PHILIPPINE EDUCATION CO., INC. (PECI) vs. MAURICIO A. SORIANO, ET AL.

(G.R. No. L-22405 June 30, 1971 DIZON, J.:)

FACTS:

Enrique Montinola sought to purchase from the Manila Post Office ten (10)
money orders of P200 each payable to E.P. Montinola. However, Montinola offered to
pay them with private checks which were not generally accepted in payment of money
orders. Having been advised to see the Chief of the Money Order Division, Montinola
managed to leave with his check and the 10 money orders without the knowledge of the
teller.

PECI received one of the money orders (no. 124688) as part of its sales receipts
and deposited it on the following day with the Bank of America. The "B of A" cleared it
with the Bureau of Posts and received from the Bureau of Post its face value of P200.

Mauricio Soriano, Chief of the Money Order Division, notified the "B of A" that
money order no. 124688 had been found to have been irregularly issued and that the
amount had been deducted from the "B of A's" clearing account. The "B of A" debited
PECI's account with the same amount and gave it a debit memo.

Montinola was charged with theft in the CFI of Manila but after trial he was
acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.

The Municipal Court rendered judgment granting the prayer of PECI. On appeal to the
CFI, the CFI of Manila dismissed the complaint, thus, PECI filed an appeal.

ISSUE:

ISSUE:
- Whether the postal money order is a negotiable instrument

HELD:
- No. therefore it does not create a contractual relationship of debtor and creditor
respectively, between the government, on one hand, and the remitter’s payee/
endorsers, on the other. It is to be noted in this connection that some of the
restrictions imposed upon money orders by postal laws and regulations are
inconsistent with the character of negotiable instruments. For instance, such laws
and regulations usually provide for not more than one endorsement; payment of
money orders may be withheld under a variety of circumstances (49 C. J. 1153).
 - Moreover, not being a party to the understanding existing between the postal
officers, on the one hand, and the Bank of America, on the other, appellant has
no right to assail the terms and conditions thereof on the ground that the letter
setting forth the terms and conditions aforesaid is void because it was not issued
by a Department Head in accordance with Sec. 79 (B) of the Revised
Administrative Code. In reality, however, said legal provision does not apply to
the letter in question.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision being in accordance with law, the same is
hereby affirmed with costs.

Caltex, Inc., petitioner

vs.
Court of Appeals, and Security Bank and Trust Company, respondent.
10 August 1992, G.R. No. 97753

Security bank issued Certificates of Time Deposits to Angel dela Cruz. The same
were given by Dela Cruz to Caltex in connection to his purchase of fuel products of the
latter. On a later date, Dela Cruz approached the bank manager, communicated the
loss of the certificates and requested for a reissuance.

Upon compliance with some formal requirements, he was issued replacements.

Thereafter, he secured a loan from the bank where he assigned the certificates
as security. Here comes the petitioner, averred that  the certificates were not actually
lost but were given as security for payment for fuel purchases.

The bank demanded some proof of the agreement but the petitioner failed to

comply. The loan matured and the time deposits were terminated and then applied to
the payment of the loan.

Petitioner demands the payment of the certificates but to no avail.

The trail court ruled that the subject certificates of deposit were not negotiable
instruments and that the petitioner did not become their holder in due course.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the certificates of deposit are negotiable instruments.

RULING:

The certifcates of deposit are negotiable instruments.

 The requisites for an instrument to become negotiable are;

...

(4) Must be payable to order or to bearer . . .

Here, the documents provide that the amounts deposited shall be repayable to
the depositor, and according to the documents, the depositor is the bearer. The
documents do not say that the depositor is Angel de a Cruz and that the amounts
deposited are repayable specifically to him. Rather, the amounts are to be repayable to
the bearer of the documents or, for that matter, whosoever may be the bearer at the
time of presentment. If the bank intended to pay Angel de la Cruz only, it could have
expressed in clear and catergorical terms in

the documents, instead of having the word “Bearer”.

However, the petitioner can still not recover the certificates of time deposit. This
is because that the respondent bank was not informed of the delivery of the certificates
of deposit from Angel dela Cruz to petitioner. A valid negotiation regarding the CTDs for
the true purpose an agreement between petitioner and Dela Cruz requires both delivery
and indorsement.

If the CTDS were indeed delivered as payment and not as security, the
petitioner’s credit manager could have easly said so instead of using the words “to
guarantee”.
RAUL SESBREÑO, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DELTA MOTORS CORPORATION AND PILIPINAS
BANK, respondents.

G.R. No. 89252/ 222 SCRA 466

May 24, 1993

FACTS:

Petitioner Raul Sesbreño made a money market placement in the amount of

P300,000.00 with the Philippine Underwriters Finance Corporation ("Philfinance") with a
term of 32 days. PhilFinance issued to Sesbreno the Certificate of Confirmation of Sale
of a Delta Motor Corporation Promissory Note 2731, the Certificate of Securities
Delivery Receipt indicating the sale of the note with notation that said security was in
the custody of Pilipinas Bank, and postdated checks drawn against the Insular Bank of
Asia and America for P304, 533.33 payable on 13 March 1981. Upon its maturity,
petitioner sought to encash the postdated checks but they were dishonored for having
insufficient funds.

Petitioner then issued a demand letter to private respondent Pilipinas Bank, but
the note was never released nor any instrument related thereto. Petitioner also made a
written demand upon private respondent Delta as maker for the partial satisfaction of
DMC PN No. 2731, explaining that Philfinance, as payee thereof, had assigned to him
said Note. Delta, however, denied any liability to petitioner on the promissory note.

As petitioner had failed to collect his investment and interest thereon, he filed an
action for damages with the RTC against private respondents Delta and Pilipinas. The
complaint was dismissed and was affirmed by the CA on appeal.

ISSUE:

WON a non-negotiable promissory note be assigned.

RULING:
 Only an instrument qualifying as a negotiable instrument under the relevant
statute may be negotiated either by indorsement thereof coupled with delivery or by
delivery alone where the negotiable instrument is in bearer form. A negotiable
instrument may, however, instead of being negotiated, also be assigned or transferred.
The legal consequences of negotiation as distinguished from assignment of a
negotiable instrument are, of course, different. A non-negotiable instrument may,
obviously, not be negotiated; but it may be assigned or transferred, absent an express
prohibition against assignment or transfer written in the face of the instrument.

In this case, while the promissory note was marked "non-negotiable," it

was not at the same time stamped "non-transferable" or "non-assignable." Hence, there
is no stipulation which prohibited the promissory note’s assigning or transferring, in
whole or in part.

FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES,

petitioner, vs., COURT OF APPEALS and LUZON DEVELOPMENT
BANK, respondents.
G.R. No. 113236. March 5, 2001

FACTS

Forjas - Arca Enterprise Company is maintaining a special savings account with Luzon
Development Bank, the latter authorized and allowed withdrawals of funds though the
medium of special withdrawal slips. These are supplied by Fojas - Arca. Fojas - Arca
purchased on credit with Firestone Tire & Rubber Company, in payment Fojas - Arca
delivered a 6 special withdrawal slips. In turn, these were deposited by the Firestone to
its bank account in Citibank. With this, relying on such confidence and belief Firestone
extended to Fojas - Arca other purchase on credit of its products but several withdrawal
slips were dishonored and not paid. As a consequence, Citibank debited the plaintiff’s
account representing the aggregate amount of the two dishonored special withdrawal
slips. Fojas - Arca averred that the pecuniary losses it suffered are a caused by and
directly attributes to defendant’s gross negligence as a result Fojas-Arca filed a
complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the acceptance and payment of the special withdrawal slips
without the presentation of the depositor’s passbook thereby giving the impression that
it is a negotiable instrument like a check.

VII. RULING:
No. Withdrawal slips in question were non-negotiable instrument. Hence, the rules
governing the giving immediate notice of dishonor of negotiable instrument do not apply.
The essence of negotiability which characterizes a negotiable paper as a credit
instrument lies in its freedom to circulate freely as a substitute for money. The
withdrawal slips in question lacked this character.

G.R. No. L-2516

September 25, 1950
Ang Tek Lian vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS: Knowing he had no funds therefor, petitioner Ang Tek Lian drew a check upon
the China Banking Corporation for the sum of P4,000, payable to the order of “cash”. He
delivered it to Lee Hua Hong in exchange for money which the latter handed in the act.
The next business day, the check was presented by Lee Hua Hong to the drawee bank
for payment, but it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds, the balance of the deposit
of Ang Tek Lian on both dates being P335 only.

Petitioner was sued for estafa. In his defense, however, he argues that as the check
had been made payable to “cash” and had not been endorsed by Ang Tek Lian, the
defendant is not guilty of the offense charged.

ISSUE: WON a check payable to “cash” needs indorsement?

HELD: NO. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law (sec. 9 [d], a check drawn payable to
the order of “cash” is a check payable to bearer, and the bank may pay it to the person
presenting it for payment without the drawer’s indorsement. Where a check is made
payable to the order of ‘cash’, the word cash ‘does not purport to be the name of any
person’, and hence the instrument is payable to bearer. The drawee bank need not
obtain any indorsement of the check, but may pay it to the person presenting it without
any indorsement.
The Philippine Bank of Commerce, plaintiff-appellee,
vs
Jose M. Aruego, defendant-appelant.
31 January 1981, G.R. Nos. L-25836-37
FACTS:
Plaintiff instituted against defendant a case for recovery of Php 35,000.00 with daily
interest plus attorney’s fees. This money represents the cost of the printing of a
periodical published by the defendant.
Defendant had Encal Press and Photo-Engraving print the periodical.
To facilitate the payment of printing, the defendant obtained credit accomodation from
plaintiff. Thus, for every printing of the periodical, the printer, Encal Press and Photo
Engraving, collected the cost of printing by drawing a draft against the plaintiff, said draft
being sent later to the defendant for acceptance. As an added security for the payment
of the amounts advanced to Encal Press and Photo-Engraving, the plaintiff bank also
required defendant Aruego to execute a trust receipt in favor of said bank wherein said
defendant undertook to hold in trust for plaintiff the periodicals and to sell the same with
the promise to turn over to the plaintiff the proceeds of the sale of said publication to
answer for the payment of all obligations arising from the draft.
The Philippine Bank of Commerce instituted an action against Aruego to recover the
cost of printing of the latter’s periodical.  Aruego however argues that he signed the
supposed bills of exchange only as an agent of the Philippine Education Foundation
Company where he is president.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is an accommodation party and can be held liable.
RULING:
No.
An accomodation party is one who has signed the instrument as maker, drawer,
indorser, without receiving value therefor and for the purpose of lending his name to
some other person. Such person is liable on the instrument to a holder for value,
notwithstanding such holder, at the time of the taking of the instrument knew him to be
only an accommodation party.
In lending his name to the accommodated party, the accommodation party is in effect a
surety for the latter. He lends his name to enable the accommodated party to obtain
credit.
In the instant case, the defendant signed as a drawee/acceptor. Under the NIL, a
drawee is primarily liable. Thus, the defendant should not have signed as an
acceptor/drawee. In doing so, he became primarily and personally liable for the drafts

ADALIA FRANCISCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 116320 November 29, 1999
--agents
FACTS:
A. Francisco Realty & Development Corporation (AFRDC), of which petitioner Francisco
is the president, entered into a Land Development and Construction Contract with
private respondent Herby Commercial & Construction Corporation (HCCC), represented
by its President and General Manager private respondent Ong. Under the contract,
HCCC was to be paid on the basis of the completed houses and developed lands
delivered to and accepted by AFRDC and the GSIS. Sometime in 1979, Ong
discovered that Diaz and Francisco, the Vice-President of GSIS, had executed and
signed seven checks of various dates and amounts payable to HCCC for completed
and delivered work under the contract. Ong, however, claims that these checks were
never delivered to HCCC. It turned out that Francisco forged the indorsement of Ong
on the checks and indorsed the checks for a second time by signing her name at the
back of the checks, petitioner then deposited said checks in her savings account. A
case was brought by private respondents against petitioner to recover the value of said
checks. Petitioner however claims that she was authorized to sign Ong's name on the
checks by virtue of the Certification executed by Ong in her favor giving her the
authority to collect all the receivables of HCCC from the GSIS, including the questioned
checks.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner cannot be held liable on the questioned checks by virtue of the
Certification executed by Ong giving her the authority to collect such checks from the
GSIS.
RULING:
Petitioner is liable. The Negotiable Instruments Law provides that where any person is
under obligation to indorse in a representative capacity, he may indorse in such terms
as to negative personal liability. An agent, when so signing, should indicate that he is
merely signing in behalf of the principal and must disclose the name of his principal;
otherwise he shall be held personally liable. Even assuming that Francisco was
authorized by HCCC to sign Ong's name, still, Francisco did not indorse the instrument
in accordance with law. Instead of signing Ong's name, Francisco should have signed
her own name and expressly indicated that she was signing as an agent of HCCC.
Thus, the Certification cannot be used by Francisco to validate her act of forgery.
Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Equitable Banking Corp.
G.R. No. 74917. January 20, 1988
FACTS:
❖ Equitable Bank drew six crossed manager’s check having an aggregate amount of
P45,982.2, payable to certain member establishments of Visa Card.
❖ Subsequently, the checks were deposited with Banco De Oro (BDO) to the credit of
its
depositor, a certain Aida Trencio . Following normal procedures and after stamping at
the
back of the checks the usual endorsements,BDO sent the checks for clearing through
the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC).
❖ Accordingly, Equitable Banking paid the checks; its clearing account was debited for
the
value of the checks and BDO’s clearing account was credited for the same amount.
❖ Thereafter, Equitable Banking discovered that the endorsements appearing at the
back
of the checks and purporting to be that of the payees were forged and/or unauthorized
or
otherwise belong to persons other than the payees.
❖ Equitable Banking presented the checks directly to BDO for the purpose of claiming
reimbursement from the latter. However, BDO refused to accept such direct
presentation
and to reimburse Equitable Banking for the value of the checks. This prompted BDO to
file a complaint against Equitable and PCHC.
❖ The dispute was presented for Arbitration; After an exhaustive investigation and
hearing
the Arbiter rendered a decision in favor Equitable and PCHC. ordering the PCHC to
debit the clearing account of the defendant, and to credit the clearing account of the
plaintiff of the amount of P45,982.23 with interest.
❖ The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner, the Board of Directors of the
PCHC
affirmed the decision of the said Arbiter. Thus, a petition for review was filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, wherein in due course a decision was rendered
affirming in toto the decision of the PCHC. Hence this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not BDO is estopped from claiming that checks under consideration are
non-negotiable instruments?
2. Whether or not only negotiable checks are within the jurisdiction of PCHC?
3. Whether or not Banco de Oro is negligent and thus responsible for any undue
payment?
HELD:
1. Yes.
❖ Banco de Oro by its own acts, stamped its guarantee is now estopped from
claiming that the checks under consideration are not negotiable instruments.
❖ The Checks were accepted for deposit by Banco de Oro stamping thereon its
guarantee,
in order that it can clear said Checks with Equitable Banking Corp. By s uch deliberate
and positive attitude of Banco de Oro, it has for all legal intents and purposes
treated the said Checks as negotiable instruments and accordingly assumed the
warranty of the endorser when it stamped its guarantee of prior endorsement at
the back.
2. No.
❖ The articles of incorporation of PCHC provide that its operation extend to
“clearing
checks and other clearing items.” No doubt transactions on non negotiable checks
are within the ambit of its jurisdiction . The term, check as used in the said Articles
of
Incorporation of PCHC can only connote checks in general use in commercial and
business activities.
❖ In a previous case, this Court had occasion to rule:“Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos.” Courts not authorized to distinguish where the law makes
no distinctions.
3. Yes.
❖ Although the subject Checks are non-negotiable, the responsibility of petitioner as
endorser thereof remains. While the drawer owes no duty of diligence to the collecting
bank but collecting bank bound to scrutinize checks deposited with it to determine
genuineness and regularity. This Court has succinctly emphasized that the
collecting
bank or last endorser generally suffers the loss because it has the duty to
ascertain the genuineness of all prior endorsements. The collecting bank being
primarily engaged in banking holds itself out to the public as the expert and the
law holds it to a high standard of conduct.
❖ Considering that neither the defendant’s depositor nor the defendant is entitled
to
receive payments for the Checks, payments to any of them give rise to an
obligation
to return the amounts received. Section 2154 of the New Civil Code mandates that
if something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly
delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises.
Gempesaw vs Court of Appeals
Gr No. 92244 February 9, 1993
218 SCRA 682

Facts:
Petitioner Natividad Gempesaw owns and operates four grocery stores located at Rizal
Avenue Extension and at Second avenue, Caloocan City. She maintains a checking
account with the Philippine Bank of Communications (respondent drawee bank) to
facilitate payment to her suppliers. Her customary practice of issuing checks in
payment of her suppliers was as follows: The checks were prepared and filled up as to
all material particulars by her trusted bookkeeper, Alicia Galang. After completing the
checks, Galang submits it to petitioner for her signature, together with the
corresponding invoice receipts which indicate the correct obligation due and payable to
her suppliers. Petitioner signs each check without verifying the accuracy of the checks
against the corresponding invoices because of her trust and confidence on Galang, her
bookkeeper. In the period of two years, in the course of her business operations, she
issued 82 checks in favour of several suppliers. The checks were all presented and
honoured by respondent drawee bank.

All the 82 checks with forged signatures of the payees were brought to Ernest L. Boon,
Chief Accountant of the respondent drawee Bank at the Buendia Branch, who, without
authority therefor, accepted them all for deposit to the accounts of his close friend,
Alfredo Y. Romero and Benito Lam.
On November 7, 1984, petitioner made a written demand on respondent drawee bank
to credit to her account the money value of the 82 checks totalling P1,208,606.89.
Respondent bank refused. On January 23, 1985, petitioner filed a complaint with the
RTC. On November 17, 1987, the RTC dismissed the case. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals in a decision dated February 22, 1990, affirmed the RTC decision. Hence this
petition.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner drawer can recover from respondent drawee bank who paid
the check with a forged indorsement of the payee.

Ruling:
The applicable law is Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. The said section
does not refer only to the forged signature of the maker of a promissory note and of the
drawer of a check. It covers also a forged indorsement, i.e., the forged signature of the
payee or indorsee of a note or check. Since under said provision a forged signature is
“wholly inoperative”, no one can gain title to the instrument through such forged
indorsement. Such an indorsement prevents any subsequent party from acquiring any
right as against any party whose name appears prior to the forgery. Although rights
may exist between and among the parties subsequent to the forged indorsement, not
one of them can acquire rights against parties prior to the forgery. Such forged
indorsement cuts off the rights of all subsequent parties as against parties prior to the
forgery. However, the law makes an exception to these rules where a party is
precluded from setting up forgery as a defense.

As a rule, a drawee bank who has paid a check on which an indorsement has been
forged cannot charge the drawer’s account for the said amount. An exception to this
rule is where the drawer is guilty of such negligence which causes the bank to honor
such a check or checks. This accounts for the rule that although a depositor owes a
duty to his drawee bank to examine his cancelled checks for forgery of his own
signature, he has no similar duty as to forged indorsements. Most of the cases
involving forgery by an agent or employee deal with the payee’s indorsement.

Petitioner failed to examine her records with reasonable diligence whether before she
signed the checks or after receiving the bank statements. Thus, petitioner’s negligence
was the proximate cause of her loss.

The banking business is so impressed with public interest where the trust and
confidence of the public in general is of paramount importance such that the appropriate
standard of diligence must be a high degree of diligence, if not the utmost diligence.
Respondent drawee bank cannot claim it exercised such a degree of diligence that is
required of it. Its liability as obligor is not merely vicarious but primary wherein the
defense of exercise of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees is
of no moment.
Respondent drawee bank is adjudged liable to share the loss with the petitioner on a
fifty-fifty ration in accordance with Article 1172: -“Responsibility arising from negligence
in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may
be regulated by the courts, according to circumstances.”

Case REMANDED to the trial court for the reception of the evidence to determine the
exact loss of the petitioner.

REPUBLIC BANK, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and FIRST NATIONAL CITY

BANK

FACTS:

San Miguel Corporation (SMC for short), drew a dividend Check No. 108854 for
P240, Philippine currency, on its account in the respondent First National City Bank
("FNCB" for brevity) in favor of J. Roberto C. Delgado, a stockholder. After the check
had been delivered to Delgado, the amount on its face was fraudulently and without
authority of the drawer, SMC, altered by increasing it from P240 to P9,240. The
check was indorsed and deposited on March 14, 1966 by Delgado in his account
with the petitioner Republic Bank.

Republic accepted the check for deposit without ascertaining its genuineness and
regularity. Later, Republic endorsed the check to FNCB by stamping on the back of
the check "all prior and/or lack of indorsement guaranteed" and presented it to
FNCB for payment through the Central Bank Clearing House. Believing the check
was genuine, and relying on the guaranty and endorsement of Republic appearing
on the back of the check, FNCB paid P9,240 to Republic through the Central Bank
Clearing House.

SMC notified FNCB of the material alteration in the amount of the check in question.
FNCB lost no time in recrediting P9,240 to SMC. On May 19, 1966, FNCB informed
Republic in writing of the alteration and the forgery of the endorsement of J. Roberto
 C. Delgado. By then, Delgado had already withdrawn his account from Republic.

FNCB demanded that Republic refund the P9,240 on the basis of the latter’s
endorsement and guaranty. Republic refused, claiming there was delay in giving it
notice of the alteration; that it was not guilty of negligence; that it was the drawer’s
(SMC’s) fault in drawing the check in such a way as to permit the insertion of numerals
increasing the amount; that FNCB, as drawee, was absolved of any liability to the
drawer (SMC), thus, FNCB had no right of recourse against Republic.

The trial court rendered judgment ordering Republic to pay P9,240 to FNCB with 6%
interest per annum.

ISSUE:

Whether Republic, as the collecting bank, is protected, by the 24-hour clearing house
rule, found in CB Circular No. 9, as amended, from liability to refund the amount paid by
FNCB, as drawee of the SMC dividend check.

RULING:

Yes, The 24-hour clearing house rule embodied in Section 4(c) of Central Bank Circular
No. 9, as amended, provides:

"Items which should be returned for any reason whatsoever shall be returned directly to
the bank, institution or entity from which the item was received. For this purpose, the
Receipt for Returned Checks (Cash Form No. 9) should be used. The original and
duplicate copies of said Receipt shall be given to the Bank, institution or entity which
returned the items and the triplicate copy should be retained by the bank, institution or
entity whose demand is being returned. At the following clearing, the original of the
Receipt for Returned Checks shall be presented through the Clearing Office as a
demand against the bank, institution or entity whose item has been returned. Nothing in
this section shall prevent the returned items from being settled by direct reimbursement
to the bank, institution or entity returning the items. All items cleared at 11:00 o’clock
A.M. shall be returned not later than 2:00 o’clock P.M. on the same day and all items
cleared at 3:00 o’clock P.M. shall be returned not later than 8:30 A.M. of the following
business day except for items cleared on Saturday which may be returned not later than
8:30 A.M. of the following day.”
The 24-hour clearing house rule is a valid rule applicable to commercial banks
(Republic v. Equitable Banking Corporation, 10 SCRA 8 [1964]; Metropolitan Bank &
Trust Co. v. First National City Bank, 118 SCRA 537).
It is true that when an endorsement is forged, the collecting bank or last endorser, as a
general rule, bears the loss (Banco de Oro Savings & Mortgage Bank v. Equitable
Banking Corp., 167 SCRA 188). But the unqualified endorsement of the collecting bank
on the check should be read together with the 24-hour regulation on clearing house
operation (Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. First National City Bank, supra). Thus,
when the drawee bank fails to return a forged or altered check to the collecting bank
within the 24-hour clearing period, the collecting bank is absolved from liability.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby reversed and set aside, and another is entered absolving the petitioner Republic
Bank from liability to refund to the First National City Bank the sum of P9,240, which the
latter paid on the check in question.