Republic of the Philippines In the petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 1969, a

SUPREME COURT summary of facts was set forth thus: "7. On July 3, 1961, a decision was
Manila rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of respondents P. J.
Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation,
SECOND DIVISION and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in the amount
of P1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings. 8. On June 24, 1969,
  respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an Order declaring the
aforestated decision of July 3, 1961 final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of
Rizal Province, Quezon City [as well as] Manila to execute the said decision. 9.
G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973
Pursuant to the said Order dated June 24, 1969, the corresponding Alias Writ of
Execution [was issued] dated June 26, 1969, .... 10. On the strength of the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, afore-mentioned Alias Writ of Execution dated June 26, 1969, the Provincial
vs. Sheriff of Rizal (respondent herein) served notices of garnishment dated June
HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of 28, 1969 with several Banks, specially on the "monies due the Armed Forces of
Cebu, Branch I, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE SHERIFF OF the Philippines in the form of deposits sufficient to cover the amount mentioned
QUEZON CITY, and THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, THE CLERK in the said Writ of Execution"; the Philippine Veterans Bank received the same
OF COURT, Court of First Instance of Cebu, P. J. KIENER CO., LTD., notice of garnishment on June 30, 1969 .... 11. The funds of the Armed Forces
GAVINO UNCHUAN, AND INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION of the Philippines on deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine
CORPORATION, respondents. Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] their branches are public
funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees,
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and
for petitioner. operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as per Certification dated July
3, 1969 by the AFP Controller,..." . The paragraph immediately succeeding in
2

Andres T. Velarde and Marcelo B. Fernan for respondents. such petition then alleged: "12. Respondent Judge, Honorable Guillermo P.
Villasor, acted in excess of jurisdiction [or] with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias writ of
execution against the properties of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, hence,
FERNANDO, J.: the Alias Writ of Execution and notices of garnishment issued pursuant thereto
are null and void."  In the answer filed by respondents, through counsel Andres
3

The Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding T. Velarde and Marcelo B. Fernan, the facts set forth were admitted with the
challenges the validity of an order issued by respondent Judge Guillermo P. only qualification being that the total award was in the amount of
Villasor, then of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I,  declaring a
1
P2,372,331.40. 4

decision final and executory and of an alias writ of execution directed against the
funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines subsequently issued in pursuance The Republic of the Philippines, as mentioned at the outset, did right in filing
thereof, the alleged ground being excess of jurisdiction, or at the very least, this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. What was done by respondent Judge
grave abuse of discretion. As thus simply and tersely put, with the facts being is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. .
undisputed and the principle of law that calls for application indisputable, the
outcome is predictable. The Republic of the Philippines is entitled to the writs It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept
prayed for. Respondent Judge ought not to have acted thus. The order thus of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit
impugned and the alias writ of execution must be nullified. unless it gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so. In the
classic formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of
any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And
which the right depends."  Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not
5
still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every
dissimilar. So it was indicated in a recent decision, Providence Washington consideration of public policy forbids it." 
12

Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines,  with its affirmation that "a
6

continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as In the light of the above, it is made abundantly clear why the Republic of the
against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of Philippines could rightfully allege a legitimate grievance.
governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious
functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted, nullifying and
the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well known setting aside both the order of June 24, 1969 declaring executory the decision of
propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the July 3, 1961 as well as the alias writ of execution issued thereunder. The
loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on July 12, 1969 is hereby made
such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well permanent.
be imagined." 7

Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made
explicit in the revised charter. It is therein expressly provided: "The State may
Barredo, J, took no part.
not be sued without its consent."  A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound
8

sense from a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a
garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously
granted and the state liability adjudged. Thus in the recent case
of Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego,  such a well-settled doctrine
9

was restated in the opinion of Justice Teehankee: "The universal rule that where
the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or
special law, it may limit claimant's action 'only up to the completion of
proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that the power of the Courts
ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties
may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements
of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required
by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be
allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their
legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law."   Such a principle
10

applies even to an attempted garnishment of a salary that had accrued in favor

of an employee. Director of Commerce and Industry v. Concepcion,   speaks to
11

that effect. Justice Malcolm as ponente left no doubt on that score. Thus: "A rule
which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public
officers, although it may be due government employees, is not liable to the
creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment. One reason is, that
the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except
by express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to
garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another
reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the
hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although
 confiscated items as cigarettes and food stuffs PUBLICLY. This is not to
mention "Auring" who is in herself, a disgrace to her division and to the Office of
Republic of the Philippines the Provost Marshal. In lieu of this observation, may I therefore, ask if the head
SUPREME COURT of the Merchandise Control Division is aware of this malpractice?
Manila
Answer: Merchandise Control Guards and all other personnel are prohibited
THIRD DIVISION from appropriating confiscated items for their own consumption or use. Two
locked containers are installed at the Main Gate area for deposit of confiscated
  items and the OPM evidence custodian controls access to these containers.

G.R. No. 74135 May 28, 1992 Merchandise Control Guards are permitted to eat their meals at their worksite
due to heavy workload. Complaints regarding merchandise control guards
procedure or actions may be made directly at the Office of the Provost Marshal
M. H. WYLIE and CAPT. JAMES WILLIAMS, petitioners,
for immediate and necessary action. Specific dates and time along with details
vs.
of suspected violations would be most appreciated. Telephone 4-3430/4-3234
AURORA I. RARANG and THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
for further information or to report noted or suspected irregularities. Exhibits E &
COURT, respondents.
E-1. (Rollo, pp. 11-12)

The private respondent was the only one who was named "Auring" in the Office
of the Provost Marshal. That the private respondent was the same "Auring"
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: referred to in the POD was conclusively proven when on February 7, 1978,
petitioner M. H. Wylie wrote her a letter of apology for the "inadvertent"
The pivotal issue in this petition centers on the extent of the "immunity from suit" publication. The private respondent then commenced an action for damages in
of the officials of a United States Naval Base inside Philippine territory. the Court of First Instance of Zambales (now Regional Trial Court) against
M. H. Wylie, Capt. James Williams and the U. S. Naval Base. She alleged that
In February, 1978, petitioner M. H. Wylie was the assistant administrative officer the article constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending
while petitioner Capt. James Williams was the commanding officer of the U. S. to impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public hatred,
Naval Base in Subic Bay, Olongapo City. Private respondent Aurora I. Rarang contempt and ridicule; and that the libel was published and circulated in the
was an employee in the office of the Provost Marshal assigned as merchandise English language and read by almost all the U. S. Naval Base personnel. She
control guard. prayed that she be awarded P300,000.00 as moral damages; exemplary
damages which the court may find proper; and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
M. H. Wylie, in his capacity as assistant administrative officer of the U.S. Naval
Station supervised the publication of the "Plan of the Day" (POD) which was In response to the complaint, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss anchored
published daily by the US Naval Base station. The POD featured important on three grounds:
announcements, necessary precautions, and general matters of interest to
military personnel. One of the regular features of the POD was the "action line 1. Defendants M. H. Wylie and Capt. James Williams acted in the performance
inquiry." On February 3, 1978, the POD published, under the "NAVSTA ACTION of their official functions as officers of the United States Navy and are, therefore,
LINE INQUIRY" the following: immune from suit;

Question: I have observed that Merchandise Control inspector/inspectress are 2. The United States Naval Base is an instrumentality of the US government
(sic) consuming for their own benefit things they have confiscated from Base which cannot be sued without its consent; and
Personnel. The observation is even more aggravated by consuming such
3. This Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter as well as the parties in The private respondent, not satisfied with the amount of damages awarded to
this case. (Record on Appeal, pp. 133-134) her, also appealed the trial court's decision.

The motion was, however, denied. Acting on these appeals, the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of
Appeals, modified the trial court's decision, to wit:
In their answer, the defendants reiterated the lack of jurisdiction of the court over
the case. WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court below is modified so that the
defendants are ordered to pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of
In its decision, the trial court ruled that the acts of defendants M. H. Wylie and P175,000.00 as moral damages and the sum of P60,000.00 as exemplary
Cpt. James Williams were not official acts of the government of the United damages. The rest of the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.
States of America in the operation and control of the Base but personal and Costs against the defendants-appellants. (Rollo, p. 44)
tortious acts which are exceptions to the general rule that a sovereign country
cannot be sued in the court of another country without its consent. In short, the The appellate court denied a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners.
trial court ruled that the acts and omissions of the two US officials were not
imputable against the US government but were done in the individual and Hence, this petition.
personal capacities of the said officials. The trial court dismissed the suit against
the US Naval Base. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows: In a resolution dated March 9, 1987, we gave due course to the petition.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against The petitioners persist that they made the questioned publication in the
the defendants jointly and severally, as follows: performance of their official functions as administrative assistant, in the case of
M. H. Wylie, and commanding officer, in the case of Capt. James Williams of the
1) Ordering defendants M. H. Wylie and Capt. James Williams to pay the plaintiff US Navy assigned to the U. S. Naval Station, Subic Bay, Olongapo City and
Aurora Rarang the sum of one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos by way were, therefore, immune from suit for their official actions.
of moral and exemplary damages;
In the case of United States of America v. Guinto (182 SCRA 644 [1990]), we
2) Ordering defendants M. H. Wylie and Capt. James Williams to pay the plaintiff discussed the principle of the state immunity from suit as follows:
the sum of thirty thousand (P30,000.00) pesos by way of attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation; and The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in
Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted
3) To pay the costs of this suit. principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land
under Article II, Section 2.
Counterclaims are dismissed.
xxx xxx xxx
Likewise, the suit against the U.S. Naval Base is ordered dismissed. (Record on
Appeal, p. 154) Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted
principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this
On appeal, the petitioners reiterated their stance that they are immune from suit doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are deemed
since the subject publication was made in their official capacities as officers of incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence
the U. S. Navy. They also maintained that they did not intentionally and of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society,
maliciously cause the questioned publication. the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations
with other states.
As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the government, suability will result only where the government is claiming
justification given by Justice Holmes that "there can be no legal right against the affirmative relief from the defendant. (Lim v. Brownell, 107 Phil. 345) (at pp. 652-
authority which makes the law on which the right depends." (Kawanakoa v. 655)
Polybank, 205 U.S. 349) There are other practical reasons for the enforcement
of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the In the same case we had opportunity to discuss extensively the nature and
local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, extent of immunity from suit of United States personnel who are assigned and
non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert stationed in Philippine territory, to wit:
jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a
celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations." (Da Haber v. Queen of In the case of the United States of America, the customary rule of international
Portugal, 17 Q. B. 171) law on state immunity is expressed with more specificity in the RP-US Bases
Treaty. Article III thereof provides as follows:
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the rights, power and
acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that authority within the bases which are necessary for the establishment, use,
if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an operation and defense thereof or appropriate for the control thereof and all the
affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount rights, power and authority within the limits of the territorial waters and air space
needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the bases which are necessary to provide
as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. (Garcia v. access to them or appropriate for their control.
Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120) In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent.
The petitioners also rely heavily on Baer v. Tizon, (57 SCRA 1) along with
several other decisions, to support their position that they are not suable in the
The doctrine is sometimes derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty" cases below, the United States not having waived its sovereign immunity from
because of the privilege it grants the state to defeat any legitimate claim against suit. It is emphasized that in Baer, the Court held:
it by simply invoking its non-suability. That is hardly fair, at least in democratic
societies, for the state is not an unfeeling tyrant unmoved by the valid claims of
The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign state without its
its citizens. In fact, the doctrine is not absolute and does not say the state may
consent is appropriate. More specifically, insofar as alien armed forces is
not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, the rule says that the
concerned, the starting point is Raquiza v. Bradford, a 1945 decision. In
state may not be sued without its consent, which clearly imports that it may be
dismissing a habeas corpus petition for the release of petitioners confined by
sued if it consents.
American army authorities, Justice Hilado, speaking for the Court,
cited Coleman v. Tennessee, where it was explicitly declared: "It is well settled
The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly. that a foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly country or to be
Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the
implied when the state enters into a contract it itself commences litigation. civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place." Two years later, in Tubb and Tedrow
v. Griess, this Court relied on the ruling in Raquiza v. Bradford and cited in
xxx xxx xxx support thereof excerpts from the works of the following authoritative writers:
Vattel, Wheaton, Hall, Lawrence, Oppenheim, Westlake, Hyde, and McNair and
The above rules are subject to qualification. Express consent is effected only by Lauterpacht. Accuracy demands the clarification that after the conclusion of the
the will of the legislature through the medium of a duly enacted statute. Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement, the treaty provisions should
(Republic v. Purisima, 78 SCRA 470) We have held that not all contracts control on such matter, the assumption being that there was a manifestation of
entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability; the submission to jurisdiction on the part of the foreign power whenever
distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts. (United appropriate. More to the point is Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, where plaintiffs as
States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487) As for the filing of a complaint by the lessors sued the Commanding General of the United States Army in the
Philippines, seeking the restoration to them of the apartment buildings they necessary to distinguish them –– between sovereign and governmental acts
owned leased to the United States armed forces station in the Manila area. A (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The
motion to dismiss on the ground of non-suability was filed and upheld by result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive
respondent Judge. The matter was taken to this Court in application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United
a mandamus proceeding. It failed. It was the ruling that respondent Judge acted Kingdom and other states in Western Europe.
correctly considering that the "action must be considered as one against the
U.S. Government." The opinion of Justice Montemayor continued: "It is clear xxx xxx xxx
that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have no
jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The question of lack of The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the
jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its
U.S. Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit which is commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said
essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have
a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter's consent but tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It
it is of a citizen filing an action against a foreign government without said does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
government's consent, which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is
courts of his country. The principles of law behind this rule are so elementary devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines,
and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not
in support thereof." utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

xxx xxx xxx The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they have acted in the
discharge of their official functions as officers or agents of the United States.
It bears stressing at this point that the above observations do not confer on the However, this is a matter of evidence. The charges against them may not be
United States of America a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents summarily dismissed on their mere assertion that their acts are imputable to the
in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also United States of America, which has not given its consent to be sued. In fact, the
insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of defendants are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which the
the United States in the discharge of their official functions. United States itself is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must
satisfy the judgment. (At pp. 655-658)
There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will
be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a In the light of these precedents, we proceed to resolve the present case.
contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves
its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied. This The POD was published under the direction and authority of the commanding
was our ruling in United States of America v. Ruiz, (136 SCRA 487) where the officer, U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay. The administrative assistant, among his
transaction in question dealt with the improvement of the wharves in the naval other duties, is tasked to prepare and distribute the POD. On February 3, 1978,
installation at Subic Bay. As this was a clearly governmental function, we held when the questioned article was published in the POD, petitioner Capt. James
that the contract did not operate to divest the United States of its sovereign Williams was the commanding officer while petitioner M.H. Wylie was the
immunity from suit. In the words of Justice Vicente Abad Santos: administrative assistant of the US Naval Station at Subic bay.

The traditional rule of immunity excepts a State from being sued in the courts of The NAVSTA ACTION LINE INQUIRY is a regular feature of the POD. It is a
another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary telephone answering device in the office of the Administrative Assistant. The
consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, Action Line is intended to provide personnel access to the Commanding Officer
the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing on matters they feel should be brought to his attention for correction or
and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been investigation. The matter of inquiry may be phoned in or mailed to the POD.
(TSN, September 9, 1980, pp. 12-13, Jerry Poblon) According to xxx xxx xxx
M. H. Wylie, the action line naming "Auring" was received about three (3) weeks
prior to its being published in the POD on February 3, 1978. It was forwarded to Moreover, the petitioner's argument that the immunity proviso under Section
Rarang's office of employment, the Provost Marshal, for comment. The Provost 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 also extends to him is not well-taken. A mere
Marshal office's response ". . . included a short note stating that if the article invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the charges being
was published, to remove the name." (Exhibit 8-A, p. 5) The Provost Marshal's automatically dropped.
response was then forwarded to the executive officer and to the commanding
officer for approval. The approval of the Commanding officer was forwarded to In the case of Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña (159
the office of the Administrative Assistant for inclusion in the POD. A certain Mrs. SCRA 556 [1988] then Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, added a clarification of
Dologmodin, a clerk typist in the office of the Administrative Assistant prepared the immunity accorded PCGG officials under Section 4(a) of Executive Order
the smooth copy of the POD. Finally, M. H. Wylie, the administrative assistant No. 1 as follows:
signed the smooth copy of the POD but failed to notice the reference to "Auring"
in the action line inquiry. (Exh. 8-A, pp. 4-5, Questions Nos. 14-15).
With respect to the qualifications expressed by Mr. Justice Feliciano in his
separate opinion, I just wish to point out two things: First, the main opinion does
There is no question, therefore, that the two (2) petitioners actively participated not claim absolute immunity for the members of the Commission. The cited
in screening the features and articles in the POD as part of their official section of Executive Order No. 1 provides the Commission's members immunity
functions. Under the rule that U.S. officials in the performance of their official from suit thus: "No civil action shall lie against the Commission or any member
functions are immune from suit, then it should follow that the petitioners may not thereof for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated
be held liable for the questioned publication. by this order." No absolute immunity like that sought by Mr. Marcos in his
Constitution for himself and his subordinates is herein involved. It is understood
It is to be noted, however, that the petitioners were sued in their personal that the immunity granted the members of the Commission by virtue of the
capacities for their alleged tortious acts in publishing a libelous article. unimaginable magnitude of its task to recover the plundered wealth and the
State's exercise of police power was immunity from liability for damages in the
The question, therefore, arises –– are American naval officers who commit a official discharge of the task granted the members of the Commission much in
crime or tortious act while discharging official functions still covered by the the same manner that judges are immune from suit in the official discharge of
principle of state immunity from suit? Pursuing the question further, does the the functions of their office.
grant of rights, power, and authority to the United States under the RP-US . . . (at pp. 581-582)
Bases Treaty cover immunity of its officers from crimes and torts? Our answer is
No. xxx xxx xxx

Killing a person in cold blood while on patrol duty, running over a child while Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability
driving with reckless imprudence on an official trip, or slandering a person during nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic.
office hours could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement. Our laws (id., at page 586)
and, we presume, those of the United States do not allow the commission of
crimes in the name of official duty. Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General, acts in bad faith,
or, as contended by the private respondent, "maliciously conspir(es) with the
The case of Chavez v. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 282 [1991] gives the law on PCGG commissioners in persecuting respondent Enrile by filing against him an
immunity from suit of public officials: evidently baseless suit in derogation of the latter's constitutional rights and
liberties" (Rollo, p. 417), there can be no question that a complaint for damages
The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another. The actions
acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil Code on Human Relations
they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith. may be taken against public officers or private citizens alike. . . . (pp. 289-291)
We apply the same ruling to this case. allegation of forgery of documents could be a defamation, which in the light of
Article 2219(7) of the Civil Code could by analogy be ground for payment of
The subject article in the US Newsletter POD dated February 3, 1978 mentions moral damages, considering the wounded feelings and besmirched reputation of
a certain "Auring" as ". . a disgrace to her division and to the Office of the the defendants.
Provost Marshal." The same article explicitly implies that Auring was consuming
and appropriating for herself confiscated items like cigarettes and foodstuffs. Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the POD dated February 3, 1978 is a
There is no question that the Auring alluded to in the Article was the private defamation against the character and reputation of the private respondent.
respondent as she was the only Auring in the Office of the Provost Marshal. Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly
Moreover, as a result of this article, the private respondent was investigated by recommended the deletion of the name Auring if the article were published. The
her supervisor. Before the article came out, the private respondent had been the petitioners, however, were negligent because under their direction they issued
recipient of commendations by her superiors for honesty in the performance of the publication without deleting the name "Auring." Such act or omission is ultra
her duties. vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was a tortious act which ridiculed the
private respondent. As a result of the petitioners' act, the private respondent,
It may be argued that Captain James Williams as commanding officer of the according to the record, suffered besmirched reputation, serious anxiety,
naval base is far removed in the chain of command from the offensive wounded feelings and social humiliation, specially so, since the article was
publication and it would be asking too much to hold him responsible for baseless and false. The petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are liable
everything which goes wrong on the base. This may be true as a general rule. In for the damages they caused the private respondent.
this particular case, however, the records show that the offensive publication
was sent to the commanding officer for approval and he approved it. The factual WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision and
findings of the two courts below are based on the records. The petitioners have resolution of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, are
shown no convincing reasons why our usual respect for the findings of the trial AFFIRMED.
court and the respondent court should be withheld in this particular case and
why their decisions should be reversed. Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code prescribes a civil liability for damages caused by a Feliciano, J., took no part.
person's act or omission constituting fault or negligence, to wit:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

"Fault" or "negligence" in this Article covers not only acts "not punishable by law"
but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional or voluntary or negligent."
(Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 191 SCRA 195 [1990]).

Moreover, Article 2219(7) of the Civil Code provides that moral damages may be
recovered in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. In effect, the
offended party in these cases is given the right to receive from the guilty party
moral damages for injury to his feelings and reputation in addition to punitive or
exemplary damages. (Occena v. Icamina, 181 SCRA 328 [1990]). In another
case, Heirs of Basilisa Justiva v. Gustilo, 7 SCRA 72 [1963], we ruled that the
 Republic of the Philippines WHEREAS, it is the policy of the government to insure that only safe and
SUPREME COURT comfortable units are used as public conveyances;
Manila
WHEREAS, the riding public, particularly in Metro-Manila, has, time and again,
EN BANC complained against, and condemned, the continued operation of old and
dilapidated taxis;
G.R. No. L-59234 September 30, 1982
WHEREAS, in order that the commuting public may be assured of comfort,
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO CABIGAO convenience, and safety, a program of phasing out of old and dilapidated taxis
and ACE TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION, petitioners, should be adopted;
vs.
THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU WHEREAS, after studies and inquiries made by the Board of Transportation, the
OF LAND TRANSPORTATION, respondents. latter believes that in six years of operation, a taxi operator has not only covered
the cost of his taxis, but has made reasonable profit for his investments;

NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to this policy, the Board hereby declares that no
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: car beyond six years shall be operated as taxi, and in implementation of the
same hereby promulgates the following rules and regulations:
This Petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order" filed by the Taxicab Operators of 1. As of December 31, 1977, all taxis of Model 1971 and earlier are ordered
Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation, seeks to declare withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no longer be registered and
the nullity of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42, dated October 10, 1977, of the operated as taxis. In the registration of cards for 1978, only taxis of Model 1972
Board of Transportation, and Memorandum Circular No. 52, dated August 15, and later shall be accepted for registration and allowed for operation;
1980, of the Bureau of Land Transportation.
2. As of December 31, 1978, all taxis of Model 1972 are ordered withdrawn from
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic public service and thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis.
corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of In the registration of cars for 1979, only taxis of Model 1973 and later shall be
Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any accepted for registration and allowed for operation; and every year thereafter,
other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. Petitioners Ace there shall be a six-year lifetime of taxi, to wit:
Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the members of
TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of such certificate of public 1980 — Model 1974
convenience.
1981 — Model 1975, etc.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which reads: All taxis of earlier models than those provided above are hereby ordered
withdrawn from public service as of the last day of registration of each particular
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of year and their respective plates shall be surrendered directly to the Board of
Transportation for subsequent turnover to the Land Transportation Commission.
Old and Dilapidated Taxis
For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein
shall immediately be effective in Metro-Manila. Its implementation outside Metro-
Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been implemented in Metro- to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs
Manila and only after the date has been determined by the Board. 1 of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out,
provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for
Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land operation.
Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980,
instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all On February 16, 1981, petitioners filed before the BOT a "Manifestation and
within the National Capitol Region, to implement said Circular, and formulating a Urgent Motion", praying for an early hearing of their petition. The case was
schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as heard on February 20, 1981. Petitioners presented testimonial and documentary
public conveyances. To quote said Circular: evidence, offered the same, and manifested that they would submit additional
documentary proofs. Said proofs were submitted on March 27, 1981 attached to
Pursuant to BOT Memo-Circular No. 77-42, taxi units with year models over six petitioners' pleading entitled, "Manifestation, Presentation of Additional Evidence
(6) years old are now banned from operating as public utilities in Metro Manila. and Submission of the Case for Resolution." 3
As such the units involved should be considered as automatically dropped as
public utilities and, therefore, do not require any further dropping order from the On November 28, 1981, petitioners filed before the same Board a "Manifestation
BOT. and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petition" praying that the case be
resolved or decided not later than December 10, 1981 to enable them, in case of
Henceforth, taxi units within the National Capitol Region having year models denial, to avail of whatever remedy they may have under the law for the protection of
over 6 years old shall be refused registration. The following schedule of phase- their interests before their 1975 model cabs are phased-out on January 1, 1982.
out is herewith prescribed for the guidance of all concerned:
Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the
Year Model case, but was later informed that the records of the case could not be located.
Automatic Phase-Out Year

  1980 On December 29, 1981, the present Petition was instituted wherein the following
queries were posed for consideration by this Court:
1974 1981
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in
1975 1982 accord with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby
safeguarding the petitioners' constitutional right to procedural due process?
1976 1983

1977   B. Granting, arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural
requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the
etc. etc. implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate
the petitioners' constitutional rights to.

Strict compliance here is desired. 2 (1) Equal protection of the law;

In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration year (2) Substantive due process; and
1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of
model 1974, in 1981.
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as
Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:
Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is neither
violative of procedural due process. As held in Central Bank vs. Hon. Cloribel
4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, and Banco Filipino, 44 SCRA 307 (1972):
measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by
operators of public utility motor vehicles. Pevious notice and hearing as elements of due process, are constitutionally
required for the protection of life or vested property rights, as well as of liberty,
Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency to when its limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasi-
follow in the exercise of its powers: judicial proceeding, generally dependent upon a past act or event which has to
be established or ascertained. It is not essential to the validity of general rules or
Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. — In the exercise of the powers granted in the regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or persons or
preceding section, the Board shag proceed promptly along the method of enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise. (Emphasis supplied)
legislative inquiry.
Petitioners further take the position that fixing the ceiling at six (6) years is
Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Board, in its discretion, may arbitrary and oppressive because the roadworthiness of taxicabs depends upon
require the cooperation and assistance of the Bureau of Transportation, the their kind of maintenance and the use to which they are subjected, and,
Philippine Constabulary, particularly the Highway Patrol Group, the support therefore, their actual physical condition should be taken into consideration at
agencies within the Department of Public Works, Transportation and the time of registration. As public contend, however, it is impractical to subject
Communications, or any other government office or agency that may be able to every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it
furnish useful information or data in the formulation of the Board of any policy, can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and
plan or program in the implementation of this Decree. even graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to
an vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies
that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that time
The Board may also can conferences, require the submission of position papers
taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment
or other documents, information, or data by operators or other persons that may
obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and
be affected by the implementation of this Decree, or employ any other suitable
comfortable service to the public specially considering that they are in
means of inquiry.
continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours
per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the
In support of their submission that they were denied procedural due process, requirement of due process has been met.
petitioners contend that they were not caged upon to submit their position
papers, nor were they ever summoned to attend any conference prior to the
On Equal Protection of the Law:
issuance of the questioned BOT Circular.
Petitioners alleged that the Circular in question violates their right to equal
It is clear from the provision aforequoted, however, that the leeway accorded the
protection of the law because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila only
Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data
and is directed solely towards the taxi industry. At the outset it should be pointed
in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it
out that implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in Memorandum
should first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or
Circular No. 77-42. To repeat the pertinent portion:
other documents from operators or persons who may be affected, this being
only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary
authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they were deprived For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein
of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public shall immediately be effective in Metro Manila. Its implementation outside Metro
respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been implemented in Metro
challenged Circulars. operators of public conveyances are not the only primary Manila and only after the date has been determined by the Board. 4
sources of the data and information that may be desired by the BOT.
In fact, it is the understanding of the Court that implementation of the Circulars in Fernando, CJ., Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De
Cebu City is already being effected, with the BOT in the process of conducting Castro, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
studies regarding the operation of taxicabs in other cities.
Teehankee and Aquino, JJ., concur in the result.
The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that
taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier
traffic pressure and more constant use. This is of common knowledge.
Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial
distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly
be successfully claimed.

As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the

overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the
dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of its
police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things
hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. 5 It may also regulate property
rights. 6 In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities
imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to
regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded". 7

In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation

services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does
not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or
persons Identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or
subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial
distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class. 8 What is required under the equal protection clause is the
uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under Identical or similar
circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and
the liabilities imposed. 9 The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria.

Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from
any constitutional infirmity. To declare a law unconstitutional, the infringement of
constitutional right must be clear, categorical and undeniable. 10

WHEREFORE, the Writs prayed for are denied and this Petition is hereby
dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines SECTION 1—It shall be unlawful for any person, group of persons, entity, or
SUPREME COURT corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or
Manila other public exhibitions, games, contests, or other performances to require
children between seven (7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay full payment for
EN BANC admission tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the
value of the said tickets.
G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988
SECTION 2—Any person violating the provisions of this Ordinance shall upon
CARLOS BALACUIT, LAMBERTO TAN and SERGIO YU conviction be punished by a fine of not less than TWO HUNDRED PESOS
CARCEL, petitioners-appellants, (P200.00) but not more than SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P600.00) or an
vs. imprisonment of not less than TWO (2) MONTHS or not more than SIX (6)
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN MONTHS or both such firm and imprisonment in the discretion of the Court.
CITY, Branch 11, and the CITY OF BUTUAN, respondents-appellees.
If the violator be a firm or corporation the penalty shall be imposed upon the
Romeo B. Sanchez, Eduardo Deza Mercado and Wilfred D. Asis for petitioners. Manager, Agent or Representative of such firm or corporation.

The City Legal Officer for respondents-appeliees. SECTION 3—This ordinance shall take effect upon its approval.

Petitioners are Carlos Balacuit Lamberto Tan, and Sergio Yu Carcel managers
of the Maya and Dalisay Theaters, the Crown Theater, and the Diamond
Theater, respectively. Aggrieved by the effect of Ordinance No. 640, they filed a
GANCAYCO, J.:
complaint before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan
At issue in the petition for review before Us is the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by
City docketed as Special Civil Case No. 237 on June 30, 1969 praying, inter
the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, the title and text of which are reproduced below: alia, that the subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, void
and unenforceable.  1

ORDINANCE--640
Upon motion of the petitioners,   a temporary restraining order was issued on
2

ORDINANCE PENALIZING ANY PERSON, GROUP OF PERSONS, ENTITY July 14, 1969 by the court a quo enjoining the respondent City of Butuan and its
OR CORPORATION ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS OF SELLING ADMISSION officials from enforcing Ordinance No. 640.   On July 29, 1969, respondents filed
3

TICKETS TO ANY MOVIE OR OTHER PUBLIC EXHIBITIONS, GAMES, their answer sustaining the validity of the ordinance. 4

CONTESTS OR OTHER PERFORMANCES TO REQUIRE CHILDREN

BETWEEN SEVEN (7) AND TWELVE (12) YEARS OF AGE TO PAY FULL On January 30, 1973, the litigants filed their stipulation of facts.   On June 4,
5

PAYMENT FOR TICKETS INTENDED FOR ADULTS BUT SHOULD CHARGE 1973, the respondent court rendered its decision,   the dispositive part of which
6

ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE SAID TICKET reads:

xxx xxx xxx IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby adjudges in favor
of the respondents and against the petitioners, as follows:
Be it ordained by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan in session
assembled, that: 1. Declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of Butuan constitutional and valid:
Provided, however, that the fine for a single offense shall not exceed TWO
HUNDRED PESOS, as prescribed in the aforequoted Section 15 (nn) of Rep. city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be necessary to carry into effect
Act No. 523; and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act, and to fix the
penalties for the violation of the ordinances, which shall not exceed a two
2. Dissolving the restraining order issued by this Court; and; hundred peso fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and
imprisonment, for a single offense.
3. Dismissing the complaint, with costs against the petitioners.
We can see from the aforecited Section 15(n) that the power to regulate and fix
4. SO ORDERED. 7 the amount of license fees for theaters, theatrical performances,
cinematographs, public exhibitions and other places of amusement has been
expressly granted to the City of Butuan under its charter. But the question which
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration   of the decision of the court a
8

needs to be resolved is this: does this power to regulate include the authority to
quo which was denied in a resolution of the said court dated November 10,
interfere in the fixing of prices of admission to these places of exhibition and
1973. 9

amusement whether under its general grant of power or under the general
welfare clause as invoked by the City?
Hence, this petition.
This is the first time this Court is confronted with the question of direct
Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the interference by the local government with the operation of theaters,
grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police power. cinematographs and the like to the extent of fixing the prices of admission to
these places. Previous decisions of this Court involved the power to impose
Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not within the power of' the license fees upon businesses of this nature as a corollary to the power of the
Municipal Board to enact as provided for in Section 15(n) of Republic Act No. local government to regulate them. Ordinances which required moviehouses or
523, the Charter of the City of Butuan, which states: theaters to increase the price of their admission tickets supposedly to cover the
license fees have been held to be invalid for these impositions were considered
Sec. 15. General powers and duties of the Board — Except as otherwise as not merely license fees but taxes for purposes of revenue and not regulation
provided by law, and subject to the conditions and limitations thereof, the which the cities have no power to exact,   unless expressly granted by its
10

Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers: charter. 

11

xxx xxx xxx Applying the ruling in Kwong Sing v. City of Manila,   where the word "regulate"
12

was interpreted to include the power to control, to govern and to restrain, it

(n) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following; . . . would seem that under its power to regulate places of exhibitions and
theaters, theatrical performances, cinematographs, public exhibitions and all amusement, the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan could make proper police
other performances and places of amusements ... regulations as to the mode in which the business shall be exercised.

xxx xxx xxx While in a New York case,   an ordinance which regulates the business of
13

selling admission tickets to public exhibitions or performances by virtue of the

Respondent City of Butuan, on the other hand, attempts to justify the enactment power of cities under the General City Law "to maintain order, enforce the laws,
of the ordinance by invoking the general welfare clause embodied in Section 15 protect property and preserve and care for the safety, health, comfort and
(nn) of the cited law, which provides: general welfare of the inhabitants of the city and visitors thereto; and for any of
said purposes, to regulate and license occupations" was considered not to be
(nn) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the within the scope of any duty or power implied in the charter. It was held therein
sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the that the power of regulation of public exhibitions and places of amusement
morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the within the city granted by the charter does not carry with it any authority to
interfere with the price of admission to such places or the resale of tickets or Constitution, the exercise of police power is necessarily subject to a
tokens of admission. qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the regard, the respect and
the obedience due to the prescriptions of the fundamental law, particularly those
In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of theaters, forming part of the Constitution of Liberty, otherwise known as the Bill of Rights
cinematographs and other places of public exhibition are subject to regulation by — the police power measure must be reasonable. In other words, individual
the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police power by the local rights may be adversely affected by the exercise of police power to the extent
government.   Thus, in People v. Chan,   an ordinance of the City of Manila
14 15 only — and only to the extent--that may be fairly required by the legitimate
prohibiting first run cinematographs from selling tickets beyond their seating demands of public interest or public welfare.
capacity was upheld as constitutional for being a valid exercise of police power.
Still in another case,   the validity of an ordinance of the City of Bacolod
16
What is the reason behind the enactment of Ordinance No. 640?
prohibiting admission of two or more persons in moviehouses and other
amusement places with the use of only one ticket was sustained as a valid A reading of the minutes of the regular session of the Municipal Board when the
regulatory police measure not only in the interest of preventing fraud in so far as ordinance in question was passed shows that a certain Councilor Calo, the
municipal taxes are concerned but also in accordance with public health, public proponent of the measure, had taken into account the complaints of parents that
safety, and the general welfare. for them to pay the full price of admission for their children is too financially
burdensome.
The City of Butuan, apparently realizing that it has no authority to enact the
ordinance in question under its power to regulate embodied in Section 15(n), The trial court advances the view that "even if the subject ordinance does not
now invokes the police power as delegated to it under the general welfare spell out its raison d'etre in all probability the respondents were impelled by the
clause to justify the enactment of said ordinance. awareness that children are entitled to share in the joys of their elders, but that
considering that, apart from size, children between the ages of seven and twelve
To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest cannot fully grasp the nuance of movies or other public exhibitions, games,
of the public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means contests or other performances, the admission prices with respect to them ought
adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose to be reduced.  a
19

and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.   The legislature may not, under the
17

guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, We must bear in mind that there must be public necessity which demands the
or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In adoption of proper measures to secure the ends sought to be attained by the
other words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power enactment of the ordinance, and the large discretion is necessarily vested in the
is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts. 
18
legislative authority to determine not only what the interests of the public require,
but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.   The 20

Petitioners maintain that Ordinance No. 640 violates the due process clause of methods or means used to protect the public health, morals, safety or welfare,
the Constitution for being oppressive, unfair, unjust, confiscatory, and an undue must have some relation to the end in view, for under the guise of the police
restraint of trade, and violative of the right of persons to enter into contracts, power, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be
considering that the theater owners are bound under a contract with the film permitted to be arbitralily invaded by the legislative department. 21

owners for just admission prices for general admission, balcony and lodge.
We agree with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for
In Homeowners' Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Municipal Board of the the public interest. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on
City of Manila,   this Court held:
19
public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between
purposes and means.  The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the
22

The authority of municipal corporations to regulate is essentially police power, burden of cost on the part of parents who have to shell out the same amount of
Inasmuch as the same generally entails a curtailment of the liberty, the rights money for the admission of their children, as they would for themselves, A
and/or the property of persons, which are protected and even guaranteed by the reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the
parents; however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these movies an attractive nuisance and yet encourage parents and children to
savings. The ordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of patronize them by lowering the price of admission for children? Perhaps, there is
earnings but it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it. Furthermore, some ,truth to the argument of petitioners that Ordinance No. 640 is detrimental
as petitioners point out, there will be difficulty in its implementation because as to the public good and the general welfare of society for it encourages children
already experienced by petitioners since the effectivity of the ordinance, children of tender age to frequent the movies, rather than attend to their studies in school
over 12 years of age tried to pass off their age as below 12 years in order to or be in their homes.
avail of the benefit of the ordinance. The ordinance does not provide a
safeguard against this undesirable practice and as such, the respondent City of Moreover, as a logical consequence of the ordinance, movie house and theater
Butuan now suggests that birth certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons operators will be discouraged from exhibiting wholesome movies for general
to prove the age of children. This is, however, not at all practicable. We can see patronage, much less children's pictures if only to avoid compliance with the
that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the ordinance and still earn profits for themselves. For after all, these movie house
business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible relation between the and theater operators cannot be compelled to exhibit any particular kind of film
ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general except those films which may be dictated by public demand and those which are
welfare. restricted by censorship laws. So instead of children being able to share in the
joys of their elders as envisioned by the trial court, there will be a dearth of
Respondent City of Butuan claims that it was impelled to protect the youth from wholesome and educational movies for them to enjoy.
the pernicious practice of movie operators and other public exhibitions
promoters or the like of demanding equal price for their admission tickets along There are a number of cases decided by the Supreme Court and the various
with the adults. This practice is allegedly repugnant and unconscionable to the state courts of the United States which upheld the right of the proprietor of a
interest of the City in the furtherance of the prosperity, peace, good order, theater to fix the price of an admission ticket as against the right of the state to
comfort, convenience and the general well-being of its inhabitants. interfere in this regard and which We consider applicable to the case at bar.

There is nothing pernicious in demanding equal price for both children and A theater ticket has been described to be either a mere license, revocable at the
adults. The petitioners are merely conducting their legitimate businesses. The will of the proprietor of the theater or it may be evidence of a contract whereby,
object of every business entrepreneur is to make a profit out of his venture. for a valuable consideration, the purchaser has acquired the right to enter the
There is nothing immoral or injurious in charging the same price for both children theater and observe the performance on condition that he behaves
and adults. In fact, no person is under compulsion to purchase a ticket. It is a properly.   Such ticket, therefore, represents a right, Positive or conditional, as
23

totally voluntary act on the part of the purchaser if he buys a ticket to such the case may be, according to the terms of the original contract of sale. This
performances. right is clearly a right of property. The ticket which represents that right is also,
necessarily, a species of property. As such, the owner thereof, in the absence of
Respondent City of Butuan claims that Ordinance No. 640 is reasonable and any condition to the contrary in the contract by which he obtained it, has the
necessary to lessen the economic burden of parents whose minor children are clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he pleases and at such price as he
lured by the attractive nuisance being maintained by the petitioners. Respondent can obtain.   So that an act prohibiting the sale of tickets to theaters or other
24

further alleges that by charging the full price, the children are being exploited by places of amusement at more than the regular price was held invalid as
movie house operators. We fail to see how the children are exploited if they pay conflicting with the state constitution securing the right of property. 
25

the full price of admission. They are treated with the same quality of
entertainment as the adults. The supposition of the trial court that because of In Collister vs. Hayman,   it was held:
26

their age children cannot fully grasp the nuances of such entertainment as
adults do fails to convince Us that the reduction in admission ticket price is The defendants were conducting a private business, which, even if clothed with
justifiable. In fact, by the very claim of respondent that movies and the like are a public interest, was without a franchise to accommodate the public, and they
attractive nuisances, it is difficult to comprehend why the municipal board had the right to control it, the same as the proprietors of any other business,
passed the subject ordinance. How can the municipal authorities consider the subject to such obligations as were placed upon them by statute. Unlike a carrier
of passengers, for instance, with a franchise from the state, and hence under people. And these laws cannot be impugned as unconstitutional for being
obligation to transport anyone who applies and to continue the business year in violative of the due process clause.
and year out, the proprietors of a theater can open and close their place at will,
and no one can make a lawful complaint. They can charge what they choose for However, the same could not be said of theaters, cinematographs and other
admission to their theater. They can limit the number admitted. They can refuse exhibitions. In no sense could these businesses be considered public utilities.
to sell tickets and collect the price of admission at the door. They can preserve The State has not found it appropriate as a national policy to interfere with the
order and enforce quiet while the performance is going on. They can make it a admission prices to these performances. This does not mean however, that
part of the contract and condition of admission, by giving due notice and printing theaters and exhibitions are not affected with public interest even to a certain
the condition in the ticket that no one shall be admitted under 21 years of age, or degree. Motion pictures have been considered important both as a medium for
that men only or women only shall be admitted, or that a woman cannot enter the communication of Ideas and expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects
unless she is accompanied by a male escort, and the like. The proprietors, in the on the perceptions by our people of issues and public officials or public figures
control of their business, may regulate the terms of admission in any reasonable as well as the prevailing cultural traits are considerable.   People of all ages
31

way. If those terms are not satisfactory, no one is obliged to buy a ticket or make flock to movie houses, games and other public exhibitions for recreation and
the contract. If the terms are satisfactory, and the contract is made, the minds of relaxation. The government realizing their importance has seen it fit to enact
the parties meet upon the condition, and the purchaser impliedly promises to censorship laws to regulate the movie industry.   Their aesthetic entertainment
32

perform it. and even educational values cannot be underestimated. Even police measures
regulating the operation of these businesses have been upheld in order to
In Tyson and Bro. — United Theater Ticket Officers, Inc. vs. Banton,   the 27
safeguard public health and safety.
United States Supreme Court held:
Nonetheless, as to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid exercise
... And certainly a place of entertainment is in no legal sense a public utility; and of police power, the same must be resolved in the negative. While it is true that
quite as certainly, its activities are not such that their enjoyment can be regarded a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be
under any conditions from the point of view of an emergency. within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be
reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary
The interest of the public in theaters and other places of entertainment may be interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business
more nearly, and with better reason, assimilated to the like interest in provision or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with
stores and markets and in the rental of houses and apartments for residence even by the exercise of police power.  A police measure for the regulation of the
33

purposes; although in importance it fails below such an interest in the proportion conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the
that food and shelter are of more moment than amusement or instruction. As we legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights.  The right
34

have shown there is no legislative power to fix the prices of provisions or of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an
clothing, or the rental charges for houses and apartments, in the absence of inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the
some controlling emergency; and we are unable to perceive any dissimilarities due process clause."" Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage
of such quality or degree as to justify a different rule in respect of amusements their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most
and entertainment ... for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay
away. 36

We are in consonance with the foregoing observations and conclusions of

American courts. In this jurisdiction, legislation had been passed controlling the Respondent City of Butuan argues that the presumption is always in favor of the
prices of goods commodities and drugs during periods of emergency,   limiting
28 validity of the ordinance. This maybe the rule but it has already been held that
the net profits of public utility   as well as regulating rentals of residential
29 although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of
apartments for a limited period,   as a matter of national policy in the interest of
30 the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the
public health and safety, economic security and the general welfare of the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is
established by proper evidence.  The exercise of police power by the local
37
government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an I find no rational basis for classifying children as a distinct group insofar as
act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, paying for admission into a moviehouse is concerned. There is absolutely no
oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right.
38
pretense that the municipal ordinance is intended to protect children, enhance
their morals, promote their health, safeguard their safety, improve their
Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of education, or otherwise promote the general welfare. In fact, the effect of the
petitioners for even if We could assume that, on its face, the interference was ordinance may be the opposite.
reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has been fully shown that it is
an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights of With the price of movie tickets suddenly within the reach of many children, they
citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, may neglect their studies or use money intended for food or school supplies to
under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid. enter moviehouses. Movie owners who are compelled to accept half prices for a
newly increased group of young patrons will be tempted to allow them to enter
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is moviehouses indiscriminately, including those where scenes of violence, crime,
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered or even sex are portrayed. Addiction of the young to movie going is definitely
declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. This injurious to their health.
decision is immediately executory.
The avowed purpose of the ordinance--to ease the burden of costs for parents
SO ORDERED. who have to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their
children as they would for themselves — is not covered by police power. If the
Yap, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Griño-Aquino, city cannot compel refreshment parlors to charge half-prices for hamburgers,
JJ., concur. soft drinks, pizzas, or cakes consumed by children by what authority can it
impose the obligation of similarly easing parents' burdens upon the owners of
moviehouses?
 
As discussed by the minority opinion, the legislature may not., under the guise of
 
protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose
unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. The imposition
Separate Opinions enacted by the municipal board of Butuan City has not been justified by its
proponents as a restriction necessary for public health or public welfare. No
  reasonable relationship has been shown between a valid purpose and the
proper means to accomplish it.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., Separate opinion
I hesitate, however, to make a brief for owners of theatres and expound
a laissez faire approach insofar as their businesses are concerned. Movie
The issue before the Court is a simple one. Does Butuan City have the power to houses may not be public utilities but as places of entertainment affected with a
compel theatre owners to charge only half fares for children below twelve even certain degree of public interest, they are subject to reasonable regulation. That
as they charge all other moviegoers full prices for admission into moviehouses? regulation is stronger and more restrictive than that of regular or ordinary
businesses.
Instead of nullifying the municipal ordinance through a broad and sweeping
justification of property rights, I believe, however, that we should do so on The following citation for instance, is pure obiter insofar as half-prices for minors
a more limited ground directly bearing on the issue. are concerned:
... [T]he proprietors of a theater can open and close their place at will, and no .... A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be
one can make lawful complaint. They can charge what they choose for unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power. (Ogden City
admission to their theater. They can limit the number admitted. They can refuse v. Leo, 54 Utah 556, 182 P. 530) A police measure for the regulation of the
to sell tickets and collect the price of admission at the door. They can preserve conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the
order and enforce quiet while the performance is going on. They can make it a legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights (Pampanga
part of the contract and a condition of admission, by giving due notice and Bus Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Tarlac, 3 SCRA 816). The right of the owner to fix
printing the condition in the ticket that no one shall be admitted under 21 years a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the
of age, or that men only or women only shall be admitted, or that a woman property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause
cannot enter unless she is accompanied by a male escort, and the like. The (Tyson and Bro.--United Theater Ticket Officers, Inc. v. Banton, supra). Hence
proprietors, in the control of their business, may regulate the terms of admission the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own
in any reasonable way. If those terms are not satisfactory, no one is obliged to way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and
buy a ticket or make the contract. If the terms are satisfactory, and the contract that ally person who did not approve could stay away (Ibid, citing v. Clifford v.
is made, the minds of the parties meet upon the condition, and the purchaser Brandon, 2 Campb. 358, 368.).
impliedly promises to perform it. (Collister v. Hayman, 76 N.E. 20,183 N.Y. 250,
253, 1 L.R.A. [N.S.] 1188, 11 Am. St. Rep. 740, An Cas. 344). may be interpreted as carte blanche for movie owners to practically ignore
municipal regulation and do as they please.
I see no reason at this time why we should pass upon situations that are not
before us or warn municipal governments beforehand to avoid enacting certain More appropriate to my maid is to state that while tile Butuan City ordinance is
regulations when nobody knows exactly what circumstances may call for those invalid, it does not necessarily follow that all forms of regulation are proscribed.
regulations.
We have ruled in People v. Chan (65 Phil. 612):
For instance,
In the first place, it must be noted that there can be no doubt that the City of
A theater ticket has been described to be either a mere license, revocable at the Manila exercises police power, by delegation and that in the exercise of that
will of the proprietor of the theater or it may be evidence of a contract whereby, power it is authorized to enact ordinances for, the regulation of the operation of
for a valuable consideration, the purchaser has acquired the right to enter the theatres and cinematographs (sec. 2444(m) and (ee) of the Revised
theater and observe the performance on condition that he behaves properly Administrative Code: U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218; U.S. v. Pompeya, 31
(Law of the State. Phil. 245).

Screen and Radio by Marchetti, 1939, ec., page 268). Such ticket, therefore, On April 17, 1935, Ordinance No. 2347 was approved. In section 1 it provides
represents a right, positive or conditional, as the case may be, according to the that all first run theatres or cinematographs should register their seating capacity
terms of the original contract of sale. This right is clearly a right of property. The with the City Treasurer, and in section 1 it prohibits the sale of tickets in said
ticket which represents that right is also, necessarily, a species of property. As theatres or cinematographs in excess of their registered seating capacity.
such, the owner thereof, in the absence of any condition to the contrary y in the
contract by which he obtained it, has the clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to Before the approval of Ordinance No. 2347, Ordinance No. 2188, approved on
whom he pleases and at such price as he can obtain Ibids, citing Ex-parte July 22, 1933, was in force, section 1 of which divides cinematographs into three
Quarg, 84 Pac., 766,149 Cal. 79, 80, 5 L.R.A. [N.S], 183, 117 Am. St. Rep. 11 5, different classes: first, second and third. The first class includes those located on
9 Ann. Ca. 747; Also People v. Steele, 231, III. 340, 344, 14 R.A. [N.S.] 361, 121 certain and specified streets like Rosario, Escolta, etc., which exhibit films for
Am. St. Rep. 321, 83 N.E. 236). .... the first time; those belonging to the second class are those which, not being
located on said streets, also exhibit films for the first time, and those which,
xxx xxx xxx being located on said streets, regularly show films for the second time or which
have the exclusive right to show secondhand films; and the third class The City of Butuan tries to justify the challenged ordinance by invoking police
comprehends all those which are not included in the first and second classes. power. The invocation is improper. The definitions of police power, including its
exercise based on the general welfare clause, are emphasized to show that the
xxx xxx xxx respondents' arguments have no merit —

To the foregoing must be added, and this is of common knowledge, that the Police power is inherent in the State but not in municipal corporations. For a
films which are shown for the first time attract a large attendance, and the municipal corporation to exercise police power, there must be a legislative grant
theatre or cinematograph, whether it is first or second class, presenting shows which necessarily also sets the limits for the exercise of the power.
for the first time, would be suffocatingly overcrowded if the number of tickets
were not limited. This is the reason for the prohibition of the sale of tickets in In the Philippines, the grant of authority to the municipality to exercise police
excess of the seating capacity. The prohibition applies with equal force wherever power is embodied in Section 2238 of the Revised Administrative Code,
the same reason exists, that is, to first and second class theatres which show otherwise known as the General Welfare Clause. Chartered cities are granted
films for the first time. (at pp. 612- 613) similar authority in their respective charters

There being a rational basis for the restriction of sales of tickets beyond seating The general welfare clause has two branches. The first authorizes the municipal
capacity, the ordinance is perfectly valid. council to enact such ordinances and make such regulations not repugnant to
law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and
The same is true for the situation found in Samson v. Mayor of Bacolod City (60 duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. The second branch
SCRA 274): authorizes the municipality to enact such ordinances as may be necessary and
proper for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
When it is further remembered that insofar as movie houses and other places of peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and inhabitants
amusement are concerned. (According to Section 17[1] of the City Charter of thereof, and for the protection of property therein. (U.S. v. Salaveria 39 Phil.
Bacolod, Commonwealth Act No. 326 119381: 'To regulate and fix the amount 103).
of the fees for the following: ... theatres, theatrical performances,
cinematographs, public exhibitions, circuses and all other performances and This Court has generally been liberal in sustaining municipal action based on the
places of amusements ....") the least doubt cannot be entertained as to the general welfare clause. In the case before us, however, there appears to be no
validity of a measure prohibiting a proprietor, lessee or operator of an basis for sustaining the ordinance even on a generous interpretation of the
amusement place to admit two or more persons with only one admission ticket, general welfare clause.
not only in the interest of preventing fraud insofar as municipal taxes are
concerned but also in accordance with public health, public safety and the  
general welfare. (Cf. People v. Chan, 65 Phil. 611 [1938]). An American
Supreme Court decision, Western Turf Association v. Greenberg, (204 US 359  
[1907] the opinion being penned by Justice Harlan is equally illuminating: 'The
statute is only a regulation of places of public entertainment and amusement Separate Opinions
upon terms of equal and exact justice to everyone holding a ticket of admission,
and who is not, at the time, under the influence of liquor, or boisterous in
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., Separate opinion
conduct, or of lewd and immoral character. .... Such a regulation, in itself just, is
likewise promotive of peace and good order among those who attend places of
public entertainment and amusement. It is neither an arbitrary exertion of the The issue before the Court is a simple one. Does Butuan City have the power to
state's inherent or governmental power, nor a violation of any right secured by compel theatre owners to charge only half fares for children below twelve even
the constitution of the United States. (at pp. 363-364). as they charge all other moviegoers full prices for admission into moviehouses?
Instead of nullifying the municipal ordinance through a broad and sweeping The following citation for instance, is pure obiter insofar as half-prices for minors
justification of property rights, I believe, however, that we should do so on are concerned:
a more limited ground directly bearing on the issue.
... [T]he proprietors of a theater can open and close their place at will, and no
I find no rational basis for classifying children as a distinct group insofar as one can make lawful complaint. They can charge what they choose for
paying for admission into a moviehouse is concerned. There is absolutely no admission to their theater. They can limit the number admitted. They can refuse
pretense that the municipal ordinance is intended to protect children, enhance to sell tickets and collect the price of admission at the door. They can preserve
their morals, promote their health, safeguard their safety, improve their order and enforce quiet while the performance is going on. They can make it a
education, or otherwise promote the general welfare. In fact, the effect of the part of the contract and a condition of admission, by giving due notice and
ordinance may be the opposite. printing the condition in the ticket that no one shall be admitted under 21 years
of age, or that men only or women only shall be admitted, or that a woman
With the price of movie tickets suddenly within the reach of many children, they cannot enter unless she is accompanied by a male escort, and the like. The
may neglect their studies or use money intended for food or school supplies to proprietors, in the control of their business, may regulate the terms of admission
enter moviehouses. Movie owners who are compelled to accept half prices for a in any reasonable way. If those terms are not satisfactory, no one is obliged to
newly increased group of young patrons will be tempted to allow them to enter buy a ticket or make the contract. If the terms are satisfactory, and the contract
moviehouses indiscriminately, including those where scenes of violence, crime, is made, the minds of the parties meet upon the condition, and the purchaser
or even sex are portrayed. Addiction of the young to movie going is definitely impliedly promises to perform it. (Collister v. Hayman, 76 N.E. 20,183 N.Y. 250,
injurious to their health. 253, 1 L.R.A. [N.S.] 1188, 11 Am. St. Rep. 740, An Cas. 344).

The avowed purpose of the ordinance--to ease the burden of costs for parents I see no reason at this time why we should pass upon situations that are not
who have to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their before us or warn municipal governments beforehand to avoid enacting certain
children as they would for themselves — is not covered by police power. If the regulations when nobody knows exactly what circumstances may call for those
city cannot compel refreshment parlors to charge half-prices for hamburgers, regulations.
soft drinks, pizzas, or cakes consumed by children by what authority can it
impose the obligation of similarly easing parents' burdens upon the owners of For instance,
moviehouses?
A theater ticket has been described to be either a mere license, revocable at the
As discussed by the minority opinion, the legislature may not., under the guise of will of the proprietor of the theater or it may be evidence of a contract whereby,
protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose for a valuable consideration, the purchaser has acquired the right to enter the
unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. The imposition theater and observe the performance on condition that he behaves properly
enacted by the municipal board of Butuan City has not been justified by its (Law of the State.
proponents as a restriction necessary for public health or public welfare. No
reasonable relationship has been shown between a valid purpose and the Screen and Radio by Marchetti, 1939, ec., page 268). Such ticket, therefore,
proper means to accomplish it. represents a right, positive or conditional, as the case may be, according to the
terms of the original contract of sale. This right is clearly a right of property. The
I hesitate, however, to make a brief for owners of theatres and expound ticket which represents that right is also, necessarily, a species of property. As
a laissez faire approach insofar as their businesses are concerned. Movie such, the owner thereof, in the absence of any condition to the contrary y in the
houses may not be public utilities but as places of entertainment affected with a contract by which he obtained it, has the clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to
certain degree of public interest, they are subject to reasonable regulation. That whom he pleases and at such price as he can obtain Ibids, citing Ex-parte
regulation is stronger and more restrictive than that of regular or ordinary Quarg, 84 Pac., 766,149 Cal. 79, 80, 5 L.R.A. [N.S], 183, 117 Am. St. Rep. 11 5,
businesses. 9 Ann. Ca. 747; Also People v. Steele, 231, III. 340, 344, 14 R.A. [N.S.] 361, 121
Am. St. Rep. 321, 83 N.E. 236). ....
 xxx xxx xxx being located on said streets, regularly show films for the second time or which
have the exclusive right to show secondhand films; and the third class
.... A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be comprehends all those which are not included in the first and second classes.
unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power. (Ogden City
v. Leo, 54 Utah 556, 182 P. 530) A police measure for the regulation of the xxx xxx xxx
conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the
legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights (Pampanga To the foregoing must be added, and this is of common knowledge, that the
Bus Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Tarlac, 3 SCRA 816). The right of the owner to fix films which are shown for the first time attract a large attendance, and the
a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the theatre or cinematograph, whether it is first or second class, presenting shows
property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause for the first time, would be suffocatingly overcrowded if the number of tickets
(Tyson and Bro.--United Theater Ticket Officers, Inc. v. Banton, supra). Hence were not limited. This is the reason for the prohibition of the sale of tickets in
the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own excess of the seating capacity. The prohibition applies with equal force wherever
way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and the same reason exists, that is, to first and second class theatres which show
that ally person who did not approve could stay away (Ibid, citing v. Clifford v. films for the first time. (at pp. 612- 613)
Brandon, 2 Campb. 358, 368.).
There being a rational basis for the restriction of sales of tickets beyond seating
may be interpreted as carte blanche for movie owners to practically ignore capacity, the ordinance is perfectly valid.
municipal regulation and do as they please.
The same is true for the situation found in Samson v. Mayor of Bacolod City (60
More appropriate to my maid is to state that while tile Butuan City ordinance is SCRA 274):
invalid, it does not necessarily follow that all forms of regulation are proscribed.
When it is further remembered that insofar as movie houses and other places of
We have ruled in People v. Chan (65 Phil. 612): amusement are concerned. (According to Section 17[1] of the City Charter of
Bacolod, Commonwealth Act No. 326 119381: 'To regulate and fix the amount
In the first place, it must be noted that there can be no doubt that the City of of the fees for the following: ... theatres, theatrical performances,
Manila exercises police power, by delegation and that in the exercise of that cinematographs, public exhibitions, circuses and all other performances and
power it is authorized to enact ordinances for, the regulation of the operation of places of amusements ....") the least doubt cannot be entertained as to the
theatres and cinematographs (sec. 2444(m) and (ee) of the Revised validity of a measure prohibiting a proprietor, lessee or operator of an
Administrative Code: U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218; U.S. v. Pompeya, 31 amusement place to admit two or more persons with only one admission ticket,
Phil. 245). not only in the interest of preventing fraud insofar as municipal taxes are
concerned but also in accordance with public health, public safety and the
On April 17, 1935, Ordinance No. 2347 was approved. In section 1 it provides general welfare. (Cf. People v. Chan, 65 Phil. 611 [1938]). An American
that all first run theatres or cinematographs should register their seating capacity Supreme Court decision, Western Turf Association v. Greenberg, (204 US 359
with the City Treasurer, and in section 1 it prohibits the sale of tickets in said [1907] the opinion being penned by Justice Harlan is equally illuminating: 'The
theatres or cinematographs in excess of their registered seating capacity. statute is only a regulation of places of public entertainment and amusement
upon terms of equal and exact justice to everyone holding a ticket of admission,
Before the approval of Ordinance No. 2347, Ordinance No. 2188, approved on and who is not, at the time, under the influence of liquor, or boisterous in
July 22, 1933, was in force, section 1 of which divides cinematographs into three conduct, or of lewd and immoral character. .... Such a regulation, in itself just, is
different classes: first, second and third. The first class includes those located on likewise promotive of peace and good order among those who attend places of
certain and specified streets like Rosario, Escolta, etc., which exhibit films for public entertainment and amusement. It is neither an arbitrary exertion of the
the first time; those belonging to the second class are those which, not being state's inherent or governmental power, nor a violation of any right secured by
located on said streets, also exhibit films for the first time, and those which, the constitution of the United States. (at pp. 363-364).
The City of Butuan tries to justify the challenged ordinance by invoking police
power. The invocation is improper. The definitions of police power, including its
exercise based on the general welfare clause, are emphasized to show that the
respondents' arguments have no merit —

Police power is inherent in the State but not in municipal corporations. For a
municipal corporation to exercise police power, there must be a legislative grant
which necessarily also sets the limits for the exercise of the power.

In the Philippines, the grant of authority to the municipality to exercise police

power is embodied in Section 2238 of the Revised Administrative Code,
otherwise known as the General Welfare Clause. Chartered cities are granted
similar authority in their respective charters

The general welfare clause has two branches. The first authorizes the municipal
council to enact such ordinances and make such regulations not repugnant to
law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and
duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. The second branch
authorizes the municipality to enact such ordinances as may be necessary and
proper for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and inhabitants
thereof, and for the protection of property therein. (U.S. v. Salaveria 39 Phil.
103).

This Court has generally been liberal in sustaining municipal action based on the
general welfare clause. In the case before us, however, there appears to be no
basis for sustaining the ordinance even on a generous interpretation of the
general welfare clause.