Guilds in Early Modern Sicily.: Causes and Consequences o F Their Weakness

Gabriella Lombardo
Guilds in early modern Sicily.
Causes and consequences o f their weakness
PhD Thesis in Economic History

London School of Economics
Supervisor: Dr. S.R. Epstein
2001
UMI Number: U146336
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Abstract
The thesis investigates the character and actions of craft guilds in early modem
Sicily. Sicilian craft guilds emerged only in few towns and compared to most
other European regions were less numerous relative to the total population; they
also never had a firm political role in urban administration.
The thesis investigates the causes and consequences of this weakness in two
directions. First, it examines the operation of the guild system through the actions
and interests of individual members, focusing in particular on the craftsmen’s
incentives to participate in guild activities or alternatively 'free ride’. Second, it
analyses the institutional and economic framework within which Sicilian guilds
emerged and survived for around four centuries, and discusses the consequences
of their weakness. The literature on early modem guilds mostly assumes that they
were economically conservative and hindered technological change; the question
therefore arises whether technological and manufacturing growth was less
constrained in early modem Sicily than elsewhere.
The thesis argues that the basic features of the Sicilian guild system were
similar to those of craft corporations elsewhere in Europe, and that they were
devised primarily to promote skills training through formal apprenticeship mles.
It therefore concludes that differences in guild development across societies were
largely a function of the institutional context within which guilds were embedded,
and in particular o f the political support or opposition offered by local and central
authorities. In Sicily, the Spanish state was unwilling to support the institutional
and legal independence o f craft guilds, and local urban elites similarly opposed
the rise o f strong crafts. Lacking legal backing to enforce membership and
apprenticeship mles, Sicilian craft guilds were unable to supply specialised labour
in support of a thriving manufacturing base. The lack of a strong craft base was
reinforced by Sicily’s specialisation in agriculture, and led to the long-term failure
of domestic manufactures.
Table of contents
Abstract......................................................................................................................ii
List of figures............................................................................................................ v
List of tables.............................................................................................................. v
Currency and measurements................................................................................ vi
Chronology...............................................................................................................vii
Chapter 1 Introduction...........................................................................................1
1.1 T o p ic a n d c o n t e x t ................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.2 W hy study S ic il ia n g u i l d s ? ............................................................................................................................... 7
1.3 H y p o t h e s e s ...................................................................................................................................................................10
1.4 S o u r c e s a n d m e t h o d o l o g y .............................................................................................................................. 11
Chapter 2 The historiographical debate............................................................. 18

2.1 F r o m g u i l d a b o l i t i o n t o m o d e r n s t u d i e s : t w o c e n t u r ie s o f d e b a t e ............................... 18
2 .2 G u il d s a n d e c o n o m ic h i s t o r y ........................................................................................................................ 25
2 .2 .1 G u ild s a n d p r o to -in d u str ia lisa tio n ............................................................................................................ 3 2
2 .2 .2 S ta te an d g u ild s in th e ‘se v e n te e n th -c e n tu r y c r is is :’ th e Ita lia n c a s e .................................... 3 5
2 .3 S ic il ia n g u il d s t u d ie s . An o v e r v i e w ........................................................................................................ 3 9
Chapter 3 Economic and political developments in early modern Sicily... 42

3.1 E c o n o m i c f a c t o r s : p a t t e r n o f t r a d e , p o p u l a t io n g r o w t h a n d t h e l a b o u r
MARKET.................................................. 44
3 .2 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE 'LATE' DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE GROUPS............... 5 6
Chapter 4 Sicilian guilds........................................................................................ 63

4 .1 DEFINITION...................................................................................................................................................................... 63
4 .1 .1 C raft g u ild s an d r e lig io u s c o n fr a te r n itie s...............................................................................................65
4 .1 .2 M ilita r y fu n c tio n s ............................................................................................................................................. 68
4 .2 STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION OF SICILIAN GUILDS...............................................................................6 9
4 .3 CHARACTERISTICS OF SICILIAN CRAFT GUILDS............................................................................................. 73
4 .4 TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION................................................................................................................................... 7 6
4 .5 A r t is a n m i g r a t i o n .................................................................................................................................................84
4 .6 T h e FRAGMENTATION OF GUILDS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY..................................... 87
Chapter 5 Structure and costs of Sicilian craft guilds......................................96

5.1 G u il d s t r u c t u r e : m a s t e r s , a p p r e n t ic e s a n d j o u r n e y m e n , w o m e n , a n d
FOREIGNERS............................................................................................................................................................................. 9 5
a) M a s te r s ........................................................................................................................................................................... 9 6
b ) A p p r e n tic e sh ip , a p p ren tices an d jo u r n e y m e n ...........................................................................................9 9
c ) M a ster sh ip an d lic e n c e s ........................................................................................................................................1 0 9
d ) W o m e n ..........................................................................................................................................................................115
e ) F o r e ig n e r s .................................................................................................................................................................... 1 1 9
5 .2 F e e s ................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 2 0
a) M e m b e r sh ip f e e s ......................................................................................................................................................121
b ) M a ster sh ip f e e s ......................................................................................................................................................... 128
c ) F o r e ig n m a s te r s ........................................................................................................................................................ 131
d ) T w o c e n tu r ie s o f f e e s ............................................................................................................................................ 1 3 4
e) The impact o f fees on living standards......................................................................................138
Chapter 6 Enforcement of guild regulation......................................................141

a) F e e s ................................................................................................................................................................................. 144
b ) Q u a lity c o n tr o l......................................................................................................................................................... 14 7
c ) L ab ou r c o n tr o l.......................................................................................................................................................... 15 2
d ) R e str ic tio n s o n c o m p e titio n ...............................................................................................................................161
e ) O ffic ia ls ' d u tie s ..................................................................................................................................................... 163
f) P a rticip a tio n in g u ild a c t iv itie s .........................................................................................................................1 6 6
Chapter 7 Causes and consequences of Sicilian guild weakness...................171

7.1 E m p ir ic a l f i n d i n g s v i s -A - v is w it h t h e o r e t ic a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ....................................... 1 7 2
a) G u ild s an d r e g u la tio n s.......................................................................................................................................... 1 7 6
b ) L ab ou r r e la tio n s ....................................................................................................................................................... 178
c ) P a r tic ip a tio n ................................................................................................................................................................18 2
d ) F e e s ................................................................................................................................................................................. 183
e ) W o m e n ..........................................................................................................................................................................1 8 6
7 .2 C a u s e s a n d c o n s e q u e n c e s o f g u i l d w e a k n e s s ................................................................................. 1 9 0
Appendix: List of Sicilian guilds..........................................................................192
Bibliography........................................................................................................... 201
A b b r e v i a t i o n s ..................................................................................................................................................................2 0 1
MANUSCRIPT SOURCES.....................................................................................................................................................2 0 1
PRINTED SOURCES.............................................................................................................................................................. 2 0 2
SECONDARY SOURCES.......................................................................................................................................................2 0 4
iv
List of figures
F ig .3.1 O r ig in s o f i m m i g r a n t s in P a c e c o , 1 6 0 8 -2 3 ...........................................................................................5 0
F ig 3 .2 T h e d is t r ib u t i o n o f p o p u l a t io n in d e m a n i a l a n d f e u d a l l a n d s ...........................................5 2
F i g .3 .3 t h e p o p u l a t io n o f S ic il y , 1 5 0 1 -1 6 8 1 ........................................................................................................ 5 3
F i g .3 .4 p o p u l a t io n o f Pa l e r m o , M e s s in a , C a t a n ia and T r a p a n i , 1 5 6 9 - 1 7 1 4 ................................5 4
F i g .3 .5 A v e r a g e g r a in p r ic e s ( m e t e ), 1 4 7 6 - 1 7 2 0 ................................................................................................ 5 5
F i g . 4 .1 THE BLACKSMITHS OF PALERMO.........................................................................................................................71

F i g . 4 .2 T h e c arpenters of T r a p a n i .............................................................................................................................71
F i g . 4 .3 THE MAP OF GUILD DISTRIBUTION....................................................................................................................... 83
F i g . 4 .4 T h e f r a g m e n t a t io n o f e m b r o id e r e r s ' g u i l d o f P a l e r m o .........................................................9 2
F i g . 4 .5 T h e f r a g m e n t a t io n o f t h e s c u l p t o r s ' g u i l d o f T r a p a n i ..........................................................93
F i g .5.1 m e m b e r s h i p f e e s f o r m a s t e r s a n d a p p r e n t ic e s in P a l e r m o , 1 5 0 0 - 9 9 ............................. 124

F i g .5 .2 m e m b e r s h i p f e e s f o r m a s t e r s a n d a p p r e n t ic e s in P a l e r m o , 1 6 0 0 - 9 9 ............................. 124
F ig .5 .3 m e m b e r s h i p f e e s f o r m a s t e r s a n d a p p r e n t ic e s in T r a p a n i , 1 6 0 0 - 9 9 .................................125
F ig .5 .4 m a s t e r s ' f e e s in T rapani and P a l e r m o , 1 6 0 0 - 9 9 ..............................................................................1 2 7
F ig .5 .5 m a s t e r s h i p f e e s f o r c it iz e n s a n d m a s t e r s ' s o n s in P a l e r m o , 1 6 0 0 - 9 9 .......................... 1 3 0
F ig .5 .6 m a s t e r s h i p f e e s f o r c it iz e n s a n d m a s t e r s ' s o n s in T r a p a n i , 1 6 0 0 - 9 9 ........................... 131
F lG .5.7 MASTERSHIP FEES FOR NATIVES AND FOREIGNERS IN PALERMO, 1 6 0 0 - 9 9 ....................................132
F ig .5 .8 m a s t e r s h i p f e e s f o r n a t i v e s a n d f o r e ig n e r s in T r a p a n i , 1 6 0 0 - 9 9 .................................. 133
F ig .5 .9 G u il d f e e s in P a l e r m o , 1 4 5 0 - 1 7 9 9 .............................................................................................................. 1 3 4
F ig . 5 .1 0 G u il d f e e s in T r a p a n i , 1 5 8 0 - 1 7 9 9 .......................................................................................................... 135
F lG .5 .1 1 AVERAGE FEES IN PALERMO, 1 4 8 0 - 1 6 9 9 ................................................................................................... 1 3 6
F IG .5 .1 2 AVERAGE FEES IN TRAPANI, 1 6 0 0 - 9 9 ............................................................................................ 136
F IG .5 .1 3 PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN TRAPANI PRICES, SALARIES AND GUILD FEES IN COMPARISON,
1 5 0 0 -1 6 6 0 ........................................................................................................................................................................... 137
F ig . 7.1 A v e r a g e m a s t e r s h ip f e e s (n o m in a l ) 184
F ig . 7 .2 A n n u a l a v e r a g e m e m b e r s h ip f e e s (n o m in a l ) 185
List of tables
T a b l e 4 .1 A r t is a n s a s p e r c e n t a g e o f u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n ............................................................................7 2
T a b l e 5.1 s t a t u t o r y l e n g t h o f a p p r e n t ic e s h i p ............................................................................................... 105

T a b l e 5 .2 a , b , c M e m b e r s h ip fees, 1 4 0 0 - 1 6 9 9 .........................................................................................................123
T a b l e 5 .3 a , b , c M a s t e r s h i p fees, 1 5 0 0 - 1 6 9 9 .......................................................................................................... 1 2 9
T a b l e 5 .4 M e m b e r s h ip f e e s f o r c it iz e n s a n d f o r e i g n e r s ......................................................................... 133
T a b l e 5 .5 M e m b e r s h ip fees, 1 5 0 0 - 1 7 9 9 ....................................................................................................................1 3 9
T a b l e 5 .6 M a s t e r s h i p fees, 1 5 0 0 - 1 7 9 9 ..................................................................................................................... 1 4 0
T a b l e 6.1 F in e s f o r f e e e v a s i o n ...................................................................................................................................1 4 6
T a b l e 6 .2 F i n e s f o r q u a l i t y - r e l a t e d o f f e n c e s ............................................................................................... 148
T a b l e 6 .3 F i n e s f o r il l e g a l b u y i n g a n d s e l l i n g .............................................................................................. 151
T a b l e 6 .4 F in e s f o r u n l i c e n s e d l a b o u r ................................................................................................................. 1 5 6
T a b l e 6 .5 F in e s for W i d o w s ............................................................................................................................................ 1 58
T a b l e 6 .6 F in e s f o r il l e g a l e m p l o y m e n t c o n d i t i o n s ..................................................................................1 59
T a b l e 6 .7 F in e s f o r il l e g a l c o m p e t i t i o n .............................................................................................................. 162
T a b l e 6 .8 F in e s f o r r e f u s in g o f f ic ia l d u t i e s .....................................................................................................1 6 4
T a b l e 6 .9 F in e s f o r d is o b e d i e n c e t o t h e o f f i c i a l s ....................................................................................... 167
T a b l e 6 .1 0 F in e s f o r n o n - p a r t ic ip a t io n in g u il d e v e n t s ...........................................................................1 6 8
v
Currency and measurements
The monetary system was unified by the Angevin dynasty in the thirteenth
century and remained unchanged until the reform of the Bourbons in 1818.1 The
basic currency in medieval and early modem Sicily was the gold onza, which was
however a money of account that was never coined.
1 onza (oz.) = 30 tari
1 tari (t.) = 20 grani
1 grano (gr.) = 6 piccoli or denari
1 scudo = 12 tari; 5 scudi = 1 onza
1 ducato = 10 tari
1 carlino = 1 0 grani = lA tari
1 fiorino di Sicilia = 6 tari
All the tables in the text are expressed in tari and tenths of tari for case of
comparison.
The most widespread measure of weight was the cantaro, equivalent to 79.35 kg;
it was divided in 100 rotoli. The libbra used for measuring silk was 0.317 kg.
Cloth was measured in canne; 1 canna = 2.06 m. Coral was measured in palmi; 1
palmo = 0.258 m.
The salma was the main measure for agricultural products; 1 salma = 222-225 kg.
The salma in eastern Sicily was 20 per cent bigger that in the west; all measures
have been converted to the west Sicilian salma.
1 C. Trasselli, Appunti di metrologia e numismatica siciliana p e r la scuola di Paleografia

dell'Archivio di Stato di Palermo (Palermo, 1969).
Chronology
1392-95 Martin of Montblanc and his son Martino conquer Sicily.

Martin becomes king of Catalonia and Aragon; Martino is
left in charge of Sicily.
3 October 1398 Parliament in Syracuse.
25 July 1409 Martino I dies. His father Martin inherits the kingdom of
Sicily.
31 May 1410 Martin of Montblanc dies without heirs.
25 June 1412 Compromise of Caspe: nine representatives of the reigns of
Aragon, Valencia and Catalonia elect Ferdinand of Trasmara
king of the three Spanish reigns and Sicily.
2 April 1416 Ferdinand dies and his son Alfonso V of Aragon inherits his
reigns
1421 Alfonso travels to Palermo to prepare his expedition to
Naples in aid of queen Joanne.
1443 Alfonso conquers Naples and recognises the supreme
authority of pope Eugenio IV.
22 April 1444 The pope authorises the creation of the University of Catania.
27 June 1458 Alfonso dies in Naples. His brother John II becomes king of
Sicily and his illegitimate son Ferrante inherits Naples.
25 February 1460 John II recognises the indivisibility of the kingdom of Sicily
and Sardinia and the Aragon crown.
19 October 1469 Ferdinand of Aragon marries Isabelle of Castile.
1478 The Sicilian parliament refuses new taxes ordered by viceroy
Giovanni Cardona.
1479 John II dies and Ferdinand II succeeds his father. War with
France for the control of Naples. Naples remains within the
Spanish crown.
6 October 1487 The Tribunal o f the Inquisition is introduced to Sicily by
Domenico La Pegna.
1492 Ferdinand II conquers the reign of Granada and a month later
decrees the expulsion of the Jews from his lands.
23 January 1516 Ferdinand dies, the last of the Aragonese-Castilian dynasty
of Trastamara. His son Charles o f Habsburg succeeds him.
23 October 1520 Charles of Habsburg is proclaimed emperor in Aachelen.
20 August 1535 Charles V of Spain lands in Trapani and begins the
construction o f new city walls throughout Sicily against the
Turkish threat.
16 January 1556 Charles V abdicates in favour of his son Philip II; he leaves
the imperial title to his brother Ferdinand, and dies on 25
September 1558.
7 October 1571 The fleet of John of Austria defeats the Turks at Lepanto.
4 July 1591 The baronial representatives in the Sicilian parliament refuse
to authorise new taxes (‘donations’) if the king does not
respect Sicilian privileges. The viceroy wins the vote with the
support of the ecclesiastical and demanial branches.
13 September 1598 Philip II dies in Escorial and is succeeds by his son Philip III.
31 March 1621 Philip III dies. Philip IV, his son, succeeds him.
9 November 1630 An extraordinary Parliament rejects Messina’s proposal to
split Sicily into two vice-reigns, with two capitals in Palermo
and Messina. Messina promises one million escudos to Philip
IV, if he accepts.
22 June 1638 The Sicilian Parliament imposes a tax the testatico, consisting
in one day’s income. The tax raises two million escudos
requested by Philip IV for the war in Italy.
25 May 1647 The revolt of Palermo. After a long famine, viceroy de Los
Veles hands the town’s insigna to the representatives of the
urban guilds, in order to calm the turmoil.
15 August 1647 Giuseppe d’Alesi takes control of Palermo’s administration
and forces the viceroy to leave the capital.
1647-1648 Attempts to repress the popular government of Palermo are
repelled.
9 July 1648 Cardinal Trivulzio at the head of Spanish soldiers occupies
the military bastions of Palermo.
9 June 1660 Following the peace signed between France and Spain, Maria
Theresa daughter of Philip IV, marries Louis XIV of France.
17 January 1664 Messina unilaterally impose its ancient monopoly over silk
production in eastern Sicily after the Council o f the reign
refuses to confirm it.
17 September 1665 Philip IV dies; his son and successor Charles II is only four
years old.
ix
Chapter 1 Introduction and methodology
Chapter 1
Introduction
More than two centuries of debate on craft guilds have shown that they were the
most widespread organisation of production in early modem Europe both in the
most economically advanced and in the most backward societies. Craft guilds
were associations of masters, whose authority was recognised by local
institutions. They organised groups that were formally represented by two or more
members, elected by full assembly, and confirmed by the local urban authorities.
The representatives together with a few additional members drafted the guild
statutes in the presence of a notary. The statutes had to be approved by the urban
councils and the central authorities and then promulgated to the assembled
members, and they regulated the activities of the organisation. The guild officials
acted as intermediaries between the members and the local and central political
authorities, and as guarantors of the statutory regulations. They were therefore
vested with the authority to collect fines and fees, to check product quality, to
adjudicate disputes, and to impose punishments.
The guild provided technical education through the institutionalisation of
apprenticeship, gave access to the skilled labour market, and often assistance to
members in need. However, whereas most of the social and welfare functions of
guilds were also provided by other organisations like confraternities, the transfer
of skills through apprenticeship was an exclusive function of the guild.
The close of the Middle Ages saw the guild movement infiltrating urban
administration in many parts of Western Europe, particularly in northern Italy,
Germany, and France. Italian towns were among the first places where a guild
system emerged and developed. According to Donata Degrassi, the appearance of
artisans as autonomous and organised groups by the twelfth century represented a
remarkable innovation and a break with the past.1
Though they presented similar basic characteristics, European guilds
developed peculiar features according to the specific economic and institutional
context within which they arose. Craft guilds took on features that made them
1 D. Degrassi, L ’ economia artigiana n ell’ Italia medievale (Rome, 1996), pp. 121-23.
1
deeply ambiguous and difficult to define. On the one hand, the craft guild seems
to have been an association based on voluntary participation, which brought
together both employers and employees (masters and apprentices) on the basis of
reciprocal assistance. On the other hand, the guild tended to realise a monopsony
over the labour force and excluded employees from decision-making. These
ambiguities account for the fragmented and contradictory character of
interpretations o f pre-modem guilds.
The long tradition of guild studies has produced a number of different

perspectives and interpretations. Scholars have pursued different approaches,
often strongly influenced by the way in which guilds were understood in
particular historical and political circumstances. Already during the eighteenth
century a debate arose concerning the allegedly restrictive features of guilds,
which eventually led to the abolition of corporate groups by national states. Later,
nineteenth-century studies debated the role of guilds in the context of the
‘workers’ problem’ (questione operaia) and the relation between corporate groups
and free markets. The previous judgement of Adam Smith in the Wealth o f
Nations (1774) concerning the negative effects of apprenticeship and corporatism
was such a historiographical milestone, that it still retains its aura today. During
the Second World War, Nazism and Fascism gave a strong positive connotation to
the concept o f corporatism and based part of their ideology on it. After 1945, the
topic was abandoned, both because of the strong negative interpretation by liberal
economists and politicians, and because of the connection with Fascism. A first
revival occurred during the 1980s with the development of urban studies, in two
directions. First, scholars began to reconstruct pre-modem urban society in the
light of social network studies. Second, new approaches to labour history and pre
modem economic performance challenged the formerly static picture of craft
corporatism. The study of guilds is now at the core of some of the most lively
debates on early modem history and pre-industrial societies.
The classical economic theory of guilds, which remains the most influential
and widespread, suggests that the guilds’ main purpose was to control production
2 A m o r e d e ta ile d o v e r v ie w o f th e h isto r io g ra p h ica l d e b a te is d e v e lo p e d in ch a p ter 2.
2
and defend members against competition. Artisans formed networks of masters

who controlled production, maintained high prices, and bargained with the state
for political rents. Production regulations imposed dead-weight costs on
manufacturing, while the state supported guild privileges in exchange for military
personnel, taxes, and political support. Consequently, the guild system prevented
the development of competitive markets, slowed down innovation, and produced
economic and technical stagnation.4
More recently a new approach has emerged, based on a positive approach to
these organisations, which are described as the most widespread and successful
production organisation in Europe. In a recent article, Epstein outlines a clear
model of this new interpretation.5 In his view, the main purpose of guilds was to
provide transferable skills through apprenticeship. In order to further their
purpose, masters bargained with the state, offering military and fiscal
contributions to obtain institutional support for their regulations. Statutes could
enforce the contractual relation between master and apprentice and therefore
ensured the transfer of skills. The unintended consequences of this behaviour were
technical innovation, the growth o f the manufacturing sector and, therefore,
economic growth. This second theory also develops the relationship between
political and economic aspects of the guild system differently from the classical
view. In as much as guilds emerged to establish and enforce training in skills,
their relationship with local authorities depended on the need to transform
informal rules into formal legislation so as to enforce the contractual relation
between master and apprentice. Political bargaining, in this view, was a means to
enforce contracts rather than a source of monopolistic rents.
3 S. Ogilvie, State Corporatism and Proto-Industry. The Wurttemberg Black Forest, 1580-1797
(Cambridge, 1997), p.5.
4 See J. Mokyr, ‘Urbanisation, Technological Progress and Economic History’, in H. Giersch
ed.Urban Agglomeration and Economic Growth (Berlin and New York, 1995), pp.3-22. A fuller
presentation o f the two main theories on guilds is developed in chapter 7.
5 S.R. Epstein, ‘Craft Guilds, Apprenticeship and Technological Change in Preindustrial Europe’,
Journal o f Economic History 58 (1998): 684-713.
3
1.1 Topic and context
Traditionally, two main factors have been used to explain the lack of formal craft
organisation in Sicily. The first is that the guild system emerged to regulate high
quality producers and skilled labour, but since Sicilian demand for luxury goods
was mainly satisfied by foreign imports, it lacked one of the main push factors for
guild development. The second is that the commercial comparative advantage of
the island, namely the cultivation and export o f agricultural goods, stifled the
development of the manufacturing sector.
A long tradition of studies has argued that the medieval and early modem
Sicilian economy was based on the exchange of agricultural products, in particular
grain, for imported manufactures, mainly textiles. Sicilian manufactures were,
according to this view, too weak to withstand foreign competition, which created
an unbalanced and externally dependent structure of exchange, and radically
curtailed any chance of autochthonous economic development. International trade
is assumed to have played a determining role in creating ‘colonial dependence’ by
the region on other countries during the late Middle Ages, a dependence which
persisted throughout the early modem period. However, the theory has been
challenged by Epstein, who has shown that imports of international manufactures,
mainly textiles to late medieval Sicily could not have supplied more than 5 per
cent or less of the population. In fact, imported manufactures were too few to
supply the Sicilian population, and too expensive and high quality to respond to
the needs of the majority.6
Other interpretations pointed at the role of the state as the main factor
influencing the Sicilian economy. Bresc has argued that when the emperor
Frederick II defeated the Muslims, he imposed the monoculture of grain that
n
caused the loss of Sicilian technical expertise in manufacture. The literature also
claimed that the rapid emergence of a powerful state resulted in a lack of
6 See S.R. Epstein, An Island fo r Itself. Economic Development and Social Change in Late
Medieval Sicily (Cambridge, 1992), ch.l for a detailed historiography on this topic.
7 H. Bresc, Un monde mediterraneen. Economie et societe en Sidle, 1300-1450, 2 vols. (Rome,
1986), p.16.
4
entrepreneurship among the local aristocracy and in the lack of resources, which
were drained away by an exhausting fiscal policy.
Against these theories, Epstein has brought to light considerable
circumstantial evidence to show the existence of cloth manufacture for local
consumption in late medieval Sicily, suggesting that the island did not depend on
manufactures imported from abroad. The widespread evidence for linen, cotton,
and hemp production and the presence of domestically made coloured cloths in
private inventories, suggest a local production of cloths and a dyeing industry that
Q
provided textiles for the majority of the population. Despite this, no guild
organisation seems to emerge until the late fourteenth and early fifteenth
centuries, and no evidence of other forms of production organisation is found on
the island.
The recent historiography on guilds has looked to the rise of the modem state as
the main push factor for guild emergence. According to Sheilagh Ogilvie, the
expanding modem state had a greater impact on society and the economy than the
expansion of the market itself. The state wished to count on the guilds’ ability to
provide a ready supply of military personnel, to collect capital taxes, and to
provide political support. In order to do so, the state enforced guild regulations
and granted strong privileges.9
Since Sicily became part of the Catalan-Aragonese kingdom by the late
fourteenth century political conditions should have been optimal for the
development of strong craft guilds. In fact, Sicilian guilds had a very limited
development. Political institutions in medieval and early modem Sicily kept local
producers under royal control, and until the early fifteenth century they did not
even allow the recognition of craft masters’ authority, forcing local producers to
organise informally. However, political conditions became more favourable under
Aragonese domination. From the 1420s onwards, the state’s growing need to
finance warfare and to ensure political consensus led to an improvement in
relations between the king and the towns on the royal demesne, which was
8 S.R. Epstein, ‘The Textile Industry and the Foreign Cloth Trade in Late Medieval Sicily (1300-
1500): A Colonial Relationship?’, Journal o f M edieval History 15 (1989): 141-83.
9 Ogilvie, State Corporatism, p.5.
5
reflected in the stronger role assigned to the Sicilian parliament. The king
demanded broad consensus for his fiscal policy from the towns and political
backing from the local aristocracy. In exchange, the king recognised urban and
local autonomies, including urban and guild statutes, and supported attempts by
the local aristocracy and patriciate to monopolise the main urban offices, leading
to the emergence of a complex urban bureaucracy.
Some guilds received formal recognition, but they remained under city
council authority and within a framework that was never particularly favourable
to guild membership and guild authority. Elsewhere, in towns under feudal
control and in the countryside, craft guilds were not formally recognised. Before
being fully confirmed, requests for approval had to go through two vetting
procedures based in the town council and in the royal Tribunale del Regio
Patrimonio, which create a combination of local and central constraints for guild
formation and development. However, although masters had very limited authority
to organise groups and set regulations and could not count on access to public office
to enforce authority over guild membership, guilds, once established, slowly but
steadily developed.
Between the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the local
aristocracy in western Sicily promoted the founding of a number of new villages in
order to extend the land under cultivation. Population in the western area of the
island continued to grow, compensating losses in the east. The stabilisation of grain
prices and the founding of new villages may have improved the standard of living in
the west of Sicily, which in turn increased demand for goods produced by guild
masters, particularly in the two largest western cities, Palermo and Trapani. Finally,
the permanent establishment of the court in Palermo signalled the last step in a
process of resource redistribution from the east to the west of the region.
During the early seventeenth century, when Palermo was competing with
Messina for the role of Sicilian capital, the Palermo city council supported craft
master requests for new guilds; in Trapani also the council approved numerous guild
statutes and made it easier to access the town council probably as a way of making
membership more attractive.
6
Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries guilds developed along

lines o f craft specialisation. However, the significance of this development should
not be overstated; Sicilian manufacture remained generally of poor quality and
supplied only the domestic market, suggesting that the skills base of Sicilian
craftsmen continued to be too narrow to compete on international markets.
Although guilds survived until 1821, when a decree by Ferdinand I abolished all
the craft statutes and regulations,10 the manufacturing sector remained
uncompetitive and the high levels of agriculture productivity led Sicily to specialise
in the more profitable agricultural export trade.
1.2 Why study Sicilian guilds?
Perhaps paradoxically, the study of Sicilian guilds sheds light on the phenomenon
of early modem craft corporatism even though Sicilian guilds were unusually weak.
This weakness was displayed in two ways. First, Sicilian guild members were
relatively few proportionally to the population, relatively to most northern Italian and
other European regions. Second, they never had a clear or strong political role. The
reason why so few scholars have studied Sicilian guilds systematically is that they
were virtually invisible.
Economists and economic historians alike have rarely explored Sicilian guilds;
they have concentrated on the Sicilian countryside because of the island’s ancient
agricultural vocation. For a long time, the town-country dichotomy, which shaped
the character of urban studies of northern Italy, also defined the parameters of
Sicilian historiography. Towns were mainly seen as the stage for social, political,
and economic conflicts, rather than as autonomous political and economic spaces,
with complex dynamics of interaction with the central state. During the 1970s,
however, urban studies took a new lease on life, in the context of a renewed interest
in the origins of Southern Italian economic backwardness. Towns became privileged
points of observation for the main economic and political forces at work in the
10 Collezione delle leggi e dei decreti Reali del Regno delle Due Sicilie, 2 vols. (Naples, 1821),
no. 132, p.272.
7
medieval and early modem period, and offered a way of situating Sicilian history
firmly in a European context. This approach also reconsidered the relationship
between town and countryside in a more integrated manner.
However, Sicilian guilds were still not generally considered worthy of study.
This is puzzling, for although guilds in Sicily were far weaker than in most other
regions, they were organised in the same way as other European guilds, and the
relative weakness of the phenomenon is no reason to exclude it as a subject of study.
According to Bloch’s criteria of comparison, the different features of a phenomenon
can only be revealed by observing it under different conditions. A comparative
analysis highlights different aspects of the object of study and completes the
picture.11
The present thesis takes up this comparative challenge by examining the
operation o f the Sicilian craft guilds through the activities and interests of
individual members. It focuses in particular on incentives for the craftsmen to
participate in guild activities. Thus, the study not only looks at how Sicilian guilds
actually worked, but will also address the question of why they did not fully
perform the functions that guilds adopted in much of the rest of Europe. At the
same time, the existence o f guilds should not be taken for granted. The thesis will
therefore also address questions concerning the necessary conditions for craft
guilds to emerge and develop, questions that are rarely considered in the analysis
of the most advanced and strongest guilds. The relative ‘failure’ of Sicilian guilds
thus offers the possibility to investigate which pre-conditions were lacking for
their full development, and what the consequences of that organisational
weakness were.
The literature on early modem guilds mostly assumes that they were
economically conservative and hindered technological change; the question
therefore also arises whether technological and manufacturing growth was less
constrained in early modem Sicily than elsewhere as a result of the relative
weakness o f craft guilds. According to the two prevailing theories of guilds, craft
guild weakness could have two possible consequences. If guild regulations aimed
11 M. Bloch, Apologie pour I ’histoire ou metier d ’ historien (Paris, 1993), p. 160; M. Bloch, ‘Per
una storia comparata delle societa europee’, in M. Bloch, Lavoro e tecnica nel medioevo (Bari,
1975), pp.29-71.
to acquire and enforce monopoly rents, as the classical theory suggests, then, in a
context o f weak guilds, manufacturing should have been able to develop more
freely and competitively. However, if guild regulations tended to protect the
contractual relationship between masters and apprentices in order to promote
skills transfer, as Epstein argues, the lack of strong guilds would result in a lack of
training, and the lack of skills transfer would adversely affect the development of
manufacturing industry.
The ability of guilds to further technical training through apprenticeship
may have also influenced the development of rural proto-industries. According to
Epstein, ‘rural putting out was ,a net consumer rather than producer of
technological innovation’, meaning that proto-industry depended on the skilled
labour trained within craft guilds, since trained masters were the main source of
advanced technical knowledge. Qualified masters were in fact employed to
organise and supervise pre-industrial enterprises and, as the literature suggests,
proto-industry received strong support from urban domestic workshops.13
Whereas conversely Tittle evidence supports the view that proto-industry
provided a significant source of industrial skills at any level’, as Ogilvie notes in
her study o f Wurttemberg.14
This implies that where manufacturing skills were widespread because of
guild development, putting out and domestic industry were also more likely to
emerge and grow. Conversely, where guild regulations could not be enforced, and
the transmission and improvement of skills through apprenticeship was therefore
unlikely to occur, proto-industrial production was unlikely to develop
successfully. The study of weak guilds is thus a key to understanding the
development of pre-industrial manufactures more broadly.
12 Epstein, ‘Craft Guilds’, p.684.

13 See P. Jeannin, ‘La proto-industrialisation: developpment ou impasse?’, Annales ESC 35 (1980):
52-65; P. Kriedte, ‘Proto-Industrialisation Revisited: Demography, Social Structure and Modem
Domestic Industry’, Continuity and Change 8 (1993): 217-52.
9
1.3 Hypotheses
The empirical evidence discussed in this thesis suggests that the classical theory
provides a less satisfactory explanation than Epstein’s interpretation. The research
deals with a specific case of under-developed guilds in order to explore the causes
and consequences of corporate weakness. The study addresses two levels of
analysis. A macro level investigates the main conditions for guild development in
medieval and early modem societies, the relations with local and central
authorities, and the way in which craft guilds coped with changes in market
structure and political institutions over time. A micro level of analysis concerns
the internal organisation and purposes of craft guilds, and the means to achieve
them.
The argument is based on two main hypotheses. First, guilds in Sicily
lacked an indispensable condition, namely political support by the state to further
their objectives. Limited political backing of the craftsmen’s authority and scarce
enforcement of guild regulations by central and local institutions, as well as
political interference in management, delayed the emergence of craft guilds. The
second hypothesis follows from the first, namely that Sicilian guilds could not
enforce their mles for apprenticeship and incentives for membership, and were
therefore unable to supply specialised labour in support of a thriving
manufacturing base. Late medieval Sicily thus lost the chance to establish a viable
high value-added manufacturing sector; the region specialised instead in
agriculture, mainly cereal production, as its main comparative advantage.
A causal relationship between guild underdevelopment and industrial failure
thus emerges from the analysis. This also confirms the view that the main purpose
of craft guilds was training in skills, and that in conditions of limited political
support guilds could not achieve their goals. Manufacturing production did not
take off because apprenticeship was underdeveloped and the level of skills
remained limited. Sicilian industrial production was unable to compete on the
international market because the supply of skilled labour remained limited.
10
The absence of guilds as a major cause for Sicilian manufacturing failure offers an
alternative explanation to the most widespread theories on the topic. Scholars
have explained the lack of a manufacturing industry in Sicily as a consequence of
the development of cereal monoculture and the lack of investments by rentier
landowners. In other words, Sicilian backwardness in the manufacturing sector is
explained in terms of entrepreneurial failure.
This thesis suggests that industrial failure is linked to other factors.
Opposition during the Middle Ages by the crown and the urban elites to the
development of craft guilds is seen to have constrained the international
competitiveness of the Sicilian manufacturing industry. This strengthened
incentives for specialisation in agricultural production and led to the growth of a
manufacturing sector producing only for the domestic market, creating an
irreversible process o f ‘path dependency’.15
1.4 Sources and methodology
In addiction to the factors set out previously, a further significant reason for the
lack of studies of Sicilian guilds relates to the paucity of primary sources. There
are no guild archives in Sicily; contemporary chronicles paid little attention to
artisan conditions and guild activities; and notarial records are not much more
informative. The lack of sources cannot be explained in terms of the limited
survival of written documentation alone, however; it is also a clear sign of the
relatively marginal role that guilds played in the society.16 The scarcity of private
acts drafted by the notaries and of public ordinances aimed at further transactions,
makes it extremely difficult to follow the day-to-day activities both of individual
members and of organisations.
15 Path dependency describes the fact that it is more likely for an economic structure to persist
along a given ‘path’ than to change course, even if the path taken proves to be sub-optimal, due to
the costs o f changing direction.
16 There are cases where the apparent absence o f artisans is actually connected to the nature o f
surviving sources, as in Sweden. In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Sweden, the state
categorised the population for the purposes o f land tax assessment and many people were
described as craftmen and cottagers, even where they were artisans. See C.J. Gadd, Sjalvhushall
11
The sources are particularly scarce for the first phase of establishment of
guilds in the fifteenth century. By the mid-sixteenth century, and particularly in
the seventeenth century, the growing conflicts between members and unregulated
competitors led guilds to seek increased protection in written documentation; by
the eighteenth century, the written sources become far more systematic.
Complete lists of crafts formally approved in towns exist neither in
contemporary chronicles, nor in recent historical studies. City councils did document
the order according to which different social groups participated in the main
religious processions; but these procession orders included social groups not
formally recognised as guilds, and they must therefore be treated with caution.
Although the statutes frequently mention the presence of account books, none
survived for early modem Sicily. Most are likely to have disappeared through
natural causes, but in many cases the small size of a guild would not justify
keeping written membership lists and formal records of fee payment.
Guild statutes (capitula) and petitions to the crown provide our best source
of information about the nature and activities of guilds. Every guild had its own
regulations, drafted by a notary and confirmed by the city council and the central
Tribunale del Regio Patrimonio, and which provide general information about the
elections o f representatives, entry fees, membership fees, length of apprenticeship,
and fines.17 Nevertheless, statutes remain a problematic source for guild studies.
Regulations described what was formally allowed and what was forbidden, rather
than what was actually done. Like all historical sources giving only the letter of
the law, they are therefore deficient in two ways. They often conceal more than
they reveal, and they do not show how guild institutions actually worked, nor how
they evolved. They tend to over-represent the extent of the guilds’ jurisdiction in
society. Guild practices were extremely fluid and changeable, and though the
statutes could be renewed, abolished, and revalidated according to momentary
conditions, they still do not mirror daily activity. It is not surprising that historians
eller arbetsdelning? Svensk lant- och stadshantverk, co 1400-1860 (Gothenburg, 1991), cited in G.
Crossick (ed.), The Artisan and the European Town, 1500-1900 (Aldershot, 1997), p.6, n.24.
17 This thesis does not deal with food producers, apart from the confectioners. In fact in Sicily
most o f these ‘guilds’ were regulated directly by the city council and they did not have the same
autonomy (statutes, consuls) as craft guilds examined in this study.
12
of guilds have, in recent years, turned to alternative, historically more sensitive

sources.18
Despite the problematic nature of this kind of material, statutes represent the
most important source of information in this study. The thesis examines most
known published and unpublished craft guild statutes in Sicily for the period
between the late fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, and compares the regulations
of different guilds in the same towns and across the island.19 The aim of this
analysis is to understand the main purposes of the guild system and the ways by
which the organisation enforced membership and participation.
A distinction between rules that remained unchanged over a long period of
time, and frequently modified regulations, emerges from the analysis. The
regulations that remained constant in time were the ones disciplining
apprenticeship, elections of representatives, social behaviour, and in general all
those rules concerning the general organisation of the guild. Other regulations,
such as labour and production controls and norms relating to the length of
apprenticeship, the masterpiece, and the terms of exclusion from the organisation,
were more closely linked to changes in economic or political constraints, and
were more flexible over time. The first group of regulations confirms that the
major organising features of the guild system aimed to regulate and back the
transmission of skills; the group of more flexible rules tended to provide
incentives and barriers for participation.
Other sets of documents, such as notarial contracts between master and
apprentice, allow an investigation of the gap between rule and actual practice.
Notarial records represent among the most important sources for medieval and
early modem history, particularly in European countries characterised by the use
of Roman law, like Italy and France, where notaries were the only professional
figures to enjoy public trust. In these countries, notaries registered all official
transactions, both private and public, ranging from wedding contracts to wills,
inventories, provisions, commercial transactions, contract o f apprenticeship, and
18 See S. Kaplan, The Bakers o f Paris and the Bread Question, 1700-1775 (Durham and London,
1996), Introduction.
19 Some o f the guild statutes that have been used in this thesis are published in various collections
o f documents and articles, whilst others are found in the local archives. Full reference about the
statutes is reported in the bibliography.
13
so on. Such a wide competence made the notary a particularly valuable source of
information, both for contemporary clients and for modem historians. The notary
records thus provide additional support for the main statutory source. However, in
Trapani, for example, formal contracts decreased because of the gradual success
of guild standards, which were well known by the urban authorities and which
intervened in case of dispute.
The use of public documentation, by which guild regulations were
approved, help to complete the picture. Local libraries and archivi comunali often
reserve a section for the town council records. These include collected summaries
of the general assemblies, the acts approved by the council, the bans imposed, and
pronouncements about citizens’ provisions, when provide material for the study of
the guilds’ political role, and the relation between masters and their local
institutions. However, these sources can also be misleading about the importance
that guild members had in the political arena. The use of these sources thus
remains subsidiary to the reading of the statutes, and has no pretension to
completeness.
Most evidence comes from Palermo, which has preserved a good body of
documentation, though there are other reasons why the research has mainly
focused on this town. As the capital, Palermo tended to present a model followed
by guilds in other towns, both in the style of their statutes and in their request for
additional privileges. Palermo moreover was the biggest and most lively market in
the island, and offered the strongest example o f guild success.
By contrast, the eastern coast suffered more natural and man-made disasters,
which often irreparably damaged or destroyed the records of its past. It seems
likely that for a long time Messina had a similar number of guilds as Palermo, but
information about them is almost non-existent, since Messina’s archive was taken
to Spain after the city’s revolt against the Spanish government in 1674. A more
complete study of Sicily from a regional perspective still remains hard to realise.
In the last twenty years, a renewed interest in guilds among local social and
art historians has also significantly expanded the body of primary and secondary
material, through publication of numerous new documents, and through detailed
analysis of art objects and luxury products produced by skilled craftsmen. Local
14
studies have also investigated relations between guild production and unregulated
producers on a day-to-day basis, and have provided indirect information about the
level of craft skills and changes in the patterns of supply and demand for luxury
goods. Social historians have focused on individual participation in guild
organisations. These studies represent particularly valuable secondary sources for
the study of this topic.
The thesis is divided into two parts and is developed through seven chapters. The
first part, consisting of three chapters, includes a general presentation of the guild
phenomenon and studies, whilst the second part examines the craft guild system
in early modem Sicily.
Chapter 2 introduces the historiographical debate relating to guilds and
highlights its complexity and fragmentation. Guild studies address different
aspects of the phenomenon: guild formation, sociological factors, political
ideology, religious functions and so on, with no clear organising framework. The
chapter surveys scholars’ attempts to organise what is known about guilds in
terms of more homogenous approaches, which tend to classify guilds according to
their different functions between the late Middle Ages and the early modem
period. A clear distinction between social, political, and economic approaches
emerges, though a causal relation between the different aspects of the
phenomenon is found missing.
A detailed overview of the economic debate shows that these studies have
made serious attempts to understand the consequences of corporatism on society,
and its impact on pre-industrial economies. Two opposing interpretations
summarise the variety of scholarly voices, distinguishing between those who
stress the negative effects of corporatism and those who remain ‘sympathetic to
the corporate groups’.20 However, the economic debate has also directed attention
towards other debates relating to proto-industry, the determinants of technological
progress, and Italy’s seventeenth-century crisis. The second part of chapter 2
surveys local studies of Sicilian guilds. This section addresses the potential
20 As Ogilvie sarcastically characterises the most recent current o f studies (Ogilvie, State
Corporatism, p. 12).
15
contribution that a study of Sicilian guilds can make to more general theories, and
conversely attempts to frame Sicilian events within a European context.
Chapter 3 outlines the economic and political conditions of early modem
Sicily and the factors affecting the development of autochthonous craft guilds.
Sixteenth and early seventeenth century Sicily had an expanding economy, and
the seventeenth century witnessed no major crisis at a time when other European
regions were suffering severe downturns. The island possessed a strong
comparative advantage in the production and export of agricultural goods, but it
lacked an international competitive manufacturing sector (the only exception
being the silk industry of Messina). As mentioned previously, the explanations for
Sicilian backwardness often focus on economic inefficiency and fiscal pressure by
the Spanish state, but the chapter suggests that the lack of development of a strong
manufacturing sector relates more to institutional than to economic or fiscal
factors.
The second part of the thesis focuses on the economic aspects of Sicilian
guilds and shows how guild peculiarities are conditioned by local political and
economic constraints. The various factors under analysis are both internal to the
organisation and institutional conditions defining individual decision-making
(including mutual trust), the costs and benefits of craft arrangements, and
institutional constraints on labour markets.
Chapter 4 applies a top-down approach to guild development from their first
emergence in the fifteenth century, to the so-called phenomenon of fragmentation
common to most European guilds in the seventeenth century, which led to the
proliferation of crafts. The analysis of the general features of Sicilian guilds
shows them to be analogous to European guilds, but the focus is on the causes and
the effects of their weakness. In this chapter a more descriptive approach is used
to frame the terminology and the characteristics of these organisations. A survey
of the distribution of guilds throughout the island shows the limited impact of the
phenomenon on the region.
Chapter 5 adopts a micro-economic perspective. Having established in
chapter 4 that guilds in Sicily were organised no differently from other European
guilds, chapter 5 analyses their internal structure. It analyses labour relations as
16
the core of the two main theories of guild formation, the presence of women in
these organisations, the fees for first entry and membership and their effects on
living standards.
In chapter 6, analysis of fines against craft infractions shows that the crafts
were most concerned with enforcing apprenticeship rules, and that they were
unable to enforce entry restrictions or control production. The chapter emphasises
that guild jurisdiction was strongly affected by the institutional context and that
institutional support was vital to the guilds’ long term survival.
These three chapters represent the heart of the empirical analysis and the
foundation of the final analysis. The empirical data offers a picture of the guild
phenomenon in a context where certain general preconditions, which classical
studies of guilds have often considered as having a dominant role, are absent.
Chapter 7 summarises this evidence and provides an interpretation based on
prevailing theories of guild formation. The chapter concludes with a theoretical
discussion of how guilds stimulated innovation and specialisation through the
transmission of skills.
17
Chapter 2. The historiographical debate
Chapter 2
The historiographical debate
The historiographical debate on guilds is characterised by fragmentation rather

than homogeneity. Corporatism is a historical phenomenon and by definition it is
interwined by a variety of regional, political and institutional conditions sensitive
to change through space and time. The multiplicity of factors that affect the study
of this phenomenon across societies give rise to a certain ambiguity in its
definition. The present chapter attempts to frame the debates in order to offer an
interpretation of the most significant approaches to the history of craft guilds,
although it has no claim to exhaustiveness or completeness.
In the first section of this chapter studies on the topic are presented in a
chronological sequence, even though the two main interpretations (pro and contra
craft guilds) developed essentially in parallel. In the sections that follow, the
studies are grouped according to specific themes. Rather than offer a
comprehensive overview, the aim is to guide the reader through the complexity of
the literature, and to distinguish the implications of the different approaches. The
number of functions exercised by the guild system was such that virtually all
aspects of the master’s life were affected by the guild organisation. The present
study focuses mainly on the economic functions of the craft guilds, but also draws
on social and historical research, in an attempt to narrow the gap between
economic and socio-historical approaches.
2.1 From guild abolition to modern studies: two centuries of debate
The interest of social and economic historians in European guilds was already
established by the time guilds were abolished in the nineteenth century. From the
outset historians took radically opposed positions, and these interpretations have
developed in parallel up until the present day. The debate developed on the basis
18
of two contrasting interpretations: the political economists generally regarded

guilds as imposing irrational limits to free enterprise and free trade, and the social
historians highlighted the guild’s positive social functions.1
Debate in the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century concentrated on

the rules that affected artisans’ lives within the craft guilds. Scholars enumerated
the formal regulations concerning apprentices, journeymen, and masters, and
described relations between guilds and the Church, and between guilds and central
government. These studies provided the empirical basis for the vexed question of
abolition, which drew on the argument developed during the second half of the
eighteenth century that guilds promoted monopolies and privileges and hindered
the ability to exercise crafts freely by means of compulsory apprenticeship. As
will be discussed in greater detail in the following section, guilds were seen as
delaying economic progress because they were economically inefficient.
Economists in Italy and in other European countries mainly supported the

abolition of corporate groups, although they were divided in their views and
explanations of corporatism.2 These debates led national governments to abolish
guilds and corporate groups in every European country between the second half of
the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century. Political
propaganda established the popular view of guilds as pressure groups that caused
negative effects on urban economies, and after abolition, and throughout the
nineteenth century, historical interest shifted from economic factors to the guilds’
effects on worker conditions and on the need for institutional reform.
1 A. Black, Guilds and Civil Society in European Political Thought from the Twelfth Century to
the Present (Cambridge, 1984), p. 10; G. Unwin, The Guilds and Companies o f London (London,
1925), pp.4-5.
2 In Italy, it was the members o f the so-called ‘scuola economico-giuridica’ who constituted the
stronger opposition to guilds. See M. Berengo, ‘Presentazione al lettore italiano’, in B. Geremek
(ed.) Salariati e artigiani nella Parigi medievale (Italian transl. Florence, 1975), pp.3-21. See C.
Mozzarelli, Economia e corporazioni. II governo degli interessi nella storia d ’Italia dal medioevo
a ll’eta cotemporanea (Milan, 1988). In the interpretation o f the Risorgimento, craft masters
represented the first class o f people who opposed feudal lordship. Berengo, ‘Presentazione’, pp.5-
6. See G.M. Monti, Le corporazioni nell'evo antico e n ell’alto medioevo (Bari, 1934), pp.VII-XII
and 327-38; F. Carli, ‘Nuovi studi sul problema della continuity storica delle corporazioni’,
Archivio di studi corporativi 1 (1936): 327-65; P.S. Leicht, Corporazioni romane e arti medievali
(Turin, 1937), pp. 13-40.
3 G. Scherma, Delle maestranze in Sicilia. Contributo alio studio della questione operaia
(Palermo, 1896).
19
At the beginning of the twentieth century and particularly between the two
world wars, however, Fascist and Nazi theories rediscovered and glorified the role
of the guilds as synonymous with ‘urban growth and social insurance’, and
presented craft guilds as precursors of the state corporatism which they promoted.
This produced a backlash after World War II, when the central role of corporatism
in Fascist ideology led to sharply declining interest in medieval and early modem
guilds.
The recovery o f interest in pre-modem guilds is recent, sparked by the work

of Michael Sonenscher and Steven Kaplan on eighteenth-century French guilds.4
Sonenscher in particular outlined the structure and internal mechanisms of artisan
production in new ways that gave due weight to non-monetary transactions and
forms of power. The complexity of variables, which Sonenscher considered,
located guilds in their broader political, legal and social context and emphasised
how the corporations and confraternities of eighteenth-century France offered
masters and journeymen the means to further their collective interests.5 Attention
was focused on non-monetary transactions, which ‘endowed the world of urban
manufacture with its specific texture, substance and culture’.6
The new rash of guild studies that appeared in the 1980s was characterised
by sociological and anthropological methods. ‘Network analysis’ became the
keyword for this kind of research, in which individuals are analysed according to
their formal and informal relationships, and the attention shifts from the study of
groups as such to the analysis of individual interaction within a group. This
approach which shed light on factors of social aggregation and group identity, had
its roots in Jean-Claude Perrot’s work on eighteenth-century Caen.7 Perrot
4 M. Sonenscher, ‘Work and Wages in Paris in the Eighteenth Century’, in M. Berg, P. Hudson,
and M. Sonenscher Manufacture in Town and Country Before the Factory (Cambridge, 1983); M.
Sonenscher, The Hatters o f Eighteenth-Century France (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1987); M.
Sonenscher, Work and Wages, Natural Law, Politics and Eighteenth-Century French Trade
(Cambridge, 1989). S. Kaplan, Provisioning Paris: Merchants and Millers in the Grain and Flour
Trade During the Eighteenth Century in France (Ithaca, 1984); S. Kaplan, ‘Les corporations, les
“faux ouvriers” et le faubourg Saint-Antoine au XVIIIe siecle’. Annales ESC 43 (1988): 353-78;
S. Kaplan, The Bakers o f Paris and the Bread Question, 1700-1775 (Durham and London, 1996).
5 See Sonenscher, Hatters, Introduction.
6 Sonenscher, ‘Work and Wages’, p. 148.
7 J.-C. Perrot, Genese d ’une ville moderne. Caen au XVIIIe siecle, 2 vols. (Paris, 1975), cited in S.
Cerutti, Mestieri e privilegi. Nascita delle corporazioni a Torino secoli XVII-XVIII (Turin, 1992),
p.ix.
20
suggested that it is possible to understand artisan social classification and

stratification through the sources that reported contemporary actors’ perspective
on their own society. In the same period, Natalie Zemon Davis in a study of
sixteenth-century Lyon,8 and Edoardo Grendi, in a study of Genoa,9 analysed
group stratification using variables of age and sex. The aim was to identify a
specific taxonomy of these social groups within the urban social context. The use
of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century terminology, and categories of sex and
age, allowed Grendi to examine social groups from within and in their own terms,
and to identify configurations of relationships among groups and individuals. The
analysis thereby produced a new physiognomy of groups, which had not been
considered before.
The study by Simona Cerutti of the tailors of Turin represents the most
complete example o f a social approach applied to guild studies. Cerutti’s
demonstration of how the guild became a political instrument of the cloth and
silk-merchants to maintain their influence over the local magistracy developed
social, political, and economic arguments simultaneously and holistically.10 This
approach was especially successful for the study of eighteenth-century guilds,
when craft guilds were at the peak of their development in most of Europe.
In the 1990s, Italian scholars added to the general debate with a special
issue of the journal Quaderni Storici devoted to the theme of labour conflicts.11
Conflict was understood to play a crucial role in the establishment of new groups
and the creation of new alliances. It was argued that conflicts over the defence of
8 N. Zemon Davis, Society and Culture in Early M odem France (Stanford, 1975).
9 E. Grendi, ‘Ideologia della carita e societa indisciplinata: la costruzione del sistema assistenziale
genovese (1470-1670)’, in G. Politi, M. Rosa, and F. Della Peruta Timore e carita. Ip o ve ri n ell’
Italia moderna (Cremona, 1982), pp.59-75.
10 S. Cerutti, ‘Group Strategies and Trade Strategies: The Turin Tailors Guild in the Late
Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries’, in S. W oolf (ed.) Domestic Strategies: Work and
Family in France and Italy in 1600-1800 (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 102-47. More recent studies by S.
Cerutti focus on the social identity o f the artisans and their individual, corporate and judicial status
in Turin.
11 Quaderni Storici 80 (1992). Most o f the papers in this special issue o f the journal responded to
the themes outlined in the work o f W. Sewell, Work and Revolution in France (Cambridge, 1980).
21
privileges and control of local markets could also shape powerful hierarchies
• 1 2
between groups, and that legal conflict was a source of social identity formation.
This perspective was further developed at a meeting held in Rome in

September 1997.13 Participants stressed how conflicts between guilds could
promote solidarity, and how conflict often strengthened the ties between crafts
and created co-operation in towns, which functioned as centres of re-distribution
and consumption of manufactured goods. Guilds functioned as systems both of
production and of distribution, open to technical and organisational innovation, often
establishing relationships (both positive and not) with rural proto-industry.
Nevertheless, in many of these studies the exploration of the emergence of

craft guilds remains inadequate, for the presence of guilds is taken for granted and
the process of corporatisation is analysed a posteriori. Moreover, the aim of
recent socio-historical studies has been to trace the relationship among individuals
within guilds, connecting the rise and fall of the guild system to its function in
society. This functionalist approach has, in a sense, taken the need for corporate
membership for granted and has failed to question why corporate groups emerged
in the first place, and what held them together over long period of time.
In a recent overview of the historiography of guilds, Prak has distinguished

between what he calls the ‘instrumental’ and the ‘functional’ approach in
contemporary studies.14 The aim is to distinguish between works that explore the
origins and economic functions of corporate groups (instrumental approach), and
the studies that investigate the role of guilds in relation with other social and
economic groups (functionalist approach). However, the distinction seems less
clear on the ground, in fact historical studies of guilds have typically adopted a
functionalist approach, in which social, political and economic factors are
analysed simultaneously and in which the objectives of the guilds are inferred
12 E. Merlo, ‘La lavorazione delle pelli a Milano fra Sei e Settecento. Conflitti, strategic,
dinamiche’, Quaderni storici 80 (1992): 369.
13 Published as A. Guenzi, P. Massa, and F. Piola Caselli, eds., Guilds, Markets and Work
Regulations in Italy Sixteenth-Nineteenth Centuries (Ashgate, 1998).
14 M. Prak, ‘Individual, Corporate and Judicial Status in European Cities (Late Middle Ages and
Early Modem Period)’, M. Boone and M. Prak (eds.) Statuts individuels, status corporatifs et
status judiciaires dans les villes europeennes moyen ages et tempes modernes (Louven and
Apeldoom, 1996).
22
from their stated behaviour. Only recently have scholars begun to apply
interdisciplinary approaches to investigate the group strategies and individual
incentives which lay at the basis of guild formation. Since the 1970s, studies have
challenged the dominant image of guilds as groups of independent masters, and have
built up a picture of guilds as having a more sophisticated degree of inter-craft
coordination. These systems were not static, but were part of a market economy that
changed and remoulded itself under evolving circumstances.
In the studies by Anthony Black and Steven Kaplan, which privilege the relationship
between guilds and the urban government, a causal link between guilds and political
institutions emerge far more strongly. Black considers the emergence of guilds in the
Italian Communes and analyses the relation with municipal governments,15 whereas
Kaplan examines the relation between guilds and the central state in France.16
Black’s study of guilds and the idea of ‘civil society’ represents, as the
author says, ‘a history of the idea o f the corporate organisation of labour’. The
author mainly develops a study of the relation between guilds and theories of
government and state both in ‘everyday ethos and in social philosophy’.17 In
Black’s view, guilds and civil society represent a specific feature of western
Europe ‘because the moral infrastructures of our society can be sought in the
perfect synthesis between self-governing labour organisations and civil
18
freedom’. Black introduces the important link between guild structure and urban
society, implying a strong correlation between the existence o f craft guilds and a
city-state type of government.
Political functionalists claimed that ‘guilds like other corporations that

constituted the social structure, derived not from the unction of nature but from
the action o f the state’.19 According to this perspective, the government played an
important role in artisan lives:
15 Black, Guilds and Civil Society.

16 See most recently Kaplan, Bakers o f Paris.
17 Black, Guilds and Civil Society, p.xi.
18 Idem. See also below, section 2.2.2.
19 Kaplan, Bakers o f Paris, p. 157.
23
The government wanted the corporations to remain in honest and able hands for the
sake o f good order and right principle. But its attitude was not wholly disinterested.
A healthy corporate system was a precious fiscal resource for the government as
well as a credit to society, as the minister o f Louis XIV had vividly demonstrated. If
the government failed to supervise corporate administration, the guilds might not be
20
in a position to contribute when called upon.
By the 1980s and 1990s, the debate on guilds had thus moved toward the analysis
of the factors supporting the guilds’ emergence, and focused on social and
political issues that were seen as determining guild functions. The literature of the
last two decades seems also to have established a clear division between social,
political and economic historians. Social historians have focused mainly on the
analysis of individual actions, and have paid little or no attention to the acquisition
of privileges and economic benefits. By contrast, economic historians have placed
greater emphasis on the rent-seeking behaviour of guilds and on their dialectical
relationship with the rising modem state. Most recently, however, a new
consensus has begun to emerge around the role of the state. The currently most
widely accepted interpretation analyses craft guild survival as a function of the
dialectic relationship between the state and the guilds to promote a process of do
ut des. In this relationship, guilds could provide military personnel and fiscal
revenues, and the state confirmed a strong privilege policy, providing economic
benefits.21 According to this approach any other function that the guild system
could exercise was secondary to the relationship between guilds and the rise of the
modem state. The relation also supports an economic interpretation that
emphasises the opportunistic behaviour of masters as organised rent-seekers, and
pushes to the side those other, positive features that recent historical and social
studies had brought to light.
20 Ibidem, p. 158.
(Cambridge, 1997).
24
This brief overview shows the diversity and sometimes contradictory character of
guild studies. These ambiguities are sometimes present in the work of individual
scholars. For example, Mokyr, who believes that guilds were privileged groups of
power that guaranteed the permanence of property rights and stifled innovation,
has also claimed that craft guilds were dynamic organisations that stimulated
manufacture until the fifteenth century.22 Hickson and Thompson claimed that
state supported guilds for their ability to extract capital taxes and military
personnel, but also argued that guilds reduced asymmetries of information in
medieval and early modem markets, which suffered from imperfect and
incomplete information, because guild regulations over labour and commodities
reduced uncertainties faced by consumers and producers when carrying out an
exchange.23
2.2 Guilds and economic history
Since the end of the nineteenth century, economic historians have tried to answer
a variety of related questions to do with the role guilds played in the functioning
of the market economy. Did the various means by which guilds sought to secure
their members’ interests delay or stimulate economic growth? Did guilds hinder
or promote the flow of trade? Did guilds attempt to expand or restrict the market
for manufactured goods? Did the guilds have any general policies regarding
innovation?24
The interpretation of entry-restrictive guilds as, among other things, socially

inefficient cartels, was established during the early twentieth century and has
22 J. Mokyr, ‘Urbanisation, Technological Progress and Economic Growth’, in H. Giersch (ed.)

Urban Agglomeration and Economic Growth (Berlin and N ew York, 1995), p. 15.
23 C. Hickson and E.A. Thompson, ‘A New Theory o f Guilds and Economic Development’,
Explorations in Economic History 28 (1991): 127-68. See also K. Persson, Pre-Industrial
Economic Growth. Social Organisation and Technological Progress in Europe (Oxford and New
York, 1988), p.53. This view follows North’s definition o f institutions. ‘The major role o f
institutions in a society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable (but not necessarily
efficient) structure to human interaction’. (D.C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and
Economic Performance (Cambridge, 1990), p.6).
24 S. Thrupp, ‘The Gilds’, in The Cambridge Economic History o f Europe, vol.3, Economic
Organisation and Policies in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1963), pp.230-31.
25
remained the standard view until the present day.25 According to Mickwitz, the
guild acted both as buyer of raw materials and as a seller of manufactured
products,26 and enforced quality standards, particularly outside its community
where its products were little known. In addition, the guilds raised prices above
their competitive levels by restricting entry to the occupation and by limiting
27
production. Mickwitz’s arguments were expanded by others.
Carlo Cipolla and Domenico Sella for example have remarked how the
crafts’ tight regulatory regime played a significant role in preventing competition
in manufacture.28
One o f the fundamental aims o f all guilds was to regulate and reduce competition
among their own members. With regard to the supply o f labour, a guild aimed at
exercising strict control over the admission o f new members and their entry into the
labour market. On the other hand, when competition among employers was in
question, the corporate body always served to control and strictly regulate
29
competition among its members as far as demand for labour was concerned.
Hickson and Thompson argue that the guild worked as a political and
administrative unit in close relation with the state. Guild masters collected capital
tax and imposed apprenticeship for abnormally long periods of time, so as to
provide the city with an ever-ready supply of military manpower; in exchange
guilds obtained protection for their members from expropriation by opportunistic
urban elites.30
25 As in the works o f H. Pirenne, Histoire de Belgique (Brussels, 1908), vol.2, p.25; G. Mickwitz,
Die Kartellfun/ctionen der Zunfte und ihre Bedeutung bei der Entstehung des Zunftwesens
(Helsinki, 1936). See also Black, Guilds and Civil Society.
26 Mickwitz, Die Kartellfunktionen, p.36.
27 H. Kellenbenz, ‘The Organisation o f Industrial Production’, in The Cambridge Economic
History o f Europe, vol.5, Economic Organisation o f Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, 1977),
&462-
D. Sella, Crisis and Continuity. The Economy o f the Spanish Lombardy in the Seventeenth
Century (Cambridge, 1979). The debate on the seventeenth-century crisis is also based on this
argument (see section 2.2.2).
29 C.M. Cipolla, Before the Industrial Revolution. European Society and Economy, 1000-1700
(London, 1981), pp.95-96.
30 Hickson and Thompson, ‘New Theory’, pp. 127-68.
26
Recently Sheilagh Ogilvie has revived the classical theory concerning

corporate groups.31 In an empirical study o f the weavers of Wurttemberg, she has
stressed the political implications of the guild system and the complex bargaining
process with the state, which imposed deadweight costs on production. The
permanence of guild regulations and guild control over production and the labour
market was supported by their strong political privileges. Without exception,
the major reason practitioners o f an economic activity form a guild is to secure

advantages for themselves, mainly through exercising monopoly and monopsony
powers ... Guilds seek to restrict entry so as to limit competition, reduce output in
order to charge higher prices to customers, collude in order to pay lower prices to
suppliers and customers, and organise political action in order to widen and enforce
these powers. Insofar as they succeed in these aims, guilds secure monopoly profits
for themselves, but cause larger losses to others, the net effect being a dead weight
cost to the economy as a whole and possible harm to economic growth through
reducing output and flexibility. Moreover, monopoly rents create incentives for
32
socio-political competition to gain control o f these rents (rent-seeking).
Political support in this view allowed guilds to develop a ‘legal community’,

'1*1
which applied sets of regulations to their members, the craftsmen. Mokyr

follows a similar line of argument when he states that guild regulations have
aspired to maintain a technical ‘status quo’ to stifle competition and innovation.34
Mokyr therefore reinforces the classical theory by making explicit the argument
of guild conservatism and its opposition to technological innovation, which had an
important role in the revisionists’ approach. In Mokyr’s view, ‘before the French
Revolution craft guilds held new techniques back, by banning inventions when
these could threaten established interests’;35 ‘the guild masters agreed within the
organisation the conventions of the technological status quo. This cut off the flow
31 Ogilvie, State Corporatism.

32 Ibidem, pp.463-64.
33 Ibidem, p.5.
34 Mokyr, ‘Urbanisation’, p. 15.
35 J. Mokyr, The Lever o f Riches. Tecnological Creativity and Economic Progress (New York and
Oxford, 1990), p.258.
27
of fresh ideas and the advantage of the exchange of knowledge, which often
stimulated technological change’.36
According to Mokyr, guild regulations were concerned with three elements

of production, which he calls the “three p ’s”: prices, procedures, and participation.
Control over these three elements prevented the development of pre-modem
technology.
The regulation o f price was inimical to technological progress because process

innovation by definition reduces costs, and the way through which the inventor
makes his profits is by underselling his competitors. Cartels regulating prices may
still allow some technological progress because innovators can realise increased
profits through lowering costs. To prevent this, procedures stipulated precisely how
a product was supposed to be made and such technical codes would o f course ossify
production methods altogether. Enforcing these procedures, however, was far more
difficult than enforcing pre-set prices. Finally, and in the long run perhaps the most
effective brake on innovation, was participation by limiting and controlling the
number o f entrants into crafts, and by enforcing them to spend many years o f
apprenticeship and joumeymanship, guild members infused them with the
conventions o f the technological status quo and essentially cut o ff the flow o f fresh
ideas and the cross-fertilisation between branches o f knowledge that so often is the
37
taproot o f technological change.
Mokyr goes onto claim that the ability to impose regulations limited free practice
of a craft, and the defence and protection of members in turn supported
conservative behaviour. These two factors negatively affected the process of
innovation and economic growth. In sum, pre-modem craft guilds imposed
product regulations, aimed to control the labour and product markets, and
bargained with the state over economic and political rents. Political privileges
were used to guarantee compulsory membership and the endurance of a
monopolistic regime.

37 Ibidem.
28
In recent years, however, a new revisionist literature has emerged to challenge

traditional views. Persson began by raising ‘elementary objections’ to the classical
interpretation. He noted that the medieval and early modem urban economy was
not composed of one but of many guilds that negotiated with each other under the
guidance of city authorities. In such negotiations, the outcome cannot be grasped
by the cartel metaphor, which implicitly assumes a duality of a cartel and a ‘non
cartelised’ sector. By contrast, Persson suggested that guilds provided stable
incomes and social security in highly unstable markets, in which agents normally
held market power.38
In this view, the guild system was interpreted as an intermediary between

the interests of consumers, represented by the city authorities, and of producers,
organised in guilds. By monitoring prices and quality standards, and negotiating
with the city authorities, the guild spread the risk of fluctuations in demand
equally among the guildsmen, and protected consumers against price volatility.
Persson went on to argue that the guild structure arose in order ‘to provide an
institutionalisation of the bargaining process’ which was necessary with poorly
developed economies. Through the guild system, ‘collusion was institutionalised
into co-operation, based on a balance o f rights and obligations more easily
manageable for the city authorities’.39
Similarly, Gustaffson analysed craft guilds with reference to their ‘ability to

reduce uncertainty and their effects of asymmetrically distributed information
between producers and consumers in early modem markets’.40 The maintenance
of quality standards guaranteed the consumer a quality product, while
simultaneously stimulating sales. Although Persson’s and Gustaffson’s
approaches seem to be applicable only to small-scale production for the local
market, they represent a real challenge to the dominant historiographical
orientation.
38 Persson, Pre-Industrial Economic Growth, pp.52-53.

39 Ibidem, p.53.
40 B. Gustaffson, ‘Introduction’, in B. Gustaffson (ed.) Power and Economic Institutions:
Reinterpretations in Economic History (Aldershot and Brookfield, 1991), p.47.
29
The previously mentioned studies by Michael Sonenscher of Parisian and

French guilds also questioned the actual incidence of the regulatory regime on
society, and argued that it was limited in time and highly variable. Following his
work, a growing number of studies described pre-industrial societies as more
developed and more dynamic than had been previously argued. In a study of Lille
and Leiden, Robert Du Plessis and Martha Howell confirmed the incompleteness
of the traditional historiographical picture, which presented merchants as the only
entrepreneurs and the artisan economy as dependent on merchant initiative. In
contrast, they stressed how craft guilds underpinned ‘small commodity
production’ even in the most economically advanced towns, providing a variety of
sophisticated goods to consumers.41 Meanwhile, Mackenney and other scholars
showed how complex metropolitan economies like that of Venice extended their
industrial base by expanding their guild system throughout the sixteenth century.42
In 1991, Hickson and Thompson objected that whereas cartels must fix
minimum prices and maximum quality, pre-industrial guilds and urban regulations
were invariably concerned with establishing maximum prices and minimum
quality, which actually encouraged competition through improved quality and
reduced input costs.43 The costs guilds created were outweighed by the benefits
they generated by overcoming imperfections in the capital markets and in quality
enforcement.44
Most recently, Epstein has reconsidered all the preceding perspectives in a

new theoretical framework. He has suggested that craft guilds emerged in the
Middle Ages in order to provide transferable skills through apprenticeship, and
that they provided the main source of training in manufacturing skills in the pre
41 R. Du Plessis and M. Howell, ‘Reconsidering the Early Modem Urban Economy: The Case of
Leiden and Lille’, Past and Present 94 (1982): 49-84.
42 R. Mackenney, Tradesmen and Traders: the World o f the Guilds in Venice and Europe, c.1250-
c.1650 (London and Sydney, 1987), p.80.
43 Hickson and Thompson, ‘New Theory’, p. 128. See also E.E. Hirshler, ‘Medieval Economic
Competition’, Journal o f Economic History 14 (1954): 52-58.
44 Hickson and Thompson, ‘New Theory’, pp. 128-30. However, it has been noted that although
guilds actually reduced information asymmetries and promoted quality standards, which improved
the marketing o f goods, similar results in small markets could be obtained as effectively through
informal arrangements and that therefore ‘the comparative advantage o f guilds in these respects is
not immediately apparent’. See S.R. Epstein, ‘Craft Guilds, Apprenticeship, and Technological
Change in Preindustrial Europe’, Journal o f Economic History 58 (1998): 686-87.
30
industrial economy.45 The basis of this theory locates the main purpose of guilds
not in the search for rents, as in the previous theory, but rather in training for skills
enhancement.
In his analysis, Epstein differentiates between two aspects of guild

behaviour, which are often confused:
the technological spillovers o f craft activities, which were largely unintentional,

unavoidable, and economically beneficial; and the crafts’ oligopolistic controls over
output, which were deliberate and had essentially negative effects, but were neither
universal, nor permanent, nor easily enforced 46
This theoretical model marks a turning point in the historiographical debate by

suggesting that we look at a different purpose in guild behaviour, which is not
limited to exogenous factors such as competition for the control of the labour
market and acquisition of privileges, but focuses instead on the endogenous
transmission of skills.
In this model, craft guilds are analysed in terms of the individual incentives
to participate in and support group strategies. The relationship between master and
apprentice is viewed as a conditio sine qua non for the guild’s existence and
survival for more than a half millennium. As master and apprentice are linked by
the need of both parties to invest in skilled labour, Epstein argues that the primary
function o f the craft association must therefore have been to enforce contractual
norms that reduced opportunism by masters and apprentices 47 A master had to be
sure that after his investment in training, he could rely on a cheap skilled labour
force for some years in order to repay his training costs; the apprentice had to be
sure that he would be fully and competently trained in a craft. The masters
provided training in order to increase the productivity of the workshop; the
apprentice could not learn the skills anywhere else. Both needed to protect
themselves against opportunistic behaviour by their counterpart, namely the

46 Ibidem, p.685.
47 Ibidem, p.687.
31
departure of an apprentice before he had repaid his training costs, or the firing of
an apprentice before he had fully learned his trade.48 According to this model,
craft guilds contributed to technological innovation and stimulated technical
diffusion. Consequently, the regions where guilds developed were provided with
technological benefits, particularly where central authorities were unwilling to
support the crafts' restrictive regulations.49 This argument also implies that guilds
did not arise naturally or spontaneously, and that their presence cannot be taken
for granted. Although the basic structure of the craft system remained unchanged
for more than half a millennium, the presence and the long-term success of guilds
was linked to local political and economic conditions. Epstein’s greatest
contribution is the combination of a social theoretical framework and economic
theory.
2.2.1 Guilds and proto-industrialisation
The aim o f this section is not to offer a complete analysis of the debate on proto
industry, but rather to focus on those specific aspects of proto-industry theory
related to debates on guilds. According to Mendels, ‘industry was pushed out of
its urban environment and into the countryside because of restrictions imposed by
the guilds on the labour supply - as well as on the freedom to produce and sell in
general’.50 Kriedte, Medick and Schlumbohm confirmed that ‘guilds limited the
artisans’ as they led control of quality and competition and prevented innovation
by being hostile to new techniques and limited access to the market.51 Finally,
48 It should be noted that although apprenticeship contracts could exist without guilds, crafit
regulations became more necessary as the size o f a town’s labour market expanded because it was
harder for individual masters and apprentices to monitor labour conditions. Therefore guilds
provided a central enforcement mechanism.
49 See the case study o f England in Epstein, ‘Craft Guilds’, p.698.
50 F. Mendels, Industrialisation and Population Pressure in Eighteenth-Century Flanders (New
York, 1981), p. 16; Ogilvie, State Corporatism, pp.72-73.
51 P. Kriedte, H. Medick and J. Schlumbohm, Industrialisation Before Industrialisation: Rural
Industry in the Genesis o f Capitalism (Cambridge, 1981), p.22.
32
Mokyr has described urban industry before proto-industrialisation as ‘stifled by

guilds’ and replaced by rural production.52
In this view, the increasing penetration of merchant capital into rural

production led to a greater dependency of producers on merchants and putters-out.
In the putting-out system, the merchants handed over (‘put out’) the raw materials
to rural producers who processed the raw materials in return for a piece rate.
Merchants encouraged the production of low and medium quality cloths in
response to increasing demand. ‘The urban crafts, unaccustomed to competition
from rural industries, were unable to resist it and collapsed’.54
Despite these emphatic statements, however, the causal connection between

the emergence of rural industry and the breakdown of the guilds has not been
empirically established. Ogilvie states that this perspective is based on the
experience of England and the Low Countries in the early nineteenth century, but
the Wurttemberg evidence, which is at the basis of her study, does not support it.
As Ogilvie notes, ‘the worsted industry o f the Wurttemberg Black Forest (...)
arose and survived for more than two centuries in a society characterised by “state
corporatism”: a symbiotic cooperation between the state and privileged corporate
groups’.55 In fact proto-industry arose in most European countries at a time when
guilds were strong, and proto-industries continued to be influenced by the urban
institutions for a very long time.56
Thus two opposing views emerge. On the one hand, scholars assumed the
existence of strong competition between the two modes of manufacture, guilds
versus proto-industry; on the other hand, recent empirical studies suggest that
52 J. Mokyr, ‘Growing-Up and the Industrial Revolution in Europe’, Exploration in Economic

History 31 (1976): 374.
53 S.C. Ogilvie and M. Cerman, ‘The Theories o f Proto-Industrialisation’, in S.C. Ogilvie and M.
Cerman (eds.) European Proto-Industrialisation (Cambridge, 1996), p.4.
54 Kriedte, Medick, and Schlumbohm, Industrialisation, p.7.
56 Ibidem, p .4 13. See also the urban character o f the Scottish proto-industry in I.D. Whyte, ‘Proto-
Industrialisation in Scotland’, in P. Hudson (ed.) Regions and Industries: A Perspective o f the
Industrial Revolution in Britain (Cambridge, 1989), p.234.
57 P. Malanima, La decadenza di un ’economia cittadina. L ’industria di Firenze nei secoli XVI e
XVIII (Bologna, 1982).
33
craft guild and proto-industrial production interacted positively with each other in
the pre-industrial market economy.58
The latter approach suggests that artisans and masters could become
entrepreneurs by employing other masters and competing with merchants or
acceding to mercantile status.59 Even Ogilvie notes that ‘guild honour mattered to
rural masters ... and guild account-books record rural masters paying mastership
fees, registering apprentices, paying guild dues, attending guild gatherings and
participating in guild lobbying’.60 Recent debates relating to the rise of the
modem factory and proto-industrialisation also claim that both systems prevailed
upon craft-based production because guilds were technologically more dynamic
and enjoyed greater economies o f scale.
Epstein suggests, by contrast, that craft-based industry was more likely to

have had greater technological dynamism thanks to the presence of
institutionalised apprenticeship. ‘For centuries, alternative arrangements were out-
competed, restricted to low-skilled production manufactures like protoindustry, or
forced to inhabit institutional niches like centralised manufactories’.61 It is
f\)
generally accepted that rural manufacture was technologically inert; indeed it
often recruited specialised masters trained in the towns, indicating that rural
workers in the putting-out system were consumers o f technological innovation,
rather than producers and providers of skills.
The two theories about guilds and proto-industry make competing verifiable
predictions. If guilds were the enemies of proto-industrialisation, the weak
development of guilds in early modem Sicily should have provided a precondition
for a vibrant proto-industrial base. If, by contrast, proto-industry was structurally
58 R.C. Davies, Shipbuilders o f the Venetian Arsenal: Workers and Workplace in the Pre-
Industrial City (Baltimore, 1991).
59 See M. Della Valentina, ‘Da artigiani a mercanti: carriere e conflitti nell’arte della seta a
Venezia fra 1600 e 1700’, paper presented at Corporazioni e gruppi professionali nell'Italia
moderna, Rome 26-27 September 1997 (Rome, 1997).
62 ‘Little evidence supports the view that proto-industry provided a significant source o f industrial
skills at any level’. Ogilvie, State Corporatism, p.27.
34
dependent on strong craft production, we would expect to find Sicilian proto

industry just as limited as its guilds.
2.2.2 State and guilds in the iseventeenth-century crisis’: the Italian case
The theory of a general economic and political crisis in the seventeenth century
has been accepted in European historiography since the famous 1960s debate in
the journal Past and Present.M The debate was cast at two levels of analysis: one
concerned the organisation of the modem nation state as guarantor of corporate
privileges, and the other concerned the emergence of the capitalist mode of
production, which is not the object of this discussion.
The classical literature on early modem guilds has emphasised the

privileged position they acquired due to the support of the emerging nation-states.
Scholars claimed that only the growth of a central state power could support the
acquisition o f privileges by corporate groups. Support for corporate and privileged
groups guaranteed the growing political and economic power o f the European
national state.65 An emerging central state backed the monopoly privileges of
corporate groups, which increased their control over the production system and
promoted the technological status quo. Ogilvie’s statement in particular is very
clear and explains the connection between the emergence o f the state and support
for corporate groups.
Most o f the states o f early modem Europe grew much faster than the economies that
sustained them, creating a mutual military menace so serious that they were willing
to issue almost any institutional privilege to corporate groups, in order to obtain the
resources and the cooperation needed for survival. The resulting military
entanglements and ruinous indebtedness kept most European states in thrall to these
groups and institutions until the late eighteenth century, if not beyond.66
64 T.H. Aston (ed.) Crisis in Europe, 1560-1660 (London, 1965).

65 Ogilvie, State Corporatism, pp.442-43. See also F. Chabod, Lo stato e la vita religiosa a Milano
n e ll’ epoca di Carlo V (Turin 1971), pp. 143-46.
35
Further, according to the classical theory, strong corporate groups were

responsible for the decline of some European economies such as that of Italy.
Hobsbawm has suggested a strong correlation between the expansion of the
Spanish Empire in early modem Europe and economic decline, which was most
noticeable in regions controlled by Spain like Italy and Castile.67 Carlo Maria
Cipolla68 and Walt Rostow69 also viewed the Italian case as paradigmatic, and
they were followed by numerous studies that explained the decline in terms of the
negative impact of Spanish domination on Italian territories.
Writing about Italian decline in the seventeenth century, Cipolla stated that
the main reason behind the ousting o f Italian textiles on the international market...
[despite the often superior quality o f Italian products] was always and fundamentally
the same: British, French, and Dutch products were sold at lower prices. ... Italian
industry, which had its hands tied by the complicated regulations o f the old town
guilds, persisted in the production by traditional methods o f articles excellent in
70
quality and out o f date in fashion.
He concluded that the excessive costs of Italian production were themselves due
to three main factors. First, ‘the excessive powers of the obsolete guilds and o f the
old corporate legislation [which] compelled Italian industry to adhere to
71
antiquated and out-of-date methods in business and production’; second,
taxation which in Italy was too high and poorly designed; finally, the cost of
labour which in Italy was greater than in competing countries. Fiscal pressure led
to state support for corporate groups, which in turn imposed high quality
standards and high labour costs. The ability of industrially and more developed
countries, such as England and Holland, to produce lighter and more colourful
67 E.F. Hobsbawm, ‘The Seventeenth Century in the Development o f Capitalism’, Science and
Society 24 (1960): 97-112.
68 C. M. Cipolla, ‘The Decline o f Italy’, Economic History Review 2nd ser., 5 (1952): 180-88.
69 W. Rostow, The Process o f Economic Growth (Oxford, 1953).
70 Cipolla, ‘Decline o f Italy’, p. 182.
71 Ibidem, pp.184-85.
36
cloths at lower costs pushed Italian production out of European markets. This
view has persisted to the present as the principal interpretation of the seventeenth-
century Italian manufacturing crisis.
Yet again, however, the conclusions about a stifling central state supporting
corporate groups, and their negative impact on urban societies, have been recently
challenged. Sella has argued that the seventeenth-century crisis in Lombardy was
precipitated mainly by a ‘city-state system’ based on the lack of institutional
77
uniformity. Black has highlighted that only the policy of freedom in the
administration of the communes could support the emergence of independent
associations of workers. A recent study by Donata Degrassi shows that
privileged and corporate groups arose in context of fragmented institutional
powers. She argues that only political competition could stimulate the interplay of
local powers with central institutions, which supported group membership in
exchange for political backing. The Italian communes could offer the necessary
and sufficient conditions to support guild membership and masters’ authority.74
Corporate groups developed with uncertain and temporary privileges and they
could not actually control the labour market. This argument seems to suggest that
a condition o f political instability could increase the bargaining power of
corporate groups that offered consensus in exchange for privileges and rents. By
contrast, the firm establishment of a central government could offer far less
opportunities for corporate groups to emerge and acquire a privileged position.
However, guilds emerged and succeeded not only in particular municipal contexts
as the city-states, but also in more centralised states, as in France.
Alternative explanations for Italian manufacturing decline during the

seventeenth century have shifted attention from corporate groups to local
institutions, merchant companies, and urban elites. A new wave of historical
studies has emphasised the autonomous role of the state and pressure of merchants
in maintaining quality standards, and has highlighted the guilds’ lack of
72 Sella, Crisis and Continuity, pp.29-31.

73 Black, Guilds and Civil Society, p. 10.
74 D. Degrassi, L ’economia artigiana nellTtalia medievale (Rome, 1996), p. 122.
37
independence in the administration of local labour markets.75 Moreover, guilds

responded positively to the need for innovation.76 Finally, scholars have begun to
revise the very idea of a general crisis in Italian manufacture, suggesting that a
reduction of activity occurred only during the last quarter of the seventeenth
century, and only in a few sectors.77
To sum up, there is still considerable controversy relating to the role of the state in
the development of corporate groups, and to their effects on urban economies.
Discussions about the optimal institutional context for the emergence and success
of craft guilds have led to the development of more careful investigations of
institutional contexts, guilds and their effects on the urban economies. Attention
has focused on two orders o f questions. On the one hand, the point is not to
determine whether guilds were rent-seeking organisations, since masters
obviously attempted to acquire privileges when and if they could; rather, the
question is whether guilds could exist and survive over the long term without
acquiring such political rents. On the other hand, it is necessary to investigate
which institutional context was best suited for the guilds’ establishment and
success without stifling the market economy.
It seems that guilds developed in accordance with the kind of backing they
received from local and central governments. The relationship between guilds and
institutions took three main shapes. First, politically unstable institutions backed
guilds unconditionally and enforced restrictive regulations in exchange for
political consensus and other benefits. Second, political authorities could decide to
support the development of craft groups without encouraging monopolistic and
restrictive behaviour. Third, under some circumstance the political elites remained
hostile to guild formation, with the result that craft guilds struggled to retain their
members and failed to accomplish their primary purposes.
75 F. Trivellato, ‘Salaires et justice dans les corporations venitiennes au XVIIe siecle. Le cas des
manufactures de verre’, Annales ESC 59 (1999): 245.
76 Idem, p.267.
77 Idem, p.260.
38
2.3 Sicilian guild studies: an overview
The debate relating to Sicilian guilds, as that relating to guilds elsewhere in

Europe, developed most forcefully at the end of the nineteenth century.78 Interest
in Sicilian guilds has focused on their origins, their social and religious functions
and, from the 1930s, their artistic production. Between 1896 and 1897 an
interesting discussion concerning the origins of the guilds was carried out by
Giovanni Scherma and Giuseppe Beccaria. Scherma identified the first evidence
for a guild system in the Arab period, specifically in the ninth century. He
supported his thesis with evidence relating to the existence of workshops and
artisans, the presence of roads and squares named after silversmiths or other
artisan activities, the names of silversmiths on royal diplomas, and the existence
in the main towns of groups of foreigners who used to live and work in the same
area. These groups, known as Logge or Nazioni, were organised according to
regulations that closely resembled those of the medieval guilds, particularly those
concerning craft supervision. Scherma also argued that in 1322 the Palermo city
council had to deal with a group of cloth merchants in order to establish the
measure to be used in market exchange. He stressed the importance of the fact that
in the fourteenth century king Frederick III established that artisans had to pay
gabelle and taxes according to the craft they exercised. Finally, he cited a specific
order of 1385, which established the sequence by which crafts proceeded toward
the cathedral of Palermo on August 15 of every year.
Beccaria noted, however, that Scherma’s evidence only pointed to the

♦ 70
existence o f crafts, not to their organisation in guilds. The cloth merchants’
ability to conduct a struggle with the town council and the simple fact of paying
78 See in particular G. Pollaci Nuccio, ‘Delle maestranze in Sicilia. Capitoli delli cochi e pastizzari,
Capitoli dei barbieri del 1642’, Nuove effemeridi siciliane ser.3, 5 (1877): 257-76; F. Lionti, Statuti
inediti delle antiche maestranze delle citta di Sicilia, Documenti per servire alia storia di Sicilia (now
DSSS), ser.2/3 (1883); V. Cusumano, ‘Contributo alia storia delle maestranze in Sicilia’, Giomale
degli economisti 3 (1890); S. Savagnone, Le maestranze in Sicilia (Palermo, 1892); G. Scherma,
Delle maestranze in Sicilia (Palermo, 1896); G. Beccaria, ‘Le maestranze siciliane e la questione
delle origini. Note critiche a proposito di una nuova pubblicazione’, ASS 22 (1897), special issue; F.
Marietta, ‘La costituzione e le prime vicende delle maestranze di Catania’, ASSOr 1 (1904): 354-8 and
2 (1905): 88-103.
79 Beccaria, ‘Maestranze siciliane’. See also BCPa, G. Beccaria, Statuti ossia capitoli di corporazioni
artigiane nel secolo XV in Sicilia, in ms. 5Qq E 190.
39
taxes did not make crafts into guilds, which were a sophisticated organisation. In
fact, he noted, even in modem times artisans paid certain taxes according to the
group they belonged to, but this fact did not make them guilds. Moreover,
Frederick Ill’s legislation concerned mles about hygiene and cleanliness in craft
activities, not craft guilds. Finally, Beccaria considered Palermo’s Ordo
cereorum, the alleged list of crafts drawn up in 1385. He noted that the sudden
appearance of 48 different craft groups in the 1380s was rather suspect,
considering that no other craft guilds were documented before the early fifteenth
century. Had they really existed, Beccaria reckoned, more and better
documentation should have survived; it was hard to believe that the poor evidence
for such a large number of guilds was due simply to chance documentary survival.
He suggested instead that the Ordo cerorum was actually a list of urban
occupational and status groups drawn up by the town council.
The debate thus clearly established the distinction between artisans and
guilds, and marked a turning point in the investigation of corporate origins. Craft
guilds were organisations able to impart mles and regulations, constrain their
members, and defend their local rights. Subsequently, however, De Stefano and
Leone claimed that Sicilian artisans were not specialised and that they worked in
order to satisfy domestic, largely aristocratic, consumption. De Stefano also noted
that craft guilds were poorly developed and claimed that they were unable to
evolve institutionally because of strong aristocratic opposition.80
More recently, Oddo has supplied that Sicilian artisans increased their
influence in town administrations by providing ad hoc services such as skilled
labour, overnight defence of the city walls, and judicial functions for petty civil
trials. Oddo recalled the hypothesis of La Colla,81 who had highlighted the guilds’
social and military roles, and who, following the general trend in guild studies,
80 F. De Stefano, Storia della Sicilia dall'X I al XIX secolo (Bari, 1977), pp.49-50, 77-79, 89-91.
S. Leone, ‘Lineamenti di una storia delle corporazioni in Sicilia nei secoli XTV-XVir, ASSr 2 (1956):
91 n.43, 93.
81 Lionti, Statuti inediti, p.50.
82 ‘Les corps s ’etant cristallises autour des privileges antisociaux, se maintenaient pour defendre
l’egoisme des privilegies; ils conferaient un poids institutionnel aux interets bien proteges de ceux
qui avaient acquis des droits particuliers, de quelque nature qu’ils fussent’. (D.D. Bien, ‘Les
offices, les corps et le credit d'Etat: l'utilisation des privileges sous 1’ ancien regime’, Annales 43
(1988): 390).
40
had described the ability of these corporate groups to obtain specific privileges as
O '!
a ‘feudalism of the people’. Oddo interpreted the emergence and development of

craft guilds as reflecting the rise of a new ‘middle class’ in open opposition to the
urban aristocracy.84 The literature has therefore confirmed a widespread inability
of Sicilian guilds to form strong social and political organisations, capable of
bargaining successfully with local authorities and with the central power.85 Yet
the specific reasons for this weakness and its consequences remained confused
and unexplored.
Finally, attention must be paid to a quite separate field of research, which has
brought to light significant new documentation, namely art history, which has
focused especially on silversmiths, goldsmiths, leather-workers, sculptors,
painters, and pottery-makers, for the purpose of understanding luxury
production. The perspective and methodology used by art historians has been
quite different from that of economic and social historians, for they have aimed to
define a stylistic continuity and originality in Sicilian artistic production, and they
have focused on artistic output as expressing the circulation of ideas and
individual originality rather than as a manifestation of craft organisation. Art
historians have been concerned with objects, rather than with the individuals and
their social relations; however, art historians have uncovered numerous archival
sources and unpublished manuscripts, which have helped interpret trademarks and
identify individual artisans. They have shed light on the degree of artisanal
specialisation and on craft mobility throughout the region, and have generally
produced the best secondary source material on the topic of pre-industrial craft
guilds.
83 Lionti defined guilds as ‘natural daughters o f the feudal system ... A feudalism o f the people’.
(Lionti, Statuti inediti, pp.XXX).
84 F.L. Oddo, Le maestranze di Palermo (secc.XII-XIX). Aspetti e momenti di vita sociale
(Palermo, 1991), p.19.
85 A.M. Precopi Lombardo, L ’artigianato trapanese dal XIV al XIX secolo (Palermo, 1987), p. 19.
86 See G. Di Marzo, I Gagini e la scultura in Sicilia nei secoli X V e XVI (Palermo, 1880-83); see also
G. Di Marzo, Delle belle arti in Sicilia (Palermo, 1858). More recent works are M. Accascina,
Oreficeria in Sicilia, dal XII al XIX secolo (Palermo, 1974); M. Accascina, I marchi delle argenterie e
oreficerie siciliane (Palermo, 1976); G. Bresc Bautier, Artistes, patriciens et confreries. Production
et consummation de I'oeuvre d'art a Palerme et en Sicile occidentale, 1348-1460 (Rome, 1979).
41
Chapter 3 Economic and political developments in early modem Sicily
Chapter 3
Economic and political developments in early modern Sicily
Interpretations of the economic history of medieval and early modem Sicily focus
mainly on the island’s backwardness and industrial failure. Explanations point to
economic inefficiency and to fiscal and political pressure exercised by the Spanish
state. Medieval and early modem Sicily specialised in grain exports and had a
comparative advantage in agriculture, although the causes and particularly the
consequences of this agricultural specialisation are under debate. Traditional
historiography points to political pressure, or exogenous factors, to explain the
dominance of the agricultural sector, which is supposed to define a poorly
developed and stagnant economy.
In his important study of medieval Sicily, Bresc refers to the final defeat of
the Muslims in the mid-thirteenth century to explain the end of technical expertise
in manufacturing in the island, and the enforcement of the grain monoculture by
Frederick II. Furthermore, recalling Croce, Bresc locates the establishment of
Sicily’s role as grain supplier in the Mediterranean during the war of the Vespers
of 1282 against the Angevins and in the establishment of the Aragonese reign that
followed.1 Alternatively, in his work on the transition to capitalism, Aymard has
suggested that Sicilian industrial failure was a consequence of the strong
commercial pressure that the most developed metropoles of Venice, Milan,
Genoa, and Florence exercised through the exports of high quality and luxury
goods, and which prevented the South’s manufacture to develop.
The historical literature thus portrays southern Italy, and Sicily in particular,
as classic instances of pre-modem economic underdevelopment. Sicily’s
agricultural economy depended on the commercially advanced North; as Bresc
put it, the island’s exchange of grain and agricultural goods for capital intensive,
high value manufactures and luxury goods was a clear example o f ‘unequal
1 H. Bresc, Un monde mediterraneen. Economie et societe en Sicile, 1300-1450, vol. I (Rome,

1986), pp.576, 917.
2 M. Aymard, ‘La transizione dal feudalesimo al capitalismo’, in R. Romano and C. Vivanti (eds.)
Storia d ’ Italia: Annali, I (Turin, 1988), pp. 1143, 1145, 1147, 1158, 1169-70.
42
exchange’.3 The industrial and commercial superiority of the North was reflected
in the more rapid development of city-states in the North and in economic
dependency in the South.4
These explanations of Sicilian backwardness are based on two main
assumptions. First, scholars assume a dependence of the South on manufacture
imports from the North. Second, they believe that agriculture must have been less
productive than manufacturing industry, and therefore incapable o f providing the
region with profitable revenues. Regarding the significance of imports from north-
central Italy, however, Epstein has proved that no more than 2 to 5 per cent of the
Sicilian population could actually buy imported luxury goods, and that the
remaining 95 per cent were not involved in this trade.5 Regarding agriculture, it is
clear that in Sicily it was highly productive and dynamic.6
This thesis aims to show that Sicily specialised in agriculture for two main
reasons. First, the island’s agriculture was highly productive, as shown by data
relating to exports, and to more general indicators such as the rate of population
growth and evidence for standards of living. Consequently, the economy - which
had expanded strongly during the sixteenth century as elsewhere in western
Europe - simply stabilised during the seventeenth century, but did not collapse as
happened in other European regions. The second reason why Sicily developed a
comparative advantage in agriculture is the poor development o f autochtonous
craft guilds, which held back the emergence of a strong export-led manufacture.
The late development of corporate groups hindered the transmission of skills and
growth in the manufacturing sector, and gave agriculture an additional
comparative advantage.
3 Ibidem, p. 167.
4 The origins o f the southern question (questione meridionale) and theories at the basis o f the
question are discussed in detail in S.R. Epstein, An Island fo r Itself. Economic Development and
Social Change in Late Medieval Sicily (Cambridge, 1992), ch.l. See also P. Jones, ‘Economia e
societa nellTtalia medievale: la leggenda della borghesia’, in Romano and Vivanti (eds.) Storia
d ‘I talia, pp. 185-372.
5 S.R. Epstein, ‘The Textile Industry and the Foreign Cloth Trade in Late Medieval Sicily (1300-
1500): a “colonial relationship”?’ Journal o f Medieval History 15 (1989): 141-83.
6 Epstein, Island fo r itself ch.4.
43
Chapter 3 Economic and political developments in early m odem Sicily
This chapter aims to show the dynamic character of the economy of

sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Sicily. The first part of the chapter
discusses the positive trend o f the Sicilian economy over two centuries and the
existence of an integrated labour market. The second part of the chapter analyses
the transition to Aragonese dominion, considers how institutional changes
affected Sicilian development in the early modem period, and looks at the
emergence of corporate groups under the control of local and central authorities.
3.1 Economic factors: pattern of trade, population growth and the labour
market
Regional integration and specialisation spurred economic growth in Sicily from

the later Middle ages. The Sicilian economy expanded and became increasingly
export-oriented after the Black Death, thanks in part to the process of political
centralisation realised by the Aragonese and later by the Spanish state.
Institutional innovations lowered domestic transport costs, reduced imbalances
between demand and supply, enforced contracts more efficiently, and stimulated
labour mobility.7
By the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century, Sicily
had completely recovered from the demographic crisis of the second half o f the
fourteenth century. Although the first two decades of the sixteenth century were
characterised by great political and economic instability, by the 1530s widespread
and general improvements could be observed. Ground rents doubled between the
1540s and 1560s (from 0.18-0.20 hi wheat/ha to 0.28-0.30 hi wheat/ha), with
sharper rises in the coastal areas where export costs were lower, and slower,
steady increases inland. Between 1561 and mid-1570s rents quadmpled, and
continued to increase more slowly until 1581. Afterwards, average ground rents
declined but stabilised at about two-and-a-half times the original values (0.45-
0.48hl/ha).8 Prices and ground rents rose faster than monetary inflation, and
7 Epstein, Island fo r itself pp.96-97.

8 In spite o f such a remarkable increase, Sicily had very low ground rents compared to other
countries in Europe. In southern France average ground rent was about 1.5 hl/ha, while in the
region around Paris and in Saxony it was 2.5 hl/ha. In 1600, it increased to 3 hl/ha in Languedoc
44
contract terms became ever shorter, owing to strong competition for the best lands
among agricultural entrepreneurs (gabelloti) and tenants.9
Agricultural expansion continued up to the first half of the seventeenth
century, and stimulated a slow but constant increase of the population in the
cereal-growing western half o f the island; elsewhere there was agricultural
intensification, with a growth in vineyard, olives and silk production. Sicily,
traditionally one of the main Mediterranean grain suppliers, responded positively
to increase domestic and international demand for food by expanding its exports,
particularly to Naples, Rome, Florence, and Genoa.10 By the late fifteenth century
average exports had reached 100,000 salme per annum, about twice those of the
first half of the century. By 1521-30 an average of 150,000 salme were exported
abroad per year, out of more than 250,000 salme sold within and outside the
region (intra e fuori regno). However, as the Sicilian population was also growing
at a fast rate, the proportion of exports to total output declined over time.11
At the turn of the sixteenth century, numerous initiatives for industrial
manufacturing emerged, particularly in Palermo, where there arose a cloth
industry,12 an ironworks,13 and a hat and dying industry.14 In Messina, the
production of silk cloth developed in parallel with the expansion of the town’s
control over the rural villages (casali) and over southern Calabria.15 A Jewish
and 5 hl/ha in the region around Paris. O. Cancila, Impresa, redditi e mercato nella Sicilia
moderna (Palermo, 2nd ed. 1993), p.45. Data in E. Le Roy Ladurie, ‘Les masses profondes: la
paysannerie’, Histoire economique et sociale de la France, 2 vols. (Paris, 1977), v o l.l, p.637.
Cancila, Impresa, redditi e mercato, pp.38-39.
10 Data for the grain trade in the early modem period are in O. Cancila, Baroni e popolo nella
Sicilia del grano (Palermo, 1983), pp.33-35; Cancila, Impresa, redditi e mercato, pp.257-58, 260;
H.G. Koenigsberger, The Practice o f Empire (Ithaca and New York, 1969), pp.79-80; M. Aymard,
‘L’approvisionnement des villes de la Mediterranee occidentale (XVIe-XVIIIe siecles)’, Flaran 5
(1983): 179; Epstein, Island fo r Itself, pp.270-91.
11 O. Cancila, L ’economia della Sicilia. Aspetti storici (Vicenza, 1992), p.25. Cancila, Impresa,
redditi e mercato, p.248-49.
12 See A. Baviera Albanese, In Sicilia nel secolo XVI: verso una rivoluzione industriale? (Palermo,
1974), pp.77-78; C. Trasselli, Da Ferdinando il Cattolico a Carlo V. L ’ esperienza siciliana, 1475-
1525, 2 vols. (Cosenza, 1982).
13 A Piedmontese master promoted the ironworks in Palermo (G. Giarrizzo, ‘La Sicilia dal
Cinquecento all’Unita d’ltalia’, in G. Galasso (ed.) La Sicilia dal Vespro a ll’Unita, vol. 16 (Turin,
1989), p.231 n.5).
14 For the hat industry and dye works see ACPa, Prowiste, 118, cc.151, 172v (1512-13).
15 C. Gallo, ‘II setificio in Sicilia’, Nuova raccolta di opuscoli siciliani (Palermo, 1878): 225; G.
Platania, ‘Sulle vicende della sericoltura in Sicilia’, ASSOr 20 (1924): 242-75; F. Marietta, ‘L’ arte
della seta a Catania nei secoli XV-XVII’, ASSOr 22 (1926): 46-91; A. Petino, ‘L ’arte e il consolato
della seta a Catania nei secoli XTV-XIX’, ASSOr 38-39 (1942-43): 15-78; C. Trasselli, ‘Ricerche
sulla seta siciliana (sec.XIV-XVII)’, Economia e storia 12 (1965): 213-71.
45
master, Charonecto Gerardino from Catanzaro (Calabria) was invited by the

councilors of Faro in 1486 ab introducendum magisterium, to introduce the craft
of weaving silk cloth, particularly velvet.16
Eastern Sicily therefore participated in the European boom in silk
production.17 According to Epstein, in Sicily ‘silk manufacture developed
successfully in the late fifteenth century when foreign competition was not yet
18
fully established and foreign markets were expanding fast’. ‘The silk industry
faced new and more rapidly expanding international markets in which, in contrast
to the luxury wool industry, neither technical nor commercial know-how were yet
in the hands of established competitors’.19 Nonetheless, Messinese silk production
90
and exports remained limited until the first decades o f the sixteenth century. The
first guild gathering silk weavers, spinners, and dyers arose no earlier than 1520
and followed the statutes of Catanzaro approved by Charles V a year before. The
industry slowly expanded during the second half of the sixteenth century, and silk
91
remained the only significant industrial export of early modem Sicily.
Messina was far more important as an exporter of raw silk, which it
gathered both from its immediate hinterland and from neighbouring southern
Calabria. In 1591, Messina paid a tax of 583,333 scudi to obtained a trade and
excise monopoly on all the silk produced in the territory between Termini and
Syracuse.22 In addition, it was promised the residence of the viceroy’s court for
eighteen months every three years. The privilege came at the end of a period of
very rapid growth in silk exports, which by the early seventeenth century had
become the most important good traded from Sicily.23 According to Aymard,
there were three phases in the export trend: a first phase of fast growth that
reached its peak between 1626 and 1631; a second phase up to 1670 characterised
16 Trasselli, ‘Ricerche sulla seta’, p.225.

17 A. Manikowski, ‘II secolo della seta. Conseguenze del boom della seta nei Seicento e le
trasformazioni sociali e politiche in Europa’, in S. Cavaciocchi (ed.) La seta in Europa secc. XIII-
XIX (Florence, 1993), pp.839-53.
18 Epstein, Island fo r Itself, p. 196 n.123.
19 Ibidem, p.206.
20 Trasselli, ‘Ricerche sulla seta’, p.224.
21 Ibidem, pp.234-35. See the numerous contracts for looms.
22 A tax o f 25 grana ‘per ogni libra di seta cosi cruda come operata, o bianca in sapone, che si esce
da questa citta di Messina tanto per fori quanto per infraregno’ (S. Laudani, La Sicilia della seta
(Rome, 1996), p.85).
23 Cancila, Impresa, redditi e mercato, p.252.
46
by slowly declining volumes; and finally, a third phase characterised by steady

recovery up to 1728 (after the crisis following Messina’s revolt in 1674) which
however failed to boost exports to the levels achieved before 1640.24
To sum up, starting in the fifteenth century, the island specialised to two main
agricultural sectors: the eastern half produced silk and other labour-intensive
agricultural goods such as olives, fruit and wine, while the western half produced
mainly grain. By the seventeenth century, the two areas became politically more
competitive and Messina suggested splitting the island into two autonomous
regions: the Sicilian Parliament, however refused. This led Messina to rise in
rebellion against the Spanish domination in a bid for independence backed by the
French. Nevertheless, Messina failed, and the ensuing punishment virtually froze
all local economic activities for about a decade. Seventeenth-century Palermo, on
the other hand, reinforced its position as the regional capital, thanks also the fact
that the viceroy established his court there permanently during the 1630s. The
decision stimulated demand for luxury goods produced locally, and led to an
increase in the number of artisans and guilds in Palermo itself and in Trapani, the
second largest city on the western coast. By contrast, the number and membership
of craft guilds contracted in the east of the island, which began to regularly buy
manufactures from the western half.
Rates of population growth provide a rough index for identifying long-term

economic expansion. The Sicilian population maintained a generally positive
trend throughout the early modem period. Between 1440 and 1460 the population
started to increase very rapidly and that expansion lasted until the late sixteenth
century.26 During the sixteenth century, the population doubled, although the
24 M. Aymard, ‘Commerce et production de la soie sicilienne aux XVTe-XVTIe siecle’, Melanges

de archeologie et d ’ histoire 77 (1965): 625.
25 O. Cancila, Aspetti di un mercato siciliano, Trapani nei secoli XVII-XIX (Caltanissetta and
Rome, 1972), p.23.
26 Census for fiscal reports have been collected for 1402, 1408, 1434, 1441-42, 1442-43, 1464 and
1478 in order to distribute the payment o f the donations throughout the population. Unlike the
Riveli (census starting from 1501) which are based on nominal lists, the documents are not very
clear. Demographic studies have been developed by J. Beloch, Bevolkerungsgeschichte Italiens
(Berlin, 1937), C. Trasselli, ‘Ricerche sulla popolazione della Sicilia nei secolo X V ’, Atti
47
western part maintained its traditionally lower density compared to the rest of the
island, with under 20 inhabitants per square kilometre compared to the eastern
half which had 32.6 inhabitants per square kilometre.27 About twenty Sicilian
towns had between 8,000 and 20,000 inhabitants. In Catania, the second largest
city in the eastern area, the population doubled, and in Messina population grew
threefold, from 31,000 inhabitants in 1505 to 100,000 in 1605. Palermo grew from
25,000 to 100,000 between 1505 and 1605, by which time it comprised ten per
cent of the total population. Sicily therefore presented one of the highest rates of
urbanisation in Europe, even by comparison with northern Italy, where
urbanisation was a high 25-40 per cent.28
Demographic growth was also magnified by the very high rates of
permanent immigration beginning in the late fifteenth century. Aymard has
distinguished two flows of immigrants.29 The first of these comprised people who
came from the north, from places such as Genoa and Lombardy, Spain, Germany,
and the Netherlands, and who resided in the island permanently with their
families. They occupied important roles in the economy of the region and in the
local urban administrations and contributed to the establishment of economic and
bureaucratic elites. Italian merchants played an important role in Sicilian history
and economy; Venetian and Florentine merchants used to connect Sicily with
England and Flanders from the main ports of Palermo and Messina. For centuries,
Ragusa, modem Dubrovnik, maintained a large colony of merchants in Sicily,
who benefited from political neutrality as vassals of the Turkish Sultan and under
papal protection, and who acted as intermediaries with the Islamic world.
Albanians and Greeks left their lands because of the Turkish advances towards the
Balkans and moved to the island creating new settlements, some of which survive
d e ll’accademia di scienze, lettere e arti di Palermo, 4th ser., 15 (1956): 213-71. Bresc, Un monde
mediterraneen, and the latest and most detailed is the one by Epstein, Island fo r Itself, p.61.
27 M. Aymard, ‘La Sicilia: profili demografici’, in G. Giarrizzo (ed.) Storia della Sicilia (Naples,
1978), p.229.
28 J. De Vries, ‘Pattern o f Urbanization in Pre-Industrial Europe, 1500-1800, in H. Shmal (ed.)
Patterns o f European Urbanization Since 1500 (London, 1981). S.R. Epstein, ‘Nuevas
aproximaciones a la historia urbana de Italia: el renacimiento temprano’, Hispania 58/2, 199
(1998): 424-25.
29 Aymard, ‘Sicilia: profili demografici’, p.226.
30 D. Mack Smith, A History o f Sicily. M edieval Sicily, 800-1713 (London, 1968), p. 104.
48
Chapter 3 Economic and political developments in early modern Sicily
today as separate ethnic communities, like Palazzo Adriani, Piana (still called
Piana dei Greci) and Mezzoiuso.
A second flow of immigration occurred during the early sixteenth century
and introduced numerous artisans and skilled labourers into the region from Spain
and central-northern Italy; examples include the Lombard stonecutters, or silver-
and goldsmiths. In Palermo, the number of foreign artisans requests for
citizenship also increased.31
Internal migration was also strong and tended to flow toward the main urban
centres. Numerous wage-labourers came from the Madonie mountains to Palermo,
and from the Nebrodi and Peloritani mountains to the northeast; however, western
rural settlements and urban industries also attracted people from central and
southwestern Sicily and from Calabria. This permanent and seasonal labour
mobility increased the integration of the regional labour market. Thus the
shoemaking industry in the Palermo monastery of San Martino alle Scale
employed labourers coming from different parts of the island, such as Noto,
Scicli, Salemi, Tusa, and Petralia.33
During the second half of the sixteenth century, many of the older towns
underwent successive reductions in ‘territorial self-sufficiency’.34 This initially
took the form of physical reductions of the rural hinterland, a process that was
initiated by enfiefments (infeudazioni) of common land, and was later intensified
by the concessions of licences that sanctioned the emergence of new territorial
and jurisdictional units. Feudal licences came with judicial rights and the rights to
found new villages, which gave feudatories almost limitless jurisdictional powers
over their new territories.
31 Towns that in the 1530s attempted to enforce urban privileges so as to attract immigrants, in the
second half o f the century registered numerous applications for citizenship and requests for legal
guarantees from foreigners. See ACPa, Atti Bandi Provviste, 151, cc.83v-92v, cc.102 and 125rv
(1546-47); 152, cc.92rv, 95, 105v, 115v-16r, 119, 120 (1547-48); 153, cc.96v (1548-49).
Silversmiths and goldsmiths arrived in Palermo from Naples, Genoa, Rome, Milan, Venice,
Valenza, Aragon.
32 Epstein, Island fo r Itself, p.219.
33 O. Cancila, ‘Esperienze precapitalistiche in un monastero siciliano, 1581-82’, Critica storica 10
(1973): 315, and O. Cancila, Impresa, redditi e mercato, p. 146. Smaller towns attracted labourers
mainly from the surrounding areas. A consistent number o f people moved to Trapani, particularly
from Monte San Giuliano (modem Erice), Marsala, and Partanna. See Cancila, Aspetti di un
mercato siciliano, p. 15.
34 T. Davies, ‘Changes in the Structure o f the Wheat Trade in Seventeenth-Century Sicily and the
Building o f New Villages’, Journal o f European Economic History 12 (1983): 371-405.
49
The phenomenon of new settlements was related to the need to bring under
cultivation empty tracts of land in central and western Sicily that were particularly
suited to cereal production.35 Between 1583 and 1748, the number of settlements
on the island increased from 195 to 326; of the 131 new villages, 90 were founded
in the first half of the seventeenth century.36 These formed more than 50 per cent
of the new settlements that appeared in the three centuries before the formal
abolition of feudalism in Sicily in 1812. The following chart on the settlement of
Paceco shows the percentage o f new inhabitants coming from the closest areas;
the largest section represents people coming from the neighbouring demanial
towns (Fig.3.1).
Fig.3.1 Origins of immigrants in Paceco, 1608-23
■ Trapani. Marsala. Monte S.Giuliano
O Calatafimi, Partanna. Vita. Salemi,

Castelvetrano
P o th e rs
*Source\ B enigno, Una casa, una terra, p.60.
35 There is a huge bibliography on this topic. See L. Genuardi, Terre comuni ed usi civici in Sicilia
(Palermo, 1907); M. Aymard, ‘Un bourg de Sicile entre XVIe et XVIIe siecle: Ganci’, in
Conjoncture economique, structures sociales. Hommage a Ernest Labrousse (Paris, 1974),
pp.359-61; M. Aymard, ‘Sicilia: sviluppo demografico e sue differenziazioni geografiche, 1500-
1800’, in E. Sori (ed.) Demografia storica (Bologna, 1975); D. Ligresti, Sicilia moderna. Le citta e
gli uomini (Naples, 1984); F. Benigno, Una casa una terra. Ricerche su Paceco: paese nuovo
della Sicilia del sei e settencento (Catania, 1985); G. Longhitano, Studi di storia della popolazione
siciliana. Riveli, numerazioni, censimenti (1568-1861) (Catania, 1988); F.F. Gallo, Dal feudo al
borgo. II primo decennio di vita di Floridia attraverso I ’analisi del “rivelo di beni, anime e
facolta ” del 1636 (Floridia, 1997).
36 Benigno, Una casa, una terra, p. 18.
50
Settlers were attracted by the favourable conditions offered by landlords, such as

concessions for building areas and land in long-term leasehold (emphyteusis) at
relatively low rates, as well as fiscal and judicial protection. Most of the first
inhabitants of the new settlements came from the main demanial towns, spurring a
steady rate of migration from the last quarter of the sixteenth century onwards.
These new settlements therefore competed with the main urban centres for
population and resources. New, small and dispersed markets were established
37
around the towns in order to supply growing inland demand more effectively.
Newly cultivated lands included both grain production and vineyards and olives,
increasing demand for labour and raising average living standards.
During the sixteenth century, inhabitants of the royal towns represented
more than fifty per cent of the Sicilian population; in 1505, they were about 52.8
per cent, and in 1569, they were about 59.8 per cent. From the 1570s, the relative
size of the demanial population steadily declined, falling to about 56.3 per cent in
1583, and 53.1 per cent by 1623. By 1651, the royal demesne included only 46
per cent o f the total population (Fig.3.2).38
37 Gallo, Dal feudo al borgo, p.33 n.35.

38 The figures cited in this paragraph are from F. Renda, ‘Le citta demaniali nella storia siciliana’, in
F. Benigno and C. Torrisi (eds.) Citta e feudo nella Sicilia modema (Catania, 1995), p.40. See also
the studies about population by F. Maggiore Pemi, La popolazione di Sicilia e di Palermo dal XI al
XVIII secolo (Palermo, 1892); Longhitano, Studi di storia della popolazione, tables pp. 147-175.
51
Fig 3.2 The distribution of population in demanial and feudal lands
□ demanial population
■ feudal population
1505 1569 1583 1623 1651

y ea rs
*Data: Renda ‘Le citta dem aniali’, p.40.
Nonetheless, sixteen out of the largest eighteen towns with a population of 10,000
people or more remained in the royal demesne, despite the fact that the shift in
population toward the new settlements meant that excises levied in the demesne
(gabelle), especially on foodstuffs, weighed more heavily on a reduced number of
consumers. Demanial towns responded to these threats by promoting a number of
fiscal initiatives, such as debt reduction, easier access to citizenship, and
concessions of monopoly.39 During the same period, however, the population of
Sicily as a whole steadily increased, from 600,000 in 1501, to 900,000 in 1569,
and 1,147,000 by 1623. Despite a slowdown from the 1580s onwards, Sicily did
not suffer major population losses during the seventeenth century (as occurred
elsewhere in Italy and Europe) because any loss of population in the eastern area
was compensated by gains on the western coast (Fig.3.3).
39 See Davies, ‘Changes in the Structure’, p.204, and for Syracuse in 1629 and 1637, Gallo, Dal
feudo al borgo, p.32, n.32.
52
Fig.3.3 The population of Sicily, 1501-1681

1200000
1100000
1000000
900000
800000
700000
600000
500000
1501 1548 1569 1583 1606 1616 1623 1636 1651 1681
* Sources: Longhitano, Studi d i s to ria d ella p o p o la zio n e.
Sicilian larger towns also confirm the positive trend of population. Palermo
showed a constant growth of the population until the plague in 1623, when after a
considerable decline the rate stabilised around 110,000 people. Messina showed a
fast growing rate of population in the second half of the sixteenth century; the city
then stabilised until the revolt in 1674, which froze Messina’s economic and
social life and also affected population growth. Population in Catania and Trapani
remained flat; however, while Catania declined in the mid-seventeenth century
following the effects of Messina’s downturn, Trapani grew to surpass 20,000
along the lines of Palermo’s growth and of development in the western half of the
island (Fig.3.4).40
40 The competition between Messina and Palermo to become the regional capital had a negative
effect on the development o f Messina.
53
Fig.3.4 Population of Palermo, Messina, Catania and Trapani, 1569-1714
140,000
125,000
110,000
95,000
- Palermo
re 80,000 - Messina
-Catania
-Trapani
65,000
50,000
35,000
20,000
5,000
1569 1583 1593 1606 1616 1623 1636 1651 1681 1714
* S o u rce: Longhitano, Studi d i s to ria d ella p o p o la zio n e.
As Sicily was a major grain exporter throughout the early modem period, grain
prices provide an important insight into the economy of the island. On the
Palermo market, grain prices rose fast during the sixteenth century, but increased
at a slower rate in the seventeenth century, very much in harmony with trends in
population (Fig.3.5). Between 1500 and 1600, the price of wheat increased six
fold, but thereafter the price remained by and large stable.
54
Fig.3.5 Average grain prices (mete), 1476-1720 (tari)
80
70
60
1 50 - P alerm o
■Trapani
40 — —trend
(Palerm o)
trend
(Trapani)
20
* Source: Cancila, Im presa redditi m ercato, p.222
Inflationary pressures also affected prices for other foodstuffs and manufactures,
although precise data are very scarce. The price o f cheese increased by 38 per cent
between the mid-sixteenth century and the early seventeenth century, and by 23
per cent between the 1650s and 1670s. In the first half of the seventeenth century,
the price of wine increased by between 43 and 55 per cent compared to the last
half of the sixteenth century.41 The price of some agricultural tools trebled during
the sixteenth century. In 1512, Palermo city council set the price o f a hoe at no
more than 2.5 tari, and that of a brush hook at 1.5 tari', by the late 1590s, the price
of a hoe had risen to 7 tari, and that of a brush hook to 3 tari. 42 By contrast,
compared with the trend elsewhere in Europe, nominal wages displayed far
greater stickiness, showing only a doubling in value during the sixteenth
century.43
41 Ibidem, p. 177.
42 Maggiore Pemi, Popolazione siciliana, p.592; Cancila, Impresa, redditi e mercato, p. 113.
43 However, according to Cancila’s study o f a big farm in the Palermo territory between 1472-73
and 1583-84 nominal salaries for sugar workers increased by 50 per cent with fluctuations between
55
3.2 Political institutions and the ‘late’ development of corporate groups
As discussed previously, the literature on early modem guilds has emphasised the
privileged position that craft guilds acquired due to the support of the emerging
nation-state. Ogilvie has argued that only the growth of a central state power
could support the acquisition of privileges by corporate groups.44 However, the
literature does not clearly explain the relation between state formation and craft
guilds. The analysis of the Sicilian case offers a new angle on this complex
process. Although early modem Sicily was very much part of, and influenced by,
the fast growing Spanish state, Sicilian craft guilds remained weak, and did not
acquire any relevant political or economic privileges. Consequently, the Sicilian
example suggests that the inevitability of guild success on the coat tails of
burgeoning early modem state has been exaggerated. In chapter 2, we discussed
the view that guild success might have depended on the presence of more strong
political competition, than of a strong, monopolistic state and more specifically on
the willingness by local and central institutions to support craft guilds and their
regulations. In this section I examine whether the Sicilian case supports the latter
hypothesis.
The end of the fourteenth century represented a turning point in Sicilian political
history. Between 1392 and 1395, Martin, Duke of Montblanc, and his son Martin
invaded and conquered Sicily, after a long period of baronial anarchy. Martin I
became king of Sicily, and his father king of Catalonia and Aragon. The re
conquest of the island by the Aragonese re-established a centralised institutional
framework, based on a relatively stable government. Martin I of Sicily promoted
0 and +111 per cent in the second half o f the sixteenth century. Maggiore Pemi registered a similar
increase for masons and carpenters:
salaries in tori: 1512-13 1580s
agriculture labourer 1.5-1.10 2-3
apprentice masons 1-1.15 2.10-3
carpenters and masons 2.10 4-5
Data from Maggiore Pemi, Popolazione siciliana, p.587; C. Trasselli, ‘Alcuni calmieri palermitani del
‘400’, Economia e storia 3 (1968): 354; Cancila, Impresa, redditi e mercato, p.147.
44 S. Ogilvie, State Corporatism and Proto-Industry. The Wiirttemberg Black Forest, 1580-1797
(Cambridge, 1997), pp.29-31.
56
the reorganisation of the institutional framework in order to guarantee the

representation of different political and social interests. The need for central
government to maintain the consensus of, and control over, local powers, through
recognition of the feudal class, had its counterpart in the gradual extension of
wider administrative autonomy to the royal demesne towns. Demanial towns
represented a major political characteristic of late medieval and early modem
Sicily, for they included the major commercial centres of the island and more than
half of the population (Fig. 3.2). Increasingly from the end of the fourteenth
century, royal demesne towns claimed stronger juridical and administrative
prerogatives, which they obtained through negotiation over new customs and
privileges. The formalisation of elective structures, the drafting of juridical rights,
and the recognition of corporate privileges began under Martin I, and continued
with increasing vigour until the reign of Charles V, as a counterpart for political
and fiscal consensus. 45 The power of municipal governments was thus
consolidated by the rise of central government and operated within the central
structures of the monarchy, in order to obtain the confirmation, approval, and
recognition of urban privileges and statutes.46
From the 1430s onwards, in a period of institutional reform and upheaval
instigation by king Alfonso, groups of masters requested the election of
representatives and the formal approval of their statutes, as means both to affirm
their authority over local producers and to find a place in local urban
administrations.
The end of the sixteenth century saw another important turning point. On the one
hand, the state supported a process of rationalisation of the central office for the
administration and management of the Sicilian kingdom. Numerous centralised
institutions emerged for the supervision of the territory and the organ of the
Magna Curia dei Maestri Rationali was converted into the major institution of
45 P. Corrao, ‘Istituzioni monarchiche, poteri locali, societa politica (secoli XIV-XV)’, in F.

Benigno and C.Torrisi (eds.) Elites e potere in Sicilia dal Medioevo ad oggi (Catanzaro and Rome,
1995), p.10.
46 See S. Cavallo, Charity and Power in Early M odem Italy. Benefactors and Their Motives in
Turin, 1541-1789 (Cambridge, 1995), p.250 for a similar phenomenon in early modem Turin.
57
financial control, the Tribunale del Regio Patrimonio.41 According to Muto, the
state aimed to achieve a stronger linkage with the legal professions (celo togato),
• 48
in order to counterbalance the local aristocracy.
On the other hand, the kingdom saw the emergence of Messina, the most
important centre of the east coast that was expanding rapidly in competition with
the capital, Palermo. Messina could rely on a big surrounding territory and on the
only export-oriented industrial product of the island, silk. Furthermore, its
geographical position close to the mainland allowed the urban elite to expand
commercial relations with the kingdom o f Naples. This successful commercial
and political network supported Messina’s claim for a silk monopoly in val
Demone in 1591, after the payment of a substantial fee to the Crown.49 The island
began to manifest a strong duality based on two different economic structures and
commercial strategies; however, the centralisation of the main political offices,
which was proceeding concurrently, advantaged the west and Palermo against
Messina
In Sicily, the first privileges granted to urban artisans date to the late twelfth and
thirteenth centuries. In 1199, Frederick allowed toll-free trade for Messina and
Trapani producers. In Syracuse in 1298, barbers obtained the privilege to be toll
free and in 1314 Trapani fishermen were allowed to catch and sell fish
everywhere without restrictions.50 Despite these few acquisitions, however,
artisans were not allowed to organise independently and give themselves proper
rules until the late fourteenth century at the earliest. From the late fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries, as the new Iberian were sought political support in local urban
society, masters were given the opportunity to lobby for political recognition. At
the same time, economic expansion and especially the rising demand for cheap
manufactures had expanded the domestic manufacturing base. There was
47 A. Baviera Albanese, Diritto pubblico e istituzioni amministrative in Sicilia (Rome, 1981).

48 G. Muto, Saggi sul govem o dell'economia nei mezzogiorno spagnolo (Naples, 1992).
49 F. Benigno, ‘La questione della capitale. Lotta politica e rappresentanza degli interessi nella
Sicilia del Seicento’, Societa e storia 47 (1990): 27-63.
50 Frederick II granted this privilege in 1314 because Trapani fishermen fought against the Turks
from the Magreb in support o f the king. The privilege is copied in the seventeenth-century
manuscript Privilegii regali et lettere viceregie di grade concesse alii pescatori della citta di
58
therefore a growing need for skilled craft labour and for a system that would
enforce and guarantee contractual relations between individual masters and
apprentices. Although notaries had acted as witnesses and guarantors for
apprenticeship agreements before formal guilds were established, such contracts
helped gradually to confirm masters as public officials.51
The first document that mentions guild representatives is dated Palermo, 6
April 1403. It is a provision drafted by barbers and addressed to the city council,
which is asked to authorise the election of a consul. The representative had to be
elected by ‘the other masters expert in similar crafts’, and his functions were ‘to
control and supervise the other masters and apprentices who work in the same
craft, and to correct, punish and dismiss them’. Other provisions by the Palermo
cobblers, followed on 10 January 1413, and the coopers of the same town made
themselves heard on 13 May 1431. It is particularly interesting that the cobblers’
request for a consular election referred explicitly to the Palermo tailors, shearers,
and barbers who had already obtained the right to elect a consul (immunitatem,
habendi consulum). In most cases, the request of the statutes followed the
consular election by few years later; however, the tailors in Palermo had a consul
by 1413 but only received their statutes in 1465.53
The second quarter o f the fifteenth century saw the beginnings of a process
of legitimisation of the guild system. In 1435, Alfonso confirmed twenty-two
guilds in Catania and gave them the right to elect their own consuls and officials.54
In 1443, potters and all other artisans (artisti) in Caltagirone were allowed to elect
their own representatives. They had to manage guild business, as consuls did
elsewhere in the kingdom.55 In the statutes of Noto of 15 May 1444, the artisan
Trapani published in G. Lombardo, Grazie e privilegi dei pescatori trapanesi tra Medioevo ed eta
moderna (Marsala, 1997).
51 BCPa, ms.Qq D54, Notamento de diverse cose della citta. di Palermo degne di memorie tanto di
privilegi come d ’ordinationepragmatiche e bandi viceregi, unnumbered fos.
52 ‘Alios magistros expertos in talibus’. BCPa, Beccaria ms. Qq E 190 unnumbered fos.: ‘videndi
et scrutandi alios magistros atque discipulos qui huismodi magisterium exercent, eosque valeat
atque possint corrigere, punire et effectualiter mandare’ (ACPa, Atti Bandi Prowiste, 113,
unnumbered fos. (1406-07)).
53 F.L. Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze di Palermo nei secoli XV-XVIII (Trapani, 1991), pp. 127-30.
54 F. Marietta, ‘La costituzione e le prime vicende della corporazione di Catania’, ASSOr 1 (1904):
354-58.
55 ‘Ki li artisti di la ditta terra pozzano eligiri consuli, li quali consuli hagiano a conuxire et
providiri in li causi di lom magisteru per la dicta universitati, cussi cornu si costuma in nei altri
59
consuls of Noto were approved by Alfonso according to the statutes of the artisans
in Catania.56 On 10 July 1444, the statutes of Patti mentioned regulations for
leather-workers.57 In Palermo, on 12 May 1447 the silver- and goldsmiths’ guild
CO
received their first set of regulations.

During the 1430s and 1440s king Alfonso V of Aragon approved numerous
sets of urban constitutions, signed most of the first statutes, and confirmed the
voting rights o f craft representatives in the main Sicilian towns. Yet, Alfonso’s
role in the process of guild institutionalisation is ambiguous. On the one hand, his
approval o f the election of consuls and legal backing of artisan regulations seems
to support the thesis that the emergence o f a central state was a prerequisite for
craft guild success.59 On the other hand, Alfonso was clearly hostile to the guilds’
political ambitions and actively prevented craft consuls from participating in
urban administration. The formal approval of guild statutes, the recognition of
craft representatives, and the support of local autonomies, were all part of the
king’s attempts to gather consensus for his military policies on the southern Italian
mainland. Alfonso was not, however, keen to promote the claims of artisans and
professional groups, which he clearly perceived as socially and politically
subversive. He therefore lighted on a compromise, whereby formal recognition
was mitigated by supporting the urban patriciate’s demands that excluded artisan
chitati di lu regno’ (A.M. Precopi Lombardo, L ’artigianato trapanese dal XIV al XIX secolo
(Palermo, 1987), p.24).
56 ‘Pro consulibus artistarum terre Nothi, (...) in observanciam capitulorum consulatus artistarum
civitatis Cataniae’ (ASPa, Regia Cancelleria, 80, c.303ss. (1443-44)).
57 ‘Item, imperoki li curbiseri di la dicta chitati su multiplicati in tantu ki quasi dipploruranu et
supra vindinu l ’arti loru et non fannu lu debitu et per quistu indi consequita grandi dannu la
universitati per la trista coirami et pillami, ancora per quista opera e magisteriu loru et excessivi
pagamenti ki si piglianu, supplica la detta universitati ki sia sua merci conchedivi graciose ki li
Iurati qui pro tempore fuerint poczanu eligiri et constituiri unu consulu supra la dicta arti annuativi
lu quali haia ad corregiri la dicta arti tantu di bonitati rej et operis quantu di lu magisteriu et di li
preci, lu quali consulu pocza consequitari et exigiri per pena a contravenientibus quillu ki per li
dicti Iurati sirra ordinatu’ (ASPa, Regia Cancelleria, 79, c.90 (1444-45)).
58 ACPa, Atti Bandi Provviste, 174, unnumbered fos.(1467-68); BCPa, ms.2Qq F197, cited by G.
Di Marzo, I Gagini e la scultura, vol.2 Documenti, pp.317-22, MC. Di Natale (ed.) Ori e argenti
di Sicilia dal Quattrocento al Settecento (Milan, 1989), p.96; Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze,
pp.23-30.
9 Although in Catania the presence o f guild consuls in general assemblies is recorded in 1427,
eight years before Alfonso’s formal recognition, artisans needed the support o f the central
authority to acquire formal recognition. See P. D ’Arrigo, ‘Notizie sulla corporazione degli
argentieri di Catania’, ASSOr 14-15 (1936-37): 35. She cited ASCt, Atti dei Giurati vol.2 Consilia.
60
representatives from most public offices.60 The Spanish Crown indeed remained
generally hostile to the emergence and development of craft guilds, with the result
that once the Spanish dominion was firmly established, Sicilian artisans were left
with very little bargaining power and guild masters had few, if any, authority to
enforce guild rules.
Based on the signatures on the town records, the participation by craft
masters in the general meetings of the Palermo town council increased by 90 per
cent in the late sixteenth century. Nevertheless, this did not coincide with a
stronger involvement in decision-making processes, for by then general
assemblies were dealing with issues of secondary importance. This marked a
considerable change compared with the first half o f the century. Up to the mid
sixteenth century, the Palermo city council had invited the most important citizens
to discuss matters of common interest such as the imposition of new taxes,
foodstuff prices, or the administration of town finances. Meetings involved lively
debates between the jurors of the council and the local aristocracy. A final vote
and further comments concluded the meetings.61 By the late sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries, however when guildsmen made their appearance en masse,
the general meetings discussed issues like charitable and religious support, the
proclamation (rather than the setting) of prices, council expenditure on donations,
and public works. The reports do not mention any debate, votes followed
smoothly with no further intervention, and all the points were regularly approved.
Only a few representatives of the local aristocracy still signed the reports,
(\)
compared with the large number of masters who voted and signed the records.
Guild masters’ participation in council’s general assemblies did not give rise to
60 ‘Item supplica lo ditto Regno, perche in alcuni citati et terri dello ditto Regno su stati creati, et
facti Consuli, et Sindici artisani, li quali capino in certa forma a lu regimentu di li dicti Cittati, et
terri, li quali su persuni idioti, et illicterati, et venino spissi volti a contentioni, et differentia cum li
officiali ordinari di sua Majesta de li Cittati predicti et terri: per li quali naxino multi inconvenienti,
et dibactiti indi venino, li quali non erano antiquamenti; et cussi li dicti Consuli et Sindici, cum
loro capitulo et privilegi, digiono cessare in ogni Cittati, et terra di lo Regno predicto: et de cetero
non si digiano fari; immo la Republica sia gubemata per li soi officiali di sua Majesta, cum ab
antiquo fu sempre usato, et accustumato’ (F. Testa, Capitula Regni Siciliae (Palermo, 1741),
p.367).
61 See ACPa, Consigli Civici, 68 (1531-50).
62 ACPa, Consigli Civici, 71-2, cc.234-5v, cc.288-9v (1600-10, 1611-30). Masters signed under
the name o f the guild they belonged to; they were mainly silversmiths, tailors, sock makers, which
seem to be the most representatives guilds in towns and the ones with more numerous members.
61
greater influence over urban policy, which was being set by small groups of
patricians listed among those eligible to the urban offices (mastre). Rather, guild
participation in public events may have helped membership along the lines
whereby participation in general meetings and religious processions increased the
masters’ visibility and improved their business, as discussed previously.64
63 F. Benigno, ‘La questione della capitale. Lotta politica e rappresentanza degli interessi nella
Sicilia del Seicento’, Societa e storia 47 (1990): 35.
64 See above, ch. 4.1.1.
62
Chapter 4 Sicilian guilds
Chapter 4
Sicilian guilds
Sicilian guilds were always few. They only emerged in a few demanial towns, did
not have many members, and had little political influence. Even the documents
and records fail to define the guilds clearly, often confusing them with
confraternities and other associations. Sicilian guilds do not seem to have been
organised differently from other European guilds, but their links with local society
were unusual. Sicilian guilds developed late, and achieved recognition from
above, rather than through a process of self-definition from below. They had
shallow roots in local administration and society, and were viewed with suspicion
if not downright hostility by the central authorities, which only acceded to their
requests at times of institutional upheaval and (temporary) necessity.
Consequently, Sicilian crafts emerged relatively late, in the fifteenth century,
when the island economy had already specialised extensively to agriculture, and
they remained underdeveloped thereafter. During the seventeenth century, when
Sicily experienced a redistribution of resources towards the western coast and the
growing economic predominance of Palermo over Messina, the growth in demand
in for high-quality manufactures supported a process of craft specialisation in
Trapani and Palermo, but led to a contraction of the craft base in other cities like
Messina. Specialisation gave rise to increased craft fragmentation; traditional
‘umbrella organisations’ broke down and were replaced by more specialised,
smaller crafts, whose size was nonetheless limited by the generally low quality of
the goods produced.
4.1 Definition
It is extremely difficult to define Sicilian guilds and to measure their size and
development over any length of time. The terminology in the original sources
does not help, because the word for craft guild (maestranza) was also applied to
religious confraternities, professional groups such as notaries and brokers, and
63
other associations which did not correspond to the craft guilds described in this
study. We have no contemporary lists of guilds, and none have been compiled by
modem scholars. In the contemporary documentation, terms such as maestranza
and arte would normally have distinguished two different groups of artisans:
maestranze were constituted by those masters who asked for representatives and
institutional recognition, while arti were groups of artisans who exercised the
same craft and who agreed to regulate their daily activity collectively, but did not
involve the urban authority.1 However, the documents frequently confused the
terms and even applied them to groups of workers who simply exercised the same
craft but had no collective agreement.
Another significant distinction, but one that it is often impossible to make
clearly, is that between guild and confraternity. Sicilian sources do not distinguish
clearly between the two forms of association. Moreover, in certain areas, guilds
seem to have depended more on ecclesiastical than on secular urban approval,
since the statutes were first confirmed by the bishop’s see, and then by the city
council. However, confraternities and guilds appeared to have been based on two
substantially different contractual relations. Guild meetings might be held in
churches, and guild masters frequently contributed to church building and
maintenance, yet guild membership was rooted in a network of economic and
professional links, officially recognised by local and central government, which
circumscribed the institutional role of the crafts. On the other hand, religious
confraternities relied on relations of mutual assistance that supported religious
belief and practice, and they were backed by the Church.
Finally, there is a distinction to be drawn between guilds and simple crafts.
Guilds existed side by side with unregulated manufacture, especially in the
convents and monasteries where nuns, priests, and young women worked. In
Sicily, the two forms of production seem to have complemented each other
because o f the limited degree of specialisation that some guilds could achieve, and
this makes it even harder to define the boundaries between formally recognised
groups and independent artisans working in private houses for noble families.
1BCPa, ms. Qq D 54, Notamento de diverse cose della citta di Palermo, unnumbered fos.
2 This is the case o f few guilds in Syracuse. See F. Carpinteri, ‘Capitoli dei Consolati d'arti e
mestieri nei '700 siracusano’, ASSr 15 (1969).
64
Nonetheless, during the seventeenth century, fully competent guild members

producing high quality goods gradually replaced convent and monastery-based
production.3
4.1.1 Craft guilds and religious confraternities
The present work focuses mainly on the economic aspect of guilds, and not on
their religious, social, or military functions. However, in a context where the
incentives for guild participation seem to have been very low, religious activities
had an important role in promoting guild membership; in Olson’s words, they
functioned as ‘non-collective social benefits’, defined as gains for individuals
participating in a group, which raise the costs of non-participation (free-riding)
and help a group to retain its members.4
Artisans frequently met in churches for the election of their consuls or the
discussion of guild affairs. Only the wealthier guilds could afford their own church;
other guilds shared the same church and collaborated in the maintenance of the
altars. Consequently, part of the Sicilian guilds’ financial resources were devoted to
Church maintenance, processions, and religious ceremonies,5 but also to the
building of chapels and altars in existing churches, for example in the town
cathedral.6 Guilds also played a special role in spreading the ideals of the Counter-
Reformation. In Sicily (as in Spain) the Jesuits introduced the representation of
3 See E. D ’Amico Del Rosso, I paramenti sacri (Palermo, 1997), p.27 for external commissioning
o f silver-ware by a Palermo convent.
4 M. Olson, The Logic o f Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory o f Groups (Cambridge,
1965), pp.72-75; S.R. Epstein, ‘Craft Guilds, Apprenticeship, and Technological Change in
Preindustrial Europe’, Journal o f Economic History 58 (1998): 687.
5 Guild statutes mention three main reasons to invest the guild’s money: first, upkeep o f the
church, altar and religious events; second, dowries for the members’ daughters; and third,
assistance o f members in need. The tendency to use money for religious purposes became more
noticeable as time went on. For example, Trapani tailors in the statutes o f 1618 (ch. 11) say that
masters and apprentices had to pay respectively 3 and 1 tari to look after the icon o f Saint Oliva,
her chapel in the church o f Saint Agostino, and to pay for the celebrations. Later, in an audit o f
1773 all the expenditures registered have been used for religious functions and events. See A.M.
Precopi Lombardo, L'artigianato trapanese dal XIV al XIX secolo (Palermo, 1987), pp.85 and
101-5.
6 Several examples can be mentioned for Palermo, where in most statutes a third o f the fines
collected were used for the building o f the cathedral. See for example F.L. Oddo, Statuti delle
65
biblical stories and of the Good Friday Passion, and these became important
aspects of artisan involvement. In Trapani, the Company of Sangue Preziosissimo
di Cristo required the town’s artisans to build 21 groups of statues, in cloth glue
and wood, representing the main stages of Christ’s Passion; these were known as
Misteri, the same term used to define crafts themselves. Each group was
sponsored by one or more guilds, and guild members carried these heavy groups
of statues throughout the town for 24 hours on Good Friday.7 The Company
assigned each group of statues to its allotted artisans with a public notarised act;
most of these groups were assigned in the first quarter of the seventeenth century.8
The guild hierarchy was reflected in the position taken in a town’s religious
processions, which was established by the urban administration and sometimes by
the viceroy himself. The rules employed are uncertain, but criteria of social prestige
and tradition, even more than economic status, seem to have determined the order of
such processions. A master could be a member of one or more confraternities and
this could offer many advantages,9 while sub-groups within a guild with specific
skills could use their role in a confraternity to further their interests, as a discussion
of the fishermen and carpenters in Trapani will show.
In Trapani, the coral fishermen were ‘brothers’ of Saint Lucia, and the
carpenters, ‘brothers’ of Saint Joseph. The fishermen’s guild was divided in two
groups, fishermen and coral fishermen, but the first alone (known as Casalicchio)
controlled both the group’s administration and the management of the guild’s
financial resources, perhaps because it was the first to take shape and was the
depository o f the guild books. This led the coral fishermen to find an autonomous
space in the confraternity of Saint Lucia, which also allowed them to further their
claims of independence from the main guild. Coral gave them a significant source
of income, higher than that gained from fishing, and the coral fishermen used their
maestranze di Palermo (Trapani, 1991), p. 151 (Palermo, statutes o f tailors, 1488); p. 153 (Palermo,
statutes o f belt makers, 1488); p. 159 (Palermo, statutes o f belt makers, 1509).
7 The procession is still one o f the most important religious events o f this town and is still
sponsored and organised by shopkeepers and local artisans.
8 See L. Novara and A.M. Precopi Lombardo, Argenti in Processione (Marsala, 1992). The authors
recovered most o f the notary contracts concerning the Misteri, according to which some guilds
became responsible for the twenty-one groups.
9 S. Barraja, ‘La maestranza degli orafi e argentieri di Palermo’, in M.C. Di Natale (ed.) Ori e
argenti di Sicilia dal Quattrocento al Settecento (Milan, 1989), p.367.
66
links with the church to store and sell the coral there. After over a century of
attempts, the coral fishermen finally obtained total independence from the main
guild in the early eighteenth century.10
Carpenters in Trapani formed one of the biggest guilds in town. They
included a number of sub-groups, represented by independent consuls and
characterised by a high degree of specialisation. The carpenters’ patron saint was
Saint Joseph, and in Trapani, the fraternity of Saint Joseph seems to have included
most of the local carpenters, since membership provided exemption from payment
of guild mastership fees.11 Many masters therefore joined the confraternity in order
to ensure themselves and their children extra benefits; but if an artisan did not show
full commitment, the guild could ask him to leave the brotherhood and pay the
mastership fees after all.
Guilds gave their members the opportunity of being actively involved in religious
events, and this participation had a direct impact on masters’ reputation. Masters
who joined a confraternity would also be perceived as members of a formally
recognised group, in contrast to those who practised similar activities without
being member of any corporation. Religious duties therefore enhanced visibility,
and often worked as incentives for guild membership. The numerous disputes
over position in religious processions expressed competition for prestige: literally,
for an intangible ‘positional’ good. Artisans cared deeply about their reputation,
which can be viewed as ‘social capital’ that could be converted into a source of
income. Particularly in a context where manufacture was mainly intended for a
domestic market, public reputation could make a difference in expected returns.
Investments in relationships and public events can be seen as a promotional
strategy ante litteram}2
10 According to Serraino, the two groups were separate guilds because o f the strong independence
that the groups o f coral fishermen showed since the early seventeenth century. M. Serraino,
Trapani nella vita civile e religiosa (Tapani, 1968). Only recently, the fee administration o f the
Casalicchio group showed that the two groups formed one guild at least until the eighteenth
century. See G. Lombardo, Grazie e privilegi dei pescatori trapanesi tra medioevo ed eta modema
(Marsala, 1997).
11 S. Corso, ‘ “Fabri lignarij”. La maestranza a Trapani nei secoli XVII e XVIII’, La Fardelliana
8-9 (1989-90): 39-99.
12 See S. Cerutti, ‘Group Strategies and Trade Strategies: The Turin Tailors Guild in the Late
Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries’, in S. W oolf (ed.) Domestic Strategies: Work and
67
4.1.2 Military functions
The military duties of artisans have been interpreted as one o f the main functions
of the guild system, and one of the main reasons why the state supported the
development of guilds. In Sicily, however, entrusting the defence o f the urban
walls to artisans, or better to the citizens in general, was an ancient, well-
established custom, long before the formal recognition of the corporate groups.13
During the early modem period the guilds provided the cities’ night watch, even if
they did not normally organise a proper military force; nevertheless, guild statutes
never referred to participation in these night guards, and guilds did not impose
fines on those who did not participate in this military duty.14 By the early
seventeenth century, moreover, guilds tried increasingly to be exempted from the
night guard, either because this duty prevented them from working at night,15 or
because it affected their dignity and reputation.16 In seventeenth-century Syracuse,
citizens and guild members demanded the recruitment of a proper military force
for the city’s defence. Although the cost of a military force was very high, 700
onze instead of the previous 200 onze, in 1636, the city council approved the
recruitment of 60 people for the protection o f the town.17
In Palermo, however, guilds always provided the military defence o f the
town. A chronicle records that in 1583, the viceroy Marco Antonio Colonna was
received by a military force composed of guild members, including tailors, sock
Family in France and Italy, 1600-1800 (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 102-47; S. Cerutti, M estieri e
privilegi. Nascita delle corporazioni a Torino, secoli XVII-XVIII (Turin, 1992).
13 L. Siciliano Villanueva, Consuetudini della citta di Palermo, in DSSS ser.2, 4 (1894): 287 and
404. Already in the fourteenth century, Palermo consuetudines established that citizens had to
protect the town, in spite o f their privilege to be exempted from any unpaid job ( ‘De modo et
qualitate custodiae adhibendis in civitate de nocte’). Masters o f escort in 1320 were Filippo
Bancheri smith, master Enrico carpenter, and in 1327 master Brando saddler. F.L. Oddo, Le
maestranze di Palermo. Aspetti e momenti di vita politica e sociale (secc. XII-XIX) (Palermo,
1991), p.79 n .l. Cfr. BCPa, ms. Qq E 29, F. Paruta, Annali delle cose oscure di Palermo, cc.126.
14 See below, ch.6.
15 See ASTp, Notai, not. F. Gioemi unnumbered fos. (8 aprile 1612), statutes o f Trapani
silversmiths.
16 The requests o f the artisans to be exempt from the night guards had already started by the
beginning o f the fourteenth century. See Oddo, Maestranze di Palermo, p.81.
17 ASSr, Consigli del Senato, vol. 13, unnumbered fos. (1633-1638), cit. in F. Gallo, ‘Le gabelle e
le mete dell'universita di Siracusa’, in D. Ligresti (ed.) II govem o della citta. Patriziati e politica
nella Sicilia moderna (Catania, 1990), p. 114, n. 96.
68
makers, engravers, and masons.18 In 1614, the guilds of Palermo numbered 20,000
soldiers, including 1,300 members of the so-called Nazioni, that is people from
Naples, Genoa, and Lombardy, now established in town.19 However, the accuracy
of the number is hard to assess, and it is in any case unclear whether 18,700
represented only the number o f guild members involved in the urban militia, or
the overall number o f artisans in Palermo (which had a total population of more
than 100,000). At the end of the seventeenth century, the urban militia was still
formed by guild members, and in 1735, king Charles III promoted the urban
militia to royal status.20
4.2 Structure and organisation of Sicilian guilds
The late emergence of Sicilian guilds and their scarce development did not alter
their basic features and organisational structure; what actually distinguished them
from other European guilds was their singular weakness, which was, as I have
suggested, a result of the lack of institutional support for the enforcement and
development of craft skills except in a few large cities.
This section shows first how Sicilian guilds mirror the other guilds in their
general features and then how the difficulties that Sicilian craftsmen faced in
having their right to organise formally, resulted in the creation of smaller and less
specialised guilds. However, once the process of craft organisation was begun, the
supply of skills was enhanced, and craft guilds tended to become more specialised
over time in spite of the authorities’ attempts to override guild jurisdiction.
As elsewhere in Europe, the only full members of a Sicilian craft were the
masters. Masters had the right to vote, and were eligible for the highest offices of
18 F. Paruta and N. Palmerino, Diario della citta di Palermo (Palermo, 1881), p.103; Oddo,
Maestranze di Palermo, p.83.
19 V. Auria, Diario delle cose occorse in Palermo (Palermo, 1881) p. 153; Oddo, Maestranze di
Palermo, p.84.
20 BCPa, ms.Qq F 36, Memorie istorico-diplomatiche della milizia urbana di Palermo, scritta da
Gerolamo de Franchis maestro di cerimonie dell’eccellentissimo Senato l ’anno 1796, cit in S.
Laudani, ‘The Guild System and City Government. Palermo in Eighteenth and Nineteenth
69
consuls and councillors, and they transmitted the secrets of the craft to younger
apprentices. Apprentices and journeymen (garzoni and lavoranti) also benefited
from the guild and contributed to the organisation and maintenance of the group,
but they had no formal decision-making rights. Finally, the craft statutes - the
guilds’ basic rules of engagement - were prepared by the masters with the help of
a notary, but required the authorisation and political and legal backing of the local
and central authorities.
Sicilian guilds frequently developed as a single structure assembling
numerous crafts. As in many European guilds, particularly in the first phase of
their emergence, the lack of boundaries between similar crafts under a single
denomination, which Epstein calls ‘umbrella organisation’, made it easier for
craftsmen to move between different sectors.21
The first Palermo guilds to obtain formal approval included metalworkers
(silversmiths, goldsmiths and blacksmiths); masons and carpenters; leather
workers (shoemakers and saddle makers) and tailors, who outnumbered the
weavers (Fig.4.1). Another example of a guild composed by other trades, is that of
the Trapani carpenters, who specialised in the building of ships for fishing, or in
making sails for the numerous windmills used in the milling of grain and local salt
(Fig. 4.2). As elsewhere in Europe, artisans tended over time to specialise to sub
sectors within the same original organisation;22 but in Sicily the emergence of
sub-groups occurred later and was more limited in amplitude than in other western
European societies.
Centuries’, in A. Guenzi, P. Massa, and F. Piola Caselli (eds.) Guilds, Markets and Work
Regulations in Italy, Sixteenth-Nineteenth Centuries (Aldershot, 1998), pp.98-116.
22 For example, some blacksmiths concentrated on the production o f keys and locks while
remaining members o f the metalworkers (Fig. 4.1).
70
Fig. 4.1 The blacksmiths of Palermo
Blacksmiths
Bronze w orkers Ironmongers Silver and Goldsmiths

(15th century) (15th century) (1447)
C arpenters Sword makers Key makers Engravers Jewellery makers Gold platers
(16th century) (1541) (1598) (17th century) (17th century) (17th century)
*Sources: BCPa, ms.2Qq F I97; ACPa, Provviste 1551-1651 ad annum. The exact dates for the
emergence o f some o f these guilds are not known.
Fig. 4.2 The carpenters of Trapani
Carpenters
1524
Walnut carpenters M asters of 'galbo' C arpenters M asters of 'axe' C ar m akers

1614 1654 1614 1654
TrommarP O ar makers Mill paddle makers Lathe m akers Wood engravers

1699 1699 1699 1699 1654
*Source: Corso, ‘ “Fabri lignarij” ’, p.40.
Although it is still very difficult to determine with any precision what percentage
of European urban population were artisans, as there are few sources which permit
comparison guilds in Sicily seem to have emerged only in a few demanial towns
and to have involved a very limited number of crafts, compared to other Italian
and European towns.23 While the total number of crafts is not necessarily a precise
indicator o f craft guild strength, since the presence of ‘umbrella groups’ in some
societies could easily mask the intensity of the phenomenon, the difference
between Palermo, with a population of around 100,000 and about 37-46 guilds,
and most other European towns is very striking.24 Dijon, for example, had around
23 See J.R. Farr, Artisans in Europe (Cambridge, 2000), p.96.

24 The lack o f records for Sicilian guilds prevents any reliable calculation o f numbers o f members,
though an approximation can be made based on the number o f members who participated in the
drafting o f the statutes.
71
80 guilds with a population of 15,000 in 1556; Nordlingen in 1579 had a

population of 10,000 and around 60 guilds; and Norwich, with a population of
20.000 in 1579, had between 171 and 200 guilds.25
A more conclusive picture is provided by the percentage of the city’s
population. It seems that only around 16 per cent of Palermo’s population of over
100.000 were members of a guild compared to figures ranging from about 30 per
cent in Dijon to up to 80 per cent in Nordlingen (Table 4.2).
Table 4.1 Artisans as proportion of urban population

Towns Date Percentage of Artisan numbers Population
population
Dijon 1464 30 910 households 15,000
Cuenca 1561 58 2,007 all household heads 15,000
Nordlingen 1579 83.3 1,054 taxed male citizens c. 10,000
Frankfurt 1587 56.1 1,247 households 2,223

am Main households
Palermo 1616 15.8 ca. 20,000 127,000
*Friedrichs, The Early M odem City, pp. 147-48 (Dijon and Frankfurt am Main); Farr, Artisans,
p.97 (Cuenca and Nordlingen); Auria, ‘Diario delle cose occorse in Palermo’, p. 153 (Palermo).
25 J.R. Farr, Hands o f Honour. Artisans and Their World in Dijon, 1550-1650 (Ithaca and London,
1988), pp.271-74 (Dijon); C.R. Friedrichs, Urban Society in an Age o f War: Nordlingen 1580-
1720 (Princeton New Jersey, 1979), p.78 (Nordlingen); C. G. A. Clay, Economic Expansion and
Social Change: England 1500-1700, v o l.l, p. 179 (Norwich). However, the case o f Milan which
had around 100 guilds and a population o f 130,000 people, show the weakness o f this kind of
comparisons. See E. Merlo, Le corporazioni conflitti e soppressioni. Milano tra sei e settecento
(Milan, 1996), p.22.
26 There is an interesting debate to establish whether the best conditions for craft settlement were
articulated in small communities where craftsmen and their institutions were densely woven into
the structure o f a traditional urban world, or in towns o f middle size which were not dominated by
a single interest. See M. Walker, German Home Towns: Community, State and General Estate,
1648-1871 (Ithaca, 1971); Thrupp, ‘The Gilds’, p.230. According to Crossick, ‘future research
must bring urban size more clearly into focus, by reflecting on the tendency to inflate conflict that
is inherent in the sources used for large-town studies, and by exploring the tensions within smaller
urban centres, especially those involved in production for wider markets’ (G. Crossick, ‘Past
Masters: In Search o f the Artisan in European History’, in Crossick (ed.) Artisan and the
European Town, pp. 15-16).
72
4.3 Characteristics of Sicilian craft guilds
Craft guilds remained under the jurisdiction of city councils. Masters therefore
had very little bargaining power with the central government to obtain privileges
(such as access to public offices) that would attract individuals to participate in the
group.27 In Palermo, all guilds came under the authority of the Praetor, and in
Messina they were subject to the Strategoto; in other towns guilds were governed
by the local city councils, who either apponted the guild consuls and councillors
directly, or approved and confirmed them after their election by the guild.
Consequently, without the local council’s approval, craft consuls had no authority
to enforce guild regulations and to monitor guild members.
The city council could easily interfere in guild elections lobbying,
factionalism and attempts to monopolise guild offices were encouraged by
opportunities to alter election results with the support of the urban officials. The
balance of power within guilds was mainly determined by these vertical allegiances,
since masters could not have access to the highest political offices directly.
The example of a consul election in the guild of Palermo shoemakers shows
how splinter groups could easily emerge.28 According to the provision sent to the
council in 1660, four names were proposed by the election among guild members:
90
Domenico Galici, Francesco Tindaro, Micheli Cozo, and Giacomo Deci. The
Senate had to elect the consul from among these names by lot (bussolo).30 One of the
jurors, don Ottavio Palminteri who was substituting the Praetor, changed two of the
appointed names with another two, and introduced one further name. In spite of the
masters’ complaints, the Praetor declared the election to have been conducted in full
respect of the rules, on the basis of the Praetor’s right to substitute named candidates,
or to suggest new ones.32
27 These represent the so-called ‘non-collective social benefit’. Cfr n.4 o f this chapter.
28 ACPa, Provviste, 693, c.51 (1660-61).
29 See ACPa, Provviste, 624, cc.89v-109r (Statutes o f Palermo shoemakers approved by
Marc’Antonio Colonna 1580-81).
30Bussolo: this is the most widespread system o f voting in Sicily, which ensured a free-election to
the municipal offices. See the term in F.L. Oddo, Dizionario delle antiche istituzioni siciliane
(Palermo, 1984), ad vocem.
31 He substituted Francesco Tindaro and Micheli Cozzo with Giuseppe Palumbo e Onofrio Mollo.
The extra name was Francesco Mazza (ACPa, Provviste, 624, c.92r (1580-81)).
32 Ibidem, cc.90rv. The first chapter stated that every quarter must have its own representative.
73
This was not an isolated case. On 11 September 1660, Palermo’s

soapmakers claimed that the consul Vincenzo Romano and the councillor Filippo
33
Bongione had been elected owing to an irregular agreement with the Praetor.
They then included a new article in their regulations, which forbade the election
of masters who had been elected before, except in case of necessity. Another of
these provisions denounced an internal group of masters sharing the consul office
for nine years, because ‘this is against the correct government of the guild’.34 In
both Trapani and Palermo, a number of provisions and new statutes claimed to
forbid re-election of members who had held the offices of consul or councillors in
the past, but the rules could be flouted by gaining access to the politicians’ ear.
All guild statutes had to be approved by the highest institutional office in the
kingdom, the Tribunale del Regio Patrimonio.35 This office, as the main organ of
control, both approved and registered the statutes and acted as Supreme Court of
Appeal in disputes between the urban authorities and guilds in the royal demesne;
to a certain extent, it oversaw and protect the legal terms of the statutes and the
effectiveness of guild privileges and rights. Consequently, if any objection arose
in the process, there was frequently a long delay between the drafting of these
statutes and the formal approval from the local and central governments, sometimes
even a few years. Thus, a provision for the Palermo tailors stated that the
regulations, drafted on 25 June 1612 by notary Michele Greco, were invalid
because the local city council had never approved them.36
The presence of these two institutional levels of approval for the guild
statutes in all the towns of the kingdom made it harder for Sicilian masters to
obtain formal recognition and held back guild development. The process of guild
and statute approval therefore provides crucial insights for an understanding of the
limits and potential of craft guilds. Rather different conditions seem to have
characterised guilds in northern Italy. In the communes, guilds emerged in a
context o f strong political competition through a process o f self-definition from
33 ACPa, Provviste, 693, c.3 (1660-61).

34 Ibidem, c.4.
35 The archive o f the Regio Patrimonio is in the Archivio di Stato o f Palermo (sez. Gancia).
Unfortunately, most o f the files are in a terrible condition and are not available to the public. In
addition, they are not yet ordered chronologically.
36 Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, p. 137. See also ASPa, Notai, not. Michele Greco unnumbered
fos. (25 June 1612).
74
below. Craft guilds could become a tool for gaining support against a political
adversary; in several places, seigniorial lords were able to acquire political
authority through support from the crafts, though artisans were not necessarily
involved in the decision-making process.37 Similar conditions o f political
instability often occurred in German towns, where ‘artisans (...) realised that their
• • IQ
opportunities were heightened when the city’s elite itself was divided’. In these
cases, guilds could enforce their position because o f the strong bargaining power
that they had towards local institutions.
In other contexts, moreover, guilds could control and enforce not so much
their political ambitions, but rather their economic features. As Epstein suggests:
the most distinctive feature o f English guilds... was not so much a generic
weakness... Rather it was the relative decline in their political links with the state
and with merchant corporations... This institutional decoupling, which made
restrictive legislation increasingly hard to enforce but maintained the technological
benefits o f the guild system after the 1660s, may have give post-Restoration
England the technological edge over the Continent’.39
In sum, the ability to implement guild regulations depended on the relation

established between guilds and local and central governments. Venetian guild
masters were closely monitored and explicitly excluded from the political arena;40
nonetheless, local institutions gave very little attention to the revision of their
regulations.41 The Venetian state gave the guilds enough legal backing to enforce
37 D. Degrassi, L ’economia artigiana nell 'Italia medievale (Rome, 1996), p. 132.

38 C.R. Friedrichs, ‘Artisans and Urban Politics in Seventeenth-Century Germany’, in G. Crossick
(ed.) Artisans and the European Town, p.44. The author however identifies masters’ authority with
their involvement in political affairs, whereas the Venetian example and London guilds clearly
showed that political activity frequently played only a secondary role.
40 ‘Venetian guilds ... were kept under firm governmental control without any chance o f political
power’. S. Thrupp, ‘The Gilds’, in The Cambridge Economic History o f Europe, vol.3, Economic
Organization and Policies in the M iddle Ages (Cambridge, 1963), p.237.
41 The two registers expected to preserve the statutes led different existences. While the official
copy remained unaltered, thus assuming the fixity o f law, the copy housed at the guild’s premises
was periodically updated. Updating meant inserting not only the decrees o f the ‘prince’ but also
the provisions proposed by the guild’s chapter and subsequently approved either by the city
council (in the case o f Terraferma) or by one o f the many magistracies superintending the
individual guilds (in the case o f Venice). Also included in this register - and this is significant -
were proposals that had not been officially approved but which had nonetheless acquired rule-
status merely by the fact o f being registered (P. Lanaro, ‘Guild Statutes in the Early Modem A ge’,
in Guenzi, Massa, and Piola Caselli (eds.) Guilds, Markets and Work Regulations, p.201).
75
membership and further their primary purposes, while generally opposing

restrictive regulations and monopolistic behaviour.42 Masters in such contexts
could easily obtain formal approval for their organisations; by implication, the
masters’ ability to implement their organisations and regulations did not derive
from any direct involvement in political affairs.
4.4 Territorial distribution
Guilds in Sicily emerged only in the demanial towns (towns under direct authority
of the Crown). Palermo, Messina, Catania, Trapani, and Syracuse seem to have
had more numerous groups than other towns. Palermo was the largest city in the
island: its population increased rapidly during the sixteenth century and at a
slower rate in the seventeenth century. As the city gradually expanded, it took its
place as sole capital in competition with Messina. It is not therefore surprising that
Palermo had the largest production and consumption of luxury goods, and the
largest number of guilds and members.
During the first half of the seventeenth century, the Palermo city council
approved numerous new guilds in response to the growing demand for specialised
manufactures. The permanent presence of the viceroy, o f the major aristocracy,
and o f numerous important Church representatives, upheld demand for carriages
and skilled coachmen, for good masons and carpenters for luxury buildings, and
for high-quality silver- and goldsmiths; there also had to be weavers and artisans
able to work with velvet, brocade, and silk; and Palermo’s guild of cooks and
cake-makers was set up in response to demand for rich food in the capital.
Consequently, the number of guilds in Palermo increased by 20 per cent, from 36
in the mid-sixteenth century to 45 in 1647.
The reputation of masters working in Palermo was such that the city’s
biggest workshops also absorbed the demand for luxury goods from clients
elsewhere. This tradition went back at least to the mid-sixteenth century, but it
gained in significance during the seventeenth century when Palermo became the
42 Mackenney, R. Tradesmen and Traders: the World o f the Guilds in Venice and Europe (1250-
76
primary centre for high quality production on the island. Already in 1546, the
abbess of a monastery in Monte San Giuliano (Erice) had ordered a bas-relief
from the workshop of the Palermitan Paolo Gili,43 even though the nearby town of
Trapani could boast well-known silversmiths. In 1552, Pietro Morana, the rector
at the church o f Saint Martino also in Monte San Giuliano, ordered silver objects
including a reliquary and a silver case from another Palermo goldsmith, Antonio
Lo Picholo. Though Palermo was more than 100km from Monte San Giuliano, the
reputation of these masters was well known. Antonio Lo Picholo used to work
with Scipione Casella, who had been an apprentice in the workshop of Paolo Gili
and Francesco la Torre, at the time of their partnership in 1531.44
Another very well-known Palermitan workshop was that of Nibilio Gagini
and Pietro Rizzo, partners from 1531. Salvatore Ferrigno, treasurer of the primate
church o f Castrogiovanni, ordered six silver candlesticks from them to the value
of 120 onze, paid by the magnifico Giulio Grimaldi, baron of Risichella 45 They
received a commission for another two silver candlesticks from the church of
Annunziata in Trapani to the value o f 20 onze, and for a cross for the cathedral in
Polizzi. Nibilio later made a silver case for the church of the Santissimo
Sacramento in Sciacca (1576-80), an ostensory for the primate church of
Mistretta, and two silver chalices for the major church of Sciacca in 1580.46
In July 1599, the jurors of Caltagirone asked the baron o f San Michele,
Sanchez Gravinas Cruillas, to order a silver case from Nibilio Gagini; the
container was to hold the relics of Saint James. According to the terms of the
contract, signed on July 12, Nunzio Trovato, a procurator of the baron, had to
monitor the work of the silversmith in Palermo, and when the silver case was
ready, some Jesuits were to carry it to Caltagirone. Unfortunately, the silversmith
died in 1607 before finishing the chest, although all the panels were ready. They
were inherited by Giuseppe, Nibilio’s son who was working in a major workshop
with his grandfather and his uncles Pietro Ciaula and Pietro Lazara. But Giuseppe
1650). London, 1987.

43 G. Di Marzo, I Gagini e la scultura in Sicilia nei secoli X V e XVI, 3 vols. (Palermo, 1880-83),
vol. 1, p.623; I. Navarra, ‘Notizie sugli orafi e argentieri operanti a Messina, Palermo, Sciacca e
Trapani, nei secoli XVI e XVII’, Libera Universita Trapani 27 (1991): 60.
44 Navarra, ‘Notizie sugli orafi’, p.83.
45 M. Accascina, Oreficeria di Sicilia dal XII al X IXsecolo (Palermo, 1974), p. 182.
77
died only three years later in 1610 and left numerous debts, which were settled by
the sale of his properties. The court appointed some silversmiths to value the
goods in the workshop; in particular, two goldsmiths were asked to value the
panels o f the chest for the relics of Saint James, one representing the interest of
Caltagirone, and the other of Palermo. On 12 September 1611, Francesco Di
Stefano from Caltagirone met Deodato Mortello, silversmith of Palermo, to value
the chest. Later, the jurors of Caltagirone sent Geronimo Ursia, a silversmith from
Catania to make a second valuation with Ferdinando la Rosa from Palermo, but
we do not know the end o f the story.47
The story shows a complex play of relations between urban administrations
and local artisans. The valuation of such an important piece of work was carried
out by two local silversmiths representing the interests of both the towns involved
in the dispute, Palermo and Caltagirone. However, in the second valuation
Caltagirone sought to be represented by a silversmith from Catania, perhaps
because they sought a non-Palermitan would be more independent. Catania’s
guild of silversmiths had a high reputation ever since Alfonso had approved its
statutes in 1435 and the town had obtained the privilege of marking the silver with
its own trademark; but it is clear that the workshops of Palermo were considered
to be the best in Sicily, capable of supplying the highest quality of manufactured
goods, and it is no coincidence that Palermo was also the town in which guilds
were most developed.
We would expect a similar situation in Messina, which competed with Palermo

for the role o f capital and about which Arenaprimo states that ‘the guilds of
Messina had the most important development among the Sicilian guilds and had a
great influence in the political, economic and social life o f the town’.
Unfortunately, the lack of documentation makes it impossible to establish the
number of guilds that might have existed there before the sixteenth century.
Contemporary chronicles indicate that at the end of the fifteenth century, and in
the early sixteenth century, Messina probably numbered as many guilds as

48 G. Arenaprimo, ‘Statuti dell’arte dei sarti di Messina del 1522’, ASM 7 (1906): 315.
78
Palermo. Messina relied on a vast hinterland, and its authority extended over the
straits to southern Calabria, whereby it established a privileged contact with the
Neapolitan area. From the late fifteenth century, the economy of this town was
dominated by silk production. The cultivation of mulberry trees and the rearing of
silkworms were in the hands o f smallholders and tenants, who lived in the hilly
countryside around the town, and unlike other towns in Sicily, a guild of silk
weavers existed here. Messina’s silk industry reached its peak in 1591, when,
thanks to a payment to the Crown of 583,333 scudi, Messina obtained the monopoly
over silk exports from eastern Sicily and the residence of the viceroy’s court for
eighteen months every three years.49
The changes in demand that occurred in Messina at the beginning of the
seventeenth century when the viceregal court began to take up residence there,
can be discerned in the production of luxury goods and in the booming building
trade, which was also stimulated by a steady influx of new immigrants and since a
plague in 1532. Masons, marble cutters and other craftsmen in the building
industry gathered in new guilds,50 as did the silver- and goldsmiths, who had their
own unique silver - gold alloy and trademark and exported their goods throughout
Europe.51
Despite this, seventeenth-century Messina had only about 18 guilds and an
estimated population of 100,000 people. It seems reasonable to assume that
conditions were affected by the emergence of Palermo as permanent capital, and
by the resulting shift of resources westwards; Messina’s claim to the patronage of
a resident viceregal court came to an end during the 1630s. Furthermore,
commercial relations between Messina and the southern mainland (with Naples
and Calabria in particular) may have been affected by the economic downturn in
this area after the difficult 1590s. Between 1595 and 1648, the population in
Naples declined by 7.4 per cent, and the whole area seems to have suffered more
^9
than Sicily as a result of the economic changes of the seventeenth century. The
49 S. Laudani, La Sicilia della seta (Catania, 1996), p.51.

50 D. Novarese, ‘Gli statuti dell’arte dei muratori, tagliapietre, scalpellini e marmorari di Messina’,
in A. Romano (ed.) Istituzioni, Diritto e Societa (Messina, 1988), p. 186.
51 The silver o f Messina had its own alloy, though slightly lighter in karats than the Palermo alloy.
52 S.R. Epstein, An Island fo r Itself. Economic Development and Social Change in Late Medieval
Sicily (Cambridge, 1992), p.406.
79
final straw was the revolt of Messina against the Spanish Crown in 1674, which
CO
caused the entire economy to stall until the early eighteenth century.
Catania, another important demanial town of the eastern coast, is poorly served by
documentation on guilds, and local studies are equally thin on the ground.
Nevertheless, the presence of good silver- and goldsmiths is attested from the
early fifteenth century, and the craft had its own trademark.54 By the seventeenth
century, silk dying had also become very important, and had given rise to a guild
of silk dyers, the only one of this kind documented for early modem Sicily. As in
Messina, the total number of guilds in Catania probably fell over time. In spite of
the important role that guild representatives seem to have acquired in the local
council in the fifteenth century,55 there were only 18 guilds there by the mid
seventeenth century, when the city had a population of about 30,000 - a higher
ratio than in Messina, but very low by international standards.
Trapani is a town on the south-western coast of Sicily, whose main activities in

the early modem period were fishing, particularly of tuna, and coral, salt
production, and port trade. The high degree of specialisation of the Trapani
carpenters reflected high demand from the shipping industry; some craftsmen
specialised in the production of specific kinds of boat, and boats from elsewhere
in the Mediterranean would stop off in Trapani for repairs (see above, Fig.4.2).56
Tuna fishing supported large number of coopers, ropers, and others. Sicily’s only
guild o f coral workers emerged here in response to the abundance of raw material
fished along the nearby coast. Some typical techniques of the Trapani coral
masters (<corallari) have been found in Naples, suggesting that Sicilian masters
had travelled there and taught their secrets to local artisans. The higher reputation
53 R. Davico, ‘La morte barocca: popolazione, quartieri e campagne di Sicilia nella rivolta del
1674-78’, in S. Di Bella (ed.) La rivolta di Messina (1674-78) e il mondo mediterraneo nella
seconda meta del Seicento (Cosenza, 1979).
54 In Sicily, only Palermo, Messina, Trapani and Catania had their own trademarks for silver and
gold production. See M. Accascina, I marchi delle argenterie e oreficerie siciliane (Trapani,
1976).
55 See F. Marietta, ‘Le costituzione e le prime vicende delle maestranze di Catania’, ASSOr
1(1904), pp.354-58, and 2 (1905), pp.88-103.
56 '’L iudelli' and ‘schifazzi ’ were little boats for fishing. Other particular boats were those used for
tuna and coral fishing, which had special ‘ingegna’ (tools) built on the boat.
80
of Trapani’s coral makers was reflected in a number of commissions from the rest
of the kingdom, including a commission by Palermo city council for a statue of
Saint Rosalia and the Virgin.57
Most of the crafts in Trapani only obtained official recognition in the early
seventeenth century, though the existence of informal organisations with
unrecorded customs is documented for a longer period. With the exception of
masons, blacksmiths, and probably silversmith, who had established craft guilds
at earlier times, Trapani crafts only drew up their statutes from the 1600s onward,
probably in response to growth in artisans number, which required more formal
ro
arrangements for monitoring labour conditions. The eighteen or nineteen guilds
present in Trapani are comparable in number to those in Catania, but Trapani’s
population of 16,000 was only half that of Catania, suggesting that it benefited
like Palermo by the institutional and economic changes of the early seventeenth
century.
Very little is known about guilds in Syracuse, another major town in the south
east, although the streets on the island of Ortigia, the original nucleus of the town,
were named after guilds. What little evidence there is suggests that there were
never many crafts, and those that did exist decreased over time, as in Messina and
Catania. Between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, the population in
Syracuse increased from 13,000 to 17,000,59 whereas the recorded number of
guilds fell from fourteen to eight.60
All other Sicilian towns had less than ten guilds each. Caltagirone was
characterised by a flourishing pottery production, mainly for domestic use, and in
1432 Alfonso exempted the guild of potters from tolls in other demesne towns;
57 See for example the inventory o f the priest Giovanni Virdiramo, who had silver and gold items
and many coral manufactures; the coral came from Trapani. Navarra, ‘Notizie sugli orafi’, p. 106.
58 R. Daidone, ‘Un maiolicaro trapanese del XVI secolo e la corporazione dei vasai del 1645’, in
R. Daidone (ed.) Maiolicari trapanesi del XVI e XVIIsecolo e g li statuti del 1645 (Palermo, 1992),
p.70. The statutes o f Trapani potters were first required for recognition in 1645, following a long
period during which they exercised the craft without written mles, as they say in the prologue.
9 Population increased especially between 1651 and 1681, rising from 13,000 to 16,000. G.
Longhitano, Studi di storia della popolazione siciliana. Riveli, numerazioni, censimenti (1568-
1861) (Catania, 1988).
60 See Appendix 1.
81
the potters could claim exclusive rights to collect coppice for their furnaces on the
town’s commons. In 1518, Caltagirone exported its pottery within a radius of
about 130 km.61 By the second half of the sixteenth century Sciacca had also
developed a vibrant pottery industry. Five furnaces discovered in the 1970s were
ffl
located just outside one of the urban gates, Porta Bagni, where the potter lived.
In the 1590s, some ropers and potters from Caltagirone moved to the town
of Burgio, where they installed numerous workshops for the production of vases
and kitchen utensils. These new arrivals challenged the existing potters in Burgio,
who had moved there from Sciacca, and began supplying the surrounding markets
of Bisacquino, Giuliana, Sambuca, Santa Margherita Belice, Caltabellotta, and
Ribera. By the seventeenth century, Burgio potters supplied markets far to the
west like Mazara and Trapani, where demand was increasing rapidly.
Nevertheless, there is no evidence relating to the existence of guilds in Burgio, as
there is not elsewhere either where artisans supplying local markets are recorded.
To sum up, although artisans were present throughout the island, the number of
craft guilds was modest. Skilled ironworkers, carpenters, and masons formed
guilds only in a few demanial towns where a large and competitive labour market
existed. The largest city, Palermo, had the greatest number of craft guilds and
their number increased during the seventeenth century, as the city’s political role
expanded. Trapani followed a similar pattern and benefited in a similar way from
seventeenth century changes, maintaining a relatively high number of guild
organisations until the eighteenth century. By contrast, Messina, Catania, and
Syracuse, which had witnessed the earliest development of craft guilds during the
fifteenth century, suffered more severely from the seventeenth-century depression,
indeed in seventeenth-century Syracuse the number of trades actually decreased.
Elsewhere in the island, craft guilds are recorded only for Patti, Acireale,
Noto, Caltagirone, Castrogiovanni, Sciacca, Marsala and Monte San Giuliano, and
the number of crafts in each locality was never more than ten (Fig.4.3). The
61 A. Ragona, La maiolica siciliana dalle origini all' Ottocento (Palermo, 1975), p.82.
62 Ibidem, p.68. This is the only information we have about artisans in Sciacca, which does not
prove the existence o f guilds. Potters’ workshops were always located next to the walls or even
outside the urban perimeter, because the smokes from the furnaces was particularly bad smelling
and harmful.
82
scarcity of evidence for guilds in Sicily, despite more than a century o f research,
clearly reflects the limited presence of these groups, rather than a lack of
exploration of the sources.
Fig. 4.3 Map of guild distribution
MilazzD
VAL DEMONE M ess*
,S.Luci«
Monts »CasW0r*i«
SGiulia Cafalu
Trapani « Tarrmni \ ^
A lc a m o V paO ftlTA H *
MtariSttft
( N 1 6 RQQ! MTS \
^ m ourns \ eCtpiui / Raitduto
apm a
S alam i
y CorieOt* ■jf /
I ’ X u^ST* m a "A /
^ —■**——’
M a ta r a Castronovo
_ _ .L Caltebelwwa 1 / Cftascibette
i \ ^ ^ P a te r n d \
poKwanni
a ta m a
* CaitamsMtt*
Agrigento
' ■' (
VAL DI MAZARA
C altagrro
A u g u s ta
Licata
Tarranova y ra c u s e
- - — Valli boundaries
[. ...3 Land uv«r 5 0 0 m etres VAL DI NOTO Modica
9 j. , i x ....^J»krn
<5 30 miles
# Less than 10 craft guilds

A Between 10 and 20 guilds
p Between 20 and 30 guilds
O More than 30 guilds
83
4.5 Artisan migration
Artisans moved from one town to another, where better conditions were offered
and where guilds could provide training and access to the market. Young people
and aspiring craftsmen travelled in search of skilled masters, who could train them
into an occupation. In Sicily, most apprentices seem to have come mainly from
small villages and towns where guilds did not exist; they were attracted to the
larger towns where a guild system could ensure they received full training.
Sometimes aspiring apprentices moved to places where they already knew a
master, who might have originated from the same village. On 12 October 1534,
Pietro Marchisio left Mazara for the workshop of Antonio Santarello, a
silversmith living in Sciacca about 30 km away, who was himself from Mazara.
He was employed for three years in the silversmith’s workshop doing any sort of
zro
work and in order to practise the craft. The Santarello family may in fact have
come originally from Trapani, about 80 km from Mazara, which was well known
for its silversmiths and goldsmiths in addition to the coral workers.64 Sicilian
apprentices however did not move systematically, or ‘tramp’, as they did for
example in Germany.65
Foreign masters also arrived from outside the kingdom in search of better
opportunities. Immigration seems to have been particularly strong during the late
fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Most immigrants came from other parts of
the Aragonese empire, only a few masters came from northern Italy, apparently to
introduce new industrial techniques with the support of local urban councils.66
Immigration is especially well-documented for silver- and goldsmiths in Palermo,
63 ‘ad omnia servitia ... apotece argentarie’ (ASSc, Notai, not. Bartolomeo Modica, 150, c.96rv
(1534-35), cit. in Navarra, ‘Notizie sugli orafi’, p.54-55). In 1537, another silversmith Andrea
Santarellois mentioned in a contract as coming from Mazara and living in Sciacca. It was common
that brothers and relatives moved together.
64 Di Marzo, I Gagini e la scultura, v o l.l, Index ad vocem.
65 According to Ehmer, there were numerous reasons why authorities and guilds encouraged
journeymen to travel. It provided a structure for flexibility in local labour markets, while German
states, in particular, saw it as a force for technical competence and the diffusion o f information
about production methods (J.F. Ehmer, ‘Worlds o f Mobility: Migration Patterns o f Viennese
Artisans in the Eighteeenth Century’, in Crossick (ed.) Artisan and the European Town, pp. 172-
99). For a good comparative survey see U.C. Pallach, ‘Fonctions de la mobilite artisanale et
ouvriere-compagnons, ouvriers et manufacturiers en France et aux Allemagnes (17e-19e siecle)’,
Francia 11 (1983): 365-406.
66 See below, chapter 7.
84
possibly because of the good conditions that the silversmiths’ statutes of Palermo
could offer. In 1509, master Salvatore Landi from Naples rented the workshop of
Paolo Petta in Palermo.67 The silversmiths Geronimo Castella came from Castile,
and Giacomo Landi from Naples.68 In 1539, the Neapolitan goldsmith,
Giandomenico Laureto is recorded in Palermo.69 In 1551, Giovanni Andrea
Chilintano, Neapolitan goldsmith, but inhabitant of Palermo, sold some silver to
Giovannello d’Amato, a goldsmith from Syracuse who lived in Agrigento.
Between 1563 and 1564, Giacomo Baldesi from Florence worked as a silversmith
in Sciacca.70 The number of foreigners applying for work in Palermo workshops
was such that on 17 August 1546 it was declared that any foreign master coming
to work in the town had to pay a deposit to guarantee his behaviour, since some
foreigners who had opened a workshop had later departed with the silver and gold
entrusted to them by their clients.71 As the large number of bonds (malleverie) that
filled the notaries’ and town archives in the early sixteenth century show, Palermo
was a popular destination for foreign silver- and goldsmiths, and the guild - one
of the most ancient and powerful in the city - offered no hindrance to their
influx.72
Masters within the island frequently moved from smaller towns towards bigger
ones, probably to work in another master’s workshop and improve their skills.
Sicilian immigrant masters could either set up a partnership with other masters or
open their own workshop after receiving a licence from the local consul. In 1441,
master Leucio de Xacca (Sciacca) worked in a workshop in Palermo with the
potter Nicolao de Cusentia. On 7 November 1448 master Pietro di Nardo, also
from Sciacca but based in Corleone, signed a partnership with Giovanni and
Gerardo Lombardo, other immigrants probably also from Sciacca. Master
67 Di Marzo, I Gagini e la scultura, p.612.

68 Probably related to the other Landi, so well informed o f the good conditions and the
opportunities o f work that existed in the town. See Navarra, ‘Notizie sugli orafi’, p.52.
69 Di Marzo, I Gagini e la scultura, p.618.
71 Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, p.30, statutes o f Palermo silver- and goldsmiths.
72 See also ACPa, Atti Bandi Provviste, 151, cc.83v, c.92rv, c.l02r, c,125rv (1546-47); 152,
cc.92rv, c.95r, c.97r, c . 105v , cc.l 15v-l 16r, c .ll9 r , c.l20r (1547-48); 153, cc.96v (1548-49).
73 Ibidem, p.53.
85
Vincentius Mole, mentioned as a citizen of Sciacca (saccensis) in documents of

Sciacca, and as a citizen of Agrigento and inhabitant of Sciacca (de civitate
Agrigenti et habitatores saccensis) in documents from Agrigento, had probably
moved to Sciacca from Malta in 1545. Girolamo Lazzaro was bom in a little
village in the territory of Messina, went to Patti as a potter’s apprentice; having
gained his mastership, he decided to specialise in decorated floor tiles and moved
to Palermo, where demand for such goods was greater. On 27 May 1591, the
Senate of Palermo requested from master Girolamo 4,000 tiles decorated with a
design of the royal architect Giovan Battista Collipietra to cover the floor of the
town hall, Palazzo Pretorio.14
Artisan mobility was not prevented by guild statutes. The Palermo hat makers’
regulations clearly stated that if a master from outside the town asked to work, the
consuls had to try to find him a job. If they could not find any, the guild paid him
3 grani to help him on his way.75
The statutes of the Palermo belt makers of 1509 allowed a master to leave
the town and close his workshop for a short period of time. Although previously
the guild had required the master to submit to new examinations on his return,
by 1509 absent masters were simply required to pay a tribute to the guild’s church
on his return, with no further penalty.77 In one case a guild forbade the
‘reintegration’ of a former master, that is when he had practised a ‘dishonourable’
craft, defined usually as any activity that did not require formal training.78 The
prohibition, which is justified as defending the dignity of the craft and of its
workers, implies that training was perceived as the distinguishing feature of craft
activities compared to others.
The sword-makers specified that a master who left and closed his workshop
had to pay 6 tari to the church as soon as he returned; after six months of absence
74 Ragona, Maiolica siciliana, p.62.

75 ‘Chi quando ascadissi chi alcuno foristeri di larti venissi a dimandari di potiri lavurari et fan
servicio li dicti consuli siano tenuti a quilli tali foristeri chercarichi di potiri loro lavurari et non chi
trovando li dicti consuli siano tenuti di soccurriri quillo tali foristeri di grana tri per potirisi
soccurriri’ (Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, p.158 (1509)).
76 Ibidem, p. 155, statutes o f Palermo belt makers, ch.8 (1489).
77 Ibidem, p. 169, statutes o f Palermo blanket makers (1541).
78 ‘Che non si possa rientrigare chi havera fatto exercitio vile’ (Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze,
p.212, statutes o f Palermo sword makers, ch.25 (1649)).
86
the master would lose the rights to keep a workshop. However, if the master left
his workshop open under the management of a qualified apprentice or
journeyman, carried on paying the fees to the church, and returned within six
months, no additional contributions were due. If a master had to leave Palermo
under duress, on the other hand, and was married and had children, his wife was
allowed to keep the workshop open, with the help of a qualified apprentice or
79
journeyman, for as long as he was away in order to support the family.
4.6 The fragmentation of guilds in the seventeenth century
As discussed in chapter 3, the long period of economic and demographic

expansion from the mid-fifteenth century came to an end between the 1570s and
1590s, when the war against the Turks and demographic slowdown in northern
markets also closed off the traditional outlets for Sicilian grain. The economic
slowdown coincided with a period of rapidly increasing financial needs by the
Habsburg monarchy, which responded by selling municipal property and rights
over the royal demesne, including charters of autonomy for hundreds of villages.80
The Sicilian aristocracy took the opportunity to buy up new land and rights to
found numerous new villages and extend cultivation. Out of the 131 new villages
founded between 1583 and 1748, around 90 were created between 1583 and 1630.
The new settlements attracted unemployed immigrants from the larger towns, who
were granted land on favourable terms and were given fiscal and and judicial
Q 1
protection. The new settlements did not require highly skilled labour; apart from
a few master builders, there is no trace of craft guilds in these villages, where the
main activity was agricultural. However, the new settlements set off a
redistribution of population from the eastern half of the island to the west, and
thus also a redistribution of income from the eastern Sicilian landlords to the
(already wealthier) western landed aristocracy. To this must be added the
79 Ibidem, pp.268-69, statutes o f Palermo sword makers, ch. 18 (1649).

80 T.B. Davies, ‘Changes in the Structure o f the Wheat Trade in Seventeenth-Century Sicily and
the Building o f New Villages’, Journal o f European Economic History 12 (1983): 371-405.
81 A higher proportion o f inhabitants in the new villages came from the main demanial towns in
the neighbourhood, as explained in chapter 3.
87
definitive establishment of Palermo as sole capital against Messina’s claims. The

combined effect was to stimulate demand in western Sicily, particularly in
Palermo and Trapani, for luxury manufactures and skilled labour. Growing
demand also accelerated a process of specialisation begun during the sixteenth
century. In the early sixteenth century convents and monasteries had still
commonly produced their own cloths; but by the second half of the century they
were turning to the trained guild masters. In 1517, the nun Caterina in the Palermo
convent o f Saint Domenico received 3 tari for the price of unius palli veteri,
brother Petrum de Costantino made a cowl, and brother Antonino Beneditto
received a payment for dyeing a cowl. In 1561 and 1571, on the other hand, a
master embroiderer (imburdituri) was hired to prepare the best gold embroidery of
89
the holy paraments for the convent.
Particularly between the 1580s and 1630s, a sharp increase of requests for
statute approvals came from new and existing guilds in both Trapani and Palermo.
Sub-groups asked to be independent from the main guilds, stimulating a
phenomenon o f fragmentation. It is still very difficult to date and give details of
the process of guild fragmentation, which triggered a rapid expansion of the
number of craft guilds. Groups separated and re-joined according to economic and
political conditions, in particular their ability to cover the costs o f organising a
group and the chances of obtaining approval from the local authorities. Guild
independence however was frequently the end of a lengthy process of
specialisation and self-organisation within a larger ‘umbrella organisation’; formal
recognition sometimes had merely the effect of constituting financial
independence through control over the cassa, and allowing the masters to collect
their own fees.
The phenomenon of craft fragmentation is of course common to most
European regions. Between 1464 and 1750 the total number of craft descriptions on
the tax rolls of Dijon increased from 81 to 102; 67 new descriptions had appeared,
whilst 45 had vanished.83 Early seventeenth-century London was marked by the
proliferation of new corporations of artisans, often breaking away from older
82 D ’Amico Del Rosso, Paramenti sacri, p.21.

83 Farr, Artisans in Europe, p.52.
88
84
organisations; between 1600 and 1640 twenty-seven new guilds were set up. In
Milan the number of crafts increased from about twenty-eight to sixty-two in 1580,
to 101 in 1772.85 But the explanation for the process is controversial. Some
scholars see it as a sign of corporate decline driven by urban governments, which
saw the multiplication of sub-groups, often in conflict with each other, as a means
to weaken opposition to the patriciate. However, this interpretation does not
explain why, if bigger guilds could protect artisans more effectively, craftsmen
should deliberately weaken their position by splitting into separate organisations.
An alternative explanation is linked to the classical view, discussed in chapter 2,
86
that guilds acquired institutional support in exchange for fiscal revenue.
However, although Spanish fiscal demands did increase roughly at the time when
Sicilian guilds began to splinter, guild fragmentation occurred only in Palermo
and Trapani, whereas growing fiscal pressure clearly affected the entire island,
and guild numbers in eastern Sicily - in Messina, Catania and Syracuse - actually
fell. Moreover, there is no evidence of a significant change in fiscal policy that
particularly affected artisans.87
A more convincing explanation for craft fragmentation points to an internal
process of gradual specialisation. Insofar as craft guilds promoted the transmission
of skills, craft specialisation arose spontaneously from the passage of time and
market expansion. Skills that originally came within the remit of broader
manufacturing activities acting as ‘umbrella organisations’ tended to organise as
independent activities that required their own specialised organisations. Thus,
artisans who were already members of a group specialised in a particular sector,
but part of an existing guild, would ask for independent statutes and
representatives. Alternatively, master artisans with similar skills but part of
different guilds could join together to form a new group.
84 Berlin, ‘Breaking in Pieces’, pp.77-78.

85 Merlo, Corporazioni, p.22. An intepretation for the fragmentation o f Italian guilds is in T.
Fanfani, ‘Le corporazioni nei centro-nord della penisola, problemi interpretativi’, in G. Borelli Le
corporazioni nella realta economica e sociale d e ll’Italia nei secoli d e ll’eta modema (Verona,
1991), pp.33-34.
(Cambridge, 1997).
87 The extent o f fiscal pressure is one o f the most debated arguments for seventeenth-century
Sicily. See R. Giuffrida, ‘La politica finanziaria spagnola in Sicilia da Filippo II a Filippo IV
(1556-1665)’, Rivista Storica Italiana 88 (1976): 310-41.
89
An example of the first case of fission is that of the guild of Palermo

embroiderers, which initially split into sub-groups according to specific
qualifications, and which by the seventeenth century had divided into at least four
different guilds.88 In 1502, no less than twelve masters had formed the guild of
embroiders, and in July that year the Palermo jurors had approved their statutes.
They set up their workshops in the Capo quarter, and they subsequently chose
Saint Anna as their patron and the church became the seat for their meetings. The
statutes stated that anyone, citizen and foreigner, could exercise the craft on
producing a masterpiece, obtaining a licence from the guild consuls, and paying a
fee o f 1 onza and 15 tan to the city cathedral and 15 tari to their church.
The emergence of the embroiderers’ guild affected other workers in the
same sector. The production of fringes and decorations for cloths, until then done
by tailors, now came under the embroiderers’ remit and the latter required that
new tailors be examined in the presence of the consuls of both the tailor and
embroiderer guilds. In 1563, 38 masters signed new statutes, which specified the
craft’s fields o f competence. Master embroiderers were no longer limited to
weaving precious cloth for religious paraments; they were now allowed to sew
male and female clothing, cart covers, home tapestry, and any other sort of
OQ
embroidery. The statutes even described how the designs had to be made, and
explained how silk embroiderers had to use velvet, silver, and gold brocade and
silk for episcopal hats and belts, while the embroiderer-weavers (cordilleri) work
similar cloth on the loom. By 1591, a number of provisions refer to unlicensed
artisans producing embroidered goods outside the craft’s jurisdiction. Other
masters worked as embroiderers under the control of certain unnamed ‘silk
consuls’.90 In 1613, the statutes of embroiderers introduced a compulsory
apprenticeship of five years plus another year as journeyman; however, many of
the new apprentices went to work in the aristocratic houses, since the city councils
88 The data about this guild have been collected by E. D ’Amico, La maestranza palermitana dei
ricamatori (Palermo, 1984).
89 ‘La figura declarata in lo dicto primo digia fari lavorata di sita clara et obscura di Palermo cum
soy firmatii cornu conveni fan’ (D ’Amico, Maestranza palermitana, appendix II, pp.21-22).
90 ACPa, Provviste, 633 , c c . 177- 79 v ( 1590- 91 ).
90
deliberated in favour of apprentices working outside the workshop for the support
of their families.91
The introduction of formal training might have seemed a way of restricting
access to the market. Alternatively, it may have been aimed at maintaining or
establishing standards of quality in a craft that was becoming increasingly
specialised. The statutes o f 1627, introduced a range of mastership tests, with
young embroiderers (imburditori) having to make episcopal hats using different
materials, as well as buttons, fringes with or without gold, and other works, and
trimmers (passamanari) having to make three designs that the consul gave them.
By the second half of the century, the guild of trimmers {passamanari) and
embroiderers (gallonara) competed for the exclusive right to produce certain
goods. Hat-makers, who drafted their statutes in 1614-15,92 and the belt-makers
who appeared in 1618 seem to have been originated within the guild of
embroiderers, so that they claimed similar exclusive rights in the production of
embroidered hats and belts for the clergy (Fig. 4.4).93
91 It is now proven that even where workshops were the location o f production, they were far from
introspective places, with personnel and activities spilling out on the street and into the
neighbourhood, and a great deal o f coming and going. See for example A. Farge, Fragile Lives.
Violence, Power and Solidarity in Eighteenth-Century Paris (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 104-30. See
also M. Sonenscher, Work and Wages. Natural Law, Politics and the Eighteenth-Century French
Trades (Cambridge, 1989), who portrayed a myriad o f methods o f employment, contract, and
payment in artisanal production.
2 We have only indirect evidence that in this year the hat-makers prepared a set o f statutes. The
register o f prowiste 1614-15, which contained these statutes, is now missing. Another guild o f hat
makers existed already in the fifteenth century. From the documents is not clear whether the case
o f the hat makers might have been rather an example o f specialisation leading to encroachment
between different guilds.
93 ACPa, Prowiste, 652, c.407 (1618-19).
91
Fig. 4.4 The fragmentation of the embroiderers’ guild of Palermo
Embroiderers
(1502)
Belt-makers Hat-makers Embroiderers Trimmers

(1618) (1614-15) (Imburditori) (Passamanari and gallonara)
1627 1627
* Source: D ’Amico, La maestranza palermitana.
The sculptors in Trapani and Palermo provide another example of guild

specialisation through the reorganisation of the productive system. In each of the
guilds of masons, carpenters, silver- and goldsmiths, and coral workers, a few of
the masters specialised to engraving, albeit with different materials such as stone,
wood, metals, alabaster, or coral. These masters constituted an almost independent
group, whose skills were closer to one another’s than to those of their fellow
guildsmen, and who were sometimes discriminated against. For example, the
sculptors of alabaster in Trapani were particularly keen to break away from the
main group of the coral workers, because they could not be elected to the main
offices of the guild, although they enjoyed full membership of it.94 Growing
demand for building decorations in Palermo and Trapani hastened the split.95 On
13 March 1645, the masonry and carpentry masters of Trapani, specialising in
carving and engraving, asked the notary Francesco Antonio Felice to draft a set of
statutes for a new guild of marble and stone cutters (marmorari et scarpellini).96
They were probably mimicking the Palermo masters, who had established a
similar guild in 1616-17.97 They specified a period of three months to enrol of the
94 L. Cocco, I consolati della citta di Trapani (Thesis, University o f Palermo 1934-35), p.99,
statutes o f Trapani coral workers (1633).
95 R. Del Bono, and A. Nobili, II divenire della citta (Trapani, 1986), p.52.
96 A.M. Precopi Lombardo, ‘Tra artigianato e arte: la scultura del trapanese nel XVII secolo’, in V.
Abate, Miscellanea Pepoli. Ricerche sulla cultura artistica a Trapani e nel suo territorio (Trapani,
1997), pp.83-113. ASTp, Notai, not. Francesco Antonio Felice, c.293r (13 marzo 1645).
97 ACPa, Prowiste, 650, cc.439-45v (1616-17).
92
new masters and pay a fee of 4 tari that was needed to cover the guild’s set up
costs.
The sculptors of other crafts manage to break the link with their main guilds
only some twenty years later. By 1665 the guild of marble and stone cutters of
no t #
Trapani gathered all the sculptors of every craft. A year later, Trapani city
council approved the new set of statutes signed by 36 sculptors. They claimed the
right to organise by skill rather than working material and demanded a monopoly
over the use of the burin (bulino) and in all sculpturing techniques (Fig. 4.5).
Fig. 4.5 The fragmentation of the sculptors’ guild of Trapani
Masons Carpenters Silver- Goldsmiths
Stonecutters Sculptors Carvers Engravers
Stone cutters and s o p o rs

(1645)
Pan-sculptors' giild
(1665)
*Data: Precopi Lombardo, ‘Artigianato e arte’, pp.83-113.
In the second half of the seventeenth century, another important distinction

emerged, that between retailers who sold unmarked, second hand, and repaired
goods, and masters who sold their own product." The retailers used to buy the
goods not just from the guild masters, who produced with a licence or respected
quality standards, but also from unregulated artisans selling at a cheaper price.
This suggests two points. Firstly, the rise and specialisation of guilds was
accompanied by the emergence of artisans (frequently family members) who,
98 ASTp, Notai, not. Antonino Russo, unnumbered fos. (23 april 1665).
99 Evidence o f an increasing number o f retailers is indirect, because only by the seventeenth
century did the statutes tend to prevent the sale o f products under the competence o f guilds,
without the approval o f the consuls. See for example ‘Che nessuno delli nostri mastri ... possa ne
voglia ne prosumma vendere ... a detti pubblichi mezzani ne’ a qualsivolgia altra persona che
facisse officio di comprare ovvero far comprare per poi quelli rivendere... nessuna specie di
93
having acquired some skills from relatives without receiving a formal training,
fitted in niches of semi-skilled work repairing guild products. For example, the
guild of shoemakers allowed journeymen to teach their brothers and close
relatives, although it forbade the training of apprentices.100 Second, the increased
level of specialisation and the increased size of the market undermined the guilds’
ability to impose their rules and control the labour market.
In short, by the seventeenth century, the process of redistribution of
resources toward the west coast, and the establishment of the Viceroy’s court in
Palermo, favoured the rise o f craft guilds to meet demand by aristocratic
consumers. Expanding markets stimulated specialisation, and specialisation
hastened a process of guild fission. At the same time, new categories of semi
skilled labourers or retailers and second-hand producers emerged to fill product
niches created by the more specialised masters.
We should not exaggerate the extent of these processes, which remained confined
to Trapani and Palermo. Sicilian manufacture did not break out o f the boundaries
of the island economy. Manufacture remained largely directed to the domestic
market. With few exceptions, such as gold- and silversmiths, Sicilian craftsmen
were still characterised by comparatively low skills and, hence, by a limited
number of crafts.
Guilds emerged when the island had already developed a strong
comparative advantage in the export of agricultural goods. Once established,
however, craft guilds took on a life of their own in spite of the attempts by local
councils to override their jurisdiction. Let us turn now to examine how the guilds
actually worked.
concio che spettano a detta arte di spadari’ (Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, p.270, statutes o f
Palermo sword makers, ch.21 (1649); p.211, statutes o f Palermo ropers, ch.10 (1613-14)).
100 ‘Che li lavoranti ... non possino tenere garzone per impararle la arte predetta appoi che non si
fosse frate o parente stritto...’ (Lionti, Statuti inediti, p.33).
94
Chapter 5 Structure and costs o f Sicilian craft guilds
Chapter 5
Structure and costs of Sicilian craft guilds
Labour relations between masters, apprentices, journeymen, foreigners, and

women were at the base of the guild system. This chapter discusses the formal
conditions for membership established by the regulations and compares them with
their practical application, with the aim o f investigating how the system really
worked and what its effects were on the economy and society.
Contemporaries and historians have offered vastly differing judgements,
while recent research has questioned many of the traditional assumptions about
guild functions. This chapter addresses two aspects of guild norms that are
particularly contentious, entry fees and the guilds’ control over artisanal activities.
Entry and participation fees represent one of the most debated aspects of the guild
system. Data on fees collected from the craft statutes of different Sicilian towns
offer some insight into the reasons why masters and apprentices paid them and on
the impact they had on masters’ income. The data show the gap between the letter
of the law and actual practice. The evidence also suggests that political authorities
overrode guild jurisdiction, and that guilds were unable to implement a strict
monopoly over artisanal activities. Guild masters could, however, enforce
apprenticeship contracts and ensure the transmission of skills; training in skills
appears to have been the conditio sine qua non of guild existence.
5.1 Guild structure: masters, apprentices and journeymen, women, and

foreigners
This section discusses participation in the guild system according to the picture
that emerges from the statutes of Palermo and Trapani, where craft guilds were
established most successfully. Masters were the only full members of guilds, and
guilds emerged from the agreements made by masters before a notary. In the
sources, masters appear mainly as artisans living off their work, as teachers and
competitors; apprentices, who were also part of the guild, albeit with few powers,
enjoyed more flexible conditions than might be imagined from classical studies.
95
Here we will examine the relation between master and apprentice, the process of
recruitment and training, the system of promotion in the workshop, the
importance of family ties in learning a craft, the process of acquiring a mastership,
and the organisation of the guild. The section also examines the position of
women and the system of licences that allowed foreigners to be integrated in the
local market. The role of women in Sicilian crafts is interesting because few of the
statutes carried explicit regulations against female participation; nevertheless,
there were no female masters or apprentices, and they did not own any workshops.
a) Masters
Masters were specialised artisans who acquired a particular position owing to their
specific ability and skills, who required institutional recognition o f their authority
and formal backing by local and central authorities to set up a guild. Sicilian
masters constituted the first formally acknowledged guilds during the late
fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries; an unfavourable institutional context, in
particular strong hostility by the Norman, Hohenstaufen and Angevin monarchs,
prevented earlier attempts to establish organisations of masters. During the
fifteenth century, political and economic changes supported craftsmen’s claims:
the Crown became more willing to accede to local interest groups’ requests, and
demand for skilled labour increased. The Palermo statutes of the shoemakers’
guild claimed that the number of shoemakers in town had almost doubled, that
they were selling their product without respect for any rule, and that they charged
high prices, and demanded that the city jurors appoint guild representatives to
monitor the masters.1 Associations of masters were recognised and their
representatives, experts in their craft,2 acted as public officials with specific duties
1 ‘Item, imperoki li curbiseri di la dicta chitati su multiplicati in tantu ki quasi dipploruranu et

supra vindinu l’arti loru et non fannu lu debitu et per quistu indi consequita grandi dannu la
universitati per la trista coirami et pillami, ancora per quista opera e magisteriu loru et excessivi
pagamenti ki si piglianu, supplica la detta universitati ki sia sua merci conchedivi graciose ki li
Iurati qui pro tempore fuerint poczanu eligiri et constituiri unu consulu supra la dicta arti annuativi
lu quali haia ad corregiri la dicta arti tantu di bonitati rej et operis quantu di lu magisteriu et di li
preci, lu quali consulu pocza consequitari et exigiri per pena a contravenientibus quillu ki per li
dicti Iurati sirra ordinatu’ (ASPa, Regia Cancelleria, 79, c.90 (1442-43) and 80, c.303 (1443-44)).
2 ‘alios magistros expertos in talibus’ (G. Beccaria, Statuti ossia capitoli di corporazioni artigiane
nel secolo X V in Sicilia, in BCPa, ms Qq E 190, unnumbered fos.).
96
in the urban constitutions of some demanial towns. According to the urban

statutes these duties were ‘to control and supervise other masters and apprentices
working in the same craft, and to correct, punish and dismiss them’. According to
the official sources, therefore, craft guilds organised in order to enforce
contractual relations between master and apprentice, and to share the costs of
training. Masters also controlled the quality and sometimes also the production of
manufactured goods. This was particularly important for silversmiths and leather
workers, who adopted the system of trademarks already in use in many Italian
towns.4
However, the legal position of masters continued to be weak, which made it
difficult to enforce guild membership. Only by the seventeenth century did
Sicilian statutes start to mention compulsory guild membership; earlier statutes
had focused mainly on the formal training required of guild members, and on the
apprentices’ participation in upholding the guild.5 Guild members could suspend
their memberships, either for travelling6 or because they were unable to work or
pay the membership fees, and they were entitled to rejoin the guild thereafter.
The evidence indicates that more specialised guilds were more likely to
demand higher fees, yet specialised guilds also seem to have suffered more from
the problem of non-participation. The reason for this may have something to do
with the fact described in the previous chapter, that increasing specialisation
through formal apprenticeship also created niches for semi-skilled labour, and that
the number of semi-skilled and unregulated labourers seems to have increased in
proportion to the expansion in formal training. Within the families of masters and
apprentices some informal teaching would invariably occur; even apprentices
were allowed to teach brothers, sisters, and close relatives.7 Thus the most highly
developed guilds also tended to suffer more from unregulated competitors, who
3 ‘Videndi et scrutandi alios magistros atque discipulos qui huismodi magisterium exercent, eosque
valeat atque possint corrigere, punire et effectualiter mandare’ (ACPa, Atti Bandi Prowiste, 113,
unnumbered fos. (1406-07)).
4 See M. Accascina, I marchi delle argenterie e oreficerie siciliane (Trapani, 1976); S. Barraja, /
marchi degli argentieri e orafi di Palermo (Palermo, 1996).
5 See F.L. Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze di Palermo nei secoli XV-XVIII (Trapani, 1991), pp. 127-
32, statutes o f Palermo tailors (1485); pp. 149-53, statutes o f Palermo pan makers (1488); and
pp. 153-59, statutes o f Palermo belt makers (1488).
6 See above, ch. 4.3.
7 See F. Lionti, Statuti inediti delle maestranze della citta di Palermo, DSSS ser.2, 3 (1883), p.33.
97
benefited from the guild system but did not pay the costs of membership: so-
called ‘free-riders’.8
The association between free-riding and craft specialisation explains why
the more specialised crafts were also most concerned with enforcing membership.
During the seventeenth century some of the most specialised craft guilds in
Palermo, which included the embroiderers, tailors, confectioners, tin platers, and
cooks, introduced forms of enforcement and exclusion of membership through
fines, which did not previously exist.9 They also established new punishments for
trainees who performed guild masters’ duties (such as cutting cloth in the tailors’
guild), or worked outside the workshop, and for masters who created partnerships
with journeymen or non-guilded artisans.10 Finally, new regulations were enacted
against selling guild goods to retailers who were not guild m em bers.11 However,
legal backing for such restrictions was not always forthcoming. In 1619, the guild
of Palermo embroiderers asked the city council to authorise a ban against
unlicensed young workers exercising the craft outside the workshop, but a few
months later, the council decided that apprentices were free to work wherever they
wanted in order to support their families. The only conditions were that they could
not leave the masters without being dismissed, that they obtain the licence from
the consuls, and that they pay 2 tan to the church of Saint Anna.12 The provision
8 The problem o f free-riding - the short-term exploitation o f a group, without paying the costs -
occurred because the group could not exclude others be excluded from consumption o f the
collective good gained by the group’s activity. See M. Olson, The Logic o f Collective Action.
Public Goods and the Theory o f Groups (Cambridge, 1965), pp.37-38, 51; T. Eggertsson,
Economic Behaviour and Institutions (Cambridge, 1990), p.5.
9 See for example a new regulation o f Palermo tailors dated 1612 (Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze,
p. 133); a 1621 provision o f Palermo confectioners enforcing compulsory membership with a fine
(ACPa, Prowiste, 655, c.181 (1621-22)); and a 1622 provision o f the Palermo confectioners
against women (ACPa, Prowiste, 655, c.168 (1621-22)).
10 Examples o f rules against partnership with masters who did not belong to the guild are found in
the statutes o f Palermo shearers (Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, p. 163), in the statutes o f Palermo
sword-makers, ch. 16 (Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, p.268), and in the statutes o f Palermo
embroiderers (E. D ’Amico, La maestranza palermitana dei ricamatori, 1502-1822 (Palermo,
1984) p.30)). For other examples see Table 6.5 in the following chapter. Regulations against
apprentices working outside the workshop are found in the statutes o f Palermo ropers (ACPa,
Prowiste, 648, c.509 (1613-14)), and in the statutes o f Palermo confectioners (ACPa, Prowiste,
628, c.388 (1585-86)).
11 See in Palermo the provisions o f tailors and silk sock makers against retailers and unregulated
producers (ACPa, Prowiste, 644, c.197 (1606-07); see also the new statutes o f Palermo tin platers
(ch. 14, 1636), which tend to prevent unregulated selling (Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, p.232).
12 D ’Amico, Maestranza palermitana, p.7; ACPa, Atti, 234/56, cc.48v-9 (1619).
98
therefore protected the apprenticeship system from free-riding, but equally upheld
young men’s right to pursue an independent living.
In 1627, the guild of embroiderers managed to ban silk merchants and
retailers from selling any material suitable for making gold embroidery to men
and women who were not members of the craft, and three years later the senate
approved even more restrictive statutes which attempted to control the problems
of fraud and free riders.13 In the first statutes women had been allowed to work
freely, though they were not regularly enrolled as members; in the new statutes
women were prevented from using new and old materials together, and foreign
and local apprentices were formally required to undertake a further year of
practice in the workshop before taking the ability test.14
The growing number of restrictions at a time when guild membership was
rapidly increasing15 suggests that the number of ‘false labourers’16 able to produce
goods in competition with the embroiderers expanded along with the development
of the guild itself. In 1627, twenty-two artisans signed the statutes and probably
there were twice as many artisans in the guild at this point. Although more
restrictions were imposed by the statutes, compulsory membership became even
more difficult to enforce.
b) Apprenticeship, apprentices and journeymen
The guilds exercised their educational functions through institutionalised

apprenticeship, which constituted the entirety of a child’s formal education and
was therefore a route to adulthood. Training was intended to provide skills and
training for adult work; during apprenticeship important social values and
behaviour were also transmitted to the young person.
13 ACPa, Prowiste, 664, cc.148-56 (1629-30). See also D ’Amico, Maestranza palermitana, p.24.
14 See in comparison the statutes approved by 1512 and those drafted in 1630, which are more
restrictive. D ’Amico, Maestranza palermitana, p.8.
15 There were about over forty members in 1627.
16 See M. Sonenscher, Work and Wages. Natural Law, Politics and the Eighteenth-Century France
(Cambridge, 1989); S. Kaplan, ‘La lutte pour le controle du marche du travail a Paris au XVIIIe
siecle’, Revue d ’histoire moderne et contemporaine 36 (1989): 363.
99
Under normal circumstances, a master agreed to train a child in a trade for a

specified number o f years, and to provide board and lodging. In return, the master
was paid the agreed premium and the child contracted to serve him faithfully.
Training could of course occur outside a guild; but as the division of labour
became more complex, the need to formalise the process of transmitting technical
knowledge gained importance. Already in the fourteenth century, notarial
documents attest to the existence o f artisans who were trying to formalise
apprenticeship, particularly where co-operation with other masters was involved.
As the size of the market expanded, the masters needed more formal institutional
backing for the contractual relation between masters and trainees to be upheld.
Masters had to be sure that the apprentice would stay after he learnt the craft,
rather than leave to go elsewhere, so that they could recover their investment in
training, whilst the apprentice had to be willing to commit himself to a long-term
relationship in which he acquired skills that could not be learnt in any other way.
These arrangements were formalised through the guilds that began to
emerge in the early fifteenth century. In every known statute, the highest fines
apply to the ‘poaching’ of apprenticed labour, suggesting that it was not unusual
for masters to hire an apprentice who was already partially trained by another
master, and that this offence was perceived as especially dangerous to the craft’s
survival. The apprentice could easily be hired for a better salary, compared to the
one he received from the previous master, who had to recover his training costs by
paying the apprentice below-market wages. At the same time, the new master
acquired a semi-skilled labourer at a lower cost than if he had had to train him
from the beginning.
Guild regulations also protected the apprentice from being given sub
standard training and from being fired by a master experiencing economic
difficulties and reneging on his agreement. As the statutes of Palermo shearers
state, masters who trained an apprentice for just a year were wasting the
apprentice’s time; by implication, they also dissuaded other potential apprentices
100
from signing up for fear of being cheated.17 Lastly, the guild protected apprentices
from physical violence by the master.18
An aspect of training about which little is known concerns the literacy of the
apprentices. Some masters were able to count and read, at least to a basic level,
and could transmit this knowledge to the apprentice along with the skills of the
craft. Literacy was probably not widespread among Sicilian artisans, and some
guilds made a point about the importance of such skills for the type of craft being
exercised. Thus, the confectioners of Palermo stated that every aspiring master
wishing to undertake the test of ability had to be able to read and write ‘in order to
prepare the labels for the jars’.19 Masters aspiring to the highest offices of a guild
were also expected to have a basic knowledge of reading, writing, and counting.
They were required to keep and update the account books, to read and draft the
statutes, and prepare the provisions addressed to the city council. Most craft
statutes specified literacy as a conditio sine qua non for the acquisition of the
9ft
office of treasurer. However, the formal requirement of literacy suggests that
only a few masters were actually qualified for office, and written records were not
commonly used. The last point may explain why guild account books are entirely
missing, although they are sometimes mentioned in the statutes.
The recruitment of apprentices had a direct impact on workshop business.
The skills that a master could teach were an important factor in the recruitment of
91
apprentices, and masters competed for apprentices through their skills.
Moreover, the discussion of artisans’ mobility in the previous chapter indicates
that apprentices moved to cities where the demand for labour was higher. The
17 ‘Perchi alcuni fiati li mastri che piglianu garzuni ad insignari per anno uno et quilli tali non
nexino mastri ne lavoranti et perdino lu tempo’ (Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, p. 162; statutes o f
Palermo shearers (1529-30)).
18 Ibidem, p.220; statutes o f Palermo silk sock-makers (1620). The statutes specify that the trainee
has to be well trained, properly fed and dressed, but also that the master should teach with
patience, and that the apprentice could claim his rights with the Praetor, who could revoke the
master’s licence.
19 ‘Che quello che si ha da examinare per fare l ’offitio et arte di confitteri sappia leggere e scrivere
accio possi non solo notare li cosi conditi sopra li bumij, ma ancora fare con piu abilita ed
efficienza ditto offitio’ (Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, p. 191; statutes o f Palermo confectioners
(1622)).
20 BF, ASSTp, Atti, unnumbered fos. (4 August 1618), statutes o f Trapani tailors, ch.2 (1618). See
also A.M. Precopi Lombardo, L ’artigianato trapanese dal XIV al XIX secolo (Trapani, 1987),
p . 81 .
See for example G. Di Marzo, I Gagini e la scultura in Sicilia nei secoli X V e XVI, 3 vols
(Palermo, 1880-83), vol.I, pp.251-53.
101
examples of Palermo and Trapani show that the concentration of skilled masters
coincided with the best production of luxury goods and bigger workshops. The
most skilled masters attracted more clients and had more successful workshops,
which in turn meant higher demand for trainees and journeymen.
Apprentices and journeymen (who had already completed a period of

apprenticeship) were both members of the guild and participated in its activities,
although they could not be elected to guild offices and were excluded from
decision making. They paid fees, which were half o f those paid by masters, and
they could benefit from the guild’s financial assistance. They received medicines
and a doctor in case of sickness, and were paid a funeral if their family could not
afford it. Furthermore, some guilds created dowry founds for daughters of
apprentices and journeymen.
Contracts for craft labour appeared in Sicily from the end of the fourteenth
century and the hierarchy of master, journeyman, and apprentice was already
referred to a half century before the institutional recognition of guilds. There were
two sorts of apprenticeship contracts, the traditional contract between master and
journeyman, in which a sum of money was given for the journeyman’s work, and
the contract o f apprenticeship, which established that the master would teach the
00
craft in exchange for the apprentice’s work in the workshop. The first
characteristic o f the latter contract was the young age o f the apprentice. Usually,
the father or a close relative o f the boy signed the document and transferred
paternal rights to the master. The apprentice moved into his master’s home and
promised to obey him in everything in exchange for daily meals, clothing,
teaching, and the tools of the trade when the contract expired. The relative of the
minor guaranteed the contract, and promised to pay a fine to the master if the boy
escaped.
Early guild statutes contain detailed norms on apprenticeship. The first set
of statutes for Palermo’s silver- and goldsmiths, the Tavula di li Capituli di lo
Officio di li Arginteri, confirmed by Alfonso I on 12 May 1447,23 already contains
22 P. Corrao, ‘L’apprendista nella bottega palermitana (secoli V-XVII)’, in E. Marchetta (ed.) /

Mestieri, tecniche, linguaggi (Palermo, 1984), p. 137-38.
23 BCPa, ms.2Qq F 197; Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, p.23.
102
an attempt to prevent the offence of poaching: ‘About the prohibition to hire

another master’s apprentice’.24 A master could not hire an apprentice already
working in a workshop; neither could the apprentice leave his master.
By the fifteenth century training contracts and guild regulations organised
the apprenticeship and promoted a system of licences assigned by the consuls to
attest apprentices’ and masters’ qualifications; sometimes, the statutes required
that after a maximum period of six months a trainee had to be publicly registered
as an apprentice.25 According to the statutes, the length of the apprenticeship
ranged from a minimum of three years to a maximum of seven years (Table 5.1).
The statutes of the Palermo shearers state that a three-year period of
apprenticeship was suitable for apprentices above fifteen, but recommended a
96
minimum o f six years for younger apprentices. Since apprentices usually started
very young, between ten and fourteen years old, they could expect to be between
seventeen and twenty-one years old when they ended their training, adult enough
to manage a workshop on their own. This matches rules concerning the offspring
of existing masters, who could not inherit a workshop before the age of sixteen or
eighteen; in the meantime, a child’s tutor, or his mother, was appointed to run the
workshop.27
24 ‘Di non raccogliri li juvini di altri mastri’ (Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, p.29).
25 Lionti, Statuti inediti, p.57; statutes o f Palermo playing card makers (1633-34).
26 ‘Chi nullo mastro non pocza pigliari garzuni ad insignari la dicta arti di anni qindichi in suso
manco di anni tri et mezo et si fussi di anni quindichi in yosu manco di anni sey’ (Oddo, Statuti
delle maestranze, p. 162, statutes o f Palermo shearers (1529-30)).
27 Ibidem, p.183, statutes ofPalermo confectioners (1586).
103
Table 5.1 Statutory length of apprenticeship
Town Guild Length of Length of Foreign Year

Apprenticeship Journeymanship master
Messina Masons 4 1559
Palermo Silversmithsa) 7 3 1649

Palermo Shearersa) 6 or 3.5 (if 1 1621
older than 15) 1629
Palermo Soapmakersb) 6 1636
Palermo Tin platera) 6 2 1636
Palermo Silver and Gold 6 1645
platersc)
Palermo Water masters d) 6 1694
Palermo Tin platersa) 5.5 1771-72
Palermo Confectioners a) 5 1530
Palermo Cooks and cake 5 2 1585
makersa)
Palermo Embroidererse) 5 1 1619
Palermo Playing card 5 1634
makers d)
Palermo Tailorsa) 5 2 1641
Palermo Masons and 5 1644
water mastersd)
Palermo Cooks and cake 5 1739
makersa)
Palermo Playing card 4 1610
makers d)
Palermo Ropersa) 4 2 1620
Palermo Silk sock 4 1641
weaversa)
Palermo Sword makersa) 2 1649
Salemi Shoemakers 7 3 1676
Trapani Masonsa) 5 1598

Trapani Silversmiths b) 4 1612
Trapani Silk, wool, linen 3 1645
weaversc)
Trapani Butchersd) 3 1656
* Sources: Messina: Novarese, ‘Statuti’;

Palermo: a) Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze-, b) ACPa, Prow iste 671; c) ACPa,
Prowiste 654; d) Lionti, Statuti inediti\ e) D ’Amico, Maestranza
palermitana.
Salemi: La Colla, Statuti inediti
Trapani: a) Denaro, ‘Capitoli’; b) ASTp, Notai, not. F.Gioemi (1612); c) BF, ASSTp,
Atti (1645-46); d) Denaro, ‘Capitoli deibucceri’.
104
Nonetheless, the length of the training set by the statutes was only an approximate
benchmark, which individual contracts could easily evade. Guild statutes could
only establish general norms suitable for the majority of the apprentices, whereas
notarial contracts could be drafted according to the specific circumstances of each
individual. Individual contracts took into consideration the age of the apprentice,
his origins, his personal status - single, or married with children - and his
previous experience, including any previous informal relationship with a trade or
a master.
Contracts of apprenticeship for Palermo masons ranged from one year,28 to
three years and two months,29 to six years.30 The main variable determining the
length of the contract seems to have been the apprentice’s age. In the contracts of
apprenticeship of four cobblers in Palermo, two sixteenth-years old boys were
-51
engaged for four and five years respectively, whereas a younger boy of twelve
had a contract for six years.32 Another apprentice, or possibly journeyman, who
was probably an adult as he presented himself alone, engaged himself for one year
promising to keep the workshop and manage it in the absence of the master. An
apprentice o f a marble sculptor had a contract for nine years, presumably because
he was only nine years old.34 But the length of the apprenticeship also varied
according to personal contacts and family ties. Almost all the statutes state that the
masters’ sons did not have to undertake the final ability test to become a master,
and the length of their apprenticeship was not fixed but depended on their ability
to replace their fathers in the management of the workshop. Apprentices or
journeymen who married into the master’s family benefited from the same
privilege. The rationale of this apparent inequity was presumably that members
28 ASPa, Notai, not. Antonino Galasso, 5188, c.llOrv (1538-39).

29 ASTp, Notai, not. Vito Vitale, 9908, unnumbered fos. (29 January 1600 and 8 November 1600).
30 ASPa, Notai, not. Giovanni Paolo De Monte, 2892, c.373rv (1538-39).
31 ASPa, Notai, not. Giovanni Paolo De Monte, 2900, unnumbered fos. (1546-47); not. G. De
Marchisio, 3799, unnumbered fos. (1545).
32 ASPa, Notai, not. Giovanni Paolo De Monte, 2900, unnumbered fos. (1546-47).
33 Ibidem.
34 ASPa, Notai, not G. De Marchisio, 3798, unnumbered fos. (1537-42).
35 See, for example, the statutes o f Palermo sword makers regarding the benefits o f marrying the
master’s daughter: ‘Casandosi alcuna flglia d’alcuno de’ nostri mastri passati con qualche
lavorante della nostr’arte, volemo che tal lavorante non sia obligato a far examine . . . ’ (Oddo,
Statuti delle maestranze, p.265).
105
of the family were exposed to craftwork from an early age, and were also more
likely to be confided the craftsman’s technical ‘secrets’.
Some contracts of apprenticeship in Palermo and Trapani established a
-I/"
salary, which was not mentioned in the statutes, perhaps because the labour
market was unusually tight. Two apprenticeship contracts with master tailors in
Trapani stated that during the three years o f training, the boys had to receive 1.10
onze in the first year, 2 onze in the second, and 3 onze in the third year; and 2 onze
in the first year, 2.12 onze in the second, and 3 onze in the last year, respectively.
A similar pattern existed for Palermo tailors, where a fourteen-year old boy was
engaged for three years and received 2 onze and 3 onze in the second and third
oo • • • •
years respectively. Thus, the salary increased m relation to the apprentice’s
increased ability over time. Only fully trained journeymen were paid more: an
artisan from Termini, who had a two year contract with a master tailor, received a
total of 11 onze (5 onze in the first year),40 and a journeyman cobbler received a
salary of 20 onze for one year managing the workshop.41
A contract drafted in Syracuse demonstrates the existence o f different
incentives for training. Nunzio agreed to train with a silversmith for three years;
however, if by the end of the period he was still unable to produce good quality
jewellery, the master would keep him at a reduced salary of 2 tari per day or
less.42 Though it is not known how much Nunzio received during his
apprenticeship, it is conceivable that silversmith apprentices could earn much
more than others: Nunzio’s reduced salary corresponded to half of the salary of a
master carpenter. Be that as it may, the reduction in salary for an apprentice who
was unable to become a master suggests that masters remunerated their
36 The statutes o f the Trapani coral workers (1633) state that the workers had to receive a
minimum wage o f 3 tari per day in cash and not coral. See L. Cocco, I consolati della citta di
Trapani (Thesis University o f Palermo, 1934-35), pp.98-99.
37 ASTp, Notai, not. Vito Vitale, 9908, unnumbered fos. (29 january 1600, and 8 november 1600).
38 ASPa, Notai, not. G.P. De Monte, 2896, cc.680v-681r (1542-43).
39 Giacomo Campaniolo sent his son Francesco to the workshop o f master Didaco. The apprentice
was to stay in the workshop even during the holidays. At the end o f the apprenticeship, the master
was to give a pair o f scissors to the aspiring master. Benedetto Migliorino signed a contract with
Master Antonio Cavarretta for training his son for three years in tailoring. The apprentice had the
duty to remain in the workshop during the holidays. See ASTp, Notai, not Vito Vitale, 9908,
unnumbered fos. (29 January 1600, and 8 November 1600).
40 ASPa, Notai, not G.P. De Monte, 2892, c.331v-2r. (1538-39).
41 ASPa, Notai, not. G.P. De Monte, 2900, unnumbered fos. (1546-47).
42 ASSr, Notai, not. Sebastiano Innorta, 11367, c.537 (1753-54).
106
apprentices according to their productivity. The salary increased as long as the

apprentice improved his skills, and decreased if he could not reach his master’s
expectations. At the same time, the payment of a salary along a moving scale
worked as an incentive to remain with the master even when the apprentice was
fully trained, as the previously mentioned contracts with the master tailor in
Trapani show.43
By the seventeenth century, some guilds imposed a period of further
practice following the apprenticeship, during which the journeyman could
produce directly for the master’s clients.44 The period was usually shorter than a
full apprenticeship, lasting between one and three years, and it seems to have been
regarded as a sort of promotion within the workshop. Furthermore, the time spent
as a journeyman was likely to help the young artisan find ready employment just
after his training, by building up his own clientele.45
The local council could interfere with the criteria of proficiency set by the
masterpiece. Local authorities could question the concession of a mastership, even
when an apprentice had passed his ability test. Although Andrea Bellagamba passed
the mastership o f the embroiderers’ guild, the Palermo senate initially refused to
allow him to practise. The council did finally grant him a licence, though the
document does not say under what conditions.46 By the second half of the
seventeenth century, the tables were being turned, as guilds themselves passed a
number of provisions for concessions of the mastership without examination on
grounds of family need; thus, Mariano Rametta became master before his
apprenticeship had formally ended.47 More often the masters themselves sought
the licence o f mastership for children, who had not yet turned eighteen. In 1654,
the journeymen of the barbers’ guild asked to be recognised as masters, on the
grounds that they were quite able to work in a workshop, and not only in private
43 D. Degrassi, L ’economia artigiana n ell’ Italia medievale (Rome, 1996), p 56; Epstein, ‘Craft
Guilds’, p.691.
44 Precopi Lombardo, Artigianato trapanese, p.86, statutes o f Trapani tailors, ch.12 (1618)
suggests that only masters and journeymen could produce for clients.
45 ‘Quarto: che sapendo non haver commodita di travagliare finiscono il tempo conforme
all’obblighi loro’ (Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, p. 135, statutes o f Palermo tailors, ch.4 (1612)).
46 ACPa, Atti Bandi Prowiste, 173, c.160 (1568-69). See also ASPa, Notai, not. Francesco
Grappo, unnumbered fos. (20 October 1568) for the licence.
47 ACPa, Atti Bandi Prowiste, 173, c.44v (1658-59).
107
houses as wage-eamers.48 On the other hand, some guilds were also attempting to
uphold the ability tests, and to maintain the distribution between masters and
journeymen. In 1619, the guild of embroiderers claimed that some journeymen
worked in their clients’ houses without a licence,49 but the city council decided that
the journeymen were free to practise the craft wherever they wanted, either in a
master’s workshop or in private houses, on condition that they could prove that they
had finished their apprenticeship with a licence from their master.50 In 1661, a
provision of the guild of gunsmiths formally required a compulsory mastership for
the practice of their trade, as an effective test that restrained unskilled producers.51
By the late fourteenth century, almost everywhere in Europe, groups of

journeymen started to organise semi-secret associations that spanned one or more
large regions.52 According to Epstein, journeymen’s associations developed to
overcome asymmetric information in skilled labour markets in regions
comparatively underpopulated or politically fragmented, where information
flowed less intensively; the presence of journeymen associations was lesser in
densely urbanised regions where information flowed more intensively. In Sicily,
there are very few examples o f journeymen organisations, probably because the
island was quite densely populated and highly urbanised, so skilled labourers
could acquire information quite easily and did not require journeymen’s
associations.54 One of the few possible examples of journeymen associations is a
set of statutes drafted in 1645 by the skilled mason labourers (‘manovali’) in
Trapani, which included a formal exam for trained apprentices wishing to join the
group.55 Whether this was in fact an autonomous association of journeymen or a
48 ACPa, Prowiste, 693, cc.7-8 (1660-61).

49 D ’Amico, Maestranza palermitana, p.13, n.6; see ACPa, Prowiste, 653, c.34 (1618-19).
50 Idem, n.8; see ACPa, Atti del Senato, 234, cc.48v-49r (1619-20).
51 ACPa, Prowiste, 693, c.297 (12 August 1661).
52 For a chronology o f these associations see C.M. Tmant, The Rites o f Labor: Brotherhoods o f
Compagnonnages in Old and New Regime France (Ithaca, 1994).
53 ‘As commodity markets increased in size and supply shocks intensified, however, more
sophisticated arrangements to pool information and improve labour mobility emerged’ (Epstein,
‘Craft Guilds’, pp.692-93). The author indicates two phases when these conditions occurred: after
the demographic downturn following the Black Death and during by the seventeenth century.
54 See Epstein, ‘Craft Guilds’, p.693. See also Tmant, Rites o f Labor; C. Lis and H.Soly, ‘ “An
Irresistible Phalanx:” Journeymen Associations in Western Europe, 1300-1800’, International
Review o f Social History 39 (1994): 22-35.
55 ASTp, Notai, not. Antonio Felice, unnumbered fos. (19 February 1645).
108
sub-section of the masters’ guild is difficult to determine. The ‘manovali’ were

probably specialised in particular tasks rather than just a lower level o f master
masons.
The only certain instance of a journeymen guild dates from 1591, when
fifty-eight members signed statutes of Palermo’s journeymen tailor association.
They closely recall the statutes of master guilds, apart from the payment o f fees,
which were not linked to the mastership graduation,56 and were formally approved
and confirmed as such by the Senate. Their main purpose seems to have been to
ensure that the journeymen could administer a separate system of welfare support;
they made no reference to labour relations or to competition with the masters. It is
possible that the guild of tailors in Palermo did not approve these statutes, because
they resulted in the masters’ no longer administering the journeymen’s fees;
however, I have found no further documentation of relations between master and
journeyman tailors, and these statutes remain an isolated case.
The existence o f craft guilds hinged on the transmission and development of
skills. Towns where guilds were better established appear to have had larger and
more numerous workshops. During the seventeenth century Palermo and Trapani
proved to have the liveliest luxury manufacture production compared to other
places where artisans also existed, but were not organised in guilds.57
c) Mastership and licences
Techniques for producing a particular good could only be learnt at the master’s
workshop. Apprentices had to pass a test of ability, the mastership (prova d ’arte),
which led them to become masters with the consuls’ approval. The statutes
occasionally stated only what an apprentice had to produce to pass this test of
ability, and consuls judged a posteriori the quality of the products.58 The
production o f a masterpiece then was an indispensable step for practising a trade
56 ACPa, Prowiste, 633, cc.241-47v (1590-91).

57 See, for example, A. Ragona, La maiolica siciliana dalle origini a ll’Ottocento (Palermo, 1975).
he finds that the best quality production came from potters organised in guilds.
58 See for example Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, p. 150, statutes o f Palermo pan makers (1488);
and D ’Amico, Maestranza palermitana, p.26, statutes o f Palermo embroiderers (1629-30).
109
and for the formal recognition o f a ‘master’. It marked the end of a long period of
practice as apprentice. The culmination of this process of qualification was
obviously of the greatest importance to the young artisan and to the corporation
alike. The former depended on its successful outcome for the possibility of
earning his livelihood, whilst for the latter, a number of contradictory pressures
were involved. Professional pride led guilds to seek to verify the competence of
petitioners for admission. In addition, it was in a craft’s interest that goods be
produced and services rendered in accordance with accepted formulae and norms
of artisanship. Aesthetic and economic values were both enhanced when work
was carried out ‘by an examined master’, as was frequently stated in the
documents.59 Masterpieces were executed by goldsmiths and tapestry weavers, to
whose handiwork we would readily ascribe an ‘artistic’ quality or intention, but
also by masons, carpenters, rope makers, and other professions, which we do not
usually associate with aesthetic concerns. The implication is thus that the request
for a masterpiece was intended to test the candidate’s general skills and
craftsmanship, rather than simply a means for excluding competitors from the
masterpiece.
The production of a masterpiece was not, however, among the original
features of guild statutes. Early regulations did not include any compulsory test of
ability, but demographic and economic expansion from the second half of the
fifteenth century gave rise to the need for a more formal qualification. In 1487, the
guild o f Palermo’s builders and marble workers introduced a compulsory
examination for foreign masters wishing to open a workshop or practise their
trade in town. In 1488, the statutes o f Palermo’s pan makers set a compulsory test
of ability for both citizens and foreigners, who until then had simply paid higher
mastership fees.60
The guild of tailors may have been among the first guilds of Palermo to
introduce a compulsory mastership, since the statutes dated 1505 are a copy of an
59 Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, p. 154, statutes o f Palermo belt makers, ch.2 (1488). Almost all
the statutes stated in the first few articles that whoever practised the craft had to be examined by
the consul; less often statutes described what the apprentice had to do for this test.
60 ‘Item ki tanto citatini como forested ki volissi mettiri putiga in quista citati di la dicta arti di
caudarari non la pocza mectiri ki prima non sia diligenter examinato da li dicti counsulo et
consilieri’ (Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, p. 150, statutes o f Palermo pan makers (1488)).
110
original set dated 1485.61 The first article stated that an artisan could neither open
a workshop nor undertake any tailoring work unless the consuls and four elder
masters had examined his ability. Only journeymen were allowed to work as
tailors under the strict control of a master; even the guild officials could not grant
a mastership without a successful examination. An apprentice (Jew, Christian or
foreigner) who was examined by the elder masters, had to pay 1 onza half to the
patron church of Saint Oliva, and half towards the construction of the Palermo
cathedral. A master who owned his own shop and who left the town for a certain
period of time did not have to be examined on his return, suggesting that the
masterpiece was a way to exclude unqualified outsiders, rather than simply a
barrier to entry in the local market.
Although the masterpiece was already included in some statutes of the
fifteenth century, the practice was enforced by a public ban in Palermo on 20
August 1512,62 which forbade anyone from practising craft, unless he had been
examined by the guild consuls or the elder masters. As mentioned before, only
the masters’ sons and sons-in-law were exonerated from producing a
masterpiece.64 In a few cases foreign apprentices paid higher fees; more often
there was no difference between citizens and foreigners producing a
masterpiece.65
Information on the production of masterpieces is uneven in its scope,
especially because the documentation is exclusively of a legal character. It
presents the masterpiece as a compulsory requirement and briefly sets forth the
61 BCPa, ms.2Qq B92.and Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, p.l27ss. Being a copy o f a previous
version dated 1485, the statutes o f 1505 still mention prescriptions for Jewish artisans, even
though Jews had been expelled from the island in 1492.
62ACPa, Atti Bandi Prowiste, 118, c.23 (1511-12). G. Scherma, Delle maestranze in Sicilia
(Palermo, 1896), p.73; S. Barraja, ‘La maestranza degli orafi e argentieri di Palermo’, in M.C. Di
Natale (ed.) Ori e argenti di Sicilia dal Quattrocento al Settecento (Trapani, 1989), p.373.
63 As far as I know, there are no detailed studies o f these tests, except from a general perspective.
See for example W. Cahn, Masterpieces. Chapters on the History o f an Idea (Princeton, 1979). In
Naples masterpieces required within the wool and silk guilds from the sixteenth century, although the
guilds were established in the fifteenth century. A. D ell’Orefice, ‘The Decline o f the Silk and Wool
Guilds in Naples in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century’, in A. Guenzi, P. Massa, and F. Piola
Caselli (eds.) Guilds, Markets and Work Regulations in Italy, Sixteenth-Nineteenth Centuries
(Ashgate, 1998), pp. 117-31.
64 Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, p.265, statutes o f Palermo sword makers, ch. 10 (1649).
65 A.M. Precopi Lombardo, ‘Documenti inediti e poco noti degli argentieri trapanesi’, in Di Natale
(ed.) Ori e Argenti di Sicilia, p.388 n.65; B. Patera, ‘Marmorari e muraturi nel privilegio del 1487’, in
Marchetta (ed.) Mestieri, p.77.
Ill
manner in which it must be carried out. It gives details about the length of time to
be spent on the preparation of the work, and the place and conditions under which
it must be executed;66 sometimes, the statutes describe the kind of project assigned
to the aspiring master.67 But the records leave us in the dark about the techniques
used and the standards and expectations of the judges, because neither of these
could be easily defined in writing.
This absence o f technical specification points to the fact that technical
knowledge was largely tacit, and techniques were not standardised. Thus, during
the searches that the consuls used to make in the workshops to enforce quality
controls, attention centred on the finished product, rather than on the procedure by
which it was made. The statutes of silver- and goldsmiths required the destruction
of the products that did not conform to basic criteria of fineness and weight, but
there was no attempt to investigate or define the techniques used for making
them.68
During the seventeenth century, as craft specialisation increased, the
masterpiece became more complex, particularly for those crafts that had more
than one sub-group o f specialised artisans. Evidence suggests that within a broad
‘umbrella denomination’,69 craft apprentices would have learned some common
basic skills, followed by a significant degree of specialisation. Masters who
formed independent groups, even within the same guild, elected representatives in
66 A masterpiece could be undertaken in a variable length o f time between a few hours and fifteen
days. These ability tests could be carried out in the consuls’ workshop, or sometimes in the
workshop where the apprentices were practising. See for example the statutes o f Trapani wool,
linen and silk weavers in which the mastership was carried out in front o f the consuls (ASTp,
Notai, not. Martino Corso, unnumbered (13 January 1645); BF, ASST, Copia Lettere, c.62v (1644-
45)); and the statutes o f Palermo embroiderers, which stated that the test took place in the church
and the aspiring masters had fifteen days to study the requirements o f the consuls for their
masterpieces (D ’Amico, Maestranza palermitana, p.21).
67 ‘La quali examina serra supra li infrascritti cose videlicet. Si sapera ben fundiri lo rami et
spachiarelu di mano suadi al incuya. Item si sapera fan una quartara et fari unu cutinuu ad uno
peczo e ki siano maystrivolementi facti’ (Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, p. 150, statutes o f
Palermo pan makers (1488)).
68 ‘Vogliamo che il consolo et consigliero, che parendogli labbiano da pigliarsi con loro uno o piu
maestri in compagnia et labbiano di andare lor in uno et in un’altra bottega a lor ben vista, per
rivedere li lavori che fanno e che han fatti nelli cassetti, e trovando qualche frode o mancamento
contrario all presenti capitoli possono rompere le opere e far pagare li peni’ (ASTp, Notai, not
Francesco Gioemi, unnumbered fos. (8 April 1612), Trapani silver- and goldsmiths statutes). See
also M. Berlin, ‘ “Broken All in Pieces:” Artisans and the Regulation o f Workmanship in Early
Modem London’, in Crossick (ed.) Artisan and European Town, pp.75-91.
69 See above, chapter 4.3.
112
each group, and aspiring masters could attend their exams with the representative
of a particular specialisation, who was better qualified to supervise the specific
test.
This is the case of Palermo’s guild of embroiderers, which in its new
statutes of 1629 granted a degree of autonomy to the trimmers (frinzari), who
nonetheless continued to belong to the mother guild. The implication is that
aspiring masters in trimming and embroidering would be asked to make different
masterpieces. On the day of the examination, the elder masters decided what
goods the aspiring master had to produce. Three masters, appointed by the consul,
prepared three products as models, and the apprentice had fifteen days to
accomplish all of them.70 The 1676 statutes of the Palermo guild of cooks and
cake makers stated that the confectioner had to prepare three kinds of pastries
according to the judges’ wishes, whilst the cooks had to prepare eight different
dishes according to the consuls’ tastes.71 Judges voted secretly on the result of the
masterpiece; a system of coloured balls in a box revealed whether or not the
apprentice had passed his test. A fine was applied in the case that the vote was
revealed, while a master could lose his right to vote in the consul elections if he
helped an apprentice to prepare the masterpiece.72
Some guilds requested two or more masterpieces if the aspiring master
wanted to exercise more than one trade within the same guild. The carpenters of
Trapani, who belonged to one of the most specialised guilds in the town (they had
four main groups with consuls and five sub-groups) were one such group. The
statutes of 1614 specified that an apprentice wishing to practise as a walnut
carpenter and as a ‘master of the axe’ had to be examined by both consuls in two
separate exams.73 The fees for the mastership did not increase with the number of
70 D ’Amico, Maestranza palermitana, pp.27-28.

71 Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, p.306, statutes o f Palermo cooks and cake makers, ch.31 (1676).
72 Ibidem, p.307.
73 ‘E perche talvota succede che uno vuole esercitare due o tre o tutte le dette arti, ... per tanto si
determina che in tal caso s ’habbia da esaminare et approbare cossi dal consolo delli carrozzeri
come dal consolo di qualsivoglia sia di queste arti. . . ’ (S. Corso, ‘ “Fabri lignarij:” la maestranza a
Trapani nei secoli XVII-XVIH’, La Fardelliana 8-9 (1989-90): 80).
113
tests undertaken, indicating that the test truly aimed to verify the apprentice’s
skills.74
A verbal licence from the consul, which certified the completion of a certain
stage, marked every step from apprenticeship to mastership; however, some
statutes stated that a notary must draft the licence in a public act. Written
licences were granting the level of craftsmanship of a master. As we saw, the city
council also had the ability to concede licences to masters, and to admit to the
mastership someone with an incomplete apprenticeship. In Palermo, the statutes of
the carpenters stated that if an apprentice did not pass the craft ability test, he
could appeal to ‘expert’ urban officials, who were authorised to give him the
licence.77 Salvatore Pittaluca, son of master Giuseppe, but not yet eighteen, as
required by the statutes of confectioners, petitioned the senate of Palermo for the
licence of master.78 Pietro Caltagirone, apprentice in a barber workshop, asked the
Praetor for a master’s licence even though he had not completed the four years of
7Q
apprenticeship; he also promised to pay 20 onze to the church. Nevertheless, it
seems that in both cases the Senate did not accede to the requests, suggesting that
they respected the guilds’ jurisdiction over apprenticeship more than that over
general practice and production control.80
74 ‘Con pagare pero sempre solamente detta onza una e tari uno’ (Corso, ‘ “Fabri lignarij” ‘, pp.80-
81).
75 The passage from apprentice to journeyman, and then to master, represented the ideal training
for artisans. Only some o f the apprentices actually became masters, whereas journeymen often
remained in the workshop as semi-skilled labourers. As Garden has written ‘masters in waiting’
are recorded throughout Europe. M. Garden, ‘Ouvriers et artisans au XVIIIe siecle. L’exemple
lyonnais et les problemes de classification’, Revue d ’histoire economique et sociale 48 (1970),
pp.41-42. See also the examples o f numerous transient journeymen with few hopes o f progress in
Farr’s research on Dijon between 1550-1650. J.R. Farr, Hands o f Honor. Artisans and Their World
in Dijon, 1550-1650 (Ithaca-London, 1988), pp. 138-40.
76 ‘Facendoli atto per mano di notar puplico di detta licenza’ (Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze,
p. 180, statutes o f Palermo confectioners, ch. 10 (1585-86)). Similar licences can be found
elsewhere in Europe. See for example the brewers o f London who stipulated that no journeyman
could be hired without a ‘passport’ from his former master certifying his ‘lawful departure’. S.
Rappaport, Worlds Within Worlds: Structures o f Life in Sixteenth-Century London (Cambridge,
1989), p.239.
77 ‘Chi li examinandi per ditti Consuli et consiglieri non fossero pati pir mastri et quilli
pretendissiro indobitamenti non essiri passati chi poczano aviri recorso ad ipsi spettabili signori
offittiali, como personi experti pozzano quilli disgravari e darli licentia retrovandoli sufficienti in
ditta arti’ (F. Lionti, Statuti inediti delle maestranze della citta di Palermo, DSSS ser.2, 3
(Palermo, 1883): 10-11, statutes o f Palermo carpenters (1573)).
78 ACPa, Prowiste, 693, c.277 (1660-61).
79 Ibidem, c.326.
80 See below, chapter 6.
114
d) Women
Female labour has an important role in the study of pre-industrial societies and
represents a vexed question in the historiographical literature, a critical discussion
of which will be developed in the final chapter. According to the literature on
female craft employment, women’s position in the labour market differed widely
according to circumstances.
In some northern European countries women acquired full membership in
local guilds, whilst some corporate groups admitted only female members.81 In
some German cities, women worked in organised corporate groups, or side-by-
side with guild masters, and the procedure of entry into the group did not differ
from that for male members.82 More often, female workers emerged as employees
of the craft, either as subcontracted labourers, or as part of the master’s family and
therefore as members of the workshop.83 Finally, women could work in
competition with guild artisans, particularly in the textile industry, and in other
trades, such as cake making and tailoring. In such cases, guilds attempted either to
regulate women’s work or to prevent women’s access to the labour market. In
Sicily, on the other hand, they often had secondary roles, but they were not
prevented from participating in guild activities. Above all, female labour became
more widespread during the seventeenth century when a process of specialisation
was taking place in the crafts of few demanial towns.
Before the seventeenth century, women artisans are hardly mentioned. Fifteenth-
century statutes referred to membership in very generic terms, irrespective of law,
81 M. Wiesner, Women in Renaissance Germany (New Bruswick and New Jersey, 1986), p. 158;
M. Howell, Women and Patriarchy in Late Medieval Cities (Chicago and London, 1986), pp.43-
44.
82 In fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Cologne, though women were restricted to certain guilds,
they dominated four textile trades. Each o f these guilds had its own statutes, which established the
length and terms o f apprenticeship, admission to the trade, workshop searches, quality controls and
so on. Female masters had their own shops, took on apprentices, purchased raw materials and
marketed their products. See M. Wensky, ‘Women’s Guilds in Cologne in the Later Middle A ges’,
Journal o f European Economic History 11 (1982): 631-50.
83 Particularly in the late sixteenth century, women’s roles were circumscribed and confined to
certain aspects o f the trade. However, in eighteenth-century Nantes women still worked mostly in
the textile, food, and female clothing crafts. For example tailors opened their guild to women
because the demand for female clothing was outstripping the male tailors’ ability to meet it. See
J.R. Farr, Artisans in Europe, 1300-1914 (Cambridge, 2000), pp.40-41.
115
status, sex, and economic circumstances; anyone wanting to practise the craft
could be enrolled by paying the relevant fees; this generic clause appears in the
statutes of the gold- and silversmiths, which was doubtless one of the most
important crafts in Palermo throughout the early modem period. In 1502 the
statutes o f embroiderers allowed women to practise their trade freely; only in case
or
of fraud did women come under consular jurisdiction. Up to the second half of
the sixteenth century, therefore almost none of the statutes limited women’s work,
and none of them specifically excluded female work from craft business.
Under these conditions, we might presume that women’s work was
widespread and that numerous female masters existed in the workshops.
Nevertheless, the Sicilian sources do not reveal a large-scale presence o f female
workers; there is no mention o f independent female masters or of workshops with
only female artisans. The rare references to female masters refer not to women
who obtained their mastership by means of a masterpiece, but to widows who had
inherited and managed the workshop of their deceased husbands.
From the middle of the sixteenth century, the statutes begin to pay more
attention to the role of women, who however appear mainly as daughters and
wives, as potential recipients o f dowries from the guilds’ dowry fund. The latter,
which appears to have become a common feature of all Sicilian crafts from the
late sixteenth century, was gradually extended to the daughters of apprentices and
journeymen. The standard provision gives a dowry (legato di maritaggio) to the
virgin daughters of the guild’s members. They had to be poor, orphans, and
sixteen years o f age, and their deceased fathers had to have paid their fees
regularly to the guild, every year.86 When by the seventeenth century, the
daughters of apprentices were also authorised to receive dowries, they were
granted less money than the master’s daughters.87 Even the daughters of foreign
masters could have access to this money on condition that their father had worked
84 ‘Tutti persuni di qualsivogli ligi, statu, sexu e condicioni siano li quali di cza (qua) innanti
vorranno usari e fari lo dicto officio digiano aomni anno che quisto officio eligeranno e vorranno
fan pagari et dari a la dicta caxa 4 carlini ... ’ (Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, p.24, statutes o f
Palermo silver- and goldsmiths, ch.2 (1447)).
85 D ’Amico, Maestranza palermitana, p.20.
86 See for example Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, pp. 177-79, statutes o f Palermo confectioners,
ch.5 (1622).
87 Ibidem, p. 177. Master’s daughter: 30 onze; apprentice’s daughter: 20 onze.
116
in town for at least ten years.88 In the guild of coachmen, even young women
whose fathers were still alive received a dowry of about 15 onze; the officials also
OQ
named four girls for a smaller contribution of 4 onze four times a year. Payments
by smaller and less wealthy guilds were less frequent, and the dowries less
generous.
The purpose of the dowry system was to provide a sum of money to young
women who were likely to marry an apprentice or a young master, who in turn
would set up a new workshop. It also worked as an incentive to members to
regularly pay their fees.90 Sometimes, the dowry of a young woman and the
mastership fees could be traded against each other, a fact that helps explain the
large proportion o f in-marrying within the guild and the frequent coincidence
between marriage and setting up shops.91 Between 1620 and 1704, the silver- and
goldsmiths set mastership fees of 18 onze, but exempted the sons of existing
masters from the ability test and payment o f mastership fee; journeymen who
married the daughter of a master were also exempted from the exam, and if the
09
bride received a guild dowry, had only to pay a fee of 3 onze to the Church.
Although the artisans’ wives clearly became involved in their husbands’
business and acquired some skills informally, guild statutes tried to restrict
widows’ involvement in the administration of the workshop. A widow was only
allowed to hold a workshop for a limited period of time until a young son could
take his father’s place. She could sell the output to maintain herself and her
family, but she could not start a new partnership with a master or a journeyman;
neither could she sell the workshop, nor inherit it completely. If she remained, she
was not allowed to keep the workshop, unless her new husband was another
master o f the same guild.
Nevertheless, the statutes of the embroiderers of 1629 suggest that women
did in fact participate in the production system, but produced cheaper goods using
88 Ibidem, p.265, statutes o f Palermo sword makers, ch.10 (1649).

89 Ibidem, p.244-45, statutes o f Palermo coachmen, ch.l 1 (1636).
90 The bride’s dowry frequently brought resources essential for setting up a workshop. See E.
Musgrave, ‘Women in the Male World o f Work: The Building Industries o f the Eighteenth-
Century Brittany’, French History 7 (1993): 37.
91 G. Crossick, ed., The Artisan and the European Town, 1500-1900 (Aldershot, 1997), p. 10.
92 Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, pp.79-80, statutes o f Palermo silver- and goldsmiths, ch.3
(1704).
117
a mixture of old and new materials, which masters tried to prevent by forbidding
unregulated labour and the making of mixed quality goods.93 In 1628-29, the
consuls of the silk guild in Palermo petitioned the city council to force a group of
female silk-makers to pay the standard guild fees and regularise their position. By
putting the women under guild control.94 However, the female silk weavers
successfully argued that since their gender excluded them from guild membership,
they could not be forced to pay the membership fees.95 Another common excuse
was that women worked only for their families and relatives using old cloth and
no new materials.96 Women were thus adept at manipulating their inferior legal
status to their advantage. Their exclusion from the guild allowed women to work
07
without respecting quality standards, and exempted them from guild controls.
Legally, only the male head of the family was required to pay fees for the
family workshop; women were exempted because they were dependent, on a par
with other members of the labour unit. Women in fact paid fees when, as widows,
they managed the workshop on their own, and by the mid-seventeenth century
guild regulations also stated that the wife of a master had to pay fees if she
managed the workshop in her husband’s absence, even though only the master
was entitled to guild membership. A wife could keep the workshop running with
an apprentice until the return o f the master, only if she paid her husband’s annual
fees.98
By the beginning of the seventeenth century, female workers are mentioned
by the Trapani coral workers and tailors and the Palermo confectioners. In
Trapani, tailors hired women for finishing the manufacture of a dress or a man’s
suit, after the master had cut the cloth. In case of dispute over quality between a
93 D ’Amico, Maestranza palermitana, p.29, statutes o f Palermo embroiderers (1629).

94 ACPa, Prowiste, 663, c.194 rv (1628-29).
95 Ibidem, c.195 rv.
96 Often artisans who did not belong to a guild could work old materials, repairing or producing
second hand goods. There are several investigations relating to the use o f the categories ‘old’ and
‘new ’ in the early modem manufacturing industry. See F. Giusberti, Multiprodotto contro
monoprodotto: il mercato degli abiti usati in una citta di Antico Regime (Florence, 1991).
97 Sicilian female artisans did not have apprentices, and their activity was less formal. However, in
other European regions women could formally teach a craft - as in Germany (Wiesner, Women,
pp.43-44), or in Cologne (Wensky, ‘Women’s Guilds’, pp.631-50). Therefore the recruitment o f
apprentices is not the key distinction between male and female labour.
9 See Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, p.269, statutes o f Palermo sword makers, ch. 18 (1649).
118
tailor and his customer, the master was not held responsible for the work done by
women, who were represented as subcontractors."
During the seventeenth century, the manufacturing sector expanded in two
directions. First, the spread of skills offered more opportunities for informal
training and for practising a craft outside the confines o f the guild. Second, new
production niches were established which male labour could not or did not wish to
fill. While the master coral workers specialised in sculpture and engraving,
women were hired to bead rosaries in the coral workers’ shops.100
e) Foreigners
During the early sixteenth century, numerous silver- and goldsmiths moved to
Palermo. They came from other demanial towns within the island, but also from
Spain and from other parts of Italy such as Rome and Genoa. According to the
contracts, they came because the conditions of Palermo’s silversmith statutes were
particularly favourable, and they paid a deposit (malleveria) of 25 onze in order
to work in town.101 This bond aimed to protect the local masters and customers
against foreign masters leaving with the gold and silver entrusted to them.
The condition of foreign artisans seems to be very similar to that of women.
Statutes do not mention any restrictions on the access o f foreign masters to the
guilds; indeed numerous guilds seem to have encouraged the integration of
foreigners. Masters did not need to undertake a further period of apprenticeship if
they could prove to have obtained a mastership elsewhere,102 and they paid the
same mastership and membership fees as local guild members. In one case, the
statutes offered a temporary subsidy for foreign masters who could not find a
99 A.M. Precopi Lombardo, Artigianato trapanese, p.81, statutes o f Trapani tailors, ch. 12 (1618).
100 I. Navarra, ‘I coralli dei corallari di Trapani fra i gioielli di Isabella De Vega e Luna Duchessa di
Bivona’, Libera Universita Trapani 19 (1988): 151-69.
101 ACPa, Provviste, 118, c.151 (1512-13).
102 ‘Vinendo in questa citta alcuno mastro forastiero della ditta arte chi volesse mettere bottega di
confitteri non li sia ammesso che prima non prova haver stato alia detta arte anni cinque continoi e
completi’ (Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, p.182, statutes o f Palermo confectioners, ch.19 (1585-
86)).
119
workshop in which to work soon after their arrival in Palermo.103 Furthermore,

exceptions were made in case they infringed specific regulations they did not
know about, and no fine was charged. The children of a foreign master or
apprentice could enjoy similar rights as the local masters’ children if their fathers
worked in a local shop for a few years.104
5.2 Fees
Participation in the guild entailed costs, which included the compulsory payment
of a mastership fee on graduation, and the annual membership fee. Fines and
monetary sanctions were applied to infractions of the regulations; these are the
subject of the following chapter. The collection of fees financed the maintenance
of the organisation and in particular circumstances (sickness, dowries, old age,
and death) constituted an assistance fund. Although fees were clearly central to
the purpose of craft guilds, their aim is the subject o f great controversy and has
produced two opposite interpretations. On the one hand, the classical thesis
represents fees as the main obstacle to free entry to the labour market, imposed by
organised lobbies of masters.105 On the other hand, Epstein has suggested that fees
were the main means to hold the guild together, through a combination of ‘stick’
(regulations and fines) and ‘carrot’ (financial benefits).106 Entry fees would raise
the cost of default for the trainee, which made apprenticeship easier to establish;
‘analogously, the entry fee to the guild was a “mortgage on trust”, which was used
to deter lesser-known masters from exploiting the guild for short-term
advantage’.107 In this view, fees were a kind of bond needed to acquire other
members’ trust and to prevent new members’ early departure from the guild, and
103 Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, p. 158, statutes o f Palermo hat makers (1509).
104 Foreign masters’ or apprentices’ children had to be bom in Palermo, their father had to have
worked in a local workshop for a few years, and to have regularly paid his fees for guild
membership. See Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, p.281, new statutes o f Palermo sword makers,
ch.12 (1688).
105 S. Ogilvie, State Corporatism and Proto-Industry. The Wiirttemberg Black Forest, 1580-1797
(Cambridge, 1997), p. 139; J. Mokyr, ‘Growing-Up and the Industrial Revolution in Europe’,
Explorations in Economic History 31 (1976): 374.
120
would explain why foreigners sometimes paid higher fees than citizens did, and
why local masters’ children (who were least likely to break collective rules,
because they were most easily monitored) were usually exempt.
a) Membership fees
Membership fees were imposed on all members - masters and apprentices, and in
every guild. According to the statutes, they were imposed in order to guarantee the
main duties of the guilds: for mutual assistance, for masters in need, for dowries,
• 108 • •
and for the maintenance of the church, including processions and festivities.
They also exempted the guild masters’ sons from the mastership, and entitled the
daughters of masters, and sometimes of apprentices, to benefit from the dowry
fund. Everybody was subject to the payment of an annual quota, which could be
paid in weekly or monthly instalments. Membership fees were also required from
a master or apprentice, who, though citizen of Palermo, lived and married
elsewhere, but returned to open a workshop in town.109 Moreover, after payment
o f the fees, a master’s child would enjoy the same rights as the child o f every
other legitimate master in town.110 There were only few exceptions, such as the
tailors of Trapani, who ruled that the children of master tailors who were not
brought up in the town had to produce the masterpiece.111
The money from the fees was collected by the guild officials, who in
Palermo were allowed to administer only a limited certain amount, usually 5 onze.
The rest was deposited in the Tavola, Palermo’s deposit bank where the money
107 Idem.
108 See for example ACPa, Provviste, 650, c.440 (1616-17), Palermo, the statutes o f the marble
cutters. See also ‘Si fara della somma riscossa come un monte e atteso prima il bisogno del Cilio,
secondariamente si potra spendere per aggiunto di qualche povero mastro infermo, carcerato, o
d’altra maniera bisognoso’ (R. Daidone, Un maiolicaro trapanese del XVI secolo e la
corporazione dei vasai del 1645 (Palermo, 1992), p.73, Trapani statutes o f potters, ch.5 (1645)).
109 Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, p.268, Palermo statutes o f sword makers, ch.18 (1649).
110 Ibidem, p.269.
111 Precopi Lombardo, Artigianato trapanese, p.84, Trapani statutes o f tailors, ch.7 (1618).
121
1 19
accrued interest and was available for larger expenditures. The money
administered directly by the consuls was used for charitable purposes and for
religious duties. Church maintenance was the most onerous part, and it increased
11^
progressively throughout the early modem period.
The payment of the membership fees had a further unspoken function:
membership fees helped strengthen respect for the statutes, since they represented
a master’s investment in the guild structure and a commitment to the system’s
efficient operation. The quota raised the costs of default, since leaving the guild
would result in losing any benefit that had been acquired. These fees worked as
constraints and incentives for the members, rather than as obstacles for their
recruitment.114
The evidence suggests that the amount of fees paid depended largely on
location and specialisation. Different fees were paid in different towns; more
specialised guilds also tended to pay higher fees, reflecting the fact that the costs
of free riding and the benefits o f co-operation were also higher (Table 5.2).115
The following tables have been compiled using data from a number of
craft statutes in different Sicilian towns (mainly Trapani and Palermo) over a
period of two centuries.
Table 5.2a Membership fees, 1400-99 (lari)

Town Guild M aster Apprentice
Palermo Pan makersa) 2.6 1.3
Palermo Belt m akersa) 2.6 1.3
Palermo Marble cutters b) 2 0.5
Palermo Tailorsa) 1 0.5
*Sources: Palermo: a) Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze', b) ACPa, Prowiste 650.
112 F. Benigno, ‘Fra Cinque e Seicento: 1’ evoluzione del sistema bancario e 1’ istituzione delle
tavole di Palermo e Messina’, in F. Pillitteri (ed.) Banche e banchieri di Sicilia (Palermo, 1992),
pp.59-74.
113 Precopi Lombardo, Artigianato trapanese, pp.85 and 101-5. See the two audits o f the guild o f
tailors, ch. 11 (1618) and 1773 where all the expenditures registered are used for religious
functions and events.
1,4 See Daidone, Un maiolicaro trapanese, p.73. The statutes o f Trapani potters stated that only the
masters who remained faithfully members o f the craft could enjoy the money collected.
122
Table 5.2b Membership fees, 1500-99 (tari)
Town Guilds Master Apprentice

Palermo Embroiderersa) 10 1
Palermo Shoemakers b) 3 1.6
Palermo Blanket makersc) 2 1
Palermo Confectionersc) 1 0.25
Palermo Tailorsc) 1 0.5
Palermo Carpenters b) 1 -
Syracuse Masons 0.05 -
Trapani M asons 4 1
*Sources: Palermo: a)D’Amico La maestranze palermitana; b)Lionti Statuti inediti; c)
Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze;
Syracuse: Carpinteri, ‘Capitoli’;
Trapani: Denaro, “Capitoli’.
Table 5.2c Membership fees 1600-99 {tari)
T ow n G u ild s M a ster A p p r e n tic e

Palerm o S ilv ersm ith sa) 60 30
Palerm o Playing card makers b) 36 18
Palerm o S oap m akersd) 24 -
Palerm o Silk sock m a k ersa) 12 6

Palerm o C ooks and cake m a k ersa) 12 6
Palerm o C o a ch m en a) 12 -
Palerm o W ater m a stersb) 9 -
Palerm o Sword m ak ersa) 6 3

Palerm o R o p e r sa) 6 -
Palerm o G old p la tersc) 6 3

Palerm o M asons b) 4 -
Palerm o T a ilo rsa) 3 2
Syracuse Leather workers 3 1.5
Trapani S ilv ersm ith sa) 30 12

Trapani C arpentersb) 6 3
Trapani M arble cu tterc) 4 -
Trapani Silk, w ool, linen w e a v e r sd) 3 2.5

Trapani Coral w o rk erse) 3 1.5
Trapani Tailors 0 3 1.5
Trapani B la ck sm ith sg) 2.6 1.3
Trapani P o ttersh) 2
*Sources: Palermo: a) Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze; b) Lionti, Statuti inediti; c) ACPa,
Prowiste 654; d) ACPa, Prowiste 653, 664, 671.
Syracuse: Carpinteri, ‘Capitoli’.
Trapani: a) ASTp, Notai, not. F. Gioemi (1612); b) Corso, ‘ “Fabri Lignarij” ’;
c) Precopi Lombardo, ‘Artigianato e arte’; d) BF, ASSTp, Atti (1645-46);
e) Cocco, Consolati; f) ASTp, Notai, not. P. Adamo (1645); g) ASTp,
Notai, not. G.A. Mastrangelo (1608-11); h) Ragona, ‘Statuti’, and
Daidone, ‘Maiolicaro’.
123
Masters generally paid about twice as much as the apprentices; sometimes masters
anticipated their apprentices’ fees, recovering the money from their work.
Fig.5.1 Membership fees for masters and apprentices in Palermo, 1500-99
Carpenters Confectioners Tailors Blanket makers Shoemakers Shearers Embroiderers
* Sources: See Table 5.2b.
Fig.5.2 Membership fees for masters and apprentices in Palermo, 1600-99
■ master
B apprentice
*Sources: See Table 5.2c.
124
Fig. 5.3 Membership fees for masters and apprentices in Trapani, 1600-99
I
■ masters
□ apprentice
11 l! 1 ■
* Sources: See Table 5.2c.
Some guilds also required the payment of trademark fees (raggioni di bulla).
Every object in silver had to be marked by the consuls who controlled the alloy of
the metal and the good quality o f the piece. Lists specified the trademark fee for
each kind of product, which had to be marked. In mid-seventeenth century
Palermo, the raggioni di bulla for silver goods varied according to weight and
manufacture. A minimum of 3-5 grani was paid for small works weighing up to
half a pound, such as bowls with or without a lid, small vases, some cutlery, and
objects of everyday use like bells for babies. A vast range o f objects carried a
trademark fee of between 10 grani/Vo. (including jugs, spittoons, and church
accessories of daily use) and 15 grani/Vo. (oil lamps, trays with or without
engraving, and crowns for saints and sculptures). Objects heavier than 1.51b. were
charged from 1 tari and over. A dozen small silver plates were taxed about 6 tari\
for more elaborate objects as well as sword blades the tax was between 1 tari/lb.
(up to 51b.) and 10 grani/Vo. (anything over 51b.).116 We would expect the raggioni
di bulla to be recovered in the sale price.
116 Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, pp.64-71.
125
The figures in Table 5.2c suggest that silver- and goldsmiths paid higher fees
everywhere; in Palermo silk sock makers paid more than gold platers; and in
Trapani carpenters paid twice as much as coral workers. In general, more guilds
required membership fees in the seventeenth century. Palermo guild masters seem
always to have paid higher fees than elsewhere, and guilds producing luxury
goods paid higher fees than these with lower levels of specialisation.
During the seventeenth century, guilds in Palermo strengthened their
regulation and raised fees substantially, by more than three times; Trapani
artisans, who did not seem to pay any fees in the sixteenth century, paid a modest
quota a century later. However, the fees mentioned in the statutes did not always
correspond to the fees actually paid. The figures in tables 5.2 a, b, and c refer to
the figures fixed in the statutes, which changed little over long periods, while the
actual payment could be more variable, particularly in smaller guilds. Several
variables could alter the fixed amount specified in the statutes. In Trapani, the fee
fixed by carpenters’ statutes was 4 tari, but later statutes mentioned that the quota
actually paid was 2 tari.ul However, guild officials could increase annual
payments through extra collections for the church, or other specific needs made on
an ad hoc basis. Sometimes guilds asked for some extra offering as alms for the
church, or for processions or other needs;118 sometimes artisans paid in kind, for
example with candle wax.
1,7 Corso, ‘ “Fabri lignarij” pp.59, statutes o f Trapani carpenters (1614).

118 This is the case o f the wool, silk, and linen weavers in Trapani. The statutes mention the
payment o f some extraordinary fees for charity. See BFTp, ASSTp, Copia Lettere, cc.58ss. (1644-
45), Trapani statutes o f wool, silk, and linen weavers.
126
Fig.5.4 Masters’ fees in Trapani and Palermo, 1600-99
P a lerm o T ra p an i
* Sources: See Table 5.2c.
The increase in membership fees during the seventeenth century, at a time of

growing demand, might indicate that guilds were trying to keep new members out
to increase their profits. But guilds, as we have seen, had no power o f exclusion;
masters could easily by-pass them by appearing to the urban authorities. Nor is
there any evidence that high fees were holding production back; on the contrary,
women workers - always an index of the overall health o f the labour market -
were finding increasing opportunities for employment. We must conclude that
guild fees were being raised to make the guilds’ service more, rather than less
attractive.
127
b) Mastership fees
One-off fees were requested for undertaking the masterpiece. Sometimes,

apprentices paid after the exam; at other times, they could pay during the year in
which they took the exam, in order to have enough time to collect the money.119 If
the apprentice did not pass the test, the money paid in advance was returned to
him.120
Table 5.3a Mastership fees, 1500-99 {tari)

Town Guild Citizen Son Foreign
Messina Masons 3 - -
Palermo Confectioners a) 45 - 75
Palermo Shoemakers b) 43 - -
Palermo Carpentersb) 30 - -
Palermo Blanket makersa) 30 - -
Palermo Embroiderersc) 30 - -
Palermo Hat makersa) 30 - -
Palermo Shearersa) 30 - -
Palermo Masons b) 10 - -
Syracuse Masons 4 - -
Trapani Masons 15 - 15
* Sources: Messina: Novarese, ‘Statuti’;
Palermo: a) Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze; b) Lionti, Statuti inediti-, c)
D ’Amico, Maestranza;
Syracuse: Carpinteri, ‘Capitoli’;
Trapani: Denaro, ‘Capitoli’.
119 See BF, ASSTp, Atti, unnumbered fos. (1645-46), statutes o f Trapani wool, linen and silk
weavers.
120 See Lionti, Statuti inediti, p.29, Palermo statutes o f shoemakers, ch.20 (1580).
Table 5.3b Mastership fees, 1600-99 {tari)

Town Guild Citizen Son Foreign
Palermo Ropersa) 150 15 -
Palermo Embroiderers 102 - -
Palermo Playing card makersc) 90 45 -
Palermo Cooks and cake makersa) 90 15 -
Palermo Water masters c) 90 15 -
Palermo Sword makersa) 60 60 120

Palermo Coachmena) 60 15 -
Palermo Silversmithsa) 60 - -
Palermo Confectioners a) 45 - 75
Palermo Silk sock makersa) 30 12 60
Palermo Tailorsa) 30 - -
Palermo Masons and water mastersc) - 4 -
Syracuse Leather workers 18 - -
Trapani Sculptorsa) 60 - -
Trapani Silk, wool, linen weaversb) 34 10 66

Trapani Tailorsc) 31 31 64
Trapani Butchers d) 31 - 60
Trapani Carpenterse) 31 - 60
Trapani Coral workers t} 31 - 31
Trapani Marble cutters a) 31 - -
Trapani Pottersg) 31 - -
Trapani Silversmiths h) 30 - 120

Trapani Blacksmiths 0 19 - 19
*Sources: Palermo: a) Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze; b) D ’Amico, Maestranza; c) Lionti, Statuti
inediti;
Syracuse: Carpinteri, ‘Consolati’;
Trapani: a) Precopi Lombardo, ‘Artigianato e arte’; b) BF, ASSTp, Atti (1645-46); c)
ASTp, Notai, not. P. Adamo (1645); d) Denaro, ‘Capitoli’; e) Corso, ‘ “Fabri
lignarij” ’; f) Cocco, Consolati; g) Ragona, ‘Statuti’; h) ASTp, Notai, not.F.
Gioemi (1612); i) ASTp, Notai, not. G.A. Mastrangelo (1608-11).
The average fee paid in Palermo was higher than the average paid in Trapani,
Messina and Syracuse, although the latter two cities offer only a few examples
and are therefore less reliable. This suggests the not surprising conclusion that
Palermo’s guilds were more specialised than elsewhere and that the labour market
was more skilled, and that consequently, Palermo artisans were willing to pay
more to be a member of a guild (Figs. 5.5 and 5.6).
129
Fig.5.5 Mastership fees for citizens and masters’ sons in Palermo, 1600-99 {tari)
1000 -
100 -
■ citizen
10- H so n
05 to
*Sources: See Table 5.3b
130
Fig.5.6 Mastership fees for citizens and masters’ sons in Trapani, 1600-99 (tari)
1000 ^
100 - -
■ citizen
E son
*Sources: See Table 5.3b.
c) Foreign masters
Foreign guild masters, who could prove they had passed their masterpiece
elsewhere, were exempted from undertaking a further period o f apprenticeship,121
although they sometimes paid a fee for producing a masterpiece in the new
town.122 In Trapani, numerous guilds required higher mastership fees from foreign
than from local masters; while in Palermo the phenomenon seems less
widespread, even though Palermo had bigger and generally wealthier guilds. This
might confirm the hypothesis that smaller markets tended to be more conservative
and less open than bigger ones to the recruitment o f skilled labour. It also
121 See above, n.101

122 ‘Et fatta tal prova habbia di far 1’ esamina ... et trovandolo abile et sufficiente se li dara la
licenza per atto puplico pagando prima tari 15 alia maggior panhormitana ecclesia et unzi due alia
detta congregazione’. Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, p. 182, statutes o f Palermo confectioners,
ch. 19 (1585-86).
131
confirms Epstein’s hypothesis that mastership fees were a kind o f bond needed to
123
acquire other members’ trust (‘mortgage on trust’).
Fig.5.7 Mastership fees for natives and foreigners in Palermo, 1600-99 {tari)
1000-1 I
■ citizen
■ fo reig n
CL
* Sources: See Table 5.3b.
132
Fig.5.8 Mastership fees for natives and foreigners in Trapani, 1600-99 (tari)
1000-1 1
100 - '
B foreign
-=£
* Sources: see Table 5.3b.
However, foreign masters usually paid the same membership fees as locals. The
only two cases when foreign masters had to pay higher membership fees
concerned the guild of silver- and goldsmiths in Trapani and Palermo (Table 5.4).
The theory that the membership fees were meant to exclude access to the guild by
outsider competitors is not supported by the evidence.
Table 5.4 Membership fees for citizens and foreigners, 1600-99 (tari)
Silver and goldsmiths Citizens Foreigners
Palermo 60 120
Trapani 31 60
* Sources: Palermo: Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze;
Trapani: ASTp, Notai, not. F.Gioemi (1612).
133
d) Two centuries of fees
In Palermo and Trapani, fees paid by guild members gradually increased from the
sixteenth to the eighteenth century (Figs. 5.9 and 5.10).
Fig. 5.9 Guild fees in Palermo, 1450-1799 {tari)

350
300
250
200
■c ♦ fees
2 trend
150
100
1450 1500 1550 1600 1650 1700 1750 1600
* Sources: See Tables 5.2 and 5.3.
134
Fig. 5.10 Guild fees in Trapani 1580-1705 {tari)

70
60
50
40
1
30
20
10
0
1580 1800 1620 1640 1660 1680 1700 1720
The percentage increase of fee paid between the sixteenth and the seventeenth
century is similar in Palermo and Trapani. Palermo guilds paid an average o f 35
tari in the sixteenth century and 75 tari in the seventeenth century, an increase of
114.2 per cent (Fig. 5.11);124 Trapani guilds paid an average o f 19 tari in the
sixteenth century and 41 tari in the seventeenth century, an increase o f 115.8 per
cent (Fig. 5.12). Unfortunately similar data are not available for the eastern part of
the island, where guilds declined from the late sixteenth century.
124 The average fees paid in Palermo between the fifteenth and sixteenth century increased by 84
per cent.
135
Fig.5.11 Average fees in Palermo, 1480-1699 (tari)
P a le r m o
1480-99 1500-99 1600-99
*Sources: See Tables 5.2 and 5.3.
Fig. 5.12 Average fees in Trapani, 1500-1699 (tari)
T rap an i
1500-99 1600-99
136
The gradual increase of fees in Trapani followed price inflation over the same
period. As mentioned in chapter 3, between the sixteenth and the seventeenth
century the price o f foodstuffs, such as wine and cheese, increased by 40 per cent,
and grain prices by 51 per cent. It seems that other prices increased more rapidly,
such as the price of manufacture goods, and on average, during that period prices
appear to have increased by 82 per cent. Salaries seem to have increased by 86 per
cent (Fig. 5.13).125
Fig. 5.13 Percentage increases in Trapani prices, salaries, and guild fees in
comparison, 1500-1699
140
120
100
!
I
♦0
20
salaries fees
*Sources: Cancila, Aspetti di un mercato (prices and salaries). Prices are inclusive o f grain prices
(in 1562 and 1662). See Figs. 5.11 and 5.12 (fees).
The very similar increase in the average fees paid in the two western towns and a
comparable rate o f inflation show that similar economic forces were at work.
Between the sixteenth and the seventeenth century most Mediterranean countries
suffered from population decline and economic contraction. Sicily, by contrast,
maintained a stable economy driven by agricultural exports and by a growing
manufacturing sector. Guild fees increased slightly faster than salaries and prices,
suggesting that these fees were not arbitrarily imposed, but responded to
125 See Cancila Aspetti di un mercato siciliano. Trapani nei secoli XVII-XIX (Caltanissetta and
137
economic changes, and that over time masters tended to invest marginally
increasing amounts o f money to maintain their membership.
e) The impact of fees on living standards
The question remains as to whether membership and mastership fees posed

significant financial barriers to entry. The answer is problematic because there are
very few available data about living costs and artisan incomes. A master’s income
depended on several variables, including production costs, the time needed to
accomplish the work, supply and demand for labour and the master’s own ability.
Differences o f wealth among masters of the same craft could be enormous and
depended on many factors: the master’s specialisation, the size of the workshop,
and the nature of his clients all made a significant difference. Furthermore, a
master’s economic status could easily change. There are some provisions about
masters who could not afford the expenses of a workshop, or who after opening
a workshop had to close it, probably to return to their own masters’ place and with
the risk o f losing the master’s qualification.127 Sometimes, masters left their crafts
temporarily, possibly because they were unable to keep their shops open; some
statutes tried to prevent the readmission of former masters to the craft, forcing
19 8
them to remain in Tow’ activities, that had not acquired guild status.
The only available artisan wages refer to carpenters, masons, and coral
workers in Trapani. According to Cancila, a daily wage of 2.10 tari in 1512-13,
and 4-5 tari at the end o f the sixteenth century, was paid to carpenters and masons
Rome, 1972), p. 177. See also chapter 3 in this thesis.

126 The transition from apprentice to master represents the ideal experience o f an artisan.
According to Garden, in Lyon the ratio o f journeymen to masters was about two to one, which
meant that most journeymen could realistically be seen as ‘masters in waiting’. Where the ratio
was much less favourable, he found it difficult to see them as other than workers. Garden,
‘Ouvriers et artisans’, pp.41-42.
127 ACPa, Prowiste, 693, c.83 (1660-61). Francesco Mancuso had to sell his workshop in 1648, he
changed activity and later a ban forbade all the needy master pharmacists who were engaged in
other activity to return to their previous activity. Numerous appeals to the Praetor resulted in
changing the ban and needy masters were only excluded from the elections o f the officials.
128 ACPa, Prowiste, 693, c.83 (1660-61). See also previous chapter (4.3).
138
at the first level of skilled labour (manovali).129 They could earn around 900 tari
(30 onze) in a year o f 200 working days.130 The statutes of the coral workers
(1633) stated that a daily salary could not be less than 3 tari for unskilled workers
in the workshop. Silversmiths earned a fixed amount of money per libra o f silver
worked, which between 1723 and 1793 varied between 16 tari and 2.4 onze per
ioi
libra according to the complexity o f the work.
The samples of carpenters, masons, and shoemakers in the tables show that
the amount of money required for the membership and mastership fees was not
very high. In seventeenth-century Trapani, the masons’ membership fees
represented 0.4 per cent, and the mastership fees 1.6 per cent of their estimated
annual income. Among carpenters the membership fees represented 0.3 per cent,
and the mastership fees 3.3 per cent o f estimated annual income.
Table 5.5 Membership fees, 1500-1799 (tari per year)
Carpenters 1500-99 1600-99 1700-99

Palermo 1 1
Salemi 6 4
Trapani masters 3 2
Trapani apprentices 3 2
Masons 1500-99 1600-99 1700-99

Messina 3
Palermo masters 2
Palermo apprentices 0.05
Syracuse 1 1
Trapani masters 4
Trapani apprentices 1
Shoemakers 1500-99 1600-99 1700-99

Palermo 3
Salemi 2
* Sources: See Table 5.2.
129 This data concerns masons and carpenters working in the salina o f Jesuits in Trapani. Cancila,
Aspetti di un mercato siciliano, p. 180.
130 I believe that the number o f days estimated by Cancila is quite small. Though these artisans
used to respect religious holidays, such as Sunday and other saints’ celebrations, they often used to
work when the workshop was closed (see also the section on fines). Moreover, the artisans were
not dependent on weather conditions, as agricultural workers were. The working days in a year
were probably closer to 300.
131 S. Barraja, Im archi degli argentieri e orafi di Palermo (Palermo, 1996), p.97.
139
Mastership fees were more expensive, but these were paid only once in lifetime
and sometimes in instalments.
Table 5.6 Mastership fees, 1500-1799 (tori per year)

Carpenters 1500-99 1600-99 1700-99
Palermo 30
Salemi apprentices 15
Salemi foreigners 30
Trapani apprentices 30 31
Trapani journeymen 12
Masons
Messina 3
Palermo 10
Syracuse 4 4
Trapani 15
Shoemakers
Palermo 3
Salemi 2
*Sources: figures from Table 5.3.
In sum fees in Sicily remained low. They had a marginal impact on members’
income, and they did not prevent access to either the guild or the labour market.
Rather than barriers to entry, low fees may reflect the poor incentives that guilds
provided for membership.
140
Chapter 6 Implementation o f guild regulations
Chapter 6
Implementation of guild regulations
Guild statutes aimed to regulate the activities of guild members. Although these
regulations have generally been studied as formal rules, their actual effectiveness
is still an open question, as the previous two chapters have suggested. In Sicilian
statutes almost every rule had a fine attached to it, in case it was breached. This
set o f monetary fines and punishments offers a key to understanding their
implementation and forms the subject o f this chapter. The presence o f fines does
not necessarily imply the widespread respect of the regulations, since the
enforcement of guild regulations depended on institutional and legal backing of
the consuls’ authority and on the guilds’ willingness to prosecute their members.
Fines do, however, provide an ordinal scale of what guildsmen considered central
to their activities and to the guilds’ purpose. The incidence and nature of the fines
provide further insight into the effectiveness of craft guilds, as well as their
purposes. The following analysis of the statutes of Sicilian guilds is a first attempt
to verify how regulations could be enforced and whether rules reflect an overall
strategy for implementation.1
The following range of fines and punishments were administered to guild
members mainly in Trapani and Palermo between the late fifteenth and the
seventeenth century. A comparison o f fines in different guild statutes over a long
period o f time offers the first significant observation. Not only are most
regulations found in the majority of statutes, but their infringement had generally
similar consequences. Some categories of offences had particularly severe
consequence; others seem to have resulted in quite small fines, whilst some of the
offences did not have a substantial penalty attached.
The mechanism for detecting and punishing infringements of guild
regulations combined the force o f guild officials and o f urban authority. After
approving a set of statutes, the city council would publish bans recognising guild
regulations as public laws. Guild officials, consul and councillors were in charge
1 Despite the rich literatures on guilds, it seems that there are no studies that specifically consider
the importance o f the fines and punishment included in guild statutes.
141
of enforcing guild rules, imposing fines, and occasionally condemning to

imprisonment with the support o f the civil authority. The consuls’ authority was
itself upheld by the city council and was subjected to revision by guild members.
Guild offices lasted only one year; at the end o f their duties, the officers had to
subject their activities to audit by the newly elected officials.2 The numerous fines
for the officials who refused a guild office itself suggest that the offices were
frequently considered a waste of time.
The system of enforcement was therefore based on a dual authority.
However, the statutes make clear that the consul and his councillors were unable
to control all the members o f a guild and all the artisans and retailers who worked
at the fringes of the guild system, and that the system relied to a great extent on
self-enforcement. Masters monitored each other, partly in order to defend their
own business, and partly because a proportion of the fines, usually one third or
•i
one quarter, would go to the person who denounced the offence. Although this
system seems to have risked members’ solidarity, it was an effective way of
reducing monitoring costs within the community.
I have grouped the various offences for which statutory fines could be imposed into
six categories: fee evasion, evading quality control regulations, breaking the labour
market rules, failure of officials to accomplish their duties, breaking competition
rules, and evasion of the guild’s social and religious duties. Each category includes
a number of different offences, which are commonly cited in Sicilian guild statutes:
a) Fees
Refusal or late payment of fees
Refusal to pay trademark fees
Refusal to pay fees for the material bought for working
Refusal to pay product tax
Refusal to accept the consul’s valuations of goods
2 See for example S. Denaro, ‘I capitoli dei maestri muratori, marmorari e cavatori di pietra nella
citta di Trapani’, La Fardelliana 14 (1995): 150, statutes o f Trapani masons (1598).
3 See for example F.L. Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze di Palermo nei secoli XV-XVIII (Trapani
1991), p.270, statutes o f Palermo sword makers, chs.20-21 (1649).
142
b) Quality control
Producing poor quality or unmarked goods
Use of bad material
Use of non-standard size or material (e.g. metal alloy, length of a rope)
Mixing old and new material together
Selling of poor quality goods
Selling of goods without trademark
Unauthorised selling of goods produced by guild members
Selling on the street
Providing goods to authorised traders
Buying material from unauthorised traders on the street
Buying a workshop without the consul’s valuation (e.g.private transaction)
c) Labour control
Masters working without licence
Apprentice working without licence
Partnership with a non-master
Recruitment of slaves or of others who practise unskilled jobs
Recruitment of apprentices by journeymen
Recruitment of foreign without deposit
Widow holding workshop for longer than permitted or after marrying a master of
another craft
Widow for society with someone who is not a master
Poaching
Apprentice leaving the master without finishing his apprenticeship
Master allowing apprentices to perform master’s duties (e.g. tailors: cutting) or to
finish the apprenticeship early
Apprentice working outside the workshop
d) Control over competition
Having two workshops or workshops too close to one another
Breaking the rules for buying raw material
Master allowing a non-master to run a workshop
Valuation without a licence
Selling at excessively high prices
ei Officials’ duties
Failure to produce an audit
Having unbalanced books
Refusal to collect fees, value goods and inspect workshops
Issuing illegal licences
Applying for offices before the approved term
Officials holding other offices
f) Participation in guild activities
Disobedience to the consuls or statutes
Refusal to inspect workshops with the consul
Refusal to attend the religious celebrations (e.g. processions, patron’s day)
143
Refusal to attend assemblies, elections or exams

Refusal to accept appointment as consul or councillor
Working during public holidays
Working during mourning for a master
Shaming the guild (practising the craft dishonourably)
In the following sections each category of offence is discussed in turn, and the
different fines levied by different guilds in various towns is presented in a series of
tables. Since fines did not change significantly over time, the different periods in
which the statutes were drafted have not been distinguished. The date o f the first set
of statutes where the norm appears is given next to the guild name; when the fine
changed over time there is more than one entry. Sometimes the date recorded is that
of the only set of statutes known for certain guilds. All financial penalties have
been converted to tari, including penalties paid in wax, where one rotolo (793 g.) of
wax was worth about tari 1.5.
a) Fees
Although membership and masterpieces fees were not very high, evasion appears to
have been widespread. The statutes invariably mention the collection o f fees and
the regular monitoring of the guild audit and accounts among the consuls’ duties.4
The system of fee enforcement was based on a combination o f penalties
against masters and of consular responsibility. A master who failed to pay
membership fees would lose his voting rights, namely the right to vote for his
representatives and to be elected as consul or councillor.5 The consul was directly
responsible for those who would not pay the fees, and could force payment by
confiscating the master’s tools and goods; otherwise the consul would be personally
liable for any amount missing in the final report (Table 6.1).
The consequences of refusing to pay fees were particularly serious if the
master had children. His sons would lose the right to become masters without
undertaking the exam and paying the mastership fees; his daughters were debarred
4 See Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, p.226, statutes o f Palermo silk sock makers (1621).
5 See for example S. Corso, ‘ “Fabri lignarij:” la maestranza a Trapani nei secoli X VII-XVIir. La
Fardelliana 8-9 (1989-90): 61, statutes o f Trapani carpenters (1614). Other examples and
consequences for fees evasion in Table 6.1.
144
from receiving guild dowries. Non-payment also led to the loss o f financial
assistance for the master and his family in case of sickness or need, which could
threaten the whole family with indigence. However, a master in arrears did not lose
any rights if he paid his outstanding fees within a certain period,6 and some guilds
exempted extremely poor masters from payment of fees and other occasional
contributions.7
Certain guilds, among them silver- and goldsmiths and leather workers,
introduced a trademark that acted as a guarantee of quality. Artisans had to pay a
fee proportional to the value of the object endorsed; this fee could then be added to
the final price. Payment need not be immediate; but refusal to pay resulted in
confiscation of the goods, a considerable threat particularly for silversmiths and
goldsmiths.
Other fees were paid on raw materials, particularly if bought with the consul’s
intermediation, but only in very few cases do the statutes mention any sort of fine
for refusing to pay these fees. Another fee was occasionally paid as a proportion of
the value of the produced goods, which seems to have corresponded to the
silversmith trademark fee and to have been connected with quality controls; yet
again, however, it was often mentioned, but there are few references to fines for
non-payment.
Local urban councils tended to give limited support to restrictions that
regulated and enforced membership and production. Consequently, refusal to pay
the fee, although frequently mentioned in the statutes, was not severely punished
and gave rise to several exemptions (Table 6.1).
Table 6.1 Fines for fee evasion (tari)

Guild Refusal to pay Refusal to Refusal to pay Refusal to Refusal to
annual fees pay the raw pay product accept
trademark material fees tax consul’s
fees estimation
6 F. Lionti, Statuti inediti delle antiche maestranze delle citta di Sicilia, DSSS ser. 2, 3 (1883):
124, statutes o f Palermo forgers (1771-72). They were allowed to pay their fees up to three months
later.
7 Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, pp.218-19, statutes o f Palermo silk sock makers (1621); and
ASTp, Notai, not G. A. Mastrangelo unnumbered fos. (1608-11), statutes o f Trapani blacksmiths
(1610).
145
Carpenters (Pa) Pay double fees

1573a)
Shoemakers (Pa) Confiscation
1580a)
Tailors (Pa) Confiscation + 1
1612 b) rot. wax
Ropers (Pa) 90
1614 b)
Soapmakers (Pa) 300
1617 c)
Silk sock makers Confiscation
(Pa) 1620 b)
Confectioners (Pa) No voting rights 30
1622b) + 1 rot. wax
Embroiderers (Pa) 1 rot. wax
1630d)
Silversmiths (Pa) Confiscation + Confiscation
1631b) no voting rights
Tailors (Pa) no rights
1641b)
Sword-makers (Pa) Confiscation + 180+No
1649 b) Exclusion from statutory
the guild rights for
children
Cooks and cake- Confiscation 60 or
makers (Pa) confiscation
1676 b)
Water masters (Pa) Confiscation 120
1694 a)
Silversmiths (Pa) Confiscation + Confiscation
1704 b) no voting rights
Pa = Palermo
* Sources: Palermo: a) Lionti, Statuti inediti; b) Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze; c) ACPa,
Provviste 650; d) D ’Amico, Maestranza palermitana.
146
Table 6 .1 Continued
Guild Refusal to pay Refusal to Refusal to pay Refusal to Refusal to
annual fees pay the raw pay product accept
trademark material fees tax consul’s
fees estimation
Masons (Tp) Confiscation
1598 a)
Blacksmiths (Tp) Confiscation
1610 b) (unless very
poor)
Silversmiths (Tp) 60
1612 c)
Carpenters (Tp) No rights
1614 d)
Coral workers (Tp) Forced to pay
1633 e)
Shoemakers Consul pays

(Salemi) 1783
Masons (Me) Confiscation

1559 o f goods
Coopers (Sr) Confiscation

1747
Tp = Trapani; Me = Messina
* Sources: Trapani: a) Denaro, ‘Capitoli dei maestri muratori’; b) ASTp, Notai, not G. A.
Mastrangelo (1608-11); c) ASTp, Notai, not. F. Gioemi (1612); d) Corso,
‘ “Fabri lignarij” ’; e) Cocco, Consolati\
Salemi: La Colla, Statuti inediti;
Messina: Novarese, ‘Statuti’;
b) Quality control
Fines concerning the quality o f goods were more severe, although exceptions might
be made for foreigners who might not be aware of the local statutes. Regulations
concerning the quality of goods were enforced by the urban officials and monitored
by the consuls of the crafts (Table 6.2). These were divided into two categories:
fines for the production of bad quality goods, and for the retailing of such goods.
Goods could be considered poor quality because of the use o f low quality materials,
the combined use of new and old materials (which could affect durability), or
because of non-standard sizes and materials. For example, the coral makers of
147
Trapani had to use a consistent quality of coral,8 and the length o f the residual
pieces o f coral they used could not be less than 1.5 palmi (ca. mm. 44). The
problem o f using mixed materials, which first emerged during the second quarter of
the seventeenth century, did not seem to affect many craft activities. The fines for
mixing materials in the shoemakers’ guilds of Trapani, Palermo, and Salemi seem
to be addressed to artisans who repaired shoes rather than producing new ones, and
who mixed new and old leather.9
Table 6.2 Fines for quality-related offences (tari)
Guilds Production of poor Use of bad Use o f non M ixing old and
quality or unmarked material standard sizes or new materials
goods material
Silversmiths (Pa) 60
1447 a)
Pan makers (Pa) 30
1488 a)
Hat makers (Pa) 0.25
1509 a)
Carpenters (Pa) 120
1573 b)
Shoemakers (Pa) 300 300 (for non 90 +loss o f goods
1580 b) regular workshop)
Ropers (Pa) 90
1614 a)
Silk sock makers 120
(Pa) 1620 a)
Hat sellers (Pa) 60+requisition
1621 a) o f the goods
Confectioners (Pa) 30-60 30
1622 a)
Embroiderers (Pa) 120 (300 for old
1630c) silk)
Cooks and Cake- 1st offence, warning,
makers (Pa) 2nd offence, 7.5,
1676 b) 3rd offence suspension
o f licence
Silversmiths (Pa) 120 60 60
1704 a)
* Sources: Palermo: a) Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze; b) Lionti, Statuti inediti; c) D ’Amico,
Maestranza palermitana.
8 There were four main qualities o f coral available in Trapani. The quality o f coral was
recognisable from the colour, which in turn depended on the depth o f sea from where the coral was
retrieved. S. Cocco, I consolati della citta di Trapani (Thesis, University o f Palermo, 1934-35),
p. 106, Trapani statutes o f coral workers (1633).
The phenomenon was very common in many other European regions. See for example C. Poni,
‘Norms and Disputes: The Shoemakers Guild in Eighteenth-Century Bologna’, P ast and Present
123 (1989): 80-108.
148
Guilds Production o f poor Use of bad Use o f non M ixing old and
quality or unmarked material standard sizes or new materials
goods material
Silversmiths (Tp) 30 60
1612 a)
Tailors (Tp) Under consul
1618 b) judgement
Coral workers (Tp) 30 30
1633c)
Silversmiths (Tp) 60 120+exclusion
1726d)
Shoemakers 60 + confiscation 3 1 + confiscation

(Salemi) 1783 o f the goods o f the goods
Shoemakers (Sr) 6
1612
Tailors (Sr) 6
1730
Silversmiths (Sr) Confiscation o f
1758 the goods and loss
o f licence
* Sources'. Trapani: a) ASTp, Notai, not. F. Gioemi (1612); b) Starrabba, ‘Capitoli dei sartori’; c)
Cocco, Consolati\ d) BF, ASSTp, Atti (1726);
The analysis of quality-related fines suggests that few Sicilian guilds were
concerned about protecting product quality, and that these were usually crafts
which used high-value materials as gold or silver, leather and silk. Moreover, the
level of the fines was commensurate to the potential damage to consumers, with
silversmiths, silk sock makers and confectioners imposing higher fines. Thus,
although the literature on north Italian guilds in particular has considered quality
control to be a central feature and justification for the guild system,10 it was
neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for Sicilian guilds.
Buying and selling
Another form of quality control was related to the retailing of manufactured goods
by authorised artisans, retailers, and shopkeepers, who were not members of the
10 C. Poni, ‘Local Market Rules and Practices. Three Guilds in the Same Line o f Production in
Early Modem Bologna’, in S. W oolf (ed.) Domestic Strategies: Work and Family in France and
Italy, 1600-1800 (Cambridge and New York, 1991).
149
guilds. Guild members could not buy raw materials from unauthorised personnel
and could not supply their goods to unauthorised resellers or sell bad quality and
unmarked goods directly. Selling on the street was generally forbidden for high
quality products, but was sometimes allowed for masters’ sons. The retailing
market developed significantly in the early 1600s. The group of mezzani in
Palermo, who had existed since the fifteenth century as intermediaries in
transactions for land and grain, changed the nature of their business. When a slow
down of the grain market occurred, some of them started to deal more regularly
with local market goods and particularly in the resale market. In 1605-06, the
mezzani presented a petition to be recognised as sellers o f second-hand goods, and
in 1618 they drafted their first set o f statutes.11
Unlicensed retailers were not permitted to sell goods within the jurisdiction of
the relevant craft guild. However, it was difficult to monitor such attempts, even in
small local markets, and by the seventeenth century increasing demand and
specialisation had created levels o f intermediary producers who found it easier to
evade craft restrictions. Poorer artisans, or more often apprentices, could stock up
with cheap raw material newly arrived in town and sell it on as below quality
goods. For example, in 1613 the statutes of Palermo ropers set a fine of 90 tari
against any journeyman who practised with people not enrolled in the guild.12 In
cases like this, the mutual monitoring o f masters could be very effective in
preventing frauds; since the informer received part of the fine, poorer masters (who
were probably most likely to cut comers) had an incentive to remain within the
guild system. As the number of producers who had learnt a craft informally
increased, more regulations were introduced in an attempt to control informal
workers.13
Nevertheless, fines for illegal buying and selling appeared only in a few
statutes of some of the better organised guilds (Table 6.3). The problem was almost
non-existent in smaller markets such as Trapani compared with larger towns like
Palermo, as the number o f unqualified artisans who lived and worked at the edge of
11 ACPa, Provviste, 652, c.171 (1618).

12 Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, p.209-10, statutes o f Palermo ropers, ch.4 (1614).
13 Ibidem, p.307, statutes o f Palermo cooks and cake makers, ch.35 (1676).
150
the guild system was directly proportional to the size of the manufacturing sector,
and smaller markets also faced lower monitoring costs.
Table 6.3a Fines for illegal selling (tari)
Guild Selling of poor Selling of Unauthorised Selling on the Providing

quality goods unmarked selling of goods street goods to
goods produced by guild unauthorised
members traders
Silversmiths (Pa) Destruction o f Confiscation
1447 a) goods
Shoemakers (Pa) 90 30 + confiscation o:
1580 b) goods, if minor
Ropers (Pa) 90 15-90
1614 a)
1617 a)
Soapmakers (Pa) 60 300 300
1617 c)
Silk sock makers 120
(Pa) 1 6 2 0 a)
Confectioners (Pa) 150
1622 a)
Embroiderers (Pa) 120
1630 d)
Playing card 120
makers (Pa) 1633b)
Tin plater (Pa) 150 150
1636 a)
Sword makers (Pa) 60 60
1649 a)
Cooks and cake- 60-300 180 (ex.Thursday)
makers
(Pa) 1676 a)
Silversmiths (Tp) Confiscation

1612a>
1633 b)
Tailors (Sr) 15
1730
Shoemakers (Sr) 6
1612
Silversmiths (Sr) Confiscation o f
1758 the goods
* Sources: Palermo: a) Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze; b) Lionti, Statuti inediti; c) ACPa, Prowiste
650 (1616-17); d) D ’Amico La maestranza\
Trapani: a) ASTp, Notai, not. F. Gioemi (1612); b) Cocco, Consolati\
151
Table 6.3b Fines for illegal buying {lari)
Guild Buying material Buying a workshop

from unauthorised without consul’s valuation
sources
Shoemakers (Pa) 180
1580a)
Silk sock makers (Pa) 120
1620 b)
* Sources: a) Lionti, Statuti inediti; b) Oddo, Statuti delle meastranze
c) Labour control
Problems relating to the labour market are the basis for understanding craft guild
performance. In the classical view, labour control exerted a negative effect on
manufacturing because it stifled competition and innovation. The alternative view,
that the guilds were the sole institution providing training for aspiring masters in
medieval and early modem Europe, suggests a different interpretation of guild
regulations of labour. In the first interpretation, craft regulations should focus on
restricting access to the labour market; in the second, they should centre on the
provision of training to unskilled labour force. Which interpretation does the
Sicilian evidence support?
Craft structures addressed two features of the relation between master and
apprentice: the quality of the training being imparted, and the potential for
‘poaching’ trained labour, which as we saw previously, threatened to undermine the
entire apprenticeship system (because no-one would be willing to train new labour
if they could not recover their costs). About the quality of training, Sicilian statutes
show that the guilds backed the recruitment o f young free workers willing to invest
their time to acquire the necessary skills to become a master. The guild therefore
prevented the teaching of slaves, because the reputation o f the guild’s free members
was at stake. Also, some statutes prohibited journeymen from recruiting their own
apprentices, unless these were their brothers or sons. It is not clear how often this
occurred, but journeymen were also prohibited from training anyone else until they
152
became masters, because they were not considered to be fully qualified.14 Finally,
masters were not allowed to hold more than one workshop, because apprentices in
the second workshop would receive insufficient teaching and supervision.15
During the seventeenth century, some guilds introduced a second
qualification between the status o f apprentice and journeyman, perhaps (as with
modem ‘grade inflation’) in response to the influx of large numbers of new recmits
who demanded easier qualifications. The recruitment of a married apprentice was
prohibited in only one of the statutes analysed.16 There is usually no specification of
marital status of apprentices and journeymen in the statutes, although in the
apprenticeship contracts marital status is one of the factors affecting the length of
17
the apprenticeship, and sometimes the salary.
As mentioned previously, foreign masters could easily participate in the
guilds. Exceptionally, Palermo’s silver- and goldsmiths required a deposit from
foreigners before accepting them in their workshops, and fined anyone who
recruited a foreign master without requiring this deposit. Such entry fees were
mainly a ‘mortgage on trust’, which protected the guild’s reputation against the
fraudsters (Table 6.4).18
The statutes indicate that there existed written mastership licences, which however
have left no visible documentary trace. Apprentices who completed their training,
and masters who passed their examinations, received a licence that was also a
precondition for opening a workshop (almost all the statutes mention a fine for
working without an appropriate licence).19
14 ‘Si prohibixe che li lavoranti della predetta mastranza non possino tenere garzone per impararle
la arte predetta appoi che non si fosse frate o parente stritto sotto la pena di onza u n a...’ (Lionti,
Statuti inediti, p.33, statutes o f Palermo shoemakers (1580)).
15 ‘Perchi alcuni... voli teniri dui putighi e non li ponno gubemari et mettino uno scanzacani a la
potiga e non sa quillo chi si fa et cussi guastano la opera’ (Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, p. 163,
statutes o f Palermo shearers (1530)).
16 This is the case o f silver and gold platers in 1620 and the fine was 120 tari (ACPa, Prowiste
650(1619-20)).
17 See above, chapter 5.1.
19 See above chapter 5 for interventions by the local council in granting licences; see for a similar
use o f licensing in London, S. Rappaport, Worlds Within the Worlds. Structures o f Life in
Sixteenth-Century London (Cambridge, 1989), p.239.
153
A licence was also a condition for exercising a trade and guilds were mainly
concerning with preventing unlicensed work. There are two main reason why
licensed work was at the core of the guild organisation: unlicensed work made it
possible to evade regulations on apprenticeship which enabled exploitation and
threatened the system itself; and unlicensed work made it harder to identify and
screen well qualified apprentices and journeymen. The consequences for practising
as an apprentice without a licence were therefore far more severe (Table 6.4) than
those for finishing the apprenticeship before the terms of the contract (Table 6.6),
indicating a concern for supplying well-trained artisans, rather than retaining them
for a long time.
In the interest of consumers and to incentivise appropriate training, some
guilds did not allow apprentices to practise all the master’s duties; for example,
master tailors could cut cloth for a client, while the apprentice could only cut cloth
for his relatives or for himself; however, such restrictions were not very frequent.
Apprentices were often forbidden from working outside the workshops in someone
else’s house; nevertheless, in this case also it was not a widespread rule and there
were exceptions. For example, embroiderers tended to prevent apprentices from
working outside the master’s workshop; however, in 1629, after a petition from
apprentice embroiderers, the city council of Palermo authorised them to work in
private houses in order to support their families.20
Another important aspect o f the relationship between master and apprentice
was the formal management o f the workshops. Apprentices, particularly qualified
ones, often shared craft duties with their masters. Although journeymen could not
open a workshop independently, they could manage a workshop when the master
was away, or when engaged to do so by a widow who inherited her husband’s
91
activity. However, they were not allowed to become partners of masters. This
regulation was important for apprentices working in a widow’s workshop. Widows
could often keep their husband’s workshop for a certain period, but only if there
was another master or sometimes an able apprentice to work in it. However, the
apprentice in this case could not own the workshop as a partner. The only exception
20 D ’Amico, M aestranzapalermitana, p.7.

21 ASPa, Notai, not. G.P. De Monte, 2900, unnumbered fos. (1546-47). A journeyman cobbler,
able to manger the workshop received a year salary o f 20 onze.
154
was through marrying the widow, which was also a way of gaining a mastership
without taking the exam; even in this case there are only few examples of fines for
widows and concentrated in the statutes of Palermo guilds. (Tables 6.4 and 6.5).
155
Table 6.4 Fines for unlicensed labour (tari)

Guild Master without Apprentice Partnership Recruitment Recruitment of Recruitment
licence without with a non of slaves or apprentices by of foreign
licence master those who journeymen without
practice a deposit
lower job
Silversmiths (Pa) 150 300
1447 a)
Belt makers (Pa) Closure o f
1488a) workshop and
confiscation o f
the material
Pan makers (Pa) Prison Prison
1488a)
Embroiderers (Pa) 30
1502b)
Shearers (Pa) 30
1530a)
Blanket makers 60 60
(Pa) 1541a)
Carpenters (Pa) 60-120
1573c)
Shoemakers (Pa) 300 30 300-120 (for 30
1580c) the appr.)
confiscation
o f goods
Ropers (Pa) 90
1614 a)
Soapmakers (Pa) 30
1619 d)
Silk sock makers 90 + closure o f 30
(Pa) 1620 a) workshop
Confectioners (Pa) 150 150
1622a)
Embroiderers (Pa) 300 30 (app. 300
1629b) without
journeyman
period)
Playing card 300 120-300
makers (Pa) 1630c)
Soapmakers (Pa) 300 30
1636 e)
Tailors (Pa) 90
1641 a)
Sword makers (Pa) 180 300 180 30
1649a)
Cooks and cake- 150 Closure o f
makers (Pa) workshop +
1676a) fine for no
licence
Water masters (Pa) 120
1694 b)
* Sources: Palermo: a) Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze\ b) D ’Amico, M aestranzapalermitana; c)
Lionti, Statuti ineditr, d) ACPa, Provviste 640; e) ACPa, Prowiste 671.
156
Guild M aster without Apprentice Partnership Recruitment Recruitment Recruitment
licence without with a non o f slaves or of o f foreign
licence master those who apprentices without
practice a by deposit
lower job journeymen
Masons (Tp) 15 15, (7.5
1598a) manovale)
Blacksmiths (Tp) 150
1610 b)
Silversmiths (Tp) 120 300 150
1612 c)
Carpenters (Tp) 60
1614 d)
Tailors (Tp) 120
1618 e)
Butchers (Tp) 60 300
1633 0
Coral workers (Tp) 31
1633 g)
Wool, linen, silk 30
weavers (Tp)
1645 h)
Sculptors (Tp) 120 or
1665 0 confiscation
Carpenters 60
(Salemi)
1761
Shoemakers 30 60 30
(Salemi)
1783
Masons (Me) Prison or other

1559
Shoemakers (Sr)
1612
Coopers (Sr) 60
1747
Tailors (Sr)
.1.769...... ......
*Sources: Trapani: a) Denaro, ‘I capitoli dei maestri muratori’; b) ASTp, Notai, not G. A.
Mastrangelo (1608-11); c) ASTp, Notai, not. F. Gioemi (1612); d) Corso, ‘
“Fabri lignarij” ’; e) Starrabba, ‘Capitoli dei sartori’; f) Denaro, ‘Capitoli’; g)
Cocco, Consolati\ h) BF ASSTp, Atti (1645-46); i) Precopi Lombardo,
‘Artigianato e arte’;
Salemi: La Colla Statuti inediti;
157
Table 6.5 Fines for widows (tari)
Guilds Widow with workshop over the Widow for society with
terms someone who is not a
or after marrying a master of master
another craft
Shoemakers (Pa) 120 (90 apprentice)
1580a)
Soapmakers (Pa) 300
1619 b)
1622c)
Playing card makers (Pa) 300
1633 a)
Sword-makers (Pa) Confiscation
1649c)
Wool, linen, silk weavers (Tp) 60 (30 apprentice)

1645
* Sources: Palermo: a) Lionti, Statuti inediti; b) ACPa, Prowiste 640 (1619-20); c) Oddo, Statuti
delle meastranze;
Trapani: BF ASSTp, Atti (1645-46).
The illegal recruitment of another master’s apprentices (‘poaching’) is one of the

major offences mentioned in the statutes. The regulations about poaching
established fines for both the offending masters and apprentices. Masters would
incur relatively high pecuniary fines, while the apprentice who left his master
without a licence could be prevented from becoming a master. The infraction is
recorded in almost all the statutes examined, both in Palermo and in Trapani.
Sometimes, the fine was recorded together with explanations why the infraction
should never occur and how poaching affected the integrity of the guild, the
reputation of the master and the future of the apprentice. The emphasis on this point
remains high over a long period o f time, as much in the first statutes as in the last,
and the severity of the fines suggests that poaching was an important issue and that
99
the fines were intended to be an effective deterrent (Table 6.6).
22 However, evidence prove that the norms for long periods o f apprenticeship were far from being
unbreakable laws and the need to enforce the institution o f the apprenticeship with high fines show
that terms fixed in the statutes were only guidelines for guild masters. See previous chapter (5.1).
158
Table 6.6 Fines for illegal employment conditions {tari)

Guild Poaching Apprentice Master allowing apprentice Apprentice working
leaving without to carry out master’s duties outside the workshop
finishing his or to finish apprenticeship
apprenticeship early
1447 a)
Tailors (Pa) 60
1485 a)
Belt makers (Pa) 6
1488 a)
Hat makers (Pa) 15 No recruitment
1509a)
Shearers (Pa) 6 30 no licence
1530a)
Blanket makers 30
(Pa) 1541a)
Carpenters (Pa) 120
1573b)
Shoemakers (Pa) 120
1580b)
Confectioners 300
(Pa) 1586a)
Playing card 300 60
makers (Pa)
1610 b)
Ropers (Pa) 90
1614 a)
Silk sock makers 60
(Pa) 1620a)
Silver and gold 120
platers (Pa)
1620c)
Confectioners 30 (shorter appr.) 120
(Pa) 1622a)
Embroiderers 120 120
(Pa) 1629 d)
Tin platers (Pa) 30 (illegal licence)
1636 a)
Tailors (Pa) 15
1641a)
Sword makers 120 180+confiscation
(Pa) 1649a)
Cooks and cake- 60
makers (Pa)
1676a)
Water masters 120
(Pa) 1694 b)
* Sources'. Palermo: a) Oddo, Statuti delle meastranze\ b) Lionti, Statuti inediti\ c) ACPa,
Provviste 654 (1619-20); d) D ’Amico, M aestranzapalermitana.
159
Guild Poaching Apprentice Master allowing apprentice Apprentice working
leaving without to carry out master’s duties outside the workshop
finishing his or to finish apprenticeship
apprenticeship early
Silversmiths (Tp) 150
1612 a)
Carpenters (Tp) 120
1614 b)
weavers (Tp)
1645 c)
Blacksmiths (Tp) 15
16 1 0 d)
Coral workers 12
(Tp) 1633 e)
Shoemakers 3 0 -6 0
(Salemi) 1783
* Sources: Trapani: a) ASTp, Notai, not. F. Gioemi (1612); b) Corso, ‘ “Fabri lignarij” c) BF,
ASSTp, Atti (1645-46); d) ASTp, Notai, not G. A. Mastrangelo (1608-11); e)
Cocco, Consolati;
Salemi: La Colla, Statuti inediti.
What then can we infer from the statutes about the purpose of labour regulations?
First, upholding the quality of training was clearly important, but - as suggested by
the previous discussion of the length o f apprenticeship and by the absence of
restrictions on consensual termination o f the training contract - the actual practise
of training was very flexible and capable of responding to individual circumstances.
A similarly pragmatic approach was taken with regard to apprentices’ and
journeymen’s duties. Second, unlicensed training and poaching labour were
invariably condemned, indicating the centrality of training to the guild as a group of
producers. Third, there is no evidence o f restrictions to apprenticeship, in terms of
numbers employed, of skills, or of social or geographical background. Contrary to
the traditional argument, access to the labour market was to all intents and purposes
unregulated.
23 See above, chapter 5.1b.
160
d) Restrictions on competition
Historians have traditionally emphasised the guild’s acquisition of a monopolistic

position through strict control o f competition. For example, Mokyr argues that
through the management o f three main aspects of production - control over prices,
procedures, and participation - guilds could impose a technological status quo.
The consuls’ duty to value the goods produced by guild members has already
been mentioned; however, prices were based on the public mete imposed by the city
council,24 and even goods with a trademark responded to a price list, which had to
be approved by the city council to be in force.25 The guild officials had the
exclusive right to value goods, for which they were paid. No one else could do this,
unless a master was appointed by the consul and licensed to do so. Often on the
basis of the consul’s estimation, a price was established for a certain product; but
the statutes rarely mention prices for goods, which were usually set by local
authorities.
Control by the guilds over procedures was also scarce. No fines for
infringement o f specific procedures have been found in any of the statutes that form
the base of this research. The only circumstances when some sort o f prescription
was given for the production process relate to the description of the masterpieces,
which however never specified any details, but simply stated that the procedure had
to meet the requirements for good quality.26Although consuls performed workshop
inspections which could have been a means of controlling production procedures,
the lack of any specific fine against procedural offences leads one to suspect that
the control of techniques was in fact not among the aims o f the ‘searches’, which
on
were generally known by the artisans well in advance.
24 F. Maggiore Pemi, La popolazione di Palermo dal X a l XVIII secolo (Palermo, 1892), p.374.
See on this topic E. Merlo, Le corporazioni conflitti e soppressioni. Milano tra Sei e Settencento
(Milan, 1996), p.68; C.R. Hickson, and E.A. Thompson, ‘A New Theory o f Guilds and European
Economic Development’, Explorations in Economic History 28 (1991): 128-31.
25 ‘Consolo e consigliere delli aurifici et arginteri per la conferma di un atto da essi fatto circa le
raggioni di bolla’ (ACPa, Prowiste, 694, c.81 (1661-62)).
26 See above, chapter 5.1c.
27 Consuls had to inspect the workshops regularly. The day o f the inspection could be fixed
according to the statutes (e.g. every four months) or at the consul’s discretion. See for example
‘Che i consoli e consiglieri possano rivedere li lavori dell’arte ... vogliamo che il consolo et
consigliero, che parendogli labbiano da pigliarsi con loro uno o piu maestri in compagnia e
161
As mentioned previously, guilds condemned masters who owned more than one
workshop. The constant presence of the master in his workshop was considered
indispensable for training and quality control; therefore, a master could be
responsible for only one workshop and apprentices and journeymen were not
entitled to open their own workshops. Only by the early eighteenth century, some
statutes mention a limit of two apprentices per master, and local councils also
published bans against the excessive number o f workshops, but there were no
financial penalties attached to this rule.28
Table 6.7 Fines for illegal competition (tari)

Guild Having two or Breaking the rules Master allowing Valuations Selling at
too close for buying raw a non-master to without excessively
workshops material run a workshop licence high prices
Belt makers (Pa) 6
1488 a)
Shearers (Pa) 30
1530a)
Shoemakers (Pa) 300
1580b)
Ropers (Pa) 300
1614 a)
Soapmakers (Pa) 300 + closure ol 300
16 1 9 c) 2nd workshop
Confectioners (Pa) 1,500
1622 a)
Sword makers (Pa) 60+ closure o f 60
1649a) 2nd workshop
*Sources: Palermo: a) Oddo, Statuti delle meastranze; b) Lionti, Statuti inediti; c) ACPa, Prowiste
650.
l ’abbiano di andare lor in uno et in un’altra bottega a loro ben viste, per rivedere li lavori che fanno
et che han fatti nelli cassetti’ (ASTp, Notai, not. F. Gioemi, unnumbered fos. (6 aprile 1612),
Trapani statutes o f silversmiths, ch. 14 (1612)).
28 In Trapani, the guild o f silversmiths set a limit o f 50 workshops for a population o f 10,000
people. See AM. Precopi Lombardo and L. Novara, Argenti in Processione (Marsala, 1992), p.27.
162
Guild Having two or Breaking the rules M aster allowing Valuations Selling at
too close for buying raw a non-master to without excessively
workshops material run a workshop licence high prices
Tailors (Tp) 7.5
1618 a)
1633b)
Wool, linen, silk 7
weavers (Tp)
1645 c)
Carpenters 7.2-15
(Salemi) 1761
Masons (Me) At consul’s

1559 discretion
Masons (Sr) 30
1505
Tailors (Sr) 15
1730
* Sources'. Trapani: a) Starrabba, ‘Capitoli’; b) Cocco, Consolati\ c) BF ASSTp, Atti (1645-46).
e) Officials’ duties
The consulate was the highest office for a guild member. Consuls and councillors
exercised control over the members, but they were themselves subject to the same
statutes, and there were many claims about the untrustworthiness o f the consuls and
about the problems caused by their dishonest behaviour. Although a consul could
not hold an office for more than one year and could not stand again for several
years (usually three), there is substantial evidence that lobbies of masters within the
same guild often attempted to retain offices for longer terms. The short-term
nature of the office was meant to ensure control over the consuls and councillors; at
the beginning of the year newly elected officials often had to deal with the actions
of their predecessors.
The statutes mention a number of punishable offences occurring among the
consuls, which were probably very common and which included refusing to provide
29 See for example the elections o f Palermo shoemakers and soapmakers (ACPa, Provviste, 693,
cc.3, 51, 77(1660-61)).
163
an audit to the incoming officials, irregularities in the balance books which they had
to make good with their own money, refusal to collect fees or inspect workshops or
perform valuations, and the illegal concession of licences to practise as an
apprentice or master. Not surprising, in the light of the previous discussion, the
concessions of illegal licences or quality trademarks were considered the most
serious offences against the guild. Such offences, which sowed uncertainty among
consumers, were also of great interest to the citizens, and the city council monitored
them closely (Table 6.8).
Table 6.8 Fines for refusing official duties {tari)

Guild Missing Having Refusal to collect Issuing Standing Consuls
audit or unbalanced fees, value goods illegal for consul holding
refusal to books and inspect licences or before fixed other
do it workshops trademarks terms offices
Tailors (Pa) 60
1485 a)
Belt makers (Pa) 10
1488a)
Sword makers (Pa) Consul pays 30
1489a)
Embroiderers (Pa) Consul pays
1502 b)
Shearers (Pa) 90
1530a)
Carpenters (Pa) 300 120
1573 c)
Shoemakers (Pa) 60 90
1580c)
1586 a)
Playing card makers 60 300 90
(Pa) 1610c)
Soapmakers (Pa) Consuls pay 300 300
1619 d)
Hat sellers (Pa) 60
1620a)
Silk sock makers (Pa) 120 60+4 years
16 2 0 a) suspen
sion
Silver and gold platers Consuls pay double
(Pa) 1620e) o f the fees
Tin plater (Pa) 60 60
1620a)
Cooks and cake- 120 120
makers (Pa) 1676a)
Water masters (Pa) Treasurer
1694c) pays 180
* Sources: Palermo: a) Oddo, Statuti delle meastranze\ b) D ’Amico, Maestranza palerm itana; c)
Lionti, Statuti inediti; d) ACPa, Provviste 650 (1619-20).
164
Guild Missing Having Refusal to collect Issuing Standing Consuls
audit or unbalanced fees, value goods illegal for consul holding
refusal to books and inspect the licences or before other
do it workshops trademarks fixed offices
terms
Masons (Tp) Consul pays
1598 a)
Blacksmiths (Tp) 150
1 6 1 0 b)
Tailors (Tp) 31 120
1618 c)
Coral workers (Tp) 12
1633 d)
weavers (Tp) 1645e)
Carpenters (Salemi) Consul pays

1761 mastership
fees
Shoemakers (Salemi) 60
1783
Shoemakers (Sr) 1
1612
Tailors (Sr) Consul pays
1730
Coopers (Sr) Officials pa>
1747
Silversmiths (Sr) 600 (missing Consul pays
1758 inspections) the goods
and he loses
his office
* Sources: Trapani: a) Denaro, ‘I capitoli dei maestri muratori’; b) ASTp, Notai, not G. A.
Mastrangelo (1608-11); c) Starrabba, ‘Capitoli’; d) Cocco, Consolati; e) BF
ASSTp, Atti (1645-46);
165
f) Participation in euild activities
All guild members would convene annually in a major assembly, usually on the
30
guild saint’s day; other assemblies were also held but were less attended. One
function of guild assemblies was to ensure that ordinary members were aware of
the guild’s regulations. Assemblies often began by proclaiming the current rules
in order to avoid ignorance of the statutes being used as an excuse, although, as
previously noted, exceptions were made for foreign masters coming to town.
Participation in the social and religious life o f the guild was considered no less
important than its economic aspects, and fines were imposed on members who did
not attend the assemblies.
Fines for refusal to hold offices were far more important, suggesting that the
post was considered rather onerous - presumably because it detracted from time
available for one’s own shop and involved a degree of financial risk. The fact that
consuls and councillors were only weakly backed by the civil officials may also
have played a part, since the guild consuls’ jurisdiction was commonly over
ridden by urban authorities.31
Certain other rules, as for example that artisans were expected to respect the
consul’s judgement and sell the goods according to his valuation seem to have
been more an aspect o f members’ duty of obedience than a measure to control
prices, because they were usually mentioned in the section concerning the
authority of the consuls rather than that dealing with product quality (Table 6.9).
30 In the main annual assembly, guild members voted their representatives whereas the other
assemblies were convoked by the consul.
31 Oddo Statuti delle maestranze, p.262, statutes o f Palermo sword makers (1649).
166
Table 6.9 Fines for disobedience to the officials (tari)

Guild Disobedience Refusal to Refusal to attend Refusal to attend Refusal of
to the officials inspect religious assemblies, the office
or statutes workshops ceremonies elections or
with the consul exams
Belt makers (Pa) 3 -6
1488 a)
Sword makers (Pa) Prison Vz - 1 rot. wax 60-30
1489a)
Hat makers (Pa) 3 -6
1509a)
Shearers (Pa) 3 -6 90
1530a)
Blanket makers (Pa) Vz -1 rot. wax
1541 a) (0.75-1.5)
Carpenters (Pa) 1 rot. wax
1573b)
Shoemakers (Pa) 1 rot. wax 1 rot. wax 180
1580b)
Confectioners (Pa) 1 rot. wax (1.5)
1586a)
Playing card makers 3 120-300
(Pa) 1610b)
Ropers (Pa) 300
1614 a)
Silversmiths (Pa) 30 30 0.5
1617a)
Soapmakers (Pa) 150
1619 c)
Embroiderers (Pa) 3 0 + 1 month 1 rot. wax 1 rot. wax
1629 d) prison
Cooks and cake- 2 rot. wax + no 120
makers (Pa) voting rights +
1676 a) no statutory
rights for
children / 60
Water masters (Pa) 2 rot. wax
1694b)
Sources: Palermo: a) Oddo, Statuti delle meastranze; b) Lionti, Statuti inediti\ c) ACPa, Prowiste
650 (1619-20); d) D ’Amico, M aestranzapalermitana.
167
Guild Disobedience Refusal to Refusal to attend Refusal to attend Refusal of
to the officials inspect religious assemblies, the office
or statutes workshops ceremonies elections or
with the consul exams
Masons (Tp) 60 2-4 (Cilio 3-7.5)
1598 a)
Wool, linen, silk 6 6-30 (Cilio) 6 15-30
weavers (Tp) 1645b)
Carpenters (Salemi) 1 rot., wax

1761
Masons (Sr) 1
1505
Tailors (Sr) 1-2
1730
*Sources: Trapani: a) Denaro, ‘Capitoli dei maestri muratori’; b) BF ASSTp, Atti (1645-46);
Salemi: La Colla, Capitoli inediti;
Table 6.10 Fines for non-participation in guild events
Guilds Working during Working during Shaming the guild

public holidays mourning for a (practising the craft
master dishonourably)
Shearers (Pa) 3-6 30
1530a)
Sword makers (Pa) V2 -1 rot. Wax 1 rot. wax
1541a)
Confectioners (Pa) 1 rot. wax
1586a)
Soapmakers (Pa) 60
1619 b)
Silk sock makers 6
(Pa) 1620a)
Embroiderers (Pa) 7.5 (Cilio) 1 rot. wax
1630c)
Cooks and cake- 60
makers (Pa) 1676a)
Masons (Tp) 15-7.5

1598 a)
Blacksmiths (Tp) 1 rot. wax
1610 b)
Tailors (Tp) Hidden work
1618 c)
* Sources: Palermo: a) Oddo, Statuti delle meastranze\ b) ACPa, Prow iste 650; c) D ’Amico,
Maestranza palermitana;.
Trapani: a) Denaro, ‘Capitoli dei maestri muratori’; b) ASTp, Notai, not G. A.
Mastrangelo; c) Starrabba, ‘Capitoli’.
168
Table 6 .1 0 Continued
Guilds W orking during W orking during Sham ing the guild
public holidays mourning for a (practising the craft
master dishonourably)
Carpenters (Salemi) 1-2
1761
Shoemakers (Salemi’ 24 120+ loss o f rights
1783
Masons (Sr) 7.5

1505
* Sources: Salemi: La Colla, Capitoli inediti;
Syracuse: Carpinteri, ‘Capitoli’
In sum, this chapter has discussed the range of fines and punishments that could
be administered to Sicilian guild members according to their statutes. Fines
represented the only means of enforcing regulations and therefore can better
define the purposes and effectiveness of the craft guilds. The evidence, however,
raises a further question, namely whether regulations in Sicily, which did not
restrict competition, made guilds weaker than other European organisations, or
whether the lack of political backing prevented guilds from enforcing control over
competition. In the second case, can be speculated that stronger institutional
support would tend to reinforce better guild restrictions over market.
The study of fines and punishments shows that Sicilian regulations aimed to
retain guild members to avoid free-riding and upheld apprenticeship. Issues such
as compulsory participation in guilds, fee payment, and respect o f quality
standards were important to the guild because they ensured members with a range
of benefits; whereas issues such as training and licences affected more the
structure of the organisation itself. It seems that certain categories of offences had
particularly severe consequences, because guild were more willing to prosecute
their members for these infractions - suggesting that effective functioning of the
guild, and therefore the survival o f the organisation itself, was dependent on them.
Other fines seem to have been relatively small and so not very effective at
preventing infringement.
The system of fines and punishments highlights the limited support that
Sicilian guilds received for the protection of regulations concerning membership
and competition control and other rules protecting masters’ interests. This fact
169
may have resulted in limited membership and consequently undermined the

system further. Guild regulations aimed primarily to define and enforce the
relation between master and apprentices. The widespread occurrence of fines for
poaching from the time of the earliest statutes supports the view that training must
have been at the core of the guild system, and shows that even weak guilds tended
to strengthen the contractual relation between masters and apprentices in training.
The last three chapters showed in detail the case of a guild system which received
only weak institutional support to further individual masters’ interests.
Nevertheless, guilds did emerge and develop to organise small-scale
manufacturing. The following and conclusive chapter analyses the causes and the
consequences of Sicilian guild weakness in the light of current theories on the
topic of craft guild activity.
170
Chapter 7 Causes and consequences o f Sicilian guild weakness
Chapter 7
Causes and consequences of Sicilian guild weakness
The study of Sicilian guilds adds a further piece to the puzzle o f corporatism,
which for the last two centuries has been one o f the main interests of European
historiography. The last three chapters have presented a picture of the Sicilian
guild system that was not in itself different from other European guilds, but which
nevertheless manifested certain peculiarities because of the weak political support
the Sicilian guilds received. Although guilds in Sicily did not have lesser interest
in political and economic claims, they were certainly far ‘weaker’ than in most
European regions.
The tendency of the historiography has been to consider the guild system as
an independent variable in early modem society. In most studies, the existence of
guilds is taken for granted, and the analysis focuses on the effects that guild
regulations had on society. The analysis of corporatism has generally focused on
the political role played by the guilds in the process of industrialisation, and on
the economic aspects including the organisation of production and the internal
structure regulating market relations.1 These two perspectives are inter-dependent,
and both contributed to the success or the failure of the guild system.
In this final chapter, the empirical data are considered in terms of two main
theories on guilds in order to determine which theoretical framework offers the
better explanation of the evidence. The chapter aims to show that while guilds
everywhere had a similar structure and purposes, the practice and the effects of
the system are mainly connected with the political and local constraints imposed
by historical circumstances. The source of this approach is Epstein’s suggestion to
constmct a regional typology o f guilds.2
The thesis argues that the basic features o f the Sicilian guild system were
similar to those o f craft corporations elsewhere in Europe and that they were
devised primarily to promote skills training through formal apprenticeship.
1D. Degrassi, L 'economia artigiana n ell’ltalia medievale (Rome, 1996), p .121.

2 S.R. Epstein, ‘Craft Guilds, Apprenticeship, and Technological Change in Preindustrial Europe’,
Journal o f Economic History 58 (1998): 685.
171
Differences in guild development across societies were largely a function of the

institutional context within which guilds were embedded. In particular, the
political support or opposition to guilds offered by local and central authorities
helped shape their specific characteristics.
The Sicilian case presents an unusual perspective of a region in which the
phenomenon of craft corporatism was well established, but where guilds remained
limited in size and number. Two aspects of the guild phenomenon require
investigation: the general structure of guilds and the specific case of Sicilian
guilds. The Sicilian case seems to prove that the absence of state support could
delay the emergence of guilds, both through active repression (as occurred in
Sicily until the fourteenth century) and withholding support, which made it hard
for guilds to attract and retain their members (as occurred thereafter). This chapter
therefore focuses, firstly, on the relationship between regulations and actual
practice o f guilds, and secondly, on the limits imposed by the Spanish authorities
on guild practice in Sicily.
The last section draws some conclusions about the causes and consequences
of the limited development of the Sicilian corporate system. An important
consequence o f weak guilds was to restrict the pool of skilled labour and constrain
manufacturing industry. Previous explanations for the lack of Sicilian
industrialisation have concentrated on agricultural development based upon
Sicily’s ‘natural’ comparative advantage and on the lack of industrial
entrepreneurs. However, evidence discussed here suggests that there was in
addition a strong causal link between guild weakness and manufacturing failure.
7.1 Empirical finding vis-a-vis with theoretical interpretations
The reasons for the existence o f the guild system are still strongly debated. Since
the end of the eighteenth century, scholars have investigated the impact of
corporate groups on medieval and early modem society in order to understand the
consequences of their existence. Theories about the emergence of guilds have
generally pointed to the rise of the ‘modem state’ as a main factor supporting the
172
establishment of corporate groups. According to Sheilagh Ogilvie, the expanding

modem state had a greater impact on society and the economy than the expansion
of the market itself. The state appealed to the guilds to manage a ready supply of
military personnel, to collect capital taxes, and to provide political support. In
exchange, the state offered guilds strong privileges and enforced guild
regulations.3 In this model, the acquisition of political and economic rents is both
a necessary and sufficient condition to explain the existence and prolonged
survival of guilds.
To this argument Mokyr has added the claim that craft guilds acquired
privileges and political influence to stifle competition and innovation.4 In his
view, the main purpose of guild regulations was to control the ‘three p ’s’: prices,
procedures, and participation. The guild system regulated prices in order to
prevent competition, and therefore inhibited technological innovation that by
definition would reduce the costs of production.5 In this view, the guild system
emerged in order to control the labour market and benefit guild members. Guilds
imposed long periods of training to limit access to the craft, and masters charged
high admission fees to limit the number of qualified members and prevent
competition. Moreover, restrictions imposed by the urban guilds on labour supply
and on general freedoms to produce and sell, stifled urban industries and pushed
them into the countryside.6 Guilds regulated labour supply through three orders of
constraints: admission regulations, the imposition of output quotas (which
increased the costs of production for masters), and the constraints imposed by
families and local communities.7 Technological innovation was also stifled by
controlling manufacturing producers. This interpretation of guilds as rent-seeking,
monopolistic and anti-technological has become the most widespread among
historians and economic historians alike, and has dominated opinion from the
nineteenth century till the present day.
3 S. Ogilvie, State Corporatism and Proto-Industry (Cambridge, 1997), p.5.

4 J. Mokyr, ‘Urbanisation, Technological Progress and Economic Growth’, in H. Giersch (ed.)
Urban Agglomeration and Economic Growth (Berlin and New York, 1995), pp. 15 and 10.
5 Ibidem, p. 15.
6 J. Mokyr, ‘Growing-Up and the Industrial Revolution in Europe’, Explorations in Economic
History 31 (1976): 374.
7 Ogilvie, State Corporatism, p. 139
173
Alternative explanations suggest that craft guilds were most likely to

emerge and succeed within a competitive and dynamic political system. In such
contexts, craft guilds could side with one or more power groups to obtain
institutional support.8 Nevertheless, in most societies the allocation of privileges
remained highly unstable and unpredictable, as a result of uncertain institutional
equilibria between competing political interests that could easily be reversed.9
Therefore, guild behaviour depended mainly on the bargaining power o f the
masters with local authorities, which could be more or less willing to engage a
relationship of do ut des, according to particular circumstances. Furthermore,
guilds did not constitute a unitary ‘interest group*. Each craft had specific claims
and interests and even within the same group there could be tensions between
wealthier and poorer masters, and between masters, journeymen and apprentices;
most masters lacked a clear perception of a collective interest or identity, both
within the overall guild system and within their own craft.10 This more political
approach does not deny that guilds sought rents if they were there for the taking,
but suggests that they were not invented and did not survive for that purpose.
The classical perspective has only recently been seriously challenged both on
theoretical and empirical grounds by Epstein, who has proposed an alternative
theory: that the guild system’s main, but not unique, function was the transmission
8 Degrassi, Economia artigiana, p. 132.

9 ‘Privilege income streams could be revoked at any time, as Charles V ’s abolition o f the guilds’
political privileges in 27 German free imperial cities between 1548 and 1552 proved to good
effect’ (Epstein, ‘Craft Guilds’, p.686), see also C.R. Friedrichs, Early M odem City, 1450-1750
(London, 1995), p.56. Venice so-called Serrata o f 1297 excluded guilds from formal political
power. ‘Their privileges may have been sanctioned by royal authorities, but what would happen to
those privileges, indeed, to the corporate system in general, o f political authorities embraced a
‘rival classiflcatory system’, to reinvoke Kaplan’s phrase?’( J.R. Farr, Artisans in Europe, 1300-
1914 (Cambridge 2000), pp.28, 277). See for example the case o f Flanders. In 1302 craftsmen
obtained corporate privilege by the Count John o f Namur for their support in the battle against the
French and obtained political shares when the French-allied patricians o f Ghent, Ypres and Bruges
were overthrown. Also Chevalier claimed the emergence o f French guilds in context o f political
conflicts. B. Chevalier, ‘Corporations, conflicts politiques et paix sociale en France aux X lV e et
XVe siecle’, Revue Historique 268 (1982): 813-44. A further example comes from the study o f M.
Walker on German towns ( ‘home towns’) who noted that guilds mainly emerged in towns with a
high degree o f independence (M. Walker, German Home Towns: Community State and General
Estate, 1648-1871 (Ithaca, 1971)).
10 C. R. Friedrichs, ‘Artisans and Urban Politics in Seventeenth-Century Germany’, in Crossick
(ed.) Artisan and the European Town, 1500-1900 (Ashgate, 1997), pp.52-53.
174
of skills through apprenticeship.11 In this view, skill training represented the main
purpose o f craft guilds everywhere in Europe, and was the main reason for the
guilds’ prolonged survival. In the absence o f formal and public schooling systems,
apprenticeship offered the only systematic source of skill training; it was therefore
in the masters’ interest as a group to uphold general rules for apprenticeship.
However, from an individual master’s point of view, investment in training did
not make sense if his apprentice could easily be poached; nor would young
apprentices have been forthcoming, if they had been subject to bad treatment or
unfair dismissal. Without collective rules of behaviour, skill training would
simply not have occurred. The craft guild, which could enforce common rules of
behaviour, was the solution to this dilemma, but the effectiveness of the craft
guild depended also on its members’ willingness to comply with its rules.
According to this theory, the collection of privileges and participation in the
political arena provided so-called ‘non-collective social benefits’, which were
needed to attract and retain masters in the guild, so as to prevent free-riding. The
theory outlines a system that maintained similar structures and purposes for a long
period o f time and over a vast geographical area, and in which features specific to
different countries were due to the institutional and political framework in which
they were embedded.12
Finally, Epstein argues that guilds had a leading role in the development of
pre-industrial manufacture, because they sustained specialised inter-regional
labour markets. He also suggests that guilds contributed to technological

12 The importance o f regional research was highlighted by Silvia Thrupp: ‘Regional research ...
should before long be able to assess the net influence o f guild organisation on medieval economic
growth more exactly. Meanwhile it is clear that several o f these theses in the field have been too
extreme. .. .Guild monopoly power was then in general far too weak to be made to account for any
features o f backwardness in the economy’ (Thrupp, ‘Gild’, pp.279-80). On the gap between
guilds’ theory and practise see J.R. Farr, ‘On the Shop Floor’, pp.24-54. The Author refers
numerous examples o f guilds behaviour, which did not respond to the standard criteria set by the
simple reading o f the guild regulations. Also local studies show the difficulties o f controlling the
labour market for the conflictual relations between guilds. See for example J.R. Farr, Hands o f
Honor. Artisans and Their World in Dijon, 1550-1650 (Ithaca and London, 1988); S. Rappaport,
Worlds Within Worlds: Structures o f Life in Sixteenth-Century London (Cambridge, 1989) and E.
Merlo, Le corporazioni conflitti e soppressioni (Milan, 1996). Sheilah Ogilvie, proves the co
existence o f guilds and pre-industrial activities (Ogilvie, State Corporatism) and S. Kaplan showed
in the Parisian guilds the gap between rules and practice ( The Bakers o f Paris and the Bread
Question, 1700-1775 (Durham and London, 1996).Epstein, ‘Craft Guilds’, p.698; see also J.R.
175
invention and innovation, albeit as an unintended consequence of their activities,

both by stimulating technical diffusion by supporting migrant labour and by
• n
providing inventors with temporary monopoly rights.
The Sicilian example suggests that guilds proved to be far weaker where a
strong central administration kept corporate groups under control, because crafts
were unable to enforce their regulations effectively, making it harder to attract and
retain members. If the guilds’ main purpose was indeed training in skills, we
would expect skilled labour to be rare in Sicily and pre-industrial manufacture
poorly developed. A systematic overview of the evidence attempts to test these
competing theories.
a) Guilds and regulations
The most evident expression of guild power was their regulations. Statutes were
approved by local and central authorities and backed by official bans and urban
regulations. Formally, they applied to all guild members, but the assumption that
regulations were fully effective, durable and unchangeable seems highly
improbable. Firstly, enforcement o f the statutes depended on legal authority that
was granted by the local urban institutions; second, most regulations were
enforced by the membership itself which varied in size over time; and finally,
guild regulations were often contradictory, subject to variations, or applied only
under highly specific circumstances. Guild rules were changed ad hoc,
occasionally renewed and abolished, and sometimes were never actually written
down.14 The consuls of each guild could only guarantee the regulatory system
with the support of the urban officials, who could back the threat of enforcement
with court summonses. In larger cities and more sophisticated markets,
regulations were even harder to enforce because more numerous competing
Farr, ‘On the Shop Floor: Guilds Artisans and the European Market Economy, 1350-1750’,
Journal o f Early M odem History 1 (1997): 24-54.
13 Epstein, ‘Craft Guilds’, pp.688 and 684.
14 For example the first statutes o f the Trapani potters were not written until the mid-seventeenth
century, although the guild was organised by the late sixteenth century. Also, Trapani fishermen
had a guild since the fifteenth century but did not draft regulations until the eighteenth century.
176
political and economic interests challenged the guilds’ privileges, and because
competing interests within the guilds themselves could more frequently neutralise
the effects of regulations; consequently, activities that were formally forbidden by
the regulations, could be practised nevertheless on a daily basis.15
Sicilian craft guilds appear economically and organisationally far more flexible
than the classical view suggests, and seem to have had an efficient arrangement
for training aspiring masters. Nevertheless, the late emergence of political support
for guilds appear to have hindered the emergence of craft organisations,
undermined the effectiveness of regulations in enforcing apprenticeship, and
weakened the training process, limiting the development of local artisan skills. It
also appear to have weakened the impact of those elements, including
participation in the political arena, which worked as ‘non-collective social
benefits’ to prevent free-riding. The lack of incentives for membership resulted in
few guild members, and a small number of organised crafts.16
Local authorities could reject or ignore new statutes, and could often require
numerous further changes to the statutes under discussion.17 Fees could often be
substituted with an offering of wax, or condoned; it was normal to accumulate
large arrears. Guild registers were kept poorly or not at all, making it harder to
keep track o f payments. The fines for fee evasion were weak, and those for low
quality standards were not evenly spread across the guilds. In contrast, the fines
for poaching apprentices were very high and were mentioned in every set of
1o
statutes found so far. Thus, Sicilian guilds expended most effort in enforcing
regulations for apprenticeship, but found it difficult to enforce additional rules
which might have provided positive incentives for membership and prevented free
riding.
15 Fan, ‘On the shop floor’, pp.24-54.

16 See above, ch.4.2 and 6f.
17 See above, ch. 5.
18 See above, 5.2.
177
b) Labour relations
The relationship between masters and apprentices is an important feature of both

guild theories. According to the classical theory, the long period of apprenticeship
reflects the guild’s monopolistic position in regulating labour supply. Masters
used the apprenticeship terms to control access to guilds and to limit the number
of competitors. In addition, the long period of training gave masters a cheap
supply of skilled labour, since the apprentice’s salary was usually below market
wages.
The new theory makes the relation between master and apprentice even
more central. Lack of support for the training process, or its poor enforcement,
could culminate in a complete absence o f training. If the master was not sure that
the apprentice would remain with him for the full duration of the contract, he
would refuse to teach, since an uncompleted contract would not allow the master
to recover the costs incurred in training. Equally, if the master retained the right to
break the contract at an early stage, the apprentice could refuse to be trained, since
he had no guarantee o f obtaining the full training be required. On the other hand, a
master could easily be tempted to recruit a part-trained apprentice from another
master, if such poaching had not been punished by a well-enforced system. In
sum, although apprenticeship contracts were not a novelty introduced by the guild
system, an expanding market economy required an institution that could provide a
firm foundation for formal training. It was in both the masters’ and the
apprentices’ interests to participate in a system which guaranteed and provided
incentives for the institutionalisation o f apprenticeship.19
Although scholars have recognised the important role of the guild system in
institutionalising apprenticeship, the length of this training is a source of
controversy. The classical view stresses the negative effects of an excessively
long period of training. Prolonged apprenticeship allegedly exploited the
apprentice by tying him to the master, and limited access to the craft in order to
19 M. Olson, The Logic o f Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory o f Groups (Cambridge,
1965), pp.37-38 and 51.
178
reduce competition and control the number of applicants. The alternative theory
argues instead that the formalisation o f apprenticeship terms protected both parties
from opportunistic behaviour; the mutual interests of master and apprentice
supported the relationship.
During the first period of the contract, masters invested money, time, and
materials in the training process. Particularly for those crafts dealing with precious
materials like coral and silver, the apprentice’s mistakes could result in expensive
losses. Later, however, when the apprentice was capable of producing reliable
work, the master could recover the costs of his investment, and could rely on
cheap labour by maintaining the apprentice’s salary low. The apprentice was
usually employed from an early age and was dedicated to being fully able to
exercise a craft. He would acquire most of the skills necessary to practise the craft
early on in the contract, while later his ability was used to increase workshop
returns and to pay back the master’s investments. Guilds accorded to the
apprentice specific rights as a trainee; this included defending his position in front
of craft officials and urban authorities.20
Guild statutes could not in fact impose the length of the apprenticeship,
although many statutes formally stated a fixed number o f years. The existence of
personal contracts in the most dynamic markets shows that the length of the
apprenticeship was established according to different variables. Notaries’
contracts considered the age of the apprentice, his previous experience, his family
01
and occasionally, in case of an adult, his marital status. Thus, the length
established by the statutes, usually between three and seven years, worked as a
‘negotiable benchmark’.22 The guild o f Palermo’s tailors for example established
a statutory length of apprenticeship o f five years in 1530. Only a few years later,
in 1542, a contract for a tailor trainee was stipulated at three years.
20 For example, in the statutes o f 1620, Palermo silk sock-makers stated that an apprentice could
accuse his master for ill treatment in front o f the Praetor. If the master did not appear in front o f
the city council, he risked disqualification (F.L. Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze di Palermo
(Palermo, 1991), p.220).
21 ASPa, Notai, not. G.P. De Monte 2892, c.331v-2r. (1538-39). The contract concerns an adult
apprentices who received an higher salary o f 11 onze for two years o f apprenticeship because he
was married.
23 ASPa Notai, not. De Monte 2896 cc.680v-681r. (1542-43)
179
The inability o f the guilds to determine and enforce the duration of

apprenticeship demonstrates that this training period could not have been used as
an effective means o f limiting access to the craft.24 A further argument against
such an idea concerns the training requirements for foreigners. If the aim of a long
apprenticeship was to limit access to the craft, we should expect to find long
training periods for foreign masters. However, guilds barely required any training
period for foreigners, although they did insist on a mastership and the payment of
fees.
In order to enforce apprenticeship, a system o f licences and mastership led
to official certification o f the period o f training. The debate focuses on the
formality of this certification, and on whether this mastership was used to enforce
the technical status quo.25 The test of ability marked the formal end of the
apprenticeship and the full qualification of the trainee in front of the craft
representatives. After the mastership, a young master could open his own
workshop, but more often entered another master’s workshop as a journeyman or
junior partner. In the sources, the mastership exam appears to have been meant to
verify the abilities o f an aspiring master, since mastership fees were returned to
trainees who did not pass the examination.26 Sometimes the mastership coincided
with the full or partial payment of entry fees; but a licence could also be obtained
on
from the local authorities without a formal exam and against the regulations.
Finally, enforcement of the mastership could not prevent the introduction of
new production techniques because it was virtually impossible to enforce specific
production processes. The statutes described a number o f requirements relating to
the final product, such as the time and the place of production and its main
characteristics, but the procedures for production were not specified. The final
judgement was based on the finished products rather than on the process of
production. Similar factors reduced the impact of the craft officials’ inspections to
the workshops. In Palermo, these inspections aimed to control the quality o f the

25 Mokyr, Lever o f Riches, p.258; Mokyr, ‘Urbanisation’, p. 15.
26 See data in ch. 5.
28 See Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, statutes o f Palermo hat makers, cooks and cake makers; E.
D ’Amico, La maestranza palerminatana dei ricamatori (1502-1822) (Palermo, 1984), Statutes o f
Palermo embroiderers.
180
workshop output, particularly for those crafts that used hallmarks. Checks were
conducted on the final product and only goods that did not meet the required
standards could be withheld or destroyed. Often, consuls would rather collect the
membership fees during the workshop inspections.
The city council also supported the introduction o f foreign techniques
against guild regulations. This is the case of soap production. In 1571 the Genoese
Simone Merello asked Palermo city council to allow production of hard soap
(‘arte della saponeria di sapone duro *), for which he demanded a monopoly. The
city council allowed him to produce soap for six years as long as he made 1,000
cantara per year.29 In 1595, Giulio Collodi and Giovanni di Silvestro Lombardo
from Lucca opened a workshop to produce ‘hard’ and ‘soft* soap in the Genoese and
Venetian styles. The officials in charge of market controls arrested them and De
Ballo, judge of the Grand Court, condemned them and closed their workshop. Only a
few months later, however the city Praetor granted them a licence to set up a new
manufacture. This is not an exception. Urban governments often overcame guild
regulations, and jurors occasionally introduced new technologies and invited
• ^1 •
foreign masters to import new means of production.
The high demand for skilled labour encouraged the employment by
aristocratic households of apprentices who had not completed their training. The
tendency for trainees to leave their masters before the expiry of their contracts
forced guilds to introduce further guarantees to retain apprentices in a master’s
workshop.32 When demand for manufactures started to increase in Palermo and
Trapani in the late sixteenth century, apprenticeship contracts began to stipulate a
gradually increasing salary for the apprentice; in most cases, the salary was higher
than the original contribution for maintenance, and it increased by 100 per cent
29 The soap had to be sold according to the following rates: the red soap for 27 grana per rotolo
and the white soap for 30 grana per rotolo. The monopoly contract was transcripted in the acts o f
the notary Antonio Carrasi (ACPa, Prowiste, 177, cc.3v-4r. (1571-72)).
30 ‘Licentiam ad hoc per publico beneficio et introdutione artis novae’ (ACPa, Prowiste, 637, c.185
(20 February 1595), and c.295 (28 April 1595)).
31 Trapani invited some masters from Messina to import the ‘art o f silk’ in town (A. Baviera,
Albanese, In Sicilia nel secoloXVI: verso una rivoluzione industriale? (Palermo, 1974), p.81).
32 These practises were common throughout Europe and particularly in the regions with higher
concentrations o f industrial activities. See Rappaport, Worlds Within the Worlds, p.321; Degrassi,
Economia artigiana, pp.56-57; Epstein, ‘Craft Guilds’, p.691.
181
every year in the following years.33 Higher salaries not only restrained apprentices
from leaving, but also attracted more labourers for craft training. In Palermo, the
best masters were also able to attract apprentices thanks to their high reputation.
There the reputation of fine guild masters turned the workshop of the Gagini’s
family into a true ‘school of art’.34 Having good apprentices attracted more clients
and increased the returns of the workshop.
c) Participation
According to orthodox theory, guilds imposed compulsory participation as a

means to control the number of masters, and restrict competition and the flow of
ideas. A number o f questions emerge if this theory is to be accepted. For
example, how did guilds impose participation? Why did participation have to be
imposed if the guild system could provide monopolistic rights and other benefits
for guild members? Was participation influenced by other factors? Can it be
assumed that all artisans were members of a guild?
Craft masters were the only full members of these associations, so that most
scholars refer to guilds as ‘lobbies o f producers’; however in some crafts,
apprentices, journeymen and their children could also benefit from the welfare
'in
system. Guild membership seems to have been far more flexible than the statutes
and the historiographic tradition suggests.
The evidence also suggests that guilds had to entice members, implying that
the individual benefits of membership were not straightforward. Members could
leave the craft at the cost of their mastership fees or rejoin the group without
penalties, and incentives and benefits were necessary to sustain participation and
retain members in the guild.
33 See for example ASTp, Notai, not. Vito Vitale, 9908, unnumbered fos. (29 January 1600 and 8
November 1600). See also ch. 5.
34 G. Di Marzo, I Gagini e la scultura in Sicilia nei secoli X V e XVI (Palermo, 1880-83).
36 Ogilvie, State Corporatism.
37 See for example Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, pp. 177-79, statutes o f Palermo confectioners
(1622).
182
Masters acquired full membership after passing the mastership examination

and paying the relevant fees. Some aspiring masters could not pay these fees at
once, so paid instalments during the first period of their practice.38 Poor masters,
or artisans whose economic circumstances suddenly changed and were therefore
unable to contribute to the maintenance of the guild, could be exempted from
payment, or could pay the fees in arrears, being suspended from the voting rights
in the meantime.39 However, they could rejoin the guild after paying the fees in
arrears, and would then reacquire voting rights.40
Furthermore, evidence also show that there were non-guilded artisans who
lived and produced side-by-side guild members. The presence of so-called ‘false
workers’,41 or of women, became far more evident when the size o f the
manufacturing sector increased. The concentration of guilds and big workshops
increased the number of people who could acquire basic skills informally. In fact,
statutes of the fifteenth and sixteenth century hardly mention the exclusive nature
of production and selling. However, in seventeenth-century Palermo, statutes
imposed fines and claimed exclusive rights of production and sale for guild
members, suggesting that a more competitive market was emerging. In other
towns, rules against non-guild members were very rare, presumably because of
the limited number of skilled labourers 42
d) Fees
Theories on guilds have stated that high admission fees prevented artisans from
participation, and that only masters who were rich and powerful formed guilds.
The implication of this assumption is that guild participation should have been
38 S. Denaro, ‘I capitoli dei maestri muratori, marmorari e cavatori di pietra nella citta di Trapani’,
La Fardelliana 14 (1995): 152, statutes o f Trapani masons (1598).
39 For poor masters exempted from payments see Oddo, Statuti delle maestranze, pp.218-19,
statutes o f Palermo silk sock makers (1620).
40 Lionti, Statuti inediti, p. 124, statutes o f Palermo forgers (1771-72). They were allowed to pay
their fees up to three months later. Other examples concern masters, who left the town for a certain
period. See above, chapter 4.5.
41 S. Kaplan, ‘La lutte pour le controle du marche du travail a Paris au XVIIIe siecle’, Revue
d ’hisotire moderne et contemporaine 36, (1989): 361-412.
42 See above, chapter 6.
183
greater where admission fees were low. However, the evidence suggests that this
was not the case. The payment of fees had numerous exceptions, including special
conditions in case of difficulties in payment and exemptions in case of poverty.
Fines for fee evasion were not heavy, implying that fees were not seriously
enforced.
Interesting observations can be made from the tables in chapter 5
concerning the average mastership fees paid in the seventeenth century in both
Trapani and Palermo (Table 5.3). There was a big difference in mastership fees
between these towns; Trapani masters paid an average o f 34.8 tari per year, while
Palermo guild members paid an average o f 79.5 tari (Fig.7.1). The masters in
Palermo were therefore paying 128 per cent more than Trapani guildsmen, even
though Palermo probably had more guild members and crafts than all the other
towns of the region. A further confirmation that higher fees did not affect the
number of guilds emerges from a record o f the annual membership fees. In the
seventeenth century, the average membership fee paid in Palermo was greater
than that in Trapani by 127 per cent: the annual fee average was 18 tari in
Palermo and 7.9 tari in Trapani (Fig.7.2).
Fig. 7.1 Average mastership fees (tari)
80
70
60
50
0 1 6 th century
ta r i 40 ■ 17th century
30
20
10
Palermo Trapani
* S ou rces: See Tables 5.3 a and b.
184
Fig. 7.2 Annual average membership fees (tari)
H 15th century
□ 16th century
■ 17th century
Palermo Trapani
* Sources: see Tables 5.2 a, b and c
Why was there such a difference in fees between these two towns? If high
admission fees were an obstacle to membership, why did guilds with higher fees
have more members? The answer is that fees, and entry fees in particular were a
kind of bond, a ‘mortgage on trust’, paid by the masters to gain access to the
guild-based apprenticeship system. The bond sustained their promise to abide by
the rules and not ‘free-ride’ or cheat.43 This would explain why masters’ children
and sons-in-law did not usually have to pay entry fees and why foreigners
occasionally paid higher fees, although this was more common in smaller, more
conservative, towns (see Table 5.4).44
Because entry and membership fees were an investment for the master to
gain access to the skilled labour market, the fees that masters were willing to pay
were proportional to their expected returns. In larger and more sophisticated
labour markets such as Palermo, the expected returns and bonuses for skilled craft

44 Occasionally, the guild required entry fees from the master’s sons. See for example Oddo,
Statuti delle maestranze, p.263, Palermo statutes of sword makers (1649).
185
masters were higher, so fees were proportionally higher too. This also explains
why fees increased over time following the general inflation trends, even though
we saw that their economic significance was minimal.45
e) Women
The European literature has shown quite clearly that the conditions of women’s
labour changed during the early modem period. Early work by Alice Clark on
England (1919) and Karl Bucher on Germany (1914)46 opened the debate. Clark’s
conclusions became the benchmark for subsequent discussion. She argued that
women’s involvement in the organisation of production decreased, and she
connected this event with the advent o f capitalism. Large scale production
required larger workshops than the artisan’s house, and wage-labour made a
distinction between age and sex. Women were paid less than before, and either
pulled out of the labour market altogether or relied on their husbands’ wages 47
More recently this explanation has been challenged. In a detailed study of
working women in early modem cities o f northern Europe, focused mainly on the
relationship between market production and the family production unit, Martha
Howell has argued that women’s labour status ‘depended upon the functions of
the family production unit during the development of the market economy’.48
Three assumptions form the basis o f this hypothesis. First, women gained what
the writer calls a ‘high-status position’ in market production only in the later
Middle Ages, because they continued to hold a key position in the family
economy during the shift from subsistence economy to market production.
Second, the high-status position was obtained mainly by women in high-status
families, and by women who were married or widowed. Third, the work, which
granted high labour status, was quickly removed from the family production
45 See above, chapter 5 and Fig.5.13.

46 A. Clark, Working Life o f Women in Seventeenth Century (London, 1919); K. Bucher, Die
Berufe der Stadt Frankfurt im Mittelalter (Leipzig, 1914).
47 Clark, Working Life.
48 M. Howell, Women Production and Patriarchy in Late M edieval Cities (Chicago and London,
1986), p.43.
186
unit.49 Martha Howell concluded that ‘women’s work in late medieval cities
changed essentially because the patriarchal order required it’.50
Other scholars have pursued these hypotheses and have suggested that
women’s work throughout Europe was gradually considered less skilled than that
of men during the early modem period. In France, women’s wages fall from three-
quarters to two-fifths o f a man’s earnings between the beginning of the fourteenth
and the end of the sixteenth centuries, although they recovered during the
seventeenth century.51 In Germany, Merry Wiesner has described a shift in
women’s position at work from being integrated in manufacturing production to
becoming unskilled labourers.52 In Italy, studies of female workers stress that
women were unskilled or low-skilled labourers often working for wages.
The debate about women in pre-industrial society has led to two theories,
which give two opposing views of the female presence in manufacturing industry.
On the one hand, proto-industrial theory has argued that the expansion of
domestic manufacture widened female participation in production.54 On the other
hand, English historiography has described a strong decrease o f women’s role in
the labour market in the passage to ‘capitalist organisation’. Sheilagh Ogilvie has
dismissed the proto-industrial perspective and argued that the decreased role of
women in the labour market occurred because of ‘specific social constraints’.55
The specific constraint she refers to is the domination of society by pressure
groups and the lack o f female corporate organisations that could defend women’s
labour flexibility from exploitation.56
It is important to note, however, that the presence of women at work in early
modem Europe was particularly widespread in regions where manufacturing
production was well developed. Numerous craftswomen emerged in French
49 Ibidem, pp.43-44.
50 Ibidem, pp. 178-79
51 M. Howell, Women Production and Patriarchy, pp.87-88.
52 M. Wiesner, Working Women in Renaissance Germany (New Bruswick and New Jersey, 1986)
and M. Wiesner, Women and Gender in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, 1993).
53 D. Herlihy, ‘Women’s work in the Towns o f Traditional Europe’, in S. Cavaciocchi (ed.) La
donna n ell’economia. Secc.XIII-XVIII(Florence, 1990).
54 S. Ogilvie, ‘Women and Proto-Industrialisation in a Corporate Society: Wurttemberg Woollen
Weaving, 1590-1760’, in P. Hudson and W.R. Lee, Women’s Work and the Family Economy in
Historical Perspective (Manchester and New York, 1990), p.75.
55 Ibidem, p.76.
56 Ibidem, pp.96-97.
187
cities;57 in Germany, they often acquired guild membership.58 In some towns,

especially in weaving and spinning centres, married women and spinsters are
recorded as guild members, and in some countries there were guilds composed
exclusively of women.59 Female workers were recognised in industry and traded
independently of their role as wife, mother, and daughter.60
The evidence therefore does not support a direct causality between the
increasing power of guilds and the decrease in female labour. In Sicily, where
guilds were weak and were not a ubiquitous feature, female labour is hardly
recorded at all, except in towns where guilds were numerous and better organised,
such as Palermo, Messina, and Trapani. Women are mentioned relatively
frequently in Palermo’s statutes, suggesting that the guilds of this town had to deal
more often with female labour. By contrast, other towns where corporate groups
were less organised lacked regulations on female work. Women did not manage
separate trades and did not generally participate as members in the guild system,
even when the regulations did not prevent their participation. However, in the few
cases where statutes do mention women at work, the guild tried to regulate them
through incorporation, as with the tailors and coral workers of Trapani, or the silk
weavers of Palermo.61
The Sicilian evidence therefore suggests that female industrial participation
was positively correlated with higher rates of specialisation. Guilds potentially
provided chances for women to be involved in industrial production and at the
same time tried to regulate and monitor female work in order to avoid free-riding.
If we accept that demand for female labour increased at times o f male labour
ff)
shortages, it follows that female work will have emerged and developed
especially at times of intense industrial production associated with well-developed
57 D.M. Hafter, ‘Women Who Wove in the Eighteenth-Century Silk Industry o f Lyon’, in D.M.
Hafter (ed.) European Women and Preindustrial Craft (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1995),
pp.42-64; C. Crowston, ‘Engendering the Guilds: Seamstresses, Tailors and the Clash o f Corporate
Identities in Old Regime France’, in French Historical Studies 23 (2000): 344.
58 Wiesner, Working Women, p. 158; see also Howell, Women, pp.43-44.
59 S. Shahar, The Fourth Estate: A History o f Women in the M iddle Ages (London, 1983), pp.191-
92.
60 Hudson and Lee, ‘Introduction’, in Hudson and Lee, Women’s Work and the Family Economy,
r,.12.
1 See above, chapter 5.
62 Ogilvie, ‘Women and Proto-Industrialisation’, pp.76-77.
188
guilds, rather than in the absence o f corporate groups and regulations. Industrial
expansion and specialisation in the urban economy seems to have created niches
in the labour market which male labour alone could not fill and which gave
women more chances to acquire new manufacturing skills. The lack of a vibrant
industrial base would explain why in Sicily, where female labour was not
restricted by guild legislation, women were nevertheless largely absent from the
labour market.
7.2 Causes and consequences of guild weakness
In Sicily the influence of a strong monarchy hindered the establishment of

corporate groups until the fifteenth century. From the 1430s, the increasing
financial needs of the Crown encouraged the approval and the acknowledgement
of corporate groups. However, a lack of strong support for craft regulations
exacerbated by the dual nature (central and urban) of political controls over guild
legislation, reduced incentives for guild membership; the number of formally
constituted crafts therefore remained far smaller than in most other European
regions. Sicilian guilds could not apply intensive pressure on the local authorities;
they did not have strong political influence with which to impose their will or
defend their members’ interests. This does not mean however that they did not try.
After the fifteenth century, when guilds acquired formal recognition, the
level of specialisation slowly but steadily increased. Specialised crafts grouped
together into larger umbrella groups incorporating metalworkers, builders and
others, although the number of sub-specialisations remained limited compared
with guilds in other European regions. During the seventeenth century, the guilds
underwent a reverse process of fragmentation in which new and more specialised
crafts obtained independent statutes and formed separate guilds. This occurred
especially in Palermo. In other demanial towns, however, human capital was often
spread between artisanship and agricultural production and the level of artisanal
189
skills remained low: thus Marsala, for example, with a population of around ten
thousand inhabitants had only four guilds.63
If we accept the classical theory, which states that guilds hindered industrial
development, the weakness of Sicilian crafts, which did not have the means to
protect the technological status quo, should have offered ideal conditions for the
free flow o f ideas, for technological progress and industrial growth. Moreover, the
weakness o f corporate groups and the lack of formal restrictions on female labour
should have offered fertile ground for developing women’s economic power. Yet,
manufacturing production in Sicily remained small-scale and restricted to the
domestic market, unable to compete against the long tradition of high-quality
production established in northern Italy and elsewhere in Europe. Sicily did not
experience successful industrial growth and technological progress.
The reasons for this failure cannot be simply a lack o f native
entrepreneurship, as a long historiographical tradition has claimed. The answer
seems to lie in Mokyr’s suggestion: successful innovation depended equally on
original ideas and skills. Sicilian guilds, which were unable to enforce their
regulations because of the lack of state support, were equally incapable of
enforcing membership and apprenticeship rules and of providing specialised
labour to a thriving manufacturing base. On the other hand, the agricultural sector
was quite able to support the economy of the island for centuries, even in the
seventeenth century when much of the rest of Europe was affected by
demographic and economic decline. Sicily seems to have specialised to
agriculture for two main reasons. First, it had a highly productive agricultural
sector, as the high level of exports in the international markets show. Second, the
delay in the establishment of craft guilds resulted in a non-competitive
manufacturing sector and a limited supply of skilled labour. The poor
development of craft guilds did not support the manufacturing industry, which
remained limited to the domestic market.
This new interpretation o f guilds permits a more complex explanation for
the failure o f the manufacturing industry, which avoids simply pointing to the lack
of entrepreneurs and the grain monoculture, as postulated in the traditional
63 M.G. Grifo (ed.) Marsala (Marsala, 1999).
190
literature on Sicily. Thus, a strong pattern o f path dependency prolonged the

effects caused by the lack o f skilled labour up to modem times.
191
Appendix 1
Recorded Sicilian guilds {PRIVATE }
CALT AGIRONE
A. Ragona, Le maioliche siciliane dalle origini all'Ottocento (Palermo, 1975)
Ropers (Cordari)
Potters (cannatari)
Pastry-cooks (cubaitari)
Goldsmiths (orefici)
CASTROGIOVANNI (ENNA)
ASPa, Protonotaro del Regno, 40, c.98r (11 May 1448)
Furriers (pellicciaria)
Tailors (custureria)
shoemakers (curbeseria)
CATANIA
P. Carrera, Delle memorie historiche della citta di Catania per Giovanni Rossi
(Catania 1641) vol.2, p.512
Blacksmiths (ferrari)
Carpenters (mastri d'ascia)
Ropemakers (cordari)
Bronze-founders (lavoratori di stagno e rame)
Shoemakers (calzolai)
Wool-cloth shopkeepers (ambasciari)
Hatters (cappellieri)
Jacket-makers (gipponari)
Tailors (sartori)
Cutlers and gunmakers (coltellieri e scopettieri)
Sword-makers (spadari)
Dyers (tintori)
Cart-makers (artefici di carri)
Pastry-cook/sweet makers (confettieri)
Baker (panettieri)
Grocers (cavallari)
Barbers (barberi)
192
MARSALA
A. Genna, Storia di Marsala (Trapani, 1994)
Blacksmiths (fabbri)
Carpenters (falegnami)
Smiths (ferrari)
Tailors (sartori)
Potters (quartarari)
MESSINA
P. Pieri, La storia di Messina nello sviluppo della sua vita comunale (Messina,
1939)
Silk weavers (setaioli)

Silver and goldsmiths (orefici e argentieri)
Cake makers (confettieri)
Tailors and jacket makers (sarti e gipponari)
Barbers (barbieri)
Carpenters (falegnami)
Saddle makers (sellai)
Tanners (conciatori)
Nail makers (tacciari o chiodaioli)
Leather workers (cuoiai)
Ropers (fimaioli)
Linen weaver (linaioli)
Pan makers (calderari)
Blacksmiths (ferrai)
Glass makers (vetrai)
Coopers (bottai)
Marble cutter and masons (marmorari, scalpellini e muratori)
G.B. Romano Colonna, Congiura dei ministri del Vicere contro la nobile citta di
Messina (Messina, 1676), vol. I, pp.57-61.
Blacksmiths (ferrai)
Coopers (bottai)
Tailors (sarti)
Goldsmith and Silversmith (argentieri/orefici)
Sculptors/Marble cutters (scarpellini e marmorari)
Silk-weavers (setaioli)
Bakers (panitteri)
193
MONTE S.GIULIANO
V. Adragna, ‘Le “corporazioni” di Monte S.Giuliano’, Trapani 2 (1971): 9-19
Shoemakers (Calzolai e ciabattini)

Carpenters and coopers (falegnami e bottai)
Blacksmiths and silversmiths (fabbri ferrai e argentieri)
Leather workers (conciatori di pelle o curviseri)
PALERMO
G.M. Amato, De principe templo panormitano, (Palermo, 1728), pp.86 (Rollus or
Ordo cerorum 15 August 1385)
Cart makers (carrozzieri)

Smiths (maniscalchi)
Carpenters (carpinteri)
Gun makers (balistreri)
Coopers (buttari)
Masons (muratori)
Sculptors (scultores)
Sailors (marinari)
Boat carpenters (calafati)
Bakers (panitteri)
Scythe makers (Falcenuriori)
Butchers (buccheri)
Sugar makers (cannamelari)
Ropers (cordari)
Wool weavers (lanarii)
Belt makers (cinturinarii)
Saddle makaers (sellari)
Painters (depittores)
Sock makers (calzettari)
Tailors (custureri)
Shoemakers (corbiseri)
Slipper makers (planellarii)
Furriers (pelliccerii)
Sword makers (spatari)
Dyers (tintori)
Sailors (mercatores maritimi)
Shop keepers (recapteri o rigattieri)
Tin workers (stagnatari)
Goldsmiths (aurifici)
Barbers (barberi)
delifichoti (?)
Sugar makers (zuccareri)
Bankers (bancheri)
194
Doctors and pharmacists (medici e speziali)
F. Maggiore Pemi, La popolazione di Sicilia e di Palermo dal X al XVIII secolo

(Palermo, 1892) (fifteenth-century Palermo).
Hat makers (berrettai)

Coachmen (cocchieri)
Blanket makers (cutrari)
Marble cutter (marmorari)
Masons (fabbricatori)
Mattress makers (materassari)
Inn keepers (tavimari)
Weavers (carieri)
Jacket makers (gipponari)
Embroiderers (frinzari gallonari e passamanari)
Sock makers working old silk (calzettieri di seta vecchia)
Carpenters (falegnami di opera bianca)
Soap makers (saponari)
Trousseau makers (Corredatori)
Leather workers (conzarioti)
Gold platters (tiratori d'oro)
Gold and silver beaters (battioro e argento)
Key makers (chiavitteri)
Gun makers (schioppettieri)
Marble cutters (marmorari)
Blacksmiths, cart makers (fabbri di opera grossa)
Cutlers (cutilleri)
Velvet workers (vellutari)
Haberdashers (merceri di mercia minuta)
Lime workers (calcinari)
Forgers (forgiatori)
Embroiderers (imburditori)
Sailors and fishermen (marinai e pescatori di Terracina di borgo, di Piedigrotta, di
Kalsa)
Carvers (intagliatori)
Carpenters, case makers (casciari)
Silk weavers (maestri di opera piana della seta)
Coach decorators (carrozzieri di opera gentile)
Hairdressers (parrucchieri)
Wax workers (arbitranti di cera)
Pharmacists (aromatari)
195
G. Scherma, Delle maestranze in Sicilia (Palermo, 1896)
Gold and silversmiths (arginteri, orefici)

Tailors for clerical cloths (zimmatori)
Jacket makers (gipponari)
Decorators (frinzari)
Sock makers using old silk (calzettieri di seta vecchia)
Gold platters (addoratori)
Belt makers (cintorari)
Soap makers (saponari)
Trousseau makers (corredatori)
Gold beaters (tiratori di oro)
Hat makers (cappellieri)
Saddle makers (sellari)
Key makers (chiavittieri)
Gun makers (scopettieri)
Smiths (frenari)
Stone cutters (perreatori)
Tailors (custureri)
Barbers (barbieri)
Shoemakers (corviseri)
Ropers (cordara)
Turners (tomari)
Masons (muratori)
Marble cutters (marmorari)
Tin workers (stagnatari)
Embroiderers (riccamatori)
Blacksmiths (ferrari d’opera grossa)
Weavers of cloth (tessitori di tela)
Knife makers (cutilleri)
Smiths (maniscalchi)
Velvet workers (vellutari)
Haberdashers (mercia minuta)
Sailors and fishermen (marinari e pescatori di Terracina)
Coopers (bottari)
Decorators (guamamentari)
Embroiderers (passamanara)
Coachmen (cocchieri)
Fishermen (pescatori di porta dei Greci)
Carvers (intagliatori)
Carpenters, case makers (casciari)
Silk consuls (consoli della seta)
ACPa, Prowiste, 1561-1650 passim
Butchers (bucceri)
Leather workers (consatori)
Habardashers (merceri)
Embroiderers and silk weavers (imborditori e sitalori)
Dyers (tingitori)
Bakers (fomari)
Shoemakers (corviseri)
Barbers (barberi)
Pharmacists (speciali, speziali)
Confectioners (confitteri e zuccarari, aromatari)
Weavers (carreri e tessitori di tila)
Marble cutters and sculptors (marmorari e scultori)
Trousseau makers (Corredatori)
Mattress makers (materazzari)
Sock and jacket makers (calcitteri e gipponari)
Tailors (custureri)
Ropers (accimatori)
Tin makers (stagnatari)
Blcksmiths (ferrari, ferrari dell'opera grossa, scopitteri, cortilleri)
Silversmiths (arginteri)
Embroiderers (racamaturi e passamanari)
Carpenters and turners (fabbri lignari e tomatori)
Coopers (buttari)
Cloth makers (panneri)
Inn keepers (tabemari)
Carvers, stone cutters and masons (intagliatori, pirriatori, muratori)
Cake and pasta makers (pastizari, vermicellari, maccaronari)
Cooks (cucineri)
Porters and servants (porteri e serventi)
Button makers (bottonari)
Haberdashers (merceri di robba vecchia)
Ropers (cordari)
Paper makers (cartari)
Linen weavers (linalori)
Hat makers (cappilleri)
Decorators (guamimentari)
Belt makers (centurari)
Shoemakers (scarpari)
Gold platers (mastri doratori)
Torch makers (torciari)
Decorators for processions (paratori)
197
SCIACCA
I. Navarra, Arte e storia a Sciacca, Caltabellotta e Burgio dal X V al XVIII secolo,
(Foggia,1986), p.l 16, n.300
Silver- and goldsmiths (aurifabri)
Cake makers (cubatari)
Sword makers (spadari)
Tailors (sutores)
SYRACUSE
BCSr, Libro dei Privilegi, vol.I (1474). Corpus Domini
Workers (Li lavoratori)

Sailors (li marinari)
Boat carpenters (li Calafati)
Blacksmiths (li ferrari)
Inn keepers (li tavemari)
Potters (li vasellari)
Crockery makers (li scutellari)
Tanners (li conzaturi)
Carpenters (li mastri d'axia)
Masons (li muraturi)
Ropers (li cordari)
Shoemakers (li corbiseri)
Merchants (li mercanti)
Tailors (custureri)
F. Carpinteri, ‘Capitoli dei consolati d’arti e mestieri nel ‘700 siracusano’, ASSr 15
(1969), pp.73-129.
Shoemakers and leatherworkers (curviseri e cunzaturi)

Masons and stone cutters (mastri muratori e pirriatori)
Shop and inn keepers (bottegari e tavemari)
Tailors (mastri custureri)
Carpenters (mastri d’ascia)
Coopers (mastri bottari)
Silver and goldsmiths (argentieri e orefici)
Tailors and shoemakers (mastri sartori e calzolai)
198
TRAPANI
BF. ASST, 11, cc.32r-v (Festa del Cilio o Cirio).
Merchants (mercanti)
Sailors (marinari)
Fishermen (piscaturi)
Pharmacists (speciari)
Silversmiths (argenteri)
Tailors (custureri)
Shoemakers (curviseri)
Masons (muraturi)
Barbers (barbieri)
Carpenters (carpinteri)
Key makers (chiavittari)
Coopers (buttari)
Innkeepers (tabemari)
Shopkeepers (putegari)
Butchers (buccheri)
C. Guida, Trapani durante il govemo del Vicere De Vega (1547-1557) (Trapani,

rist.1996), p.43. Letter from viceroy De Vega 1555.
Sailors (Li navi)

Fishermen (la barca)
Shopkeepers (li putiari)
Innkeepers (li tavimari)
Blacksmiths (li firrara)
Masons (li muratura)
Carpenters (li mastrurascia)
Coopers (li bottai)
Boat carpenters (li calafati)
Ropers (li curdara)
Sword makers (li spatari)
Cake makers (li cubbaitari)
Butchers (li camizzeri)
Tailors (li custureri)
Coral workers (li curallai)
Silversmiths (li arginteri)
Barbers (li barberi)
Merchants (li mircanti)
Pharmacists (li speziali)
Pedlars (li merceri a bando)
199
BF, ASST, Lettere (1764-65).
Coopers (bottai)
Ropers (cordari)
Barbers (barberi)
Carpenters (mastri di Noci)
Tailors (sartori)
Shoemakers (scarpari)
Coral workers (corallai)
Key makers (chiavitteri)
Silk weavers (setaioli)
Tanners (conzarioti)
Stone cutters/Sculptors (scarpellini)
Cart makers (carrozzieri)
Cake makers (cubaitara)
Tailors (sartori)
Shoemakers (scarpara)
Bibliography
Abbreviations:
ASA: Archivio di Stato, Acireale
ASI: Archivio Storico Italiano.
ASM: Archivio Storico Messinese.
ASSOr: Archivio Storico Sicilia Orientale.
ASPa: Archivio di Stato, Palermo.
ASPa, Notai: Archivio di stato, Palermo. Sez. Notai.
ASS: Archivio Storico Siciliano.
ASSc: Archivio Storico, Sciacca
ASSr: Archivio di stato, Siracusa.
ASTp: Archivio di Stato, Trapani.
ASTp, Notai: Archivio di Stato, Trapani. Sez. Notai
BCPa: Biblioteca Comunale, Palermo.
BCSr: Biblioteca Comunale, Siracusa
BF: Biblioteca Fardelliana.
BF ASSTp: Biblioteca Fardelliana Archivio del Senato di Trapani.
DSSS: Documenti per servire alia storia di Sicilia.
MANUSCRIPT SOURCES
Palermo, Archivio di stato (Gancia)

Regia Cancelleria, 79 (1442-43), 80 (1443-44), 1081.
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Antonino Galasso 1538-39; Vincenzo Rostagno 1616-20; Mario Giordano
1630-31; Giovanni Guercio 1649-50; Carlo Raimondo 1660-63; Domenico
Iacopelli 1751-52.
Palermo, Archivio comunale
Atti Banni e Prowiste ad annum 118(1512-13), 151-53 (1546-48).
Prowiste: 166-695 (1561/62-1662/63; the following years are missing: 1576-
77, 1579-80, 1599-1604, 1607-08,1612-15,1643-44,1657-58).
Consigli civici: 68 (1531-50); 69 (1551-70); 70 (1571-91); 71 (1592-1610);
72 (1611-30).
Palermo Biblioteca Comunale
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ospedali ed altri luoghi pii della citta di Palermo, le Confratemite, le
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Guilds in Early Modern Sicily.: Causes and Consequences o F Their Weakness

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Guilds in Early Modern Sicily.: Causes and Consequences o F Their Weakness

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Gabriella Lombardo

Guilds in early modern Sicily.

Causes and consequences o f their weakness

PhD Thesis in Economic History

Supervisor: Dr. S.R. Epstein

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

Currency and measurements................................................................................ vi

Chapter 2 The historiographical debate............................................................. 18

Chapter 3 Economic and political developments in early modern Sicily... 42

Chapter 4 Sicilian guilds........................................................................................ 63

Chapter 5 Structure and costs of Sicilian craft guilds......................................96

Chapter 6 Enforcement of guild regulation......................................................141

Chapter 7 Causes and consequences of Sicilian guild weakness...................171

Appendix: List of Sicilian guilds..........................................................................192

F i g . 4 .1 THE BLACKSMITHS OF PALERMO.........................................................................................................................71

F i g .5.1 m e m b e r s h i p f e e s f o r m a s t e r s a n d a p p r e n t ic e s in P a l e r m o , 1 5 0 0 - 9 9 ............................. 124

T a b l e 5.1 s t a t u t o r y l e n g t h o f a p p r e n t ic e s h i p ............................................................................................... 105

1 C. Trasselli, Appunti di metrologia e numismatica siciliana p e r la scuola di Paleografia

1392-95 Martin of Montblanc and his son Martino conquer Sicily.

The long tradition of guild studies has produced a number of different

2 A m o r e d e ta ile d o v e r v ie w o f th e h isto r io g ra p h ica l d e b a te is d e v e lo p e d in ch a p ter 2.

and defend members against competition. Artisans formed networks of masters

1.1 Topic and context

Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries guilds developed along

1.2 Why study Sicilian guilds?

12 Epstein, ‘Craft Guilds’, p.684.

1.4 Sources and methodology

of guilds have, in recent years, turned to alternative, historically more sensitive

The historiographical debate

The historiographical debate on guilds is characterised by fragmentation rather

2.1 From guild abolition to modern studies: two centuries of debate

of two contrasting interpretations: the political economists generally regarded

Debate in the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century concentrated on

Economists in Italy and in other European countries mainly supported the

The recovery o f interest in pre-modem guilds is recent, sparked by the work

suggested that it is possible to understand artisan social classification and

This perspective was further developed at a meeting held in Rome in

Nevertheless, in many of these studies the exploration of the emergence of

In a recent overview of the historiography of guilds, Prak has distinguished

Political functionalists claimed that ‘guilds like other corporations that

15 Black, Guilds and Civil Society.

2.2 Guilds and economic history

The interpretation of entry-restrictive guilds as, among other things, socially

22 J. Mokyr, ‘Urbanisation, Technological Progress and Economic Growth’, in H. Giersch (ed.)

Recently Sheilagh Ogilvie has revived the classical theory concerning

the major reason practitioners o f an economic activity form a guild is to secure

Political support in this view allowed guilds to develop a ‘legal community’,

which applied sets of regulations to their members, the craftsmen. Mokyr

31 Ogilvie, State Corporatism.

According to Mokyr, guild regulations were concerned with three elements

The regulation o f price was inimical to technological progress because process

36 Mokyr, ‘Urbanisation’, p. 15.

In recent years, however, a new revisionist literature has emerged to challenge

In this view, the guild system was interpreted as an intermediary between

Similarly, Gustaffson analysed craft guilds with reference to their ‘ability to

38 Persson, Pre-Industrial Economic Growth, pp.52-53.

The previously mentioned studies by Michael Sonenscher of Parisian and

Most recently, Epstein has reconsidered all the preceding perspectives in a

In his analysis, Epstein differentiates between two aspects of guild

the technological spillovers o f craft activities, which were largely unintentional,

universal, nor permanent, nor easily enforced 46

This theoretical model marks a turning point in the historiographical debate by

dependent on strong craft production, we would expect to find Sicilian proto