G. R. No.

107764             October 4, 2002

EDNA COLLADO, BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO C. TORRES,

JOSE AMO, SERGIO L. MONTEALEGRE, VICENTE C. TORRES,
JOSEPH L. NUÑEZ, GLORIA SERRANO, DANILO FABREGAS, FERNANDO T. TORRES,
LUZ G. TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD T. TUTANA, JOSE C. TORRES, JR.,
IMELDA CAYLALUAD, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA ASTORIAS, MYRNA M. LANCION,
NORBERTO CAMILOTE, CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO BRIONES,
REMEDIOS BANTIGUE, DANTE L. MONTEALEGRE, AIDA T. GADON, ARMANDO T. TORRES
and FIDELITO ECO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru the Director of
Lands, respondents,
BOCKASANJO ISF AWARDEES ASSOCIATION, INC.,
LITA MENDOZA, MORADO PREFIDIGNO, TERESITA CRUZ
and CALOMA MOISES, respondents/intervernors.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This Petition1 seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals,2 dated June 22, 1992, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 25597, which declared null and void the Decision3 dated January 30, 1991 of the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-59179,
confirming the imperfect title of petitioners over a parcel of land.

The Facts

On April 25, 1985, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the land registration court an application for
registration of a parcel of land with an approximate area of 1,200,766 square meters or 120.0766
hectares ("Lot" for brevity). The Lot is situated in Barangay San Isidro (formerly known as Boso-
boso), Antipolo, Rizal, and covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620. Attached to the application was the
technical description of the Lot as Lot Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-
Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which stated, "[t]his survey is inside IN-12
Mariquina Watershed." On March 24, 1986, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed an Amended Application
to include additional co-applicants.4 Subsequently, more applicants joined (collectively referred to as
"petitioners" for brevity).5

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and the Municipality of Antipolo,
through its Municipal Attorney and the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners’
application. In due course, the land registration court issued an order of general default against the
whole world with the exception of the oppositors.

Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial. Their possession has
been open, public, notorious and in the concept of owners. The Lot was surveyed in the name of
Sesinando Leyva, one of their predecessors-in-interest, as early as March 22, 1902. Petitioners
declared the Lot for taxation purposes and paid all the corresponding real estate taxes. According to
them, there are now twenty-five co-owners in pro-indiviso shares of five hectares each. During the
hearings, petitioners submitted evidence to prove that there have been nine transfers of rights
among them and their predecessors-in-interest, as follows:
 "1. SESINANDO LEYVA was the earliest known predecessor-in-interest of the Applicants
who was in actual, open, notorious and continuous possession of the property in the concept
of owner. He had the property surveyed in his name on 22 March 1902 (Exhibit "W" and "W-
1" testimonies of J. Torres on 16 December 1987 and Mariano Leyva on 29 December
1987).

2. DIOSDADO LEYVA, is the son of Sesinando Leyva, who inherited the property. He had
the property resurveyed in his name on May 21-28, 1928 (Exhibit "X" and "X-1"; testimony of
Mariano Leyva, a son of Diosdado Leyva).

3. GREGORIO CAMANTIQUE bought the property from Diosdado Leyva before the
Japanese Occupation of the Philippines during World War II. He owned and possessed the
property until 1958. He declared the property for tax purposes, the latest of which was under
Tax Declaration No. 7182 issued on 3 February 1957 (Exhibit "I" and testimony of Mariano
Leyva, supra).

4. ANGELINA REYNOSO, bought the property from Gregorio Camantique by virtue of a

Deed of Sale on 3 February 1958 (Exhibit "H"). During the ownership of the property by
Angelina Reynoso, Mariano Leyva the grandson of Sesinando Leyva, the previous owner,
attended to the farm. (Testimony of Mariano Leyva, supra). Angelina Reynoso declared the
property in her name under Tax Declaration No. 7189 in 4 February 1958, under Tax
Declaration No. 8775 on 3 August 1965, under Tax Declaration No. 16945 on 15 December
1975, and under Tax Declaration No. 03-06145 on 25 June 1978.

5. MYRNA TORRES bought the property from Angelina Reynoso on 16 October 1982
through a Deed of Sale (Exhibit "G").

6. EDNA COLLADO bought the property from Myrna Torres in a Deed of Sale dated 28 April
1984 (Exhibit "P-1" to "P-3").

7. Additional owners BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO TORRES, JOSE AMO, VICENTE

TORRES and SERGIO MONTEALEGRE who bought portions of the property from Edna
Collado through a Deed of Sale on 6 November 1985 (Exhibit "Q" to "Q-3").

8. And more additional Owners JOSEPH NUNEZ, DIOSDADO ARENOS, DANILO

FABREGAS, FERNANDO TORRES, LUZ TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD TUTANA, JOSE
TORRES JR., RODRIGO TUTANA, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA ASTORIAS, MYRNA
LANCION, CHONA MARCIANO, CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO BRIONES, REMEDIOS
BANTIQUE, DANTE MONTEALEGRE, ARMANDO TORRES, AIDA GADON and AMELIA
M. MALAPAD bought portions of the property in a Deed of Sale on 12 May 1986 (Exhibit "S"
to "S-3").

9. Co-owners DIOSDADO ARENOS, RODRIGO TUTANA, CHONA MARCIANO and

AMELIA MALAPAD jointly sold their shares to new OWNERS GLORIA R. SERRANO,
IMELDA CAYLALUAD, NORBERTO CAMILOTE and FIDELITO ECO through a Deed of
Sale dated 18 January 1987 (Exhibit "T" to "T-9")."6

During the hearing on January 9, 1991, only the assistant provincial prosecutor appeared without the
Solicitor General. For failure of the oppositors to present their evidence, the land registration court
issued an order considering the case submitted for decision based on the evidence of the
petitioners. The court later set aside the order and reset the hearing to January 14, 1991 for the
presentation of the evidence of the oppositors. On this date, counsel for oppositors failed to appear
again despite due notice. Hence, the court again issued an order submitting the case for decision
based on the evidence of the petitioners.

The Trial Court’s Ruling

After appraisal of the evidence submitted by petitioners, the land registration court held that
petitioners had adduced sufficient evidence to establish their registrable rights over the Lot.
Accordingly, the court rendered a decision confirming the imperfect title of petitioners. We quote the
pertinent portions of the court’s decision, as follows:

"From the evidence presented, the Court finds that from the testimony of the witnesses presented by
the Applicants, the property applied for is in actual, open, public and notorious possession by the
applicants and their predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial and said possession had been
testified to by witnesses Jimmy Torres, Mariano Leyva, Sergio Montealegre, Jose Amo and one
Chona who were all cross-examined by Counsel for Oppositor Republic of the Philippines.

Evidence was likewise presented that said property was declared for taxation purposes in the names
of the previous owners and the corresponding taxes were paid by the Applicants and the previous
owners and said property was planted to fruit bearing trees; portions to palay and portions used for
grazing purposes.

To the mind of the Court, Applicants have presented sufficient evidence to establish registrable title
over said property applied for by them.

On the claim that the property applied for is within the Marikina Watershed, the Court can only add
that all Presidential Proclamations like the Proclamation setting aside the Marikina Watershed are
subject to "private rights."

In the case of Municipality of Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 734, 1983 "private rights" is
proof of acquisition through (sic) among means of acquisition of public lands.

In the case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 193-195, by "private rights" means that
applicant should show clear and convincing evidence that the property in question was acquired by
applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish government or by
Possessory Information title, or any other means for the acquisition of public lands xxx"
(underscoring supplied).

The Court believes that from the evidence presented as above stated, Applicants have acquired
private rights to which the Presidential Proclamation setting aside the Marikina Watershed should be
subject to such private rights.

At any rate, the Court notes that evidence was presented by the applicants that as per Certification
issued by the Bureau of Forest Development dated March 18, 1980, the area applied for was verified
to be within the area excluded from the operation of the Marikina Watershed Lands Executive Order
No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per Proclamation No. 1283 promulgated on June 21, 1974 which
established the Boso-boso Town Site Reservation, amended by Proclamation No. 1637 dated April
18, 1977 known as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation. (Exhibit "K")."7

In a motion dated April 5, 1991, received by the Solicitor General on April 6, 1991, petitioners
alleged that the decision dated January 30, 1991 confirming their title had become final after the
Solicitor General received a copy of the decision on February 18, 1991. Petitioners prayed that the
land registration court order the Land Registration Authority to issue the necessary decree in their
favor over the Lot.

On April 11, 1991, the Solicitor General inquired from the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal whether the
land registration court had already rendered a decision and if so, whether the Provincial Prosecutor
would recommend an appeal. However, the Provincial Prosecutor failed to answer the query.

According to the Solicitor General, he received on April 23, 1991 a copy of the land registration
court’s decision dated January 30, 1991, and not on February 18, 1991 as alleged by petitioners in
their motion.

In the meantime, on May 7, 1991, the land registration court issued an order directing the Land
Regulation Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration in favor of the petitioners.

On August 6, 1991, the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment pursuant to Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129 on the ground that there had been no clear
showing that the Lot had been previously classified as alienable and disposable making it subject to
private appropriation.

On November 29, 1991, Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an association of holders of
certificates of stewardship issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
("DENR" for brevity) under its Integrated Social Forestry Program ("ISF" for brevity), filed with the
Court of Appeals a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention. They likewise
opposed the registration and asserted that the Lot, which is situated inside the Marikina Watershed
Reservation, is inalienable. They claimed that they are the actual occupants of the Lot pursuant to
the certificates of stewardship issued by the DENR under the ISF for tree planting purposes.

The Court of Appeals granted the motion to intervene verbally during the preliminary conference
held on April 6, 1992. During the preliminary conference, all the parties as represented by their
respective counsels agreed that the only issue for resolution was whether the Lot in question is part
of the public domain.8

The Court of Appeals’ Ruling

In a decision dated June 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and declared null and
void the decision dated January 30, 1991 of the land registration court. The Court of Appeals
explained thus:

"Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is enshrined in the 1935 (Art. XIII, Sec. 1), 1973 (Art. XIV, Sec.
8), and 1987 Constitution (Art. XII, Sec. 2), all lands of the public domain belong to the State. An
applicant, like the private respondents herein, for registration of a parcel of land bears the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain
(Director of Lands vs. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296).

A positive Act of government is needed to declassify a public land and to convert it into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Bacas, 176 SCRA 376).

In the case at bar, the private respondents failed to present any evidence whatsoever that the land
applied for as described in Psu-162620 has been segregated from the bulk of the public domain and
declared by competent authority to be alienable and disposable. Worse, the technical description of
Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge, Survey Division, Bureau of Lands,
which was attached to the application of private respondents, categorically stated that "This survey is
inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed.""

That the land in question is within the Marikina Watershed Reservation is confirmed by the
Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds in a Report, dated March 2, 1988, submitted to
the respondent Court in LR Case No. 269-A. These documents readily and effectively negate the
allegation in private respondent Collado’s application that "said parcel of land known as Psu-162620
is not covered by any form of title, nor any public land application and are not within any government
reservation (Par. 8, Application; Emphasis supplied). The respondent court could not have missed
the import of these vital documents which are binding upon the courts inasmuch as it is the exclusive
prerogative of the Executive Department to classify public lands. They should have forewarned the
respondent judge from assuming jurisdiction over the case.

"x x x inasmuch as the said properties applied for by petitioners are part of the public domain, it is
the Director of Lands who has jurisdiction in the disposition of the same (subject to the approval of
the Secretary of Natural Resources and Environment), and not the courts. x x x Even assuming that
petitioners did have the said properties surveyed even before the same was declared to be part of
the Busol Forest Reservation, the fact remains that it was so converted into a forest reservation, thus
it is with more reason that this action must fail. Forest lands are inalienable and possession thereof,
no matter how long, cannot convert the same into private property. And courts are without
jurisdiction to adjudicate lands within the forest zone. (Heirs of Gumangan vs. Court of Appeals. 172
SCRA 563; Emphasis supplied).

Needless to say, a final judgment may be annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, fraud or that
it is contrary to law (Panlilio vs. Garcia, 119 SCRA 387, 391) and a decision rendered without
jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time (Suarez vs. Court of Appeals, 186
SCRA 339)."9

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues

The issues raised by petitioners are restated as follows:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN

REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE APPLICATION OF THE
PETITIONERS FOR CONFIRMATION OF TITLE;

II

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN

GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT FILED BY THE
REPUBLIC LONG AFTER THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL;

III

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN

GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE INTERVENORS’ PETITION FOR INTERVENTION WHICH WAS
FILED OUT OF TIME OR LONG AFTER THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME
FINAL.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

First Issue: whether petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.

There is no dispute that Executive Order No. 33 ("EO 33" for brevity) dated July 26,
190410 established the Marikina Watershed Reservation ("MWR" for brevity) situated in the
Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioners even concede that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620,
is inside the technical, literal description of the MWR. However, the main thrust of petitioners’ claim
over the Lot is that "all Presidential proclamations like the proclamation setting aside the Marikina
Watershed Reservation are subject to private rights." They point out that EO 33 contains a saving
clause that the reservations are "subject to existing private rights, if any there be." Petitioners
contend that their claim of ownership goes all the way back to 1902, when their known predecessor-
in-interest, Sesinando Leyva, laid claim and ownership over the Lot. They claim that the presumption
of law then prevailing under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926 was that the land
possessed and claimed by individuals as their own are agricultural lands and therefore alienable and
disposable. They conclude that private rights were vested on Sesinando Leyva before the issuance
of EO 33, thus excluding the Lot from the Marikina Watershed Reservation.

Petitioners’ arguments find no basis in law.

The Regalian Doctrine: An Overview

Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State.11 The Spaniards first introduced the doctrine to the Philippines
through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the
Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias12 which laid the foundation that "all lands that were
not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain."13 Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all "lands, territories and
possessions" in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.14

The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The
Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as
possessory claims. The Royal Decree of 1894 or the "Maura Law" partly amended the Mortgage
Law as well as the Law of the Indies. The Maura Law was the last Spanish land law promulgated in
the Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise the
lands would revert to the state.15

Four years later, Spain ceded to the government of the United States all rights, interests and claims
over the national territory of the Philippine Islands through the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898.
In 1903, the United States colonial government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No.
926, the first Public Land Act, which was described as follows:

"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine
Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and
regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the
Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to
public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon
public lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the
Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the
Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the government’s title to public land sprung
from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The
term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the
government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands."16

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land
Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the
lands are alienable and disposable.

Act 2874, the second Public Land Act, superseded Act No. 926 in 1919. After the passage of the
1935 Constitution, Commonwealth Act No. 141 ("CA 141" for brevity) amended Act 2874 in 1936.
CA 141, as amended, remains to this day as the existing general law governing the classification
and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands.17

In the meantime, in order to establish a system of registration by which recorded title becomes
absolute, indefeasible and imprescriptible, the legislature passed Act 496, otherwise known as the
Land Registration Act, which took effect on February 1, 1903. Act 496 placed all registered lands in
the Philippines under the Torrens system.18 The Torrens system requires the government to issue a
certificate of title stating that the person named in the title is the owner of the property described
therein, subject to liens and encumbrances annotated on the title or reserved by law. The certificate
of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon
issuance of the certificate.19 PD 1529, known as the Property Registration Decree enacted on June
11, 1978,20 amended and updated Act 496.

The 1935, 1973, 1987 Philippine Constitutions

The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine substituting, however, the
state, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the public domain. Justice Reynato
S. Puno, in his separate opinion in Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources,22 explained thus:

"One of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the
nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the country. There was an overwhelming
sentiment in the Convention in favor of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the
adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary
starting point to secure recognition of the state’s power to control their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention very well knew that the
concept of State ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards,
however, they were not certain whether it was continued and applied by the Americans. To remove
all doubts, the Convention approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian
doctrine."

Thus, Section 1, Article XIII23 of the 1935 Constitution, on "Conservation and Utilization of Natural
Resources" barred the alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural lands, which were
the only natural resources the State could alienate. The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian
doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV24 on the "National Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation". The
1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII25 on "National Economy
and Patrimony".

Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except
agricultural lands of the public domain. The 1987 Constitution readopted this policy. Indeed, all lands
of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated in the Philippine Constitution
belong to the State.

Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource

The term "natural resource" includes "not only timber, gas, oil coal, minerals, lakes, and submerged
lands, but also, features which supply a human need and contribute to the health, welfare, and
benefit of a community, and are essential to the well-being thereof and proper enjoyment of property
devoted to park and recreational purposes."26

In Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,27 the Court had occasion to
discourse on watershed areas. The Court resolved the issue of whether the parcel of land which the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources had assessed to be a watershed area is exempt
from the coverage of RA No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law ("CARL" for
brevity).28 The Court defined watershed as "an area drained by a river and its tributaries and
enclosed by a boundary or divide which separates it from adjacent watersheds." However, the Court
also recognized that:

"The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The most important product
of a watershed is water which is one of the most important human necessit(ies). The protection of
watershed ensures an adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods
that not only damage property but also cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an
"intergenerational" responsibility that needs to be answered now."

Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067) provides:

"Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or overlying any
ground water may be declared by the Department of Natural Resources as a protected area.
Rules and Regulations may be promulgated by such Department to prohibit or control such activities
by the owners or occupants thereof within the protected area which may damage or cause the
deterioration of the surface water or ground water or interfere with the investigation, use, control,
protection, management or administration of such waters."

The Court in Sta. Rosa Realty also recognized the need to protect watershed areas and took note of
the report of the Ecosystems Research and Development Bureau (ERDB), a research arm of the
DENR, regarding the environmental assessment of the Casile and Kabanga-an river watersheds
involved in that case. That report concluded as follows:

"The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated in the heartland of both watersheds.
Considering the barangays proximity to the Matangtubig waterworks, the activities of the farmers
which are in conflict with proper soil and water conservation practices jeopardize and endanger the
vital waterworks. Degradation of the land would have double edge detrimental effects. On the Casile
side this would mean direct siltation of the Mangumit river which drains to the water impounding
reservoir below. On the Kabanga-an side, this would mean destruction of forest covers which acts as
recharged areas of the Matangtubig springs. Considering that the people have little if no direct
interest in the protection of the Matangtubig structures they couldn’t care less even if it would be
destroyed.
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a most vital life support system to
thousands of inhabitants directly and indirectly affected by it. From these watersheds come the
natural God-given precious resource – water. x x x

Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with sound watershed management. More so,
the introduction of earth disturbing activities like road building and erection of permanent
infrastructures. Unless the pernicious agricultural activities of the Casile farmers are immediately
stopped, it would not be long before these watersheds would cease to be of value. The impact of
watershed degradation threatens the livelihood of thousands of people dependent upon it. Toward
this, we hope that an acceptable comprehensive watershed development policy and program be
immediately formulated and implemented before the irreversible damage finally happens."

The Court remanded the case to the Department of Agriculture and Adjudication Board or DARAB to
re-evaluate and determine the nature of the parcels of land involved in order to resolve the issue of
its coverage by the CARL.

Sta. Rosa Realty gives us a glimpse of the dangers posed by the misuse of natural resources such
as watershed reservations which are akin to forest zones. Population growth and industrialization
have taken a heavy toll on the environment. Environmental degradation from unchecked human
activities could wreak havoc on the lives of present and future generations. Hence, by constitutional
fiat, natural resources remain to this day inalienable properties of the State.

Viewed under this legal and factual backdrop, did petitioners acquire, as they vigorously argue,
private rights over the parcel of land prior to the issuance of EO 33 segregating the same as a
watershed reservation?

The answer is in the negative.

First. An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of proving that he meets the
requirements of Section 48 of CA 141, as amended. He must overcome the presumption that the
land he is applying for is part of the public domain and that he has an interest therein sufficient to
warrant registration in his name arising from an imperfect title. An imperfect title may have been
derived from old Spanish grants such as a titulo real or royal grant, a concession especial or special
grant, a composicion con el estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through
purchase.29 Or, that he has had continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty years
preceding the filing of his application as provided by Section 48 (b) CA 141.

Originally, Section 48(b) of CA 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by RA 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-
year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title.
The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on
January 25, 1977, the law prevailing at the time petitioners’ application for registration was filed on
April 25, 1985.30 As amended, Section 48 (b) now reads:

"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or
force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter."
Interpreting Section 48 (b) of CA 141, the Court stated that the Public Land Act requires that the
applicant must prove the following:

"(a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period
prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor
of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued."31

Petitioners do not claim to have documentary title over the Lot. Their right to register the Lot is
predicated mainly upon continuous possession since 1902.

Clearly, petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or title because of the failure
to complete the required period of possession, whether under the original Section 48 (b) of CA 141
prior to the issuance of EO 33, or under the amendment by RA 1942 and PD 1073.

There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, petitioners had acquired ownership or
title to the Lot either by deed or by any other mode of acquisition from the State, as for instance by
acquisitive prescription. As of 1904, Sesinando Leyva had only been in possession for two years.
Verily, petitioners have not possessed the parcel of land in the manner and for the number of years
required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.

Second, assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior to the issuance of EO 33 in
1904, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since then, the Lot became non-disposable and
inalienable public land. At the time petitioners filed their application on April 25, 1985, the Lot has
been reserved as a watershed under EO 33 for 81 years prior to the filing of petitioners’ application.

The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in 1904 could no longer be counted because
as a watershed reservation, the Lot was no longer susceptible of occupancy, disposition,
conveyance or alienation. Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended, applies exclusively to alienable
and disposable public agricultural land. Forest lands, including watershed reservations, are
excluded. It is axiomatic that the possession of forest lands or other inalienable public lands cannot
ripen into private ownership. In Municipality of Santiago, Isabela vs. Court of Appeals,32 the Court
declared that inalienable public lands -

"x x x cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive,
does not run against the State.

‘The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended, never confers title
thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not
operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same
under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.’ "

Third, Gordula vs. Court of Appeals33 is in point. In Gordula, petitioners did not contest the nature of
the land. They admitted that the land lies in the heart of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve,
which Proclamation No. 573 classified as inalienable. The petitioners in Gordula contended,
however, that Proclamation No. 573 itself recognizes private rights of landowners prior to the
reservation. They claim to have established their private rights to the subject land. The Court ruled:

"We do not agree. No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or
implied from the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of a title from the state. The
facts show that petitioner Gordula did not acquire title to the subject land prior to its reservation
under Proclamation No. 573. He filed his application for free patent only in January, 1973, more than
three (3) years after the issuance of Proclamation No. 573 in June, 1969. At that time, the land, as
part of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, was no longer open to private ownership as it has
been classified as public forest reserve for the public good.

Nonetheless, petitioners insist that the term, "private rights," in Proclamation No. 573, should not be
interpreted as requiring a title. They opine that it suffices if the claimant "had occupied and cultivated
the property for so many number of years, declared the land for taxation purposes, [paid] the
corresponding real estate taxes [which are] accepted by the government, and [his] occupancy and
possession [is] continuous, open and unmolested and recognized by the government. Prescinding
from this premise, petitioners urge that the 25-year possession by petitioner Gordula from 1944 to
1969, albeit five (5) years short of the 30-year possession required under Commonwealth Act (C.A.)
No. 141, as amended, is enough to vest upon petitioner Gordula the "private rights" recognized and
respected in Proclamation No. 573.

The case law does not support this submission. In Director of Lands vs. Reyes, we held that a settler
claiming the protection of "private rights" to exclude his land from a military or forest reservation
must show "x x x by clear and convincing evidence that the property in question was acquired by
[any] x x x means for the acquisition of public lands."

In fine, one claiming "private rights" must prove that he has complied with C.A. No. 141, as
amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, which prescribes the substantive as well as the
procedural requirements for acquisition of public lands. This law requires at least thirty (30) years of
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and possession of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for free patent. The rationale for the 30-year period lies in the presumption that the land
applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and/or possessors claim an interest therein
only by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open and notorious possession."

Next, petitioners argue that assuming no private rights had attached to the Lot prior to EO 33 in
1904, the President of the Philippines had subsequently segregated the Lot from the public domain
and made the Lot alienable and disposable when he issued Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21,
1974. Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1283 expressly excluded an area of 3,780 hectares
from the MWR and made the area part of the Boso-boso Townsite Reservation. Petitioners assert
that Lot Psu-162620 is a small part of this excluded town site area. Petitioners further contend that
town sites are considered alienable and disposable under CA 141.

A positive act (e.g., an official proclamation) of the Executive Department is needed to declassify
land which had been earlier classified as a watershed reservation and to convert it into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.35 Unless and until the land classified as such is
released in an official proclamation so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.36

The principal document presented by petitioners to prove the private character of the Lot is the
Certification of the Bureau of Forest Development dated March 18, 1986 that the Lot is excluded
from the Marikina Watershed (Exh. R).

The evidence of record thus appears unsatisfactory and insufficient to show clearly and positively
that the Lot had been officially released from the Marikina Watershed Reservation to form part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. We hold that once a parcel of land is included
within a watershed reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, as in the instant case, a
presumption arises that the land continues to be part of such Reservation until clear and convincing
evidence of subsequent declassification is shown.

It is obvious, based on the facts on record that neither petitioners nor their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the Lot for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title. Even if
they submitted sufficient proof that the Lot had been excluded from the MWR upon the issuance of
Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974, petitioners’ possession as of the filing of their application
on April 25, 1985 would have been only eleven years counted from the issuance of the proclamation
in 1974. The result will not change even if we tack in the two years Sesinando Leyva allegedly
possessed the Lot from 1902 until the issuance of EO 33 in 1904. Petitioners’ case falters even
more because of the issuance of Proclamation No. 1637 on April 18, 1977. According to then DENR
Secretary Victor Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 reverted Lot A or the townsite reservation, where
petitioners' Lot is supposedly situated, back to the MWR.

Finally, it is of no moment if the areas of the MWR are now fairly populated and vibrant communities
as claimed by petitioners. The following ruling may be applied to this case by analogy:

"A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified
as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other
farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas
covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also
be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not
have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as
"forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply."

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 22, 1992
declaring null and void the Decision dated January 30, 1991 of Branch 71, Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-59179 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), on official leave.

G.R. No. 157485

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by AKLAN NATIONAL COLLEGE OF FISHERIES

(ANCF) and DR. ELENITA R. ANDRADE, in her capacity as ANCF Superintendent, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF MAXIMA LACHICA SIN, namely: SALVACION L. SIN, ROSARIO S. ENRIQUEZ,
FRANCISCO L. SIN, MARIA S. YUCHINTAT, MANUEL L. SIN, JAIME CARDINAL SIN, RAMON
L. SIN, and CEFERINA S. VITA, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
65244 dated February 24, 2003, which upheld the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 6130 and the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of New
Washington and Batan, Aklan in Civil Case No. 1181, segregating from the Aklan National College
of Fisheries (ANCF) reservation the portion of land being claimed by respondents.

Petitioner in this case is the Republic of the Philippines, represented by ANCF and Dr. Elenita R.
Andrade, in her capacity as Superintendent of ANCF. Respondents claim that they are the lawful
heirs of the late Maxima Lachica Sin who was the owner of a parcel of land situated at Barangay
Tambac, New Washington, Aklan, and more particularly described as follows:

A parcel of cocal, nipal and swampy land, located at Barangay Tambac, New Washington, Aklan,
containing an approximate area of FIFTY[-]EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIX (58,606) square
meters, more or less, as per survey by Geodetic Engineer Reynaldo L. Lopez. Bounded on the North
by Dumlog Creek; on the East by Adriano Melocoton; on the South by Mabilo Creek; and on the
West by Amado Cayetano and declared for taxation purposes in the name of Maxima L. Sin
(deceased) under Tax Declaration No. 10701 (1985) with an assessed value of Php1,320.00.2

On August 26, 1991, respondent heirs instituted in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan a complaint against
Lucio Arquisola, in his capacity as Superintendent of ANCF (hereinafter ANCF Superintendent), for
recovery of possession, quieting of title, and declaration of ownership with damages. Respondent
heirs claim that a 41,231-square meter-portion of the property they inherited had been usurped by
ANCF, creating a cloud of doubt with respect to their ownership over the parcel of land they wish to
remove from the ANCF reservation.

The ANCF Superintendent countered that the parcel of land being claimed by respondents was the
subject of Proclamation No. 2074 of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos allocating 24.0551
hectares of land within the area, which included said portion of private respondents’ alleged
property, as civil reservation for educational purposes of ANCF. The ANCF Superintendent
furthermore averred that the subject parcel of land is timberland and therefore not susceptible of
private ownership.

Subsequently, the complaint was amended to include ANCF as a party defendant and Lucio
Arquisola, who retired from the service during the pendency of the case, was substituted by Ricardo
Andres, then the designated Officer-in-Charge of ANCF.

The RTC remanded the case to the MCTC of New Washington and Batan, Aklan, in view of the
enactment of Republic Act No. 7659 which expanded the jurisdiction of first-level courts. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 1181 (4390).

Before the MCTC, respondent heirs presented evidence that they inherited a bigger parcel of land
from their mother, Maxima Sin, who died in the year 1945 in New Washington, Capiz (now Aklan).
Maxima Sin acquired said bigger parcel of land by virtue of a Deed of Sale (Exhibit "B"), and then
developed the same by planting coconut trees, banana plants, mango trees and nipa palms and
usufructing the produce of said land until her death in 1945.

In the year 1988, a portion of said land respondents inherited from Maxima Sin was occupied by
ANCF and converted into a fishpond for educational purpose. Respondent heirs of Maxima Sin
asserted that they were previously in possession of the disputed land in the concept of an owner.
The disputed area was a swampy land until it was converted into a fishpond by the ANCF. To prove
possession, respondents presented several tax declarations, the earliest of which was in the year
1945.
On June 19, 2000, the MCTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondents, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring plaintiffs [respondent heirs herein] the owner and
possessor of the land in question in this case and for the defendants to cause the segregation of the
same from the Civil Reservation of the Aklan National College of Fisheries, granted under
Proclamation No. 2074 dated March 31, 1981.

It is further ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs actual damages for the
unearned yearly income from nipa plants uprooted by the defendants [on] the land in question when
the same has been converted by the defendants into a fishpond, in the amount of Php3,500.00
yearly beginning the year 1988 until plaintiffs are fully restored to the possession of the land in
question.

It is finally ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs the sum of Php10,000.00
for attorney’s fees and costs of this suit.3

According to the MCTC, the sketch made by the Court Commissioner in his report (Exh. "LL") shows
that the disputed property is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Furthermore, the
land covered by Civil Reservation under Proclamation No. 2074 was classified as timberland only on
December 22, 1960 (Exh. "4-D"). The MCTC observed that the phrase "Block II Alien or Disp. LC
2415" was printed on the Map of the Civil Reservation for ANCF established under Proclamation No.
2074 (Exh. "6"), indicating that the disputed land is an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.

The MCTC likewise cited a decision of this Court in the 1976 case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals4 where it was pronounced that:

Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be
acquired. The claims of persons who have settled on, occupied, and improved a parcel of public land
which is later included in a reservation are considered worthy of protection and are usually
respected, but where the President, as authorized by law, issues a proclamation reserving certain
lands, and warning all persons to depart therefrom, this terminates any rights previously acquired in
such lands by a person who has settled thereon in order to obtain a preferential right of purchase.
And patents for lands which have been previously granted, reserved from sale, or appropriated are
void. (Underscoring from the MCTC, citations omitted.)

Noting that there was no warning in Proclamation No. 2074 requiring all persons to depart from the
reservation, the MCTC concluded that the reservation was subject to private rights if there are any.

The MCTC thus ruled that the claim of respondent heirs over the disputed land by virtue of their and
their predecessors’ open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession amounts to an imperfect
title, which should be respected and protected.

Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, where the case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 6130.

On May 2, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision affirming the MCTC judgment with modification:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is modified absolving Appellant Ricardo
Andres from the payment of damages and attorney’s fees. All other details of the appealed decision
are affirmed in toto.5

The RTC stressed that Proclamation No. 2074 recognizes vested rights acquired by private
individuals prior to its issuance on March 31, 1981.

The RTC added that the findings of facts of the MCTC may not be disturbed on appeal unless the
court below has overlooked some facts of substance that may alter the results of its findings. The
RTC, however, absolved the Superintendent of the ANCF from liability as there was no showing on
record that he acted with malice or in bad faith in the implementation of Proclamation No. 2074.6

Petitioner Republic, represented by the ANCF and Dr. Elenita R. Andrade, in her capacity as the
new Superintendent of the ANCF, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a Petition for
Review. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65244.

On February 24, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petition for lack of
merit. In addition to the findings of the MCTC and the RTC, the Court of Appeals held:

Moreover, petitioner had not shown by competent evidence that the subject land was likewise
declared a timberland before its formal classification as such in 1960. Considering that lands
adjoining to that of the private respondents, which are also within the reservation area, have been
issued original certificates of title, the same affirms the conclusion that the area of the subject land
was agricultural, and therefore disposable, before its declaration as a timberland in 1960.

It should be noted that Maxima Lachica Sin acquired, through purchase and sale, the subject
property from its previous owners spouses Sotera Melocoton and Victor Garcia on January 15,
1932, or 28 years before the said landholding was declared a timberland on December 22, 1960.
Tacking, therefore, the possession of the previous owners and that of Maxima Lachica Sin over the
disputed property, it does not tax ones imagination to conclude that the subject property had been
privately possessed for more than 30 years before it was declared a timberland. This being the case,
the said possession has ripened into an ownership against the State, albeit an imperfect one.
Nonetheless, it is our considered opinion that this should come under the meaning of "private rights"
under Proclamation No. 2074 which are deemed segregated from the mass of civil reservation
granted to petitioner.7 (Citation omitted.)

Hence, this Petition for Review, anchored on the following grounds:

ISSUE:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN UPHOLDING

RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM TO SUPPOSED "PRIVATE RIGHTS" OVER SUBJECT LAND DESPITE
THE DENR CERTIFICATION THAT IT IS CLASSIFIED AS TIMBERLAND.

The central dispute in the case at bar is the interpretation of the first paragraph of Proclamation No.
2074:

Upon recommendation of the Director of Forest Development, approved by the Minister of Natural
Resources and by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President
of the Philippines, do hereby set aside as Civil Reservation for Aklan National College of Fisheries,
subject to private rights, if any there be, parcels of land, containing an aggregate area of 24.0551
hectares, situated in the Municipality of New Washington, Province of Aklan, Philippines, designated
Parcels I and II on the attached BFD Map CR-203, x x x [.]9

The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals unanimously held that respondents retain private
rights to the disputed property, thus preventing the application of the above proclamation thereon.
The private right referred to is an alleged imperfect title, which respondents supposedly acquired by
possession of the subject property, through their predecessors-in-interest, for 30 years before it was
declared as a timberland on December 22, 1960.

At the outset, it must be noted that respondents have not filed an application for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title under the Public Land Act or the Property Registration Decree. Nevertheless, the
courts a quo apparently treated respondents’ complaint for recovery of possession, quieting of title
and declaration of ownership as such an application and proceeded to determine if respondents
complied with the requirements therefor.

The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title are found in Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, as follows:

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.

An equivalent provision is found in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, which
provides:

SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

This Court has thus held that there are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest
under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and

(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.10
With respect to the second requisite, the courts a quo held that the disputed property was alienable
and disposable before 1960, citing petitioner’s failure to show competent evidence that the subject
land was declared a timberland before its formal classification as such on said year.11 Petitioner
emphatically objects, alleging that under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong
to the State and that lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State.

After a thorough review of the records, we agree with petitioner. As this Court held in the fairly recent
case of Valiao v. Republic12:

Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly,
public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or
alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. Unless public
land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the
commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription.
Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the
lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who
must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application
(or claim) is alienable or disposable.

There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable.1âwphi1 To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification
from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years
is alienable and disposable. (Citations omitted.)

This Court reached the same conclusion in Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources v. Yap, which presents a similar issue with respect to another area of the same province
of Aklan. On November 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring
Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas of the Philippines, as tourist zones and
marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). On September
3, 1982, PTA Circular 3-82 was issued to implement Proclamation No. 1801. The respondents-
claimants in said case filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, claiming
that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes. The respondents claim
that through their predecessors-in-interest, they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945 or earlier since
time immemorial.

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of the petition for review of the above case with this Court,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into
four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-
eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). Petitioner-
claimants and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition,
mandamus and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064, alleging that it infringed on their "prior vested
right" over portions of Boracay which they allege to have possessed since time immemorial. This
petition was consolidated with the petition for review concerning Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA
Circular 3- 82.

This Court, discussing the Regalian Doctrine vis-à-vis the right of the claimants to lands they claim to
have possessed since time immemorial, held:

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a
positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land
into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits
alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and
classified."

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable. There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification
from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years
is alienable and disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to
2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were
already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. They call for proof.14 (Emphases in the original; citations omitted.)

Accordingly, in the case at bar, the failure of petitioner Republic to show competent evidence that
the subject land was declared a timberland before its formal classification as such in 1960 does not
lead to the presumption that said land was alienable and disposable prior to said date. On the
contrary, the presumption is that unclassified lands are inalienable public lands. Such was the
conclusion of this Court in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v.
Republic,15 wherein we held:

While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands are public
forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the
classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released and
rendered open to disposition. x x x. (Emphasis supplied, citation deleted.)

The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
as amended, and the equivalent provision in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree was
furthermore painstakingly debated upon by the members of this Court in

Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic.16 In Malabanan, the members of this Court were in
disagreement as to whether lands declared alienable or disposable after June 12, 1945 may be
subject to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. There was, however, no disagreement that there
must be a declaration to that effect.

In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents which have the burden to identify a positive act of
the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. Since respondents failed to do so, the alleged
possession by them and by their predecessors-in-interest is inconsequential and could never ripen
into ownership. Accordingly, respondents cannot be considered to have private rights within the
purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as to prevent the application of said proclamation to the subject
property. We are thus constrained to reverse the rulings of the courts a quo and grant the prayer of
petitioner Republic to dismiss Civil Case No. 1181 (4390) for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65244 dated February 24, 2003, which upheld the Decisions of
the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 6130 and the First Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of New Washington and Batan, Aklan in Civil Case No. 1181 (4390), segregating from the
Aklan National College of Fisheries reservation the portion of land being claimed by respondents is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 1181 (4390) of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
New Washington and Batan, Aklan is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

G.R. No. 150000             September 26, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
TRI-PLUS CORPORATION, respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Decision1 dated September 14, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60671,
which affirmed the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Metro Cebu in LRC
Case No. N-21 granting herein respondent's application for registration of title to Lots Nos. 1061 and
1062 of the Cadastral Survey of Consolacion, Cebu.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On April 30, 1997 Tri-Plus Corporation2, through its president, Euclid C. Po, filed with the MTC of
Consolacion, Metro Cebu,3 an Application for Registration of Title over two parcels of land
designated as Lots 1061 and 1062 of the cadastral survey of Consolacion, Cebu, containing an area
of 3,939 and 4,796 square meters, respectively, and located at Barangay Tayud, Consolacion,
Cebu.4 In its application, Tri-Plus alleged that it is the owner in fee simple of the subject parcels
of land, including the improvements thereon, having acquired the same through purchase;
and that it is in actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession of
the subject properties in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years, including that of its
predecessors-in-interest.5 The case was docketed as LRC Case No. N-21.6

On September 4, 1997, the trial court received an Opposition to the Application for Registration filed
by the Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on the grounds
that neither the applicant nor its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior
thereto; that the muniments of title submitted by the applicant which consists, among others, of tax
declarations and receipts of tax payments, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of
a bona fide acquisition of the land applied for or of its open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; that
the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of a Spanish title or grant may no longer be availed
of by the applicant because it failed to file an appropriate application for registration in accordance
with the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 892; and that the subject parcels of land are
portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and are not subject to
private appropriation.7

On September 19, 1997, Tri-Plus presented documentary evidence to prove compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements of the law. On even date, a Manifestation and Motion was filed by the
heirs of Toribio Pepito praying that they be given a period of 10 days within which to file their written
opposition.8 However, the oppositors failed to file their written opposition on time. The trial court then
commissioned its clerk of court to receive evidence from the applicant and directed the former to
submit a report thereon. Accordingly, a Commissioner's Report was submitted on the proceedings
taken.9

In its Judgment dated February 26, 1998, the MTC made the following finding and conclusion:

The totality of the evidence, both documentary and testimonial, of the applicant clearly shows
that it and its predecessors-in-interest had been in actual, public, exclusive and continuous
possession in concept of owner of the parcels of land above-mentioned for no less than thirty
(30) years prior to the filing of the instant petition for registration of its imperfect title. This
being so, the applicant is entitled that its title be confirmed under the provisions of the
Torrens System of Registration.10

Accordingly, it disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the applicant
TRI-PLUS LAND CORPORATION the exclusive and absolute owner of Lot 1061 of the
Cadastral Survey of Consolacion, Cebu, as shown on plan Ap-07-002362 (Exhibit "J") and
described in its corresponding technical description (Exhibit "K"), and Lot 1062 of the
Cadastral Survey of Consolacion, Cebu, as shown on plan Ap-07-002366 (Exhibit "O") and
described in its corresponding technical description (Exhibit "P").

Once this decision becomes final, let an Order for the issuance of the decree of registration
for Lots 1061 and 1062, Consolacion Cadastre, be issued in the name of TRI-PLUS LAND
CORPORATION.

SO ORDERED.11
The OSG appealed the trial court's judgment with the CA.12

Subsequently, the Land Registration Authority (LRA), through its Director on Registration, submitted
a Report dated August 6, 1998 to the MTC, pertinent portions of which read as follows:

1. Two (2) parcels of land described as Lots 1062 and 1061, Cad. 545-D, Consolacion
Cadastre on Plan Ap-07-002366 and Ap-07-002362, both situated in the Barangay of Tayud,
Municipality of Consolacion, Province of Cebu, are being applied for original registration of
title;

2. After examining the afore-said plan discrepancy was noted in the bearings and distances
of line 3-4 and 4-5 of Lot 1061, Ap-07-002362, being S.57 deg. 19'W 8.02m. and S.52 deg.
10'W 18.24, which do not conform with the bearings and distances (N. 52 deg. 01'E.,
18.00m) and (N. 52 deg. 47'E., 17.71m.) along lines 12-13 and 11-12, respectively of plan
Rs-07-01-000358, lot 1508, Consolacion Cad. 545-D, decreed in LRA (NALTDRA) Record
No. N-60851.

3. That the above discrepancy was brought to the attention of the Regional Technical
Director, DENR, Land Management Services, Region VII, Mandaue City, for verification and
correction in a letter dated 7 July 1998.

4. This Authority is not in a position to verify whether or not the parcels of land subject of
registration are already covered by land patent.13

On September 14, 2001, the CA rendered the presently assailed Decision finding no reversible error
in the appealed judgment, thereby, affirming the same.14

Hence, herein petition based on the following assignments of errors:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DECIDE THE
CASE, BECAUSE THE IDENTITY OF THE LAND REMAINS UNCERTAIN.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT

RESPONDENT FAILED TO DISCHARGE THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE
PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT

RESPONDENT IS DISQUALIFIED FROM ACQUIRING LANDS OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN.15

As to the first assigned error, petitioner contends that the CA erred in relying on the original survey
plan approved by the Lands Management Services of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) when it ruled that the applicant was able to duly establish the identity of Lot
1061. This reliance, petitioner argues, is mistaken considering that the Report of the Director on
Registration of the LRA pointed to a discrepancy in the bearings and distances of the boundaries
which separate Lot 1061 from an adjoining land, Lot 1058. This discrepancy, petitioners submit,
casts doubt on the identity of the land subject of the application for registration. Petitioner then
concludes that if there is uncertainty in the metes and bounds of the property sought to be titled, the
trial court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Hence, the proceedings
before the trial court, including its decision granting the application for registration, are void.

As to the second assignment of error, petitioner argues that the CA erred in holding that the
applicant was able to prove that the subject properties are alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. Petitioner contends that a mere notation appearing in the survey plans of the
disputed properties showing that the subject lands had been classified as alienable and disposable
on June 25, 1963 is not sufficient to establish the nature and character of these lands. Petitioner
asserts that there should be a positive act on the part of the government, such as a certification from
the DENR, to prove that the said lands are indeed alienable and disposable. Petitioner further
contends that even if the subject properties were classified as alienable and disposable on June 25,
1963, the law, nonetheless, requires that such classification should have been made on June 12,
1945 or earlier.

Anent the last assigned error, petitioner contends that since the applicant failed to discharge the
burden of proving that the subject properties are alienable and disposable, there is no basis for the
CA to rule that these properties are private lands.

In its Comment, respondent contends that it was able to prove the identity of Lot 1061 with certainty.
While it admits the discrepancy in the bearings and distances which form the boundary between Lot
1061 and the adjoining Lot 1058, respondent contends that such discrepancy is merely technical in
nature because Lots 1058 and 1061 remain the same and that there is neither an increase nor
decrease in the area of the subject lot sought to be titled; and that what was required by the LRA in
its Report was for the applicant to correct and adjust the bearings and distances of Lot 1061 in order
to conform to the boundaries of Lot 1058.

Respondent also argues that the notations appearing in the survey plans of the subject properties
serve as sufficient proof that these lands are alienable and disposable. Respondent asserts that the
survey plans were duly approved by the DENR, Lands Management Services whose official acts are
presumed to be in accordance with law.

Lastly, respondent argues that its predecessor-in-interest's continuous, actual, adverse and peaceful
possession of the subject properties in the concept of an owner for a period of more than 30 years,
coupled with the fact that they declared these lands in their name, gives a strong presumption in
respondent's favor that the subject properties no longer form part of the public domain.

Parties filed their respective Memoranda.16

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

At the outset, however, the Court does not agree with petitioner's contention in its first assigned error
that respondent failed to properly identify Lot 1061 which is one of the lots sought to be titled.

Insofar as the identity of the land subject of an application for original registration is concerned, this
Court has laid down the rule, as follows:
 The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of
Lands, in cases for application of original registration of land is a mandatory requirement.
The reason for this rule is to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not
overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a previous land registration,
and to forestall the possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of any
adjoining land. The failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to petitioner's application
for registration.17

However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals 18 and in the more recent cases
of Spouses Recto v. Republic of the Philippines 19 and Republic of the Philippines v. Hubilla 20, the
Court ruled that while the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes is the
original tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands (now the Lands Management Services of the
DENR), blueprint copies and other evidence could also provide sufficient identification. In the
present case, respondent submitted in evidence a blueprint copy of the Advance Plan of Lot
106121 and a Technical Description22 thereof, both of which had been duly certified and approved by
the Lands Management Services of the DENR. The Court finds these pieces of evidence as
substantial compliance with the legal requirements for the proper identification of Lot 1061. The
discrepancy in the common boundary that separates Lot 1061 from Lot 1058, as contained in the
LRA Report does not cast doubt on the identity of the subject lot. As the CA correctly held, the
discrepancy is not substantial because it does not unduly increase or affect the total area of the
subject lot and at the same time prejudice the adjoining lot owner. It is only when the discrepancy
results to an unexplained increase in the total area of the land sought to be registered that its identity
is made doubtful. Besides, only a portion of the many boundaries of Lot 1061 has been found to
bear a discrepancy in relation to the boundary of one adjoining lot and the LRA Report simply
recommends that the Lands Management Services of the DENR verify the reported discrepancy and
make the necessary corrections, if needed, in order to avoid duplication in the issuance of titles
covering the same parcels of land.

Petitioner's argument that, on the basis of the LRA Report, the MTC should have dismissed
respondent's application for registration for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, is without
merit. The MTC could not have possibly done this because said Report was submitted to the trial
court more than five months after the latter rendered its Decision. A copy of the LRA Report attached
to the present petition shows that it is dated August 6, 1998 while the MTC decision was rendered
much earlier on February 26, 1998. In fact, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) perfected its
appeal by filing a notice of appeal of the MTC Decision on April 2, 1998, which is also prior to the
submission of the LRA report. Hence, by the time the LRA report was submitted to the MTC, the
latter has already lost jurisdiction over the case, not on the ground cited by petitioner but because
the appeal to the CA was already perfected, vesting jurisdiction upon the appellate court.

In any case, while the subject lands were properly identified, the Court finds that respondent failed to
comply with the other legal requirements for its application for registration to be granted.

Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: (a) that the land forms part of
the alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona
fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.23

In the present case, the Court finds merit in petitioner's contention that respondent failed to prove the
first requirement that the properties sought to be titled forms part of the alienable and disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain.
Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, provides that the classification and
reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is the prerogative
of the Executive Department. Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all
lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any
ownership of land.24 All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State.25 Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as
alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable
public domain.26

It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable.27

In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by law
is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are alienable
and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an
administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or
statute.28 The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied
for are alienable and disposable.29 In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation
was certified by the Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the
technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with
the nature and character of the property surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from
the proper government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable
and disposable.

As to the second requirement, testimonial evidence were presented to prove that respondent's
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject lots in the concept of an owner for
the period required by law. The first witness was Thelma Pilapil who claims to be the daughter of
Constancia Frias from whom respondent bought Lot 1061. Pilapil testified that her family has been in
possession of Lot 1061 since her birth.30 When her testimony was offered on October 7, 1997, she
was 40 years old.31 Deducting 40 years from 1997, it means that her family started possession of Lot
1061 only in 1957. The second witness who was presented was Tomas Frias from whom
respondent bought Lot 1062. Frias testified that he was 67 years old at the time that his testimony
was taken on October 7, 1997.32 He claims that he started owning the subject lot when he was 17
years old and had been in possession of the same since then.33 Hence, by simple arithmetic, the
testimony of Frias proves that he came to possess Lot 1062 only in 1947. While he testified that Lot
1062 was previously owned by his father and that he inherited the property from his parents, no
evidence was presented to show that the latter indeed previously owned the said property and that
they had been in possession of the same on or before June 12, 1945.

Moreover, other pieces of evidence presented by respondent to prove the period of its possession
and that of its predecessors-in-interest show that the subject properties were declared for taxation
purposes beginning only in 1961.34 This date may be considered as relatively recent considering that
respondent's predecessors-in-interest claim to have been in possession of the subject properties as
early as 1947. While belated declaration of a property for taxation purposes does not necessarily
negate the fact of possession, tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are, nevertheless,
good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying
taxes for a property that is not in his actual, or at least, constructive possession.35 In the present
case, respondent failed to explain why, despite the claim of its predecessors-in interest that they
possessed the subject properties in the concept of an owner as early as 1947, it was only in 1961
that they started to declare the same for purposes of taxation.
From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent and its predecessors-in-interest failed to prove that
they had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject properties
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, as required by law.

Well-entrenched is the rule that the burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant
who must show clear, positive and convincing evidence that his alleged possession and occupation
were of the nature and duration required by law.36 In the present case, the Court finds that
respondent failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the legal requirements that the lands
sought to be titled are alienable and disposable and that its predecessors-in-interest were already in
possession of the subject lots since 1945 or earlier.

As to the last assigned error, respondent having failed to prove that the subject properties are
alienable and disposable public lands, the Court agrees with petitioner that there would be no basis
in concluding that these lands have already become private. The presumption remains that said
properties remain part of the inalienable public domain and, therefore, could not become the subject
of confirmation of imperfect title.

Finally, while it is an acknowledged policy of the State to promote the distribution of alienable public
lands as a spur to economic growth and in line with the ideal of social justice, the law imposes
stringent safeguards upon the grant of such resources lest they fall into the wrong hands to the
prejudice of the national patrimony.37 The Court must not, therefore, relax the stringent safeguards
relative to the registration of imperfect titles.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
September 14, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 60671 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Tri-
Plus Corporation's application for registration and issuance of title to Lots 1061 and 1062,
Consolacion Cad-545-D, in LRC Case No. N-21 filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Consolacion,
Metro Cebu, is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., Chairperson, Ynares-Santiago, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario, J.J., concur.

G.R. No. 163766             June 22, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CANDY MAKER, INC., as represented by its President, ONG YEE SEE,* Respondent

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

At bar is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the May 21,
2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 73287, which affirmed in toto the
October 12, 2001 Decision2 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Taytay, Rizal in Land Registration
Case No. 99-0031 declaring respondent the owner of the parcels of land designated as Lots 3138-A
and 3138-B in Plan CSD. 04-018302, Cainta-Taytay Cadastre.
Sometime in 1998, Candy Maker, Inc. decided to purchase Lot No. 3138 Cad. 688 of the Cainta-
Taytay Cadastre, a parcel of land located below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters,
about 900 meters away from the Laguna de Bay, and bounded on the southwest by the Manggahan
Floodway, and on the southeast by a legal easement.

On April 1, 1998, Geodetic Engineer Potenciano H. Fernandez, prepared and signed a Subdivision
Plan of the property for Apolonio Cruz. The property was subdivided into two lots: Lot No. 3138-A
with an area of 10,971 square meters, and Lot No. 3138-B with an area of 239 square meters.3 The
technical description of Lot No. 3138 was also prepared by Fernandez, and was approved by the
Regional Technical Director of the Bureau of Lands on April 14, 1998.4

On April 29, 1999, Antonio, Eladia, and Felisa, all surnamed Cruz, executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of Candy Maker, Inc.5 The buyer declared Lot No. 3138 for taxation purposes in 1999
under Tax Declaration Nos. 004-18929, 004-18930 and 004-18931.6

On June 16, 1999, Candy Maker, Inc., as applicant, filed an application with the MTC of Taytay,
Rizal, for the registration of its alleged title over Lot No. 3138-A and Lot No. 3138-B under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.

Acting thereon, the MTC issued an Order7 on June 18, 1999 directing the applicant to cause the
publication of the notice of initial hearing and for the Deputy Sheriff to post the same. The
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) and the Directors of the Land Management
Bureau (LMB) and Forest Management Bureau (FMB) were also instructed to submit their respective
reports on the status of the parcels of land before the initial hearing scheduled on October 29, 1999.

The Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) of Antipolo City filed on
August 18, 1999 his Report8 declaring that "[t]he land falls within the Alienable and Disposable Zone,
under Land Classification Project No. 5-A, per L.C. Map No. 639 certified released on March 11,
1927" and that the property is the subject of CENRO Case No. 520(97) entitled Perpetua San Jose
v. Almario Cruz. On the other hand, the LRA, in its September 21, 1999 Report,9 recommended the
exclusion of Lot No. 3138-B on the ground that it is a legal easement and intended for public use,
hence, inalienable and indisposable.

On September 30, 1999, the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) approved Resolution No.
113, Series of 1993, providing that untitled shoreland areas may be leased subject to conditions
enumerated therein.

The applicant filed its Amended Application10 on December 15, 1999 for the confirmation of its
alleged title on Lot No. 3138, alleging therein that:

1. x x x the applicant is the President of CANDYMAKER[,] INC. and registered owner of a parcel of
land located at Panghulo Brgy. San Juan, Taytay, Rizal with an area of TEN THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE (10,971) square meters and as fully described and bounded under Lot
3138-A plan CSD-04-018302[,] copy of which and the corresponding technical descriptions are
hereto attached to form parts hereof;

xxxx

8. That for Lot 3138-A the applicant hereby prays for the benefit granted under the Land Registration
Act and/or under the benefits provided for by P.D. No. 1529, as applicant and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, public, continuous, and peaceful occupation and possession of the said
land since time immemorial in [the] concept of true owners and [adverse] to the whole world; x x x11

On March 27, 2000, the MTC issued an Order12 admitting the Amended Application and resetting the
initial hearing to June 23, 2000. However, upon the requests of the LRA for the timely publication of
the Notice of Initial Hearing in the Official Gazette,13 the court moved the hearing date to September
22, 2000,14 then on January 26, 200115 and until finally, to June 15, 2001.16

On July 20, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, the LLDA filed its Opposition17 to the Amended
Application in which it alleged that the lot subject of the application for registration may not be
alienated and disposed since it is considered part of the Laguna Lake bed, a public land within its
jurisdiction pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4850, as amended. According to the LLDA, the
projection of Lot No. 3138-A, Cad-688-D Csd-04-018302 in its topographic map based on the
Memorandum18 of Engineer Christopher Pedrezuela of the Engineering and Construction Division of
the LLDA indicated that it is "located below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters referred
to datum 10.00 meters below mean lower water" and under Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, the
property is a public land which forms part of the bed of the Laguna Lake. This Memorandum was
appended to the application.

At the hearing conducted on August 31, 2001, the applicant marked in evidence the complementary
copies of the Official Gazette and the People’s Tonight as Exhibits "E-1" and "F-1," respectively.19

Except as to the LLDA and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), which was represented by the
duly deputized provincial prosecutor,20 the court, upon motion of the applicant, issued an Order of
general default.21

The applicant presented as witnesses its Treasurer, Fernando Co Siy, and Antonio Cruz, one of the
vendees.

Cruz testified that his grandparents owned the property,22 and after their demise, his parents, the
spouses Apolonio Cruz and Aquilina Atanacio Cruz, inherited the lot;23 he and his father had
cultivated the property since 1937, planting palay during the rainy season and vegetables during the
dry season; his father paid the realty taxes on the property,24 and he (Cruz) continued paying the
taxes after his father’s death.25 Cruz insisted that he was the rightful claimant and owner of the
property.

Sometime in the 1980s, Apolonio Cruz executed an extrajudicial deed of partition in which the
property was adjudicated to Antonio Cruz and his sisters, Felisa and Eladia, to the exclusion of their
five (5) other siblings who were given other properties as their shares.26 He did not know why his
ancestors failed to have the property titled under the Torrens system of registration.27 He left the
Philippines and stayed in Saudi Arabia from 1973 to 1983.28 Aside from this, he hired the services of
an "upahan" to cultivate the property.29 The property is about 3 kilometers from the Laguna de Bay,
and is usually flooded when it rains.30

Fernando Co Siy testified that the applicant acquired Lot No. 3138 from siblings Antonio, Eladia and
Felisa,31 who had possessed it since 1945;32 that after paying the real estate taxes due thereon,33 it
caused the survey of the lot;34 that possession thereof has been peaceful35 and none of the former
owners claims any right against it;36 neither the applicant nor its predecessors-in-interest received
information from any government agency that the lot is a public land;37 the subject lot is 3 kms. away
from Laguna de Bay,38 above its elevation and that of the nearby road;39 the property is
habitable40 and was utilized as a riceland at the time it was sold by the former owners;41 and that he
was aware that a legal easement is affecting the lot and is willing to annotate it in the land title.42
On cross-examination by the LLDA counsel, Siy admitted that his knowledge as to the distance of
the lot with respect to the Laguna de Bay came from "somebody residing in Taytay" and also from
an adjacent owner of the lot;43 that the lot is submerged in water since there is no land fill yet;44 and
that no improvements had been introduced to the property.45

The LLDA moved for a joint ocular inspection of the parcels of land in order to determine its exact
elevation.46 On September 14, 2001, a Survey Team of the Engineering and Construction Division of
the LLDA, composed of Ramon D. Magalonga, Virgilio M. Polanco, and Renato Q. Medenilla,
conducted an actual ground survey of the property. The team used a total station and digital survey
instrument to measure the elevation of the ground in reference to the elevation of the lake water. A
representative of the applicant witnessed the survey. The team found that the lot is below the
prescribed elevation of 12.50 m. and thus part of the bed of the lake; as such, it could not be titled to
the applicant. The team also reported that the property is adjacent to the highway from the
Manggahan Floodway to Angono, Rizal. The LLDA moved that the application be withdrawn,
appending thereto a copy of the Survey Report.47

The LLDA did not offer any testimonial and documentary evidence and agreed to submit the case for
decision based on its Opposition.

On October 12, 2001, the MTC rendered a Decision granting the application for registration over the
lots. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the court hereby rendered judgment confirming title of the
applicants over the real property denominated as Lot 3138-A Csd-04-018302 of Cad-688-D Cainta-
Taytay Cadastre; Lot 3138-B Csd-04-018302 of Cad 688-D Cainta-Taytay Cadastre.48

On appeal to the CA, the petitioner contended that the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
application for registration since the actual copies of the Official Gazette (O.G.) where the notice of
hearing was published were not adduced in evidence; the applicant likewise failed to establish
exclusive ownership over the subject property in the manner prescribed by law. The petitioner
argued further that the requirements of Section 23, par. 1 of P.D. No. 1529, 49 as amended, are
mandatory and jurisdictional, and that failure to observe such requirements has a fatal effect on the
whole proceedings. Citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals50 and Register of Deeds of
Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, MM, Br. 170,51 the Republic averred that a mere certificate of publication
is inadequate proof of the jurisdictional fact of publication because the actual copies of the O.G.
must be presented at the initial hearing of the case. Moreover, witnesses were not presented to
prove specific acts to show that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
exclusive, open, continuous, and adverse possession of the subject lots in the concept of the owner
since June 12, 1945 or earlier, in accordance with Sec. 14, par. 1 of P.D. No. 1529.52 It noted that
the testimonies of the applicant’s witnesses are more of conclusions of law rather than factual
evidence of ownership. Other than the general statement that they planted rice and vegetables on
the subject lots, their possession could properly be characterized as mere casual cultivation since
they failed to account for its exclusive utilization since 1945 or earlier. After stressing that tax
declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership, it concluded that the subject lots rightfully belong
to the State under the Regalian doctrine.53

The applicant averred in its Appellee’s Brief54 that it had marked in evidence the actual copy of the
O.G. where the notice of initial hearing was published; in fact, the MTC Decision stated that the copy
of the O.G. containing the notice was referred to as Exhibit "E-1." Moreover, Sec. 14, par. 1 of P.D.
1529 is inapplicable since it speaks of possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain. Instead, par. 4 of the same section55 should govern because the subject
parcels of land are lands of private ownership, having being acquired through purchase from its
predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn, inherited the same from their parents. It pointed out that there
were no adverse claims of interest or right by other private persons and even government agencies
like the Province of Rizal. Lastly, while tax declarations and tax receipts do not constitute evidence
of ownership, they are nonetheless prima facie evidence of possession.

On May 21, 2004, the appellate court rendered judgment which dismissed the appeal and affirmed in
toto the Decision of the MTC,56 holding that the copy of the O.G., where the notice was published,
was marked as Exhibit "E-1" during the initial hearing. On the issue of ownership over the subject
lots, the CA upheld the applicant’s claim that the parcels of land were alienable and not part of the
public domain, and that it had adduced preponderant evidence to prove that its predecessors had
been tilling the land since 1937, during which palay and vegetables were planted. In fact, before the
lots were purchased, the applicant verified their ownership with the assessor’s office, and thereafter
caused the property to be surveyed; after the lots were acquired in 1999 and a survey was caused
by the applicant, no adverse claims were filed by third persons. Further, the CA ruled that tax
declarations or tax receipts are good indicia of possession in the concept of the owner, which
constitute at least positive and strong indication that the taxpayer concerned has made a claim either
to the title or to the possession of the property.

The Republic, now petitioner, filed the instant Petition for Review on the following issues:

A.

WHETHER THE LAND IN QUESTION MAYBE THE SUBJECT OF REGISTRATION.

B.

WHETHER THE COURT A QUO ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE RES CONSIDERING ITS

INALIENABLE CHARACTER.

C.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING
THAT RESPONDENT COMPLIED WITH THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS ON POSSESSION AS
MANDATED BY SECTION 14 OF P.D. NO. 1529.57

Petitioner asserts that the Engineer’s Survey Report58 and the Laguna de Bay Shoreland
Survey59 both show that Lot No. 3138-A is located below the reglementary lake elevation, hence,
forms part of the Laguna Lake bed. It insists that the property belongs to the public domain as
classified under Article 502 of the Civil Code.60 Citing the ruling of this Court in Bernardo v.
Tiamson,61 petitioner avers that the subject lot is incapable of private appropriation since it is a public
land owned by the State under the Regalian doctrine. On this premise, petitioner avers that the MTC
did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter, and as a consequence, its decision is null and
void.

Petitioner maintains that respondent failed to present incontrovertible evidence to warrant the
registration of the property in its name as owner. The testimonies of the two witnesses only proved
that the possession of the land may be characterized as mere casual cultivation; they failed to prove
that its predecessors occupied the land openly, continuously, exclusively, notoriously and adversely
in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
On the other hand, respondent argues that the Engineer’s Survey Report and the Laguna de Bay
Shoreland Survey have no probative value because they were neither offered nor admitted in
evidence by the MTC. It points out that petitioner failed to invoke these reports in the appellate court.

It was only when the petition was filed with this Court that the respondent learned of its existence.
Petitioner’s reliance on the reports/survey is merely an afterthought. The case of Bernardo v.
Tiamson is irrelevant because the factual issues are different from those of this case.

On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Manifestation62 with this Court, appending thereto the
report63 conducted by the survey team of the LLDA Engineering and Construction Division on April
12, 2005. It stated that the 10,971 sq m property subject of the case is below the 12.5 elevation, and
that the profile distance of the property from the actual lake waters is about 900 m. to 1 km.

The issues in this case are the following: (1) whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the amended
application; (2) whether the property subject of the amended application is alienable and disposable
property of the State, and, if so, (3) whether respondent adduced the requisite quantum of evidence
to prove its ownership over the property under Section 14 of P.D. 1529.

The petition is meritorious.

On the first issue, we find and so rule that the MTC acquired jurisdiction over respondent’s
application for registration since a copy of the O.G. containing the notice of hearing was marked and
adduced in evidence as Exhibit "E-1." The representative of the OSG was present during the hearing
and interposed his objection thereto.

On the second and third issues, we find and so rule that the property subject of this application was
alienable and disposable public agricultural land until July 18, 1966. However, respondent failed to
prove that it possesses registerable title over the property.

Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by R.A. No. 1942, reads:

Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, nay apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

This provision was further amended by P.D. No. 1073 by substituting the phrase "for at least thirty
years" with "since June 12, 1945;" thus:

Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are
hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession, and occupation by the applicant himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.

Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides:

SEC. 14. Who may apply. —The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
[now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier (emphasis
supplied).

Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must, therefore, prove the following: (a) that the land
forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same
under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.64

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State. The presumption is that lands of whatever classification belong
to the State.65 Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a
private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Property of the public
domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive
prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title.66 The statute of limitations with regard to public agricultural
lands does not operate against the State unless the occupant proves possession and occupation of
the same after a claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the
State.67

No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant from the government, whether
express or implied. It is indispensable that there be a showing of a title from the State.68 The
rationale for the period "since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945" lies in the presumption that
the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants or possessor claim an interest
thereon only by virtue of their imperfect title as continuous, open and notorious possession.

A possessor of real property may acquire ownership thereof through acquisitive prescription. In Alba
Vda. de Raz v. Court of Appeals,69 the Court declared that:

x x x [W]hile Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that ‘(o)wnership and other real rights over
immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years,’ this
provision of law must be read in conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article states that
‘x x x (o)rdinary acquisitive prescription of things requires possession in good faith and with just title
for the time fixed by law.’ Hence, a prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by mere possession
thereof under claim of ownership for a period of ten years unless such possession was acquired con
justo titulo y buena fe (with color of title and good faith). The good faith of the possessor consists in
the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and
could transmit his ownership. For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse
claimant came into possession of the property through one of the recognized modes of acquisition of
ownership or other real rights but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.70
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, or administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of
Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute.71 Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect
title do not apply. A certification of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources stating that the land subject of an application is
found to be within the alienable and disposable site per a land classification project map is sufficient
evidence to show the real character of the land subject of the application.72

The applicant is burdened to offer proof of specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim over
the land.73 Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property.74 A mere casual cultivation of
portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute sufficient basis for a claim of ownership; such
possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State.75

In this case, the evidence on record shows that the property is alienable agricultural land. Romeo
Cadano of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, Antipolo Rizal, certified that
the property "falls within the Alienable and Disposable zone, under Land Classification Project No. 5-
A, per L.C. Map No. 639 certified released on March 11, 1927."76 However, under R.A. No. 4850
which was approved on July 18, 1966, lands located at and below the maximum lake level of
elevation of the Laguna de Bay are public lands which form part of the bed of said lake. Such lands
denominated as lakeshore areas are linear strips of open space designed to separate incompatible
element or uses, or to control pollution/nuisance, and for identifying and defining development areas
or zone. Such areas of the lake with an approximate total area of 14,000 hectares form a strip of the
lakebed along its shores alternately submerged or exposed by the annual rising and lowering of the
lake water. They have environmental ecological significance and actual potential economic benefits.

Under Section 1 of the law, the national policy of the State is to promote and accelerate the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities
and towns within the context of the national and regional plans and policies for social and economic
development and to carry out the development of the Laguna Lake region with due regard and
adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of
human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances,
deterioration and pollution.

The rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore town of Laguna de Bay,
combined with current and prospective uses of the lake for municipal-industrial water supply,
irrigation, fisheries, and the like, created deep concern on the part of the Government and the
general public over the environmental impact of such development, on the water quality and ecology
of the lake and its related river systems. The inflow of polluted water from the Pasig River, industrial,
domestic and agricultural wastes from developed areas around the lake and the increasing
urbanization have induced the deterioration of the lake, and that water quality studies have shown
that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same. The floods in the
Metropolitan Manila area and the lakeshore towns are also influenced by the hydraulic system of the
Laguna de Bay, and any scheme of controlling the floods will necessarily involve the lake and its
river systems.

This prompted then President Ferdinand E. Marcos to issue on October 17, 1978 P.D. 813
amending Rep. Act No. 4850. Under Section 6 of the law, the LLDA is empowered to issue such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to effectively carry out the policies and programs therein
provided including the policies and projects of the LLDA, subject to the approval of the National
Economic Development Authority.
In 1996, the Board of Directors of LLDA approved Resolution No. 113, series of 1996 relating to the
Environmental Uses Fee Systems and Approval of the Work and Financial Plan for its
operationalization in the Laguna de Bay Basin. Section 5 of the Resolution provides that the LLDA
as a matter of policy is to maintain all shoreland areas lying below elevation 12.50 meters as buffer
zone in consonance with the LLDA policies, plans programs for the improvement of the water quality
and pollution and conservation of the water resources of the Laguna de Bay.

As gleaned from the Survey Report of Magalonga, Polanco and Medenilla of the LLDA based on the
ocular inspection dated September 14, 2001 as well as the Memorandum of Engineer Christopher
Pedrezuela, the property is located below the reglementary level of 12.50 m.; hence, part of the bed
of the Laguna de Bay, and, as such, is public land. Although the Report and Memorandum were not
offered as evidence in the MTC, the respondent admitted in its Manifestation in this Court that the
property is situated below the 12.50 elevation based on the survey of Magalonga, Polanco and
Medenilla, the same survey team who conducted an ocular inspection of the property on April 12,
2005, which thus confirmed the September 14, 2001 survey report. This is a judicial admission in the
course of judicial proceedings which is binding on it.77

Under R.A. No. 4850 and the issuances of LLDA, registerable rights acquired by occupants before
the effectivity of the law are recognized. However, the respondent failed to adduce proof that its
predecessors-in-interest had acquired registerable title over the property before July 18, 1966:

First. Cruz failed to prove how his parents acquired ownership of the property, and even
failed to mention the names of his grandparents. He likewise failed to present his father’s
death certificate to support his claim that the latter died in 1980. There is likewise no
evidence when his mother died.

Second. Cruz also failed to adduce in evidence the extrajudicial partition allegedly executed
by his parents in 1980 where the property was supposedly deeded to him and his sisters,
Felisa and Eladia, to the exclusion of their five siblings.

Third. Cruz claimed that he and his parents cultivated the property and planted palay and
vegetables, and that they had been paying the realty taxes over the property before his
parents died. However, no tax declarations under the names of the spouses Apolonio Cruz
and/or Eladia Cruz and his siblings were presented, or realty tax receipts evidencing
payment of such taxes. Indeed, while tax receipts and tax payment receipts themselves do
not convincingly prove title to the land,78 these are good indicia of possession in the concept
of an owner, for no one in his right mind would pay taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or, at least, constructive possession.79 While tax receipts and declarations are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute, at the least, proof that the holder has
a claim of title over the property, particularly when accompanied by proof of actual
possession of property.80 The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation
purposes not only manifests one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property,
but also announces an adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties with
an intention to contribute needed revenues to the government. Such an act strengthens
one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.81

Fourth. When he testified on October 5, 2001, Antonio Cruz declared that he was "74 years
old."82 He must have been born in 1927, and was thus merely 10 years old in 1937. It is
incredible that, at that age, he was already cultivating the property with his father. Moreover,
no evidence was presented to prove how many cavans of palay were planted on the
property, as well as the extent of such cultivation, in order to support the claim of possession
with a bona fide claim of ownership.
 Fifth. Cruz testified that he hired a worker "upahan" to help him cultivate the property. He,
however, failed to state the name of the worker or to even present him as witness for the
respondent.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73278 is SET ASIDE. The Municipal Trial Court of Taytay, Rizal is
DIRECTED to dismiss the application for registration of respondent Candymaker, Inc. in Land
Registration Case No. 99-0031. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 103882 November 25, 1998

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE CORPORATION,
respondents, CULTURAL CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor.

G.R. No. 105276 November 25, 1998

PASAY CITY AND REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE CORPORATION, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PURISIMA, J.:

At bar are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Here, the Court is confronted with a case commenced before the then Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal in Pasay City, in 1961, more than 3 decades back, that has
spanned six administrations of the Republic and outlasted the tenure of ten (10) Chief Justices of the
Supreme Court.

In G.R. No. 103882, the Republic of the Philippines, as petitioner, assails the Decision, dated
January 29, 1992 and Amended Decision, dated April 28, 1992, of the Court of Appeals1 which
affirmed with modification the Decision of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch
7, Pasay City) in Civil Case No. 2229-P, entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Pasay City
and Republic Real Estate Corporation".

The facts that matter are, as follows:

Republic Act No. 1899 ("RA 1899"), which was approved on June 22, 1957, authorized the
reclamation of foreshore lands by chartered cities and municipalities. Section I of said law,
reads:

Sec. 1. Authority is hereby granted to all municipalities and chartered cities to

undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging,
filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to
 establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking
and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may determine
in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications.

On May 6, 1958, invoking the a forecited provision of RA 1899, the Pasay City Council passed
Ordinance No. 121, for the reclamation of Three Hundred (300) hectares of foreshore lands in
Pasay City, empowering the City Mayor to award and enter into reclamation contracts, and
prescribing terms and conditions therefor. The said Ordinance was amended on April 21,
1959 by Ordinance No. 158, which authorized the Republic Real Estate Corporation ("RREC")
to reclaim foreshore lands of Pasay City under certain terms and conditions.

On April 24, 1959, Pasay City and RREC entered into an Agreement 2 for the reclamation of
the foreshore lands in Pasay City.

On December 19, 1961, the Republic of the Philippines ("Republic") filed a Complaint 3 for
Recovery of Possession and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Preventive injunction and
Mandatory Injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 2229-P before the former Court of First
Instance of Rizal, (Branch 7, Pasay City).

On March 5, 1962, the Republic of the Philippines filed an Amended Complaint 4 questioning

subject Agreement between Pasay City and RREC (Exhibit "P") on the grounds that the
subject-matter of such Agreement is outside the commerce of man, that its terms and
conditions are violative of RA 1899, and that the said Agreement was executed without any
public bidding.

The Answers 5 of RREC and Pasay City, dated March 10 and March 14, 1962, respectively,
averred that the subject-matter of said Agreement is within the commerce of man, that the
phrase "foreshore lands" within the contemplation of RA 1899 has a broader meaning than
the cited definition of the term in the Words and Phrases and in the Webster's Third New
International Dictionary and the plans and specifications of the reclamation involved were
approved by the authorities concerned.

On April 26,1962, Judge Angel H. Mojica, (now deceased) of the former Court of First Instance
of Rizal (Branch 7, Pasay City) issued an Order 6 the dispositive portion of which was to the
following effect:

WHEREFORE, the court hereby orders the defendants, their agents, and all
persons claiming under them, to refrain from "further reclaiming or committing
acts of dispossession or dispoilation over any area within the Manila Bay or
the Manila Bay Beach Resort", until further orders of the court.

On the following day, the same trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction 7 which
enjoined the defendants, RREC and Pasay City, their agents, and all persons claiming under
them "from further reclaiming or committing acts of dispossession."

Thereafter, a Motion to Intervene8, dated June 27, 1962, was filed by Jose L. Bautista,
Emiliano Custodio, Renato Custodio, Roger de la Rosa, Belen Gonzales, Norma Martiner,
Emilia E. Paez, Ambrosio R. Parreno, Antolin M. Oreta, Sixto L. Orosa, Pablo S. Sarmiento,
Jesus Yujuico, Zamora Enterprises, Inc., Industrial and Commercial Factors, Inc.,
Metropolitan Distributors of the Philippines, and Bayview Hotel, Inc. stating inter alia that
they were buyers of lots in the Manila Bay area being reclaimed by RREC, whose rights
would be affected by whatever decision to be rendered in the case. The Motion was granted
by the trial court and the Answer attached thereto admitted. 9

The defendants and the intervenors then moved to dismiss 10 the Complaint of the Republic,
placing reliance on Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5187, which reads:

Sec. 3. Miscellaneous Projects

x x x           x x x          x x x

m. For the construction of seawall and limited access highway from the south
boundary of the City of Manila to Cavite City, to the south, and from the north
boundary of the City of Manila to the municipality of Mariveles, province of
Bataan, to the north, including the reclamation of the foreshore and
submerged areas: Provided, That priority in the construction of such seawalls,
highway and attendant reclamation works shall be given to any corporation
and/or corporations that may offer to undertake at its own expense such
projects, in which case the President of the Philippines may, after competitive
didding, award contracts for the construction of such project, with the winning
bidder shouldering all costs thereof, the same to be paid in terms of
percentage fee of the contractor which shall not exceed fifty percent of the
area reclaimed by the contractor and shall represent full compensation for the
purpose, the provisions of the Public Land Law concerning disposition of
reclaimed and foreshore lands to the contrary notwithstanding: Provided,
finally, that the foregoing provisions and those of other laws, executive orders,
rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, existing rights, projects
and/or contracts of city or municipal governments for the reclamation of
foreshore and submerged lands shall be respected. . . . . (emphasis ours).

Since the aforecited law provides that existing contracts shall be respected, movants
contended that the issues raised by the pleadings have become "moot, academic and
of no further validity or effect."

Meanwhile, the Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. ("PLCU") moved to intervene 11,
alleging as legal interest in the matter in litigation the avowed purpose of the organization for
the promotion of good government in Pasay City. In its Order of June 10, 1969, the lower
court of origin allowed the said intervention 12.

On March 24, 1972, the trial court of origin came out with a Decision, disposing, thus:

WHEREFORE, after carefully considering (1) the original complaint, (2) the first
Amended Complaint, (3) the Answer of Defendant Republic Real Estate
Corporation to the first Amended Complaint, (4) the Answer of Defendant
Pasay City to the first Amended Complaint, (5) the Second Amended
Complaint, (6) the Answer of Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation to
the Second Amended Complaint, (7) the Answer of Defendant Pasay City to the
Second Amended Complaint, (8) the Memorandum in Support of Preliminary
Injunction of Plaintiff, (9) the Memorandum In Support of the Opposition to the
Issuance of Preliminary Injunction of Defendant Pasay City and Defendant
Republic Real Estate Corporation, (10) the Answer in Intervention of
Intervenors Bautista, et. al., (11) Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Intervene,
(12) the Reply to Opposition to Motion to Intervene of Intervenors
Bautista, et. al., (13) the Stipulation of Facts by all the parties, (14) the Motion
for Leave to Intervene of Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc.,
(15) the Opposition to Motion For Leave to Intervene of Intervenors
Bautista, et. al., (16) the Reply of Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union,
Inc., (17) the Supplement to Opposition to Motion to Intervene of Defendant
Pasay City and Republic Real Estate Corporation (18) the Complain in
Intervention of Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc., (19) the
Answer of Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation, (20) the Answer of
Intervenor Jose L. Bautista, et. al., to Complaint in Intervention, (21) the Motion
to Dismiss of Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation, and Intervenors
Bautista, et. al., (22) the Opposition of Plaintiff to said Motion to Dismiss, (23)
the Opposition of Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc., (24) the
Memorandum of the Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation, (25) the
Memorandum for the Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc., (26)
the Manifestation of Plaintiff filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, and all
the documentary evidence by the parties to wit: (a) Plaintiff's Exhibits "A" to
"YYY- 4", (b) Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation's Exhibits "1-RREC"
to "40-a" and (c) Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc's., Exhibits
"A-PLACU" to "C-PLACU", the Court hereby:

(1) Denies the "Motion to Dismiss" filed on January 10, 1968, by Defendant
Republic Real Estate Corporation and Intervenors Bautista, et. al., as it is the
finding of this Court that Republic Act No. 5187 was not passed by Congress
to cure any defect in the ordinance and agreement in question and that the
passage of said Republic Act No. 5187 did not make the legal issues raised in
the pleadings "moot, academic and of no further validity or effect;" and

(2) Renders judgment:

(a) dismissing the Plaintiff's Complaint;

(b) Dismissing the Complaint in Intervention of Intervenor Pasay Law and

Conscience Union, Inc.,

(c) Enjoining Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation and Defendant

Pasay City to have all the plans and specifications in the reclamation approved
by the Director of Public Works and to have all the contracts and sub-contracts
for said reclamation awarded by means of, and only after, public bidding; and

(d) Lifting the preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on April 26, 1962, as
soon as Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation and Defendant Pasay City
shall have submitted the corresponding plans and specifications to the
Director of Public Works, and shall have obtained approval thereof, and as
soon as the corresponding public bidding for the award to the contractor and
sub-contractor that will undertake the reclamation project shall have been
effected.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. (See Court of Appeals' Decision dated January 28, 1992; pp. 6-

8)
Dissatisfied with the said judgment, the Republic appealed therefrom to the Court of Appeals.
However, on January 11, 1973, before the appeal could be resolved, Presidential Decree No.
3-A issued, amending Presidential Decree No. 3, thus:

Sec. 1. Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 3, dated September 26, 1972, is

hereby amended by the addition of the following paragraphs:

The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of

areas under water, whether foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the National
Government or any person authorized by it under a proper contract.

All reclamations made in violation of this provision shall be forfeited to the

State without need of judicial action.

Contracts for reclamation still legally existing or whose validity has been
accepted by the National Government shall be taken over by the National
Government on the basis of quantum meruit, for proper prosecution of the
project involved by administration.

On November 20, 1973, the Republic and the Construction Development Corporation of the
Philippines ("CDCP") signed a Contract13 for the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project (Phases I
and II) which contract included the reclamation and development of areas covered by the
Agreement between Pasay City and RREC. Then, there was issued Presidential Decree No.
1085 which transferred to the Public Estate Authority ("PEA") the rights and obligations of
the Republic of the Philippines under the contract between the Republic and CDCP.

Attempts to settle amicably the dispute between representatives of the Republic, on the one
hand, and those of Pasay City and RREC, on the other, did not work out. The parties involved
failed to hammer out a compromise.

On January 28, 1992, the Court of Appeals came out with a Decision 14 dismissing the appeal
of the Republic and holding, thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the

following modifications:

1. The requirement by the trial court on public bidding and submission of

RREC's plans specification to the Department Public Works and Highways in
order that RREC may continue the implementation of the reclamation work is
deleted for being moot and academic;

2. Ordering the plaintiff-appellant to turn over to Pasay City the ownership and
possession over all vacant spaces in the twenty-one hectare area already
reclaimed by Pasay City and RREC at the time it took over the same. Areas
thereat over which permanent structures has (sic) been introduced shall,
including the structures, remain in the possession of the present possessor,
subject to any negotiation between Pasay City and the said present possessor,
as regards the continued possession and ownership of the latter area.

3. Sustaining RREC's irrevocable option to purchase sixty (60%) percent of the

Twenty-One (21) hectares of land already reclaimed by it, to be exercised
 within one (1) year from the finality of this decision, at the same terms and
condition embodied in the Pasay City-RREC reclamation contract, and
enjoining appellee Pasay City to respect RREC's option.

SO ORDERED.

On February 14, 1992, Pasay City and RREC presented a Motion for Reconsideration of such
Decision of the Court of Appeals, contending, among others, that RREC had actually
reclaimed Fifty-Five (55) hectares, and not only Twenty-one (21) hectares, and the respondent
Court of Appeals erred in not awarding damages to them, movants.

On April 28, 1992, the Court of Appeals acted favorably on the said Motion for
Reconsideration, by amending the dispositive portion of its judgment of January 28, 1992, to
read as follows:

WHEREFORE, the dispositive portion of our Decision dated January 28, 1992 is
hereby AMENDED to read as follows:

1. The requirement by the trial court on public bidding and the submission of
the RREC's plans and specification to the Department of Public Works and
Highways in order that RREC may continue the implementation of the
reclamation work is deleted for being moot and academic.

2. Ordering plaintiff-appellant to turn over to Pasay City the ownership and

possession of the above enumerated lots (1 to 9).

3. Sustaining RREC's irrevocable option to purchase sixty (60%) percent of the

land referred to in No. 2 of this dispositive portion, to be exercised within one
(1) year from the finality of this Decision, at the same terms and condition
embodied in the Pasay City-RREC reclamation contract, and enjoining Pasay
City to respect RREC's irrevocable option.

SO ORDERED.

From the Decision and Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals aforementioned, the
Republic of the Philippines, as well as Pasay City and RREC, have come to this Court to seek
relief, albeit with different prayers.

On September 10, 1997, the Court commissioned the former thirteenth Division of Court of
Appeals to hear and receive evidence on the controversy. The corresponding
Commissioner's Report, dated November 25, 1997, was submitted and now forms part of the
records.

On October 11, 1997, the Cultural Center of the Philippines ("CCP") filed a Petition in
Intervention, theorizing that it has a direct interest in the case being the owner of subject nine
(9) lots titled in its (CCP) name, which the respondent Court of Appeals ordered to be turned
over to Pasay City. The CCP, as such intervenor, was allowed to present its evidence, as it
did, before the Court of Appeals, which evidence has been considered in the formulation of
this disposition.
In G.R. No. 103882, the Republic of the Philippines theorizes, by way of assignment of errors,
that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE

VALIDITY OF PASAY CITY ORDINANCE NO. 158 DATED APRIL
21, 1959 AND THE RECLAMATION CONTRACT ENTERED INTO
BETWEEN PASAY CITY AND RREC;

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT RREC HAD

RECLAIMED 55 HECTARES AND IN ORDERING THE TURN-
OVER TO PASAY CITY OF THE OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION
OF NINE (9) LOTS TITLED IN THE NAME OF CCP.

In G.R. No. 105276, the petitioners, Pasay City and RREC, contend, that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 3-A UNCONSTITUTIONAL;

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT AWARDING

DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF PASAY CITY AND RREC.

Let us first tackle the issues posed in G.R. No. 103882.

On the first question regarding the validity of Pasay City Ordinance No. 158 dated April 21,
1959 and the Agreement dated April 24, 1959 between Pasay City and RREC, we rule in the
negative.

Sec. 1 of RA 1899, reads:

Sec. 1. Authority is hereby granted to all municipalities and

chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense
the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any
foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide,
construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and
harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may
determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

It is the submission of the petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, that there are no foreshore
lands along the seaside of Pasay City 15; that what Pasay City has are submerged or offshore
areas outside the commerce of man which could not be a proper subject matter of the
Agreement between Pasay City and RREC in question as the area affected is within the
National Park, known as Manila Bay Beach Resort, established under Proclamation No. 41,
dated July 5, 1954, pursuant to Act No. 3915, of which area it (Republic) has been in open,
continuous and peaceful possession since time immemorial.

Petitioner faults the respondent court for unduly expanding what may be considered
"foreshore land" through the following disquisition:

The former Secretary of Justice Alejo Mabanag, in response to a

request for an opinion from the then Secretary of Public Works
and Communications as to whether the term, "foreshore areas"
as used in Section I of the immediately aforequoted law is that
defined in Webster's Dictionary and the Law of Waters so as to
make any dredging or filling beyond its prescribed limit illegal,
opined:

According to the basic letter of the Director of

Public Works, the law of Waters speaks of "shore"
and defines it thus: "that space movement of the
tide. Its interior or terrestrial limit in the line
reached by highest equinoctial tides."

Webster's definition of foreshore reads as follows:

That part of the shore between high water and

low-water marks usually fixed at the line to which
the ordinary means tide flows: also, by extension,
the beach, the shore near the water's edge.

If we were to be strictly literal the term foreshore

or foreshore lands should be confined to but a
portion of the shore, in itself a very limited area.
(p. 6, Intervenors-appellees' brief).

Bearing in mind the (Webster's and Law of

Waters) definitions of "shore" and of foreshore
lands, one is struck with the apparent
inconsistency between the areas thus described
and the purpose to which that area, when
reclaimed under the provision of Republic Act No.
1899, shall be devoted. Section I (of said Law)
authorizes the construction thereat of "adequate
docking and harbor facilities". This purpose is
repeated in Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.

And yet, it is well known fact that foreshore lands

normally extend only from 10 to 20 meters along
the coast. Not very much more if at all. In fact
certain parts in Manila bordering on Manila Bay,
has no foreshore to speak of since the sea
washes the sea wall.

It does not seem logical, then, that Congress had

in mind. Webster's limited concept of foreshore
 when it enacted Republic Act No. 1899, unless it
intends that the wharves, piers,
docks, etc. should be constructed parallel to the
shore, which is impractical.

Since it is to be presumed that Congress could

not have intended to enact an ineffectual measure
not one that would lead to absurd consequences,
it would seem that it used "foreshore" in a sense
wider in scope that defined by Webster. . . .

To said opinion on the interpretation of the R.A. 1899, plaintiff-

appellant could not offer any refutation or contrary opinion.
Neither can we. In fact, the above construction is consistent with
the "rule on context" in statutory construction which provides
that in construing a statute, the same must be construed as a
whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be
studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole
and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious
whole (see Araneta vs. Concepcion, 99 Phil. 709). There are two
reasons for this. Firstly, the force and significance of particular
expressions will largely depend upon the connection in which
they are found and their relation to the general subject-matter of
the law. The legislature must be understood to have expressed
its whole mind on the special object to which the legislative act
is directed but the vehicle for the expressions of that meaning is
the statute, considered as one entire and continuous act, and
not as an agglomeration of unrelated clauses. Each clause or
provision will be illuminated by those which are cognate to it
and by the general tenor of the whole statute and thus
obscurities end ambiguities may often be cleared up by the most
direct and natural means. Secondly effect must be given, if it is
possible, to every word and clause of the statute, so that
nothing shall be left devoid of meaning or destitute of force. To
this end, each provision of the statute should be read in the light
of the whole. For the general meaning of the legislature, as
gathered from the entire act, may often prevail over the
construction which would appear to be the most natural and
obvious on the face of a particular clause. If is by this means
that contradiction and repugnance between the different parts of
the statute may be avoided. (See Black, Interpretation of Laws,
2nd Ed., pp. 317-319).

Resorting to extrinsic aids, the "Explanatory Note" to House Bill

No. 3830, which was subsequently enacted as Republic Act No.
1899, reads:

In order to develop and expand the Maritime

Commerce of the Philippines, it is necessary that
harbor facilities be correspondingly improved
and, where necessary, expanded and developed.
 The national government is not in a financial
position to handle all this work. On the other
hand, with a greater autonomy many chartered
cities and provinces are financially able to have
credit position which will allow them to undertake
these projects. Some cities, such as the City of
Bacolod under R.A. 161, has been authorized to
reclaim foreshore lands bordering it.

Other cities end provinces have continuously

been requesting for authority to reclaim foreshore
lands on the basis of the Bacolod City pattern,
and to undertake work to establish, construct on
the reclaimed area and maintain such port
facilities as may be necessary. In order not to
unduly delay the undertaking of these projects,
and inorder to obviate the passage of individual
pieces of legislation for every chartered city and
province, it is hereby recommended that the
accompanying bill be approved. It covers
Authority for All chartered cities and provinces to
undertake this work. . . . (emphasis supplied)

Utilizing the above explanatory note in interpreting and

construing the provisions of R.A. 1899, then Secretary of Justice
Mabanag opined:

It is clear that the "Bacolod City pattern" was the

basis of the enactment of the aforementioned bill
of general application. This so-called "Bacolod
City pattern" appears to be composed of 3 parts,
namely: Republic Ad No. 161, which grants
authority to Bacolod City to undertake or carry
out . . . the reclamation . . . of any [sic] carry out
the reclamation project conformably with
Republic Act No. 161; and Republic Act No. 1132
authorizing Bacolod City to contract indebtedness
or to issue bonds in the amount not exceeding six
million pesos to finance the reclamation of land in
said city.

Republic Act No. 161 did not in itself specify the

precise space therein referred to as "foreshore"
lands, but it provided that docking and harbor
facilities should be erected on the reclaimed
portions thereof, while not conclusive would
indicate that Congress used the word "foreshore"
in its broadest sense. Significantly, the plan of
reclamation of foreshore drawn up by the Bureau
of Public Works maps out an area of
approximately 1,600,000 square meters, the
boundaries of which clearly extend way beyond
 Webster's limited concept of the term "foreshore".
As a contemporaneous construction by that
branch of the Government empowered to oversee
at least, the conduct of the work, such an
interpretation deserves great weight. Finally,
Congress in enacting Republic Act No. 1132
(supplement to RA 161), tacitly confirmed and
approved the Bureau's interpretation of the term
'foreshore' when instead of taking the occasion to
correct the Bureau of over extending its plan, it
authorized the city of Bacolod to raise the full
estimated cost of reclaiming the total area
covered by the plan. The explanatory note to
House Bill No. 1249 which became Republic Act
No. 1132 states among the things:

The Bureau of Public Works already prepared a

plan for the reclamation of about 1,600,000 square
meters of land at an estimated costs of about
P6,000,000.00. The project is self-supporting
because the proceeds from the sales or leases of
lands so reclaimed will be more than sufficient to
cover the cost of the project.

Consequently, when Congress passed Republic

Act No. 1899 in order to facilitate the reclamation
by local governments of foreshore lands on the
basis of the Bacolod City pattern and in order to
obviate the passage of individual pieces of
legislation for every chartered city and provinces
requesting authority to undertake such projects,
the lawmaking body could not have had in mind
the limited area described by Webster as
"foreshore" lands. . . . .

If it was really the intention of Congress to limit the area to the

strict literal meaning of "foreshore" lands which may be
reclaimed by chartered cities and municipalities, Congress
would have excluded the cities of Manila, Iloilo, Cebu,
Zamboanga and Davao from the operation of RA 1899 as
suggested by Senator Cuenco during the deliberation of the bill
considering that these cities do not have 'foreshore' lands in the
strict meaning of the term. Yet, Congress did not approve the
proposed amendment of Senator Cuenco, implying therefore,
that Congress intended not to limit the area that may be
reclaimed to the strict definition of "foreshore" lands.

The opinion of the then Secretary of Justice Mabanag, who was

at that time the chief law officer and legal adviser of the
government and whose office is required by law to issue
opinions for the guidance of the various departments of the
government, there being then no judicial interpretation to the
contrary, is entitled to respect (see Bengzon vs. Secretary of
Justice and Insular Auditor, 68 Phil. 912).

We are not unmindful of the Supreme Court Resolution dated

February 3, 1965 in Ponce vs. Gomez (L-21870) and Ponce vs.
City of Cebu (L-2266), by a unanimous vote of six (6) justices
(the other five (5) members deemed it unnecessary to express
their view because in their opinion the questions raised were not
properly brought before the court), which in essence applied the
strict dictionary meaning of "foreshore lands" as used in RA
1899 in the case of the city of Cebu. But this was promulgated
long after the then Secretary of Justice Mabanag rendered the
above opinion on November 16, 1959 and long after RREC has
started the subject reclamation project.

Furthermore, as held by the lower court, Congress, after the

Supreme Court issued the aforementioned Resolution, enacted
RA 5187. In Sec. 3 (m) of said law, Congress appropriated money
"for the construction of the seawall and limited access highway
from the South boundary of the city of Manila to Cavite City, to
the South, and from the North boundary of the city of Manila to
the municipality of Mariveles, province of Bataan, to the North
(including the reclamation of foreshore and submerged
areas . . . provided . . . that . . . existing projects and/or contracts
of city or municipal governments for the reclamation of
foreshore and submerged lands shall be respected . . ." This is a
clear manifestation that Congress in enacting RA 1899, did not
intend to limit the interpretation of the term "foreshore land" to
its dictionary meaning.

It is presumed that the legislature was acquainted with and had

in mind the judicial construction given to a former statute on the
subject, and that the statute on the subject, and that the statute
was enacted having in mind the judicial construction that the
prior enactment had received, or in the light of such existing
judicial decisions as have direct bearing upon it (see 50 Am.
Jur., Sec. 321, pp. 312-313). But notwithstanding said
interpretation by the Supreme Court of RA 1899 in the Ponce
cases, Congress enacted a law covering the same areas
previously embraced in a RA 1899 (as mentioned earlier, cities
without foreshore lands which were sought to be excluded from
the operation of RA 1899 were not excluded), providing that
respect be given the reclamation of not only foreshore lands but
also of submerged lands signifying its non-conformity to the
judicial construction given to RA 1899. If Congress was in
accord with the interpretation and construction made by the
Supreme Court on RA 1899, it would have mentioned
reclamation of "foreshore lands" only in RA 5187, but Congress
included "submerged lands" in order to clarify the intention on
the grant of authority to cities and municipalities in the
reclamation of lands bordering them as provided in RA 1899. It
is, therefore, our opinion that it is actually the intention of
Congress in RA 1899 not to limit the authority granted to cities
 and municipalities to reclaim foreshore lands in its strict
dictionary meaning but rather in its wider scope as to include
submerged lands.

The Petition is impressed with merit.

To begin with, erroneous and unsustainable is the opinion of respondent court that under RA
1899, the term "foreshore lands" includes submerged areas. As can be gleaned from its
disquisition and rationalization aforequoted, the respondent court unduly stretched and
broadened the meaning of "foreshore lands", beyond the intentment of the law, and against
the recognized legal connotation of "foreshore lands". Well entrenched, to the point of being
elementary, is the rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no
reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application. 16 So also, resort to
extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, is unwarranted, the language
of the law being plain and unambiguous. 17 Then, too, opinions of the Secretary of Justice are
unavailing to supplant or rectify any mistake or omission in the law. 18 To repeat, the term
"foreshore lands" refers to:

The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks
and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the
tide. (Words and Phrases, "Foreshore")

A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream);

the part of a seashore between the low-water line usually at the
seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave
wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm.
(Webster's Third New International Dictionary)

The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot
broaden its meaning, much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress
were to include submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress did not
so provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term "foreshore
lands".

Neither is there any valid ground to disregard the Resolution of this Court dated February 3,
1965 in Ponce v. Gomez (L-21870) and Ponce v. City of Cebu (L-22669) despite the enactment
of Republic Act No. 5187 ("RA 5187"), the relevant portion of which, reads:

Sec. 3. Miscellaneous Projects

x x x           x x x          x x x

m. For the construction of seawall and limited access highway

from the south boundary of the City of Manila to Cavite City, to
the south, and from the north boundary of the City of Manila to
the municipality of Mariveles, province of Bataan, to the north,
including the reclamation of the foreshore and submerged
areas: Provided, That priority in the construction of such
seawalls, highway and attendant reclamation works shell be
given to any corporation and/or corporations that may offer to
undertake at its own expense such projects, in which case the
President of the Philippines may, after competitive bidding,
 award contracts for the construction of such projects, with the
winning bidder shouldering all costs thereof, the same to be
paid in terms of percentage fee of the contractor which shall not
exceed fifty percent of the area reclaimed by the contractor and
shall represent full compensation for the purpose, the
provisions of the Public Land Law concerning disposition of
reclaimed and foreshore lands to the contrary
notwithstanding: Provided, finally, that the foregoing provisions
and those of other laws, executive orders, rules and regulations
to the contrary notwithstanding, existing rights, projects and/or
contracts of city or municipal governments for the reclamation
of foreshore and submerged lands shall be respected. . . . .

There is nothing in the foregoing provision of RA 5187 which can be interpreted to broaden
the scope of "foreshore lands." The said law is not amendatory to RA 1899. It is an
Appropriations Act, entitled — "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR PUBLIC WORKS,
SYNCHRONIZING THE SAME WITH PREVIOUS PUBLIC WORKS APPROPRIATIONS."

All things viewed in proper perspective, we reiterate what was said in Ponce v. Gomez (L-
21870) and Ponce v. City of Cebu (L-22669) that the term "foreshore" refers to "that part of
the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of
the tides." As opined by this Court in said cases:

WHEREAS, six (6) members of the Court (Justices Bautista

Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Dizon and Jose P.
Bengzon) opine that said city ordinance and contracts are ultra
vires and hence, null and void, insofar as the remaining 60% of
the area aforementioned, because the term "foreshore lands" as
used in Republic Act No. 1899 should be understood in the
sense attached thereto by common parlance; (emphasis ours)

The aforesaid ruling was applied by then Secretary of Justice Claudio Teehankee, in his
opinion dated December 22, 1966, in a case with analogous facts as the present one, to wit:

Decem
ber 22,
1966

The Secretary of Agriculture

and Natural Resources

Diliman, Quezon City

Sir:

x x x           x x x          x x x

I. Facts —
1. On January 19, 1961, pursuant to the provisions of Republic
Act No. 1899, the Municipality of Navotas enacted Ordinance No.
1 authorizing the Municipal Mayor to enter into a reclamation
contract with Mr. Chuanico.

2. On March 15, 1961, a reclamation contract was concluded

between the Municipality of Navotas, represented by the
Municipal Mayor, and Mr. Chuanico in accordance with the
above ordinance. Thereunder, Mr. Chuanico shall be the
attorney-in-fact of the Municipality in prosecuting the
reclamation project and shall advance the money needed
therefor; that the actual expenses incurred shall be deemed a
loan to the Municipality; that Mr. Chuanico shall have the
irrevocable option to buy 70% of the reclaimed area at P7.00 per
square meter; that he shall have the full and irrevocable powers
to do any and all things necessary and proper in and about the
premises," including the power to hire necessary personnel for
the prosecution of the work, purchase materials and supplies,
and purchase or lease construction machineries and equipment,
but any and all contracts to be concluded by him in behalf of the
Municipality shall be submitted to public bidding.

x x x           x x x          x x x

3. On March 16, 1961, the Municipal Council of Navotas passed

Resolution No. 22 approving and ratifying the contract.

x x x           x x x          x x x

III. Comments —

1. The above reclamation contract was concluded on the basis

of Navotas Ordinance No. 1 which, in turn, had been enacted
avowedly pursuant to Republic Act No. 1899. This being so, the
contract, in order to be valid, must conform to the provisions of
the said law.

By authorizing local governments "to execute by

administration any reclamation work," (Republic Act No. 1899
impliedly forbids the execution of said project by contract. Thus,
in the case or Ponce et al. vs. Gomez (February 3, 1966), five
justices of the Supreme Court voted to annul the contract
between Cebu Development Corporation and Cebu City for the
reclamation of foreshore lands because "the provisions of
said . . . contract are not . . . in accordance with the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1899," as against one Justice who opined that
the contract substantially complied with the provisions of the
said law. (Five Justices expressed no opinion on this point.)

Inasmuch as the Navotas reclamation contract is substantially

similar to the Cebu reclamation contract, it is believed that the
former is likewise fatally defective.
 2. The Navotas reclamation project envisages the construction
of a channel along the Manila Bay periphery of that town and the
reclamation of approximately 650 hectares of land from said
channel to a seaward distance of one kilometer. In the basic
letter it is stated that "practically, all the 650 hectares of lands
proposed to be reclaimed under the agreement" do not
constitute foreshore lands and that "the greater portion of the
area . . . is in fact navigable and presently being used as a
fishing harbor by deep-sea fishing operators as well as a fishing
ground of sustenance fisherman. Assuming the correctness of
these averments, the Navotas reclamation contract evidently
transcends the authority granted under Republic Act No. 1899,
which empowers the local governments to reclaim nothing more
than "foreshore lands, i.e., "that part of the land adjacent to the
see which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow
of the tides." (26 C.J. 890.) It was for this reason that in the cited
case Ponce case, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 6-0 with five
Justices abstaining, declared ultra vires and void the contractual
stipulation for the reclamation of submerged lands off Cebu
City, and permanently enjoined its execution under Republic Act
No. 1899.

x x x           x x x          x x x

In accordance with the foregoing, I have the honor to submit the

view that the Navotas reclamation contract is not binding and
should be disregarded for non-compliance with law.

Very
truly
yours,

(SGD)
CLAU
DIO
TEEHA
NKEE

Secret
ary of
Justic
e

The said opinion of Justice Secretary Teehankee who became Associate Justice, and later
Chief Justice, of this Court, did, in our considered view, supersede the earlier opinion of
former justice Secretary Alejo Mabanag, aforestated, as the cases, in connection with which
subject opinions were sought, were with similar facts. The said Teehankee opinion accords
with RA 1899.

It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by
Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the
intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and void.
What is worse, the same Agreement was vitiated by the glaring absence of a public bidding.

Obviously, there is a complete dearth of evidence to prove that RREC had really reclaimed 55
hectares. The letter of Minister Baltazar Aquino relied upon by RREC is no proof at all that
RREC had reclaimed 55 hectares. Said letter was just referring to a tentative schedule of work
to be done by RREC, even as it required RREC to submit the pertinent papers to show its
supposed accomplishment, to secure approval by the Ministry of Public Works and Highways
to the reclamation plan, and to submit to a public bidding all contracts and sub-contracts for
subject reclamation project but RREC never complied with such requirements and
conditions sine qua non.

No contracts or sub-contracts or agreements, plans, designs, and/or specifications of the

reclamation project were presented to reflect any accomplishment. Not even any statement
or itemization of works accomplished by contractors or subcontractors or vouchers and
other relevant papers were introduced to describe the extent of RREC's accomplishment.
Neither was the requisite certification from the City Engineer concerned that "portions of the
reclamation project not less than 50 hectares in area shall have been accomplished or
completed" obtained and presented by RREC.

As a matter of fact, no witness ever testified on any reclamation work done by RREC, and
extent thereof, as of April 26, 1962. Not a single contractor, sub-contractor, engineer,
surveyor, or any other witness involved in the alleged reclamation work of RREC testified on
the 55 hectares supposedly reclaimed by RREC. What work was done, who did the work,
where was it commenced, and when was it completed, was never brought to light by any
witness before the court. Certainly, onus probandi was on RREC and Pasay City to show and
point out the as yet unidentified 55 hectares they allegedly reclaimed. But this burden of
proof RREC and Pasay City miserably failed to discharge.

So also, in the decision of the Pasay Court of First Instance dismissing the complaint of
plaintiff-appellant, now petitioner Republic of the Philippines, the lifting of the writ of
Preliminary Injunction issued on April 26, 1962 would become effective only "as soon as
Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation and Defendant Pasay City shall have submitted
the corresponding plans and specifications to the Director of Public Work, and shall have
obtained approval thereof, and as soon as corresponding public bidding for the award to the
contractor and sub-contractor that will undertake the reclamation project shall have been
effected." (Rollo, pp. 127-129, G.R. No. 103882)

From the records on hand, it is abundantly clear that RREC and Pasay City never complied
with such prerequisites for the lifting of the writ of Preliminary Injunction. Consequently,
RREC had no authority to resume its reclamation work which was stopped by said writ of
preliminary injunction issued on April 26, 1962.

From the Contract for Dredging Work, dated November 26, 1960, marked Exhibit "21-A" for
RREC before the lower court, and Exhibit "EE" for CCP before the Court of Appeals, it can be
deduced that only on November 26, 1960 did RREC contract out the dredging work to C and
A Construction Company, Inc., for the reclamation of the 55 hectares initially programmed to
be reclaimed by it. But, as stated by RREC itself in the position paper filed with this Court on
July 15, 1997, with reference to CDCP's reclamation work, mobilization of the reclamation
team would take one year before a reclamation work could actually begin. Therefore, the
reclamation work undertaker by RREC could not have started before November 26, 1961.
Considering that on April 26, 1962 RREC was enjoined from proceeding any further with its
reclamation work, it had barely five (5) months, from November, 1961 to April, 1962, to work
on subject reclamation project. It was thus physically impossible for RREC to reclaim 55
hectares, with the stipulated specifications and elevation, in such a brief span of time. In the
report of RREC (Exhibit "DD" for CCP), it was conceded that due to the writ of preliminary
injunction issued on April 26, 1962, C and A Construction Co., Inc. had suspended its
dredging operation since May, 1962.

The "graphical report" on the Pasay Reclamation project, as of April 30, 1962, attached to the
Progress Report marked Exhibit "DD", is a schematic representation of the work
accomplishment referred to in such Progress Report, indicating the various elevations of the
land surface it embraced, ranging from 0.00 meters to the highest elevation of 2.5 meters
above MLLW. Such portrayal of work accomplished is crucial in our determination of whether
or not RREC had actually "reclaimed" any land as under its Contract for Dredging Work with
C and A Construction Company (Exhibit "EE", the required final elevation for a completely
reclaimed land was 3.5 meters above MLLW, as explicitly provided in said Contract for
Dredging Work. So, the irresistible conclusion is — when the work on subject RREC-Pasay
City reclamation project stopped in April, 1962 in compliance with the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the trial court of origin, no portion of the reclamation project worked on
by RREC had reached the stipulated elevation of 3.5 meters above MLLW. The entire area it
worked on was only at sea level or 0.00 meter above MLLW. In short, RREC had not yet
reclaimed any area when the writ of preliminary injunction issued in April 1962.

On this point, the testimonies of Architect Ruben M. Protacio, Architect and Managing partner
of Leandro V. Locsin and partners, Architect and City Planner Manuel T. Mañoza, Jr. of
Planning Resources and Operation System, Inc., Rose D. Cruz, Executive Assistant, Office of
the President, from 1966 to 1970, and Dr. Lucrecia Kasilag, National Artist and member of
CCP Advisory Committee, come to the fore. These credible, impartial and knowledgeable
witnesses recounted on the witness stand that when the construction of the Main Building of
the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) began in 1966, the only surface land available
was the site for the said building (TSN, Sept. 29, 1997, pages 8, 14 and 50), what could be
seen in front of and behind it was all water (TSN, Sept. 29, 1997 pages 127-128). When the
CCP Main Building was being constructed, from 1968 to 1969, the land above sea level
thereat was only where the CCP Main Building was erected and the rest of the surroundings
were all under water, particularly the back portion fronting the bay. (TSN, Sept. 13, 1997, pp.
181, 182, 185, 186, 188). Dr. Lucrecia R. Kasilag stressed that on April 16, 1966, during the
ground breaking for the CCP Main Building, it was water all around (TSN, Sept. 30, 1997, pp.
320, 324, 325).

There was indeed no legal and factual basis for the Court of Appeals to order and declare
that "the requirement by the trial court on public bidding and the submission of RREC's plans
and specification to the Department of Public Works and Highways in order that RREC may
continue the implementation of the reclamation work is deleted for being moot and
academic." Said requirement has never become moot and academic. It has remained
indispensable, as ever, and non-compliance therewith restrained RREC from lawfully
resuming the reclamation work under controversy, notwithstanding the rendition below of the
decision in its favor.

Verily, contrary to what the Court of Appeals found, RREC had not reclaimed any area with
the prescribed elevation of 3.5 meters above MLLW, so much so that in 1978, it (RREC) opted
to file with the former Ministry of Public Highways, a claim for compensation of
P30,396,878.20, for reclamation work allegedly done before the CDCP started working on the
reclamation of the CCP grounds. On September 7, 1979, RREC asked the Solicitor General to
settle its subject claim for compensation at the same amount of P30,396,878.20. But on June
10, 1981, guided by the cost data, work volume accomplished and other relevant information
gathered by the former Ministry of Public Highways, the Solicitor General informed RREC that
the value of what it had accomplished, based on 1962 price levels, was only P8,344,741.29,
and the expenses for mobilization of equipment amounted to P2,581,330.00. The aforesaid
evaluation made by the government, through the then Minister of Public Highways, is factual
and realistic, so much so that on June 25, 1981, RREC, in its reply letter to the Solicitor
General, stated:

We regret that we are not agreeable to the amount of

P10,926,071.29, based on 1962 cost data, etc., as compensation
based on quantum meruit. The least we would consider is the
amount of P10,926,071.29 plus interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from 1962 to the time of payment. We feel that 6% is very
much less than the accepted rate of inflation that has
supervened since 1962 to the present, and even less than the
present legal rate of 12% per annum. 19

Undoubtedly, what RREC claimed for was compensation for what it had done, and for the
dredge fill of 1,558,395 cubic meters it used, on subject reclamation project.

Respondent Court likewise erred in ordering the turn-over to Pasay City of the following titled
lots, to wit:

LOT NO. BUILDING AREA OCT/TCT

42 Gloria Maris 9,516 sq.m. OCT 159 in the

Restaurant name of GSIS

3 Asean Garden 76,299 sq.m. OCT 10251 in the

name of CCP

12 Folk Arts Theater 1.7503 hec. TCT 18627 in the

and PICC parking name of CCP

space

22 landscaped with 132,924 sq.m. TCT 75676 in the

sculpture of Asean name of CCP

Artists-site of

Boom na Boom

23 open space, back 34,346 sq.m. TCT 75677 in the

 of Philcite name of CCP

24 Parking space for 10,352 sq.m. TCT 75678 in the

Star City, CCP, name of CCP

Philcite

25 open space 11,323 sq.m. TCT 75679 in the

occupied by Star name of CCP

City

28 open space, 27,689 sq.m. TCT 75684 in the

beside PICC name of CCP

29 open space, 106,067 sq.m. TCT 75681 in the

leased by El name of CCP

Shaddai

We discern no factual basis nor any legal justification therefor. In the first place, in
their answer to the Complaint and Amended Complaint below, RREC and Pasay City
never prayed for the transfer to Pasay City of subject lots, title to which had long
become indefeasible in favor of the rightful title holders, CCP and GSIS, respectively.

The annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the certificates of title covering the said lots is
of no moment. It did not vest in Pasay City and RREC any real right superior to the absolute
ownership thereover of CCP and GSIS. Besides, the nature of the action did not really
warrant the issuance of a notice of lis pendens.

Sec. 14 of Rule 13, Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, reads:

Sec. 14. Notice of lis pendens. — In an action affecting the title

or the right of possession of real properly, the plaintiff and the
defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may
record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province in
which the property is situated a notice of the pendency of the
action. Said notice shall contain the names of the parties and the
object of the action or defense, and a description of the property
in that province affected thereby. Only from the time of filing
such notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the
property affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive
notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency
against the parties designated by their real names.

The notice of lis pendens herein above mentioned may be

cancelled only upon order of the court, after proper showing that
 the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or
that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who
caused it to be recorded.

Under the aforecited provision of law in point, a notice of lis pendens is necessary when the
action is for recovery of possession or ownership of a parcel of land. In the present litigation,
RREC and Pasay City, as defendants in the main case, did not counterclaim for the turnover
to Pasay City of the titled lots aforementioned.

What is more, a torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue of validity of a torrens
title, whether fraudulently issued or not, may be posed only in an action brought to impugn or
annul it. (Halili vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 257 SCRA 174, Cimafranca vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 147 SCRA 611.) Unmistakable, and cannot be ignored, is the
germane provision of Section 48 of P.D. 1529, that a certificate of title can never be the
subject of a collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding instituted in accordance with law.

Although Pasay City and RREC did not succeed in their undertaking to reclaim any area
within subject reclamation project, it appearing that something compensable was
accomplished by them, following the applicable provision of law and hearkening to the
dictates of equity, that no one, not even the government, shall unjustly enrich oneself/itself at
the expense of another 20, we believe; and so hold, that Pasay City and RREC should be paid
for the said actual work done and dredge-fill poured in, worth P10,926,071.29, as verified by
the former Ministry of Public Highways, and as claimed by RREC itself in its aforequoted
letter dated June 25, 1981.

It is fervently hoped that long after the end of our sojourn in this valley of tears, the court, for
its herein historic disposition, will be exalted by the future generations of Filipinos, for the
preservation of the national patrimony and promotion of our cultural heritage. As writer
Channing rightly puts it: "Whatever expands the affections, or enlarges the sphere of our
sympathies — Whatever makes us feel our relation to the universe and all that it inherits in
time and in eternity, and to the great and beneficent cause of all, must unquestionably refine
our nature, and elevate us in the scale of being."

WHEREFORE

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 200223, June 06, 2018

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LAKAMBINI C. JABSON, PARALUMAN C.

JABSON, MAGPURI C. JABSON, MANUEL C. JABSON III, EDGARDO C. JABSON, RENATO C.
JABSON, NOEL C. JABSON, AND NESTOR C. JABSON, REPRESENTED BY LAKAMBINI C.
JABSON, ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,* J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, seeking to reverse and set aside the Amended Decision1 dated November 4, 2010 and
Resolution2 dated December 26, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82986 entitled,
"Lakambini C. Jabson, Paraluman C. Jabson, Marpuri C. Jabson, Manuel C. Jabson III, Edgardo C.
Jabson, Renata Jabson, Noel C. Jabson, and Nestor C. Jabson, represented by Lakambini C.
Jabson, Attorney-in Fact." The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision3 dated October 28, 2003 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 161, Pasig City in LRC Case No. N-11402 entitled, "Re:
Application for Registration of Title Lakambini C. Jabson, et al., Applicants, Represented by:
Lakambini C. Jabson, Attorney-in-Fact."4

Factual Antecedents

On February 17, 1999, siblings Lakambini, Paraluman, Tala, and Magpuri together with Manuel III,
Edgardo, Renato, Noel, and Nestor representing their father, Manuel, Jr., all surnamed Jabson
(respondents Jabson), filed for the second time an Application for Registration of Title5 (Application)
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 161, Pasig City docketed as LRC Case No. N-11402.
Their first attempt to have the subject properties registered in their names was denied by then Court
of First Instance in 1978 "for failure of the applicants to comply with the recommendation of the then
Land Registration Commission to include in their application the complete names and postal
addresses of all the lessees occupying the lands sought to be registered."6

The RTC narrated the facts leading to the application's filing, viz.:

There are two parcels of land being applied for registration—one is located at Barrio San Jose,
Pasig City, and the other is situated in Barangay Bagong Katipunan, Pasig City. Both used to form
part of seven parcels of land owned and possessed by the Jabson family as early as 1909. Each
and every applicant herein claims undivided share and participation as follows: Lakambini C. Jabson
—1/5; Paraluman Jabson—1/5; Magpuri Jabson—1/5 & Tala J. Olega—1/5; Manuel III, Edgardo,
Renata, Noel & Nestor Jabson as legal heirs of their father Manuel Jabson, Jr. —1/5.

Sometime in 1978, applicants had already applied for registration of the same parcels of land.
However, said previous application docketed as LRC No. 9572 was dismissed by the CFI of Rizal,
Branch 11, as per Order dated 29 December 1978 for failure of the applicants to comply with the
recommendation of the then Land Registration Commission to include in their application the
complete names and postal addresses of all the lessees occupying the lands sought to be
registered.

The first parcel of land (or the San Jose property) consists of Lots 1, 2 and 3 with a total area of
1,344 square meters and is covered by verified survey plan PSU-233559. x x x

The second parcel of land (or the Bagong Katipunan property) sought to be registered consists of
Lots 26346 and 26347, with a total area of 3,024 square meters and is covered by verified survey
plan AP-00- 000399.7 x x x (Citations omitted.)

Respondents Jabson acquired the San Jose and Bagong Katipunan properties via inheritance and
purchase from their predecessors-in-interest. At the time of filing, it is not disputed that Lakambini,
Paraluman, and Magpuri have already built their residences on the San Jose property, with
remaining portions of the land occupied by third parties either thru lease or applicants' mere
acquiescence. As to the Bagong Katipunan property, respondents Jabson alleged that they have
leased portions of it to various third parties who have been paying rentals thereon.8

Decision of the RTC

In its Decision dated October 28, 2003, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents Jabson, viz.:

WHEREFORE, the verified application for registration of title of the subject lots filed by the
applicants Lakambini, Paraluman, Magpuri, Manuel III, Edgardo, Renato, Noel and Nestor, all
surnamed Jabson, and Tala J. Olega is hereby GRANTED.

Upon this decision becoming final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued to herein
applicants.9

The RTC found that respondents Jabson acquired the properties from their predecessors-in-interest
who, in turn, have possessed the same since time immemorial. Upon acquisition, respondents
Jabson possessed the parcels of land for more than 30 years in an open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious manner, and in the concept of an owner. Moreover, their title was never disputed by other
persons occupying the land. Thus, the RTC ruled that respondents Jabson satisfactorily proved and
established their rights over the subject properties, in compliance with Section 14(1) and (2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529.

Aggrieved, petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On January 30, 2009, the appellate court rendered a Decision10 (Original Decision) in petitioner
Republic's favor, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (Branch 161) is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the instant application for registration and confirmation of title
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.11

The Court of Appeals held that in land registration cases, the applicant has the burden of showing
that he is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for.12 Thus, to have his
imperfect title confirmed, the applicant must present evidence to prove that his possession has been
adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful, and in the concept of an owner13 since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. However, the appellate court noted that the rule on confirmation of an imperfect title
grounded on adverse possession does not apply unless and until the subject land has been released
in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable lands of the public
domain. To this end, the applicant must secure a certification from the Government that the land
applied for is in fact alienable and disposable.14

It found that respondents Jabson did not present any evidence showing that the San Jose property
had already been classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. A plain
photocopy of a purported Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)
Certification dated May 14, 1998, which tended to show that the Bagong Katipunan property is
"within the alienable and disposable zone," was submitted to the trial court.15 However, the Court of
Appeals noted that no party identified, testified to, nor offered the certification in evidence. Thus, the
Court of Appeals held that it cannot be admitted in evidence. Moreover, even if respondents Jabson
offered in evidence a subdivision plan with a notation that the Bagong Katipunan property "is
alienable and disposable" as certified by the Bureau of Forest Development, the Court of Appeals
ruled that such plan does not constitute proof that the property is indeed alienable and disposable.16
Subsequently, respondents Jabson moved for the reconsideration of the aforequoted Decision. And
finding merit in their motion, the appellate court issued its assailed Amended Decision dated
November 4, 2010, viz.:

WHEREFORE, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. This Court's Decision
dated January 30, 2009 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered affirming the
Decision dated October 28, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 161, Pasig City in LRC Case
No. N-11402.17

The Court of Appeals found that respondents Jabson sufficiently established that: (a) they have had
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject properties; and (b) such
properties formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.

Previously, the appellate court did not give weight to the CENRO Certification dated May 14, 1998
as it was not offered in evidence. However, relying on the principle of substantial justice,18 it admitted
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Certification19 dated February 19,
2009 submitted by respondents Jabson, which reads:

This is to certify that the tract of land as shown and described at the reverse side of this Advance
Plan (Ap-00-000399) of Lots 26346 and 26347, Mcad-579, Pasig Multi-Purpose Cadastre situated
at Brgy. Bagong Katipunan, Pasig City containing an area of 3,024 square meters as surveyed by
Geodetic Engineer Juanito A. Ilad for Manuel Jabson, Jr., et al., was verified to be within the
Alienable and Disposable Land, under Project No. 21 of Pasig City per L.C. Map No. 639,
approved on March 11, 1927.

This certification is issued upon the request of Lakambini C. Jabson for whatever legal purpose it
may serve as contained in her letter dated February 18, 2009. (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court of Appeals pointed out that based on Llanes v. Republic,20 in the interest of substantial
justice and to resolve a material issue in a land registration case, the court is allowed to admit a
CENRO Certification in evidence despite its belated submission and lack of formal offer.

Further, the appellate court ruled that respondents Jabson sufficiently established their adverse
possession of the subject properties through the following: (a) by exercising specific acts of
ownership such as constructing residential houses on the subject properties and leasing the same to
third parties, and (b) as admitted by petitioner Republic, by possessing and occupying the San Jose
property since 1944.

Petitioner Republic's subsequent motion for reconsideration21 was denied in a Resolution dated

December 26, 2011.

Hence, the present petition.

The Issue

Petitioner Republic comes before this Court raising a single issue:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING ITS EARLIER DECISION AND
SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENTS
FAILED TO ESTABLISH ALL THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE LAW TO WARRANT THE
REGISTRATION IN THEIR FAVOR OF THE LOTS IN QUESTION.22
Petitioner Republic insists that respondents Jabson failed to establish with clear and convincing
evidence that they have complied with all the requirements under the law to register their title over
the subject properties.23

Specifically, petitioner Republic maintains that respondents Jabson failed to present any document
showing that the subject properties are alienable and disposable. It argues that the appellate court
erred in admitting the DENR Certification dated February 19, 2009 on two grounds – first,
respondents Jabson did not show that Carlita P. Castañeda, DENR Senior Forest Management
Specialist, the signatory in the certification, was authorized to issue such a document; and second,
as held in Republic v. Castro,24 a document that has not been identified and presented during the
proceedings in the trial court cannot be submitted for the first time on appeal. Citing Republic v.
T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,25 petitioner Republic asserts that respondents Jabson should establish that
the DENR Secretary had approved the subject properties' classification as alienable and disposable
parts of the public domain. Further, respondents Jabson also failed to show the manner by which
their predecessors-in-interest acquired the subject properties. They did not present proof showing
their predecessors' basis for claiming ownership or any act that would establish the nature of their
predecessors' possession or ownership.26

For their part, respondents Jabson insist that they have proven through clear and convincing
evidence the subject properties' alienable and disposable nature, the manner and length of time of
their predecessors-in interest's possession, as well as their acts of ownership over the subject
properties.27 Thus, inasmuch as the Court of Appeals' factual findings are supported by these
evidence, such findings are binding on this Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

At the onset, We address respondents Jabson's argument that, as this Court is not a trier of facts,
We are bound by the trial and appellate courts' factual findings, when supported by clear and
convincing evidence. Thus, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari.

It is settled that a question of law arises when there is doubt or difference as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, and the question does not call for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or
controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.28

The present petition does not require an examination of the probative value or truthfulness of the
evidence presented. It merely raises the question whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly
applied the law and jurisprudence when in granting respondents Jabson’s application for registration
of title to the subject property.29 Thus, the pivotal question herein is whether or not the grant of
respondents Jabson's application for registration of title to the subject property was proper under the
law and current jurisprudence.

The general rule prevailing over claims of land is the Regalian Doctrine, which, as enshrined in the
1987 Constitution, declares that the State owns all lands of the public domain.30 In other words, land
that has not been acquired from the government, either by purchase, grant, or any other mode
recognized by law, belongs to the State as part of the public domain.31

In turn, The Public Land Act32 governs the classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain, except for timber and mineral lands.33 The law also entitles possessors of public lands to
judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles, viz.:
Sec. 48. The following described Citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.34

The above-cited provision is echoed in Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, viz.:

SECTION 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.

It is clear from the above-cited provisions that any applicant for registration of title to land derived
through a public grant must sufficiently establish three things: (a) the subject land's alienable and
disposable nature; (b) his or her predecessors' adverse possession thereof, and (c) the reckoning
date from which such adverse possession was under a bona fide claim of ownership, that is, since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.35

That land has been removed from the scope of the Regalian Doctrine and reclassified as part of the
public domain's alienable and disposable portion cannot be assumed or implied. The prevailing rule
is that the applicant must clearly establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as
a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute to prove the alienable and
disposable nature of the subject land.36

In the present case, the Court of Appeals ruled that the DENR Certification dated February 19, 2009
was sufficient evidence to establish the subject properties' alienable and disposable character.

We disagree.

We cannot give probative value to the DENR Certification dated February 19, 2009 as submitted by
respondents Jabson.

First, respondents Jabson's belated submission of a supposed vital document tending to prove the
subject properties' alienability is fatal to their cause.
The general rule is that an applicant must formally offer evidence supporting his application before
the trial court to duly prove the documents' genuineness and due execution.37 As an exception to this
rule, in Llanes v. Republic as cited by the Court of Appeals, the Court admitted in evidence a
corrected CENRO certification not formally offered in the trial court and only presented on appeal.
However, Llanes is not on all fours with the present petition. There are special circumstances
justifying the Court's ruling in Llanes that are not present in the case at bar.

When the proceedings in Llanes reached the appeal stage, the applicants therein had already
presented two certifications before the trial court to support their claim that the subject property
therein had already been classified as alienable and disposable. However, the two certifications bore
different dates as to when the subject land was classified. To clarify the matter, on appeal, the
applicants therein submitted a corrected certification confirming the true date of classification. Thus,
the Court held:

If the Court strictly applies the aforequoted provision of law, it would simply pronounce that the Court
of Appeals could not have admitted the corrected CENRO Certification because it was not formally
offered as evidence before the MCTC during the trial stage. Nevertheless, since the
determination of the true date when the subject property became alienable and disposable is
material to the resolution of this case, it behooves this Court, in the interest of substantial
justice, fairness, and equity, to consider the corrected CENRO Certification even though it
was only presented during the appeal to the Court of Appeals. Since rules of procedure are
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, it is well recognized that the Court is
empowered to suspend its rules or to exempt a particular case from the application of a general rule,
when the rigid application thereof tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice.

Moreover, the Spouses Llanes should not be made to suffer the grave consequences, which
include the possibility of losing their right to their property, arising from the mistake of
CENRO, a government agency. CENRO itself admitted its blunder and willingly issued
a corrected Certification. Very conspicuously, no other objection to the corrected CENRO
Certification was raised except as to its late presentation; its issuance and authenticity were not
challenged or placed in doubt.38 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted.)

From the foregoing, what was belatedly filed in Llanes was merely

a corrected or amended certification, the unedited version of which had been earlier presented in the
trial court as evidence of the alienable and disposable nature of the land. And the correction or
amendment pertained merely to the statement of the reckoning date of adverse possession.

Unlike in Llanes, however, respondents Jabson failed to present during trial any evidence
establishing the subject properties' alienable and disposable nature. Admittedly, found in the trial
court's records was Oppositor Leonida Jabson's Oposisyon sa Pagpapatitulo ng Lupa dated July
2, 1998, and attached thereto was an alleged CENRO Certification dated May 14, 1998 issued by
Atty. Juanito A. Viernes, a CENR Officer, stating that the subject Bagong Katipunan property is,
"[w]ithin the Alienable and Disposable Zone per Project No. 21 and Land Classification Map No.
639."39 But such document is of no consequence as it was: (a) merely a plain photocopy; (b) not
formally offered during trial; and (c) only formed part of the trial court's record not at the instance of
respondents Jabson, but due to Oppositor Leonida's submission.

The DENR Certification dated February 19, 2009 was submitted for the first time by respondents
Jabson in their Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' original Decision dated January
30, 2009. This document also cannot be given probative value – it was not presented and identified
during trial, much less formally offered in evidence. That it was procured as an afterthought is a
given. A cursory reading of the document will reveal that the document was dated after respondents
Jabson had already lost their appeal on January 30, 2009. This fact underscores that it
was submitted to "cure" what the original Decision identified as a "defect" in the case.

Second, as correctly pointed out by petitioner Republic, Carlito P. Castañeda, a DENR Sr. Forest
Management Specialist, was not authorized to issue certifications as to land classification, much less
order for the release of lands of the public domain as alienable and disposable.40

The Public Land Act41 vested the President the authority to classify lands of the public domain into
alienable and disposable. Subsequently, the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines42 also
empowered the DENR Secretary to determine and approve land classification as well as declare the
same as alienable and disposable.43

In turn, DENR Administrative Order (DENR AO) No. 2044 dated May 30, 1988 authorized the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO)45 and CENRO46 to issue
certifications as to the status of land classifications, as part of their efforts to decentralize selected
functions and authorities of the offices within the DENR. Note, however, that within the department,
the DENR Secretary retains the sole authority to approve land classification and release lands as
alienable and disposable.47

In other words, while the PENRO and CENRO are authorized to issue certifications as to the status
of land classification, only the DENR Secretary is empowered to declare that a certain parcel of land
forms part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.

Third, a certification alone is not sufficient in proving the subject land's alienable and disposable
nature. We have already ruled that a PENRO and/or CENRO certification must be accompanied by
a copy of the original classification, certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records, which: (a) released the subject land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and
(b) was approved by the DENR Secretary.48

Fourth, even assuming arguendo that the DENR Certification dated February 19, 2009 does not
suffer the aforementioned shortcomings, the same only served to prove the land classification of one
of the subject properties – Bagong Katipunan. To recall, respondents Jabson filed their application in
relation to two properties, viz.: San Jose and Bagong Katipunan properties. However, the DENR
Certification dated February 19, 2009 covers the Bagong Katipunan property only.

To this day, respondents Jabson have not established the alienable and disposable nature of the
San Jose property.

All told, from the foregoing, it is clear that respondents Jabson did not overcome the presumption
that the parcels of land sought to be registered still formed part of the public domain. Thus, there
was absolutely no basis for the Court of Appeals to approve respondents Jabson's application
pertaining to the Bagong Katipunan property, and much less the San Jose property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Amended Decision dated November 4, 2010
and Resolution dated December 26, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82986,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents Jabson's application for registration and issuance of
title to: (a) Lots 1, 2, and 3 as per PSU-233559, Barrio San Jose, Pasig City, and (b) Lots 26346 and
26347 as per AP-00-000399, Barangay Bagong Katipunan, Pasig City, in LRC Case No. N-11402
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 161, Pasig City is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

SO ORDERED.
 September 6, 2017

G.R No. 168065

TRINIDAD DIAZ-ENRIQUEZ represented by her Attorney-in-fact, JOSE MARCEL E. PANLILIO,

substituted by MONTESOL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner
vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, COURT OF APPEALS, GERONIMO SACLOLO, JOSEFINO SACLOLO
and RODRIGO SACLOLO, Respondents

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 168070

GERONIMO SACLOLO, JOSEFINO SACLOLO and RODRIGO SACLOLO, Petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, TRINIDAD DIAZ-ENRIQUEZ and DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Respondents.

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

These consolidated petitions for review on certiorari 1 seek to reverse and set aside the 26 May 2004
Decision2 and 13 May 2005 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA - G.R. CV No. 53838,
which nullified the 6 July 1995 Decision4 and the 30 January 1996 Order5 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 15, Naic, Cavite (RTC), in LRC Case No. TM-95, a case for application of registration of title.

THE FACTS

On 27 December 1974, Geronimo, Josefino, and Rodrigo, all surnamed Saclolo (the Saclolos) filed
before the then Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court, Naic, Cavite, a joint application for
registration of title over three (3) parcels of land (subject lands), with a total area of 3,752,142 square
meters (375.2 hectares) and located at Sitio Sinalam, Bario Sapang, Ternate, Cavite.6 The Saclolos
averred that they had acquired title to the subject lands through purchase and that together with their
predecessors-in-interest, they had been in actual and exclusive possession, occupation, and
cultivation of the subject lands since time immemorial. 7

The government, thru the Director of Lands, Abdon Riego de Dios, and Angelina Samson filed
oppositions to the application. 8 The Director of Lands argued that the subject lands are not alienable
and disposable because: they are located within the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation,
segregated from the public domain by Proclamation No. 307, dated November 20, 1967; that by
virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6236, the right to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
Section 48 of the Public Land Law, with respect to lands having an area of more than 144 hectares,
has expired; that the Saclolos had not acquired title over the subject lands through any recognized
mode of acquisition of title; that the Saclolos and their predecessors-in-interest had not been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lands for at
least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and that PSU 68, 69, and 70, the
plans which cover the subject lands, have not been verified by the Bureau of Lands as required by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 239.9
On 27 December 1993, Trinidad Diaz-Enriquez (Enriquez) filed a motion for intervention alleging that
the Saclolos had sold to her all their interests and rights over the subject lands on 19 September
1976. The RTC allowed Enriquez's claim to be litigated. 10

The RTC Ruling

In its Decision, dated 6 July 1995, the RTC ruled that the subject lands are alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain because Proclamation No. 307 itself stressed that the segregation of the
Calumpang Point Naval Reservation was subject to private rights. It opined that the pieces of
evidence presented by the Saclolos proved that their rights over the subject lands, being private in
nature and character, were excluded from the reservation for military purposes. The fallo reads:

Wherefore, finding the evidence of applicants sufficient, their titles to the parcels of land applied for
are hereby confirmed. The Land Registration Authority is hereby Ordered to issue the corresponding
decrees of registration and certificates of title in the names of the applicants subject to the
intervenor's rights upon finality of judgment.11

In its Order, dated 30 January 1996, the RTC modified its earlier decision by ordering the issuance
of the decree of registration to Enriquez.12

The CA Ruling

In its assailed decision, dated 26 May 2004, the CA declared that the subject lands are all within the
Calumpang Point Naval Resevation, as testified to by Eleuterio R. Paz, Chief of the Survey Division
of the Bureau of Lands-Region 4; thus, the said lands could not be privately titled. It held that even if
Proclamation No. 307 qualifies the reservation as being subject to private rights, the Saclolos have
not established by adequate proof their open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession over
the subject lands.

The appellate court observed that the informacion possessoria, upon which the Saclolos heavily rely
to support their claim, did not at all indicate the area covered by the claim. It added that the tax
declarations, technical descriptions, sketch plans, tax receipts, deeds of sale, and surveyor's
certificates did not show the nature of the Saclolos' possession.

The CA stated that the trial court disregarded the fact that judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Section 48 of the Public Land Act with respect to lands having an area of more than 144
hectares had lapsed pursuant to R.A. No. 6236, approved on 19 June 1971. It further noted that the
trial court's jurisdiction to entertain the application was not established since the plans had not been
verified by the Bureau of Lands as required by P.D. No. 239 and the alleged verifications in the plans
were not authentic. The appellate court concluded that the subject lands could not be registered
because they lie within a naval reservation and most of them are forest and foreshore lands. It
disposed the case thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the January 30, 1996 order of the trial court is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment is entered DISMISSING the applications for registration of title
to the subject three (3) lots in LRC Case No. TM-95 for lack of jurisdiction and failure to prove
acquisitive prescription.13

Aggrieved, the Saclolos and Enriquez moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the
CA in its Resolution, dated 13 May 2005.
Hence, these consolidated petitions.

THE ISSUES

In G.R. No. 168070, the Saclolos raised the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE CASE
(CA- G.R. CV NO. 53838 (LRC CASE NO. TM - 95 OF RTC, BRANCH XV, NAIC, CA VITE) IN A
WAY NOT PROBABLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS
OF THE SUPREME COURT.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN MAKING ITS FINDING,
WENT BEYOND THE ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL AND THE SAME IS CONTRARY TO THE
ADMISSIONS OF BOTH APPELLANTS AND APPELLEES.

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED

CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS NOT DISPUTED BY THE PARTIES AND WHICH, IF PROPERLY
CONSIDERED, WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION.

IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAS COMMITTED A GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DECLARED THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO
JURISDICTION TO TRY THE CASE AND WHETHER OR NOT IN RENDERING THE
QUESTIONED DECISION DATED MAY 26, 2004, AND IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED
RESOLUTION, DATED MAY 13, 2005 THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
MISAPPREHENSION OFF ACTS.

V. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ALSO COMMITTED A GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT RESOLVE THE ISSUES RAISED BY PETITIONERS
AS APPLICANTS- APPELLANTS IN CA- G.R. CV NO. 53838 OF THE RESPONDENT COURT.14

On the other hand, in G.R. No. 168065, Enriquez submits the following assignment of errors:

I. The HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

WHEN IT VIOLATED AND CONTRAVENED SECTION 3, RULE 41 OF THE REVISED RULES ON
CIVIL PROCEDURE.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

FINDING THAT INTERVENOR HAS NO REGISTRABLE TITLE.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS CAPRICIOUSLY, ARBITRARILY AND

WHIMSICALLY FOUND THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION TO TRY
THECASE.15

In sum, the issues are: 1) Whether the appellate court may declare that the lands sought to be
registered are not alienable and disposable notwithstanding the failure of the Director of Lands to
appeal from the decision of the trial court decreeing the issuance of certificates of title; 2) Whether
the appellate court may resolve issues which are not raised as errors on appeal; and 3) Whether the
applicants for registration of title have sufficiently proved that the subject lands are alienable and
disposable.
In G.R. No. 168070, the Saclolos argue that the Director of Lands did not appeal from the R TC
decision, thus, the facts pertaining to the registration of titles are already final and settled; and that
Proclamation No. 307 even strengthens their rights over the subject lands for the same proclamation
expressly recognizes the rights of private parties.

In G.R. No. 168065, Enriquez, citing Carrion v. CA,16 avers that the appellate court committed a
reversible error when it modified the decision of the trial court and granted to the Director of Lands,
who did not appeal from such decision, affirmative reliefs other than those granted to them by the
trial court's judgment; that Proclamation No. 1582-A excluded the private occupants from the
coverage of the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation; that based on uncontroverted evidence, it has
been established that the Saclolos' predecessors-in-interest have declared the subject lands for
taxation purposes as early as 1945; and that the Director of Lands should have raised the plans' lack
of verification during the trial of the case.

In his Comment,17 the Director of Lands, citing Baquiran v. CA, counters that issues, though not
specifically raised in the pleadings in the appellate court, may, in the interest of justice, be properly
considered by the said court in deciding a case, if there are questions raised in the trial court and are
matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or
which the lower court ignored; that Delfin Buhain, the alleged caretaker of the Saclolos and the
husband of the Saclolos' alleged predecessor-in-interest Pasencia Ruffy, testified that since he came
to know of the land and up to the time it was sold to the Saclolos, his parents-in-law, his wife, and
brother-in-law Roman Bernardo Ruffy had possessed the same in the concept of a true and legal
owner, though he could not remember when the Saclolos bought it from his wife and brother-in-law;
that the deed of sale between the Ruffys and Geronimo Saclolo covers only 170 hectares, 156 of
which are mountainous areas and only 14 hectares are planted to rice and com; that the informacion
possessoria on which the Ruffys rely to prove that they had inherited the land from their parents
does not even mention the area subject thereof; that no effort was ever taken by the Saclolos to
reconcile the glaringly disproportionate areas allegedly occupied by them and their predecessors-in-
interest, and the area being applied for, i.e., 325.1 hectares; that Marte Saclolo, son of Geronimo
Saclolo and the alleged administrator of the whole property, could only account for about 150
hectares devoted to rice, bamboo, mangoes, bananas and other fruit-bearing trees while admitting
that the rest of the area applied for are forest, foreshore, and mountain lands; and that the subject
lands fonn part of the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation, thus cannot be privately titled.

THE COURT'S RULING

The petitions are without merit.

The subject lands may still be

declared public lands
notwithstanding the Director
of Lands' failure to appeal
from the RTC decision.

In Laragan v. Court of Appeals,18 petitioners therein averred that the appellate court could not
declare the parcel of land in question as public land, because the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Isabela ordering the registration of said parcel of land in their favor, had already become
final and executory for failure of the Director of Lands to appeal therefrom. The Court found such
argument untenable, viz:

x x x While it may be true that the Director of Lands did not appeal from the decision of the trial
court, his failure to so appeal did not make the decision of the trial court final and executory, in view
of the appeal interposed by the other oppositors, Teodoro Leafio, Tomas Leafio, Francisco Leafio,
and Consolacion Leafio, who also seek the confirmation of their imperfect title over the land in
question.

Neither did such failure of the Director of Lands to appeal foreclose the appellate court from
declaring the land in question to be public land, since the oppositors and the herein
petitioners are both seeking the registration of their title pursuant to the provisions of
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law where the presumption always is that the land pertains
to the state, and the occupants and possessors claim an interest in the same, by virtue of
their imperfect title or continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
under a bona fide claim of ownership for the required number of years. Thus, in their
application for registration, the petitioners alleged that they "hereby apply to have the land
hereinafter described brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act, and to have the title
thereto registered and confirmed." The petitioners are deemed to thereby admit that, until such
confirmation, the land remains public.19 (emphasis supplied and citations omitted)

In addition, an applicant is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered under the Torrens
system simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the registration of his land.
He must show, even though there is no opposition to the satisfaction of the court, that he is the
absolute owner, in fee simple.20

Consequently, the appellate court may still determine whether the subject lands are indeed alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, notwithstanding the Director of Lands' failure to appeal
from the RTC decision.

The appellate court may

reverse the decision of the trial
court on the basis of grounds
other than those raised as
errors on appeal.

As a general rule, only matters assigned as errors in the appeal may be resolved. Section 8, Rule 51
of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 8. Questions that May Be Decided. - No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over
the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be
considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an
assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court may pass upon plain errors and
clerical errors.

The exceptions to this rule have been enumerated in Catholic Bishop of Balanga v. Court of
Appeals:21

[T]he appellate court is accorded a broad discretionary power to waive the lack of proper assignment
of errors and to consider errors not assigned. It is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even
if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal. Inasmuch as the Court of Appeals may consider
grounds other than those touched upon in the decision of the trial court and uphold the same on the
basis of such other grounds, the Court of Appeals may, with no less authority, reverse the decision
of the trial court on the basis of grounds other than those raised as errors on appeal. We have
applied this rule, as a matter of exception, in the following instances:

(1) Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(2) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within
contemplation of law;

(3) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a
just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid
dispensing piecemeal justice;

(4) Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters
of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the
lower court ignored;

(5) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and

(6) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question
properly assigned, is dependent.22

In this case, there is no doubt that the application for registration of title hinges upon the
determination of whether the subject lands are alienable and disposable. Further, this is consistent
with the appellate court's authority to review the totality of the controversy brought on appeal.23

Applicants failed to prove that

the subject lots are alienable
and disposable.

The application of the Saclolos was filed on December 27, 1974. Accordingly, the law governing the
application was Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, as amended by R.A. No. 1942, particularly
Section 48 (b) which provides that:

Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter.

As can be gleaned therefrom, the necessary requirements for the grant of an application for land
registration are the following:

1. The applicant must, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, have been in possession
and occupation of the subject land;

2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;

3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and

4. The subject land must be an agricultural land of the public domain.24

Among these requirements, the question of whether the subject lands were declared alienable and
disposable is of primordial importance because it is determinative if the land can in fact be subject to
acquisitive prescription and, thus, registrable under the Torrens system. Without first determining the
nature and character of the land, all the other requirements such as the length and nature of
possession and occupation over such land do not come into play. The required length of possession
does not operate when the land is part of the public domain. 25

In Republic v. Heirs of Fabio, 26 the Court similarly tackled the issue of whether certain parcels of
land located within the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation are alienable and disposable, to wit:

The three proclamations cited reserving the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation for the exclusive
use of the military are the following: (1) U.S. War Department Order No. 56 issued on 25 March
1904, (2) Proclamation No. 307 issued on 20 November 1967, and (3) Proclamation No. 1582-A
issued on 6 September 1976. Such proclamations state:

U.S. War Department General Order No. 56

U.S. War Department General Order No. 56
Washington, March 25, 1904.

For the knowledge and governance of all interested parties, the following is hereby announced:

The President of the United States, by the Order dated March 14, 1904, which provides that the
reservations made by Executive Order of April 11, 1902 (General Order No. 38, Army Headquarters,
Office of the Adjutant General, April 17, 1902), at the entrance of Manila Bay, Luzon, Philippine
Islands, are arranged in such a way that will include only these lands as later described, whose
lands were reserved by the Order of March 14, 1904 for military purposes, by virtue of Article 12 of
the Act of Congress approved on July 1, 1902, entitled "Act providing for the Temporary
Administration of Civil Affairs of the Government of the Philippine Islands and for Other Purposes"
(32 Stat. L., 691 ); namely:

1. In the northern side of the entrance to Manila Bay, in the province of Bataan, Luzon (Mariveles
Reservation), all public lands within the limits that are described as follows:

"Starting from the mouth of the Mariveles River in the eastern border and from here straight North to
a distance of 5,280 feet; from this point straight to the East to intercept a line, in a straight direction
to the South from a stone monument marked U.S. (Station 4); from there straight from the North until
the aforementioned Station 4; from here straight to the East to a distance of 6,600 feet until a stone
monument marked U.S. (Station 5); from here straight South to a distance of 6,600 feet until a stone
monument marked U.S. (Station 6); from here straight to the East to a distance of 8,910 feet until a
stone monument marked U.S. (Station 7); from here straight to the South to a distance of 7,730 feet
until a stone monument marked U.S. (Station 8), situated at the northwest comer of the second
creek to the east of Lasisi Point, 30 feet North of the high-tide mark; from there in the same direction
until the high-tide mark; from here towards the East following the shoreline up to the starting point."

2. In the southern side of the Manila Bay entrance, in the province of Cavite, Luzon
(Calumpang

Point Reservation), all public lands within the limits that are described as follows:

"Starting from a stone monument marked U.S. (Station 1) situated in the cliff on the Eastern
side of Asubig Point, 20 feet above the high-tide mark and about 50 feet from the edge of the
cliff and continuing from there to the South 28° 10' West, a distance of up to 22,000 feet until
a stone monument marked U.S. (Station 2); from here to North 54° 10' West at a distance of
5,146 feet until a stone monument marked U.S. (Station 3); from here towards South 85° 35'
30 "West, at a distance of 2,455 feet until a stone monument marked U.S. (Station 4), situated
on the beach near the Northeast corner of Limbones Bay, about 50 feet from the high-tide
mark and following in the same direction until the high-tide mark; from here towards North
and East following the shoreline until North 28° 10 ' East from the starting point and from
there encompassing more or less 5,200 acres. The markers are exact."

3. The islands of Corregidor, Pulo Caballo, La Monja, El Fraile, and Carabao, and all other islands
and detached rocks lying between Mariveles Reservation on the north side of the entrance to Manila
Bay and Calumpang Point Reservation on the south side of said entrance. aETDic

4. The jurisdiction of the military authorities in the case of reservations in the northern and southern
beaches of the entrance to Manila Bay and all the islands referred to in paragraph 3, are extended
from the high-tide marker towards the sea until a distance of 1,000 yards.

By Order of the Secretary of War:

GEORGE L. GILLESPIE,

General Commander, Chief of Internal General Staff,

Official copy.

W.P. HALL, Internal Adjutant General. (Emphasis supplied)

Proclamation No. 307

. . . do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for military purposes under the
administration of the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, subject to private rights, if any
there be, a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the municipality of Temate,
province of Cavite, Island of Luzon, more particularly described as follows:

Proposed Naval Reservation

Calumpang Point

A parcel of land (the proposed Calumpang Point Naval Reservation), situated in the municipality of
Temate, province of Cavite. Bounded on the NW., N. and E., by Manila Bay; on the SE. and S., by
municipality of Temate; and on the W., by Manila Bay. Beginning at a point marked '' 1" on the
attached Sketch Plan traced from Coastal Hydrography of Limbones Island.

thence N. 54 deg. 30' E., 750.00 m. to point 2;

thence N. 89 deg. 15' E., 1780.00 m. to point 3;

thence N. 15 deg. 10' E., 6860.00 m. to point 4;

thence N. 12 deg. 40' W., 930.00 m. to point 5;

thence S. 77 deg. 20' W., 2336.00 m. to point 6;

thence S. 49 deg. 30' W., 4450.00 m. to point 7;

thence S. 12 deg. 40' E., 2875.00 m. to point 8;

thence S. 30 deg. 30' E., 2075.00 m. to the point of beginning; containing an approximate area of
twenty eight million nine hundred seventy three thousand one hundred twelve (28,973, 112) square
meters. CHIEDS

NOTE: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future surveys."

Proclamation No. 1582-A

WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 307 dated November 20, 1967 and U.S. War Department Order
No. 56 dated March 25, 1904 reserved for military purposes, and withdrew from sale or
settlement, a parcel of land of the public domain situated in the Municipality of Ternate,
Province of Cavite, more particularly described as follows: ...

WHEREAS, the Philippine Navy and the Philippine Marines now need that portion of this area
reserved under Proclamation No. 307, particularly, Caylabne Cove, Caynipa Cove, Calumpang Cove
and Sinalam Cove, for their use as official station, not only to guard and protect the mouth of Manila
Bay and the shorelines of the Province[s] of Cavite, Batangas and Bataan, but also to maintain
peace and order in the Corregidor area, which is now one of the leading tourist attractions in the
country; ...

. . . containing an approximate area of EIGHT MILLION EIGHTY NINE THOUSAND NINE

HUNDRED NINETY (8,089,990) SQUARE METERS, more or less.

The portion that remains after the segregation which are occupied shall be released to bona .fide
occupants pursuant to existing laws/policies regarding the disposition of lands of the public domain
and the unoccupied portions shall be considered as alienable or disposable lands.

The proclamations established that as early as 1904 a certain parcel of land was placed under the
exclusive use of the government for military purposes by the then colonial American government. In
1904, the U.S. War Department segregated the area, including the Lot, for military purposes through
General Order No. 56. Subsequently, after the Philippines regained its independence in 1946, the
American government transferred all control and sovereignty to the Philippine government, including
all the lands appropriated for a public purpose. Twenty years later, two other presidential
proclamations followed, both issued by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, restating that the
same property is a naval reservation for the use of the Republic.27 (emphases in the original)

From the foregoing proclamations, four (4) things are clear: first, a parcel of land containing
28,973,112 square meters, located in Temate, Cavite, was withdrawn from sale or settlement and
reserved for military purposes; second, by virtue of Proclamation No. 1582-A, the area reserved for
military purposes was limited to 8,089,990 square meters instead of the original 28,973, 112 square
meters; third, the occupied portions, after segregating the 8,089,990 square meters, would be
released to bona fide occupants; and fourth, the unoccupied portions were declared alienable and
disposable lands.

To reiterate, the Director of Lands insists that the subject lands are within the Calumpang Point
Naval Reservation. This was bolstered by the testimony of Eleutorio R. Paz, Chief of the Survey
Division of the Bureau of Lands-Region 4.28 Thus, it was incumbent upon the Saclolos and Enriquez
to prove that the subject lands do not form part of the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation because
"when a property is officially declared a military reservation, it becomes inalienable and outside the
commerce of man."29

Indeed, Proclamation No. 307 recognizes private rights over parcels of land included in the
reservation. Further, Proclamation No. 1582-A provides that the occupied portions which remained
after segregating the 8,089,990 square meters shall be released to bona fide occupants. Thus, a
mere invocation of "private rights" does not automatically entitle an applicant to have the property
registered in his name. "Persons claiming the protection of private rights in order to exclude their
lands from military reservations must show by clear and convincing evidence that the pieces of
property in question have been acquired by a legal method of acquiring public lands."30

In this case, however, none of the documents presented by the Saclolos and Enriquez prove that the
subject lands are alienable and disposable.1âwphi1

First, the Investigator's Report even contradicted the claim that the subject lands are alienable and
disposable as it noted that these lands are "within the extensive Calumpang Point Reservation
however, the applicants assert their private rights to the subject area."31

Further, the informacion possessoria upon which the Saclolos heavily rely to support their claim
neither states that the subject lands were declared alienable and disposable nor indicates the area
covered thereby. It merely describes it as "capacity of three cavans seed in palay." What can only be
determined from such certificate of possession is that a certain Bernabe Fabio had possessory title
over a parcel of land registered in 1895 but was subsequently lost and that the children of Fabio
eventually sold such parcel of land to the Spouses Ruffy.32 This, however, does not prove that the
subject lands were already legally acquired by the Saclolos and their predecessors-in-interest at a
time when such parcels of land were declared alienable and disposable by the government.
Moreover, it is worthy to note that P.D. No. 892 discontinued the system of registration under the
Spanish Mortgage Law by categorically declaring all lands recorded under the latter system, not yet
covered by Torrens title, unregistered lands. P.D. No. 892 divests the Spanish titles of any legal
force and effect in establishing ownership over real property.33

Finally, in the Deed of Sale between the heirs of the Spouses Ruffy and Geronimo Saclolo, the
parcel of land was described as containing 170 hectares (1,700,000 square meters).34 However, in
the Saclolos' application for registration of title, the total area of the subject lands is stated as 375.2
hectares. Further, Marte Saclolo, son of Geronimo, could only account for 150 hectares devoted to
rice, bamboo, mangoes, bananas and other fruitbearing trees.35 Thus, the alienability and
disposability of the subject lands and even the exact area covered thereof lack factual bases.

In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines,36 the Court emphasized that lands of the
public domain, unless declared otherwise by virtue of a statute or law, are inalienable and can never
be acquired by prescription. No amount of time of possession or occupation can ripen into ownership
over lands of the public domain. All lands of the public domain presumably belong to the State and
are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to
the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a
positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,37 declassifying inalienable public
land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.38 In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits
alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been officially delimited and
classified.39
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.40 To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable.41 There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.42 The applicant may also secure a certification
from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years
is alienable and disposable.43

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that the subject
lands were proclaimed by the government to be alienable and disposable. Time and again, it has
been held that matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for
proof.44

On a final note, it is worth emphasizing that as early as 1904, a certain parcel of land has already
been reserved for military purposes. It behooves the Court how the Saclolos remained oblivious to
such fact despite a considerable lapse of time. Certainly, there would have been several people who
knew of such reservation considering that the same is not confidential information. The Saclolos and
even Enriquez failed to exercise such diligence as prudent men ordinarily would. As such, they only
have themselves to blame for their predicament. They should have taken full advantage of the
opportunity to present during trial all pieces of evidence to prove that the subject lands are alienable
and disposable especially in the light of the fact that the government vehemently opposes the
registration. Thus, in view of the glaring lack of evidence as regards the alienability and disposability
of the subject lands, the Court is constrained to deny their registration of title.

WHEREFORE, the 26 May 2004 Decision and 13 May 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 53838 are AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR: