Julius Hall Motion To Correct Sentence

Case 4:01-cv-00183-BAE Document 1 Filed 08/06/01 Page 1 of 122
ORIGINAL
(!'V401 - 18 3
ON UN D E R 28 U S C § 2255 TO V ACATE, SET ASIDE, O R CO RRECT
A0243 (Rev. 5185) MOTI
SEN TENCE BY A PERSO N IN FEDERAL CU STODY
I District
%tta fPS 15 IBi t1`[Lx TIIIIYl Southern
Federa l Co r rectiona l I n s t i t u t ion , PMB 1000 , Talla d ega , Alabama 35160
U NITED STATES OF AMERICA V Jul i u s Ph i llip Ha ll

(name under which convicted)
MOTION
1 . Name and locati on of court which entered the j udgment of conviction under attack U .S . District Court for
the Southern District of Georgia (Savann a h Divisi on ), S avannah, G a .
2 . Date of judgment of conviction Octobe r 11 , 1991
3. Length of sentence _Life imprisonment, reduced to 300 months
4. Nature of offense involved (all counts) Ct . 1 : 21 U .S .C . § 846 ; Cts . 4 & 5 : 18 U .S .C .

1952(a)(3) ; Ct . 10 : 18 U .S .C . 1503, Ct . 14 : 18 U .S .C . § 1623 ; and Ct .
15 : 18 U . S .C . §1956 ( a )( 1)( B) (i )
5 . What was your plea ? ( Check o ne)

(a) Not guilty 0
(b) Guilty O
( c) Nolo contendere D
If you entered a guilty plea to one count or i nd ictment , and a not guilty plea to another count or indictment, gi ve detail s :
6 . If you pl eaded not guilty, what kind of tria l did you have? (Check one )
( a ) Jury B
( b) Judge only 0
7 . Di d y ou testify at the trial?

Yes C& No D
8 . Did yo u appeal fro m the j ud gme nt of convic t io n ?

Yes 0 No 0
(1)
AO 243 (Rev. 5 185 ) ~ R~ .
9. If yo u d i d appeal , answer th e following :
(a) Name of court T h e El eve n t h Ci r cu it Cou r t o f Appea l s
(b) Result D e n ied
(c) D ate of result June of 1993
10 . Other than a direc t appeal from the judgment of c onvi ction and sentenc e , have y ou pre v iou sly filed a ny petitions,
application s or motion s with respect to this judgment in any federal court?
Yes 0 No D
1 1 . If your answ er to 10 was "ye s," g iv e th e following information :
(a )( 1 ) Name of court U .S . District Court ( Savannah Division
(2) Nature of proceeding 3582 motion
(3) Grounds raised Newly devel ope d circumstances which chan ged the
U .S . S .G . § 2D1 .1 .
( 4) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on y our petition, appl i cation or motion?
Yes O No IZ
(5) Result
(6) D ate of result
(b) As to an y second petition , application or motion gi ve the same i nformation:
(1) N ame of court

Y
(2) Nature of proceed ing
(3) Grou nd s
A O 2 4 3 (Rev 5)8 5 )
(4) Did you receive a n evidentiary hearing on your pet ition, application or motion?
Yes 0 No 0
(5)
( 6) Date of result
(c) Did you appeal, to an appe llate federal court having jurisdiction , the result of acti on t aken o n any petition .
application or motion?
(1) First petition, etc . Yes D No 0
(2) Second petition, etc . Yes ONo O
(d ) If you did not appeal from the adver se action on any petition , application or moti o n , explain briefly why you d i d not :
B e c aus e of In effective Ass i stance of Counsel
[ S ee G round F ive and Hal l 's A f fidavit . ]
1 2 . Sta te concis ely every ground on which you claim that you are be i ng h eld i n violation o f the constitution, laws or
tre aties of the United States . Summarize bri efly the facts supporti n g each grou nd . If n ec e ssary, you may a ttach
pages st ating additional grounds and fac ts s upport ing s ame .
Cnu 'noN: If you fail to set forth all i n t h is b e barred from presenting additional
For your information, the following is a list of the most frequently raised grounds for relief in these proceedings ., Each
statement preceded by a letter constitutes a separate ground for possible relief . You may raise any grounds which you have
otherthan those listed . However, you should raise in this motion all available grounds (relating to this conviction) on which
you based your allegations that you are being held in custody unlawfully .
Do not check any of these listed grounds . If you select one or more of these grounds for relief , you must allege facts . The
motion will be returned to you if you merely check (a) through (j) or any one of the grounds .
(a) Conviction obtained by plea of guilty which was unlawfully induced or not made voluntarily or with understanding of
the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea .
(b) Conviction obtained by use of coerced confession .
AO 243 ( Rev . 5 / 85 )
(c) Conviction obtained by use of evidence ga ined pur suant to an uncon sdwtiona l s earch and se i zure .
(d ) Con v i ction obtained by use of evidence obt ained pursuant to an unlawful arrest .
(e) C on vi ction obtained by a violation of the p r ivi lege again st self-i ncri m i natio n.
(f) Co n victi on obtained by the unconstitut io nal fail ure of the prosecuti on to d isc lose to t he defendant e vid en ce fa vorabl e
to t he defendant .
(g) Convi ction obtained by a violation of the protection against double j eopardy.
(h) Conviction obtai ned by action of a grand or petit jury wh ich was unconstitutionally selected a n d i mpanelled .
(i) Denia l of effec tiv e ass istanc e o f co un s e l .
0) Deni al of right of appeal .
A. Ground one: [See Atta che d M emorandum .
Supporting FACTS (state briefly without citing cases or law)
B. Ground two :
Supporting FACTS (state briefly without citing cases or law) :
C. Ground three :
Supporting FACTS (state briefly wit hout c iting cases or law ):
(5)
A O 243 (Rev 5/ 85 )
D . Ground four :
Supporting FACTS (state briefly without citing cases or law ) :
13 . If any of th e grounds l is ted i n 1 2A , B , C , and D were not previous ly presented , state briefly wh at gro und s were not so
presented , and give your rea s ons fa r n o t presenting t hem :
Apprendi V . New Jersey , 120 S . Ct . 23 4 8 (2000)
14 . Do you have any petit io n o r appeal now pendi ng in an y court as to t he judgment u nder attack?
Ye s 0 No 0
15 . Give the name and addr e ss, if known, of each attorney who represente d you in the following stages of the judgment attacked
herein :
David Roberson
( a) At prel im inary hearing
s
21 W est P ark Avenue
Savannah, Georgia 31401

(b) At arraignment and plea
(c)At trial [same]
[same]
( d) At s entencing
(F )
AO 2 43 (Rev 5/85 )
(e) On appea l (same]
(fl I n any p ost-convic tion proceedi ng None
(g) On appe al from any advers e ruling in a post-conviction proc eeding None
1 6 . Were you s entenc ed on more than one count o f an indictment, or on more than one i ndi ctment, i n the same court and at
approximately the same time?
Ye s M No0
17 . Do you have any future sentence to serv e after you c omplete the s entenc e impo s ed by the j udgment under a ttac k?
Yes ONo 0
(a) If s o, give name and location of court whi c h i mpos ed s entence to be served in the future :
(b) Gi ve d ate an d length of the a b ove s entence:
( c) Have you filed, or do you contemplate fili ng , any petition attacking the judgment which impo sed tht sentence to be
served i n the future?
Yes O No O
Whe refore , movan t prays that the Court grant him all r eli ef to wh ich he may b e entitled in this proceed ing .
N/A
Signature of Attorney (if any)
1
I declare under pena lty of perjury that the fo regoing is true a nd correct. Exec uted on
7-12-6-0/
(d ate) ~~
Sig nature of M ovant
l~l. Vlu.l~e .ct-

AFFIDAVIT OR DECLARATION
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION F OR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
I, .ruiius P . Hall , am the petitioner in the above-entitled case. In support of my

motion to proceed in forma pauperis, I state that because of my poverty I am unable to pay the
costs of this case or to give security therefor; and I believe I am entitled to redress .
1. For both you and your spouse estimate the average amount of money received from each of tj
following sources during the past 12 months . Adjust any amount that was received weekly,
biweekly, quarterly, semiannually, or annually to show the monthly rate . Use gross amounts,
that is, amounts before any deductions for taxes or otherwise .
Income source Average monthly amount during Amount expected

the past 12 months next month
You Spouse You Spouse
Employment $A- $ $ O $ N A
Self-employment $_o $ N/A $ 0 $ N /A
Income from real property $__E_ $ o $ o N /A

(such as rental income)
Interest and dividends $ o
G ifts $ o
Alimony $ 0
Child Support
Retirement (such as social $_ 0

security, pensions,
annuities, insurance)
Disability ( such as social $ 0

security, insurance payments)
Unemployment payments $_0
Public-ass istance $ o $
(such as welfare)
Other (specify) : _$ 0
Total monthly income : $ 0 9
,. .
2. List your employment history for the past tw o years, most recent first . (G ross monthly pay is
before taxes or other deductions .)
Employer Address Dates of Gross monthly p ay

Employment
N/A
3. Li st your spouse 's employment hist ory fo r the past two years , most recent e mployer first. (G ross
monthly pay is before taxes or other deductions.)
Employer Address Dates of Gross monthly pay

Employment
N/A
4. How much cash do you and your spouse have? $ a

Below, state any money you or your spouse have in bank accounts or in any other financial
institution .
Financial institution Type of account Amount you have Amount your spouse has
N/A $ $
$ $
5 . List the assets , and their values , whi ch you own or your spouse owns . Do not list clothing a nd
ordinary household furnishings .
Home 0 Other real estate

Value N/A Value
0 Motor Vehicle #1 D Motor Vehicle #2

Year, make & model Year , make & mode(
Value Value
Other assets
Description N/A
Value
6 . State eve ry person, business, or organization owing you or your spouse money, and the am ot
owe d . N/A
P e rson owing you or Amount owed to you Amount owed to your spouse
your spouse money
S
7. State the persons who rely on you or your spouse for support.
Nam e Relationship Age
N/A
8. Estimate the average monthly expen ses of you and your family. Show separately the
amounts paid by your spouse. Adjust any payments that are .m ade weekly, biweekly, quarterly,
or annually to show the monthly r ate.
You Your spouse
$ NIA
Rent or home-mortgage payment
(include lot rented for mobile home)
Are real estate taxes included? D yes 0 no
Is property insurance included? D yes 13 no
Utilities (electricity, heating fuel,

water, sewer, and telephone) $ $
Home mainte nance (repairs and upkeep) $ 0
Food ~ 0
Clothing $ o
Laundry and dry-cleaning $ Q

$
Medical and dental expenses 0 $
M You Your spouse
Transportation (not including motor vehicle payments) $ 0 $ -
Recreation, entertainment, newspapers, magazines, etc . $ a $
Insurance (not deducted from wages or included in mortgage payments)
Homeowner's or renter's $ N/A $
Life $ $
Health $ $
Motor Vehicle $ $
Other: $ $
Ta xes (not deducted from wages or included in mortgage payments)

(specify)- N/A ~
Installment payments
$_/A
Motor Vehicle
Credit card(s)
Department store(s)
Other :
Alimony, mainte nance, and support paid to others
Regular expenses for operation of business, profession,

or farm (attach detailed statement) $ ~
Other (specify) : N/A $ y
Total monthl y expenses : $ 0 $

9. Do you expect any major changes to your monthly income or expenses or in your assets or
liabilities during the next 12 months?
Dyes 29 no If yes, describe on an atta ched sheet.
10. Have you paid - or will you be paying - an attorney any money for services in connection with
this case, including the completion of this form? yes n
~
If yes, how much?
If yes, state the attorney's name, address, and telephone number.
11. Have you paid - or will you be paying - anyone other than an attorney (such as a paralegal or a
typist) any money for services in connection with this case, including the completion of this form?
0 yes M no
If yes, how much?
If yes, state the person's name , address, and t elephone numb er:
12. Provide any other information that will help explain why you cannot pay the costs of this case .
I am currently in prison and is unable
to generate any income .
I declare under penalty of perj ury that the foregoing is true and co rrec t.
Executed on : juiv 23rd 2001
A VlUJJ ~
CAS E NO :
IN THE U N ITED STATES DI STR ICT COURT

FO R THE S OU THE RN DI ST RICT OF G E ORG I A
S AVA NNAH DIV I S IO N
JULIUS PHILLIP HALL,

Appellant / Movant,
V .S .
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee / Respondent .
MOTIO N FO R LEAVE TO FIL E FIRST 2 255 MOTI O N TO VACATE ,

SET ASI D E, OR CORRECT AN I LLEGAL SENTE NCE
a
JULIUS P . HALL
Pro se
Reg . No . 07594-085
PMB 1000
Talladega, Alabama 35160
Table o f C onte nts
P age
Table of Contents i,
Index of Authorities iii,iv,v,l
Statement of Grounds Presented i,ii,2,3,1
Statement of the Case 4, 5, 6 .
Statement of Facts 6, 7, 8, 9.
Arguments 9,-48 .
Ground One
I. "A watershed change in Constitution al law," A pp re n di v .
United Stat e s, U .S ._, _, 2000, Cr i minal Law Rep o rter, Vol .
67, No . 13 @ 487 (June 28, 2000), Justice Sandr a Day O'Conner
(joined by Rehnquist dissenting) . Whether the government failed
to provide true notice of sentencing exposure by indictment when
the tri al court did not en j oin the prosecution to present to the
jury the type and amount of drugs requisite to be proven beyond a
reaso nable doubt . which subsequentl y increased Petitioner's
s tatutory maximum sentenc e by thre efold ; whether Petitioner's
maximum penalty sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, and denied equal
prote ct ion and due pr oc e ss r„ law via def e ctive indictment andt-;
ac tu a l innocence .
Ground Two
Whe ther the sentence i s in excess of the maximum authorized
by law, with a general verdict for controlled substance
conspiracy covering multiple drugs require sentencing for the
i
drug ca rryin g the lowest penal ty? Pet i ti oner claims the court
applied the wrong statutory maximum and mandatory minimum
sentenc e pena l ty was us ed i n mu lt ipl e dr ug c onspiracy c as e .
Ground Three
Whether multiple-drug-type distribution for counts one,
four, five and fifteen were duplicative, for double-jeopardy
purposes, of counts which charged defendant, base on same conduct
of conspiracy?
Ground Four
Whether the Court improperly applie d the Fou r Level
Enhance ment fo r Organizer L eade r ship Ro le , p ur s u ant to U .S . S . G .
Section 3 B1 . 1(a) wa s unconstitutional and unwarra nte d, in
violation of P e titioner 's Fifth Amendment right to d ue process ,
"not to be s entenc ed on fa lse and unrel iable information or
facts which were not charged in the ind ictment o r deter mined by a
jury and proven b eyond a reasonable doubt?"
Ground Five
Ineffective assistance of counsel, p rio r to tria l , at t rial,
at sente n cing, an d on d irect appeal .
ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Agan V . Dugger, 83 5 F .2d 1 337 , 1 33 8 (11th C ir . 1 987 ) . . . . . . . . . . 46
Armstrong V . United States
51 7 U .S . 456, 464, 1 34 L .E d .2 d 687 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Apprendi v . New Jersey
-U .S ._ . No . 99 _478 (June 28, 2000) . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . i-48
Bailev v . United States, 516 U .S . 137 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . 7,8
3 Blackstone 396
Blockbuger v . United States, 284 U .S . 299, 52 S .Ct . 180 (1932) . 29
Bousley v . United States
523 U .S . 614, 118 S .Ct . 1604, 1610 (1998) . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 6-8
C r onic , 46 6 U . S . 658, 10 4 S .Ct . 20 46 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38,39,4
D avis v . United States , 4 17 U . S . 33 (197 4) . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Dixon v . Uni t ed S tates , 509 U . S . 688 , 696 , 113 S .Ct . 2849 (1993) 29
E dwards v . United S tates , U . S ._, 118 S . Ct . 1 4 75 , 1477 (1998) 1 - 47
Evitts v . Lucey , 8 3 L . Ed . 2d 821 ( 1985 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
FU's . : « . Dugger, 874 F .2d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir . 1989) . . . . . . . . . . 46
Griffin v . United States, 502 U .S . 46, 56-57 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
flames v . Kerner , 404 U .S . 519, 520 (1972) . . . . . .• . .•• . .•• .•• .• 1
Jones v . United States, 143 L .Ed .2d 311 (1999) . .. ... . .. . . . . ... 1-47
Johnson v . Singletary, 938 F .2d 1166 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .• 1
Johnson v . United States, 520 U .S . 461, 467, 117 S .Ct . 1544 • . . 28
Lierena-Acosta v . United States , 511 U .S . 1011, 114 S .Ct . 1385 . 30
Mason v . Hanks, 97 F .3d 887, 902 (7th Cir . 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Mattire v . Wainwr i ght, 811 F .2d 1430 (11th Cir . 1987) . . . . . . . . . . 38,45
McMillian v . Pennsylvania, 477 U .S . 79 (1986) . . . .••••••••••••• . 11
Montemoino v . U .S ., 68 F .3d 416 (11th Cir . 1995) . . . .• . . . . .•••• 40
iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES (Con't . I)
O r a z io v . D u gge r, 876 F .2d 1508 , 15 10 ( 11th C ir . 198 9 ) . . . . . . . . 45

P eople v . B owen , 93 L .Ed .2d 5 97 (198 6 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Ri ver 's V . Ro a dway Ex p ress I nc .
511 U .S . 113 S .Ct . 1250 ( 1 993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Roe v . Flores-Ortega, 145 L .Ed .2d 985 (2000) . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . 46
Russell v . United States, 369 U .S . 749, 763-64, 825 S .Ct . 1038 9
Stano v . bugger, 901 F .2d 898, 899 (11th Cir .) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39,4'
Strickland v . Washington, 80 L .Ed .2d 674 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38,4 :
Thomas v . United States
U .S ._, 121 S .Ct . 749, L .Ed .2d (2001) . . . . . . . . . 2-36

Townsend V . Burke, 92 L .Ed .1690 (1948) . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . .. . . . 34
Townsend v . Sain, 91 L .Ed .2d 777 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
United-States V . Tucker, 30 L .Ed .2d 592 (1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
U .S . V . Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F .3d 926, 67 CrL 627 (8th Cir . 2000) 12,3 `
U .S . v . Barnes, 158 F .3d 662, 668 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
U . S . v . B ass
U .S .D .C .N .D . Fla . Pensacola . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
U .S . v . Bell, 154 F .3d 1205, 1209-12 (10th Cir . 1998) . . . . . . . . . 15
U .S . v . Bounds, 985 F .2d 188, 194-95 (5th Cir . 1993) . . . . . . . . . . 19
U .S . v . Connellere, 69 F .3d 1 116, 1121 (11th Cir . 1995) . . . . . . . 11
U .S . v . Cook, 45 F .3d 388, 395 (10th Cir . 1995) . . . . . . . . . . .•••• 45
U . S . v . C ox, 9 57 F . 2 d 26 4, 265 ( 6th Cir . 1992 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .' 17
U . S . V . Da le , 178 F . 3 d 42 9 (6th C ir . 1999 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .•••• 15,1
U. S . v . Fish er , 22 F . 3d 57 4 , 576 (5t h C i r . 199 4) . . . . . . . . . . . .•• 16
U .S . v . Fitzgerald , 89 F .3d 21 8 (5th Cir . 1996 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .• 40
U .S . v . Freyre-Lazaro, 3 F .3d 1507 (11th Cir . 1993) . . . . . . . . . .• 19
U .S . v . Garcia, 37 F .3d 1357, 1369-71 (9th Cir . 1984) . . . . .•••• 30
iv
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES (Con't . II)
U .S . v . G ayto n, 7 4 F . 3 d 5 4 5 , 552 ( 5 th Ci r . 19 96) . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 9
U .S . v . Hester, 199 F .3d 1287 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 8-36
U .S . V . Kakatin, 214 F .3d 1051 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
U .S . V . Lloyd, 188 F .3d 184, 187 (3rd Cir . 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
U .S . v . Martin, 81 F .3d 1083 (11th Cir . 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
U .S . v . Moreno , 181 F .3d 206 (2nd Ci r . 1999) . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . .. 19
U .S . V . Nagib, 56 F .3d 798 (7th C ir . 1995) . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39,40
U . S . V . Newman , 817 F .2d 635 (10th Ci r . 1987) . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 14,15
U . S . V . Nordby , 6 7 CrL 755 (9th Ci r . 2000 ) . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. 12
U .S . v . Or ozco -P rada, 732 F . 3d 1 07 6, 10 8 3 -84 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15,1
U . S . v . Owens , 9 0 4 F .2 d 4 11, 4 1 4- 15 ( 8 th Cir . 1990) . . . . . . . ... . 19
U . S . v . Ph illips , 2 10 F . 3 d 345 , 353 ( 5th Cir . 2 0 00) . . . . . . . . .• . 45
U . S . V . R andolph , 2 3 0 F .3 d 243 (6th Ci r . 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .•• 19
U.S. V . Rebmann, 67 CrL 731 (6t h Cir . 2000 ) . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . ..• • 12
U . S . v . Riley , 1 4 2 F .3d 1254 ( 11th Ci r . 1998) . . . . . . .• ••••••• •• 1-47
U .S . v . Rogers
F .3d , 2000 WL 1451907 (11th Cir . Sept . 29, 2000) •• 11
U .S . V. Scott, 987 F .2d 266 (5th Cir . 1993) . . . . . . . . . .• .••••••• 30
U .S . v . Thomas Fields
99-3138, 99-3139, U .S . District of Columbia (No . _'
98-cr -00071-01)(No . 98 cr00071 -06) . . . . . . . . . . . . .••••••••• 37
U .S . v . Valdez , 1 9 5 F . 3d 5 4 4, 5 4 6 - 547 (9th Cir . 1999 ) •• •• •• •• • 7
Statutes
Title 18 U .S .C . section 2
T itle 18 U . S .C . section 7 ( c ) (1)
v
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES (Con't . III)
Titl e 18 U .S .C . section 924(c)
Tit le 18 U .S .C . section 1 503
Tit le 18 U .S .C . section 1623
Tit le 18 U .S .C . section 1952
Title 18 U .S .C . s ection 1956(a)(1)
Ti tl e 1 8 U .S .C . section 3582(c)
Titl e 21 U .S .C . sect ions 841, 846
Titl e 28 U .S .C . section 2255
Other
A .E .D .P .A ., April 24, 1996
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
Rule 35(b) FRCrP
Rule 52(b)
U .S .S .G . 2D1 .1
U .S .S .G . 251 .1(a)(2)
U .S .S .G . 3B1 .1(a)
U .S .S .G . 3D1 .2(a), (b), and (c)
U .S .S .G . 3D1 .3
vi
I N THE UNITE D STATES D ITRI CT COU RT

FOR THE SOUT HE RN D I S TRI C T OF GEO RGIA
SAVANNAH D IVI S I O N
J ULI US P HI LLI P S HA LL ,
Ap p e l la nt / Movant,
-v . s .- Case No .
Criminal Case No . :CR491-00111-002
UN IT ED S TATE S O F AMERI CA,

Ap p el lee/Re s ponde n t s .
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF

. . . MOTION TO FILE FIRST 2255 MOTION TO VACATE, SET ASIDE,
OR CORRECT AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE IN THE DISTRICT COURT
INTERPOSING JONES V . UNITED STATES , 526----U .S .----,
119 S .Ct . 1215 143 L .Ed .2d 311 (1999) ; APPRENDI V .
NEW JERSEY , U .S . , No . 99-478 (JUNE 28, 2000) ;
EDWARDS V . UNITED STATES , U .S . , 118 S .Ct . 1475, 1477, (1998) ;
UNITED STATES V . RILEY, 142 F .3d 1234 (11th Cir . 1998) ;
JOHNSON V . SINGLETARY, 938 F .2d 1166 (1991) (ACTUALLY
INNOCENT OF PENALTY IMPOSED), AND : DAVIS V .
UNITED STATES , 417 U .S . 333 (1974) .
Comes now, appellant-movant, Julius Phillip Hall, pro se,and in durance tti1le,
interposing Haines v . Kerner, 404 U .S . 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam), and respectfully
moves this honorable court pursuant to Jones v . U .S ., 526 U .S ._, 119 S .Ct . 1215,
143 L .Ed .2d 311 (1999) ; Apprendi v . New Jersey, U .S .`, No . 99-478 (June 28, 2000) ;
Edwards v . United States, U .S . 118 S .Ct . 1475, 1477 (1998) ; U .S . v . Riley,
142 F .3d 1234 (11th Cir . 1998) ; Johnson v . Singletary, 938 F .2d 1166 (1991) (actually
innocent of penalty imposed) for leave to file first 2255 or second or successive
motion under 38 U .S .C . § 2255 (3) .
-1-
REASONS FOR GRAN T ING FIRST 225 5 M OT I ON TO VACA TE , SET ASIDE ,

O R CO R REC T A N I L LEGAL SE NTEN CE .
Ground One
"A watershed change in constitutional law," Apprendi V . New
Jersey, U .S ._, 2000, criminal Law Reporter, Vol . 67, No .
13 @ 489 (June 28, 2000), Justice Sandra Day O'Conner (joined by
Rehnquist, dissenting) . Whether the government failed to provide
true notice of sentencing exposure by indictment when the trial
court did not enjoin the prosecution to present to the jury the
type and mount of drugs requisite to be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, which subsequently increased Movant's statutory
maximum sentence by threefold, Movant's maximum penalty sentence
was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States which denied equal protection and due process of
law via defective indictment, and actually innocent of the
penalty imposed .
Prior to Apprendi, the law held that "the quantity of drugs
involved in a section 841 offense remains a sentencing factor to
be determined by the district Judge ." United States v . Thomas,
204 F .3d 381, 384 (2000)(per curiam) . However, the Supreme
Court vacated Thomas, along with similar opinions by circuits and
remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Apprendi . See
Thomas v . United States, U .S . , 121 S .Ct . 749, L .Ed .2d_
(2001) ; see also, e .g ., United States v . Hester, 199 F .3d 1287,
1291-92 (11th Cir .), vacated and remanded, U .S ._, 121 S .Ct .
336, 148 L .Ed .2d 270 (2000) ; United States v . Jones, 194 F .3d
1178, 1186 (10th Cir . 1999), vacated and remanded, U .S ._,
2
120 S . Ct . 2739 , 1 4 7 L .Ed .2d 1 0 0 2 ( 2 000 ) on rema nd 235 F . 3 d 1 2 3 1,
1 2 36-37 (1 0th C ir . 2000 ) (f indi ng that fa ilu r e t o i nc lude drug
q uantity in a i ndictme n t for dr ug di str ibution under 2 1 U . S .C .
Se ction 8 4 1 ( a ) an d to pres en t the quest ion to t he j ury vi olated
Appre nd i .) "[T]he judgment, though pron o u nc ed or awarded by the
j udge s, is not th e ir d etermination or sentenc e , but the
d e term inatio n and the sent e nce of t he law ." 3 Blac k stone 396
( e mpha sis dele ted) . Apprendi v . New Jersey, U .S . 2 0 00,
Crim i n al Law Reporte r, Vol . 67, No . 13 @ 487 (June 28, 20 00 ) .
Ground Two
Whether the sentence is in excess of the maximum authorized
by law, with a general verdict for controlled substance
conspiracy covering multiple drugs require sentencing for the
drug carrying the lowest penalty? Petitioner contends the court
sentence penalty was used in multiple-drug conspiracy case .
Ground Th r ee
Whether multiple-drug-types distribution for counts one,
Four, Five and Fifteen were duplicative, for double- j eopardy
purposes, of counts which charged defendant, based on same
conduct of consp i racy?
Ground Four
Whether the Court improperly applied the Four Level
Enhancement for O r ganizer Leadership Role, pu r suant to U .S . S . G .
Section 3B1 .1(a) was unconstitutional and unwa r ranted, in
3
violatio n of P et i t io ne r's F ifth Amendment ri g ht to du e proce ss,
" not to be sen te nc e d on fal se and un reliab le information o r facts
whi ch we re not c har ged in the indictmen t or determi ned by a j ury
and proven beyond a re a son ab le doubt ? " Apprendi .
Ground F ive
Ineffe c t ive Assist a nce of Counsel, pri or to trial, at tr i al,
a t sente ncin g , and on direct appeal .
STATE M ENT OF THE CASE
Statement of the P roceedings
On June 7, 1991, a fifteen count sealed indictment was
returned against Julius P . Hall [hereinafter Hall] and others
charging violations of various federal statutes (R1-15) . The
indictment charged Hall in six of the fifteen counts : Count one,
Conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribution
of controlled substances (R1-15-1)t Count four, unlawful
interstate travel (R1-15-9) : Count five, unlawful interstate
travel (R1-15-10) ; Count ten, obstruction of justice (R1-15-13) ;
Count fourteen, false declarations before the federal grand jury
(R1-15-15) ; and Count fifteen, money laundering (R1-15-17) .
On July 2, 1991, Hall was arraigned and retained counsel
entered his appearance (R2-104, 105) . Within twenty (20) days
after arraignment, Hall timely filed his pre-trial motions
(R2-129) through (R2-142) . On August 8, 1991, the Federal Grand
Jury at Savannah, Georgia returned a superseding indictment
essentially charging Hall with the same offenses as the original
4
indict me n t (R2 - 15 4) . The n, on Septembe r 13 , 199 1, th e Fed er al
Gr and Jury sitti ng at Savan n ah , Geo rgia returne d a secon d
sup e r se di ng in di c tme nt aga i ns t Ha l l an d o t hers essentiall y
charging the same offenses as the original indictment .
On Septembe r 26, 1 9 9 1 , th e gove rnmen t made it s fi rs t
Brady/ Gig lio di sclo sure (R4-2 0 8) . Thereaft er, o n O c tober 2,
19 9 1 , the gove rnme nt made its secon d Brady/ Gigil o d i sclo sure
(R5- 2 2 9 ) . Pr eviously, on S eptemb e r 24, 1991, the gove rnme nt made
its fourth supplemental statemen t re garding di s c ov e ry (R3-206) .
After the trial cour t set the tr i a l down for O ctober 7,
1991, Hall moved for a continuan ce on Octob e r 1, 1 9 9 1 (R4-226) .
The court d enied Hal l 's motion (R4-240) . Th e t rial commenc ed on
October 7 , 1991, resulting in a verdict of guilty on all counts
charged as to Hall (R5-267) . Hall timely mov e d for a new tr ial
or j udgment notwithstanding the jury verdict (R5-275) . Hall also
time ly filed a motion for arrest of j udgment (R 6 -276) . All
moti ons were denied by the trial court (R6-299) .
Judgme nt was entered upon the jury verdict and H al l was
comm i tted to the custody of the Unit e d St a t e s Bure a u of Pr i sons
as follows : Count 1, life imprisonment ; 60 months as to counts
4, 5, 10, and 14 ; 240 month s a s to counts 1 5 . All sen t enc e s were
imposed to r un concurrently (R6-302 - 2) . Hall remains
incarc e rated wi thin the custody of the Unit e d Stat e s Bur e au of
Pr i sons .
On D ecemb e r 1 3 , 199 1 , Hall timely no ted his appea l to this
Court (R6-306) . Hall's direct a ppea l to th e 1 1th Cir . Court o f
Appeal s was denied in June of 1993 .
5
On November 23, 1992, the government filed a motion pursuant
to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 35(b),
requesting a reduction in the defendant's sentence based on
substantial assistance rendered . However, the district court
denied the motion on May 18, 1994 .
On February 12, 1998, the government again filed a motion
pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 35(b),
requesting a reduction in the defendant's sentence based on
substantial assistance rendered .
On April 13, 1998, the district court believes the sentence
of life imprisonment imposed on Count 1 of the defendant's
indictment should be reduced ; as such the government's motion is
Granted, and the Court reduces the sentence imposed as to Count 1
of the defendant's indictment to a term of 340 (three hundred
forty) months, to be concurrent with the sentences imposed on
Counts 4, 5, 10, 14, and 15 .
On Ju ne 1 , 1998, defendant Hall filed a motion for
reconsideration . However, the Court after extended revi ew,
concluded that the sentence should be reduced to 300 months on
February 5 , 199 9 .
On of July , 2001 , Hall timely no t e d this motion to this court .
S TATEME NT OF FACTS
The Supreme Court has not specifica lly ruled that the direct
appeal decisions in APA rendi, Jones , Castillo, or Richardson are
retroactive on collate ral review . This is technically correct,
but irrelevant since Bousley pronounced that statutory
6
construction decisions are always retroactive since they state
what the law always was . See Rivers v . Roadway Express , infra .
The Supreme Court's recognition of a statutory right should
suffice under § 2255(3) . In United States v . Valdez , 195 F .3d
544, 546-547 (9th Cir . 1999), the Court allowed a defendant to
file his first § 2255 motion long past the one-year limitation
based on the new United States Supreme Court decision in .Bailey
regarding "use" of a firearm under Title 18 U .S .C . § 924(c) . The
Court was forced to permit this filing because of the later
decision in Bousley v . United States, 523 U .S . 614, 118 S .Ct .
1604, 1610 (1998) making Bailey specifically retroactive on
collateral review . See also United States v . Lloyd, 188 F .3d
184, 187 (3rd Cir . 1999) .
This motion could be looked upon as a first 2255 in the case
herein because counsel Robertson failed and did not advise Hall
of his right to appeal the appellate court decision or his right
to file 2255, pursuant to the (A .E .D .P .A .) Anti-terrorism Act of
April 24, 1996 . Hall did not know of these rights before counsel
induced Hall to seek substantial assistance with the government .
The Supreme Court decision on statutory construction is
always retroactive . Rivers v . Roadway Express Inc ., 511 U .S ._,
113 S .Ct . 1250 (1993) . When the Supreme Court "construes a
statute, it is explaining its understanding of what the statute
has meant continuously since the date when it became law ." Id .,
113 S .Ct . at 1264 . The decision of the Court as to what a
certain statute has always meant serves to "explain why the
Courts of Appeals had misinterpreted the will of the enacting
7
Congress ." Id .
There are new rulings on criminal procedure, substantive
law, and decision defining the terms of statutes . New rules on
criminal procedure are not retroactive on habeas or collateral
review unless specifically made so in the Court's ruling .
However, in Bousley v . United States, 523 U .S . 614, 118 S .Ct .
1604, 1610 (1998) .
The United States Supreme Court held that a defendant is
authorized under Title 28 U .S .C . § 2255's exception to file such
a motion where there is a new decision from the United States
Supreme Court that correctly interprets the language of a statute
in that instance, the case was Bailey v . United States, 516 U .S .
137 (1995), which defined the meaning of "use" of a firearm in 18
U .S .C . § 924(c) . The court held that claims based on pre-Baffle
convictions were properly raised on habeas petitions . Baffle
stated only what the statute had meant since the date the statue
was enacted .
Prior to Apprendi (2000), the Court held that "the quantity
of drugs involved in a section 841 offense remains a sentencing
factor to be determined by the district Judge ." United States V .
Thomas, 204 F .3d 381, 384 (2000)(per curiam) . However, the
Supreme Court vz~caied Thomas, along with similar upinions by
other circuits, and remanded the case for reconsideration in
light of Apprendi . See Thomas v . United States, U .S ._, 121
S .Ct . 749, L .Ed .2d_ (2001) ; see also, e .g ., U .S• v . Hester,
199 F .3d 1287, 1291-92 (11th Cir .), vacated and remanded, U .S .
_, 121 S .Ct . 336, 148 L .Ed .2d 207 (2000) ; United states v .
8
Jones, 19 4 F .3d 1178 , 11 8 6 (1 0th Ci r . 19 9 9), v a c ated a n d
remanded, U .S . _ , 120 S .Ct . 2739, 147 L .Ed .2d 1002 (2000), on
r e mand 2 35 F . 3 d 1 231 , 1 236 -37 (1 0th Ci r . 2 00 0) ( fi ndi ng that
fa il ure to inc lude drug quan t i ty in an i ndictme nt for drug
di stribut ion under 2 1 U .S . C . 841( a ) and to presen t the ques tion
to th e j ury v i o late d App rendi) .
Ground On e
Apprendi, (2000)("A watershed change in constitutional
Law"), whether Hall's maximum penalty sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States and
denied equal protection and due process of the law via defective
indictment, and actual innocence of the higher drug penalty?
When an indictment's failure to charge an offense
constitutes a jurisdictional defect?
Because an indictment is jurisdictional, defendants at any
time may raise an objection to the indictment based on failure to
charge an offense .
To be sufficient, an indictment must allege each material
element of the offense ; if it does not, it fails to charge that
offense . See United States v . Gayton, 74 F .3d 545, 552 (5th Cir .
1996) ; see also Russell v . United States , 369 U .S . 749, 763-64,
825 S .Ct . 1038, 8 L .Ed .
This requirement stems directly from one of the central
purposes of an indictment . To ensure that the grand jury finds
probable cause that the defendant has committed each element of
9
the offense, hence justifying a trial, as required by the Fifth
Amendment .
Petitioner avers his indictment's citation of statute
setting forth offense of control substance violation was
insufficient in itself to substitute for indictment's failure to
include offense drug amount element . Statutory citation,
standing alone can not substitute for failure to include all the
elements of a crime in an indictment . The failure to allege the
drug amount element of the element of the offense is not a
technical error, but rather is violative of the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fifth Amendment and procedural
requirements of F .R .C .P . Rule 7(c)(1) and specifically of the
principles enunciated in the Apprendi ruling, and thus requires
dismissal of the Defective Indictment .
Petitioner argues, and establishes by the record, that the
government failed to provide true notice of the maximum
sentencing exposure by indictment ; and denied Petitioner a
fundamentally fair trial when it failed to present the type and
amount of drugs for the jury's consideration, to be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt, where the penalty provisions of 21 U .S .C .
section 841 provides escalating sentencing exposure depending
upon the type and amount of drugs .
The Due Process and Equal Protection of Laws' Clauses of the
Fifth Amendment and the jury trial guarantees under The Sixth
Amendment, requires any fact, other than the prior convictions,
which increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged
10
in the indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt . Petitioner respectfully submits Jones v .
United States, 526 U .S .,, 119 S .Ct . 1215, 143 L .Ed .2d 311
(1999), and Apprendi v . United States, Û .S ._, (2000),
Criminal Law Reporter, Vol . 67, No . 13 @ 487 (June 28, 2000),
applies to sentences for violation of 21 U .S .C . Sections 841 and
846 under U .S .S .G . 2D1 .1 . "A fundamental principle stemming from
the Fifth Amendment is that a defendant can only be convicted for
a crime charged in the indictment ." United States v . Canellere,
69 F .3d 1116 @ 1121 (11th Cir . 1995) . In the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, U .S . v . Rogers, F .3d ._, 2000 WL 1451907
(11th Cir . Sept . 29, 2000), the court stated that Apprendi
applies to section 841(a) . In an opinion by Judge Gerald B .
Tjoflat, the Eleventh Circuit began by tracing the development of
the Apprendi rule from the court's decision in McMillian v .
Pennsylvania, 477 U .S . 79 (1986), through Jones v . United States,
526 U .S . 227, 64 CrL 512 (1999) .
In United States v . Hester, 199 F .3d 1287 (2000), the
Eleventh Circuit interpreted Jones without the guidance of the
later decision in Apprendi . As a matter of statutory
construction, the Hester court ruled that Section 841(b), which
sets out the penalties for violations of Section 841(a), requires
sentencing judges rather than juries to make findings as to
sentence enhancing drug quantities . In light of Apprendi, the
Supreme Court reversed and remanded Hester, U .S .____ . 2000 WL
2797322 (U .S . Oct . 16, 2000) . In overruling its prior decision
of Hester in the Roger's case, the Eleventh Circuit said, "[I]t
11
is clear that Apprendi applies to drug cases and that the
prescribed statutory maximum for a drug offense must be
determined without regard to quantity . The court explained :
"This means that Sections 841(b)(1)(A) and 841(b)(1)(B)

may not be utilized for sentencing without a finding of
drug quantity by the jury . If a provision of Section
841(b) that does not contain a quantity amount applies,
for example, Section 841(b)(1)(C), then a convicted
defendant ma p still be sentenced under that provision ."
The court went on the state : "In light of Hester's determination
that Section 841 is not ambiguous and given to alternate
interpretation, we must conclude that principles of statutory
construction alone cannot resolve this case, and that the
constitutional issue decided by Apprendi is starkly presented ."
See also United States v . Nordby, F .3d ._, No . 99-10191 (9th
Cir . Sept . 11, 2000)("We conclude that we are unable to give a
construction to [section 841] that would avoid the constitutional
issue raised by Apprendi .") . Applying Apprendi's constitutional
principle to section 841 cases, it is clear that the principle is
violated if a defendant is sentenced to a greater sentence than
the statutory maximum based upon the quantity of drugs, if such
quantity is determined by the sentencing judge rather than the
trial jury . The statutory maximum must be determined by
assessing the statut e without regard to quantity . This *:i~-ns
that sections 841(b)(1)(A) and 841 (b)(1)(B) may not be utilized
for sentencing wi thout a finding of drug quantity by the jury .
The court added that another circuits have reached the same
conclusion . See United States ' v . Nordby, 67 CrL 755 (9th Cir .
2000), United States v . Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F .3d 926, 67 CrL 627
(8th Cir . 2000) ; United States V . Rebmann , 67 CrL 731 (6th Cir .
12
2 000) .
Petitioner ar gues and cla ims th at the gov ernm ent an d
counsel 's failur e to object v iolated his Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights by using drug typ e a n d quant ity to in cr ease his
st atutory m aximum pena l ty even thou gh t he j ury made no sp e c i f i c
finding as t o the typ e or quantity o f dru g involv ed in the
c on sp iracy . Specifically, defendant ar gue s that abs e nt such a
jury findi ng he sho uld have been sen tenced under 21 U .S .C .
Sectio n 841(b)(1)(C), the " catch-all" penalty provision for drug
crim es th at with one exception contains no reference to specific
drug t ype or quantity . An individual sentenced und er section
841(b ) (1)(C) is not subject to a mandatory mini mum sentence, and
fac e s a maximum term of imprisonment of twenty years and a
supervised release term of at least three ye a rs .
Inste ad of sentencing Petitioner under this provision, the
court appl ied the harsher penalties of 21 U .S .C . Section
841(b ) (1)(A), which provide in relevant part that wh e re the
offense in five grams or more of cocaine base, the defendant is
sub j ect to a 10-year minimum term of imprisonment and a maximum
lifetime term of imprisonment and at least five years of
supervised release .
On December 6, 1991 the Court, as p+;xt of its de t ermination
of relevant conduct, accepted the Probat i on office
recommendations under U .S .S .G ., which held Petitioner responsible
fo r 1 0 . 1 7 ki lograms of crack cocaine and the C our t se ntenced
Petiti o ne r to a term of life imprisonm ent as to Count One . On
Novembe r 23, 1992, the Go v ernment filed a Rule 35(b), requestin g
13
a reduction in the Petitioner's sentence . However, on May 18,
1994, the Court denied that motion . On February 12, 1998, the
government again filed another Rule 35(b), requesting a reduction
of Petitioner's sentence . On April 13, 1998, the Court Granted
the motion . The Court reduced the sentence imposed as to Count
One of the Petitioner's indictment to a term of 340 (three
hundred forty) months, to be served concurrently with the
sentences imposed on Counts 4, 5, 10, 14, and 15 . On June 1,
1998, Petitioner filed a motion, pursuant to 3582(c)(2) to
reconsider reducing his sentence based upon newly developed
circumstances . On February 5, 1999, the Court granted motion .
The Court reduced the sentence to 300 months as to Count One .
Petitioner asserts and argues that under the Supreme Court's
ruling in Jones v . United States, 526 U .S . 227 (1999), Apprendi
v . New Jersey, 120 S .Ct . 2348 92000) and United states v . Ropers,
228 F .3d 1318 (11th Cir . 2000), this sentence is
unconstitutional . See Exhibit C : District Court Judge's two
orders for Reduction .
The Petitioner here in this case must be resentenced without
regard to drug quantity . The Court directed, "In effect, the
jury's general verdict convicted the Petitioner only of
Conspiracy to Possess with intent to Distribute and Distribution
of Controlled Substances, an undermined quantity of crack cocaine
and cocaine hydrochloride ." Moreover, it is Petitioner's
position that since Apprendi instructs that it is the province of
the jury to determine quantity and type of drugs, the trial
court's failure to instruct the jury was plain error . Newman v .
14
United States, 817 F .2d 635, 637-39 (10th Cir . 1987)(holding that
uncertainty regarding jury's findings as to object of conspiracy
taints both sentence and conviction itself, and vacating
conviction) ; the Newman court's holdings that the conviction
itself should be vacated was subsequently abrogated by the
Supreme Court's decision in Griffin v . United States, 502 U .S .
46, 56-57, 112 S .Ct . 466, 116 L .Ed .2d 371 (1991) . United States
V. Dennis, 786 F .2d 1029, 1037-41 (11th Cir . 1986) (recognizing
principle but finding no error because evidence was sufficient to
support conviction for higher-penalized drug) . Since the Supreme
Court's decision in Edwards, several circuit courts have held,
consistent with Rhynes, that sentences imposed for convictions
under section 846 of multiple-object drug conspiracies for which
only a general verdict was returned may not exceed the statutory
maximum for the drug carrying the lowest penalty . See United
States V. Dale , 178 F .3d 429, 432-34 (6th Cir . 1999) ; United
States v . Barnes, 158 F .3d 662, 666-69 (2nd Cir . 1998) ; see also
United States V . Bell, 154 F .3d 1205, 1209-12 (10th Cir . 1998) .
However, the principle articulated in Rhynes and Edward's is
not a new one the Supreme Court in Edwards cites to the Second
Circuit's 1984 decision in United States v . Orozco-Prada , 732
F .2d 1076 (2nd Cir . 1994) . In Orozco-Prada, the Second Circuit
reached the same conclusion regarding sentences for
multiple-object drug conspiracies as the Fourth Circuit
subsequently did in Rh nes . See Orozco-Prada, 732 F .2d at
1083-84 . Prior to Petitioner's trial in 1996, several other
circuits had likewise held or indicated that, absent a special
15
verdict, a sentence for a multiple-object drug conspiracy cannot
exceed the statutory maximum for the controlled substance
carrying the lowest penalty . See United states v . Fisher, 22
F .3d 574, 576 (5th Cir . 1994)(recognizing principle but finding
no error because defendant's sentence was within the statutory
maximum for lesser-penalized drug) .
Appellant Hall is actually innocent of the maximum penalty
sentence imposed by the District Court of 300 months and suffers
actual prejudice from the penalty which exceeds the lower
statutory penalty for the drugs carrying the lowest penalty as
required by law . The indictment in this case should be dismissed
for the failure to charge all the essential elements of the
offense in the indictment . For this reason, the Petitioner
Hall's conviction and sentence should be reversed and in
alteration, [re]manded for [re]sentence .
Ground Two
Whether the sentence is in excess of the maximum authorized
by law with a general verdict for controlled substance conspiracy
covering multiple drugs required sentencing for the drug carrying
the lowest penalty? Hall claims and contends that the Court
sentence penalty was used in multiple drug conspiracy case for
two different drugs .
When the jury returns a general verdict to a charge that a
conspiratorial agreement covered multiple-drugs, the defendant
must be sentenced as if the defendant was convicted only of the
16
drug carrying the lowest penalty . United States V . Dale, 178
F .3d 429 (6th Cir . 1999) .
In Dale, the Court held that it was "plain error" to impose
on such a defendant a sentence which surpassed the maximum
allowable for the object of the conspiracy carrying the least
grave sentencing consequences . Id . at 433 .
Trial counsel for the Dale defendant had not formally
objected to the general verdict used in that case and had not
requested a special verdict ; nonetheless, the court held that
imposition of a sentence which surpassed the five-year statutory
maximum for conspiracy to possess marijuana constituted a
"manifest miscarriage of justice ." See Fed .R .Crim .P . 52(b) ;
United States v . Cox, 957 F .2d 264, 465 (6th Cir . 1992) .
The Court's decision in Dale makes clear that if the
government seeks imposition of a sentence reflecting culpability
for an object of a conspiracy carrying greater than the least
grave sentencing consequences, the government must also seek a
special verdict . Id . Dale, 178 F .3d 429 (6th Cir . 1999) .
Dale's case was remanded to the district court for a
decision either to sentence Dale as though he had been convicted
of a marijuana-only conspiracy or else to order a new trial, at
the prosecution , ;, election .
The indictment in this case named Petitioner and four
convicted co-defendants . The indictment also named
multiple-drugs . Petitioner was charged with conspiracy 'to
possess with intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride and
cocaine base ("crack"), Count One ; Count Four and Five,
17
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base,
"crack ." See Exhibit A : Indictment .
As previously noted, Petitioner's argument is based upon the
recent Supreme Court decisions in Apprendi V . New Jersey, 120
S .Ct . 2348 (2000), Jones v . United States, 119 S .Ct . 1215 (1999),
and in this particular issue, Edwards v . United States, 140
L .Ed .2d 703 (1998) ; United States v . Riles, 142 F .3d 1234,
1256-57 (11th Cir . 1998) .
The Supreme Court decided in Jones and reaffirmed in
Apprendi that "any factor that increases that the maximum penalty
for a crime (other than prior conviction) must be set forth in
the indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt . Id . at 119 S .Ct . at 1228 .
In dictum, the Eleventh Circuit has interpreted Edwards v .
United States, U .S ._ . 118 S .Ct . 1475, 1477 (1998), to hold
that in a conspiracy to distribute case with two controlled
substances but only a general verdict, "if the amount of one
substance involved leads to a lower statutory maximum sentence
than would apply to the amount of the other substance . . . then
the district court must stay below the lower statutory maximum ."
See United States V . Riles, 142 F .3d 1254 (11th Cir . 1998) .
The Court acknowledged pursuant to Edwards, that .i the
amount of one substance leads to a lower statutory maximum
sentence than would apply to the amount of the other substance,
the sentencing court must stay below the lower statutory maximum .
Id . Riles, 142 F .3d 1254 (11th Cir . 1998) ; see also United States
v . Dale, supra ; United States V. Bass, U .S .D .C .N .D . Fla .,
18
Pensacola ; United States v . O rozco- Prada , 732 F . 2d 1076 , 1083 -8 4
(2 nd Ci r . 19 8 4 ) ; Uni ted S tates v . B arnes , 1 58 F . 3 d 6 6 2 , 668 (2 nd
Cir . 1998 ) ; Newman v . United St a tes , 817 F . 2d 635 ( 1 0th Ci r .
1 9 8 7) ; Un ited St ate s v . O we ns, 904 F . 2 d 4 11 , 414- 1 5 (8th Ci r .
1 99 0) ; Unite d Stat e s v . B ou nds, 985 F .2d 188 , 19 4- 95 (5 th Cir .
1 99 3 ) United St a tes v . Garc ia, 37 F .3d 1 3 5 7 , 1369-7 1 (9th Cir .
1994) ; Uni te d State s v . Moreno, 181 F .3 d 2 0 6 (2 nd Cir . 1999) ;
Un ite d Stat e s v . Randol ph , 2 30 F .3d 24 3 (6th C ir . 20 0 0) .
In the instant c ase, pe titioner avers that the j ury returned
a general verdict of guilty as to Count One (1) of the indictment
which alleg ed a conspiracy to distribute cocain e hydrochlorid e
and cocaine base ("crack") . Count Four (4) and Count Five (5)
both alle ged possession with intent to distribute coc aine base,
"crack . " See Exhibit A Indictment, pages 2 , 11, 12 , 18 and 19 .
However, at sentencing, the Court by a preponderance of evidence
standard in determining the Petitioner's sentence with the
adoption of the Prob a tion Office Presentence Report
.- recommendations under U .S .S .G . Section 2D1 .4 as a means for
combining the controlled substances erroneously determined that
as to Count one, the maximum term of impris onment is life and the
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment is 10 years, pursuant to
21 U .S .C . Section 841(b)(1)(A) . As to Counts 4, 5, 10 and 14,
the maximum term of imprisonment is 5 years, pursu ant to 18
U .S .C . Sections 1942, 150 3 , and 1623 . The maximum term of
imprisonment for Count 15 is 20 years, pursu a nt 18 U .S .C . Section
1956(a)(1) , was applicable .
The Guideline provisions : according to the commenta ry to
19
the sentencing table in Chapter 5 (Application Note 2), an
offense level of more than 43 is to be treated as an offense
level of 43 . Therefore, based upon a total combined offense
level of 48 and a criminal history category of I, the guideline
imprisonment term is life, which the Court did impose at that
stage of the proceeding . The Court has granted several sentence
reductions due to the government's request and Petitioner's
request pursuant to a 3582 motion . The Government requested
reduction from life sentence, the Court granted reduction to 340
months . Petitioner requested reduction from 340 pursuant to
U .S .S .G . section 2D1 .1, newly developed circumstances, and the
Court granted reduction to 300 months . See Exhibit C : the
Court's orders .
Petitioner argues that he is actual innocent of the penalty
of 300 months imprisonment and suffers actual prejudice from this
sentence the Court imposed . Petitioner argues in accordance with
the decision in Edwards, supra, and Apprendi, this sentence
cannot stand as it exceeds the statutory maximum sentence for a
conspiracy to distribute control substances of a multiple-drug
conspiracy of cocaine hydrochloride and cocaine base ; and cocaine
base, "crack" was used in this case ; which is not the drug
carrying the lower statutory penalty for the lowest drug in this
case ; pursuant to 21 U .S .C . Section 841(b)(1)(C)p Riley, supra .
Hall further argues that because the jury in this case was
not instructed to determine the drug quantity of drugs involved,
the maximum sentence for Count 1, which allege violations of
sections 841 and 846, should be governed by 841(b)(1)(C), which
20
sets forth the pena l ty fo r s e lli ng an i n dete rminate amount o f
dr ugs .
Section 841(b)(I)(C) (2000) provides a maximum sentence of
2 0 year s impr is on ment . See 21 U .S . C . S ec t io n 8 4 1( b ) ( 1 )(C ) (2 000)
st ates i n relevant part : " In the c a se o f a co ntro ll ed sub s t anc e s
in Sche dule I or II, or 1 gram o f flunitr azepam, exce p t as
provided i n subparagra ph s (A), (B), and (D), such pers o n sha ll be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not mo r e than 20 years
. . .'
Petitioner contends at the time of his sentencing (1991),
prior to Apprendi "the quantity of drugs involved in a section
841 offense remains a sentencing factor to be determined by the
district judge ." United States V. Thomas, 204 F .3d 381, 384
(200)(per curiam) . However, the Supreme Court vacated Thomas,
along with similar opinions by other sister circuits, and
remanded the case for consideration in light of Ap prendi . See
Thomas v . United States, _U .S ._, 121 S .Ct . 749, L .Ed .2di
(2001) ; see also, e .g ., United States v . Hester, 199 F .3d 1287,
1291-92 (11th Cir .) vacated and remanded, U .S ._, 121 S .Ct .
336, 148 L .Ed .2d 270 (2000) ; United States v . Jones, 194 F .3d
1178, 1186 (10th Cir . 1999), vacated and remanded, U .S ., .
120 S .Ct . 2739, 1236-37 (10th Cir . 2000)(finding that failure to
include drug quantity in an indictment for drug distribution
under 21 U .S .C . 841(a) and to present the question to the jury
violated Apprendi) .
Petitioner argues that clearly the holding in Rile y, is
controlling in this case wherein a conspiracy to distribute case
21
with two controlled substances but only a "general verdict" if
the amount of one substance involved leads to a lower statutory
maximum sentence than would apply to the amount of the other
substance than would apply to the amount of the other substance,
then the district court must stay below the lower statutory
maximum . The holding in Apprendi, is also controlling in that
"any factor which increases the statutory maximum (other than
prior conviction), must be set forth in the indictment,
determined by the jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt ."
Id . APprendi, 120 S .Ct . 2348 (2000) .
Clearly, the drug amounts and quantity were not determined
by a jury, therefore, the district court's assessment of the
quantity and type of drugs was constricted to the lower statutory
provisions set forth in 21 U .S .C . Section 841(b)(1)(C) ; 0-20
years maximum sentence .
Petitioner contends it is also relevant that the district
court adopted the finding of the (PSR) in determining the
following :
Offense level Computation
Pursuant to section 3D1 .2(b) and (c), counts 1, 4, 5, 10,
and 14 shall be grouped together into a single group . . Count 15
represents unrelated conduct and will be treated as a separate
group .
Group One - Counts 1, 4, 5, 10, and 14
In the case of counts grouped together pursuant to section
3D1 .2(a)-(c), the offense level applicable to a group is the
offense level, determined in accordance with Chapter 2 and Parts
22
A, B, and C . of Chapter 3, for the most serious of the counts
comprising the group (the highest offense level of the counts in
the group) . Section 3D1 .3(a) . Pursuant to Section 3C1 .1,
Application Note 6, when the defendant is convicted both of the
obstruction offenses (counts 10 and 14) and the underlying
offense (count 1), the counts for the obstruction offenses will
be grouped with the count for the underlying offense under
Section 3D1 .2(e) . The offense level for that group of
closely-related counts will be the offense level for the
underlying offense increased by the 2-level adjustment specified
by section 3C1 .1, or the offense level for the obstruction
offense, whichever is greater . Therefore, counts 10 and 14 will
be applied to the offense level computation of Count 1 . Counts 4
and 5 will comprise the other 2 counts of the group .
Group Two (Count 15)
Base Offense Level : The guideline for an 18 U .S .C . Section
1956(a)(1)(B)(i) offense is found in Section 251 .1 of the
Sentencing Guidelines . Pursuant to Section 2S1 .1(a)(2), the base
offense level for Count 15 is 20 .
Specific Offense Characteristic : Since the defendant knew
that the funds ($15,000) were the proceeds of an unlawful
activity involving the distribution of controlled substances, the
offense level is increased 3 levels pursuant to section
251 .1(b)(1) . See Exhibit B_1 : Presentence Report (PSR), pages
5, 6, paragraph 17, and page 8, paragraph 32 .
Hall contends that the Court's adoption of these relevant
facts is in conjunction with the decisions of the Supreme Court
23
in Edwards v . United States, 118 S .Ct . 1475 (1998) and the
Eleventh Circuit's in dicta decision in United States V . Riley,
142 F .3d 1254, 1256-57 (11th Cir . 1998), which held that where a
conspiracy relies upon a substantive act in the conjuncture, the
drug type carrying the lower statutory maximum sentence is
controlling .
In this case it is the conspiracy to distribute cocaine
hydrochloride, (9 ounces) . See Exhibit A Indictment, page 4 . 9
ounces under 1991 U .S .S .G . Section 2D1 .1(c)(10) is a Base Offense
Level 24 for cocaine . Pursuant to Sentencing Table with a
Criminal History Category I, and base offense level 24, the
guidelines sentence for cocaine which is the lower drug of the
two controlled substances starts at 51-63 months of imprisonment
without enhancements attached . The lowest statutory maximum of
21 U .S .C . Section 841(b)(1)(C) of 20 years maximum is applicable
in this case because of new precedence law of Appxendi, and Jones
and cause, there was no instruction gave to the jury for
determining drug amounts or quantity . Petitioner's sentence
would start anywhere from 5 to 20 years maximum, without
enhancements .
The decisions in Edwards and Riley are plain and
understandable, the court must resentence the Petitioner within
the applicable lower statutory maximum .
The decisions reached in Apprendi and Jones are also very
plain in requiring that the indictment should also have set forth
the drug quantities as an element of the offense and put the
issue before the jury for its determination and proved beyond a
24
reasonable doubt .
Appellant contends that under the facts of this case,
counsel did submit objections before and at sentencing and on
appellate review, see Exhibit B-2 Defendant's objections to (PSR)
and Appellant's Brief, pages 29-31 .
The law in 1991 at that stage of the proceedings made it
permissible, both Courts denied Petitioner's objections . Prior
to Apprendi, "the law held that "the quantity of drugs involved
in a section 841 offense remains a sentencing factor to be
determined by the district Judge ." United States v . Thomas, 204
F .3d 381, 384 (2000)(per curiam) . However, the Supreme Court
vacated Thomas, along with similar opinions by other circuits,
and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Apprendi .
See Thomas v . United States, U .S ._, 121 S .Ct . 749,
L .Ed .2d (2001) ; see also, e .g ., United States V . Hester,
199 F .3d 1287, 1291-92 (11th Cir .), vacated and remanded, U .S .
_, 121 S .Ct . 336, 148 L .Ed .2d 270 (2000) ; United States v .
Jones, 194 F .3d 1178, 1186 (10th Cir . 1999), vacated and
remanded, U .S ._, 120 S .Ct . 2739, 147 L .Ed .2d 1002 (2000) on
remand 235 F .3d 1231, 1236-37 (10th Cir . 2000)(finding that
failure to include drug quantity in an indictment for drug
distribution under 21 U .S .C . section 841(a) and to present the
question to the jury violated Apprendi .) . Thus, placing the
authority back to the jury .
Hall further contends that counsel should have objected to
the court's sentencing Petitioner based on cocaine base (crack)
in the absence of a request for a special verdict . His failure
25
to do so resulted in actual prejudice to petitioner from
counsel's deficient performance .
Counsel also abandoned without notice, and failed to perfect
the direct appeal by not pursuing a writ of certiorari to the
U .S . Supreme Court, over the demands of Petitioner to do so .
Petitioner did not know at that stage anything about his right
under the law as to 2255 because counsel abandoned without notice
and did not tell Petitioner about the procedural time limits for
certiorari or 2255 . Petitioner further avers that had counsel
objected and requested a special verdict to determine drug
amounts and quantity and requested statutory maximum sentence for
lowest drug in the conspiracy and perfect Petitioner's direct
appeal by pursuing a writ of certiorari to the U .S . Supreme Court
and not abandoned Petitioner's case a crucial stage of the
proceedings there is strong probability that the outcome of the
sentencing and the sentence proceeding would have been different,
had counsel pursued a certiorari to the U .S . Supreme Court .
Petitioner pray the Court grant review and further grant
relief in favor of the Petitioner . In light of Jones, 119 S .Ct .
1215 Apprendi, 120 S .Ct . 2362-63 and in blazing light of
Edwards, 118 S .Ct . 1475, 1477 and Riley, 142 F .3d 1254 (11th
Gir . 1998) .
This motion should be vacated and granted as to the issues,
and the case should be scheduled for resentencing .
Indeed, it is unfortunate that the government wishes to make
Petitioner's case an exception to the rules . The rules should be
followed without exception . Petitioner concedes that there are
26
exceptions to a rule . However, t h e de cisi ons o f ou r Hono ra b le
Courts , though s tric t , must b e ju s t . When mi sta kes are made in
prior proceedi ngs , to revis i t the p roc ee di ng s and correc t such
errors , a re t h e fee lings that should ari se in a c our t full o f
equity and ju stice .
' Ground Three
Double Jeopardy Argument One
Whether multiple-drug-type distribution counts for One,
Four, Five and Fifteen were duplicative, for double jeopardy
purposes, of counts which charged defendant, based on same
conducted of conspiracy?
Petitioner asks on double jeopardy grounds that the Court
vacate his convictions on counts 1, 4, 5, and 15 of the
indictment, which charge him with drug distribution in violation
of Count One, Title 18 U .S .C . section 2, Title 21 U .S .C . section
841(a)(1) and 846 ; Count Four, 21 U .S .C . section 841(a)(1) and
846, and 18 U .S .C . section 1952(a)(3) ; Count Five, Title 21
U .S .C . section 841(a)(1) and 846, and 18 U .S .C . section
1952(a)(3) ; and Count Fifteen, Title 18 U .S .C . section 2956(c)(4)
and Title 18 section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) .
Petitioner avers and argues that the government has
improperly charged "a single offense as an offense multiple time,
in separate counts, when, in law and fact, only one crime has
been committed," Chacko, 169 F .3d at 145, see generally, Part
II A, supra, or that the prosecutors have improperly exercised
their broad discretion to charge, see United States v . Armstrong,
27
517 U .S . 456, 464, 116 S .Ct . 1480, 134 L .Ed .2d 687 (1996) ; see
also Moreno, 2000 WL 1843232, at 10 .
Petitioner argues that his conviction on the above counts is
duplicative of his conviction and sentence on the Court one,
violation pursuant to Title 18 U .S .C . section 2, Title 21 U .S .C .
section 841(a)(1) and 846 . The Court must agree that counts 4, 5
and 15 are lesser included offenses of the drug distribution
conspiracy of Count One . See Exhibit A, Indictment Count One,
pg . 1-19 and Exhibit B-1 (P .S .R .), pg . 2, part A-1 ; also pg . 3,
no . 5, 6 ; pg . 4, no . 7, 8, 9 and 10 .
Petitioner avers that the Court reviews this double jeopardy
argument, which is a question of law, de novo . However, Hall
suffers actual prejudice from deficient performance of counsel
because counsel did not make objections before the District
Court, the Court could review for plan error . See Fed .R .Crim .P .
52(b) ; Johnson v . United States, 520 U .S . 461, 467, 117 S .Ct .
1544, 137 L .Ed .2d 718 (1997) . "[B]efore an appellate court can
correct an error not raised at trial, there must be (1) 'error,'
(2) that is 'plain,' and (3) that 'affect[s] substantial rights .'
If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then
exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if
(4) the error 'seriU ;:k3_ .y affect[s] the fairness, integrity, u :.
public reputation of judicial proceedings ."' Johnson, 520 U .S .
at 466-67, 117 S .Ct . 1544 (quoting United States v . Olano, 507
U .S . 725, 732, 113 S .Ct . 1770, 123 L .Ed .2d 508 (1993)) .
Petitioner further avers that in determining whether the
three are duplicative and thus violates petitioner's rights under
28
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment .
Petitioner further avers that in determining whether the
three are duplicative and thus violates petitioner's rights under
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Petitioner asks
whether each count contains an element not contained in the
other? See Chacko, 169 F .3d at 146 (citing Blockburger v . United
States, 284 U .S . 299, 52 S .Ct . 180, 76 L .Ed . 306 (1932) ; United
States v . Dixon, 509 U .S . 688, 696, 113 S .Ct . 2849, 125 L .Ed .2d
556 91993)) . If so, the offenses "are not the same offense for
purposes of double jeopardy, and they can both be prosecuted ."
Chacko , 169 F .3d at 146 . If, however, either offense does not
contain an element not contained in the other, the offenses are
considered the same offense for double jeopardy purposes, and a
defendant cannot be convicted of both .
Petitioner avers and argues that the indictment herein this
case for Counts 1, 4, 5 and 15 are composed of and charge for the
same elements of unlawful activity, transactions, objects, ways,
manner, means, overt acts and the same conspiracy of Count One of
the indictment . No element of possession and distribution of
cocaine base and cocaine hydrochloride under Count One of Title
18 U .S .C . section 2, Title 21 U .S .C . section 841(a)(1) and 846 of
Count One is not also an element of the distribution or unlawful
activity under Counts 4, 5, and 15 ; for the same transactions .
See Exhibit A Indictment .
Petitioner avers for the above stated facts, Petitioner's
conviction and sentences should be vacated . In light of
Apprendi, 120 S .Ct . at 2354, and in more light of Blockburger v .
29
United Sta t es , 28 4 U . S . 2 99 , 52 S .Ct . 18 0 , 76 L .E d . 306 ( 1932)
. . . se e K akat i n , 2 14 F . 3 d at 1 05 1 ; U .S . v . Sc ott , 987 F .2d 26 6
( 5t h C ir . 1993 ) ; Freyre-Lazaro, 3 F .3d at 15 07 ( 11 th Cir . 1993),
cer t . denied sub nom ; Lle r ena-Ac osta v . United S t ates, 511 U .S .
1011, 114 S .Ct . 1385, 128 L .E d .2d 59 (1994) .
' Ground Four
The Court improperly applied the Four Level Enhancement for
Organizer Leadership Role, pursuant to U .S .S .G . section 3B1 .1(a)
was unconstitutional and unwarranted, in violation of
Petitioner's Fifth Amendment right to due process, "not to be
sentenced on false and unreliable information or facts which was
not charged in the indictment or determined by a jury and proved
over counsel's objection before sentencing and at sentencing, the
Court adopted the Probatrion office Presentence Report (PSR)
finding that Petitioner should be considered an organizer and
thereofe a Four Level enhancement should be attached ; (PSR)
paragraph 20 .
Adjustment for Role in the Offense :
Evidence proved that the defendant was the organizer of this
drug distribution ring . Hall devised the plan to transport crack
from Southern Florida to be distributed i ;i F;avnnah . The
defendant obtained beepers and developed a code so members of the
conspiracy could utilze the beepers in the distribution of crack
and paid otehr members of the conspiracy $1,000 per month'for
their participation in the distribution ring . Therefore,
pursuant to section 381 .1(a), 4 levels are added since the
30
defendant was an organizer of a criminal activity that involved 5
or more participants .
These alleged facts which Petitioner completely disagrees,
were assumed by the government prior to the issue of indictment
and prior to the trial in this case and therefore should have
been set forth in the indictment and presented to the jury for
their determinations, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt .
Petitioner contends that under the Supreme Court's ruling in
Jones v . United States, 526 U .S . 227 (1999) , this 4 level
enhancement is unconstitutional .
In Jones, the Court addressed the question of whether the
penalty enhancement section of a multipart federal staute (the
federal carjacking staute) defined a separate crime or was merely
a penalty provision . The sentencing judge viewed the provision
in question as a sentencing factor and accordingly, he enhanced
defendant's sentence using facts that had not been submitted to
the jury for a dtermination . On certiorari review, the Court
reversed and remanded concluding that each portion of the
statute, including the provision setting forth the sentencing
enhancement factor, defined a separate offense . 526 U .S . at 252 .
Petitioner contends that under the above language Petitioner
would have to be charged with C .C .E . in the indictment in order
to recieved the Role fo organizer Leadership, pursuant to
3B1 .1(a), 4 level enhancement .
The Court explicitly stated in Jones that is decision did
nto announce a new principle of constitutional law, but "merely
interpret[ed] a particular federal staute in light of a set of
31
constitutional co nce rns th a t h ave eme rged " in pr io r decisio ns .
Id . at 251, n .ll .
Nevertheless, the Court broached the broader question of
whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments allow "judicial
factfinding by a preponderance [to] support the application of
aprovision that increases the potential severity of the penalty
for a variant of a given crime ." Id . at 242 . In foot-note
dictum, the Court stated :
[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment

and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth
Amendment, any fact (other than prior convictions) that
increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be
charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt . 3 Id . at 243, n .6 .
Petitioner contends that this footnoted language compels
correction of his improperly applied 4 level enhancement at
sentencing by the Court and Probation Office pursuant to
3B1 .1(a) .
Petitioner further contends that the court should have
properly applied 2 level enhancement at sentencing pursuant to
3B1 .1(c), or at the lease 3B1 .1(B) 3 levels .
For reasons here-stated, the indictment in this case named 9
co-conspirators with Petitioner included, 3 were unidicted of any
charges, 6 were charged with Petitioner including, 1 was
acquitted, now petitioner after trial only had 4 co-defendants
with Petitioner not included . At sentencing the Petitioner had 4
co-defendants, thus the Court improperly applied the organizer
Leadership Role with 4 co-defendant . Petitioner asked the
question if Petitioner is attributed the organizer Leadership
Role then how does the Court justify its discretion with 4
32
co -de fendants . The U . S . S . G . sect ion 3 B 1 . 1(a ), speci fi cally
s tates , if t he defe nda tn w a s an orga niz er o r leader of a cr i m inal
ac t i v ity that involv e d five o r more p artici p an ts or ws oth erwise
ex tensive, incre a se by 4 l eve l s . U .S .S . G . sec t ion 3 B 1 . 1(a ) .
P e t i tion er further contends he need s 5 convicte d
co-de fendan t s in the indictment of this cas e as cha rged , before
sentenc e enhancement of 4 levels may be a pplie d .
The court clearly could have applied the pr o pe r role of
M anager or supervisor pursuant to U . S .S .G . section 3B1 .1(c) 2
levels enhanc e ment as the clear language of the indictment in
this case is similar and unquestionable in the wording in the
language and meaning as stated on pages 3 and 4 of the indictment
under :
W ays , manner and means of the Co n spi r acy
The conspiracy operated with members performing different
functions at different times and at different levels of
responsibility . Certain members of the conspiracy, including
Julius Phillip Hall and others, both known and unknown, assumed
managerial roles, directing and supervising the effects of
co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspoiracy . Certain
members of the conspiracy, including :
Herbert Nathaniel Johnson
Julius Phillip Hall
James Willis Saget
Calvin Morris and Joseph Williams
would acquire large quantities of cocaine hydrochloride and
cocaine base, "crack," and then transport or cause it to be
33
transported to Savannah, Georgia, and elsewhere for further
distribution . (See Exhibit A, pages 3 and 4 of Indictment .)
Petitioner shows from t he record of indictment above stated
there is no statement of facts t hat Petiltioner was labeled as
the organizer of the Conspiracy, in the Indictment, or p resented
at trial .
Petitioner sho w s from the record o f the indictment and the
trial record that he s uffered actua l prejudice fr om the false and
unreliable fact of labling t he P etitioner as t he organizer and
giving him a 4 level enha ncement by the Cou rt an d t he Pr obation
Office by a J udge's preponderance of evidence s tandard ;
especially, when t he factor s of labling t he Petitione r as t he
Organize r were not cha rged in th e i ndictmen t o f t his cas e, nor
"determined by a ju ry an d proved beyond a reaso nab le doubt . " Id .
Jones, 119 S . Ct . 1215 ; App rendi, 120 S . C t . 2 3 62 -63 . An d furthe r
assuring Petit i one r' s so le cons titut ional due p r ocess right not
to be sentenced on the basis of inaccur ate as sumptions, false and
unr eliable information . Townsen d v . Bur ke , 33 4 U . S . 736 , 74 1 , 68
S . Ct . 1255 , 92 L . Ed . 1690 (1948) ; United S tates v . Tu c ker, 4 04
U . S . 44 3 , 44 6, 92 S .Ct . 5 8 9 , 59 1 , 3 0 L . Ed .2 d 5 9 2 ( 197 2) .
The Due Process Clause o f the Fifth and Fou r teenth Amendment
require t he governme;ic to p rove the es s ential e l ements of a crime
beyond a reasonable doubt . In re Wi nship, 3 9 7 U .S . 358 , 36 4
(1970), additionally , the gove rnment mu st allege all elements of
a c rime in the indictment . See Almandrez - Torres v . United
States, 523 U . S . 22 4, 226 ( 19 9 8 ) .
Thus , the decisions in Appr endi a nd Jones a re noting new
34
wh erea s t he Du e Proces s C l ause ha s been in e ff e ct . Howe ver, in
th e ins tant ca s e, t h e gove rnment h as chose n to ignor e Du e Process
requi remen t s . App rend i cl ea r ly state s tha t u nder the Du e Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the jury trial guarantees of
the Sixth Amendment, any factor (other than prior convictio n )
th a t increa se s the maximum penalty for a cri me must be charged in
an indic tment , submitted to a jury and pr ove n beyond a re asonable
doubt .
This factor also includes the enhanced penalty for organizer
which has been erroneously applied in this case .
If the Court, the Probation Office and the Government is to
allege that Petitioner is the organizer worthy of the four (4)
levels enhancement, pursuant to U .S .S .G . section 3B1 .1(a), then
the allegations must be considered an element of the offense and
set forth in the indictment and proven beyond a reasonable doubt .
In a subsequent appellate decision, United States v .
Aguayo-Delgado, 2000 WL 988128 (8th Cir . July 18, 2000), the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that "[i]n Apprendi,
the Supreme Court made it clear that the principle discussed in
Jones is a rule of constitutional law ." Id . at 4 . Moreover, as
the Aguayo-Delgado, decision confirms, the Court's ruling in
Apprendi means that in any drug case in excess of those
prescribed by 28 U .S .C . section 841(b)(1 ) (C ) , the government must
charge drug quantity and prove that fact to the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt . Id . at 6 ; see also Apprendi, 120 S .Ct : at
2366, n .21 .
Petitioner assert that Jones and Apprendi language above
35
cited compels correction of his improper 4 level enhancement
sentence factor which was not charged in the indictment or
determined by a j ury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt .
Petitioner avers that he suffered actual prejudice from this
imporperly applied 4 levels enhancement and counsel ' s deficient
performance : Counsel did submit objections at sentencing (see
Exhibit B-2 : Defendant's objec tion) and on appellate review , the
law at that time made it permissible ; both Courts de nied , prior
to Apprendi , "the la w held tha t the quantity of drugs involved in
a section 8 4 1 offense remains a sentencing facto r to be
determined by t he distr ict Judge . " United States v . Thomas , 2 04
F .3d 381 , 3 84 ( 2000 ) (pe r cur iam) . Howeve r, the Su preme Cour t
vacated T homas, alon g with simi lar opin ions by other c i rcuits,
and remande d the cas e for reconsiderat ion in light o f Appren di .
See Thomas v. Un ited S tate s, ÌI . S . _ , 121 S . Ct . 7 4 9,
L . Ed . 2d (200 1 ) ; see also , e . g ., Un ite d States v . Heste r ,
199 F . 3d 1287 , 129 1 -9 2 ( 11th Cir .), vacated and remanded , U .S .
_, 121 S . Ct . 3 36 , 148 L .Ed . 2d 270 ( 2 000 ) United States v .
Jones , 1 9 4 F . 3d 11 7 8, 1 1 86 ( 10th Ci r . 1999 ), vacated and
r emanded, U .S ._, 1 2 0 S .Ct . 2739, 1 4 7 L .Ed . 2d 1002 ( 2000) on
remand 2 35 F . 3d 1231, 1 23 6 -3 7 ( 10th C ir . 2000)(finding that
failure ~o include drug quan tity i n an i.idictment for drug
di stribut ion under 2 1 U . S .C . § 8 4 1 ( a ) and to present t h e question
to the j ur y viola ted Apprendi) . Thu s , p lacing the aut h ority back
to the ju ry .
Counsel aba ndoned wi thout n otice , and failed to perfect the
direct appeal by not pur suing a writ of certiorari to the U . S .
36
Ex hibit B
1 . Pre sentenc e Report
2 . Defendant Julius P . Hall's objections to Presentence

Report
3 . Addendum to the Presentece Report
50
E xhibit B
S-1 Presentence Report
51
•~
Case 4:01-cv-00183-BAE Document 1 Filed 08/06/01 Page 57 of
~, 122 --
UN ITED STATES DI STRIC T COURT

FOR THE
SOUTHERN DI STRICT OF GEORGIA
UNITED S TATE S O F AMERICA
vs . Doc ket No . CR4 91 - 1 11

Defendant No . 02
JUL I US PHILL I P HAL L
PRESENTENCE REPO RT
Prepared for : S e ntencing Date :

The Honorable B . Avant Edenfield
Chief United States District Judge
Prepared by : Office Loca tion :
Richard A . Long Savannah, Georgia
r . U .S . Probation Officer
Offense :
Count 1 : 2 1 USC y °= .c .1 to Possess with Intent Lc a nd
Distribution of Controlled Substances, a Class A felony .
Counts 4 & 5 : 18 USC § 1952(a)(3) -Interstate Travel, Class D felonies .
Count 10 : 18 USC § 1503 -Obstruction of Justice, a Class D felony .
Count 14 : 18 USC 5 1623 -False Declarations Before Federal Grand Jury, a
Class D felony .
Count 15 : 18 USC § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) -Money Laundering, a Class C felony .
Date of Arrest : June 11, 1991

Custodial Status : June 14, 1991 - Released on $25,000 secured bond and
placed on electronic monitoring . Detained upon conviction on October 11,
1991 .
Identifyina Data
Date of Birth : 01-09-62 Age : 29 Citizenship : U .S .

R ace : Black Sex : Male Dependents : 1 (daughte r )
F BI No . : SSN : 258-25-7915 Other ID No . :
Educat ion: High School U .S . Marshal No . : 07335-021
Graduate
Legal Address : U .S . Bureau of Prisons
Retaine rs : None
s
Codefendants : Herbert Natha niel Johnson, CR 491-111-01
Jame s Willis S aget, CR 4 91 -111-03
Cecel ia Cook S trobe rt, CR 491-111-04
L am ar Roberson , CR 491-111-OS
Johnny James Hail, CR 491-111-06
Assistant U .S . Attorney Defense Counsel '

Thomas A . Withers David Roberson (Re tained)
P .O . Box 8999 21 West P ark Aven ue
Savannah, GA 314?< Savannah, GA 3 14 0 1
(912) 944-3145 (912 ) 236 - 3 60 5
Date report pry , .a: ed :

Revised : Mandatory Minimum
RE : HALL , Julius P . Page 2
PART A : THE OFFENSE
Charges and Convictions
1 . Julius Phillip Hall, the defendant, Herbert Nathaniel

Johnson, James Willis Saget, Cecelia Cook Strobert, Lamar
Roberson, and Johnny James Hall were indicted in various
counts of a 15 count Redacted Second Superceding Indictment .
The defendant was charged in counts 1, 4, 5, 10, 14, and 15 .
Count 1 charges that from on o r abo ut February , 1988, and

continuing up to-and includi ng the date of the Indictment
(June 7, 1991), Herbert Johnso n , Julius Hall, James Saget,
Cecelia Strobert, Lamar Roberson , and Johnny James B all,
aided and abetted by each other and others, conspired to
possess with intent to distri bute coc aine hydroc h loride and
cocaine base, in violation of 1 8 OSC 5 2 and 21 U SC 5846 .
Count 4 charges that or - •-----±?=_ ._ date in the summer o f

1990, Julius Hall traveled in interstate commerce from the
Southern District of Georgia to the Southern Di stri ct o f
F lorida, with intent to p romote and faci l i tate u n lawful
activity, that is the possession with intent to distribute
and conspiracy to distribute quantities of crack, in
violation of 18 USC § 1952(a)(3) .
Count 5 c harges that on or about November 29, 1990 , Herbe rt

Johnson a nd the defendant trave led in inter s tate co mmerce
fro m the Southern District of Georgia to the M iddle D istrict
o f Flori da , with intent to promote and facilita te un lawful
activity, th at i s the pos ses s ion with intent to d istribute
and conspiracy to dis tribute quantities of c rack, i n
violatio n of 18 USC § 1 952 (a)( 3) .
C ount 10 charges that on or about Apr il 5 or 6, 19 9 1,

H erbert Johnson and the defen dant did endeavor to in fluence,
obstruct, and impede the due admini s tration o f j ustice i n
t hat they questioned a Southern Distr ict o f Georgia Gr and
Juror conce rning the i nves tigation of the Grand Ju ry into
t he distrib ution of crack, in violat ion of 1 8 USC S 2 and 1 8
USC § 1503 .
s
C ou nt 1 4 c harges t hat on June 4, 1991 , the def e ndant ma de
false decl ar ations to the S outhern Di stric t of G eo r gi a Grand
Jury co ncernin g the poss e s s io n and d i stribution o f c rac k, i n
v iolatio n of 18 U SC 5 1623 .
Count 15 charges that from on or about ear ly April, 1991, to

the date of the Indictm ent ( June 7, 1991 ) , Herbert Johnson ,
Julius Hall, and James W . Saget inve sted $ 1 5,00 0 into the
materials, labor, and workmanship o n Sound Tracks, which
currency was the proceeds of the s ale of cra ck, knowing th a t
RE : HALL, Julius P . Pa ge 3
the property involved in the financial transaction

constituted proceeds of their illegal activity, with intent
to conceal or disguise the nature of the proceeds of the
illegal activity, in violation of 18 USC S 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) .
2 . On October 11, 1991, a Southern District of Georgia Jury

convicted the defendant on counts 1, 4, 5, 10, 14, and 15 of
the Indictment . Herbert Nathaniel Johnson was convicted on
10 counts, James Willis Saget was convicted on 1 count, and
Lamar Roberson was convicted on 3 counts of the Indictment .
A not guilty verdict was returned on Cecelia Strobert .
Johnny James Hall was grantec{à severance and is awaiting
trail .
3 . Since the offenses occurred after November 1, 1987, the

Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 is applicable .
Related Cases
4 . catvin Morris, CR 491-173, has e ntered a ple a o f guil ty to a

two count In formation and is awaiting s entencing . Clarence
Eugene Smith, CR 491 - 17 4 , has e ntered a plea of gu ilty t o a
three cou nt Information and is awaiting sentencing .
The O ffense Conduct
5 . In February, 1988, Julius P . Hall, a Savannah Police

Officer, and Calvin Morris provided William "Red" McDonald
with approximately 13 grams of cocaine hydrochloride to
distribute in Savannah . Since the negotiated quantity of
cocaine to be delivered to McDonald was one ounce, McDonald
returned the 13 grams of cocaine to hall and Morris . Hall
and Morris then gave McDonald $1000 in cash to purchase one
ounce of cocaine hydrochloride with the understanding that
McDonald would distribute the cocaine and return a profit to
Hall and Morris . McDonald never returned any cash or
cocaine to Hall and Morris . Clarence Eugene Smith reported
he saw Hall in possession of small quantities of cocaine
. hydrochloride on two separate occasions prior to February of
1988 .
~
6 .. Hall then began conspiring with other individuals to possess
and distribute cocaine hydrochloride and cocaine base . -'"
Joseph "Jo-Jo" Williams related he distributed cocaine
hydrochloride and crack to Julius Hall on numerous occasions
in 1988 . Will iams stated he usually sold cocaine
hydrochloride to Julius Hall and on at least 3 separate
occasions in 1988 and 1989, Williams distributed 9 ounces
(for a total of 765 grams) of cocaine hydrochloride to
Julius Hall . Williams reported that Julius Hall quit
dealing with h i m in March or April of 1989, after Hall told
Williams he was being investigated by law enforcement
offic ials .
RE : HA IL , Julius P . Page 4
7 . Julius Hall began distributing quantities of cocaine base

(crack) to Calvin Morris in the summer of 1989 . Morris
related he obtained one-quarter to one-half ounce quantities
of crack from Hall on a weekly basis for at least 6 months .
Cecelia Strobert, Hall's half-sister, would deliver Hall's
crack to Morris . Applying the rule of lenity, Hall
distributed 6 ounces (one-quarter ounce quantities for 24
weeks) or 170 grams of crack to Morris from the summer of
1989 to early 1990 .
8 . In June of 1990, Hall's drug distribution ring expanded to

the acquisition of large quantities of crack which were
transported from Miami, Florida, to Savannah . Hall
personally traveled from Savannah to areas in Florida on at
least two occasions to help facilitate the acquisition of
the crack . From June of 1990, to mid-May of 1991, James
Willis Saget traveled from Miami to Savannah every 10 to 14
days with 17 .5 ounces (496 grams) of crack . Saget purchased
the crack-in e^•- ` -- Florida and transported -the _-_.7 '. `-
Cecelia Strobert in Savannah . Strobert stored the crack
until Herbert Nathaniel Johnson and/or Calvin Morris
obtained the crack to distribute in Savannah . Lamar
Roberson and Johnny James Hall obtained portions of this
crack from John son to be distributed in west Savannah .
Julius Hall and Calvin Morris collected the profits from the
distribution of the crack and Julius Hall, Calvin Morris,
James Saget, Cecelia Strobert, and Herbert Nathaniel Johnson
each received $1,000 per month from the profits . The
remainder of the profits was used for investment purposes .
Applying the rule of lenity, Hall's distribution ring
obtained 10 kilograms of crack from southern Florida to be
distributed in Savannah from June, 1990, to mid-May, 1991 .
9 . Sound Tracks, a night club owned by Julius Hall, Calvin

Morris, Herbert Johnson, and Brenda Mack, was an investment
which received profits from Hall's crack distribution ring .
According to Calvin Morris, Julius Hall devised the scheme
to launder funds from the drug sales to Sound Tracks . Hall
.invested $15,000 of currency obtained from drug sales in
Sound Tracks .
10~ On April 6, 1991, Garfield Hills, a Grand Juror for the ,

~' Southern District of Georgia, advised Julius Hall and f"
Herbert Nathaniel Johnson that the Grand Jury was
investigating the distr ibution of crack by Hall and others .
Hall advi sed Hil ls to keep him informed concerning the Grand
Jury's i nvestigation of Hall's distribution ring . Hills
later received $20 worth of crack from Lamar Roberson for
$5 as a reward for advising Julius Hall he was being
investi gated by the Grand Jury .
1 1 . On June 4, 1991, Julius h all made false d eclar atio ns to the

Southe:• . District of Georgia Grand Jury concerni ng the
distrib-o ion of crack . Hall advis ed the Grand Jury t hat he
had no ;e :-sonal knowledge that Herbert Johnso n , Calvin
Morris, and/or James Sag et had distributed c rack . Further,

Ha ll advised the Grand J ury that he had never been i nvolved
in the illegal possessio n o f cocaine or any o ther contr oll ed
s ubs tance .
12 . The total amount of cocaine hydrochloride attributed to

Julius Hall is 778 grams . The total amount of crack
~( attributed to Hall is 10 .17 kilograms . For Sentencing
Guidelines purposes, different drug types must be added .
According to the conversion tables found in Section 2D1 .1,
one gram of crack is equivalent to 100 grams of cocaine
hydrochloride . Therefore, 778 grams of cocaine
hydrochloride is equivalent to 7 .78 grams of crack .
Consequently, the total amount of crack attributed to the
defendant is 10' .17 kilograms .
Adjustment for Obstructi on of Just ice
13 . S ection 3C1 .1, Applicat?n" **n*- 3(a) relates ob struc tio*+

occurs when a defendant i ntajna.uate s or unlawfully in fluences
a juror, directly or indirectl y, or a ttempts to do so .
A fter Garfield Hills advi sed the defen dant that he was be ing
investigated by the Sou thern Distr ict of Georgi a Gr and Jury,
Hall advised Hills to keep him informed concerning the Grand
Jury's i nvestigation of Halls ' s crack d is tribut ion ring .
14 . Sectio n 3C 1 .1, Applicati on Note 3 ( b) s tates ob stru ctio n

oc curs when a defendant commits or attempts to c omm it
p erj ury . As the j ury f ound i n count 14 of the Ind ictment,
on June 4 , 1991, Hall made false declar ations to the
Southe rn District of G eorgia Grand jury concerning h is
involvement in the dis tribut ion of illegal drug s as wel l as
the i nvolvement of Herbe rt Johnson, James Sa get, and Calvin
Morris in the distribution of illegal drug s .
Adj ustment for Acceptance of Resnons ibility
15 . The de fendant denies his criminal involvement in the ins tant

offenses ; therefore, pursuant to S 3E1 . 1, Ha l l ha s no t
acc epted re sponsibilit y for his crimina l conduct .
Offense Leve l Computation Jr

16 . Pursuan t to § 3D1 .2(b) and ( c ) , count s 1 , 4 , 5 , 10 , and 1 4
shall be grouped toget her into a s ingle Group . Count 1 5
repres ents unrelated co nduc t and wi ll be treated as a
separate Group .
Group One - counts 1, 4 . 5 . 10, and 1 4
17 . In the case of counts grouped together pursuant to §

3D1 .2(a) - (c), the offense level applicable to a Group is
RE : HA LL, Julius P . Page 6
the offense level, determined i n acco rdance w ith Chapter 2

and Parts A , B, and C of Chapter 3, for th e mos t serious of
the counts comprising the Group (the highest offense level
of the counts in the Grou p ) . § 3D1 .3(a ) . Purs uant to
Section 3C1 .1, Applicatio n Note 6, when t he defendant is
convicted both of the obst ruction offenses (counts 10 and
14) and the underlying offense (count 1), the counts for the
obstructio n offen s es w il l be grouped with the cou nt for the
underlying offense under §3D1 .2(c) . The offens e level for
that group of closely - related counts will be the offense
leve l for th e underlying offehse increased by the 2- l evel
adjustment speci f ied by § 3C1 .1, or the offense level for
the ob struction of fen se, whichever is greater . Th eref ore ,
counts 10 and 14 will be appli ed to the of f ense level
c omputat ion of count 1 . Counts 4 and 5 w il l compr ise the
othe r 2 cou nts of t he Group .
Counts 1 . 10, and 14
18 . Base Offense Level : The guideline for a 21 USC § 846

offense is found in § 2D1 .4 of the Sentencing Guidelines .
That section provides that if a defendant is convicted of a
conspiracy involving a controlled substance, the offense
level shall be the same as if the object of the conspiracy
had been completed . The object of this conspiracy was the
distribution of controlled substances in violation of 21 USC
5 841(a)(1) . The guideline .for a 21 IISC S 841(a)(1) offense
is found in 5 2D1 .1 of the Sentencing Guidelines . Pursuant
to § 2D1 .1(c)(2), offenses involving at least 5 kilograms
but less than 15 kilograms of cocaine base have a base
offense level of 40 . Since the total amount of crack
attributed to the defendant is 10 .17 kilograms when relevant
conduct is considered pursuant to § 181 .3(a), the base
offense level is
40 .
19 . Specific O ffense C h arac teristics : None .
20 Adjustment for Role in the Offense : Evidence proved that

the defendant was the organizer of this drug distribution
ring . Hall devised the plan to transport crack from l
southern Florida to be distributed in Savannah . The J'
defendant obtained beepers and developed a code so members
of the conspiracy could utilize the beepers in the
distribution of crack . Further, Hall collected proceeds
from the distribution of crack and paid other members of the
conspiracy $1,000 per month for their participation in the
distribution ring . Therefore, pursuant to § 3B1 .1(a), 4
levels are added since the defendant was an organizer of a
criminal activity that involved 5 or more participants .
22 .~ Adjustment for Role in the Offense : Based on § 3B1 .3, the

offense level is increased 2 levels because the defendant
abused a position of public trust in a manner that
RE : HALL, Julius P . Page 7
significantly facilitated the-commission and concealment of

the offense . Hall organized this distribution ring knowing
he could provide protection based upon information he
,~ learned as a police officer . Joseph Williams related Hall
ceased all drug activities with him after Hall learned that
Joseph Williams was being investigated by law enforcement
officials . Further, Hall advised William "Red" McDonald
that he would remove outstanding warrants for McDonald if
McDonald would distribute cocaine for him .
22 . Victim Related Adjustment : None .
23 . Ad j us tment for Obstru c tion of Justice : As outlined in

Paragr ap hs 1 3 and 1 4 , the de fendant obstructed the
adm inis tratio n of j ust ice . Pursuant to S 3C1 .1, the offense
level is increased 2 levels .
24 . Ad j u sted Offense Level , Counts 1, 10, and 14 (Subtotal ) :
Counts -4 and 5
25 . Base Offense Level : The guideline for an 1 8 US C $

1952(a)(3) offense is found i n § 2E 1 . 2 of t he S entencing
Guideli nes . That sectio n provide s that the base of fense
leve l is the greater of 6 or the offen se level app l icabl e to
the underlying c rime of violence or other unlawf ul ac tivity
in respect to which the tr avel was und ertaken . The
underly ing unlawful acti vity in coun ts 4 and 5 was the
possession w ith intent to distribute an d distribut ion of
crack, in violation of 21 USC 5 841 ( a )(1) . The guide line
4
for a 21 USC 5 8 1(a)(1) offe nse is fo und i .1 o f t he
n S 2D1
Sentencing Guidelines . Pursuant to § 2 D 1 .1( c )( 4 ), o ffenses
involving a t least 500 grams but less than 1 . 5 kilograms of
c rack have a base offense level of 36 . S ince t hese two
cou nts involved travel fo r the purchase and ult imate
distribution of 35 ounces (99 2 grams) of crack , the base
offense level is 36 .
26 : S pecific Offense Characteristi cs : None .
27 . Adjustment for Role in t he Of fense : None . '
28 . Victim Related Adjustment : None . f
29 . Adjustment for Obstructio n of Ju sti ce : None .
30 . Ad j usted Offense Level, Counts 4 and 5 (Subtotal) :
Adiusted Offense Level for Group One
31 . S ince the ad j usted of f ense level for counts 1, 10, and 14 is

the higher<s t of f e nse level o f the counts in the Group, the
adjusted offense level for Group One is 4 8 .
RE : HALL, Juliu s P . Page 8
Gro up Two (Count 15)
3 2 . Base Offe nse Level : The gu idel ine for an 18 USC §

19 56 (a)(1)(B)(i) offense is found in § 251 .1 of the
Se n tenci ng Guidelines . Pur suant to 5 251 . 1 ( a )( 2 ) , the b as e
o ffense lev el for count 15 is 20 .
33 . Specific Offense Characteristic : Since the defendant knew

that the funds ($15,000) were the proceeds of an unlawful
activity involving the distribution of controlled
substances, the offense level is increased 3 levels pursuant
to § 251 .1(b)(1) .
34 . Adjustment for Role in the Offense : None .
35 . Vict im Related Adjus tment : None .
-1 F . Adjustme nt f o r Obstr~ =---*~- None .
37 . Ad justed Offense Level, Group Two ( S ubtotal) :
Mul ti ple Cou nt (Group) Adjustment (See Chapter 3, Part D)
Units
38 . Group One Adjusted Offense Level . 48 1
39 . Group Two Adjusted Offe nse Level . 2 3' 0

_
40 . Total Numb er of Units . 1 1
41 . Grea ter of the Adjusted Of f ense

L evels Above . 48
42 . Increase in Offense Level (See § 3D1 .4) . 0
43 . Combined Adjusted Offense Level . 48
4 4 . Adjustment for Acceptance of Responsibility : The defendant

has not admitted to his involvement in the offenses .
Therefore, his offense level is not reduced 2 levels
pursuant to § 3E1 .1 .
45 . Total Offense Level :
PART S . THE DEFENDANT 'S CRI M I NAL HI STO RY
Juvenile Ad i udicat ions
46 . None .
Crim inal Convictions
47 . None .
RE : HALL, Julius P . P age 9
C ri m inal Hi sto ry Comp utat io n
48 . The defendant has zero criminal history points and a

criminal history category of I .
Other Criminal Conduct
4 9 . None .
Pending C harges
50 . None .
PART C . S E NTENC I N G O P TIONS
C ustody
Provisions : As to _C ~•,w.` ::.,^~um term of -

'" imprisonment is life and the mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment is 10 years . 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(A) . As to
counts 4, 5, 10, and 14, the maximum term of imprisonment is
5 years . 18 USC 5 1952, 18 USC § 1503, and 18 USC 5 1623 .
The maximum term of imprisonment for count 15 is 20 years .
18 USC 5 1956(a)(1) .
52 . Guideli ne P rovisio ns : Acc ording to the Commentary to t he

Sentencing Table i n Chapter 5 ( Applicat ion Note 2 ) , an
offense level of more than 4 3 is to be treated as an offense
level of 43 . There fore, based upon a to ta l combined offense
l vel of 48 and a criminal his tory cat egory o f I , the
e
guideline imprisonment term is life .
Supervised Relea se
53 . Statutory Provisions : As to count one, a toterm of supervised

release of at least 5 years shall be imposed . 21 USC S
841(b)(1)(A) . A term of supervised release of not more than
3 years may be imposed on counts 4, 5, 10, 14, and 15 . 18
USC S 3583 . Such terms of supervised release run
concurrently . 18 U5C 5 3624(e) .
54 . Guideline Provisions : The guideline term for supervised

release is 5 years, § 5D1 .2(a) .
Probation
55 . Stat utory Provi sions : Pur suant to 21 USC S 84 1( b )( 1 ),( A ) ,

the defendant is i neligib le for probation . As to counts 4,
5 , 10, 1 4 , a nd 1 5 , the de fendant is e lig ib l e f or probat i on
by statute . 18 U SC S 356 1( a ) . If a sentence of p robat i on
were imposed as t o these cou nts, the authori zed term is not
less than one year nor mo re than 5 ' years . 18 US C S
3561(b)(1) .
RE : HALL , Julius P . Pa g e 10 ,
56 . Guide line Provi sions : Pursuant to S 5B1 . 1( b ) (2 ) , the

defendant is ine ligible for probation .
PART D . OF F END ER CHARACTER I STICS
Family Ties, Family Responsibilities , a nd Community T ies
57 . Julius Ph i llip Hall was born on January 9, 1962, in

Savannah, Georgia . He is the only child born to the
relationship of Lonise Hall and Porter Screen . The
defendant does have 5 half-siblings . The defendant was
raised in Savannah, except for two years he spent in New
Jersey while a ,teenager . According to the defendant's
mother, Hall experienced a normal childhood . Hall's mother,
Louise Tolbert, resides at 230 Fell Street in Savannah, and
his father, Porter Screen, also resides in Savannah . At the
time of his arrest, the defendant resided in an apartment
with Bernard warrs^ . - .. ' - ~ ,.~ u„va;.,zah . - -: - ---
~ . The defendant married Tonya Wright on September 15, 19 8 4 , i n

\J Savannah . The marriage e nded in divorce on June 1 4, 19 89 .
One child, Gabrielle Dom i n ique Hall ( age 4 ) , was born to
this marriage . Tonya Wright was awarded legal custody of
Gabrielle H a ll wh en the couple was divorced ; however , the
defendant's chil d is now in the legall c ustody of He len
Duncan, Tonya Wright's mother . Tonya Wrigh t was killed on
June 3, 1 99 1, and Hele n Duncan has cared for the defend ant ' s
c hild si nce that time . According to Ms . Duncan and the
defendant, Hall has not provi de d $75 per week in court-
o rdered c hild support since June 4, 19 91 . It sh ould be
noted that on July 11, 199 1, that defendant received a death
benefit fro m Allstate Insurance Company as a res ult of Tonya
Wright's death . Tonya Wright never c hanged the ben e fic i ary
on her life insura nce po licy a fter she and the de fendant
w e divorced . The tota l amount of the death bene fit was
$50,742 . Ms . Duncan related the defendant's daughter has
not received any money from this death bene fit . It should
also be noted that the defendant did not advise the
probation officer that he r eceived this death bene fit . .
s
Mental and Emotional Health
59 . The defendant visited a psychiatrist, Dr . Andrew Shanlanan,

on two occasions in October, 1990, for stress-related
problems . After Hall's second meeting with Dr . Shanlanan,
his treatment was terminated . The probation officer has
uncovered no information indicating the defendant is
experiencing mental or emotional problems at the present
time
Physical Condition . Including Drug Dependence and Alco hol

Abuse
60 . The defendant is 5 feet, 9 inches t all and weighs 180

pounds . Hall reports good health . He relates he is on
medication, atarex, for skin irritation . Hall denies the use
of illegal drugs and reports consuming alcohol on a social
basis .
Educatio n an d Vocatio n al Skill s

1
61 . The de fendant gradua t ed from Tompkins High School on June 3,

1981 . His c lass rank was 38 out of 165 students . He has
rece ived tra ining ne ces s ary to be a cert i fied peace officer .
Emplo yment Record
62 . The defendant was employed

. ~ .•- * + ^ asvannah P olice Department- .
from October 6, 1980, to June t/, 1991 . From October 6,
1 980, to July 6, 1983, Hall was emp loyed as a custodian . On
July 7, 1983, the defenda nt was promoted to a police
o fficer . Hall was a corpo ral when he re signed his position
on June 17, 1991 .
63 . Hall relates that he has al so worked as an off-duty police

o fficer fo r several establishme nts in Savannah . F urther ,
the defendant reports he was .a director f or Matador S e curity
for approximately 4 months in 1990 . This informat ion c ould
not be verified . The defendant also adv i ses that he has
owned or co-owned s everal s mal l bu sine sses in Savannah
between 1987 and 1990 .
PART E . PINES AND RESTITUTION
Statuto rv Provisions
64 . As to count one, the maximum fine is $4,000,000 . 21 USC 5

• 841(b)(1)(A) . The maximum fine for each of the remaining
counts is $250,000 . 18 USC 5 3571(b) .
65 . A special as sessment of $300 ( $50 as to each cou nt) is j

mandatory . 18 USC 5 3 0 1 3 . l
66 . Restitution is not applicable .
Guideline Provisions
67 . The fine range for these offenses i s from $25,000 (§

SE1 .2(c)(1)(A)) to $4,000 , 000 (§ 5 E1 . 2 (c)( 4 )) .
Exhibi t B
B-2 Defendant Julius P . Hall's objections to Presentence

Report
52
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

I
VS . ) CR 491-111
JULIUS P . HAIL, et al ., )
Defendants . j
DEFENDANT JULIUS P . EiALL' S

OBJECTIONS TO PRESENTENCE REPORT
C omes No w th e Defe nda n t Julius P . Hall a n d o b je c ts to t he '
Presentence Report as Follows :
Part A
7 . The evidence at trial did not show that Morris received
crack from Cecelia Strobert (Strobert was acquitted of all
charges) . Thus, Hall did not distribute 170 grams of cocaine base
(crack) .
8 . Again, the evidence at trial failed to prove that Hall
obtained cocaine base (crack) which was s t ored by Cecelia Strobert .
The report is therefore inaccurate regarding the 10 kilograms of
crack even without the rule of lenity .
10 . Both Lamar Roberson and Garfield Hills testified that~the
crack obtained by Hills' from Roberson was unrelated to Hill's
conversation with Defendant Hall and Defendant Johnson .
12 . Assuming the evidence at trial and the various
convictions accurately reflect the events as they occurred, then
the maximum amount of crack that arguably could be attributed to

Defendant Hall is 778 g r ams of c r ack . S e e objec t ions Part A 7-a n d
8 a b ov e . S /A Delo ach test i fied th at o f a l l t h e co c ain e h e w a s able
t o a ctu all y i de n t i f y i n th i s case , the a mount was subst a ntia ll y
le s s th a n 5 k il ogr am s . See , United Statesv . Wise, 881 F .2d
970(11th C i r . 1989 ) and U n ite d Sta t es v . C ostell an o s , 882 F .2d 474
(11th Cir . 1989) . Note : Section 2 D1 .4 attempts and conspira c ies,
application notes provide :
2 . wnere there is no drug seizure . . . the sentencing judge
shall approx imate the quantity of the controlled substance .
That provision further provides that, 11 [i]n making this
determination, the judge may consider, for example, the price
generally obtained for the controlled substance, financial or othe r
records, similar transactions in controlled substances by the
Defendant ."
In the instant case, using the price generally obtained for
controlled substance, financial or other records, it is clear that
the amount of drugs attributable to Defendant Hall is inaccurate .
This is especially true when one considers the financial records of
Defendant Hall and Diana Mack which were admitted into evidence .
l
At most, the government was able to show approximately $13,50,0 .00
invested in Sound Tracks . However, Defendant Hall introduced
evidence proving that he had won substantially more than $13,500 .00
fr om vario us g amb ling w inn ings But See United S t ates v . A ls t o n ,
2
895 F . 2d 1362 ( 11th Cir . 1990) .
18 . Defendant Hall obj ect s to th e bas e l evel of fense
utilized . The guideline for Defendant Hall's offense should have
been calculated pursuant to §2 D1 .1(c)(4), thus the base level for
t he offense should have been 36, when the arguments or objections
above are applied .
20 . Defendant objects to the characte r i z ation a s the
organizer, and the 4 point enhancement . The testimony clearly
d emo n strated that Calvin Morr i s w as in f act th e organizer and
distributed a l leged proceeds of the unlawful activity .
21 . Defendant on7ec cs to the adjustment of 2 levels increase
because he abused a position of public trust . Spec i fically, S/A
Deloach testified that at no time was he able to determine or
obtain evidence that Defendant Hall used his position as a police
officer in furtherance of the charged conspiracy . Nor was there
any evidence at trial that Defendant Hall utilized any information
he obtained in such capacity to facilitate the commission of the
crimes charged .
23 . Defendant Hall adopts his argument in support of his
motion in arrest of judgment in support of his objection to this
item . See Exhibit "A" attached hereto .
58 . By way of explanation, the Defendant did not receive the

r
death benefit referred to in Part D, item 58 . The policy prod'eeds
were assigned to the Defendant's attorney pursuant to contract for
legal representation .
3
CO NC LUSIO N
Based up on the f orego i ng object ions , Defendant Ha l l subm i ts
that considering the greater of the adjusted offense levels, his
total offense level should be 36 . This level should be used in
c onnection w ith the sentenci ng options . Additio n ally, D e f end ant
Hall requests permission to supplement these objections .
Respectfully su bmit ted,
7
J l+
~
B ZGE:~
DAVI D RO B ERS
GEO RGI A BAR NO . 6 0 8043
A T T ORNE Y FO R JULI US P . HALL
P . O . Box 9 304
Savannah, G eorg i a 3141 2
( 912 ) 2 3 6- 3 605
4
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

S O U THERN DI STRI CT OF GEO RGIA
PRO B ATION OFFICE
TOMMASO D . RENDINO AUGU STA 3 0903

CHILI PROBATION OMCXR 1 . O. l01CTN
No vembe r 25 , 1 9 91 U. & COURT sous e
P. a box $165
SAVA NNAH w.msaa
M S. COURT House
SAVANNAH 31412 BRUNSWICK 31321
P. o. BOX m
coMnu# u . w .u s3 USr.O . ! COURT House
rrx z.wu Vus cs i a i
Tho mas A . Withers David Roberson

P .O . Box 89,09 2 1 W . Park Avenue
Savannah, GA 31412 Savannah, GA 3 14 01
RE : HALL , Julius Phillip

Ca g oi_i, 1 no
Enclosed is a copy of the addendum on the above named

individual . It is the responsibility of the defendant's attorney
to disclose this information to him .
Sincerely,
Richard A . Long
Sr . U .S . Probation Officer
RAL/rdw
E nclos ure
r
Exhib i t B
B- 3 Addendum to t he Pre sentenc e Report

T! : i ;~ ?^2 • ' ; lO :~ '~ : 1F 1
POINTS OBJECTIONS (111) rv L Li. g
( II ) ORPage 75 of 122
Case 4:01-cv-00183-BAE Document Filed 08/06/01
HONORED Z I' S U DMl 'i': GU +3 Y "tilti_"
POSITZCN OF 18L' PAR=
WIZIi RFSPFJC'T TO SENTEIX~JC` k 71CSC%iS
~ RE : Jujus Phillio Ha~i

Cr,SE No . CR491-111-02
it is the responsibility of the Probation Officer to endeavor to resolve any disputed

issues raised by the parties . It is our burden to submit an addendum setting forth
any objections counsell may have made together with the Probation Officer's comment
thereon . Please select and complete one of the following options and return this
form to the Probation Office, to arrive too later than the close of business on
November 18, 1991 - In the event either counsel raises issues
under option SII, the Probat .Lon Officer must make a determination as to the need
for a meeting of the parties . If this is the case please phone the Probation Officer
as soon as possible so as to facilitate the earliest possible meting .
I . No written objections are being made to the material information,

sentencing classifications, sentencing guideline ranges, and policy
~ùt`.clilECl t S contained in or 'Cr 't .
Prin t Name
Signatu re Dat e
ZI . No writt en obj ection (s) to ' the ma teria l information, sente nci nc
class ification, sente nc ing guideline rang es, and policy statement :
con tained in or omitted from the report is ( are) being submitted .
w
Ho ev er we do wish to ma ke the fo llowi ng po in ts whic h are attac hes
For the record .
Name
Sign a ture Dat e
IZI . The attached objection(s) is(are) being made to the material information
sentencing classifications, sentencing guideline ranges, and/or poLic
statements contained in or omitted from the report :
David Roberso n
Prim astt~---~ / J
Signature ~ Date '
c . Opposing Counsel
This form will be provided to t he Court at the time the £resaxt enoe Report is c-
. : n 'TA AENE : NEITHER THIS FORM NOR ANY POINTS (XI) OR OBJECTIONS (III) W :~L:+
HONORED.(Revised
IF SUBMITTED
1 f? v "FAX ."
/GA Form 302 :
RE : HALL, Julius
ADDENDUM TO THE PRESENTENCE REP O RT
The probation officer certifies that the presentence report,

including any revision thereof, has been disclosed to the
defendant, his attorney, and counsel for the Government, and that
the content of the Addendum has been communicated to counsel . The
Addendum fairly states any objection's they have made .
OB JECTIONS
By the Government
The Governme nt has no ob j ections .
By the Defendant
The defendant objects to paragraph 7 by stating the evidence

at trial did not show that Calvin Morris received crack from
Cecelia Strobert (Strobert was acqu itted of all charges .
Therefore, Ha l l did not distribute 170 grams o f crack as re l ated in
paragraph 7 .
The probat ion officer believes evidence presented at trial
showed Calvin Morris received crack from Cecel i a Strobert as early
as 1988 . According to Morris' testimony at trial, he contacted the
defendant every two weeks in 1988 and 1989, and advised Hall that
he wished to purchase crack . Morris related that Cecel i a Strobert
would then de liver the crack he and Hall negot i ated . Further, the
probation officer personally interviewed Calvin Morris and Morris
advised the probation officer that Cecelia Strobert stored and
delivered Hall's crack to him and others .
As to paragraph 8, the defendant contends the evidence at
trial failed to prove that Hall obtained crack which was stored by
Cecelia Strobert ; therefore, the report is inaccurate regarding the
10 kilograms of crack even without the rule of lenity . As
previously stated by the probation officer, Calvin Morris provided
evidence at trial and to the probation officer that he personally
viewed crack which James Saget delivered to Cecelia Strobert .
Morris testified that Hall devised the plan to have crack
transported from Miami to Savannah . Hall collected proceeds from
the distribution of the crack and invested some of the proceeds in
a night club . During an interview with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation on August 7, 1991, Herbert Nathaniel Johnson
substantiated Hall's involvement in this crack distribution ring .
Therefore, the probation officer concludes that the total amount of
crack n r a_nsported from Miami to Savannah should be attributed to
the . .-giant .
•3 paragraph 10, the defendant relates that both Lamar
Rob,~• k- .1d Garfield Hills testified that the crack obtained by
Hi*" Roberson was unrelated to Hills' conversation with
Julius Hall and Nathaniel Johnson . The probation officer

ackno wledges that Hall an d Johnson were not present when Roberson
gave the crack to Hills o n April 6, 1991 . However, Johnson adv ised
Roberso n to give Hills a $2 0 piece of crack for $5 based upon
Hills' information provided to Hall and Johnson concerning the
Grand Jury's investigation into the defendant's crack distribution
ring .
The def endan t mak es the f ollo wing o b jectio n t o p a ragraph 1 2 :
A ssuming the evidence at trial and the various conv i ctions
acc urat e l y re flect the event s a s t hey occurred , then t h e maximum
amo u n t of c rac k that arguab l e could be at tri b uted t o De f en da nt Hal l
i s 778 g r am s . S e e object ion s Part A 7 and 8 a bo ve . S / A De l oach
tes tif ied t hat of all the coc a ine he wa s a b le to act ua l ly id enti f y
in this ca se , t he amoun t was sub st ant i a ll y less than 5 ki lograms .
See , Uni te d State s v . Wise, 881 F . 2d 970(llth C i r . 1989) and United
States v . Costellanos, 882 F .2d 474 (1 1 th Cir . 1989) . No te :
Sect i on 2D 1 . 4 attempts 8^,,4 ~"~^"`~"' aC1@$ ~ ap plication notes
2. Where there is no drug seizure . . .the sentencing judge

shall approximate the quantity of the controlled substance .
That provision further provides that, "[i]n making this
determination, the judge may consider, for example, the price
generally obtained for the controlled substance, financial or other
records, similar transactions in controlled substances by the
Defendant ."
In the instant case, using the price generally obtained for
controlled substance, financial or other records, it is clear that
the amount of drugs attributable to Defendant Hall is inaccurate .
This is especially true when one considers the financial records of
Defendant Hall and Diana Mack which were admitted into evidence .
At most, the government was able to show approximately $13,500 .00
invested in Sound Tracks . However, Defendant Hall introduced
evidence proving that he had won substantially more than $13,500 .00
from various gambling winnings . But See United States V . Alston,
895 Ft 2d 1362 (11th Cir . 1990) .
The probation officer agrees that the Court must approximate
the total quantity of crack attributed to Hall since there was no
drug seizure . The probation officer believes the total quantity of
crack attributed to Hall in the presentence report is very lenient .
Paragraphs 5 through 12 of the report outline conduct by the
defendant that can be established with "sufficient indicia of
reliability to support its probable accuracy ." See Section
6A1 .3(a) . Evidence provided by Calvin Morris and substantiated by
Herbert Nathaniel Johnson concerning the quantity of crack
attributed to the defendant appears reliable . An examination 6f
the defendant's financial records is not a reliable method to
determine the amount of crack attributed to the defendant in the
instant case .
The defenda•- ^ enjects to the base offense _ level stated in
paragraph 18 . contends his base offense lexel should have
been c alculated pursuant to Section 2D1 .1(c)(4), which e s tablishes

a base offe n s e level of 3 6 . The probation officer believes the
total quantity o f crack attributed to the defendant is 10 .17
kilograms, which results in a base offense level of 4 0 .
Hall ob jects to the 4 level enhancement i n paragr aph 2 0 for
his role as the o r gani zer in this conspiracy . The defendant
contends the test imo ny c l earl y demonstr a ted that C alvin Morris was
in fact the or ganizer and d istribu ted a lleged proceeds of the
unlawful activity .
The pr obation officer contends the evidence showe d that the
de fendant was the or ganizer of this crack distribution r ing . As
the presentence re port butl ines, Hall devi sed the plan t o tr ans port
crack from southern Florida t o S ava nnah . He obt ained beep ers a nd
deve loped a code so members o f the co nspir acy could ut ilize the
b eepers when di s tributing crack . Further, Hall co llected proceeds
from the distribution of cra c k and naid other members , o f_ _ this
-- - ._.:_r-.., .C:y a mo nthly salary of $1,Ouu ror Lneir particip ation in
the consp iracy .
The defendant ob jects t o the 2 level enhancement in pa r agrap h
21 based upon his abu s e of a pos i tion o f trus t . Spec ifically, Hall
relate s Agent De loach testified that at no time was he able to
determine or obtain evidence that Hall used his position as a
police officer in fur therance of the con spiracy . Nor was there any
ev idence at tria l that the defendant utili zed any information -he
obtained in such capacity to facilitate the com mis s ion of the
crime s charged .
The probat ion officer believes the de fendant did abuse his
position as a po lice officer to facil itate the commi s sion and
concealment of the offense . As stated i n the presente nce report,
Hall ceased all drug activit ies with Joseph Williams after he
learned law enforcement offic ials were invest iga ting Joseph
Williams . Hall gained this knowledge thr ough hi s employment as a
police officer . Further, Hal l advised William McDonald that he
would remove outstand ing arres t warrants for Mc Donald if McDonald
would distribute cocaine for him .
As to paragraph 23, the defendant adopts hi s argument in
support of his motion in arrest o f judgement . Hal l contends count
10 of the indictment does not charge an offense against the United
States .
The probation officer can not address the legal issue of .the
defendant ' s motion ; however, the probation off icer can determine
that the defendant obstructed just ice when he unlawfully influenc ed
a juror, Garfield Hills . Even if Ha ll had not been formally
charged with obstruction, the probat ion off icer can still consider
the defendant ' s conduct when preparing the presentence report .
Therefore, the probation off i car concludes that Hall obstruct ed
justice when he advised Hills to keep him informed concerning th e
Grand Jury ' s invest igatior
n of ?3 13. 's crack distribution ring .
By way of exp l anation, tns•c : andant did not rece i ve the death
benefit referred to in p a raJ:•,.:: 58 . The po licy proceeds wer e
assigned to the de fendant ' s a ':t• pursuant to contract for leg a:
zepresentation .
Cert ified by :
Richard A . Long
Sr . U .S . Probation Officer
t
Revie wed & Approved :
Thomas L . Moore III

Actg . Dep . Chief U .S . Probation Offi cer
Exhibit C
D istr ict C ourt Judge ' s Two O rders Granti ng Reduction of Sen tence .
C-1 Order one dated Ap ril 13, 1998 .
C-2 Order Two date d February 5, 1999 .

F __
UN ITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVI S ION
f. .
I '
UNITED S TATES OF AMERICA
V. Case No. CR491-00111-002
JULIUS PHILLIP HALL
ORD E R
On October 11, 1991, Julius Phillip Hall was convicted by ajury on Counts 1, 4, 5, 10, 14,
and 15 of the Indictment charging him with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled
substances (Count 1), interstate travel (Counts 4 and 5), obstruction of justice (Count 10), false
dec larations before a Federal Grand Jury ( Count 1 4), and money laund ering (Count IS) . On
December 6, 1991, this Court s entenced the Defendant to serve a term of life as to Count 1 ; sixty
(60) months as to Counts 4, 5, 10, and 14 ; and 240 (two hundred forty) months as to Count 15, all
to be served concurrently.
On November 23, 1992, the Government filed a motion pursuant to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Rule 35(b), requesting a reduction in the Defendant's sentence based on
substantial assistance rendered. However, on May 18, 1994, this Court denied that motion .
On February 12, 1998, th e Government again filed a motion pursuant to the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, Rule 35(b), requesting a r eduction in the Defendant's sentence based on
substantial assistance rendered .
The Court notes the Defendant was a police officer with the C ity of Sa vannah whil e he was
the leader of a large crac k cocaine d istribution ring in Savannah, Georgia. The Court further notes
that the Defendant committed perjury before a Federal Grand Jury and dur ing the trial of this cas e.
The Court has examined the Government's motion and concludes the Defendant provided
substantial assistance in several cases in the Southern District of Georgia, most notably the "Broken
Oath " case involving numerous corrupt police officers in the Savannah area. The Court believes the
sentence of life imprisonment imposed on Count I of the Defendant's Indictm ent should be reduced ;
however, the Court cannot and will not overlook the Defendant's past cri minal conduct and his
commission of perjury during his trial . As such, th e Government's motion is GRANTED , and the
Court reduces the sentence imposed as to Count 1 of the Defendant's Indictment to a term of 340
(three hundred forty) months, to be served concurrently with the sentences imposed on Counts 4, 5,
10, 14, and 15 .
SO ORDE RED, this 13th day o f April , 1
B: AVAM EDEN]
UNITED STATES TRICT JUDGE
FOR Tf E SOUTFD DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
.. . _ ~. ~.
SOUTHER N DISTRICT OF G EORGIA SAVANNAH UI V
SAVANNAH DIVISION
~E8 ~ S 36 Q~ ~ Sg
U NITED STATES OF AMERICA

SO . DI<. . . OF G A.
V. Case No. CR491-00111-0 02
JULIUS PHILLIP HALL .)
ORD E R
The Defendant has filed a Motio n with the Court, pursuant to 18 U.S.C., Section 3582(c)(2)
to reconsider reducing his sentence based upon newly developed circumstances .
The Court, in an Order dated January 1 7, 1996, denied 'a motion filed by the Defendant
pursuant to 18 U.S.C, Section 3582(c), asking for a recalculation of his guide lines based on a
retroactive amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines regarding the upper limit of the drug quantity
table at U.S.S .G., Section 2D1 .1 . Further, in a n Order dated April 13, 1 998, the Court reduced a
sentence of life imprisonment imposed on Count I of the Defendant's Indictment to 340 months.
based on the Defendant 's substantial assistance the Gove:nmment.
The Court has not been unmindful of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by t he Defendant
on June 1, 1998 , but a thorough review of his assistance was in order . As such, the Court is
uncertain whether a further reduction is warranted. However it has, after extended review ,
c oncluded that the sentence should be reduced to 300 months. ~

j' : ~ .
Ce+u t . ~~ 9
A~
v. , - .
to 300 months . All other terms and condition s of the original sentence are to remain in full force.
S O ORDERED, this 5th day of February, 1999 .
S. AVANVEDEN]
UNITED STATES
FOR TfESOiJTH DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
Exhibit D
A ffidavit of J uliu s P . H all

IN TH E UNITED S T AT ES D I ST R ICT COURT

FOR T H E SOUT H E RN D ISTRI CT O F GEORGIA
SAVANNAH D IV ISION
JULIUS PHILLIP HALL, ]

Appellant/Movant,
l
vs . J Case No . CR 491 -00111 - 002
I
UNITED ST A TES OF AME RICA, ]
Appellee/Respo n dent . ]
AFFIDAVIT OF JULIUS P . HALL
State of Alabama ]
] SS : Affidavit
County of Talladega
I, the undersigned Affiant, Julius P . Hall, hereby dispose
and under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and
correct to the best of my personal knowledge and belief .
On or about June of 1993, Affiant Hall avers that the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals denied Affiant's direct appeal .
' That same week Affiant spoke with his appellate counsel (Mr .
David Roberson) concerning the denial of Affiant's direct appeal
and we discussed what was next . I asked appellate counsel
Roberson . if , we could appeal to the U .S . Supreme Court? The
appellate counsel advised me that the U .S . Supreme Court would
not hear my case and the appellate counsel stated further that
the Supreme Court hardly ever hears a drug case .
I, the Affiant Hall, told appellate counsel Roberson that I
wanted to try it anyhow . I want to appeal my case to the U .S .
Supreme Court .
49
The appellate counsel Roberson told me that he thought it
was a bad idea and waste of time . He then stated that he was not
obligated to do anymore legal work for me b e yond the Eleventh
Circuit, and he was not going to waste his time and his o f fice
resources to argue something he thought was final .
He then advised me that he though t my best chance at some
relief was to wor k w ith the gove rnment and provide the government
w ith substantial assistance . I have not tal ked to him since .
A ffiant Hall avers that appel l ate counsel Roberson mislead
me with false inducement which wa s e rro neous advice conce rning my
rights to appeal at a c r itical stage of my p r oceedings o n direct
appeal . Appel l ate c ounsel did not explain my r ights fully as to
appeal to t he U .S . Supreme C ourt . he ab ando ned my appea l, he did
not te ll me about my rights to 22 5 5 . He d id not tell me abo ut
obtaining another lawye r from the Court . He knew I was indigent .
he knew I relied on him for my defense . He kn ew I did know or
h ave an y knowledge of the app l ication of crimina l or of
procedur a l law .
A ffiant Hall avers that appellate cou n sel Roberso n 's bad
advic e or erro neous advice left me with the impr ession in mine
th at I did not have a right t o appeal to the United States
S upreme Court .
Af fiant Hall aver that he wa s neve r adv ised of his
cons ti tutional rights to appeal to the U .S . Su p reme Cour t being
waived by the 1 1th Circuit Court of Ap pe als nor app ellate counse l
Ro berson , neither did Affiant hav e a full und erstandin g of what
to do, which make s s aid waiver of appeal to b e in v io l ation of
50
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution . Affiant is

presently serving a federal sentence of 500-months without the
possibility of parole .
Executed on this ~day of June, 2001 .
Ju is P . Hall, A f f iant
..
61
V1L11 L(-C C ,6L --
51
Affidavit of Julius P . Hall
4:10,
This, the 2 (p day of July, 2001 .
?
QLJJtQ-Q .
J i s P . Hall, Affiant
-52 -
Ce rt i f ica t e o f Se r vice
I , J ul ius P . H al l, h ereby ce rt ify t ha t t he fo r egoing ins t rumen t, "Leave t o F i le

Fir s t 2255 mo t io n t o vaca t e , s et asi de o r co rr ec t a n i l legal s e n t enc e " , w i t h memoran -
d um of La w an d e xhi b i ts a tt ac h e d, has b ee n p lace d in t he Talla d ega F . C . I . ma ili n g
sys t e m wit h t he p r ope r pos t age aff ixed ther e t o , t o b e sent by U . S . Pos t age to t he
parties of interest listed below :
United States
Chief District Court
B . Avant Edenfield
U .S . Southern District Court
o f Georgi a , Savannah Divi s i o n
Assistant U .S . Attorney
Thomas A . Withers
P .O . Box 8999
Savannah, GA 31412
Clerk of the Court

U .S . District Court
of Georgia, Savannah Division
44~
S o e xecut e d o n thi s , the ~k of July, 2 001 .
?
J us P . Hall
Movant, Pro Se
Reg . No . 07594-085 3
PMB 1000 l
Talladega, AL 35160
Supreme Court, over the demands of Petitioner to do so .
Petitioner did not know anything about his right under law as to
2255 because counsel abondoned him without notice and did hot
tell Petitioner about the procedural time limits for certiorari
or 2255 .
Petitioner further avers that with a decrease enhancement
levels, there is strong probability that the outcome of the
sentence proceedings would have been different, had counsel
pursued certiorari to the U .S . Supreme Court .
Petitioner prays the Court grant review and furtehr grant
relief in favor of the Petitioner . In light of Jones, 119 S .Ct .
1215 ; Apprendi, 120 S .Ct . 2362-63 and in blazing light of United
States v . Thomas Fields, decided March 13, 2001, Case No . 99-3138
consolidated with Case No . 99-3139, appeals from the United
States District Court for the District of , Columbia (No .
98cr00071-01)(No . 98cr00071-06), the Court stated (because the
fact of leadership role may increase a defendant's sentence
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, Apprendi applies .
Accordingly, the issue of leadership must be charged in the
indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt . Because Fields did not argue at trial that leadership
should have been submitted to the jury, however, we review the
record for plain error .) .
Ground Five
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
prior to trial, at trial, at sentencing and on direct appeal .
Petitioner asserts the claim that his convictions on October
37
11, 1991, was obtained by a denial of effective assistance of
counsel prior to, during, and after Petitioner's convictions were
obtained on federal charges .
Although the trial record was fully developed, Petitioner's
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was not preserved at
the district [level] in the first instance, and therefore must be
raised in this petition for post-conviction relief, rather than
for the first time on direct appeal . U .S . v . Millwood, 961 F .2d
194, 195 (11th Cir . 1992) .
To make a successful claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must show that his counsel's performance was
deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his
defense .
Strickland v . Washington, 466 U .S . 668, 104 S .Ct . 2052, 80
L .Ed .2d 674 (1984), Boschen, 845 F .2d at 922 ; Matire v .
Wainwright, 811 F .2d 1430, 1435 (11th Cir . 1987) . Counsel's
performance is deficient only if it fall below the wide range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases . Id . at 688,
104 S .Ct . at 2065 .
Prejudice is established when there is a reasonable
probability that the result of the proceedings would have been
different had counsel not performed deficiently . Strickland, Id .
at 694 ; Boschen, 845 F .2d at 922 ; Matire, 811 F .2d at 1435 .
As held in Cronic , which was handed down on the same day as
Strickland, the Supreme Court created an exception to the
Strickland, standard for ineffective assistance of counsel and
acknowledged that certain circumstances are so egregiously
38
prejudicial that ineffective assistance of counsel will be
presumed . Stono v . Dugger, 921 F .2d 1125, 1152 (11th Cir . 1991)
(en banc)(citing Cronic , 466 at 658, 104 S .Ct . at 2046) .
In Evitts v . Lucey, 469 U .S . 387, 396, 399, 83 L .Ed .2d 821,
105 S .Ct . 830 (1985), the Supreme Court held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to
effective assistance fo counsel on a first appeal .
The standard of ineffective assistance is the same for trial
and appellate counsel . People v . Bowen, 791 F .2d 861 (11th Cir .)
cert . denied U .S .^, 107 S .Ct . 597, 93 L .Ed .2d 597 (1986) .
Nevertheless, Petitioner Hall will now carry his burden of
point to the specific errors manifested from counsel (Mr . David
Roberson)'s deficient performance and actual prejudice suffered
therefrom in each ground raised in this post-conviction relief
motion to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence imposed .
Fir st Prong of S trickland
Petitioner Hall argues that counsel (Mr . David Roberson)'s
performance was deficient and prejudical by :
1 . Counsel's ineffective assistance on appellate level for
failing to perfect Petitioner Hall's direct appeal by not filing
an appeal of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal's decision of
denial of Petitioner Hall's direct appeal on June of 1993 to the
United States Supreme Court, over the direct demands of
Petitioner Hall's request to do so . See Exhibit D, Petitioner
Hall's Affidavit ; see U .S . V. Nagib, 56 F .3d 798 (7th Cir .
1995)(If the defendant told his lawyer to appeal, and the lawyer
dropped the ball, then defendant has been deprived not of
39
effective assistance of counsel, but of any assistancy of counsel
on appeal) ; Martin v . U .S ., 81 F .3d 1083 (11th Cir . 1996) ;
Montemoino v . United States, 68 F .3d 416 (11th Cir . 1995) .
2 . Counsel was ineffective for withdrawing and abandoning
Petitioner's case without g iving Petit i oner notice of his rights
to appeal the appellate court's decision, to obtain another
attorney, to give notice of procedural time-limits concerning
appeal to the United States Supreme Court, to have his direct
appeal perfect, and did not follow the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals Rule 46-1(f) . See Exhibit D, Petitioner Hall's
Affidavit . Nagib, 56 F .3d 798 (7th Cir . 1995)(Abaondonment is
a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment) .
3 . Counsel was ineffective for failing to object and
request for a dismissal of indictment on grounds of
double-jeopardy and failed to raise double-jeopardy objections in
arguments prior to trial, at tr i al, at sentencing and on direct
appeal . See Ground Three .
4 . Counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
defective indictment, which did not allege drug quantity and rug
amounts in Counts One, Four, Five and Fifteen . See U .S . v .
Fitzgerald, 89 F .3d 218 (5th Cir . 1996) . See Ground One .
5 . Counse l was ineffective for failing to t_ :~ject to a
general verdict use in the case, and fail to request for a
special verdict to be used in the case of a multiple-drug-
conspiracy composed of one or more drugs ; cocaine hydrochloride
and cocaine base "crack ." See Ground Two .
40
violated Petitioner Hall's rights under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment by using drug type and quantity to increase his
statutory maximum penalty even though the jury made no specific
finding as to the type or quantity of drug involved in the
conspiracy ; Petitioner Hall specifically argues that absent of
such a jury finding he should be now and should have been
sentenced back in 1991 under 21 U .S .C . section 841(b)(1)(C), the
"catch-all" penalty provision for drug crimes that with one
exception contains no reference to specific drug type or
quantity . Counsel's failure toobject to this issue and appeal
this issue which Petitioner Hall is actually innocent, and
results in actual prejudice to Hall from counsel's deficient
performance to defend Hall's right to not be sentenced in excess
of the maximum penalty authorized by law, wh i ch in this case
would be the lower statutory maximum penalty for , a multiple-drug-
conspiracy of two different drugs ; cocaine hydrochloride and
cocaine base "crack ." See Ground one .
7 . Counsel was ineffective for failing to object and appeal
Hall's sentence on grounds that the wrong mandatory minimum
sentence was applied in multiple-drugs-conspiracy to the United
States Supreme Court . See Grounds One and Two .
appealing to the United States Supreme Court the fact that the
Petitioner should have been sentence to the lower statutory
maximum for the lowest drugs in a multiple-drug-conspiracy . See
Grounds One and Two .
9 . Counsel was ineffecitve for failing to appeal to the
41
United States Supreme court the decision of the appellate court's
denial that the District Court did improperly apply the four
level enhancemtn for organizer pursuant to U .S .S .G . section
3B1 .1(a) was unconstitutional and unwarranted in violation of
Hall's Fifth Amendment right to due process "not to be sentenced
on false and unreliable information and not on facts which was
not charged in the indictment or determined by a jury and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt . See Ground Four .
Petitioner contends that he was convicted of criminal acts
without the benefits of effective assistance of counsel as
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and argues furtehr that he was denied his right
effective assistance of counsel at all critical stages . And as a
result of Counsel Roberson's manifested and total dereliction of
Hall's defense[s], indeed constitutes a deprivation of the
Petitioner's constitutional rights to due process and effective
assistance of counsel, which is in itself prejudicial per se .
Moreover, certain circumstances are so egregiously
prejudicial that ineffective assistance of counsel will be
presumed . Stano V . Dugger, 921 F .2d 1125, 1152 (11th Cir . 1991)
(en banc)(citing Cronic, 466 U .S . at 658, 104 S .Ct . at 2046) .
Cronic presumes prejudice where there has been an actual
breakdown in the adversarial process at trial . This indeed has
been shown and established from the acts and omissions of Counsel
Roberson's unprofessional errors . See also Strickland, 466 U .S .
at 692, 104 S .Ct . at 2067 ("actual or constructive denial of the
assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in
42
p rejud i ce . " ) I n the case at ba r, is pr ejudice pre sumed?
Second Prong of Strickland
The Supreme Court recognized in Cronic that there are
"circumstances which are so likelyh to prejudice the accused that
the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is
unjustified ." Crahic, 466 U .S . at 658, 104 S .Ct . at 2046 .
Hall argues that his case indeed falls within the criteria
of these circumstances . The Court identified the complete denial
or deprivation of effective representation of counsel at a
critical stage of an accused's trial, as a presumption of
prejudice . Id . 659 S .Ct . at 2047 . Hall maintains that Counsel
Roberson's conduct prior to, during and after trial caused a
complete breakdown in our adversarial system of justice, which
compels an application of the Cronic exception to teh Strickland
requirement of a showing that the outcome of the trial, sentence,
and direct appeal would have been different without counsel's
errors or omissions .
The Supreme Court went further to instruct Cronic that "if
counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to
meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of
Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself
presumptively unreliable ." Id . 659 S .Ct . at 2047 . it is celarly
established throughout this claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, prior to trial, at trial, at sentencing and on direct
appeal that Counsel Roberson completely failed to subject the
prosecution's entire case to a meaningful adversarial testing and
the cost of Hall litigating their effect is totally
43
[un]justified .
However, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome
of the proceedings prior to trial, at sentencing, on direct
appeal and an appeal to U .S . Supreme Court in light of Apprendi
would indeed have been different, after a review of this motion,
Grounds One - Five and the nine claims of ineffective assistance
under Ground Five, had it not been for the complete denial of
effective assistance at those critical stages ; and if Counsel
Roberson had not been so [c]onstitutionally ineffective and
properly argue the Grounds One - Five, the claims of ineffective
assistance, and pursued appeal to the U .S . Supreme Court .
Hall would not have recieved a 200 month sentence, which is
onver the lower statutory maximum penalty for the drug carrying
the lowest penalty pursuant to a jamority circuit case law
favoring Hall's position and further pursuant to Title 21 U .S .C .
section 841(b)(1)(C), a statutory maximum sentence penalty
commencing from 0-20 years maximum by statute for a jury's
general verdict which do not specify a drug type or a drug amount
from amultiple-druq-conspiracy of two different drugs, composed
of cocaine hydrochloride, and cocaine base, "crack ." Hall's
sentence would be different, and suffer actual prejudice and is
actully innocent of the sentence imposes by the District Court .
Furthermore, counsel did make objections pertaining to base
offense level enhancement of U .S .S .G . section 3B1 .1(a) and the
amount of drugs attributed to Hall which should have been
appealled to the U .S . Supreme Court .
Appellate Counsel Roberson failed to raise these issues and
44
claims on Hall's direct appeal, and appeal to the U .S . Supreme
Court, really prejudiced the defense of the whole proceeding of
the presentment of such meritorious claims . The failure of
counsel to appeal the enhancements and the decision of the
Eleventh Circuit to the United States Supreme Court constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel . See Orazio v . Dugger, 876
F .2d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir . 1989)(denied effective assistance of
counsel on appeal for failing to raise trial court's denial of
defendant's request to proceed pro se on appeal) . See also
Mattive v . Wainwright, 811 F .2d 1430 (11th Cir . 1987)(failure to
raise the issue on direct appeal was ineffective assistance of
counsel) .
Hall contends that prejudice has injured him from the
reluctant failure of counsel to raise the issues and claims set
forth herein this motion on direct appeal, and appealed them to
the U .S . Supreme Court, over the direct demands of Hall to do so,
and there exists a marginal probability that not for counsel's
failure to raise my issue on appeal to the U .S . Supreme Court I
would have enjoyed a reversal and remand for re - sentencing . See
United States V. Phillips, 210 F .3d 345, 353 (5th Cir .
2000)(appellate counsel ineffective for failing to challenge
Obstruction of Justice enhancement on appeal) . See also United
States v . Cook, 45 F .3d 388, 395 (10th Cir . 1995)(appellate
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue, and
defendant was excused from procedural default) ; Mason v . Hanks,
97 F .3d 887, 902 (7th Cir . 1996)(appellate counsel's failure to
raise the issue constituted ineffective assisance of counsel) .
45
In a most-recent decsion handed down by the Supreme Court in
Roe v . F lores-Ortega, 528 U . S . 4 70, 120 S . Ct . 1029, 145 L . Ed .2d
985 (2000)(T he H igh Court stated, even where counsel fails to
" Consult " w ith a defendant on t he issue of whet he r he would like
an appeal filed, con stitute s ine ffective a s sis tanc e of counse l,
and such performance on behalf of counsel would be deemed
constitutionall y d ific ient under th e Si xth A mendment .) .
It is we ll e stablis hed tha t th e clai ms rai s ed her ein thi s
motion wi ll wa rrant a n " E v identiary H eari ng" on this ineffecti ve
as si s tance o f counsel c laim . Hall is e ntitled to an evidentiary
hearing, i f Hall can allege facts which if true would warrant
habeas corpus re lief . Stano v . Dugger, 910 F .2d 989, 8 99 (11th
Cir . 199tr)(en banc) ; Futch v . Dugger, 874 F .2d 1483, 1485 (11th
Cir . 2989)(citing Townsend v . Sain, 91 L .Ed .2d 770, 83 S .Ct . 745
(19631 .
The Court on review must accept all of the Petitioner's
alleged facts as true and determine whether Petitioner has set
forth a v a lid claim . Agan v . Dugger , 835 F .2d 1337, 1338 (11th
Cir . 1987) .
Accordingly, Appellant-Movant asks that this Court grant an
Evidentiary Hearing into this matter so that the govern ment and
Hall can- re solve the issues and claims set-forth herein this
motion, in a more judicial economical manner .
Wherefore, Hall concludes, maintaining that his due process
and equal protection rights of the law as guaranteed by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution were
violated, as well as, Petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights to a
46
fair trial and effective assistance of counsel . Further arguing
that, because of all these crucial violations of trial counsel's
unprofessional error[s], which are clearly pointed out by
Petitioner and conclusively supported by the record . Petitioner
have shown in grave details that trial, sentencing, and direct
appeal counsel (Mr . David Roberson)'s acts fell far below an
objective standard of reasonable professional assistance .
Therefore, this Honorable Court should after reviewing
Hall's arguments and facts, vacate the convictions and sentences
imposed, to correct this unconstitutional and fundamentally
unjust incarceration ; and to further correct this manifested
miscarriage of . . . Justice . . . .
Conclusion
I n light o f the de cis on in Edwar ds, Riley, A pprend i and
Jones, the Appel lant Hal l's sentenc e has been unconstitutionally
imposed . C learly , the s entenc e of life impri s onment afte r two
reduces to a now 300 months exc eeds the lowest statu t o ry maximum
of twenty ye ar s pur suant to Ti tle 2 1 U . S .C . section 8 4 1(b)(1 ) (C)
for a conspi racy to di stribute multi ple -drug .
As a re s ult o f a "genera l ve rdict" in this case , the
district c ou rt has c learly erred in imposing a sentence which
exc eeds t he statutory max imum for t he drug ca rrying the lo wes t
penalty, in t his case i t wou ld cocaine hydrochloride the d rug
carrying the lo west penalty .
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing facts, arguments and
citations of authority, Appellant Hall requests that his
47
conviction and sentence be vacated, set aside, re-sentenced, or
an evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed facts .
Respectfully submitted,
~ I .
srul,ius P . Hall
g . No . 07594 - 085
PMB 1000 B eta A
Talladega, Al 35160
48
Ex h ib it A : Indictment - CR 49 1 - 00 11 1 -002
49
Filed in office
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

~GtiG..I
SAVANNAH DIVISION Deputy Clark
UNITED STATES OF AMER I CA REDACTED SECOND

SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT
CR
V.
VIO : 21 .U .S .C . 5 846
HERBERT NATHANIEL JOHNSON CO NS PIRAC Y TO POSSESS W ITH
A/K/A "NAY", A/K/A "NA= I N T ENT TO D I STR I B UTE AND
JULIUS PHILLIP HALL DIST RIB UTION O F CONTROLLED
JAMES WILLIS SAGET SUBSTANCES
CECELIA COOK STROBERT
LAMAR ROBERSON, 21 U .S .C . 5 841(a)(1)
A/EC/A "LAMAR ROBINSON" POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO
JOHNNY JAMES HALL, DISTRIBUTE AND
A/K/A "JOHNNY RED" DISTRIBUTION
18 U .S .C . § 1952
INTERSTATE TRAVEL
18 U .S .C . § 1956(a)(1)
MONEY LAUNDERING
18 U .S .C . 5 1623
FALSE DECLARATIONS BEFORE
FEDERAL GRAND JURY
18 U .S .C . § 1503
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
18 U .S .C . 5 2
AIDING A ND ABETTING
COUNT ONE
J
THE GRAND JURY CHARGES THAT :
From on or about F ebruary , 1988, the exact date being

unknown to the Grand Jury, a nd continu ing up to and including the
date of t he Indictment, i n Chatham County, Georgia within the
04
Southern District of Georgia, in Duval County, Florida, and
elsewhere, the defendants herein :
HERBERT NATHANIEL JOHNSON

A/K/A "NAY", A/K/A "NATE"
JULIUS PHILLIP HALL
JAMES WILLIS SAGET
CECELIA COOK STROBERT
LAMAR ROBERSON
A/K/A "LAMAR ROBINSON"
JOHNNY JAMES HALL,
A/K/A "JOHNNY RED"
aided and abetted by each other and by others including
unindicted co-con s pirators CALVIN MORRIS, JOSEPH "JO JO"
WILLIAMS, and CHARLES LINDSEY "TRUCK" DAMS, and o thers both
known and unknown, did unla w full y and willfully combine,
con spire, con federate and agree together and w ith each other to
c ommit certain offe nses ag ainst the Unite d States, to wit : to
knowi ngly and inte ntion ally possess with intent to distribute
cocaine hydrochloride and cocaine base, "crack", Schedule II X
narc otic controlled su bstances, i n violation of Title 1 8 , United
States Code, Sectio n 2 and Tit le 21 , U nited S tates Code, S ection
841 ( a )( 1 ) .
OBJE CTS OF THE CO NSPIRACY
The core of the conspiracy a lleged herein has been _:
situated in Chatham County, Ge orgia, within the Southern D istr ict
of Georgia, and its activities extend e d to the Middle Di str ict o f
Florida and the Southern District of F lorida and elsewher e .
It was an object of the consp i racy that members would
obtain quantities of cocaine base "crack" from South Fl o ri da and
2
o t her l ocatio ns inside and outsi de the S o uthern Di s trict of
Georgia .
It was further an ob j ec t of the c o ns piracy for the
conspirators t o obtain either large amounts of United States
currency (i .e ., cash) and other va luable assets o r a ready supply
of cocaine base, "crack" .
It was f urth er an objec t of the co ns p iracy that
JULIUS PHILLIP HALL
would di s tr i but e ounce qu a nt i t ie s of coca i n e hydroch l oride and
coca i ne base, "c rack " , to CALV I N MORRIS, HERBERT NATHANIE L
JOHNSON, and others both known and unkno wn, beginning at an exact
date u nknown to the Grand Jury but belie ved to be February, 1988 .
I t was f urther an object of the conspirac y that
HERBE RT NATHANIEL JOHNSON

JULIUS PHILLIP HALL
JAMES WILLIS SAGET
CALVIN MORRIS
would distribute 17 h ounces of crack cocaine every 8 to 14 days
beginning at an exact date unknown to the Grand Jury but bel iev e d
to be ear l y 1990 and continuing to the date of the I ndictment .
It was further an obj ect of the consp iracy that var ious
co nspirators wou ld conceal the exi stenc e of the unl aw ful scheme
to po s sess and distribute cocaine hydrochloride and cocaine bash , %t
"crack ."
WAYS, MANNER AND MEANS OF THE CONSPIRACY
The conspiracy operated with members performing

different funct i ons at different times and at different le vels of
res ponsibility .
3
Certa in members of the conspiracy, i ncl ud i ng
JULIUS PHILLIP HALL
and o t hers, both known and unknown, assume d manager ial role s ,
directing and supervising the effects of coconspirators in
furtherance of the conspiracy .
C e rtain members of t he co nspi racy , includi ng :

JIILZUS PHILLIP HALL
JAMES WILLIS SAGET
CALVIN MORRIS and
JOSEPH WILLIAMS
would acquire large quantities of cocaine hydrochloride and
cocaine base, "crack," and then transport or cause it to be
transported to Savannah, Georgia, and else where for further
distribution .
At an exa ct date unknown , but believed by the Grand
Jury to be February, 1988,
JULIUS PHILLIP HALL
purchased ounce quantities of cocaine hydrochl o ride from JOSEPH

~ , WILLIAMS . JULIUS PHILLIP HALL purchased the cocaine
hydrochlor ide in varying quant ities ult imate ly purchas ing 9
ounces for $5,500 . As members of the conspiracy, including
CALVIN MORRIS and HERBERT NATHANIEL JOHNSON, and others, both
known and unknown, needed cocaine they would call CECELIA COOK -'
STROBERT who delivered the cocaine to them as needed in the form
of cocaine base, "crack" .
At an exact date unknown to the Grand Jury,
JAMES WILLIS SAGET
4
became a partner assigned to transport the cocaine base, "crack-",
between Florida and Savannah, Georgia . He would transport the
cocaine base, " crack " to CECEILA COOK STROBERT, . who would
in turn store the cocaine base, "crack", until ready for
distribution . As supplies and funding, or cash flow allowed,
various members of the conspiracy who had access to cocaine base,
"crack", would divide the quantity into smaller parcels and
further distribute the cocaine . These members were at times
buyers and sellers within their own ranks .
In order to facilitate the distribution of narcotics,
the co nspirators would arrange for, maintain and u se lines of
c ommunication amongst its members, including telephone and paging
faciliti e s .
As pa rt of t he conspiracy JULIUS PHILLIP HALL would
control the money made from the sale of cocaine base, "crack ."
CALVIN MORRIS and HERBERT NATHANIEL JOHNSON would turn over to
JULIUS PHILLIP HALL part of the profits made from the sale of
cocaine base . JULIUS PHILLIP HALL would, in turn, split those
profits with HERBERT NATHANIEL JOHNSON, JULIUS PHILLIP HALL,
JAMES WILLIS SAGET, CECELIA COOK STROBERT, and CALVIN MORRIS with
each co-conspirator receiving One Thousand Dollars ($1,000) a
month as profit . JULIUS HALL would use the remainder of the
profits for investments and for his personal use .
As members of the conspiracy,
JULIUS HALL
CALVIN MORRIS
0
needed c oc a ine fo r dis tribut ion, they would c all the beeper
number for
CECELIA C OOK STROBERT,

sister of JULIUS PHILLIP HALL
They would then place into the beeper a code E ach conspirator
had an identification number assigned to them T he conspirator
would first put in the identification number, then the code for
the amount of cr ack cocai ne ne ede d , a code for t he loca t io n for
delivery, and a code to show the time for de livery . CECELIA C OOK
STROBERT would then deliver the crack cocaine per instructions .
All members of the conspiracy participated directly or
indirectl y in the distribution of cocaine at various levels .
HERBERT NATHANIEL JOHNSON and

JULIUS PHILLIP HALL
attempted to i nfluence the due administratio n o f j ustice by
questio ning a Federal Grand Juror sitting on the Gran d Ju ry for
the Southern District of Ge orgia c oncern ing th e Grand Jury
investigatio n into the possessio n and distribution of cocaine
bas e , " crack ", by JULIUS HALL and others and by r equesting that a
Federal Gr a nd Juror in form th em of informat io n reveale d t o the
Grand Jury dur i ng that inv esti gation .
OVERT ACTS
1 . On or about the 24th day of May, 1989, in Savannah,
Georgia JOHNNY JAMES HALL knowingly and intenti onal ly dis tributed
approximately 3 . 9 grams of coca ine base "crack", a Schedu le II
Narcotic Controll ed Sub stance .
6
2 . On or ab out the 8 t h day o f J u n e , 19 8 9, in Sav ann ah,
Georgia JOHNNY JAMES HALL knowingly and intentionally distributed
approximately 4 .7 grams of cocaine base "crack", a Schedule II
Narcotic Controlled Substance .
3. On or ab out June, 1 9 90 , HE R B E RT NAT HAN I EL J OHNSO N ,
CALVIN MORRIS, AND JULIUS PHILLIP HALL travelled from Savannah,
Georgia, to Miami, Florida, to deliver $12,000 .00 in cash to
JAMES WILLIS SAGET for the purchase of 17 h ounces of cocaine
base, "crack", a Schedule II Narcotic Controlled Substance .
4 . On o r ab out the 29th day of November, 1990, JAMES
WILLIS SAGET travelled from Miami, Florida to Jacksonville,
Florida and there met with HERBERT NATHANIEL JOHNSON, JULIUS
PHILLIP HALL and CALVIN MORRIS to obtain $12,000 .00 in cash from
them for the later purchase and delivery of 17 h ounces of cocaine
base, "crack", a Schedule II Narcotic Controlled Substance .
5. On or ab out the 18 th day of Januar y , 1991, in
Savannah, Georgia, HERBERT NATHANIEL JOHNSON knowingly and
intentionally distributed approximately 1 gram of cocaine base
"crack", a Schedule II Narcotic Controlled Substance .
6. On or about the 5th day of February, 199 1 , in
Savannah, Georgia, LAMAR ROBERSON knowingly and intentionally
possessed 3 .7 grams of cocaine base, "crack", a Schedule II
7. On or about the 5th day of February, 1991, in

Savannah, , Georgia, LAMAR ROBERS ON, did knowingly po sse ss the
7
follow ing firearms :
One (1) Mossberg .20 gauge pump shotgun, Serial #

J810783 ;
One (1) R .G . Industries .38 caliber revolver, Serial #

R158089 ;
One (1) Taurus .357 Model 66 revolver, Serial # 116323 ;
One (1) Glennfield .22 caliber rifle, Serial #

26722483,
which had been shipped and transported in interstate commerce .
8 . On or about the 5th day of February, 1991, in
Savannah, Georgia, HERBERT NATHANIEL JOHNSON kno wingly and
" crack", a Schedule II Narcotic Controlled S ubstance .
9 . On or a bout the 8th d ay of Fe bruary, 1991, i n
Savan nah, Geo rgia , HERB ERT NATHANIEL JOHNSON knowing ly and
"crac k" , a Schedule II Narcotic Controlled S ubsta nce .
10 . O n or about the 28th day of February, 19 91 , in

Savannah, Georgia, HERBE RT NATHANIEL J OHNSON knowingly and
intentionally distributed approximately 10 .7 grams of cocaine
base "crack", a Schedule II Narcotic Controlled Substance .
11 . On or about the 6th day of April, 199 1 , HERB ERT
NATHANIEL JOHNSON and JULIUS PHILLIP HALL were informed by a
Grand Juror s itting on the Unit ed States Grand Jury for the
Southern Distr ict of Georgia that the Grand Jury was
investigating the possession and distr ibu tion of cocaine ba se ,
"crack", by JULIUS PHILLIP HALL and other s and that , after
questioning the afor esaid Federal Grand Juror , JULI US PHILIP HA LL
8
and HERBERT NATHANIEL JOHNSON requested that he keep them
informed of further information revealed to the Grand Jury during
that investigation .
12 . On or about the 6th day of April, 1991, after the
conversation referenced in paragraph 11 above, HERBERT NATHANIEL
JOHNSON and LAMAR ROBERSON knowingly and intentionally
distributed $20 of cocaine base, "crack" to the Federal Grand
Juror as payment for providing Grand Jury information .
13 . On or about the 7th day of May, 1991, in Savannah,
Georgia, LAMAR ROBERSON knowingly and intentionally distributed 1
gram of cocaine base, "crack", a Schedule II Narcotic Controlled
Substance .
14 . On or about t he 10th day of May, 1991, in

Savannah, Georg ia , HERBERT NATHAN IEL JOHNSON knowingly and
intent ional ly d istributed app roximately 1 gram of cocaine base,
"crack", a Schedule II Narcotic Co ntrolled Substance .
15 . On or about the 16th day of May, 1991, in
Savannah , Georgia, CALV IN MORRIS knowin gly and in tentio nally
distribut ed approximately 6 . 0 gr ams of coc a ine base, "crack", a
Schedule II Narcot ic Contro lled Subs tance .
16 . On or about the 1 6th day o f May , 199 1 , in
Savannah, Georgia, CALVIN MORRIS knowingly and intentionally 'usdd
a communication facility, to wit, a telephone, in facilitating
the distribution of cocaine base, °crack°, a Schedule II

All of the above was done in violation of Title 18,
9
United States C ode, Sectio n 2 and T i tle 21, United State s Code ,
Section 8 4 6 .
COUNT TWO
THE GRAN D JURY FURTHER CHARG ES THAT :
On o r about the 24 t h d ay of M ay , 1 9 89, in Savannah ,
Georgia, with i n the S outhern D is tr ict o f Geo rgia, the de fendant
JOHNNY JAMES HALL, A/K/A "JOHNNY RED"
aided and abetted by o thers, known a nd unknown, did kno wingly and
i ntentionally distribute approximately 3 .9 grams of cocaine base,
" crac k" , a Schedule I I ' Narcotic Co ntrolled Substance, done in
viol ation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2 and Title
2 1, United States Code, Sectio n 841(a)(1) .
COUNT THREE
THE GRAND JURY F URTHER CHARGE S THAT :
On or about the 8th day of June, 1989, in Savannah,
Geor gia, within t he So uther n District of Geo rgia, t he defendant
JOHNNY JAMES HALL, A/K/A "JOHNNY RED "
a ided and abetted by other s , known and unknown, did knowingly and
intentionally d i stribute approx imate ly 4 . 7 grams of co caine base,
"crack", a Schedule II Narcotic Co ntro lled Sub stance, d one i n .
violation of Title 1 8 , United States Code, section 2 and Ti t le j
21 , United States Code , Section 841 (a)( 1 ) .
COUNT FOUR
THE GRAND JURY FURTHER CHARGES THAT :
On or about a date uncertain in the summer of 1990,
10
believed by the Grand Jury to be June of 1990,
JULIUS PHILLIP HALL
did willfully and intentionally travel in interstate commerce,
from Chatham County, Georgia, within the southern District of
Georgia, to Miami, Florida, within the Southern District of
Florida, with intent to promote, carry on and facilitate unlawful
activity, that is the possession with intent to distribute,
distribution and conspiracy to distribute quantities of cocaine
base, "crack", a Schedule II Narcotic Controlled Substance which
constitutes violations of Title 21, United States Code, Sections
841(a)(1) and 846 and thereafter did deliver to
JAMES WILLIS SAGET
$ 12, 0 00 for the purchase of cocaine b ase, "crack", to promote,
carry on and facili tate the a fo resaid controlled substance
violation, done in violation of Title 18, United States Code,
Sect io n 195 2(a)( 3 ) .
COUNT FIVE
On or about the 29 th day o f November, 1990,

JULIUS PHILLIP HALL
did willfully and intentionally travel in interstate commerce, l
from Chatham County, Georgia, within the Southern District of
Georgia, to Jacksonville, Florida, with intent to promote, carry
on and facilitate unlawful activity, that is the possession with
intent to distribute, distribution and conspiracy to distribute
11
quantities of co caine base, " crack " , a Sche dule II Narc o t ic
Co ntro l l ed Substance which constitutes violati o ns o f Ti tl e 2 1 ,
United States Code, Sections 841 ( a ) (1) and 846 and thereafter d id
de liver to
JAMES WILLIS SAGET
$12,000 for the purchase of cocaine base, "crack", to promote,
carry on and facilitate the aforesaid controlled substance
violation, done in violation of Title 18, United States Code,
Section 1952(a)(3) .
COUNT SIX
THE GRAND JURY FURTHER C HARGES THAT :
On or about the 1 8 th d a y of January, 1991, in C hatham
County , Georgia, within the Southern District of Georgia, the
defendant,
HERB ERT NATHANIEL JOHNSON
aided and abetted by others , k nown and unkno wn, did knowingly and
intent ional ly dis tribute approximately 1 gr am of cocaine b ase
" crack " , a Sc hedule II Narcotic Controlled Substance, done in
violation of Title 18, United States Code, section 2 and Title
21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1) .
COUNT SEVEN I
THE GRAN D JURY FURTHER CHARGES THAT :
On or about the 5th day of February , 1991, in Cha tham
County, Georgia, within the Southern District of Georgia, the
defendant,
12
aided and abetted by others, known and unknown, did knowingly and
intentionally distribute approximately 1 gram of cocaine base
"crack" , a Schedule II N arcot ic Controlled Substance, done in
v iolat ion of Title 18, Un ited States Code, S ectio n 2 and Title
21, Un i ted States Code, S ec tion 84 1( a )(1) .
COUNT E IGHT
On or about the 8 th day of February, 1991, in Chatham
County, Georgia, within the Southern District of Geo rgia, the
defendan t ,
HERB ERT NATHANIEL JOHNSO N
intentionally dis t ribute approximately 1 gram of cocaine base
"crack", a Sc hedu le II Narcotic Controlled Substance, done in
viola t ion of Title 1 8, United States Code, Section 2 and Title
21, Un ited St ates Code , Section 841 ( a )(1) .
COUNT NINE
On or about the 28th day of February, 1991, in Chatham
County, Georgia, within the Southern D istr ict of G eorgia, the. s
defendant,
intentionally distribute approximately 10 .7 grams of cocaine base
13
" crack " , a Schedule II Narcotic Controlled Substance, done in
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2 and Title
21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1) .
COUNT TEN
On or about the 5th or 6th day of April, 1991, in
Chatham County, Georgia, within the Southern District of Georgia,
the defendants,
HERBERT NATH ANIEL JOHNSON and

JULIUS PHILLIP HALL
aided an d abetted by each other, did corruptly endeavor to
infl uenc e , obstruct a nd impede the due administration of j ustice
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia in that a Grand Juror fo r the United States Grand Jury
for the Southern D istrict of Georgia i nformed
that the Gr and Jury was conducting an i nvestigatio n int o the
po ssess ion and di stributio n of cocaine base, "c rack", by
JULIUS PHILLIP HALL
and others .

JULIUS PHILLIP HALL y
then questioned the Grand Juror about that investigation knowing
that the individual was at that time a Grand Juror sitting on a
United States Grand Jury for the Southern District of Georgia,

and
JULIUS PHILLIP HALL
14
requested that the Grand Juror disclose to them any further
information presented to the United States Federal Grand Jury for
the Southern District of Georgia at future proceedings, all done
in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2 and
Title 18, United States Code, Section 1503 .
C OUNT ELEVEN
On or about the 6th day of April, 1991, in Chatham
County, Georgia, within the Southern District of Georgia, the
defendants,

LAMAR ROBERSON
aided and abetted by each other did kno wingly and intentionall y
distribute approximately 1 gram of cocaine base "crack", a
Schedule II Narco t ic Controlled S ubstance, done in violatio n of
Title 18, Un ited St ates Code, Sect ion 2 a nd Title 2 1, Un ited
State s Code , Section 841 ( a )(1) .
COUNT TWELVE
On or about the 7th day of May, 199 1 , in Ch atham
County, Georgia, within the Southern District of Georg ia, the

r
defendant,
LAMAR ROBERSON
intentionally distribute approximately 1 gram of cocaine base
"crack", a Schedule II Narcot ic Control led Sub stance, done in
15
violation of Title 1 8, United States Code, Section 2 and Title
21, United States C o de, Section 841(a) ( 1 ) .
COU NT THIRTE EN
On or about the 10th day of May, 1991, in Ch atham
County, Geo rgia, within the Southern Distr ict o f Georgia, the
defendants,
HERBERT NATHAN IEL JOHN SON
aided and abetted by others , both known and unknown , did
know ingly and intentio nally d istribute approxima te ly 1 gram of
coc aine ba se *crack", a Schedule II Narco t ic Controlled
S ubstance, done in v iola tion of Title 1 8 , United St ates Code,
Sec t ion 2 and Ti tl e 2 1, Unite d S tate s Code , Sect ion 841 ( a )(1) .
COUNT FOURTEEN
The allegat ions conta ined in Counts One through C ounts
Thirteen of this Indictment are incorporated by reference as if
fully set forth herein :
On or about the 4th day of June, 1991, in Chatham
County, Georgia, within the Southern District of Georgia -'-
JULIUS PHILLIP HALL
while under oath and testifying in a proceeding before the Grand
Jury of the United States in the Southern District of Georgia,
knowingly did make a false material declaration, that is to say :
16
At the time and place aforesaid the Grand Jury w as
conducting an investigation to determine whether violations of
Title 21, United States Code, Section 841 and 846 had been
committed, and to identify the persons who had committed, caused
the commission of and conspired to commit such violations .
It was material to the inquiry then being conducted to
determine whether
JULIUS PHILLIP HALL

CALVIN MORRIS
JAMES WILLIS SAGET
had ever p ossessed o r distributed coc aine base, "crack" .
At the time and place alleged
JULIUS PHILLIP HALL
appearing as a wit nes s under oath at a proceeding befo re the
Grand Jury knowingly made the following declarations in response
to ques tions with respect to the material matter set forth above
as follows :
Q . To your knowledge, has Herbert Nathaniel Johnson

ever distributed or possessed crack cocaine or any
other narcotic controlled substance?
A . To my personal knowledge, no .
Q . So, to your knowledge, then, he has never been _'

involved in the sale or distribution of crack cocaine?
A. Not to my personal kno wledge, no .
Q . All right . How about Calvin Morris? To your

knowledge, has he ever been involved in the sale or
distribution of crack cocaine or any other narcotic
controlled substance?
A. Not Mr . Morris, no . .
17
Q. To your know ledge, has James Saget ever possessed

or distributed crack cocaine or any other narcotic
controll ed substa nce?
A. No t t o my k no w ledge . .
Q . Have you ever been involved in illegal possession

of cocaine or other narcotic drug?
t
A . Never in my life.
Q. Have you ever provided money to anyone else for the

purpose of purchasing cocaine or any o ther narcotic?
A . Never .
The aforesa i d testimony of J ULIUS PH ILLIP HALL as he
then well knew and believed was false, all done in violation of
Title 18, Un i ted S tates Code , Se ct ion 1 623 .
COUNT FIFTEEN
From on or ab o ut ear l y Ap ril , 199 1 to the da te of the
Indictment, in Savannah, Georgia , wi thin the Southern District of
Georgia,

JULIUS PHILLIP HALL
JAMES W . SAGET
aided and abetted by others both known and unknown, d id invest -

$15,000 .00 in United States currency into the materials, labor l
and workmanship on a building located at 2428 Bull Street,
Savannah, Georgia, to be used as nightclub by the name of Sound
Tracks, which currency was the proceeds of the sale of cocaine
base, "crack", which constituted a financial transaction as
18
defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(c)(4),
knowing that the property involved in the financial transaction
constituted proceeds of the above specified unlawful activity,
with intent to conceal or disguise the nature of the proceeds of
the abo ve unlawful acti v i ty, tha t i s, the distributio n of cocaine
ba se, " crack", done in v i ola tio n o f T itl e 18, Un i ted St ates Code,
Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i} .. `
rue Silli
c-GC
oreperson
q
HINTON R . PIERCE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
Thomas A . Withers
Assistant United States Attorney
19

Julius Hall Motion To Correct Sentence

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Julius Hall Motion To Correct Sentence

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Case 4:01-cv-00183-BAE Document 1 Filed 08/06/01 Page 1 of 122

Federa l Co r rectiona l I n s t i t u t ion , PMB 1000 , Talla d ega , Alabama 35160

U NITED STATES OF AMERICA V Jul i u s Ph i llip Ha ll

the Southern District of Georgia (Savann a h Divisi on ), S avannah, G a .

2 . Date of judgment of conviction Octobe r 11 , 1991

3. Length of sentence _Life imprisonment, reduced to 300 months

4. Nature of offense involved (all counts) Ct . 1 : 21 U .S .C . § 846 ; Cts . 4 & 5 : 18 U .S .C .

5 . What was your plea ? ( Check o ne)

7 . Di d y ou testify at the trial?

8 . Did yo u appeal fro m the j ud gme nt of convic t io n ?

AO 243 (Rev. 5 185 ) ~ R~ .

9. If yo u d i d appeal , answer th e following :

(a) Name of court T h e El eve n t h Ci r cu it Cou r t o f Appea l s

(b) Result D e n ied

(c) D ate of result June of 1993

1 1 . If your answ er to 10 was "ye s," g iv e th e following information :

(a )( 1 ) Name of court U .S . District Court ( Savannah Division

(2) Nature of proceeding 3582 motion

(6) D ate of result

(b) As to an y second petition , application or motion gi ve the same i nformation:

(1) N ame of court

B e c aus e of In effective Ass i stance of Counsel

[ S ee G round F ive and Hal l 's A f fidavit . ]

A. Ground one: [See Atta che d M emorandum .

Supporting FACTS (state briefly without citing cases or law)

Supporting FACTS (state briefly without citing cases or law) :

Supporting FACTS (state briefly wit hout c iting cases or law ):

Supporting FACTS (state briefly without citing cases or law ) :

Apprendi V . New Jersey , 120 S . Ct . 23 4 8 (2000)

Savannah, Georgia 31401

(c)At trial [same]

(e) On appea l (same]

(fl I n any p ost-convic tion proceedi ng None

(b) Gi ve d ate an d length of the a b ove s entence:

Sig nature of M ovant

l~l. Vlu.l~e .ct-

I, .ruiius P . Hall , am the petitioner in the above-entitled case. In support of my

Income source Average monthly amount during Amount expected

Self-employment $_o $ N/A $ 0 $ N /A

Income from real property $__E_ $ o $ o N /A

Interest and dividends $ o

Retirement (such as social $_ 0

Disability ( such as social $ 0

Unemployment payments $_0

Total monthly income : $ 0 9

Employer Address Dates of Gross monthly p ay

Employer Address Dates of Gross monthly pay

4. How much cash do you and your spouse have? $ a

Home 0 Other real estate

0 Motor Vehicle #1 D Motor Vehicle #2

Nam e Relationship Age

You Your spouse

Utilities (electricity, heating fuel,

Home mainte nance (repairs and upkeep) $ 0

Laundry and dry-cleaning $ Q

M You Your spouse

Transportation (not including motor vehicle payments) $ 0 $ -

Recreation, entertainment, newspapers, magazines, etc . $ a $

Insurance (not deducted from wages or included in mortgage payments)

Homeowner's or renter's $ N/A $

Ta xes (not deducted from wages or included in mortgage payments)

Alimony, mainte nance, and support paid to others