No. 32, Duration): “In the time of
monarchy, one should worship the king. In the time of democracy, one should worship the people. In the time of
nationalism, one should worship the nation. In the time of socialism, one should worship society.”⁠ Phan Bội Châu.
Chu Dịch, 386. This clearly indicates that Phan’s ideological employment of the Confucian repertoire is utterly
divorced from any attachment to institutions, past, present, or future.
It is important to note here just how distinctive Phan’s focus on temporality and timeliness is. To be sure, the
Analects and the Mencius discuss the importance of time and the importance of according with it. Nevertheless,
for Confucius in the Analects it is accordance with li 禮 that takes precedence.⁠ Schwartz, World of Thought,
81. For Mencius, the focus is on moral intentionality, by which one can bring out one’s inner goodness.⁠
Ibid., 262. For Phan, there is a sense that time itself constantly looms and inevitably rushes ahead. Here we can
most clearly see the reason choosing The Book of Changes as an ideological organizing framework. Facing the
harsh truths of colonial statehood, social fragmentation, and economic exploitation, Phan felt strongly that time was
not on his side. In order to escape the fate augured by Social Darwinists, Phan needed an ideological framework
that both took temporality seriously and provided some means of bringing time itself back under control. The Book
of Changes offered this possibility, but taking advantage of it required that Phan reinterpret and rearticulate elements
of the Confucian repertoire so that Phan’s modern notion of ethical time could take center stage in his commentary.

162
 Personal Cultivation
According to Phan, although a grasp of time is essential to success, cultivating the right personal
attributes is necessary as well.745 To perceive time and act appropriately, one must develop moral
character. Through his careful explanation of the hexagrams, Phan reveals the individual
characteristics required of the superior man (quân tử 君子). In Phan’s presentation, this term, is
ethical, not social, in quality. That is, anyone proving themselves capable of embodying virtue
and righteousness could become a superior man. Money and power are not prerequisites, but
determination and education are. Of course, the foresight of the superior man is directly tied to
his timeliness. Phan argues that a superior man also embodies the virtues of selflessness,
perspicacity, and consistently correct conduct. He constantly works to refine his knowledge
through learning and strengthen his will through patience and the exercise of prudent judgment
in times of struggle.
Phan has obvious debts to the Confucian classics in his conceptualization of the ideal
superior man. To elucidate his points, Phan often cites or refers to Confucian moral aphorisms
and statements, mostly from the Analects and the Doctrine of the Mean. However, his
presentation differs from standard Confucian tropes in three important ways. First, the context of
the individual’s actions is entirely different. Throughout his Commentary, Phan presents the
superior man as faced with awesome challenges that he can meet only by cultivating within
himself the ethical properties of fortitude, awareness, and perfect precision under fire. Phan’s
superior man is not a widened scholar or deferent bureaucrat. He is an action hero.
However, to become a modern day knight errant, one must still rely on aspects of tradition.
For example, Phan lays a heavy emphasis on the importance of learning. Phan advises that
students should ask questions in order to better understand the principles of the Sages. Studying
should thus help one “bring everything together 學以聚之.”746 However, the purpose of
studying is not simply to amass knowledge from books. It is to cultivate one’s character. To do
so requires a new type of learning: experiential and reflective study. In an indication of how to

Throughout Phan’s commentary, the necessity of awareness of and proper accordance with time recurs again
and again. When the time is not right, Phan routinely counsels restraint and patience. When factors align and one is
able to see the opportunity to act, one must take action or face the imminent danger of falling behind time. For
Phan, this is best expressed in the “Commentary on the Image” of the Qian 乾 hexagram (No. 1, The Creative):
“The superior man strengthens himself without rest 君子以自強不息.” Commenting on this phrase, Phan writes,
“Never rest. One must strengthen oneself from youth until old age, then from old age until death. There can never
be an interruption. If there is an interruption, one has already lost the ability to strengthen oneself.”⁠ Phan Bội Châu.
Chu Dịch, 39. Phan thus seeks to answer Herbert Spencer (1820-1903)’s existential threat through ceaseless self-
reform. It is clear here that time is of the essence: in the modern world, only the timely will survive.
745
For example, when discussing the Daguo 大過 hexagram (No. 28, Great Reward), Phan suggests that
time by itself will not produce victories. He writes:
“After the period of village settlements [primitive accumulation], [history] entered the period of autocratic rule,
represented by Shang and Wu [the Tang and Zhou Dynasties]. After the period of monarchy, [history] entered the
period of people’s rule [democracy], represented by the French Revolution. Within the country of Hinduism,
Buddhism was set up, as represented by Shakyamuni Buddha. Within imperialist countries, there was nationalism,
and a socialist state was set up, as represented by Lenin (Vladymir Ilych Ulyanov). These were great events and
only through the efforts of great men could they have happened. But also the time has to be just right. If there are
great men, but the time is not right for great rewards, then there will be no success. Only when the time is right for
great rewards and there are great men will great events take place.”⁠ Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 341.
746
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 55.

163
use history as a pedagogical tool, Phan argues that, “The successes and failures of former
times…should serve as our teachers for the future. This is what it means to study.”747 Books are
useful, but only as tools for accessing and understanding the lessons of the past.
This line of thinking is similar to that of the eighteenth-century literatus Lê Quý Đôn (1726-
1784), who argued that “one had to first cultivate one’s moral being, for only morally upright
individuals could actually perceive the natural patterns manifest in the heavens and on earth.”748
Personal cultivation is the means by which a superior man could develop the perceptive capacity
to grasp the nature of time and change. This perceptiveness goes beyond empirical observation.
Rather, it is defined by the attempt to holistically and intuitively apprehend the nature of time
and space. It means grasping of the fundamental unity underlying reality and orienting oneself
according to the ethical properties of time.749 By do so, one might then be able to apply that
knowledge to any number of specific contexts.
Cultivation requires consistent dedication to honing one’s sense of rectitude. Learning
and contemplation are worth nothing if the course of study is not oriented according to
righteousness (nghĩa [vt], yi 義). This is a concept that Benjamin Schwartz claims refers to
“right behavior in the vast sea of unique life situations where more often than not there is no
simple ‘covering’ rule of li 禮.”750 In explaining the Yi 頤 hexagram (No. 27, Nourishment),
Phan writes,
Religious people, scholars, artists all focus on nourishing the spirit, but they cannot forget
to nourish the body. Laborers, farmers, and workers all focus on nourishing the body, but
they must also nourish the spirit. The use of the term ‘providing nourishment [頤]’
encompasses both of these.
When nourishing the spirit, going the way of superstition and the occult is not correct.
When nourishing the body, going the way of slavery and servile labor ruins the
conscience and is thus not correct.
Thus the sage taught, “perseverance in nourishing brings success.” This means that the
task of nourishment, no matter in what sense, must be done correctly. Whenever one
nourishes correctly, one has character. When one does not nourish correctly, one does not
have character.751
Once the superior man has accumulated a certain degree of character, he can begin to
influence those around him. However, this can also be dangerous if selfish thoughts remain or
begin to creep in.752 To properly cultivate one’s character, one must be determined and

747
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 55.
748
Kelley, “Vietnam,” 71.
749
Hall and Ames, reading the Analects, describe “actualizing or realizing the meaningfulness of the
world” as the prime focus of thinking. Hall and Ames identify one of the main operative ways of thinking of
Confucius as the act of realization or zhi 知, which they claim “refers to a propensity for forecasting or predicting
the outcome of a coherent set of circumstances.” David Hall and Roger Ames, Thinking Through Confucius.
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1987) 44, 51.
750
Schwartz, World of Thought, 79.
751
Phan Bội Châu. Chu Dịch, 327.
752
This is because virtue radiates outward from one’s person, causing correlative resonances in other
people. Phan writes: “Not only must we nourish ourselves, when we nourish others we must do it correctly. If we
fail to nourish ourselves correctly, we fall into the way of the small man. If we fail to nourish others correctly, we
bring them into the ambit of the small man. Thus the sage said, “We must look at how we nourish others and first

164
sincere.753
Second, Phan’s conception of personal cultivation is decidedly focused on the individual.
This is consistent with the Neo-Confucian turn towards the self noted by Peter Bol and William
De Bary. As Bol explains, “the subject of learning was learning itself, and the goal of learning
was transforming oneself into a responsible actor in the world.”754 Like Song and Ming, who
were Neo-Confucians who “turned inward” after finding it increasingly difficult to influence
policies at court, Phan created an non-institutional ideology embodying a theory of learning that
“gave those who internalized it a ready means of making sense out of the everyday human
experiences of acquiring knowledge, thinking, feeling, and making choices. It not only told them
how to divide up and organize into a coherent whole the various aspects of human experience,
but also justified respect for historical models.”755

decide for ourselves if it is good or bad, successful or disastrous.”⁠ Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 327. Phan suggests
the cultivation of character begins with one’s person and radiates outwards.
753
For example, Phan explains the Xian 咸 hexagram (No. 31, Influence) thusly, “In matters of the heart,
one must follow the essence earnestly. Earnestness means to amass sincerity within one’s heart. In order to meet
the time, one must have an empty heart. An empty heart means there is nothing within one’s heart. There are no
selfish or sexual desires occupying a portion of one’s heart. If a selfish or sexual desire should enter our heart then
we will have a full heart. Once a man’s heart is full, he cannot receive the timeless way of heaven and must thus
empty his heart. If we study psychology we must consider both of these aspects. Thus studying the Changes, we
must look at the Daxu 大畜 hexagram (No. 26, The Taming Power of the Great), which contains the word “Sincerity
誠” and at Xian hexagram, Influence, which contains the word “Empty 虛” as the meanings help to explain one
another.”⁠ Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 371.
754
Bol, Neo-Confucianism, 192.
755
Bol, Neo-Confucianism, 158. However, unlike the Song and Ming Neo-Confucians,, Phan’s vision was
oriented around the necessity of creating heroes capable of acting with alacrity and complete dedication of purpose.
Phan took exception to Vietnamese scholars willing to serve in the Nguyễn civil administration, which, because it
was dominated by the French colonial state, he considered an “empty” institution.⁠ Alexander Woodside, for
instance, notes how Phan, “was obsessed by the need to launch a war against the fatally distracting upper-class
appetite for the ‘honors of office’ (cong danh), which he called ‘empty names’ (hu danh).” Woodside, Community,
42. Simply put, there were no legitimate institutions in Vietnam. As such, Phan’s formulation of Confucianism
concentrated wholly on the individual and what he might be able to accomplish. There is also little consideration of
the individual’s familial role or social class. Given that Phan was not one to speak candidly about his own family, it
might be assumed that the lack of attention to kinship or social relations simply reflects modesty on his part.
However, the effect is to focus considerable attention on the virtuous individual to the exclusion of that individual’s
social context.⁠.”
This line of ‘individual-centric’ thinking can be found in the Analects, although there is profound disagreement over
exactly what constitutes an individual. Herbert Fingarette, on one side, claims that “the entire notion [of an inner
psyche] never entered [Confucius’s] head.”⁠ Herbert Fingarette, Confucius - The Secular as Sacred (New York, NY:
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972). 45. Thus, any emotional or ethical emphases could only be found within the
context of specific performances of ritual or proper behavior, but never as a part of the inner world of the individual.
This would mean Phan was making a considerable leap by constructing an ideology around the individual that
stressed the psychological aspects of “amassing sincerity within one’s heart.” It would also mean that Phan was
developing through his reading of The Book of Changes a modern form of Confucian psychology, a supposition
supported by the fact that Phan was one of the first Vietnamese intellectuals to write an autobiography (indeed,
two!).
On the other side, Benjamin Schwartz counters by writing, “Confucius is, in fact, enormously interested in the
inner state of the person even when he is not operating in the public space and regards these sustained inner states as
of the utmost relevance to public behavior.”⁠ Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985)., 75. If Schwartz is correct, then Phan’s

165
 Third, there a radical emotional quality to Phan’s prescriptions that sets it apart from standard
Confucian interpretations. In a gloss to the Kun 困 hexagram (No. 47, Oppression), Phan offers a
glimpse of how far he expected his adherents to go in their dedication to righteousness: “There is
a line in the Analects: ‘The scholar, seeing threatening danger, is prepared to sacrifice his life.’
To give one’s life in tribute to the nation and society is what it means to ‘sacrifice one’s life 致命
.’”756 Phan’s interpretation of this line (Analects 19:1) is rather extraordinary. In contrast,
Edward Slingerland provides the following translation and comment: “19.1 Zizhang said, ‘To
submit to fate when confronted with danger…’” Most commentators understand this to be a
summary of the minimum qualities that are necessary to make one an acceptable scholar-
official.”757 Phan’s version thus converts “submitting to fate” as a scholar official into
“sacrificing one’s life in tribute to the nation and society,” indicating that the stakes of personal
cultivation had increased dramatically in the context of modern colonialism.758
Leadership and Grouping
Once an individual attains an appropriate level of personal cultivation, they will begin
attracting followers. Here we encounter Phan’s theory of the formation of groups (qun 群).
Entirely irrespective of what political or religious ideology they profess, Phan contends that
people will gravitate toward leaders based on the principles of correlative resonance. However,
for the nascent leaders several problems then emerge. First, one must consider how to select and
foster good, loyal subordinates. Second, one must decide how to conceive of and create larger
sociopolitical units.
Phan subscribed to a Confucian version of Carlyle’s “Great Man Theory of History,” wherein
the decisions of “heroes” are held responsible for the progression of history.759 Phan’s version
differed significantly from Carlyle, for Phan’s heroes do not determine the path of history, rather
they perceive the opportunities afforded by the changing of time and, by virtue of their
cultivation, are able to guide their followers in accordance with the times. Significantly, heroic or
virtuous qualities ensured precisely nothing if their timing was not right.
Leaders were necessary for revolutions to take place.760 When explaining the Cui 萃

notion of a self-aware individual who cultivates sincerity and virtue does have meaningful roots in the Analects,
though the goal to which Phan directs this cultivation may indeed be novel.
756
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 531.
757
Confucius: Analects. With Selections from Traditional Commentaries, trans. by Edward Slingerland,
(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.), 221.
758
In contrast, Alexander Woodside describes how “Pham Quynh unhesitatingly identified the ideal
Vietnamese national character, in 1925, as that of the ‘wind-and-stream’ man, the imperturbable intellectual who
tranquilly offered wine to his friends.” Woodside, Community, 91.
759
See Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History (New York, NY: Frederick
A. Stokes & Brother, 1888).
760
Explaining the second line of the Jing 井 hexagram (No. 48, The Well), Phan makes the claim “There
needed to be a King Tang in the time of Yi Yin to cut down Jie and save the populace. There was [Kaiser] Wilhelm
in the time of Bismarck who was able to make strong the country of Germany. Without intelligent kings such as
those two men, who would be able to draw from the well?” Phan did not apparently see any categorical differences
between ancient Shang and modern German rulers, though the ability of each to accord with their particular time
periods ensured their success. No matter the time period, Phan maintains that an elite vanguard of ethically trained
and knowledgeable individuals must be available and willing to guide a polity to success. Phan Bội Châu,Chu Dịch,
547.

166
hexagram (No. 45, Gathering Together), Phan makes it clear that “When men collect as a group,
there must be a great man to serve as leader. When men collect as a nation, there must be a great
man to serve as president.”761 Accordingly, a time with all small men and no great men (the
situation of line four of the Kun 坤 hexagram, No. 2, the Receptive) is a great disaster for a
nation or a society.762 Leadership and the formation of groups are thus presented as mutually
productive phenomenon. Having one without the other is an indication of a misalignment within
time.
To become a leader, one needed a following. Phan raises this issue many times over the
course of his commentary. He offers little idea of how exactly a leader is to attract followers.
The implicit suggestion is that a virtuous individual will inevitably draw people to him by the
power of his charismatic moral persona. Should this fail to take place, the virtuous individual
would simply bide his time, waiting patiently for recognition. Phan seems to suggest that
personal cultivation will simply guide the superior man toward taking whatever steps will be
necessary to attract a following. In his Autobiography, Phan spends little time reflecting on
exactly why people chose to follow him. Charisma is not something to be explained in a
Machiavellian fashion, it is simply something the virtuous leader will have as a result of his
personal moral cultivation.
Conversely, Phan’s emphasis is on the proper selection of followers. Discussing the Zhun 屯
hexagram (No. 3, A Difficult Beginning), Phan writes, “When national or social affairs are at
stake, one should find and rely upon talented subjects.”763 That those followers be suitable
individuals is, of course, crucial, as Phan points out in an explanation of the third line of the Bi
比 hexagram (No. 8, Union):
In a village there are neighbors, when studying there are friends, when getting along there
are colleagues, when working there are parties, wives choose husbands, husbands choose
wives, servants choose masters, masters choose servants, all of this is [part of finding]
Union. No matter what group, anytime you employ a crook things will be ruined. Thus
you should choose a person who balances you well. This is really worth paying attention
to.”764
Here we see the principles of resonance and good judgment at work. A superior man is one
who can discern which people will in time prove suitable for particular tasks. Phan himself was
forced to rely on many individuals and, as such, points out the necessity of compromise in
choosing subordinates. However, as he admits in his Autobiography, he was often too gullible
when trusting people.765 Thus, in an explanation of the top line of the Shi 師 hexagram (No. 7,
The Army), he claims: “Stupid, corrupt, and deceitful people are useful, but only for military
purposes. Once you turn to running a country you need to get rid of these people!”766
Phan’s prescription for the creation and expansion of sociopolitical units is an interesting
blend of Mencian populism and socialist democracy. Phan’s Commentary includes a rather

761
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 512.
762
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 84.
763
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 87.
764
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 149.
765
Phan Bội Châu, Overturned, 45.
766
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 142.

167
vague conception of politics based on analogous amplification of the same principles that apply
to personal cultivation. When discussing the concept of self-strengthening 自強, for example,
Phan claims that the same methods of making oneself self-reliant would work equally well for “a
family, a nation, a society, or the world.”767 Similarly, when explaining the fifth line of the
Jiaren 家人 hexagram (No. 37, The Family), Phan considers the following question:
Why does [the hexagram] not state “extends to the country” and only states “extends to
the family”? Is not a king who extends only to his family particularistic? We must
understand that a nation is only a root, a country is really a large family. A family is
really a small country. “Extends to the family” is stated because it is part of the Jiaren
hexagram, so the word “Country” could not be stated. The intention of the sage is,
however, that “country” means “family” and “family” means “country.”
This is an excellent example of correlative cosmological thinking. Though it would be easy to
point to a regression in the sophistication of Phan’s political philosophy here to an almost absurd
reductionism, it is equally important to recognize the analytical utility of this sort of analogical
explication. Discourses that describe nations as “fatherlands” and “motherlands” abound in the
West, as do leaders calling themselves “fathers of the nation.” By shifting “family” to
“country,”Phan is acknowledging the reorientation of political affiliation around national
groupings, but without claiming the nation to be a fundamentally new category. Rather,
“country” and “nation” have taken the analogical place, not the formal place, of “family.” As
such, “family” can still exist within “country” without a formal contradiction. Thus, what seems
at first glance to be a simplistic reversion to tradition is in fact a subtle reorientation of
archetypal categories to account for changes in the modern world.
Another of Phan’s analogies for leadership deserves similar attention. Explaining the Zhun
屯 hexagram (No. 3, A Difficult Beginning), Phan writes, “Weave the threads together to create
fiber lengths. Constructing an organization and building a nation or society, large or small,
requires this act.”768 The Image line reads: “Clouds and Thunder. A Difficult Beginning. The
superior man weaves thread 經綸.” The characters in question also mean “statecraft.” Here we
can see again the power of analogical reasoning. Forming a strong sociopolitical unit is akin to
weaving together threads that by themselves are weak. Phan and other Vietnamese intellectuals
long deplored the “sandlike” nature of the Vietnamese people. An effective leader would be one
who could not just attract people to him by the power of his charisma, but one who could bind
them together by careful and consistent interweaving of individuals and families.
With regard to political policy, Phan had a few suggestions of a Mencian bent. Phan
considered the people’s livelihood important. This is made evident in a long passage taken from
Phan’s discussion of the Yi 益 hexagram (No. 42, Increase), concerning Lord Mengchang of Qi
(See Appendix D). This story contains many themes we have previously reviewed . First, we
see the importance of having a trustworthy servant, even one who may at first seem disobedient.
Second, we see how the accrual of personal virtue, here in the form of “righteousness,” garners
the support of the people. Third, we can see a political philosophy in which the elite are
expected to provide for the people’s material needs. Finally, there is an embryonic impulse

767
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 39.
768
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 90.

168
towards economic though not social equalization.
The message is essentially one of Mencian populism - rulers need to take the people’s
interests into account before their own. The unstated corollary is the practical consideration that
by doing so, rulers would be ultimately benefitting themselves. Phan himself suggests as much
in a gloss to the Tai 泰 hexagram (No. 11, Peace):
Heaven increases the number of people and earth provides this with advantages. If there
is not a method of dividing and developing or [a method of] assisting and regulating so
that the common people can be satisfied, there will be excesses and shortages. This will
produce innumerable inequities in society. The rich will become richer, the hungry will
become hungrier, the happy will become happier, and the destitute will become more
destitute. The people above will oppress the people below and the people below will
grow to hate the people above. All this will occur because of the lack of a means of
dividing, developing, assisting and regulating on behalf of the people.769
It might be said that before there is policy, there must be principle. Phan’s observations of the
French colonial state led him to believe that policy came first and principle failed to come at all.
The veiled threat of the “people below growing to hate the people above” is thus significant.
Phan’s populism only went as far as economic equality and did not include political
equality along the lines of socialism.770 Phan argues that hierarchy should be meritocratic. It is
precisely those who have cultivated their perception of time and sense of discernment who
should be in charge of political affairs. In essence, Phan argues here for a meritocratic ideal
independent of the institution of the examination system. There is a strong appeal to common
sense here. Phan feels that if those on top can rectify the national or global situation, then it will
be possible for everyone to find their proper place. Though this may seem like the most
undeveloped aspect of Phan’s modern Confucian worldview, it is worth noting how similar it is
to the pragmatism of John Dewey or the meritocratic ethos of global capitalism.
An Example: Ge 革 Revolution
I will now focus on a single hexagram: Ge 革 (No. 49, Revolution). This is the hexagram
Phan considers to be the most important for Vietnamese intellectuals to grasp and put into action.
Phan’s exegesis of Revolution is impassioned, forceful, and innovative. Phan argues for an
overdue overturning of the French colonial state and the Vietnamese monarchal administration as
part of a global wave of modern revolution. This revolution would be ethical, for it would fit the
time and the needs of the people. It would also represent the culmination of all of Phan’s other
themes: individuals would cultivate their personal virtue, become charismatic leaders, rally the
people and effectively organize them into a powerful collective political force and, when the time
was just right, drive out everything that failed to resonate with the ethical power of the
769
Phan Bội Châu,Chu Dịch, 176.
770
Phan makes this clear in a frank discussion of the matter found his explanation of the Lü 履 hexagram
(No. 10, Treading): Distinguishing between above and below does not mean distinguishing between social classes.
Long ago everyone was quite equal, but this only meant equal in social class. Sometimes you have to distinguish
between talent and position. Observe a village. Could anyone be village leader and could anyone be the village
herald? If anybody was leader and anybody was herald, could village matters be properly handled? If roles are
properly doled out, then people don’t bicker and things get done. Not only does everyone have a duty, everyone
also has some authority. This is really equality. Up and down are only sorted according to talent while equality is
achieved through balanced authority and responsibility. These two methods seem contradictory but are really
complementary.”⁠ Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 163.

169
revolutionary moment.
Phan foreshadows his discussion in a short passage appearing under the fifth line of the
Tongren 同仁 hexagram (No. 13, Fellowship with Men):
If you consider all of the options, going back and forth over it, you will come to
revolution. The racial revolution isn’t over, the national revolution isn’t over. We must
bring up the social revolution and the world revolution. Though there will be crying and
shouting all over the world, we will be smiling. To summarize, there is only the great
master sculptor. What is the great master sculptor? It is Revolution, Revolution!
Phan here sounds like a student on the streets of Beijing on May 4, 1919 (or perhaps August 18,
1966?).771 There is an exuberance in this passage, as there is in the following passages, not
found elsewhere in the commentary. This is one of the most unique aspects of Phan’s
formulation of Confucianism: it is a Confucianism that features moral revolution as its primary
purpose, the goal toward which all other descriptions of value and utility are directed.
Phan’s sense of excitement in his essay on Revolution is palpable (See Appendix E). Phan’s
initial two-part justification for revolution reveals that revolution is a sort of cosmological
“cleansing device.” If humans fail to keep up with time for long enough, Phan seems to argue
that revolution is an inevitable result. On the other hand, Phan makes a strong case for
individuals to “absorb the spirit of revolution,” indicating that he was not confident revolution
would take place on its own. For example, at the end of his explication of the “Commentary on
the Appended Statements,” Phan emphasizes that the Way relies on people to carry it out.772 The
essay is thus both a justification and a prescription.
The second part of the justification indicates that Phan anticipates that Revolution will bring
Vietnam into the modern era. There is a whisper of total revolution here, but it is conditioned by
Phan’s choice of metaphors. A modern revolution is akin to buying new clothing or building a
new house. It does not necessarily involve a thoroughgoing change to one’s identity or way of
thinking. The line, “revolution has been happening for a long time” indicates that Phan
understands revolution to have both gradual and sudden aspects. He also notes that revolutions
can be dangerous, though this fact does little to dampens his enthusiasm.
Phan identifies several paradoxes of revolution. First, it is both what people desire and
something that bewilders and terrifies them. There is the suggestion here that the ethical
properties of time are intimately linked to the sentiment of the majority of the people. Phan’s
advice for the would-be-revolutionary is ambivalent on this issue - he can only wait patiently and
accumulate virtue and followers until the time of revolution comes. This pessimism is perhaps a
result of Phan’s failure to arouse sufficient popular sentiment for revolution despite years of
writing harsh tracts denouncing French colonialism.
A second paradox concerns the ubiquity and proper use of the word “revolution.” Despite
the lack of willingness on the part of the people to undertake or at least condone revolution, Phan
notes that they bandy the word about with annoying frequency. Phan feels obliged in light of the
discursive spread of “revolution” to distinguish between “real” revolutions and simply instances
of “change.” Where there is an actual change of “mandate,” Phan argues, then it is suitable to
refer to a revolution. The notion of a “Mandate of Heaven” figures prominently in Mencian
populism, and here seems to represent the will of the majority of the people. That is to say, if a
771
Phan actually was in Beijing by August 1919, according to his Autobiography. It is likely that he would
have observed some portion of the New Culture Movement there or in Hangzhou. Phan Bội Châu, Overturned, 244.
772
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 743-744.

170
change is not a reflection ofthe will of the people, then it should not be considered a revolution.
The final paragraphs present instances of revolution drawn from around the world. These
modern examples of revolution are specifically linked to nationalist causes. Phan points out that
Washington, Kemal, and Lenin were considered “fathers of the nation” after completing
revolutions, suggesting that Phan implicitly associates revolution with nation-building.
Phan’s Coherent Vision of a Modern Confucian Revolutionary Ideology
Having demonstrated how Phan conceives of and utilizes the Book of Changes, I consider
now the overall significance of his commentary. The key questions are: what does the text reveal
about Phan’s ideological ambitions and how do these ambitions complicate historical and
theoretical narratives in which Phan is implicated? It reveals Phan’s coherent vision of a modern
Confucian revolutionary ideology.
First, Phan’s vision is coherent and totalistic. This is made evident in the introduction and
again in Phan’s explanation of the Great Commentary. The Changes includes all things under
heaven and upon the earth and nothing escapes it.773 Such a perspective is on par with other
contemporary totalizing visions such as those of French colonialism, Marxist historical
materialism, Weberian rationalism, or biological science. All of these ideologies claim to
represent the entire world, even the entire universe, and to have a special knowledge of what
causes change. Phan’s vision is distinct from these other ideologies insofar as it locates the
cause of change in change itself. That is, no single substance or quality animates the totality -
not civilisatrice, the economic base, transcendental ethics, or biodynamic energy.
In Phan’s correlative cosmology, neither is the totality a unitary self-generative whole.
Rather, all things have their own particular orienting principles, which are ultimately analogous
to the orienting principle of the whole or dao 道, but not reducible to it. Phan’s ideological
articulation is based fundamentally on ideas derived from what is known as correlative
cosmology: an epistemological system that organizes and classifies phenomenon through
analogies and the ascertaining of essences. Chenshan Tian contends the system also underlies
Chinese dialectics, including those articulated by the Chinese Communist Party.
Second, Phan’s vision is modern.774 Despite apparent similarities, Phan’s totalistic vision is
different from those of earlier exponents of The Book of Changes. Specifically, Phan
demonstrates throughout his commentary that The Book of Changes is applicable to the modern
era by refracting modern events through hexagrams and hexagram lines to reveal the clarifying
utility of the text. The text, if used properly, could be a tool for understanding and responding to
the modern world.775

773
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 724.
774
It is important distinguish between modernity and the process of modernization. According to Frederic
Jameson, modernity is a feeling, specifically a feeling of newness. He writes, “Modernity would describe the way
‘modern’ people feel about themselves…the modern feeling seems to consist in the conviction that we ourselves are
somehow new, that a new age is beginning, that everything is possible and nothing can ever be the same again; nor
do we want anything to be the same again, we want to ‘make it new,’ get rid of those old objects, values, mentalities,
and ways of doing things, and somehow be transfigured.”⁠ Alternatively, modernization, “has something to do with
industrial progress, rationalization, reorganization or production and administration along more efficient lines,
electricity, the assembly line, parliamentary democracy, and cheap newspapers.”⁠ Frederic Jameson,
Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991). 304, 310.
775
Joseph Levenson rightly points out, maintaining an idea after that idea’s time has passed changes the
⁠
idea. Levenson writes, “An idea is always grasped in relative association, never in absolute isolation, and no idea, in
history, keeps a changeless self-identity.” Leveson, Confucian, xxviii.

171
 An important aspect of Phan’s commentary is his continual emphasis on time, timeliness, and
calculation. In a creative explanation of time and space in the Zhun 屯 hexagram (No. 3), Phan
notes how when it is nighttime in America, it is daytime in Asia. Not only does Phan here
demonstrate his awareness of international time zones, he shows how The Book of Changes can
function in a global modality. In explaining the importance of thorough consideration in the
context of the third line of the Qian 乾 hexagram (No. 1), Phan uses the metaphor of taking a
train :
When going from Huế to Hà Nội, do we not need to know beforehand which train to
take? Knowing the final train is fundamental, [but must we] not also know how many
trains must be taken in between, how many hours this will take, how much it will cost,
what luggage we will take with us, how many people we will need to help us, what
precautions to take to ensure a successful trip and where we will stay when we get off in
Hanoi?
Moreover, between leaving and arriving, what dangers might there be?
Such matters as listed above must be calculated thoroughly and only then can we
decide to leave and [actually] get to the place we want to go. If these fundamentals are
followed, our design of getting to Hanoi will not fail.
Phan had taken many trains and ships earlier in life and understood quite well the importance
of being on-time and attending closely to many details at once. A diligent reader of The Book of
Changes, then, would be able to make better use of modern transportation. Beyond this, they
would be able to master any modern technological system which differed from the situations
presented in The Book of Changes only in terms of speed and complexity, not in terms of kind or
type.
In addition to timeliness, Phan claims another aspect of modernity: being civilized. Having
criticized the French claim to “civilization” in earlier works, Phan repeats the argument in line
five of the Bi 比 hexagram. First he explains how when hunting, sage kings would leave one of
four sides open to allow animals to escape. In contrast to this practice, Phan writes, “Look at the
policies of the colonizers from the civilized nations - they simply throw down the net but do not
open it again. On the outside they appear civilized but within they are extremely boorish!”776
Phan’s discursive claim stabs right at the heart of the French colonial paradox - the country of
Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité was denying all of these to the Vietnamese. A necessary element of
modernity for Phan was a sophisticated ethics - a set of values to serve as a personal and social
standard.
Third, Phan’s vision is Confucian, but Confucian only insofar as it draws from the Confucian
repertoire to articulate an argument centered upon the capacity of the superior man to
successfully cultivate his personal moral force, gather the people to him through virtuous
conduct, and carry out a national revolution.777 Phan’s Confucianism is a distinctly hero-based

776
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 150.
777
There is considerable debate over exactly how to conceptualize and discuss ‘Confucianism.” A large
part of this problem stems from attempts to conceive of Confucianism as a coherent ideology. Rather than an
ideology, Benjamin Elman, John Duncan, and Herman Ooms call Confucianism alternatively “a repertoire of world-
ordering devices” or a “repertoire of common techniques or tactics.”⁠ Seen as a repertoire, Confucianism could take
many forms and retain both intellectual and emotional value in a variety of different geographical and historical
contexts.⁠ Furthermore,,a repertoire does not face the same definitional problems as an ideology. However, I would

172
ideology emphasizing virtues such as courage, determination, and perspicacity.778 Phan
elsewhere wrote prodigiously about Vietnamese heroes, so it comes as no surprise to find such
examples in his Commentary.779
While Phan consistently references heroes displaying Confucian values, he dispensed with
what Alexander Woodside calls the “defensive corporatism” engendered by state exams and Neo-
Confucian state orthodoxy.780 That is, Phan’s Confucian ideology is non-institutional, similar in
many ways to the non-institutional Confucian inspired ontologies of Xiong Shili and Liang
Shuming. Phan makes this clear in a gloss to the Pi 否 hexagram (No. 12): “Monarchy
flourishes, but one day it will fall. As monarchy falls, the common man will rise.” The ease
with which Phan dismisses the dynastic state indicates that his version of Confucianism is really
quite distinct from the articulations of Confucianism identified and discussed by Shawn McHale
and Nola Cooke. Like his Chinese counterparts, Phan developed an ideology that incorporated
portions of the Confucian repertoire with aspects of Western political theory and philosophy.
Phan’s Confucianism is distinctive for his articulation of personal ethical values within an
ontological framework informed by correlative cosmology.
Fourth, Phan’s vision is political and revolutionary. Throughout the commentary Phan
describes a process whereby a perceptive individual who gauges the time correctly could
overcome adversity to achieve political success. The politics described in the commentary is
based on a principle of analogical expansion. That is, Phan contends that the proper cultivation
of virtue and ordering of what is near will inevitably extend and apply to larger sociopolitical
units and more significant situations. Politics, then, falls primarily under the Confucian concepts
of “grouping 群.” Nevertheless, Phan conceives of groups only as instances in which people
coalesce around leaders. The groupings here are not social so much as they are charismatic.
For Phan, the purpose of politics in the modern global context is to constitute a national unit

make a further correction. It seems to me most appropriate to think of a Confucian repertoire containing a vast array
of potentially mutually conflicting texts, concepts, principles, narratives, and practices upon which individuals can
and have drawn for the purpose of articulating ideological visions. See Benjamin Elmanwith John B. Duncan and
Herman Ooms. “Introduction.” Rethinking Confucianism: Past and Present in China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, in
eds. Benjamin Elman, et al. (Los Angeles, CA: UCLA Asian Pacific Monograph Series, 2002),. 4-5.
Such a definition also accords with Hao Chang’s term, a “storehouse of moral wisdom.” Hao Chang, “New
Confucianism and Contemporary China,” In The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservative Alternatives in
Republican China, ed. Charlotte Furth. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 300.
778
104. Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 185.
779
Phan dedicates some fifteen pages in Phan Bội Châu Niên Biệu to the students who took part in the
Đong Du movement, describing how many were killed on the battlefield, the gallows, or took their own lives.
Phan’s grand monument to such men was written in 1920 with the Việt Nam Nghĩa Liệt Sử (The History of the
Martyrs of Vietnam). Prior to this, he also wrote Hà Thành Nhị Liệt Sĩ [The History of the Two Martyrs of Hanoi]
following a failed attempt in 1908 to poison French soldiers and attack Hanoi, Trần Đông Phong Truyện [The Story
of Tran Dong Phong] about a young student who committed suicide, Tái Sinh Truyện [The Story of a Resurrection]
about Bùi Chính Lộ, who took his own life in a Siamese prison after killing two French operatives, Kỷ Niệm Lục [A
Record of Memories] concerning the lives of Tăng Bạt Hổ and Vương Thúc Quý, and Sùng Bái Giai Nhân [A
Tribute to Shining Lives], a collection of biographies of recent heroic figures. The greatest single individual to
receive confirmation and praise from Phan was Phạm Hồng Thái. In Phạm Hồng Thái Liệt Sĩ Truyện [A Biography
of the Martyr Pham Hong Thai] and several other writings, Phan recounted the life of the young man and his
explosive assassination attempt on Governor-General Merlin in 1924.
780
Alexander Woodside, “Territorial Order and Collective-Identity Tensions in Confucian Asia: China,
Vietnam, Korea.” Daedalus 127, no. 3, 1998), 210.

173
out of resonant groups of bioculturally similar people (one’s countrymen), and to overcome any
political force exercising sovereignty over that grouping. Phan does not spend much time in the
commentary discussing the particular situation of Vietnam. This points to the global nature of
Phan’s political ambitions. Beyond the national unit, Phan, like Kang Youwei, seems to have
envisioned some sort of world unity. This global unit is mentioned only in passing, and seems to
be a largely unarticulated utopian goal to be considered once the national unit has been
successfully made sovereign and defended against international enemies.
Finally, Phan’s vision is ideological. The Book of Changes offers the most comprehensive,
rich, and cosmologically sound means of interpreting the world, history, and nature of political
and charismatic power. It thus serves as an ordering framework for a political theory of
revolution. Phan presents The Book of Changes as a system for categorizing moral examples. It
is a device, a theoretical framework for understanding all events, all times, all pathways and
instances of change. It is also a toolbox, full of images that allow access into the very nature of
change and time. Used properly, it offers the reader who would intuit its meaning an escape
route, a source of emotional and psychological succor, and a means of conceptualizing a way
forward.781
Phan’s ideology draws from correlative cosmology, but does so in a coherent fashion that
establishes clear prescriptions for individual and group political action. Phan is able to interpret
world events, both past and present,through the prismatic framework of The Book of Changes.
He is further able to propound clear instructions for personal moral cultivation, the gathering of
followers, and the carrying out of revolution. All actions are to be taken only after careful and
conscious observation of the situation to determine an appropriate ethical course in accordance
with the nature of change and time itself. This could thus be described as a political-ethical
temporal ideology of drawing on the Confucian repertoire. Phan employs The Book of Changes
as a refractive ordering device through which he articulates a coherent vision of a modern
Confucian nation.
Conclusion: Effectiveness and Comparisons
In this evaluation of Phan’s commentary, I have sought to demonstrate that
“Confucianism,” “Modernism,” and indeed “nationalism” are best understood not as fixed
categories by which to classify intellectual production, but rather terms that indicate frames of
reference and repertoires of cultural and philosophical content from which individuals can draw
to form more or less cohesive ideologies that describe their perspective of the world and offer
visions of change within it. This commentary presents a conceptual device, the use of which,
Phan argues, would allow perceptive and well-cultivated patriotic leaders to first cultivate their
own virtue and capacity, then carry out a revolution producing a modern nation founded on
principles of personal and collective virtue, politico-moral heroism, and social harmony. Phan’s
commentary lays out a coherent vision of the cosmos and suggests the most appropriate means of
acting within it.
How effective was Phan’s ideology? On the face of it, not very. Phan’s commentary was
not published until 1969 -twenty-nine years after he passed away. It has not had a significant
influence on Vietnamese philosophers, politicians, or for that matter, scholars. Phan did not

781
Hall and Ames say The Book of Songs serves a similar function to the function the Book of Changes
serves for Phan. They write, “People of different ages with different concerns could use the text creatively to
arrange and express their experiences, to structure their priorities and to argue for a specific point of view.” David
Hall and Roger Ames, Thinking Through Confucius ( Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1987), 64.

174
achieve the ideological influence he intended with this text.
If we consider the text on its own merits, that is, as a presentation of a systematic
framework for understanding the modern world, a rather different evaluation is possible. Phan
interprets and explains The Book of Changes in such a way that time itself becomes the primary
ontological unit. This allows for a modern understanding of temporality, albeit one distinct from
the Western notion of temporality as empty, homogenous, and linear. By focusing on the
superior man’s overriding need to accord with time, Phan reorients the text and fundamentally
alters its interpretive possibilities. By focusing his reader’s attention on time, in effect, Phan can
“keep up” with the velocity of the modern.782
Phan’s focus on the development of proper ethical attributes for a hero draws upon
traditional sources, but presents them within modern contexts and facing modern problematics,
such as colonialism. In this sense, Phan is demonstrating the utility of traditional values,
provided they are oriented around a modern conception of time. Phan’s modern heroes, such as
Cai E and Camillo Cavour, display the same characteristics of courage, charisma, determination,
and perspicacity as do traditional heroes. Phan’s point is that virtues do not change. For Phan,
what made a man a strong leader in the past will make him a strong leader in the future as well.
Phan’s employment of values found in traditional texts underscores his belief in the fundamental
validity of certain portions of Confucian doctrine, but they are precisely the portions he is most
able to accommodate to a modern global conception of revolution.
Though it is easy to criticize Phan’s validation of traditional virtues, it is worth
comparing them to the virtues upheld by the organization typically praised for its modern and
effective approach to politics and nation-building: The Vietnamese Communist Party. There are
many homologies. Both ideological perspectives include an ontological of dialectical time, place
a strong emphasis on personal moral cultivation, and posit revolution as their goal. However,
there is a critical difference. Whereas The Book of Changes is systematic, it uses analogical
reasoning, which is primarily descriptive of the totality and prescriptive for the
individual. Communist ideology is primarily prescriptive for the totality and descriptive of the
individual (assignment of class status).
Thus, at its heart, Phan’s ideology is most effective for an individual navigating the
modern world. It is a road map for young Vietnamese revolutionaries who are determined to
learn, develop morals, and do whatever might be required to succeed. On a societal scale, Phan’s
framework and vision would quickly prove inadequate. However, on a personal level, Phan’s
way of interpreting and explaining the world, and an individual hero’s place in it, are remarkably
coherent, morally sophisticated, and psychologically satisfying.
Appendix - Data Analysis of the Content of the Commentary
As indicated in the corresponding chart (See Appendix A1), the most important finding is
that 80% (441/551) of the references were to Chinese texts or historical figures. This exceeds the
number of references to Vietnamese texts and historical figures, 10% (55/551), by a factor of
eight. We can draw three conclusions from this. First, Phan Bội Châu’s knowledge of Chinese
history and literature was considerable. Second, Phan had no compunction about employing
Chinese references, which suggests that he saw China less as a foreign nation to compete with

782
For an excellent discussion of this and other velocity-related theoretical concerns, see Paul Virilio,
Speed and Politics (Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e), 2007). Virilio points out that in the modern era, that which is
more rapid will inevitably overcome that which is more wealthy. He locates the geographical source of velocity:
“speed is the hope of the West [italics in original],” 70.

175
and more as a reservoir of meaningful cultural content. Third, Phan seems to have assumed that
his readers would at the very least recognize and comprehend his references, for he makes little
effort to explain them.
Of the Chinese references (See Appendix A2), 246 are citations from identifiable texts.
Approximately 64% (158/246) of these citations are from works traditionally understood as
classical Confucian texts. These include The Book of Documents or shujing 書經 (16), The Book
of Songs or shijing 詩經 (8), and the Zuo Commentary or zuozhuan 左傳 (9). The Daoist
citations are primarily from the Dao De Jing 道德經 (14). The portion described as Later
Commentaries come from a vast range of sources. Of these,there is considerable representation
from late Tang and Song dynasty scholars including Han Yu 韓愈 (768-824),783 Shao Yong,
Cheng Yi, and Sima Guang 司馬光 (1019-1086). The “foreword” is particularly interesting
because of the individuals Phan references in it. In rapid succession, Phan mentions the
polymath Shao Yong, the strategist Zhang Liang 張良 (262-189 BCE), the philosopher Mencius
孟子 (372-289 BCE?), and Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵 (1139-1192) and Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472-
1529), the founders of the Lu Wang School.784 He does this only to elucidate his distinction
between Buddhism, Daoism, and the study of The Book of Changes.
However, the bulk of citations (109) come from a group of classical Confucian texts
known at the Four Books (See Appendix A3).785 This set of texts, selected by the Neo-Confucian
educator Zhu Xi, comprise the core of the Neo-Confucian curriculum in China. These include the
Analects or lunyu 論語 (39), the Mencius or mengzi 孟子 (39), the Great Learning or daxue 大

783
Phan offers a particularly interesting story about Han Yu as a gloss to the second line of the Xun 巽
hexagram (No. 57, Penetration): “Han of Changli [Han Yu] was banished to Chaozhou. He went to Hang Mountain.
The clouds and snow blocked the mountain pass and he couldn’t see the path. He prayed to himself sincerely and
suddenly the clouds dissipated and the snow hardened. Chaozhou often had people injured by crocodiles. The
people of Chaozhou at that time were savages. They said crocodiles were spirits and they did not dare touch them.
He had men go purchase bows and arrows to shoot them with. When planning to attack a crocodile, first a
proclamation was thrown into the river informing the crocodiles that if they truly were spirits then they needed to
leave within three days or they would all be wiped out. In two days, thunder and lightning suddenly and violently
struck the river. A great many crocodiles followed the wind away. From that point forward the people of Chaozhou
had no more crocodile problems.” The line in question reads: “Nine in the second line. There is penetration
underneath the bed. If one employ many priests and sorcerors there will be good fortune and no error.” Phan Bội
Châu, Chu Dịch, 630.
784
The Lu-Wang school refers one of the two major Neo-Confucian schools, the other being the Cheng-
Zhu school associated with the Cheng brothers, Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033-1107), Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032-1085), and
Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200).
785
Citations from the Four Books can be found throughout the text, in comments on judgments, line
statements, or in Phan’s “extra notes” provided to gloss his exegetical remarks. Nevertheless, Phan is somewhat
selective; for 16 out of 64 hexagrams (exactly one quarter), there are no citations from the Four Books at all.
Phan’s use of the Four Books ranges from the definitional to the pedagogical, butthroughout he displays a tendency
to emphasize the importance of the virtuous individual and of learning. A majority of citations concern the actions,
behaviors, and states of mind necessary for an individual to become or be considered a superior man 君子. A
number of others underscore the importance of timeliness and of patience under duress. Of those citations that relate
to social groupings, most concentrate on the effect the superior man has on those around him.

176
學 (10), and the Doctrine of the Mean or zhongyong 中庸 (21). The Four Books were imported
into Vietnam at the time of the Ming occupation (1407-1427), and served as the basis for
Vietnamese Confucian education in village schools such as the ones Phan attended in Nghệ An
province. In his Autobiography, Phan recalls memorizing portions of The Book of Songs and the
Analects, even going as far as to compose his own Analects of Mr. Phan, for which he was
reprimanded.786
Of course, the Analects is a foundational text for the Confucian repertoire. It provides
many anecdotes, aphorisms, and pragmatic principles an individual can use to determine their
own way to walk a moral path. The text demonstrates a concern for ritual corruption and a
decline in ethical conduct associated with the moral chaos of the Spring and Autumn period
(771-476 BCE).787 The sense of moral concern for the political state of the Central Country only
increased as the “Way of the Zhou” deteriorated in the violent atmosphere of the Warring States
period (475-221 BCE). In addition to serving as Phan’s childhood primer and his textbook for
the civil service exams, The Analects can be best understood as a resource Phan drew upon for
guidance when faced with political and social trouble.788
Phan’s liberal use of Mencius is striking, although not surprising. Of the Four Books, the
Mencius held a privileged reputation for Vietnamese Confucian scholars. Alexander Woodside
points out, “There is no doubt that Mencianism had become broadly internalized in the
consciousness of Vietnamese village scholars by the 1700s.” Furthermore, Woodside suggests
that the influence of Mencius may have been stronger in Vietnam than in China due to the
“narrower, more controlled range of Confucian scholarship.”789

786
Phan, Overturned, 48.
787
Edward Slingerland writes, “Such a situation of moral chaos is what Confucius saw around him in a
society that had lost the true Way because of its obsession with externalities.” Edward Slingerland, “Introduction.”
Confucius: Analects, trans. Edward Slingerland. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2003), xxiii.
788
Phan draws primarily on four chapters of the Analects (See Appendix A4): Chapter One 學而, Chapter
Four 里仁, Chapter Seven 述而, and Chapter Fifteen 衛靈公. Chapter One focuses on the importance of learning
and virtuous public behavior. Phan cites the opening line three times: “The Master said, ‘To learn and then have
occasion to practice what you have learned - is this not satisfying? To be patient even when others do not
understand - is this not the mark of a gentleman?’”⁠ Confucius, Trans. by Slingerland, 1. Learning here does not
mean simple academic learning, but rather the moral progression of the individual. Phan thus reinforces his
contention that the ability to properly utilize The Book of Changes requires constant attention to one’s conduct,
thinking, and sense of determination. Chapter Four concentrates on the goodness embodied by the superior man and
the latitude this virtue allows him in influencing the perceptions and opinions of others. Meanwhile, Chapter Seven,
concerns, “the importance of a properly directed and sufficiently intense will or intention.”⁠ Confucius, Trans. by
Slingerland, 64. Chapter Fifteen has no central unifying theme, but the passages Phan cites generally highlight the
forbearance and probity exercised by the superior man in the face of adversity. From this collection of citations, we
can see Phan emphasizing the qualities of a resolute, virtuous leader, a man that could draw on his inner will no
matter the array of forces against him.
789
Alexander Woodside, “History, Structure, and Revolution in Vietnam.” International Political Science
Review 10, no. 2 (1989): 149. Phan’s use of the Mencius is distinctive and bears some scrutiny. Written after a
conceivable “Confucian” doctrine had taken form, the Mencius is a text concerned with defending the faith against
other hostile doctrines such as those of Yang Chu and Mozi.⁠ Schwartz, World of Thought, 259. Mencius contends
that human nature is good, but that it can be corrupted if the people are not afforded a “stable livelihood.” Ibid., 278.
As such, it is important for a ruler to ensure the people’s material needs are met. Providing for the people’s
economic livelihood is, according to Mencius, one of the most important duties of a sovereign and necessary for any
attempt to improve the people’s moral condition. A ruler failing to do so is not a proper ruler, and can be

177
 Phan’s textual allusions thus give the impression that he seeks to use The Book of Changes to
foster and guide virtuous heroes capable of maintaining their inner will amidst the turmoil of the
modern age. Phan’s emphasis on developing one’s perception so that one can take action in a
timely manner suggests that he sees the Book of Changes as a calibrating device, a catalyzing
prism through which change can be ascertained and harnessed, no matter its velocity. Those able
to understand the message will become heroes of the modern age.
The historical references in Phan’s commentary are primarily individuals - mostly heroes, but
occasionally villains (See Appendix A5). Phan uses the exploits of these individuals to gloss
particular hexagrams and explain their significance.790 Many of the references are to the four

legitimately dethroned.⁠ H.G. Creel, Chinese Thought: From Confucius to Mao Tse-tung (New York, NY: 1953),
71. While this suggests an analogue of the Western notion of popular sovereignty, Benjamin Schwartz takes pains
to point out that, “one is struck by the extraordinary passivity of the people. Without the sages, they are completely
at the mercy of nature and totally unable to cope with their most rudimentary needs.”⁠ Schwartz, World of Thought,
287.
It is particularly interesting, then, that Phan does not cite Mencius in this capacity, although his discussion
admits of a certain Mencian populism. Most of the 39 citations of the Mencius pertain to the refinement of personal
virtue in the face of difficulty, in line with Phan’s citations from the Analects. Mencius, like Confucius, stresses the
importance of proper moral cultivation. However, he emphasizes that this be accomplished by means of a “constant
accumulation of righteousness.” Creel, Chinese Thought, 79. Phan’s citations focus on a potent kind of moral force
described by Mencius.⁠ Phan cites the following line twice: “Be skillful at nourishing one’s vast flow of energy.”⁠
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 221, 328. Following this line in the Mencius is an explanation of the term “vast flow of
energy 浩然之氣.” Mencius states, “It is difficult to explain. It is vital energy. If raised continuously and not
harmed, it will fill up all between heaven and earth. It is vital energy. It accords with righteousness and the Way.
Without it, one goes hungry. It is brought into being by an accumulation of righteousness. It is not obtained by
sporadic righteous acts.”⁠ Mencius, ed. by Li Weihui (Xinhua Publishing Company, 2003),66. [My translation].
The passage goes on to compare the proper accumulation of righteousness with planting seeds and allowing them
time and space to grow. The cultivator of virtue is thus analogous to the cultivator of grain. If one is able to
emulate the diligence and patience of the farmer, one may obtain access to a vast store of moral energy - a source of
the willpower, perspicacity, and personal charisma that are the makings of a great leader. Phan’s citations from The
Great Learning and Doctrine of the Mean are also mostly along these same lines.⁠ Towards the latter half of the
commentary, Phan shifts from citing the Four Books precisely using Sino-Vietnamese, and begins paraphrasing in
colloquial Vietnamese. It is unclear why he does so.
790
Two figures receive a significant amount of attention: Yi Yin 伊尹 (c. 1600-1549 BCE) and Zhuge
Liang 諸葛亮 (181-234). Yi Yin, as described in the Mencius, was a minister in the early Shang dynasty who
helped Emperor Tang of Shang 商湯 (r. 1675-1646 BCE) defeat the last Xia ruler Jie 夏桀 (1728-1675). Phan
mentions Yi Yin ten times, usually in his capacity as a sagely advisor. In 1905, Phan took the young Cường Để, a
member of the Nguyễn dynasty, to Japan, hoping to eventually help him take the throne and establish a
constitutional monarchy. This plan failed, but the narrative is noticeably similar to the Yi Yin story Phan repeats
throughout the commentary.⁠ Phan was not alone in his appreciation of Yi Yin. Alexander Woodside notes that Ngo
Thi Nham, a prominent advisor to Emperor Quang Trung of the Tay Son, “publically represented himself as a
Vietnamese version of the famous reformer in Mencius (Yi Yin), who had believed that he could make any ruler
into a sage emperor; Ngo Thi Nham even took Yi Yin’s name as his own.” Woodside, “History,” 150. Interestingly
enough, Phan uses the example of Ngo Thi Nham fleeing after the fall of the Tay Son to explain the Bo 剝 hexagram
(No. 23, Splitting Apart). Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 296. Zhuge Liang was a famous strategist and advisor to Liu
Bei 劉備 (161-223), a warlord who made himself Emperor of the Shu-Han 蜀漢 state (221-263) during the Three
Kingdoms period (220-280). Phan mentions Zhuge Liang nine times, also in his capacity as a sagacious advisor and
brilliant tactician (Phan also references Liu Bei twice). Though Zhuge Liang was not as successful as Yi Yin, his
reputation as a crafty and perceptive man capable of pulling off victories such as at the famous battle of Red Cliff 赤

178
putative authors of the Book of Changes: Fu Xi (6), King Wen (17), the Duke of Zhou (10), and
Confucius (36). The perseverance and struggles of King Wen and Confucius during difficult
times are a common theme.791 Mentions of legendary and historical figures range from the sage
kings Yao 堯 and Shun 舜 to Liu Xiucheng 李秀成 (1823-1864), a Taiping military commander
who died along with 3,000 martyrs rather than submit to the Qing dynasty.792
While they are few (7), Phan’s references to modern Chinese figures are some of the most
interesting in his commentary. Sun Yatsen appears twice as a positive figure and national leader.
The remaining five references are to Yuan Shikai 袁世凱 (1859-1916) (4 mentions), a Qing
general who assumed the Presidency of the nascent Republic of China in 1912 and then declared
himself Emperor in1915 in a short-lived attempt to revive the monarchy, and his one-time
commander-in-chief Cai E 蔡鍔 (1882-1916), who raised a rebellion from Yunnan province
which extinguished Yuan Shikai’s ambitions. In a witty explication of the third line of the Dun
遯 hexagram (No. 33, Retreat), Phan demonstrates the importance of knowing when to be patient
and when to take action (See Appendix A).
It is not entirely clear why Phan included such a long section on Cai E. It seems more an
example of authorial exuberance than a morally appropriate gloss for the line in question, which
reads: “Nine in the third line, shows one retreating but hassled, this is dangerous and distressing.
Fostering a retainer or concubine would bring good fortune.”793 Rather than breeze over a line
that counsels a hero to find succor in “drink and pleasure,” Phan here seems to revel in the sheer
appropriateness of the example. Nevertheless, it is a fascinating example of how the modern
events can be viewed through the lens of particular hexagrams in The Book of Changes.
Vietnamese Historical References
Though Chinese references far outnumber Vietnamese ones, the latter offer a unique
example of a national history refracted through the prism of correlative cosmology. These
examples effectively demonstrate that Confucian virtues and ethical conduct can be found in
Vietnam just as they can in China. Interestingly, Vietnamese historical references usually follow

壁 ensured a long legacy within (though not central to) the Confucian repertoire. In his Autobiography, Phan
mentions learning The Essentials of Zhuge Liang (Vũ-hầu tâm-thư) by heart.⁠ Phan, Overturned, 52. Guy Alitto
notes that Liang Shuming had a similar interest in Zhuge Liang.⁠ Alitto, “Conservative as Sage,” 236. Thus, both of
Phan’s most referenced individuals were advisors who embodied traits Phan found important: tactical insight and the
ability to achieve some measure of political success.⁠ Most importantly, these two men understood the nature of time
and the importance of timely action.
Another individual Phan pays particular attention to is Jizi 箕子 (5), a semi-legendary figure purported to have been
a virtuous relative of the last king of Shang, the evil tyrant Zhou Xin 紂辛 (1075-1046 BCE). Jizi supposedly
feigned madness to avoid being killed after remonstrating against Zhou Xin’s conduct. After Zhou Xin was
defeated, Jizi then assisted King Wen of Zhou in administering the state.
791
Phan mentions both to explain line five of the Wuwang 無妄 hexagram (no. 25, Innocence): “King Wen
was imprisoned at You Li and Confucius went hungry between Chen and Cai. Since they were innocent of these
maladies, what need had they for medicine?” The implication is that only those guilty of having put themselves in
jeopardy need be anxious about the result. As King Wen and Confucius held true to their virtue, they could
persevere without external assistance. Phan Bội Châu. Chu Dịch, 221, 315.
792
Li Xiucheng’s story is used to explain the top line of the Sui 隨 hexagram (No. 17). Phan Bội Châu,
Chu Dịch, 245.
793
James Legge’s translation.

179
directly after Chinese ones, setting up analogical parallels between historical events in both
countries.794
Heroes and emperors comprise the bulk of the 55 historical references. Trần Hưng Đạo
795
(4), Lê Lợi (4), and Gia Long (1762-1820) (3) exemplify, respectively, loyalty, wherewithal,
and good judgment.796 In addition to rulers, Phan also introduces Vietnamese sagely advisors.

794
As an illustration of Phan’s use of Vietnamese history to explain The Book of the Changes, I present an
example of failure that shows Phan’s technique of establishing parallels between Chinese and Vietnamese historical
situations. To explain the third line of the Kun 困 hexagram (No. 48, Oppression), Phan writes,
“During the Han Dynasty, Cai Yong 蔡邕 [132-192] was killed for crying over the corpse of Dong Zhuo 董卓 [?-
192]. Because Yang Xiong sang the praises of Wang Mang 王莽 [45 BCE-23 CE] and jumped from a building
trying to commit suicide, he ended up wasting his life and was scorned on his tombstone.
Nguyễn [Hữu] Chỉnh [?-1787] abandoned Lê and Trịnh and went to the Tây Sơn. In the end the Tây Sơn destroyed
the Trịnh, whereupon Chỉnh came under suspicion and was killed by the Tây Sơn.
Lê Văn Chất [1769-1826], a famous Tây Sơn general, followed Gia Long after turning against the Tây Sơn. In the
end, he and his descendants were executed by the Nguyễn Dynasty.”⁠ Phan Bội Châu. Chu Dịch, 535.
The line, a yin line trapped between two yang lines and located on a yang position, reads: “Imprisoned in stone
and rests upon brambles. Upon entering the hall, one does not see one’s wife. There will be misfortune.” This line
would apply to any individual trapped between two forces. Clearly for Phan, the fact that at least fifteen centuries
intervene between the examples does not affect their analogous relationship. It is interesting that the Vietnamese
examples both involve “traitors” whereas the Chinese examples involve men who simply chose the wrong patron.
This may indicate a subtle critique of Vietnamese who collaborate with French colonialism, and a warning that
when Vietnam achieves independence a last minute conversion to the nationalist cause may not save them.
795
To explain line four of the Sui 隨 hexagram (No. 17), a strong line in a weak position, Phan writes,
“Trần Hưng Đạo takes responsibility for this line. When the Mongols invaded our country three times the king
moved the capitol and the Retired Emperor fled to Thanh Hoa. The many forces of the national army were entrusted
to a Great Prince, but the people doubted whether he could exercise authority and save the country. However, his
lordship, being patriotic and hating the enemy, was able to drive off the Mongols. When he greeted the king and the
Retired Emperor, the country was still in a dangerous state and owed its safety to the Great Prince. The king had
abandoned the throne and relied on the Great Prince to get it back. When he had risen to high position, above the
entire world, but still refused to take the country.” Phan Bội Châu,Chu Dịch, 242.
The corresponding line in The Changes reads: “Nine in the fourth line, one who follows reaps success, but to
persevere [on one’s own accord] will bring disaster. If one is sincere in abiding by the Way and makes that evident,
how could he be blamed?”⁠ Here, Phan both provides an appropriate explication of the line and commends Trần
Hưng Đạo for his military capability and loyalty. This line is an excellent example of how distinct the mantic
and moral readings of the text can be. Richard Rutt provides a reconstructed version of the line without a moral
interpretation: “Pursuit ends in finding. Augury: Disastrous. Sacrificing captives on the way; in a covenant, could
there be misfortune?” Rutt, Zhouyi, 240.
796
Emperor Gia Long of the Nguyễn dynasty (1802-1885) and his rival Quang Trung of the Tây Sơn
(1778-1802) appear in two contrasting vignettes. The first is used to explain the first or bottom line of the Guai
夬 hexagram (No. 43, Breakthrough), in which one “forcefully moves forward ahead of one’s toes (one gets ahead
of oneself), thus failing to achieve victory:”
“In the Tây Sơn period, when Emperor Quang Trung heard that the Manchu enemy had entered Hanoi, he
first came up with a plan. He ordered men to convey [his desire to] surrender to the Manchus to make the enemy
arrogant. He then ordered five columns to secretly attack Long Thành, cleanly driving out 150,000 Manchu troops.
This was victory by achieving victory before acting.
In Siam, at the same time, Gia Long gathered reinforcements and hastily extended his forces, 150,000
strong, into Cambodia, intending to take the south. He did not expect Quang Trung to extend his forces from the
north down to the south to attack Cambodia [which he did]. In one battle the Siamese troops fell like leaves. This
was defeat by acting before achieving victory.”⁠ Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 494.
Clearly Quang Trung is shown to be the better general because he recognized the timing of the

180
Glossing the second line of the Song 訟 hexagram (No. 6, Conflict), Phan writes:
During the Lê dynasty, the Nguyễn and the Trịnh fought each other for the throne. The
Lê Emperor was weak and, although he wanted to side with the Nguyễn, he was unable
to. The Nguyễn wanted to contend with the Trịnh, but the Trịnh were too powerful and
still enjoyed the support of the people of the north. The Nguyễn Lord sent an emmisary
to plot with Nguyễn Bỉnh Khiêm [1491-1585], who advised the Nguyễn to leave the
north to the Trịnh. However, he explained further, “You can take refuge beyond the
mountains.” This meant taking refuge beyond the Ngang pass. Thus the Nguyễn Lord
requested the land of Ô Châu, known today as Thuận Hóa. This is exactly the meaning of
the line “When you are unable to contend, retreat to a safe refuge 不克訟，歸而逋.”797
Here we see Nguyễn Bỉnh Khiêm, a famous scholar of The Book of Changes in his own
right,798 serving a similar role as Yi Yin and Zhuge Liang. In several examples, Phan clearly
references intra-Vietnamese warfare - an interesting choice for a nationalist ostensibly interested
emphasizing Vietnamese unity vis-a-vis the French colonial state. Phan’s sole concern is the

situation. Gia Long in this instance did not and over-extended. The phrase “moving ahead of one’s toes 壯于前趾”
offers a sense of acting before the time is right to act.
The second narrative is used to explain the second line of the Lü 旅 hexagram (No. 56, Wandering), in
which one wanders up to an inn carrying one’s property and thereby obtains the service of a young servant, allowing
one to go on:
“At this point in the Yijing, the story of Gia Long being forced by the Tây Sơn to flee to Siam comes to
mind. Nguyễn Huỳnh Đức was captured by Quang Trung. Quang Trung wanted Huỳnh Đức to work for him so he
tried his best to persuade him, even sleeping in the same bed with him, but Huỳnh Đức wasn’t satisfied. Outwardly,
he paid obeisance to Quang Trung, but he remained every day dedicated to his old lord.
One day, while sleeping in Quang Trung’s bed, [Huỳnh Đức] murmured in his sleep, “Kill the enemy in
Huế…Kill the enemy in Huế.” Quang Trung understood and the next morning he asked Huỳnh Đức, “I’ll ask you
straight, I’ve been very kind to you, what are your true thoughts?”
Huỳnh Đức complained, “I thank you my lord, but you cannot order me to forget my lord. If I should know
where he is, I would go to him immediately. Quang Trung was satisfied and told him, “Your lord is in Bangkok, I
will send someone to take you there.” The next morning Quang Trung gathered his officers and held a feast to see
off Nguyễn Huỳnh Đức and send a man to show him the way to Siam. Huỳnh Đức went to Bangkok and visited Gia
Long. As soon as they saw each other, he embraced Gia Long’s knee and cried for a long while, he couldn’t say a
word. The King of Siam saw and exclaimed, “If Vietnam has servants such as this, how could you not go back?”
The King of Siam thereupon sent reinforcements to convey the Emperor [Gia Long] to Gia Dinh [Sai Gon].
From this we know that having a ‘good and trusty servant’ is wonderful during the time of wandering.”⁠ Phan Bội
Châu, Chu Dịch, 622.
At first glance it is odd to see an Emperor discussed in reference to the peripatetic Lü hexagram, yet here it
is entirely appropriate.⁠3 Gia Long was the heir to the Nguyễn Lords, who had dominated the state of Đàng Trong in
what is now Southern Vietnam from 1588 until they were deposed by the Tây Sơn rebels in 1777. Gia Long,
followed by Nguyễn Phúc Ánh, then traveled back and forth through Siam [Thailand] and the southern islands off
the coast of the Mekong Delta for many years. We can see here the value Phan places on finding and retaining
talented and loyal assistants. Phan himself wandered throughout China from 1912 until 1924, often relying on the
same young men he had brought to Japan during the Eastern Travel Movement. For an insightful explanation of the
Lü hexagram, see Hellmut Wilhelm, Heaven, Earth, and Man in the Book of Changes (Seattle, WA: University of
Washington Press, 1977), 164-189.
797
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 127.
798
Richard Smith notes, “Nguyen [Binh Khiem] used the Yijing to unite Neo-Confucian metaphysics with
Daoism and Buddhism. He also gained fame as an able and insightful exponent of Shao Yong’s numerological
approach to divination.” Smith, The I Ching, 152.

181
degree to which an action corresponds to the timing of the situation. He evinces no interest in
which side is the “right” one. This suggests strongly that Phan’s worldview is amoral, although
it is clearly normative. As I will discuss in greater detail later, Phan’s vision of reality combines
the sociopolitical concerns of Social Darwinism with notions of strategic ethical temporality
drawn from The Book of Changes.
Other Citations and References: Buddhism, Japan, and the West
This category includes fifty-four heterogenous examples ranging from references to the
Śūraṅgama Sūtra (Kinh Lăng Nghiêm 楞嚴經)799 to an explication of the phrase “wind comes
from fire 風自火出” by reference to “the Western scientific axiom that mechanical movement
relies on fire and electricity to produce wind, thus [indicating] electricity is a product of fire and
wind.”800 These citations and references are a mixed bag, but show Phan’s willingness to
perceive nearly any phenomena as perfectly relatable to the hexagrams and lines of The
Changes. The very catholicism of Phan’s approach indicates an ordering method at odds with
Western rational classification systems. Nevertheless, there is an effort on Phan’s part to
demonstrate a totalistic epistemology - one that can and does find useful analogues for any
phenomenon.
The foreword is particularly interesting because of the individuals Phan integrates into it.
In rapid succession, Phan mentions the polymath Shao Yong, the strategist Zhang Liang 張良
(262-189 BCE), the philosopher Mencius 孟子 (372-289 BCE?), and the Lu-Wang School
founders Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵 (1139-1192) and Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472-1529), to elucidate
his distinction between Buddhism, Daoism, and the study of The Changes.
Most of Phan’s references to Buddhism note how Buddhists or Buddhist texts interpret
particular words or lines of The Changes. While explaining the Guan 觀 hexagram (No. 20,
Contemplation), Phan cites the Diamond Sutra: “Those who see me in form or seek me through
sound are on a mistaken path; They do not see the Tathagata.”801 Phan states that this is exactly like
the line from the Commentary on the Judgment: “Contemplation. One washes one’s hands but
does not sacrifice.” Though a Buddhist might disagree, Phan at least makes an effort here to
draw parallels between the two philosophical perspectives. At other points, Phan makes
distinctions between the doctrines. For example, when explaining the Wuwang 無妄 hexagram
(No. 25, Innocence), Phan writes: “In Buddhism, rashness 妄 is a hated word, while in the study
of The Changes innocence 無妄 is treasured.”802

799
Phan Bội Châu. Chu Dịch, 299.
800
Phan Bội Châu. Chu Dịch, 428.
801
“若以色见我 以音声求我 是人行邪道 不能见如来.” Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 266.
802
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 310. Phan’s use of Buddhism thus indicates an attempt to incorporate other
epistemological systems into his own. By presenting the refractive facets through which Buddhists observe
phenomenon, Phan suggests that not only are all things relatable, methods of knowing themselves are akin to
looking into the prism of reality from a different side. This attempt to seek holistic knowledge both of things and
ways of perceiving them reflects what is truly radical about Phan Bội Châu: he saw no fundamental disagreement
between types or modes of reality. Taking Kang Youwei’s syncretism one step farther, Phan sought to discursively
establish the unity of the entire universe - an extreme reaction to the fragmentation of the Vietnamese socio-polity
akin in revealing ways the projects of Hegel and Marx.

182
 Phan offers only a few references to Japan. This is rather odd given that he spent five years
(1905-1909) there, and was initially quite impressed with Japanese technology and social
customs. However, by the 1920s, Phan had begun to describe Japan as a threat.803 Whether
related to these concerns or not, Phan only includes eight references to Japan in his commentary.
In one interesting example, Phan references Zhu Shunsui (1600-1682), a famous Ming loyalist
who fled to Japan and worked for Tokugawa Mitsukuni, and Mạc Ngọc Luyến, who left Vietnam
for Longzhou. Phan cites these two men as examples for a phrase from line four of the Mingyi
明夷 (No. 36, Brightness Wounded), which Phan explains as “finding comfort when the
brightness is wounded.”804 Phan here reads the line as a validation of self-selected exile as a
response to the foreign occupation of one’s homeland. Certainly this line thus read could apply
to Phan himself during his long exile (1905-1924).
Phan’s references to Western historical figures and events are few, but particularly
interesting. In the introduction, Phan notes how Richard Wilhelm spent twenty years in Qingdao
studying The Book of Changes and received a doctorate from Kaiser Wilhelm II. Phan’s
references here testify to his broad learning and, in effect, claim that his work participates in a
modern global discourse on the Book of Changes. Phan demonstrates his enthusiasm for Camillo
Cavour805 and George Washington, but counts Napoleon as a dictator who took things too far.
Explaining the top line of the Qian 乾 hexagram (No. 1, The Creative) entitled “the arrogant
dragon,” Phan notes that George Washington refused to declare himself king or President for life
and turned down a second term while Napoleon, like Yuan Shikai, declared himself emperor,
thus inviting his own downfall.806 “Socialism” is mentioned five times in various contexts. As
an offside gloss for the Xu 需 hexagram (No. 5, Waiting for Nourishment), Phan cites Marx’s
Critique of the Gotha Program.807
By far the most curious reference to a Western situation appears in Phan’s explanation of
the Song 訟 hexagram (No. 6, Conflict, See Appendix B). Here Phan attempts a materialist
explanation of international conflict through a reading of the “Sequence of the Hexagrams,” one
of the Ten Wings that offers usually not-altogether-convincing explanations for why one
hexagram follows another. It is not clear from where Phan derived his information, but since he
was held in jail in Guangzhou from 1914 to 1917, it is entirely possible it was through prison
hearsay. It is also possible Phan read about WWI in a Chinese newspaper. Given the endemic
food shortages associated with Vietnam’s subsistence economy,808 it is not ultimately surprising
that Phan would focus on food as a principle cause of warfare. Regardless of the provenance of
the “bread problem”explanation, we see here a clear attempt to interpret modern events as
representations of hexagrams shifting in time.

803
Duiker, “Phan Bội Châu,” 84.
804
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 418.
805
Glossing the Daguo 大過 hexagram (No. 28, Great Achievement), Phan points out how Camillo
Cavour, like Yi Yin, farmed and read books, secretly researching the past for over ten years before unifying Italy.
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 339.
806
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 47.
807
Phan refers to his source as “the book entitled Socialism.” However, the citation is “From each
according to his ability, to each according to his need.” Phan Bội Châu.,Chu Dịch, 109.
808
James Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia. (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976).

183
 Appendices

Appendix A - Charts
1. All Textual Allusions and Historical References

2. Citations from Chinese Works.

3. Citations from the Four Books

184
 4. Citations from the Analects

5. Chinese Historical References

185
 Appendix B - Yuan Shikai and Cai E
“When the Republic of China was founded, Cai E was the Military Governor of Yunnan Province. Because
Yuan Shikai wanted to oppose democracy by declaring himself Emperor and he knew that Cai E supported
democracy, Yuan ordered Cai E to come to Beijing. If he did not come to Beijing, Yuan would send his army to
attack. At the time, Cai E was not strong enough to fight against Yuan, so he contained himself and went to
Beijing.
Yuan kept him in Beijing and made him Commander in Chief, but did not allow him to attend to military
matters. Instead, Yuan sent a dozen agents to spy on Cai E every day. Cai E had no opportunity to hide from
Yuan, so he waited two years in complete secrecy. Every day, aside from the time he spent in Yuan’s hall, he
was only with the actress [Xiao] Fengxian 小鳳仙. An agent was sent to spy at Fengxian’s house for a long
time, but seeing Cai E doing absolutely nothing, finally grew disheartened and bored and began to take his
guard duties less seriously. Cai E knew that Yuan still did not trust him, and since a revolt [against Yuan] was
not forthcoming, Cai E continued to suffer patiently and secretly married Fengxian. Every day after leaving
Yuan’s hall he went immediately to stay at Fengxian’s house and did not return to the mansion. Yuan sent
another operative to spy on the mansion to see if there was a plot. Cai E understood Yuan’s intent. One day
when Cai E took Fengxian to the mansion Cai E’s wife grew jealous and came to blows with him, scratching
and tearing his face. Cai E immediately asked Yuan for a divorce. Legally, for the Commander in Chief to
divorce his wife, he needed the permission of the President. Yuan saw this and declared Cai E highly improper.
At that point Cai E’s wife took a portion of his money and left for his hometown in Hunan with the divorce
papers. From this point forward Cai E ate and slept religiously at Fengxian house, did not bother to go to the
mansion and spent his days and nights lost in drink and pleasure. Two years later, in the fourth year of the
Republic, Yuan officially pronounced himself Emperor Hongxian and exchanged nationalism for imperialism.
The next morning at seven o’clock sharp, gallantly dressed up in his military attire with his sword and
helmet, his carriage gleaming, [Cai E] went from Fengxian’s house straight to the Tian’an Gate (Tian’anmen) to
report to the eunuch guarding the gate and asked to be let into the Imperial Hall. The guarding eunuch replied,
“The Emperor has not yet come forth, wait for a bit and you can come in at nine o’clock.” Cai E immediately
changed his whole uniform and placed his entire carriage smack in front of the Tian’an Gate and announced to
everyone “Wait for me here. It’s early and I haven’t eaten breakfast. I am going to the Oten restaurant for a
little bit and I will be back at nine o’clock.”
Cai E then grasped his Commander in Chief’s sword and beckoned for a rickshaw to run him straight
to Fengxian’s house. He tossed his sword and threw off his uniform and everything else, including his general’s
quill, and donned some light clothes. Cai E took Fengxian under his arm onto a train headed to Tianjin, then
immediately boarded a Japanese ship for Hong Kong where he met his teacher Liang Qichao and friend Ân
Thừa Hiến who were waiting for him. Beijing was suddenly missing a Commander in Chief. Yuan was
enraged and killed twelve policemen and twelve agents. The next month Yunnan was the first to rise up against
Yuan. Everywhere else responded and within three months Emperor Hongxian had fallen and Yuan died soon
after. Cai’s wife went to Sichuan to help him with affairs. From this we know the hero’s way of Retreat 遯 and
furthermore that the power of servants is not negligible. When Cai E died, the entire country met to
commemorate him. Fengxian also wrote a couplet for him:
Unhappy fate! Zhou Lang’s life cut short
It was known early on that Li Jing was a hero.”809

Appendix C - Germany in The Great War

“The Song hexagram [Conflict] comprises all of the conflicts, large or small, from within a family up to the
international stage.
In 1914 Europe began a war that lasted four years. The number of casualties in the combatant countries
reached 10 million. After the war was over, scholars sought to find out what had caused it. There was a simple
and very correct answer: ‘the bread problem.’ This meant that the fighting had simply started over food. How
correct!”
At the start of the 20th century, before the war began, Europe was completely fixated on economic
problems and the problem of securing a food supply.

809
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 392-294.

186
 At that time, the population of Germany had risen to over 70 million and it seemed as if there would not be
enough food to eat. [Germany] needed colonies to expand business around the globe. Because of difficulties,
Germany was a late developing [nation], most of the valuable and wealthy land around the world had already
been seized by Britain, France, and America. Although [Germans] wanted to get food from the sea, [they could
not] because of the Red Hairs’ [Britain] maritime monopoly. After twenty years of heartbreak, the Germany
Kaiser initiated a Great War on land against the French and Italians and by sea against the Red Hairs. Even if
[Germany] should lose, it would be preferable to die with honor than to die of starvation. Britain and France,
fearing German hegemony and that their own food supplies might be captured, banded together to contend with
Germany.
To summarize, the European imperialist war shattered the earth and shook the heavens, but if we seek out
its causes, we find two:
One is the issue of capturing food and the other is that of maintaining enough food. These were the causes
of the European war and it was because of food that [the combatants] clashed, that blood flowed into rivers and
bones piled up into hills. This was caused by ‘the bread problem’ alone.
This shows the subtle import of The Book of Changes [which states that] if there is Waiting for
Nourishment ［需］, there will certainly be Conflict. Truly this strikes right through to the heart of world
affairs!
Oh! Looking at the world’s present and future, [we can see] ‘the bread problem’ has yet no solution. If
things continue badly, like in the beginning of the 20th century, the Second Great War will likely affect the entire
world; it is unavoidable. Any peace or disarmament without a solution to the food shortage problem will be
nothing but idle talk.
Waiting for Nourishment leads to Conflict; Conflict leads to the Army [師]. Reading the Book of Changes
brings immeasurable grief!”810
Appendix D - Lord Mengchang of Qi
“During a time of peace the result of ‘increasing what is below’ is quite small. However, during a time of
great obstacles and troubles, that ‘increase’ will be seen as very great! In the past Lord Mengchang, the
Chancellor of Qi, lent a sum to the people of Xue in the amount of several tens of thousands. When interest
came due, he sent Feng Huan to collect on the contracts. He asked Lord Mengchang, “After I collect the debt,
should I buy anything to bring back?” Lord Mengchang replied, “If you see anything missing from my house,
then buy that.” Feng Huan went, taking the contracts with him in a carriage. As soon as he reached Xue, he
saw that the people had met several years of poor harvests and that life was bleak. Feng Huan immediately
gathered the people and announced, “The Lord Chancellor told me to come here principally to pay attention to
the people’s sentiment and not to demand a debt. Right now the people feel miserable, on behalf of the
Chancellor, your debts are hereby exempted.” Whereupon he lit many contracts on fire before the people. Feng
Huan returned with empty hands and reported to Lord Mengchang. Lord Mengchang asked, “Why are your
hands empty?” Feng Huan pleaded, “I saw the people were starving and miserable, so I burned the contracts.
Seeing that your home is already full of expensive and strange things, [I felt] there was only one thing still
missing: ‘Righteousness.’ So I bought ‘Righteousness’ and brought it back for your good lordship.” Lord
Mengchang was unhappy, but he allowed Feng Huan to stay.
Not long afterward the King of Qi died and his son became King. Many courtiers who detested Lord
Mengchang’s power and influence impeached him before the King, accusing him of many evils. The King was
furious. He dismissed Lord Mengchang from the Chancellorship and banished him from the capital.
Lord Mengchang was frightened that his entire life would become difficult. Feng Huan came to his table
and urged him to go to Xue. Lord Mengchang listened to his advice and left in the middle of the night,
speeding his carriage to Xue. He arrived at the border at mid-day. The people had heard he was coming and
young and old, men and women all turned out to greet the carriage of Lord Mengchang. They gathered before
his carriage and yelled in unison: “The father of our district has returned!” There were tens of thousands on
either side of his carriage.
Lord Mengchang looked back and said to Feng Huan, “Today I understand what gain the ‘righteousness’
you bought has brought us!”
The King of Qi heard about this and feared that Lord Mengchang had won too much of the people’s

810
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 121-122.

187
 adoration and feared that [Lord Mengchang] would soon be able to overthrow him. He immediately invited
Lord Mengchang back to Qi, appointed him Chancellor as before, and sternly reproached the group that had
impeached him.
From reviewing this case, we can understand the words “decreasing what is above and increasing what is
below 損上益下” and that “advantageous for crossing the great river利涉大川” are not idle words.”811
Appendix E - Exegesis on Revolution
Revolution means to change what is old. Whenever a matter grows old or something becomes old, there
must be revolution. This is for two reasons.
First, according to history anything that has been around for a long time accumulates evil. If evil is
accumulated for a long time and cannot be changed, there comes a time when medicine cannot clear it out. At
this point there must be revolution.
Second, the circumstances are different today than they were in the past. We must attune to present day
society. We have to welcome with high regard new and strange trends. After we have welcomed with high
regard new and strange trends, there will certainly be outdated things to get rid of. Because of the two reasons
stated here, in the course of life it is impossible to escape revolution.
Because of this there must be a hexagram for revolution in the Book of Changes. Revolution is quite a
commonplace phenomenon. For example, when clothing is torn one must purchase new clothing. If a house
becomes old one must erect a new house. To talk of these things is not at all strange, but then there are issues of
a more difficult nature, such as personal or familial revolution, which cannot be undertaken carelessly, or
national and social revolutions, which are so much more severe and dangerous.
To explain, with so many old things and set habits, a sudden change can bewilder people. Moreover,
suddenly smashing the old foundations before a new foundation is erected can terrify people. Not to mention
one cannot carry out revolution alone! One must rely upon the majority of the people. How difficult!. Human
nature prefers what is familiar and sticks to the old. Few people understand. Most people are only happy once
things are going, but do not have faith at the beginning. So heavy, Revolution! So hard, Revolution! What
should we think in regard to timing? One can only wait upon the situation and reflect on the principle of
righteousness. This way the time for revolution will come naturally. When things have gotten to the point of
revolution, one must carry out revolution. A long time has passed and the principle of righteousness is now
clear. The situation still tends toward this direction and now the people’s hearts must follow. This means that
revolution has been happening for a long time but only now are people ready to believe.
A nation or a society, having suffered a great defeat that brought it to the point of termination, will fall
silent. For example, Xia was not willing to become Shang, Shang was not willing to become Zhou, though at
those times the common people feared death at the hands of the tyrants Jie and Zhou. It was Tang who had to
drive out Jie to carry out a revolution over the Xia, it was Wu who had to strike Zhou to carry out a revolution
over the Shang. Tang and Wu’s revolutions were in accordance with the way of Heaven and fulfilled the desires
of the people.
The word ‘Revolution’ is on the tongues of people nowadays. But what does it mean to them? Up until
now no one has provided a suitable explanation. Please follow this explanation of the meaning drawn from the
Book of Changes: ‘cách’ means change, ‘mệnh’ means a correct mandate. Changing a nation, a court, or a
government all mean replacing an old mandate with a new mandate.’
For example, in a family replacing an old habit with a new habit is called ‘family revolution.’
For an ethnicity, to replace that race with this race is called ‘ethnic revolution.’ To replace an old corrupt
administration with a new administration is called ‘national revolution.’ To replace an old class with a new
class is called ‘social revolution.’ For some matters one cannot say ‘revolution.’ In these cases it is enough to
say ‘change,’ whereas adding the word ‘mandate’ would be excessive.
For example: moral revolution, career revolution, craft revolution, economic revolution, artistic revolution.
Compared with national revolution and political revolution, [we might say] for one group it is correct to say
‘mandate,’ whereas for the other group it does no good to say ‘mandate.’
At the end of the hexagram for Revolution there must be a warning: ‘resting in correctness brings success.’
For example, Yuan Shikai overthrew the Manchus and established the Republic of China. This was the

811
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 479-480. This story seems to be a Vietnamese paraphrasing of “The
Biography of Lord Mengchang” from the The Records of the Grand Historian or the Shiji 史記. Sima, Qian (1995).
The Grand Scribe's Records, vol. VII. (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press). 189.

188
conclusion of the revolution, but he continued to alter the body politic and set up the Hongxian Dynasty. In the
end he lost both his dignity and his life.
Napoleon toppled the monarchy, opened the National Assembly, and established the constitution. Was this
not the end of the revolution? Yet he turned around and declared himself emperor to flatter himself. In the end
he also lost both his dignity and his life. Both of these men ‘kept going, thus inviting disaster.’
When we read the words, ‘resting in correctness brings success,’ we must admire Washington. After eight
years of bloody war he drove out the British government and founded the United States, he let another person
take over as President and was content to be an average citizen. Today the people of America still call him the
father of the nation - is this not an example of ‘resting in correctness brings success?’
Never mind the far, [let us consider] what is closer. How great were the causes of Mustapha Kemal in
Turkey and Lenin in Russia and how much their people believed in them! Before they had carried out
revolutions they were seen as saints by the people, after they completed the revolutions they were seen as
parents.
Whoever is born in the time of revolution or who wants to carry out revolution, must absorb the entire spirit
of the hexagram Revolution.”

189
 Bibliography

Newspapers and Periodicals

Vietnam
Bách Khoa (1957-1975)
Công Luận Báo (1925)
Courrier Saigonnais (1925)
Đông Pháp Thời Báo (1925-1926)
L’Argus Indochinois (1925-1926)
L’Écho Annamite (1925-1926)
L’Independence Tonkinoise (1925)
L’Indochine (1925-1926)
La Tribune Indigène (1925)
La Cloche Fêlée (1925-1926)
Le Courrier d’Haiphong (1925-1926)
Nam Phong Tạp Chí (1916-1919)
Thực Nghiệp Dân Báo (1925-1926)
Tiếng Dân (1926-1940)
Trung Bắc Tân Văn (1925-1926)
Trung Lập Báo (1925-1926)
Văn Hóa Nguyệt San (1963-1965)

France
Le Paria

China
Bingshi Zazhi (兵事雜誌)
Gongren zhi Lu (工人之路)

Archival Materials

Archives nationale d’outre-mer (ANOM)

Gouvernement générale de l’Indochine (GGI)
Service de protection du corps expéditionnaire (SPCE)
HCI SPCE 351
HCI SPCE 352, Commission Criminelle du Tonkin (1925), Affaire Phan Boi Chau:
Interrogatoires; Phan Boi Chau: Dossier transmis par Sûreté Annam; Feuillet No. A.232 (Phan
Boi Chau personal file); Affaire Phan Boi Chau: Grâce Accordée a Phan Boi Chau par M. le
Gouverneur General de l’Indochine; Affaire Phan Boi Chau: Pourvoi formé par PBC contre
l’arrêt du 23 Nov 1925 de la Commission Criminelle de Hanoi
HCI SPCE 353
HCI SPCE 354, Documents remis par M. Bride

190
 HCI SPCE 354BIS, Surveillance Phan Boi Chau (1909-1926)
HCI SPCE 355, Lettres et documents écrits par P.B.C. Pendant sa detention; P.B.C.,
Prime de capture, Dossier affaires politiques (1919, 1925); P.B.C. Arrestation et transport à
Hanoi (1925); P.B.C. Correspondance relative à son arrestation et documents saisis sur lui;
Renseignements et documents a utiliser pour l’interrogatoire de P.B.C. et pour l’application du
Décret de 1908; Affaire Phan Boi Chau: Arrêt; Arrestation P.B.C. Documents envoyes au
President de la Commission Criminelle: Jugement, Correspondances avec le Département
Pourvoi en Conseil de Protectorat; P.B.C. Arrestation: Retentissement dans les milieux indigenes

Trung Tâm Lữu Trự Quốc Gia I (Hanoi)

Châu bản triều Nguyễn
Direction de Finances
Gouvernement générale de l’Indochine (GGI)
Mairie de Haiphong
Mairie de Hanoi
Résidence de Ninh Binh
Résidence de Ha Dong
Résidence de Nam Dinh
Résidence supérieur du Tonkin (RST)

Trung Tâm Lữu Trự Quốc Gia IV

Khoa bảng Bắc Bộ và Thanh Hóa qua tại liệu Mộc bản triều Nguyễn
Khoa bảng Nghệ An - Hà Tĩnh - Quảng Bình qua tại liệu Mộc bản triều Nguyễn
Khoa bảng Trung Bộ và Nam Bộ qua ti liệu Mộc bản triều Nguyễn

{BnF Gallica Gallica.bnf.fr

Annuaire général de l'Indo-Chine française (1900-1925)

Secondary Sources

Anderson, Benedict R. O’G. Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism. London; New York: Verso, 2006.
————. The Age of Globalization : Anarchism and the Anticolonial Imagination. London;
New York, NY: Verso, 2013.
Nguyên Thê Anh. “Historical Research in Vietnam: A Tentative Survey.” Journal of Southeast
Asian Studies 26, no. 1 (1995): 121–32.
Balakrishnan, Gopal., and Benedict R. O’G. Anderson. Mapping the Nation. London; New York:
Verso, 2012.
Barlow, Jeffrey G. Sun Yat-Sen and the French, 1900-1908. Berkeley: Center for Chinese
Studies, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1979.
Baylé, Claude. Prisonnier Au Camp 113 : Le Camp De Boudarel. Paris: Perrin, 1991.
Bergère, Marie-Claire., and Janet Lloyd. Sun Yat-Sen. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press,
1998.

191
Bickers, Robert. Britain in China. Manchester University Press, 1999.
Boudarel, Georges. Vietnam: Phan Boi Chau Et La Société Vietnamienne: Extrait De France-
Asie 199. France Asie, 1972.
————. Autobiographie. Paris: J. Bertoin, 1991.
Brocheux, Pierre, and Daniel Hémery. Indochina. Univ of California Press, 2011.
Bùi Đình. Vu Án Phan-Bội Châu. Hà Nội: Nhà xuất bản Tiếng Việt, 1950.
Bùi, Tín. Following Ho Chi Minh : the Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel. Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 1995.
Charuel, Marc. L’Affaire Boudarel. [Monaco]: Editions du Rocher, 1991.
Chesneaux, J. “Stages in the Development of the Vietnam National Movement 1862-1940.” Past
& Present (1955)
Chi, Hsi-sheng. The Chinese Warlord System: 1916 to 1928. Washington: American University,
Center for Research in Social Systems, 1969.
————. Warlord Politics in China, 1916-1928. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press,
1976.
Chu Đăng Sơn. Luận Đề Về Phan Bội Châu Và Phan Chu Trinh. Saigon: Thăng Long, 1959.
Chương, Thâu. Hồ Sơ Vụ Án Phan Bội Châu. Hà Nội: Nhà xuất bản Văn hóa-thông tin, 2002.
————. Nghiên Cứu Phan Bội Châu. Hà Nội: Nhà xuá̂t bản Chính trị quó̂c gia, 2004.
————. Đông Kinh Nghĩa Thục Và Văn Thơ Đông Kinh Nghĩa Thục. Hà Nội: Nhà xuá̂t bản
Hà Nội, 2010.
————., and Ngọc Vương Trần. Phan Bội Châu, Về Tác Gia Và Tác Phẩm. Hà Nội: Nhà xuất
bản Giáo dục, 2001.
Thoại-Nguyên, Cô. “Bà Phan-Bội-châu.” Bách Khoa 25 (1958): 71–75.
Cooke, N. “Nineteenth-Century Vietnamese Confucianization in Historical Perspective:
Evidence From the Palace Examinations (1463–1883).” Journal of Southeast Asian
Studies (1994):
————. “The Composition of the Nineteenth-Century Political Elite of Pre-Colonial Nguyen
Vietnam (1802–1883).” Modern Asian Studies (1995):
————. “The Heaven and Earth Society Upsurge in Early 1880s French Cochinchina.”
Chinese Southern Diaspora Studies (2010):
Nguyên, Cung Giũ. “Ý Niệm Quốc Gia Trong Thời Đại Mới.” Bách Khoa 251 (1967): 13–16.
Mai, Đặng Thai. Văn Thơ Phan Bội Châu. Hanoi: Nhà Xuất Bản Văn Hóa, 1958.
Đào Trinh Nhất. “Đời Cách Mạng Phan Bội Châu Theo Tập “ngực Trung Thư”.” (1945)
————. Phan Đình Phùng, Việt Sử Giai Thoại. 2000.
Đào Văn Hội. “Ba Nhà Chí Sĩ Họ Phan.” (1957)
Daoudal, Yves. Le Dossier Boudarel, Ou, Le Procès Impossible Du Communisme. Paris: Editions
Remi Perrin, 2001.
Daughton, J. P., and James Patrick Daughton. An Empire Divided. Oxford University Press,
2008.
Duiker, William J. “Phan Boi Chau: Asian Revolutionary in a Changing World.” The Journal of
Asian Studies 31, no. 1 (1971): 77–88.
————. Ho Chi Minh. Hachette UK, 2012.
Edwards, MK. “Traître Au Colonialisme? The Georges Boudarel Affair and the Memory of the
Indochina War.” French Colonial History (2010):
Elman, Benjamin A. Civil Examinations and Meritocracy in Late Imperial China. Cambridge,

192
 Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press, 2013.
————., John B. Duncan, and Herman Ooms. Rethinking Confucianism. UCLA Asian Pacific
Monograph Series, 2002.
————., and Alexander. Woodside. Education and Society in Late Imperial China, 1600-1900.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
Fogel, Joshua A. The Cultural Dimension of Sino-Japanese Relations : Essays on the Nineteenth
and Twentieth Centuries. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1994.
————. The Literature of Travel in the Japanese Rediscovery of China, 1862-1945. Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1996.
————. The Role of Japan in Liang Qichao’s Introduction of Modern Western Civilization to
China. Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California Berkeley,
Center for Chinese Studies, 2004.
————. The Teleology of the Modern Nation-State : Japan and China. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005.
————. Crossing the Yellow Sea : Sino-Japanese Cultural Contacts, 1600-1950. Norwalk:
EastBridge, 2007.
————. Articulating the Sinosphere : Sino-Japanese Relations in Space and Time. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009.
Fourniau, Charles. Annam-Tonkin, 1885-1896 : Lettrés Et Paysans Vietnamiens Face À La
Conquête Coloniale. Paris: L’Harmattan, 1989.
————. Vietnam : Domination Coloniale Et Résistance Nationale, 1858-1914. Paris: Indes
savantes, 2002.
Gendre, Claude. Le Dê Tham (1858-1913): Un Résistant Vietnamien À La Colonisation
Française. Editions L’Harmattan, 2009.
Giebel, Christoph. Imagined Ancestries of Vietnamese Communism : Ton Duc Thang and the
Politics of History and Memory. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004.
Goscha, Christopher. Vietnam. Basic Books, 2016.
————. Going Indochinese. University of Hawaii Press, 2012.
————. Thailand and the Southeast Asian Networks of the Vietnamese Revolution, 1885-1954.
Routledge, 2013.
Gosselin, Charles. L’Empire D’Annam. Paris: Perrin, 1904.
Harrison, Henrietta. The Making of the Republican Citizen : Political Ceremonies and Symbols
in China, 1911-1929. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
————. China. London : New York: Arnold; Co-published in the United States of America by
Oxford University Press, 2001.
Hodgkin, Thomas. “Scholars and the Revolutionary Tradition: Vietnam and West Africa.” Oxford
Review of Education 2 (1976): 111–28.
Howland, Douglas. “Society Reified: Herbert Spencer and Political Theory in Early Meiji
Japan.” Comparative studies in society and history (2000):
————. “The Sinking of the Ss Kowshing: International Law, Diplomacy, and the Sino-
Japanese War<sup>1</sup.” Modern Asian Studies (2008):
————. “Japanese Neutrality in the Nineteenth Century: International Law and Transcultural
Process.” The Journal of Transcultural Studies (2010):
————. “Sovereignty and the Laws of War: International Consequences of Japan’s 1905
Victory Over Russia.” Law and History Review (2011):

193
————. “The Dialectics of Chauvinism: Minority Nationalities and Territorial Sovereignty in
Mao Zedong’s New Democracy.” Modern China (2011):
————. “Japan and the Universal Postal Union: An Alternative Internationalism in the 19th
Century.” Social Science Japan Journal (2014):
————. Borders of Chinese Civilization : Geography and History At Empire’s End. Durham,
N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996.
————. Translating the West : Language and Political Reason in Nineteenth-Century Japan.
Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2001.
————. International Law and Japanese Sovereignty : the Emerging Global Order in the 19th
Century. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
————, and Luise. White. The State of Sovereignty : Territories, Laws, Populations.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009.
Hucker, Charles O. A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China = Zhongguo Gu Dai Guan
Ming Ci Dian. Beijing Shi: Beijing da xue chu ban she, 2008.
Huỳnh Thúc Kháng. Huỳnh Thúc Kháng Tự Truyện. Hué̂: Anh-Minh, 1963.
Huỳnh, Kim Khánh. Vietnamese Communism, 1925-1945. Cornell University Press, 1986.
Jenkins, Christopher., Khánh Tuyết. Trần, Sanh Thông Huỳnh, David G. Marr, Bôi Châu Phan,
and Chí Minh Hồ. Reflections From Captivity. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1978.
Judge, Joan. Print and Politics : ‘Shibao’ and the Culture of Reform in Late Qing China.
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1996.
Kapp, Robert A. Szechwan and the Chinese Republic; Provincial Militarism and Central Power,
1911-1938. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973.
Karl, Rebecca E. Staging the World : Chinese Nationalism At the Turn of the Twentieth Century.
Durham: Duke University Press, 2002.
————, and Peter Gue. Zarrow. Rethinking the 1898 Reform Period : Political and Cultural
Change in Late Qing China. Cambridge, Mass.: Published by the Harvard University
Asia Center : Distributed by Harvard University Press, 2002.
Keith, Charles. Catholic Vietnam. Univ of California Press, 2012.
Kelley, Liam C. Beyond the Bronze Pillars. University of Hawaii Press, 2005.
Kiêm Đạt. Luận Đê Về Phan Bội Châu Tiểu Sử, Tư Tưởng, Đối Tránh Đầu, Văn Thơ, Phê Bình.
Saigon: Nhà Sách Khai Trí, 1960.
————. “Phan Bội Châu.” (1981)
Lam Giang. Giảng-Luận Về Phan Bội Châu : Nhận-Xét Thân-Thế, Tư-Tưởng, Sự-Nghiệp, Giảng
Văn, Luận Mẫu. Saigon: Nhà xuất bản Tân Việt, 1959.
Lâm, Truong Buu. Colonialism Experienced : Vietnamese Writings on Colonialism, 1900-1931.
Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan, 2000.
————. and Maivân Lâm. New Lamps for Old : the Transformation of the Vietnamese
Administrative Elite. Singapore: Maruzen Asia, 1982.
————. and Maivân Lâm. Resistance, Rebellion, Revolution : Popular Movements in
Vietnamese History. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984.
Lanessan, Jean Marie Antoine de. L’Indo-Chine Française. Paris: F. Alcan, 1889.
Lâm), Lê Cương Phụng (Tùng. “Phan Bội Châu Ngày Nay.” (1926):
Le Jariel, Yves. Phan Boi Chau, 1867-1940 : Le Nationalisme Vietnamien Avant Ho Chi Minh.
Paris: Harmattan, 2008.
Kỉ Niệm 100 Năm Năm Sinh Phan Bội Châu, 1867-1940. Saigon: Trình Bầy, 1967.

194
Lee, Ta-ling. Foundations of the Chinese Revolution, 1905-1912 (an Historical Record of the
Tʻung-Meng Hui). [New York]: St. John’s University Press, 1970.
Điền, Long. “Thuyết Pháp Việt Đề Huề Với Nhóm La Cloche Fêlée.” Bách Khoa 410 (1974):
43–52.
Thiển, Lưu Trần. Phan Bội Châu Tiểu Sử Và Văn Thơ. Hanoi: Nhà Xuất Bản Ngày Mai, 1950.
“Những Tin Tức Và Dư Luận Về Ông Phan Bội Châu.” (1926):
“Thanh Khí Nhé Hằng: Mấy Bài Luận Thuyết Về Những Vấn Đề Có Quan Hệ Đến Danh Dự Và
Quyền Lợi Của Nhân Dân.” (1926):
Mair, Victor H, and Liam Kelley. Imperial China and Its Southern Neighbours. Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 2015.
Marr, David G. Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885-1925. Berkeley: University of California
[Press], 1971.
————. Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 1920-1945. Berkeley: University of California Press,
1981.
————. Vietnam. Univ of California Press, 2013.
McAleavy, Henry. Black Flags in Vietnam. 1968.
McAlister, John T. Vietnam; the Origins of Revolution, 1885-1946. 1968.
McHale, Shawn Frederick. Print and Power. University of Hawaii Press, 2004.
McLeod, Mark W. “Nationalism and Religion in Vietnam: Phan Boi Chau and the Catholic
Question.” The International History Review 14, no. 4 (1992): 661–80.
Morlat, Patrice. La Répression Coloniale Au Vietnam, 1908-1940. Paris: Editions l’Harmattan,
1990.
————. Les Affaires Politiques De L’Indochine, 1895-1923 : Les Grands Commis, Du Savoir
Au Pouvoir. Paris: Harmattan, 1995.
————. Indochine Années Vingt : Le Balcon De La France Sur Le Pacifique. Paris: Indes
savantes, 2001.
————. Indochine Années Vingt : Le Rendez-Vous Manqué (1918-1928) : La Politique
Indigène Des Grands Commis Au Service De La Mise En Valeur. Paris: Les Indes
savantes, 2005.
————. Le Krach De La Banque Industrielle De Chine : La Rivalité Des Banques Françaises
En Extrême-Orient, 1912-1928. Paris: Indes savantes, 2012.
————. Indochine Années Vingt : Le Proconsulat “socialiste” D’Alexandre Varenne : Les
Aléas Du Réformisme Colonial (1925-1928). Paris: Les Indes savantes, 2018.
————. La République Des Frères : Le Grand Orient De France De 1870 À 1940. Penser La
Cité Idéale. Paris: Perrin, 2019.
Munholland, J Kim. “The French Connection That Failed: France and Sun Yat-Sen, 1900–1908.”
The Journal of Asian Studies 32, no. 1 (1972): 77–95.
————. “The French Response to the Vietnamese Nationalist Movement, 1905-14.” The
Journal of Modern History 47, no. 4 (1975): 655–75.
Trai, Ngô Khâm. “Địa Bị Cụ Phan Ở Quốc Dân Ta.” (1926):
Ngô Thành Nhân (Anh Minh) (Anh. Dật-Sử Cụ Phan Sào Nam : (Từ Khi Ở Hải Ngoại Đến Khi
Về Huế). Huế: Nhà xuá̂t-bản Anh Minh, 1950.
————. Kỳ-Ngoại-hầu Cường-Để, Với Phan Bội-Châu, Phan Châu-Trinh, Huỳnh Thúc
Kháng. Saigon: Tác-giả xuá̂t-bản, 1951.
————. Những Chí Sĩ Cùng Học Sinh Du Học Nhật Bản Dưới Sự Hướng Dẫn Của Cụ Sào

195
 Nam Phan Bội Châu. Huế: Nhà xuất bản Tân Dân, 1952.
————. Cụ Sào-Nam, 15 Năm Bị Giam Lỏng Ở Hué. Huế: Nhà xuất-bản Anh Minh, 1956.
Nguiễn Hữu Ngư. “Huỳnh Thúc Kháng.” Bách Khoa 37 (1958): 40–63.
Nguyễn Duy Diễn, Bằng Phong. Luận Đề Phan Bội Châu Và Phan Chu Trinh. Saigon: Á Châu,
1957.
̂
Nguyẽn Quang Tô. Sào Nam Phan Bội Châu (1867-1940): Con Người Và Thi Văn. Saigon: Từ
sách văn học bộ văn-hóa giáo-dục và thanh-niên, 1974.
Nguyễn Thượng Huyền. “Cụ Phan-Bội-châu Ở Hàng-Châu.” Bách Khoa 73 (1960): 29–40.
Nguyễn Tiến Lực. Những Hoạt Động Của Phan Bội Châu Ở Nhật Bản (1905-1909). TP. HCM:
Nhà xuất bản Đại học quốc gia, 2008.
————. “Okuma Shigenobu Và Phong Trào Đông Du.” tainguyenso.husc.edu.vn (2011)
————. “Các Cuộc Đàm Phán Thiết Lập Quan Hệ Ngoại Giao Giữa Nhật Bản Và Việt Nam
Dân Chủ Cộng Hoà.” tainguyenso.husc.edu.vn (2018):
Nguyễn Văn Bảo. “Đời Một Tổng Thống, Hình Ảnh Cuộc Đời Và Sự Nghiệp Cô Tổng Thống
Ngô Đình Diệm.” (1971):
Nguyễn Văn-Hầu. “Nguyễn Thần Hiến Với Phong Trào Đông Du.” Bách Khoa 125 (1962): 9–
16.
————. “Cụ Phan-Bội-châu Và Vài Hành Động Chính Trị Trong Chuyên ‘Nam-Hành’ Năm
Quí Mão.” Bách Khoa 140 (1962): 11–16.
Nguyễn Văn Xuân, . “Từ Tự Phán Đến Phan Bội Châu Niên Biểu.” 396-397 (1973): 5–16, 25.
Nguyễn Hiến Lê. Đông Kinh Nghĩa Thục : Phong Trào Duy Tân Đầu Tiên Ở Việt Nam. [United
States: s.n., 1985.
————. “Mối Tình Giữa Một Nhà Cách Mạng Việt Nam Và Một Học Giả Trung Quốc.” 174
(1964): 13–16.
Ninh, Kim Ngoc Bao. A World Transformed. University of Michigan Press, 2002.
Ōba, Osamu, and Joshua A. Fogel. Books and Boats : Sino-Japanese Relations in the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. Portland, Me.: Merwin Asia, 2012.
Pasquier, Pierre Marie Antoine. L’Annam D’Autrefois; Essai Sur La Constitution De L’Annam
Avant L’Intervention Franc̜aise. Paris: Société d’éditions géographiques, maritimes et
coloniales, 1929.
PAUL, CHACK. Hoang-Tham Pirate. EDITIONS DE FRANCE, 1933.
Pelley, Patricia M. Postcolonial Vietnam. Duke University Press, 2002.
Persell, Stuart Michael. The French Colonial Lobby, 1889-1938. Stanford, CA: Hoover
Institution Press, 1983.
Peycam, Philippe M. F. The Birth of Vietnamese Political Journalism : Saigon, 1916-1930. New
York: Columbia University Press, 2012.
Phạm Hoàn-Mí. “Ngày Giỗ Phan-Sào-nam Thứ 17.” Bách Khoa 20 (1957): 10–21.
Phan Bội Châu. “Bài Diễn Thuyết Của Cụ Phan Bội Châu.” (1926):
————. “Vấn Đề Giáo Dục, Công Dụng, Và Giá Trị.” (1932):
————. Ngục Trung Thư : Tức Là Đời Cách Mệnh Phan Bội Châu. Saigon: Nhà xuất bản Tân
Việt, 1950.
————. Tự-Phán : Lịch-Sử Cách-Mạng Cụ Phan-Sào-nam, Do Tay Cụ Tự Vié̂t : Di-Cảo.
[Hué̂]: Anh-Minh, 1956.
————. Việt-Nam Vong Quốc Sử. Translated by Nguyễn Quang Tô. Saigon: Tao Dan, 1969.
————. Phan Bội Châu Niên Biẻ̂u : Hò̂i Ký. Saigon: Nhóm nghiên-cứu sử-địa, 1971.

196
————. Thơ Văn Phan Bội Châu Thời Kỳ Ở Hué̂, 1926-1940. Hué̂: Thuận hóa, 1987.
————. Overturned Chariot: The Autobiography of Phan-Bội-châu. Translated by Vinh Sinh
and Nicholas Wickenden. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1999.
————. Phan Bội Châu toàn Tập: Tập 8, Văn Vần 1925-1940. Huế: Nhà xuất bản Thuận
hóa;Trung tâm văn hóa ngôn ngữ Đông Tây, 2001.
————. “Tập Diễn Thuyết.” (1926):
————. Phan Bội Châu Niên Biẻ̂u : Tức “tự Phê Phán”. Hà-Nội: Văn Sử Địa, 1957.
————. Phan Bội Châu toàn Tập: Tập 1, Văn Thơ Thời Kì Trước Khi Xuất Dương (1882-
1905). Huế: Nhà xuất bản Thuận hóa;Trung tâm văn hóa ngôn ngữ Đông Tây, 2001.
————. Phan Bội Châu toàn Tập: Tập 10, Khổng Học Đăng. Huế: Nhà xuất bản Thuận
hóa;Trung tâm văn hóa ngôn ngữ Đông Tây, 2001.
————. Phan Bội Châu toàn Tập: Tập 2, Văn Thơ Những Năm Đầu Ở Nước Ngoài (1905-
1908). Huế: Nhà xuất bản Thuận hóa;Trung tâm văn hóa ngôn ngữ Đông Tây, 2001.
————. Phan Bội Châu toàn Tập: Tập 3, Văn Thơ Những Năm Ở Nước Ngoài (1908-1916).
Huế: Nhà xuất bản Thuận hóa;Trung tâm văn hóa ngôn ngữ Đông Tây, 2001.
————. Phan Bội Châu toàn Tập: Tập 4, Tiểu Thuyết Các Truyện Ký. Huế: Nhà xuất bản
Thuận hóa;Trung tâm văn hóa ngôn ngữ Đông Tây, 2001.
————. Phan Bội Châu toàn Tập: Tập 5, Văn Thơ 1917-1925. Huế: Nhà xuất bản Thuận
hóa;Trung tâm văn hóa ngôn ngữ Đông Tây, 2001.
————. Phan Bội Châu toàn Tập: Tập 6, Tự Truyện. Huế: Nhà xuất bản Thuận hóa;Trung tâm
văn hóa ngôn ngữ Đông Tây, 2001.
————. Phan Bội Châu toàn Tập: Tập 7, Văn Xuôi 1925-1940. Huế: Nhà xuất bản Thuận
hóa;Trung tâm văn hóa ngôn ngữ Đông Tây, 2001.
————. Phan Bội Châu toàn Tập: Tập 9, Chu Dịch. Huế: Nhà xuất bản Thuận hóa;Trung tâm
văn hóa ngôn ngữ Đông Tây, 2001.
————, Georges Boudarel. Memoires De Phan Boi Chau. Paris: France-Asie/Asia, 1969.
————. Việt-Nam Vong Quõc Sử. Saigon: Tao-Đàn, 1969.
————, Anh Vinh. Trần, and Thâu. Chương. Thơ Văn Phan Bội Châu Thời Kỳ Ở Huế, 1926-
1940. Huế: Thuận hóa, 1987.
Phan Chu Trinh, and Sính. Vĩnh. Phan Châu Trinh and His Political Writings. Ithaca, N.Y.:
Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 2009.
Popkin, SL. “Corporatism and Colonialism: The Political Economy of Rural Change in
Vietnam.” Comparative Politics (1976):
————. “Colonialism and the Ideological Origins of the Vietnamese Revolution—a Review
Article.” The Journal of Asian Studies (1985):
Quinn-Judge, Sophie. Ho Chi Minh. Univ of California Press, 2002.
Ramsay, Jacob. Mandarins and Martyrs: The Church and the Nguyen Dynasty in Early
Nineteenth-Century Vietnam. 2008.
Rhoads, Edward J. M. China’s Republican Revolution. Harvard University Press, 1975.
Roden, Donald. Schooldays in Imperial Japan : a Study in the Culture of a Student Elite.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.
Shiraishi, Masaya. Nihon O Mezashita Betonamu No Eiyu to Oji : Fan Boi Chau to Kuon De.
Sairyusha., 2012.
————. Betonamu Minzoku Undō to Nihon Ajia : Fan Boi Chau No Kakumei Shisō to Taigai
Ninshiki. Tōkyō: Gannandō Shoten, 1993.

197
Shiraishi, Masaya., and Ikuo. Takeuchi. Betonamu No Doimoi No Shintenkai. Tōkyō: Ajia Keizai
Kenkyūjo, 1999.
Sun, Xun, Kemeng. Zheng, and Yiyuan Chen. Yuenan Han Wen Xiao Shuo Ji Cheng. Shanghai:
Shanghai gu ji chu ban she, 2010.
Sutton, Donald S. Provincial Militarism and the Chinese Republic : the Yunnan Army, 1905-25.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980.
Ru, Tạ Văn. Luận Đề Phan Bội Châu Và Phan Chu Trinh. Saigon: Tao Đàn, 1960.
Tai, Hue-Tam Ho. Radicalism and the Origins of the Vietnamese Revolution. Harvard University
Press, 1996.
————. The Country of Memory. Univ of California Press, 2001.
————. Passion, Betrayal, and Revolution in Colonial Saigon. Univ of California Press, 2010.
————. Millenarianism and Peasant Politics in Vietnam. 2013.
Fong-Hiệb, Tân. “Hai Nhà Nho Chí-Sĩ Ngô-Đức-kế Và Phan-Bội-châu Đối Với Truyện Kiều.”
Bách Khoa 17 (1957): 49–52.
Tập Án Phan Bội Châu. Hanoi: Nhà In Thực Nghiệp, 1926.
Taylor, Keith Weller. A History of the Vietnamese. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2013.
Thế Nguyên. Phan Bội Châu Thân Thế Và Thi Văn. Saigon: Tân Việt, 1950.
Thomas, Martin. The French Colonial Mind: Mental Maps of Empire and Colonial Encounters.
U of Nebraska Press, 2011.
Tjio, Kayloe. The Unfinished Revolution : Sun Yat-Sen and the Struggle for Modern China.
Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Editions, 2017.
Tôn Quang Phiệt. Phan Bội Châu Và Phan Chu Trinh. Hà Nội: Ban nghiên cứu văn sử địa, 1956.
————, ed. Ông Già Bến Ngự Hồi Ký Ho Chi Minh City: Nhà Xuất Bản Thuận Hóa, 1987.
————. “Phan Bội Chau Trong Lịch Cử Chống Thực Dân Pháp Của Dân Tộc Việt Nam,” In
Tự Phê Phán, edited by Phan Bội Châu, 7–30. Thanh Hóa: Nhà Xuất Bản Thanh Hóa,
2008.
Trác Ngọc. “Cụ Huỳnh-Thúc-kháng Nói Chuyện Về Bài Thơ ‘Con Muỗi’.” Bách Khoa 159
(1963): 51–56.
Trần Huy Liệu. “Việc Ông Phan Bội Châu.” (1926)
Trần Trọng Khắc. Năm Mươi Bốn Năm Hải Ngoại: Hồi Ký Của Cụ Nguyễn Thức Canh Tức Bác
Sĩ Trần Trọng Khắc, Nhà Tiền Bối Cách Mạng Việt-Nam Qua Các Phong Trào Đông Du,
1904-1908, Và Việt-Nam Quang Phục, 1912 : Tài Liệu Lịch Sử Cách-Mạng Việt-Nam.
[Saigon: s.n., 1971.
Trần Trọng Kim. Một Cơn Gió Bụi : Kiến Văn Lục. [Saigon]: Vĩnh Sơn, 1969.
————. Việt Nam Sử Lược. TP. HCM: Xí nghiệp in Fahas, 2011.
Tréglodé, Benoît de., and Claire. Duiker. Heroes and Revolution in Vietnam. Singapore: NUS
Press in association with IRASEC, 2012.
Trịnh Văn Thảo. “Ba Thế Hệ Trí Thức Người Việt (1862-1954).” (2013)
————, and Văn Khánh Nguyễn. Ba Thế Hệ Tri Thức Người Việt (1862-1954). 2013.
Sanpachirō, Utsumi. Vetonamu Dokuritsu Undōka Fan Boi Chau Den : Nihon Chūgoku O
Kakenuketa Kakumeika No Shōgai. Tōkyō: Fuyō Shobō Shuppan, 1999.
“Việc Phan Bội Châu Tại Hồi Đồng Đề Hình.” (1925)
Vĩnh Sính, ed. Phan Boi Chau and the Dong-Du Movement New Haven, CT: Council on
Southeast Asia Studies, Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1988.

198
————. Phan Bội Châu and the Đông-Du Movement. New Haven, CT, USA: Council on
Southeast Asia Studies, Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1988.
Vũ Tiến Quỳnh. “Nguyễn Bỉnh Khiêm, Chu Mạnh Trinh, Phan Bội Châu.” (1991)
Vũ Thanh Sơn. Nhân Vật Lịch Sử Việt Nam Cuối Thế Kỷ Xix Đầu Thế Kỷ Xx : Sách Tham Khảo.
Hà Nội: Nhà xuất bản Quân đội nhân dân, 2013.
Vương Đình Quang. “Hồi Ký Về Cụ Phan Và Cụ Huỳnh.” (1997)
Waldron, Arthur. From War to Nationalism : China’s Turning Point, 1924-1925. Cambridge;
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Woodside, Alexander. “Problems of Education in the Chinese and Vietnamese Revolutions.”
Pacific Affairs (1976):
————. “History, Structure, and Revolution in Vietnam.” International Political Science
Review (1989)
————. Community and Revolution in Modern Vietnam. Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 1976.
Wright, Mary (Clabaugh. China in Revolution: the First Phase, 1900-1913. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1968.
Wyatt, DK, A Woodside, and MA Thwin. “Moral Order and the Question of Change Essays on
Southeast Asian Thought.” philpapers.org (1982)
Xie Wensun. Chinese Historiography on the Revolution of 1911 : a Critical Survey and a
Selected Bibliography. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University,
1975.
Xue Jundu. Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University
Press, 1961.
Yeh Wen-hsin. Provincial Passages : Culture, Space, and the Origins of Chinese Communism.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.
Yên Nhu. Phan Bội Châu Đi Học. Hanoi: Sở Văn Hóa Thông Tin, 1975.
Zinoman, Peter. The Colonial Bastille : a History of Imprisonment in Vietnam, 1862-1940.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.
白石昌也. ベトナム民族運動と日本·アジア. 1993.
白石昌也. 日本をめざしたベトナムの英雄と皇子. 2012.
白石昌也. 日本の「戦略的パートナーシップ」外交. 2014.
白石昌也. 第二次世界大戦期のインドシナ·タイ,そして日本·フランスに関する研究蓄積
と一次資料の概観. 2015.
白石昌也, and 吳瑞雲. 越南. 1994.
羅景文. “潘佩珠及其漢文小說之研究,” diss., 國立成功大學, 2012.

199