G.R. No.

152496               July 30, 2009 Mr. German Anunciacion, Mesdames

Liwayway Nava, Evangeline Pineda,
SPOUSES GERMAN ANUNCIACION and ANA FERMA and Ana Ferma
ANUNCIACION and GAVINO G. CONEJOS, Petitioners, 2982 Rizal Ave. Ext.
vs. Sta. Cruz, Manila
PERPETUA M. BOCANEGRA and GEORGE M.
BOCANEGRA, Respondents. Dear Sir and Mesdames:

DECISION I write in behalf of my clients, MS. PERPETUA M. BOCANEGRA and

MR. GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA, the registered owners of the parcel
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: of land known as Lot 1-B (LRC) PSD-230517 located at 2982 Rizal
Ave. Ext., Sta. Cruz, Manila, and duly covered by Transfer
This is a petition for review on certiorari, assailing the Certificate of Title No. 122452, which you are presently occupying.
Decision,1 dated November 19, 2001, and the Resolution, 2 dated
March 31, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. I would like to inform you that your occupation and possession of
65516. The CA decision affirmed the Orders dated February 19, the said land is based on mere tolerance of the owners, and
20013 and May 16, 20014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of without any payment on your part of any rental. Now, the owners
Manila, Branch 40 in Civil Case No. 00-98813 which dismissed the need the subject property for their own use.
complaint5 for Quieting of Title and Cancellation of TCT No. 122452
of petitioner spouses German Anunciacion and Ana Ferma In view thereof, I hereby demand that you vacate the said land
Anunciacion and their co-petitioner, Gavino G. Conejos. within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this letter.
Otherwise, much to our regret, I shall be constrained to institute
The facts of the case are as follows: the proper criminal and/or civil action against you.

On September 29, 2000, petitioners filed before the RTC, Manila, a Trusting that you will give this matter your most serious and
complaint for Quieting of Title and Cancellation of TCT No. 122452, preferential attention.
docketed as Civil Case No. 00-98813. The complaint averred that
defendants (respondents) may be served with summons and legal Very truly yours,
processes through Atty. Rogelio G. Pizarro, Jr., with office address
at 2830 Juan Luna St., Tondo, Manila.6 The summons, together ATTY. ROGELIO G. PIZARRO, JR.
with the copies of the complaint, were then served on Atty. Pizarro.
The record shows that before the filing of the said complaint, Atty. On October 27, 2000, respondents, through their counsel, Atty.
Pizarro wrote a demand letter7 on behalf of respondents and Norby C. Caparas, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss 8 on the ground that
addressed to petitioner German Anunciacion, among others, the complaint stated no cause of action. Petitioners filed their
demanding that they vacate the land owned by his clients Comment on the Motion to Dismiss9 on November 6, 2000.
(respondents), who needed the same for their own use. The said
demand letter reads:
A Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Reply to the Comment on
the Motion to Dismiss10 dated November 13, 2000 was filed by
2830 Juan Luna St.Tondo, Manila respondents, alleging an additional ground that petitioners failed to
pay the required filing fee. The petitioners filed, on November 27,
August 19, 2000 2000, their Opposition to the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and
Comment to the Reply to the Comment on the Motion to Dismiss.11
Thereafter, respondents filed a Second Supplemental Motion to defendant is an invalid service of summons. (Cordova v. Provincial
Dismiss and Manifestation dated November 27, 2000,12 citing the Sheriff of Iloilo, 89 SCRA 59)
following grounds:
Going to the other raised issue, Section 20, Rule 14 of the 1997
1.) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides –
defending party.
"The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be
2.) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to
matter of the claim. dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
3.) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of appearance."
action.
The presentation of all objections then available as was done by
Petitioners then filed their Additional Comment on the Motion to the movants subserves the omnibus motion rule and the
Dismiss, Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Comment on the concomitant policy against multiplicity of suits.1awphi1
Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss.13
WHEREFORE, premises considered, on the ground that the Court
In its order of February 19, 2001, the trial court sustained the has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants, the case is
respondents and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction hereby DISMISSED.
over the persons of respondents as defendants.lavvph!l The trial
court ruled as follows: The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied
for lack of merit.
However, the Court finds for the defendants on the Second
Supplemental Motion. Aggrieved, petitioners filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari,
seeking the nullification of the RTC Orders dated February 19, 2001
In point is Section 3, Rule 3 of the same Rules, which reads – and May 16, 2001, on the ground that the said orders were issued
with grave abuse of discretion.
"Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a
representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the On November 19, 2001, the CA dismissed the petition upon finding
beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be that there was no waiver of the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the
deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a part of respondents in the form of voluntary appearance. Applying
trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or Section 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the CA
administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. x x x x" held that although the grounds alleged in the two (2) earlier Motion
to Dismiss and Supplemental Motion to Dismiss were lack of cause
In the case at bar Atty. Pizarro, Jr., has not been shown to be a of action and failure to pay the required filing fee, the filing of the
trustee of an express trust, a guardian, or any of the above for the said motions did not constitute a waiver of the ground of lack of
action to be allowed to be defended by a representative. jurisdiction on their persons as defendants. The CA then concluded
that there was no voluntary appearance on the part of
respondents/defendants despite the filing of the aforesaid motions.
The fact that Atty. Pizarro, Jr., was the lawyer of the defendants in
The CA also rejected petitioners’ contention that the service made
the demand letters do not per se make him their representative for
to Atty. Rogelio Pizarro, Jr. was deemed service upon
purposes of the present action. To this effect, service on lawyer of
respondents/defendants, thus:
First of all, Atty. Rogelio Pizarro cannot be considered as counsel of AMOUNTS TO VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE BEFORE THE REGIONAL
record wherein We could apply the jurisprudential rule that notice TRIAL COURT AND THEREFORE CONFERS JURISDICTION OF THE
to counsel is notice to client. Atty. Pizarro cannot be deemed REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ON THE PERSON OF RESPONDENTS.
counsel on record since Defendants were not the one’s (sic) who
instituted the action, like plaintiffs who did the same thru counsel 2. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED
and therefore, obviously the one who signed the pleadings is the WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT
counsel on record. Sadly, the Motion to Dismiss filed by Private CONSIDER THAT THE SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION ALLEGING
Respondents were signed not by Atty. Pizarro but by someone else. THAT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OF
How then could Petitioners claim that Atty. Pizarro represents THE PERSONS OF THE DEFENDANTS IS ALREADY LATE FOR THE
Private Respondents? FIRST MOTIONS, NAMELY, THE "MOTION TO DISMISS" AND THE
"SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO DISMISS AND REPLY TO THE
Secondly, the fact that Atty. Pizarro was the one who wrote and COMMENT TO THE MOTION TO DISMISS", WHICH HAD BEEN
signed the August 19, 2000 letter, on behalf of Private OPPOSSED, ONE AFTER THE OTHER, BY PETITIONERS, HAD
Respondents, demanding that Petitioners vacate the premises of ALREADY CONFERRED JURISDICTION OF THE HONORABLE TRIAL
the former’s land does not fall under the substituted service rule. COURT ON THE PERSONS OF DEFENDANTS.
To be sure, Section 7 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules, provide thus:
3. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED
Sec. 7. Substituted Services – If, for justifiable causes the WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided JURISDICTION WHEN IT CONSIDERED THAT THESE 3 MOTIONS OF
in the preceding section; service maybe reflected (a) by leaving RESPONDENTS ARE BEING TREATED AS OMNIBUS MOTION AND
copies of the summons at the defendants’ residence with some ARE COVERED BY SECTION 20 RULE 14 OF THE 1997 RULES ON
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein or (b) CIVIL PROCEDURE.
by leaving the copies at defendant (sic) office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof. 4. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
In the case at bench, service upon Atty. Pizarro did not fall under WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER ATTY. ROGELIO PIZARRO, JR., AS
the aforequoted rule and therefore cannot qualify as substituted THE AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF RESPONDENT TO RECEIVE
service. Since the service made by Petitioners was defective, the THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT.
Public Respondent court never did acquire jurisdiction over the
persons of defendants and therefore correctly ordered the In the Resolution dated July 14, 2003, the Court gave due course
dismissal of the complaint.14 to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. In compliance, the respondents filed their
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the decision but it, too, Memorandum on September 8, 2003,15 while the petitioners filed
was denied by the CA in its Resolution of March 31, 2002. their Memorandum on September 24, 2003.16

Hence, the instant petition which raises the following assignment of We find merit in the petition.
errors:
While it is a settled doctrine that findings of fact of the CA are
1. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ACTED WITH binding and not to be disturbed, they are subject to certain
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF exceptions for very compelling reasons, such as when: (1) the
JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DID conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise
NOT CONSIDER THAT THE FILING OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3)
AND THE SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO DISMISS BY RESPONDENTS there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact of the CA are It was only in respondents’ Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss
contrary to those of the trial court; (6) said findings of fact are dated November 27, 2000 that respondents for the first time raised
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are the court’s lack of jurisdiction over their person as defendants on
based; and (7) the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the the ground that summons were allegedly not properly served upon
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on them. The filing of the said Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss
record.17 The Court finds here cogent reason to take exception did not divest the court of its jurisdiction over the person of the
from the general rule. respondents who had earlier voluntarily appeared before the trial
court by filing their motion to dismiss and the supplemental motion
Respondents, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss dated to dismiss.lavvph!l The dismissal of the complaint on the ground of
October 25, 2000,18 with only one ground, i.e., that the pleading lack of jurisdiction over the person of the respondents after they
asserting the claim "states no cause of action." Under this ground, had voluntarily appeared before the trial court clearly constitutes
respondents raised the issues quoted hereunder: grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC.
I. Defendants19 anchored their complaint on a WRONG
Decree of Registration; Quite apart from their voluntary appearance, respondents’
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Second Supplemental Motion
II. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines has to Dismiss were clearly in violation of Rule 15, Section 8 in relation
recognized the authenticity of TCT No. 122452; and to Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules.

III. Plaintiffs do NOT have the legal personality to ‘quiet the Rule 15, Section 8 of the Rules provides:
title’ of the subject property.
Sec. 8. Omnibus motion. – Subject to the provisions of Section 1 of
Section 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or
Rules) states: proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all
objections not so included shall be deemed waived. (emphasis
ours)
Sec. 20. Voluntary Appearance – The defendant’s voluntary
appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of
summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds Rule 9, Section 1, in turn, states:
aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. (Underscoring ours) Sec. 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
The filing of the above-mentioned Motion to Dismiss, without answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the
invoking the lack of jurisdiction over the person of the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no
respondents, is deemed a voluntary appearance on the part of the jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action
respondents under the aforequoted provision of the Rules. The pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the
same conclusion can be drawn from the filing of the Supplemental action is barred by prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the
Motion to Dismiss and Reply to the Comment on the Motion to court shall dismiss the claim. (emphasis ours)
Dismiss dated November 13, 2000 which alleged, as an additional
ground for the dismissal of petitioners’ complaint, the failure of Applying the foregoing rules, respondents’ failure to raise the
plaintiffs to pay the required filing fee again but failed to raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction over their persons in their very first
alleged lack of jurisdiction of the court over the person of the motion to dismiss was fatal to their cause. They are already
respondents. deemed to have waived that particular ground for dismissal of the
complaint. The trial court plainly abused its discretion when it
dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over defendant in the trial court on the ground of failure to serve the
the person of the defendants. Under the Rules, the only grounds summons on him. In that case, the Court agreed with the appellate
the court could take cognizance of, even if not pleaded in the court's ruling that there was no abuse of discretion on the part of
motion to dismiss or answer, are: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the the trial court when the latter denied the petitioner's motion to
subject matter; (b) existence of another action pending between dismiss the complaint and ordered the issuance of an alias
the same parties for the same cause; and (c) bar by prior summons.
judgment or by statute of limitations.
To be sure, a trial court should be cautious before dismissing
We likewise cannot approve the trial court’s act of entertaining complaints on the sole ground of improper service of summons
supplemental motions to dismiss which raise grounds that are considering that it is well within its discretion to order the issuance
already deemed waived. To do so would encourage lawyers and and service of alias summons on the correct person in the interest
litigants to file piecemeal objections to a complaint in order to of substantial justice.
delay or frustrate the prosecution of the plaintiff’s cause of action.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the CA erred in dismissing the
Although the CA correctly observed that Atty. Pizarro, as the petition and affirming the challenged orders of the RTC which
lawyer of the respondents in the demand letters, does not per se dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
make him their representative for purposes of the present action, a the person of the respondents who were the defendants.
scrutiny of the record shows that the address of Atty. Pizarro and
Atty. Norby Caparas, Jr., (the counsel who eventually entered his WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The CA’s Decision
appearance for respondents) is the same. This circumstance leads dated November 19, 2001 and the Resolution dated March 31,
us to believe that respondents’ belated reliance on the purported 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 65516 affirming the Orders dated February
improper service of summons is a mere afterthought, if not a bad 19, 2001 and May 16, 2001 of the RTC in Civil Case No. 00-98813
faith ploy to avoid answering the complaint.1avvphi1 are reversed and set aside. Consequently, Civil Case No. 00-98813
is hereby ordered REINSTATED. Let the records of this case be
At this point, we find it appropriate to cite Philippine American Life remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.
& General Insurance Company v. Breva,20 where this Court held
that: G.R. No. 130974 August 16, 2006

The trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC, Petitioner,
denied the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioner due to lack of vs.
jurisdiction over its person. In denying the motion to dismiss, the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and AGAPITA TRAJANO on
CA correctly relied on the ruling in Lingner & Fisher GMBH vs. behalf of the Estate of ARCHIMEDES TRAJANO, Respondents.
Intermediate Appellate Court, thus:
DECISION
A case should not be dismissed simply because an original
summons was wrongfully served. It should be difficult to conceive, VELASCO, JR., J.:
for example, that when a defendant personally appears before a
Court complaining that he had not been validly summoned, that
The court’s jurisdiction over a defendant is founded on a valid
the case filed against him should be dismissed. An alias summons
service of summons. Without a valid service, the court cannot
can be actually served on said defendant
acquire jurisdiction over the defendant, unless the defendant
voluntarily submits to it. The defendant must be properly apprised
In the recent case of Teh vs. Court of Appeals, the petitioner of a pending action against him and assured of the opportunity to
therein also filed a motion to dismiss before filing his answer as
present his defenses to the suit. Proper service of summons is used of summons. The grounds to support the motion were: (1) the
to protect one’s right to due process. address of defendant indicated in the Complaint (Alexandra
Homes) was not her dwelling, residence, or regular place of
The Case business as provided in Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court;
(2) the party (de la Cruz), who was found in the unit, was neither a
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 presents the representative, employee, nor a resident of the place; (3) the
core issue whether there was a valid substituted service of procedure prescribed by the Rules on personal and substituted
summons on petitioner for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction. service of summons was ignored; (4) defendant was a resident of
Petitioner Manotoc claims the court a quo should have annulled the Singapore; and (5) whatever judgment rendered in this case would
proceedings in the trial court for want of jurisdiction due to be ineffective and futile.
irregular and ineffective service of summons.
During the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Manotoc
The Facts presented Carlos Gonzales, who testified that he saw defendant
Manotoc as a visitor in Alexandra Homes only two times. He also
identified the Certification of Renato A. de Leon, which stated that
Petitioner is the defendant in Civil Case No. 63337 entitled Agapita
Unit E-2104 was owned by Queens Park Realty, Inc.; and at the
Trajano, pro se, and on behalf of the Estate of Archimedes Trajano
time the Certification was issued, the unit was not being leased by
v. Imelda ‘Imee’ R. Marcos-Manotoc 2 for Filing, Recognition and/or
anyone. Petitioner also presented her Philippine passport and the
Enforcement of Foreign Judgment. Respondent Trajano seeks the
Disembarkation/Embarkation Card 7 issued by the Immigration
enforcement of a foreign court’s judgment rendered on May 1,
Service of Singapore to show that she was a resident of Singapore.
1991 by the United States District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii,
She claimed that the person referred to in plaintiff’s Exhibits "A" to
United States of America, in a case entitled Agapita Trajano, et al.
"EEEE" as "Mrs. Manotoc" may not even be her, but the mother of
v. Imee Marcos-Manotoc a.k.a. Imee Marcos, Civil Case No. 86-
Tommy Manotoc, and granting that she was the one referred to in
0207 for wrongful death of deceased Archimedes Trajano
said exhibits, only 27 out of 109 entries referred to Mrs. Manotoc.
committed by military intelligence officials of the Philippines
Hence, the infrequent number of times she allegedly entered
allegedly under the command, direction, authority, supervision,
Alexandra Homes did not at all establish plaintiff’s position that she
tolerance, sufferance and/or influence of defendant Manotoc,
was a resident of said place.
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 39 of the then Revised Rules of
Court.
On the other hand, Agapita Trajano, for plaintiffs’ estate, presented
Robert Swift, lead counsel for plaintiffs in the Estate of Ferdinand
Based on paragraph two of the Complaint, the trial court issued a
Marcos Human Rights Litigation, who testified that he participated
Summons 3 on July 6, 1993 addressed to petitioner at Alexandra
in the deposition taking of Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr.; and he
Condominium Corporation or Alexandra Homes, E2 Room 104, at
confirmed that Mr. Marcos, Jr. testified that petitioner’s residence
No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City.
was at the Alexandra Apartment, Greenhills. 8 In addition, the
entries 9 in the logbook of Alexandra Homes from August 4, 1992
On July 15, 1993, the Summons and a copy of the Complaint were to August 2, 1993, listing the name of petitioner Manotoc and the
allegedly served upon (Mr.) Macky de la Cruz, an alleged caretaker Sheriff’s Return, 10 were adduced in evidence.
of petitioner at the condominium unit mentioned earlier. 4 When
petitioner failed to file her Answer, the trial court declared her in
On October 11, 1994, the trial court rejected Manotoc’s Motion to
default through an Order 5 dated October 13, 1993.
Dismiss on the strength of its findings that her residence, for
purposes of the Complaint, was Alexandra Homes, Unit E-2104,
On October 19, 1993, petitioner, by special appearance of counsel, No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila, based on the
filed a Motion to Dismiss 6 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of documentary evidence of respondent Trajano. The trial court relied
the trial court over her person due to an invalid substituted service
on the presumption that the sheriff’s substituted service was made Hence, petitioner has come before the Court for review on
in the regular performance of official duty, and such presumption certiorari.
stood in the absence of proof to the contrary. 11
The Issues
On December 21, 1994, the trial court discarded Manotoc’s plea for
reconsideration for lack of merit. 12 Petitioner raises the following assignment of errors for the Court’s
consideration:
Undaunted, Manotoc filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition 13 before the Court of Appeals (CA) on January 20, I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED [A] SERIOUS
1995, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 36214 seeking the annulment of ERROR IN RENDERING THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN
the October 11, 1994 and December 21, 1994 Orders of Judge QUESTION (ANNEXES A AND B) IN DEFIANCE OF LAW AND
Aurelio C. Trampe. JURISPRUDENCE IN RULING THAT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE PETITIONER THROUGH
Ruling of the Court of Appeals A SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH
SECTION 8, RULE 14 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT.
On March 17, 1997, the CA rendered the assailed
Decision, 14 dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED [A] SERIOUS
The court a quo adopted the findings of the trial court that ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WAS A VALID SERVICE OF
petitioner’s residence was at Alexandra Homes, Unit E-2104, at No. SUMMONS ON AN ALLEGED CARETAKER OF PETITIONER’S
29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila, which was also the RESIDENCE IN COMPLETE DEFIANCE OF THE RULING IN CASTILLO
residence of her husband, as shown by the testimony of Atty. VS. CFI OF BULACAN, BR. IV, G.R. NO. L-55869, FEBRUARY 20,
Robert Swift and the Returns of the registered mails sent to 1984, 127 SCRA 632 WHICH DEFINES THE PROPRIETY OF SUCH
petitioner. It ruled that the Disembarkation/Embarkation Card and SERVICE UPON MERE OVERSEERS OF PREMISES WHERE A PARTY
the Certification dated September 17, 1993 issued by Renato A. De SUPPOSEDLY RESIDES.
Leon, Assistant Property Administrator of Alexandra Homes, were
hearsay, and that said Certification did not refer to July 1993—the III. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED [A] SERIOUS
month when the substituted service was effected. ERROR IN CONCLUDING THAT THE RESIDENCE OF THE HUSBAND
IS ALSO THE RESIDENCE OF HIS WIFE CONTRARY TO THE RULING
In the same Decision, the CA also rejected petitioner’s Philippine IN THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. DE COSTER, G.R.
passport as proof of her residency in Singapore as it merely NO. 23181, MARCH 16, 1925, 47 PHIL. 594.
showed the dates of her departure from and arrival in the
Philippines without presenting the boilerplate’s last two (2) inside IV. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED [A] SERIOUS
pages where petitioner’s residence was indicated. The CA ERROR IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE ON EXTRA-TERRITORIAL
considered the withholding of those pages as suppression of SERVICE OF SUMMONS UNDER SECTIONS 17 AND 18, RULE 14 OF
evidence. Thus, according to the CA, the trial court had acquired THE REVISED RULES OF COURT. 17
jurisdiction over petitioner as there was a valid substituted service
pursuant to Section 8, Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court. The assigned errors bring to the fore the crux of the disagreement
—the validity of the substituted service of summons for the trial
On April 2, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for court to acquire jurisdiction over petitioner.
Reconsideration 15 which was denied by the CA in its
Resolution 16 dated October 8, 1997. The Court’s Ruling

We GRANT the petition.

Acquisition of Jurisdiction "Reasonable time" is defined as "so much time as is necessary
under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should
service of summons or the defendant’s voluntary appearance in be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if
court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the any[,] to the other party." 23 Under the Rules, the service of
court’s jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, summons has no set period. However, when the court, clerk of
"any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of the
person of the defendant is null and void." 18 In an action strictly in summons and the latter submits the return of summons, then the
personam, personal service on the defendant is the preferred mode validity of the summons lapses. The plaintiff may then ask for an
of service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the alias summons if the service of summons has failed. 24 What then is
defendant in person. If defendant, for excusable reasons, cannot a reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a personal service in
be served with the summons within a reasonable period, then order to demonstrate impossibility of prompt service? To the
substituted service can be resorted to. While substituted service of plaintiff, "reasonable time" means no more than seven (7) days
summons is permitted, "it is extraordinary in character and in since an expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff
derogation of the usual method of service." 19 Hence, it must wants. To the sheriff, "reasonable time" means 15 to 30 days
faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch
circumstances authorized by the rules. Indeed, "compliance with clerk of court to require the sheriff to submit a return of the
the rules regarding the service of summons is as much important summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriff’s Return
as the issue of due process as of jurisdiction." 20 provides data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the
Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the Office of the Court
Requirements for Substituted Service Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the succeeding
month. Thus, one month from the issuance of summons can be
considered "reasonable time" with regard to personal service on
Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court which applies
the defendant.
to this case provides:

Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of

SEC. 8. 21 Substituted service. – If the defendant cannot be served
summons with due care, utmost diligence, and reasonable
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section
promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious
[personal service on defendant], service may be effected (a) by
dispensation of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try their best
leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with
efforts to accomplish personal service on defendant. On the other
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein,
hand, since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade
or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of
service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering,
business with some competent person in charge thereof.
canny, and diligent in serving the process on the defendant. For
substituted service of summons to be available, there must be
We can break down this section into the following requirements to several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons
effect a valid substituted service: within a reasonable period [of one month] which eventually
resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two
different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts
The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can
that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility be confirmed or accepted.
of prompt service. 22 Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff
or the sheriff is given a "reasonable time" to serve the summons to (2) Specific Details in the Return
the defendant in person, but no specific time frame is mentioned.
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and (4) A Competent Person in Charge
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. 25 The
efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the If the substituted service will be done at defendant’s office or
failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date regular place of business, then it should be served on a competent
and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to person in charge of the place. Thus, the person on whom the
locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged substituted service will be made must be the one managing the
residence or house of defendant and all other acts done, though office or business of defendant, such as the president or manager;
futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the and such individual must have sufficient knowledge to understand
Return to justify substituted service. The form on Sheriff’s Return the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance,
of Summons on Substituted Service prescribed in the Handbook for and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons.
Sheriffs published by the Philippine Judicial Academy requires a Again, these details must be contained in the Return.
narration of the efforts made to find the defendant personally and
the fact of failure. 26 Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5 Invalid Substituted Service in the Case at Bar
dated November 9, 1989 requires that "impossibility of prompt
service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the
Let us examine the full text of the Sheriff’s Return, which reads:
defendant personally and the failure of such efforts," which should
be made in the proof of service.
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on many occasions several attempts were
made to serve the summons with complaint and annexes issued by
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
this Honorable Court in the above entitled case, personally upon
the defendant IMELDA ‘IMEE’ MARCOS-MANOTOC located at
If the substituted service will be effected at defendant’s house or Alexandra Condominium Corpration [sic] or Alexandra Homes E-2
residence, it should be left with a person of "suitable age and Room 104 No. 29 Merlaco [sic] Ave., Pasig, Metro-Manila at
discretion then residing therein." 27 A person of suitable age and reasonable hours of the day but to no avail for the reason that said
discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 defendant is usually out of her place and/or residence or premises.
years old) and is considered to have enough discernment to That on the 15th day of July, 1993, substituted service of
understand the importance of a summons. "Discretion" is defined summons was resorted to in accordance with the Rules of Court in
as "the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible the Philippines leaving copy of said summons with complaint and
choice and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or annexes thru [sic] (Mr) Macky de la Cruz, caretaker of the said
wise may be presupposed". 28 Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, defendant, according to (Ms) Lyn Jacinto, Receptionist and
such person must know how to read and understand English to Telephone Operator of the said building, a person of suitable age
comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the need and discretion, living with the said defendant at the given address
to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the who acknowledged the receipt thereof of said processes but he
earliest possible time for the person to take appropriate action. refused to sign (emphases supplied).
Thus, the person must have the "relation of confidence" to the
defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be
WHEREFORE, said summons is hereby returned to this Honorable
notified of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must therefore
Court of origin, duly served for its record and information.
determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence
of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient’s relationship with
the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the Pasig, Metro-Manila July 15, 1993. 29
significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to
immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the A meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned Return readily reveals
defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must be the absence of material data on the serious efforts to serve the
clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons. Summons on petitioner Manotoc in person. There is no clear valid
reason cited in the Return why those efforts proved inadequate, to
reach the conclusion that personal service has become impossible attempts, inquiries to locate defendant, names of occupants of the
or unattainable outside the generally couched phrases of "on many alleged residence, and the reasons for failure should be included in
occasions several attempts were made to serve the summons x x x the Return to satisfactorily show the efforts undertaken. That such
personally," "at reasonable hours during the day," and "to no avail efforts were made to personally serve summons on defendant, and
for the reason that the said defendant is usually out of her place those resulted in failure, would prove impossibility of prompt
and/or residence or premises." Wanting in detailed information, the personal service.
Return deviates from the ruling—in Domagas v. Jensen 30 and other
related cases 31—that the pertinent facts and circumstances on the Moreover, to allow sheriffs to describe the facts and circumstances
efforts exerted to serve the summons personally must be narrated in inexact terms would encourage routine performance of their
in the Return. It cannot be determined how many times, on what precise duties relating to substituted service—for it would be quite
specific dates, and at what hours of the day the attempts were easy to shroud or conceal carelessness or laxity in such broad
made. Given the fact that the substituted service of summons may terms. Lastly, considering that monies and properties worth
be assailed, as in the present case, by a Motion to Dismiss, it is millions may be lost by a defendant because of an irregular or void
imperative that the pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding substituted service, it is but only fair that the Sheriff’s Return
the service of summons be described with more particularity in the should clearly and convincingly show the impracticability or
Return or Certificate of Service. hopelessness of personal service.

Besides, apart from the allegation of petitioner’s address in the Granting that such a general description be considered adequate,
Complaint, it has not been shown that respondent Trajano or there is still a serious nonconformity from the requirement that the
Sheriff Cañelas, who served such summons, exerted extraordinary summons must be left with a "person of suitable age and
efforts to locate petitioner. Certainly, the second paragraph of the discretion" residing in defendant’s house or residence. Thus, there
Complaint only states that respondents were "informed, and so are two (2) requirements under the Rules: (1) recipient must be a
[they] allege" about the address and whereabouts of petitioner. person of suitable age and discretion; and (2) recipient must reside
Before resorting to substituted service, a plaintiff must in the house or residence of defendant. Both requirements were
demonstrate an effort in good faith to locate the defendant through not met. In this case, the Sheriff’s Return lacks information as to
more direct means. 32 More so, in the case in hand, when the residence, age, and discretion of Mr. Macky de la Cruz, aside from
alleged petitioner’s residence or house is doubtful or has not been the sheriff’s general assertion that de la Cruz is the "resident
clearly ascertained, it would have been better for personal service caretaker" of petitioner as pointed out by a certain Ms. Lyn Jacinto,
to have been pursued persistently. alleged receptionist and telephone operator of Alexandra Homes. It
is doubtful if Mr. de la Cruz is residing with petitioner Manotoc in
In the case Umandap v. Sabio, Jr., 33 it may be true that the Court the condominium unit considering that a married woman of her
held that a Sheriff’s Return, which states that "despite efforts stature in society would unlikely hire a male caretaker to reside in
exerted to serve said process personally upon the defendant on her dwelling. With the petitioner’s allegation that Macky de la Cruz
several occasions the same proved futile," conforms to the is not her employee, servant, or representative, it is necessary to
requirements of valid substituted service. However, in view of the have additional information in the Return of Summons. Besides,
numerous claims of irregularities in substituted service which have Mr. Macky de la Cruz’s refusal to sign the Receipt for the summons
spawned the filing of a great number of unnecessary special civil is a strong indication that he did not have the necessary "relation
actions of certiorari and appeals to higher courts, resulting in of confidence" with petitioner. To protect petitioner’s right to due
prolonged litigation and wasteful legal expenses, the Court rules in process by being accorded proper notice of a case against her, the
the case at bar that the narration of the efforts made to find the substituted service of summons must be shown to clearly comply
defendant and the fact of failure written in broad and imprecise with the rules.
words will not suffice. The facts and circumstances should be
stated with more particularity and detail on the number of
attempts made at personal service, dates and times of the
It has been stated and restated that substituted service of show that serious efforts or attempts were exerted to personally
summons must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed serve the summons and that said efforts failed. These facts must
requirements and in the circumstances authorized by the rules. 34 be specifically narrated in the Return. To reiterate, it must clearly
show that the substituted service must be made on a person of
Even American case law likewise stresses the principle of strict suitable age and discretion living in the dwelling or residence of
compliance with statute or rule on substituted service, thus: defendant. Otherwise, the Return is flawed and the presumption
cannot be availed of. As previously explained, the Return of Sheriff
The procedure prescribed by a statute or rule for substituted or Cañelas did not comply with the stringent requirements of Rule 14,
constructive service must be strictly pursued. 35 There must be Section 8 on substituted service.
strict compliance with the requirements of statutes authorizing
substituted or constructive service. 36 In the case of Venturanza v. Court of Appeals, 41 it was held that "x
x x the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
Where, by the local law, substituted or constructive service is in functions by the sheriff is not applicable in this case where it is
certain situations authorized in the place of personal service when patent that the sheriff’s return is defective (emphasis supplied)."
the latter is inconvenient or impossible, a strict and literal While the Sheriff’s Return in the Venturanza case had no statement
compliance with the provisions of the law must be shown in order on the effort or attempt to personally serve the summons, the
to support the judgment based on such substituted or constructive Return of Sheriff Cañelas in the case at bar merely described the
service. 37 Jurisdiction is not to be assumed and exercised on the efforts or attempts in general terms lacking in details as required
general ground that the subject matter of the suit is within the by the ruling in the case of Domagas v. Jensen and other cases. It
power of the court. The inquiry must be as to whether the is as if Cañelas’ Return did not mention any effort to accomplish
requisites of the statute have been complied with, and such personal service. Thus, the substituted service is void.
compliance must appear on the record. 38 The fact that the
defendant had actual knowledge of attempted service does not On the issue whether petitioner Manotoc is a resident of Alexandra
render the service effectual if in fact the process was not served in Homes, Unit E-2104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City, our
accordance with the requirements of the statute. 39 findings that the substituted service is void has rendered the
matter moot and academic. Even assuming that Alexandra Homes
Based on the above principles, respondent Trajano failed to Room 104 is her actual residence, such fact would not make an
demonstrate that there was strict compliance with the irregular and void substituted service valid and effective.
requirements of the then Section 8, Rule 14 (now Section 7, Rule
14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Petition for Review is hereby
GRANTED and the assailed March 17, 1997 Decision and October 8,
Due to non-compliance with the prerequisites for valid substituted 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals and the October 11, 1994
service, the proceedings held before the trial court perforce must and December 21, 1994 Orders of the Regional Trial Court,
be annulled. National Capital Judicial Region, Pasig City, Branch 163 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.No costs.
The court a quo heavily relied on the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty. It reasons out that "[t]he G.R. No. 192615               January 30, 2013
certificate of service by the proper officer is prima facie evidence of
the facts set out herein, and to overcome the presumption arising SPOUSES EUGENE L. LIM and CONSTANCIA LIM, Petitioners,
from said certificate, the evidence must be clear and convincing." 40 vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS-Minadanao Station, HON.
The Court acknowledges that this ruling is still a valid doctrine. FLORENCIA D. SEALANA-ABBU, Presiding Judge of Branch
However, for the presumption to apply, the Sheriff’s Return must
20, Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, and The in a representative capacity or as an authorized officer of BPI; nor
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Respondents. did it state that Ramos was authorized by BPI’s Board of Directors
to file the complaint through a board resolution made specifically
DECISION for the purpose. BPI filed a comment8 on the petitioners’ second
motion to dismiss.
BRION, J.:
Together with its comment, BPI submitted a copy of the Special
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari  by 1 Power of Attorney (SPA) signed and executed by Rosario Jurado-
petitioners Spouses Eugene L. Lim and Constancia Lim Benedicto (Benedicto), the Assistant Vice-President of BPI, granting
(petitioners), filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to assail the Ramos the authority to represent the bank and sign the verification
February 26, 2010 decision2 and the May 28, 2010 resolution 3 of and certification against forum shopping on BPI’s behalf. Also, it
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03103-MIN. submitted a copy of the certified true copy of BPI’s Corporate
Secretary’s Certificate showing that Benedicto was among those
authorized by the bank’s Executive Committee to grant and extend
Facts
a SPA to other bank officers to appear in court in cases where BPI
is the complainant or plaintiff. BPI contended that its submissions
On January 26, 1999, respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands already constituted substantial compliance with the procedural
(BPI) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, rules and should be applied in this case to facilitate and effectuate
Cagayan de Oro City, a complaint for collection of money with the ends of substantial justice. BPI also contended that the
prayer for preliminary injunction against the petitioners. The petitioners, by raising the issue of Ramos’ authority only in their
verification and certification against forum-shopping attached to May 26, 2008 motion to dismiss and after having already filed
the complaint were signed by Francisco R. Ramos (Ramos), then several motions in court, are now estopped from raising and are
BPI Assistant Vice-President and Mindanao Region Lending Head. deemed to have waived this issue by reason of laches.

On April 22, 1999, the petitioners moved to dismiss BPI’s The RTC denied the petitioners’ second motion to dismiss9 and the
complaint on the ground that there was a pending action for subsequent motion for reconsideration.10 The petitioners assailed
foreclosure proceedings before the RTC of Ozamis City, filed by BPI these orders of denial in the petition for certiorari 11 they filed with
against Philcompak, a corporation where the petitioners are the the CA.
majority stockholders. The RTC found that the present complaint
and the pending action for foreclosure proceedings involved
In a decision dated February 26, 2010,12 the CA dismissed the
different causes of action; hence, the RTC denied the petitioners’
petitioners’ certiorari petition. The CA ruled that the SPA granting
motion to dismiss4 and the subsequent motion for reconsideration.5
Ramos the authority to represent BPI and to sign the verification
and certification against forum shopping and the certified true copy
The petitioners also moved to consolidate the present complaint of BPI’s Corporate
with the other cases pending before the RTC of Ozamis City, but
the RTC (Cagayan de Oro City) denied their motion.6 The court
Secretary’s Certificate, although belatedly submitted, constituted
likewise denied the petitioners’ subsequent motion for
substantial compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court.
reconsideration.7
The CA also took notice that in the banking industry, an Assistant
Vice-President of a bank "occupies a sufficiently elevated position
On May 26, 2008, the petitioners filed another motion to dismiss, in the organization as to be presumed to know the requirements
this time, on the ground that there had been a fatal defect in the for validly signing the verification and certification (against forum
verification and certification against forum shopping attached to shopping)."
BPI’s complaint. They argued that the verification and certification
did not state or declare that Ramos was filing the subject complaint
The petitioners moved to reconsider the assailed decision but the A closer look into the SPA and the Corporate Secretary’s Certificate
CA denied their motion, hence, the filing of the present petition for submitted by BPI reveals that, at the time the subject complaint
review on certiorari13 with this Court. was filed on January 26, 1999, Ramos did not have the express
authority to file and sign the verification and certification against
Issues forum shopping attached to BPI’s complaint. The SPA, which
appointed Ramos and/or Atty. Mateo G. Delegencia as BPI’s
The issues to be resolved in this case are: (a) whether the CA attorneys-in-fact in the case against the petitioners, was executed
gravely erred when it affirmed the RTC in not dismissing BPI’s only on July 8, 2008. Even the Corporate Secretary’s Certificate
complaint against the petitioners due to the alleged lack of that named the officers authorized by the BPI’s Executive
authority of Francisco R. Ramos to file the BPI complaint and sign Committee to grant and extend a SPA to other officers of the bank
its attached verification and certification against forum shopping; was executed only on February 21, 2007. The Executive Committee
and (b) whether the Special Power of Attorney and Corporate is part of the bank’s permanent organization and, in between
Secretary’s Certificate that BPI belatedly submitted constituted meetings of BPI’s Board of Directors, possesses and exercises all
substantial compliance with the requirements under the rules on the powers of the board in the management and direction of the
verification and certification. bank’s affairs.16

Ruling BPI’s subsequent execution of the SPA, however, constituted a

ratification of Ramos’ unauthorized representation in the collection
case filed against the petitioners. A corporation can act only
We resolve to deny the present petition. The CA did not commit
through natural persons duly authorized for the purpose or by a
any reversible error in rendering its assailed decision and
specific act of its board of directors,17 and can also ratify the
resolution.
unauthorized acts of its corporate officers.18 The act of ratification
is confirmation of what its agent or delegate has done without or
The denial of a motion to dismiss, as an interlocutory order, cannot with insufficient authority.19
be the subject of an appeal until a final judgment or order is
rendered in the main case.14 An aggrieved party, however, may
In PNCC Skyway Traffic Management and Security Division
assail an interlocutory order through a petition for certiorari but
Workers Organization (PSTMSDWO) v. PNCC Skyway
only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of
Corporation,20 we considered the subsequent execution of a board
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.15
resolution authorizing the Union President to represent the union in
a petition filed against PNCC Skyway Corporation as an act of
The petitioners argue that the CA gravely erred in not finding that ratification by the union that cured the defect in the petition’s
the RTC had committed graveabuse of discretion in denying their verification and certification against forum shopping. We held that
second motion to dismiss. They contend that the RTC lacked "assuming that Mr. Soriano (PSTMSDWO’s President) has no
jurisdiction over BPI’s complaint because Francisco R. Ramos, the authority to file the petition on February 27, 2006, the passing on
bank officer who filed the complaint in BPI’s behalf and who signed June 30, 2006 of a Board Resolution authorizing him to represent
the verification and certification against forum shopping, did not the union is deemed a ratification of his prior execution, on
have the authority to do so at the time the complaint was filed; February 27, 2006, of the verification and certificate of non-forum
and that, despite Ramos’ lack of authority, the RTC still acted on shopping, thus curing any defects thereof."
BPI’s complaint and erroneously held that Ramos was authorized
by the bank as he "was one of those enumerated in the board
In Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal
resolution authorized to file the case." The CA affirmed the RTC in
Revenue,21 we likewise recognized that certain officials or
its assailed decision and resolution.
employees of a company could sign the verification and
certification without need of a board resolution, such as, but not
limited to: the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, the President SPOUSES LYDIA and VIRGILIO MELITON,* petitioners,
of a corporation, the General Manager or Acting General Manager, vs.
Personnel Officer, and an Employment Specialist in a labor case. COURT OF APPEALS and NELIA A. ZIGA, represented by her
For other corporate officials and employees, the determination of Attorney-in-Fact RAMON A. AREJOLA,** respondents.
the sufficiency of their authority is done on a case-to-case basis.22
 
We note that, at the time the complaint against the petitioners was
filed, Ramos also held the position of Assistant Vice-President for REGALADO, J.:
BPI Northern Mindanao and was then the highest official
representing the bank in the Northern Mindanao area.23 This In its judgment in CA-G.R. No. 250911 promulgated on August 9,
position and his standing in the BPI hierachy, to our mind, place 1991, respondent Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the
him in a sufficiently high and authoritative position to verify the orders dated February 22, 1991 and March 18, 1991 of the
truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the subject Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 27, in Civil Case No. RTC
complaint, to justify his authority in filing the complaint and to sign 89-1942 thereof and ordered the dismissal of petitioner's complaint
the verification and certification against forum shopping. Whatever filed herein, hence this appeal by certiorari.
is lacking, from the strictly corporate point of view, was cured
when BPI subsequently (although belatedly) issued the appropriate
On June 22, 1988, private respondent Nelia Ziga, in her own behalf
SPA.1âwphi1
and as attorney-in-fact of Alex A. Ziga and Emma A. Ziga-Siy, filed
a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. RTC 88-1480 of the
In any case, it is settled that the requirements of verification and Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Naga City,2 against herein
certification against forum shopping are not petitioner Lydia Meliton for rescission of a contract of lease over a
jurisdictional.24 Verification is required to secure an assurance that parcel of land situated at Elias Angeles Street, Naga City. Alleged
the allegations in the petition have been made in good faith or are as grounds therefor were said petitioner's failure, as lessee, to
true and correct, and not merely speculative.25 Non-compliance deposit the one month rental and to pay the monthly rentals due;
with the verification requirement does not necessarily render the her construction of a concrete wall and roof on the site of a
pleading fatally defective,26 and is substantially complied with when demolished house on the leased premises without the lessor's
signed by one who has ample knowledge of the truth of the written consent; and here unauthorized sublease of the leased
allegations in the complaint or petition, and when matters alleged property to a third party.
in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct.27 On the other hand, the certification against forum
On July 29, 1988, petitioner Lydia Meliton filed an answer to the
shopping is required based on the principle that a party-litigant
complaint denying the material averments thereof and setting up
should not be allowed to purse simultaneous remedies in different
three counterclaims for recovery of the value of her kitchenette
for a.28 While the certification requirement is obligatory, non-
constructed on the leased parcel of land and which was demolished
compliance or a defect in the certification could be cured by its
by private respondent, in the amount of P34,000.00; the value of
subsequent correction or submission under special circumstances
the improvements introduced in the kitchenette to beautify it, in
or compelling reasons, or on the ground of "substantial
the amount of P10,000.00, plus the value of the furniture and
compliance.29"
fixtures purchased for use in the kitchenette in the amount of
P23,000.00; and moral damages in the amount of P20,000.00
WHEREFORE., premises considered, we hereby DENY the present aside from attorney's fees of P5,000.00 and P250.00 per court
petition for review on certiorari. Costs against the petitioners. appearance, with litigation expenses in the amount of P1,000.00. 3

G.R. No. 101883 December 11, 1992 On May 29, 1989, the trial court, on motion of private respondent
contending that her cause of action had already become moot and
academic by the expiration of the lease contract on February 7, or being necessarily connected with the transaction
1989, dismissed the complaint. The counterclaims of petitioner or occurrence subject matter of the petitioner's
Lydia Meliton were also dismissed for non-payment of the docket complaint. The failure of the respondents to seek a
fees, ergo the trial court's holding that thereby it had not acquired reconsideration of the dismissal of their counterclaim
jurisdiction over the same. 4 or to take an appeal therefrom rendered the
dismissal final. Such dismissal barred the prosecution
On December 6, 1989, petitioners Lydia Meliton and Virgilio Meliton of their counterclaim by another action (Section 4,
filed a complaint against private respondent for recovery of the Rule 9, Revised Rules of Court; Javier vs. IAC, 171
same amounts involved and alleged in their counterclaims in Civil SCRA 605).
Case No. RTC 88-1480, which complaint was docketed as Civil
Case No. RTC 89-1942 5 and likewise assigned to Branch 27 of the The respondent Court, therefore, in issuing the
same trial court. orders complained of (Annexes G and I, petition),
gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of
On February 15, 1991, private respondent filed a motion to dismiss jurisdiction.
the complaint on the ground that the cause of action therein was
barred by prior judgment in Civil Case No. RTC 88-1480, the order WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED.
of dismissal wherein was rendered on May 29, 1989. 6 Accordingly, the orders complained of (Annexes G
and I, petition) are annulled and set aside and the
On February 22, 1991, the court below denied private respondent's respondents' complaint in Civil Case No. RTC 89-
motion to dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. RTC 89-1942 on 1942 before the respondent Court, DISMISSED.
the ground that the dismissal of the petitioner's counterclaims in Costs against the respondents, except the
Civil Case No. RTC 88-1480 is not an adjudication on the merits as respondent Court. 10
the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the counterclaims for
failure of petitioner Lydia Meliton to pay the docket fees, hence the Petitioners are now before use, assailing the said judgment of the
said dismissal does not constitute a bar to the filing of the later Court of Appeals and praying for the annulment thereof.
complaint. 7
The present petition requires the resolution of two principal issues,
Private respondent's motion for reconsideration of the foregoing to wit: (1) whether or not the counterclaims of petitioners are
order was denied by the lower court for lack of merit in its order of compulsory in nature; and (2) whether or not petitioners, having
March 18, 1991. 8 Dissatisfied therewith, private respondent filed a failed to seek reconsideration of or to take an appeal from the
petition for certiorari with this Court. In our resolution dated April order of dismissal of their counterclaims, are already barred from
29, 1991, we referred this case to the Court of Appeals for proper asserting the same in another action.
determination and disposition pursuant to Section 9, paragraph 1,
of B.P. Blg. 129,9 where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 25093. 1. Considering Section 4 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a
counterclaim is compulsory if (a) it arises out of, or is necessarily
In a decision promulgated on August 9, 1991, the Court of Appeals connected with, the transaction or occurrence which is the subject
granted the petition, the pertinent part of which reads: matter of the opposing party's claim; (b) it does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
x x x           x x x          x x x acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain
the claim.
The respondents' counterclaim against the petitioner
in Civil Case No. RTC 88-1480 (Annex E, petition) is It has been postulated that while a number of criteria have been
a compulsory counterclaim, it having (arisen) out of advanced for the determination of whether the counterclaim is
compulsory or permissive, the "one compelling test of The relationship between petitioners' counterclaims and private
compulsoriness" is the logical relationship between the claim respondent's complaint is substantially the same as that which
alleged in the complaint and that in the counterclaim, that is, exists between a complaint for recovery of land by the owner and
where conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the the claim for improvements introduced therein by the possessor.
parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time, as As we have ruled, in actions for ejectment or for recovery of
where they involve many of the same factual and/or legal issues. possession of real property, it is well settled that the defendant's
claims for the value of the improvements on the property or
The phrase "logical relationship" is given meaning by the purpose necessary expenses for its preservation are required to be
of the rule which it was designed to implement. Thus, a interposed in the same action as compulsory couterclaims. In such
counterclaim is logically related to the opposing party's claim cases, it is the refusal of the defendant to vacate or surrender
where, as already stated, separate trials of each of their respective possession of the premises that serves as the vital link in the chain
claims would involve a substantial duplication of effort and time by of facts and events, and which constitutes the transaction upon
the parties and the courts. Where multiple claims involve many of which the plaintiff bases his cause of action. It is likewise an
the same factual issues, or where they are offshoots of the same "important part of the transaction constituting the subject matter
basic controversy between the parties, fairness and considerations of the counterclaim" of defendant for the value of the
of convenience and of economy require that the counterclaimant be improvements or the necessary expenses incurred for the
permitted to maintain his cause of action. 11 preservation of the property. They are offshoots of the same basic
controversy between the parties, that is, the right of either to the
In the aforesaid Civil Case No. 88-1480, all the requisites of a possession of the property. 12
compulsory counterclaim are present. The counterclaims, as this
term is now broadly defined, are logically related to the complaint. On the foregoing considerations, respondent Court of Appeals
Private respondent's complaint was for rescission of the contract of correctly held that the counterclaims of petitioners are compulsory
lease due to petitioner Lydia Meliton's breach of her obligations in nature.
under the said contract. On the other hand, petitioner's
counterclaims were for damages for unlawful demolition of the 2. Petitioners having alleged compulsory counterclaims, the next
improvements she introduced pursuant to her leasehold occupancy point of inquiry is whether or not petitioners are already barred
of the premises, as well as for the filing of that civil suit which is from asserting said claims in a separate suit, the same having been
contended to be clearly unfounded. dismissed in the preceding one. The answer is in the negative.

Both the claims therein of petitioners and private respondent arose It is indeed the rule, embodied in Section 4, Rule 9 of the Rules of
from the same contract of lease. The rights and obligations of the Court, that a counterclaim not set up shall be barred if it arises out
parties, as well as their potential liability for damages, emanated of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence
from the same contractual relation. Petitioners' right to claim that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does
damages for the unlawful demolition of the improvements they not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of
introduced on the land was based on their right of possession whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. However, said rule is
under the contract of lease which is precisely the very same not applicable to the case at bar.
contract sought to be rescinded by private respondent in her
complaint. The two actions are but the consequences of the Contrary to the claim of private respondent, it cannot be said that
reciprocal obligations imposed by law upon and assumed by the therein petitioners failed to duly interpose their causes of action as
parties under their aforesaid lease contract. That contract of lease counterclaims in the previous action. Petitioners' claims were duly
pleaded by private respondent constitutes the foundation and basis set up as counterclaims in the prior case but the same were
relied on by both parties for recovery of their respective claims. dismissed by reason of non-payment of docket fees. The ruling of
respondent Court of Appeals to the effect that the failure of
petitioners to appeal or to move for reconsideration of the said The dismissal of the case without prejudice indicates the absence
order of dismissal bars them from asserting their claims in another of a decision on the merits and leaves the parties free to litigate
action cannot be upheld. the matter in a subsequent action as though the dismissal action
had not been commenced. 17 The discontinuance of a case not on
Firstly, where a compulsory counterclaim is made the subject of a the merits does not bar another action on the same subject
separate suit, it may be abated upon a plea of auter action matter. 18 Evidently, therefore, the prior dismissal of herein
pendant or litis pendentia and/or dismissed on the ground of res petitioners' counterclaims is not res judicata and will not bar the
judicata, 13 depending on the stage or status of the other suit. filing of another action based on the same causes of action.

Both defenses are unavailing to private respondent. The present Secondly, a reading of the order of dismissal will show that the trial
action cannot be dismissed either on the ground of litis court, in dismissing the complaint of private respondent, did not
pendentia since there is no other pending action between the same intend to prejudice the claims of petitioners by barring the
parties and for the same cause, nor on the ground of res judicata. subsequent judicial enforcement thereof. As stated therein, "(t)he
court in dismissing the counterclaim(s) has taken into account the
In order that a prior judgment will constitute a bar to a subsequent fact that a counterclaim partakes of the nature of a complaint
case, the following requisites must concur: (1) the judgment must and/or a cause of action against the plaintiffs." 19 This is a clear
be final; (2) the judgment must have been rendered by a court indication, deducible by necessary implication, that the lower court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the was aware of the fact that petitioners could avail of the causes of
judgment must be on the merits; and (4) there must be between action in said counterclaims in a subsequent independent suit
the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, based thereon and that there was no legal obstacle thereto. That
and of causes of action. 14 this was the import and intendment of that statement in its order
dismissing petitioners' counterclaims in Civil Case No. RTC 88-1480
was categorically confirmed by the very same court, wherein Civil
The first case, Civil Case No. RTC 88-1480, was dismissed upon
Case No. RTC 89-1942 was also subsequently filed, in its assailed
motion of private respondent, plaintiff therein, under Section 2 of
orders denying private respondent's motion to dismiss the latter
Rule 17. Dismissal thereunder is without prejudice, except when
case on the ground of res judicata.
otherwise stated in the motion to dismiss or when stated to be with
prejudice in the order of the court. 15 The order of dismissal of the
first case was unqualified, hence without prejudice and, therefore, This is also concordant with the rule governing dismissal of actions
does not have the effect of an adjudication on the merits. On a by the plaintiff after the answer has been served as laid down in
parity of rationale, the same rule should apply to a counterclaim Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, which is summarized as follows: An
duly interposed therein and which is likewise dismissed but not on action shall not be dismissed at the request of the plaintiff after the
the merits thereof. service of the answer, except by order of the court and upon such
terms and conditions as the court deems proper. The trial court has
the judicial discretion in ruling on a motion to dismiss at the
Moreover, in the same order of dismissal of the complaint, the
instance of the plaintiff. It has to decide whether the dismissal of
counterclaims of herein petitioners were dismissed by reason of the
the case should be allowed, and if so, on what terms and
fact the court a quo had not acquired jurisdiction over the same for
conditions. 20
non-payment of the docket fees. On that score, the said dismissal
was also without prejudice,
since a dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction does not In dismissing private respondent's complaint, the trial court could
constitute res judicata, 16 there having been no consideration and not but have reserved to petitioners, as a condition for such
adjudication of the case on the merits. dismissal, the right to maintain a separate action for damages.
Petitioners' claims for damages in the three counterclaims
interposed in said case, although in the nature of compulsory
counterclaims but in light of the aforesaid reservation in the permissive and could be the subject of a separate and independent
dismissal order, are consequently independent causes of action action. Under the Rules, there is no need to pay docket fees for a
which can be the subject of a separate action against private compulsory counterclaim. 23 The ruling in Manchester applies
respondent. specifically to permissive counterclaims only, thereby excluding
compulsory counterclaims from its purview, 24 and that was the
An action for damages specifically applicable in a lessor-lessee ruling of the court below to which the litigants therein submitted.
relationship is authorized in Article 1659 of the Civil Code which Had the trial court correctly specified that petitioners'
provides that: counterclaims were compulsory, petitioners could have objected to
the dismissal sought by private respondent on the ground that said
Art. 1659. If the lessor or the lessee should not counterclaims could not remain pending for independent
comply with the obligations set forth in articles 1654 adjudication. 25
and 1657, the aggrieved party may ask for the
rescission of the contract and indemnification for Furthermore, under the Manchester doctrine, the defect cannot be
damages, or only the latter, allowing the contract to cured by an amendment of the complaint or similar pleadings,
remain in force. much less the payment of the docket fee. Hence, the only remedy
left for the petitioners was to file a separate action for their claims
Paragraph 3 of Article 1654 of the same Code requires that the and to pay the prescribed docket fees therein within the applicable
lessor must "maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate and reglementary period, which is what they did in the case at bar
enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the in obedience and deference to the judicial mandate laid down in
contract." 21 The aggrieved party has the alternative remedies, in their case. At any rate, the ambivalent positions adopted by the
case of contractual breach, of rescission with damages, or for lower court can be considered cured by what we have construed as
damages only, "allowing the contract to remain in force." effectively a reservation in its order of dismissal for the filing of a
complaint based on the causes of action in the dismissed
counterclaims.
The act of private respondent in demolishing the structures
introduced by petitioners on the property leased and the
improvements therein during the existence of the lease contract is This, then, is one case where it is necessary to heed the injunction
a clear violation by her, as lessor, of her obligation mandated by that the rules of procedure are not to be applied in a rigid and
paragraph 3, Article 1654 of the Civil Code. The said violation gave technical sense. After all, rules of procedure are used only to help
rise to a cause of action for damages in favor of herein petitioners. secure substantial justice. They cannot be applied to prevent the
achievement of that goal. Form cannot and should not prevail over
substance. 26 Absent a specific requirement for stringent
Lastly, even assuming arguendo that the bar under the rule on
application, the Rules of Court are to be liberally construed to the
compulsory counterclaims may be invoked, the peculiar
end that no party shall be deprived of his day in court on
circumstances of this case irresistibly and justifiedly warrant the
technicalities. The courts in our jurisdiction are tribunals both of
relaxation of such rule.
law and equity. Hence, under the antecedents of this case, we are
persuaded that even if only to approximate that desirable measure
The court a quo dismissed petitioners' counterclaims for non- of justice we are sworn to dispense, this controversy should be
payment of docket fees pursuant to our then ruling in Manchester resolved on the merits.
Development Corporation, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et
al.,  22 before its modification. The failure of petitioners to seek
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent Court of
reconsideration of or to take an appeal from the order of dismissal
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. RTC
of the counterclaim should not prejudice their right to file their
89-1942 is hereby REINSTATED and the Regional Trial Court of
claims in a separate action because they were thereby made to
Naga City, Branch 27, or wherever the case has been assigned, is
understand and believe that their counterclaims were merely
directed to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the adjudication On March 30, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court
thereof. (RTC) of Iloilo, Branch 22, a Complaint against respondent for
Breach of Contract, Specific Performance and Damages. The
G.R. No. 138137            March 8, 2001 Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 20341 (hereafter referred to
as the "Iloilo case"), was grounded on the alleged violation of the
PERLA S. ZULUETA, petitioner, Dealership Agreement.
vs.
ASIA BREWERY, INC., respondent. On July 7, 1994, during the pendency of the Iloilo case, respondent
filed with the Makati Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, a Complaint
PANGANIBAN, J.: docketed as Civil Case No. 94-2110 (hereafter referred to as the
"Makati case"). The Complaint was for the collection of a sum of
money in the amount of P463,107.75 representing the value of
When two or more cases involve the same parties and affect
beer products, which respondent had delivered to petitioner.
closely related subject matters, they must be consolidated and
jointly tried, in order to serve the best interests of the parties and
to settle expeditiously the issues involved. Consolidation, when In view of the pendency of the Iloilo case, petitioner moved to
appropriate, also contributes to the declogging of court dockets. dismiss the Makati case on the ground that it had split the cause of
action and violated the rule against the multiplicity of suits. The
Motion was denied by the Makati RTC through Judge Eriberto U.
The Case
Rosario.
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Upon petitioner's Motion, however, Judge Rosario inhibited himself.
Rules of Court, questioning the August 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the
The case was raffled again and thereafter assigned to Branch 142
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 45020; as well as the
of the Makati RTC, presided by Judge Jose Parentala Jr.
February 23, 1999 Resolution2 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration. The decretal portion of the CA Decision reads as
follows: On January 3, 1997, petitioner moved for the consolidation of the
Makati case with the Iloilo case. Granting the Motion, Judge
Parentala ordered on February 13, 1997, the consolidation of the
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is given due course. The
two cases. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which
assailed orders of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City,
was denied in an Order dated May 19, 1997.
Branch 142 dated 13 February 1997 and 19 May 1997 are
hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE.
On August 18, 1997, respondent filed before the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari assailing Judge Parentala's February 13, 1997
SO ORDERED."
and May 19, 1997 Orders.
The Facts
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Respondent Asia Brewery, Inc., is engaged in the manufacture, the
Setting aside the trial court's assailed Orders which consolidated
distribution and sale of beer; while Petitioner Perla Zulueta is a
the Iloilo and the Makati cases, the CA ruled in this wise:
dealer and an operator of an outlet selling the former's beer
products. A Dealership Agreement governed their contractual
relations. "There is no common issue of law or fact between the two
cases. The issue in Civil Case No. 94-2110 is private
respondent's indebtedness for unpaid beer products; while
in Civil Case No. 20341, it is whether or not petitioner
 (therein defendant) breached its dealership contract with First Issue:
private respondent. Propriety of Petition with the CA

"Private respondent in her complaint aforequoted attempts Petitioner avers that the Makati RTC's February 13, 1997 and May
to project a commonality between the two civil cases, but it 19, 1997 Orders consolidating the two cases could no longer be
cannot be denied that her obligation to pay for the beer assailed. Allegedly, respondent's Petition for Certiorari was filed
deliveries can exist regardless of any "stop payment" order with the CA beyond the reglementary sixty-day period prescribed
she made with regard to the checks. Thus, the rationale for in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on
consolidation, which is to avoid the possibility of conflicting July 1, 1997. Hence, the CA should have dismissed it outright.
decisions being rendered, (Active Wood products, Co. vs.
Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 774, Benguet Corporation, Inc. The records show that respondent received on May 23, 1997, the
vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 27; Vallacar Transit, Inc. Order denying its Motion for Reconsideration. It had, according to
vs. Yap, 126 SCRA 503) does not exist."3 petitioner, only sixty days or until July 22, 1997, within which to
file the Petition for Certiorari. It did so, however, only on August
Hence, this Petition.4 21, 1997.

The Issues On the other hand, respondent insists that its Petition was filed on
time, because the reglementary period before the effectivity of the
In her Memorandum,5 petitioner interposes the following issues for 1997 Rules was ninety days. It theorizes that the sixty-day period
the consideration of this Court: under the 1997 Rules does not apply.

"a. Were the Orders of February 13, 1997 and May 19, 1997 As a general rule, laws have no retroactive effect. But there are
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 142 in Makati City certain recognized exceptions, such as when they are remedial or
(ordering consolidation of Makati Civil Case No. 94-2110 procedural in nature. This Court explained this exception in the
with the Iloilo Civil Case No. 20341) already final and following language:
executory when respondent filed its petition for certiorari
with the Hon. Court of Appeals such that said Court could "It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines,
no longer acquire jurisdiction over the case and should have "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary
dismissed it outright (as it originally did) x x x, instead of is provided. But there are settled exceptions to this general
due giving course to the petition?; and rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in
nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
"b. Independent of the first issue, did the Makati RTC,
Branch 142, correctly order the consolidation of the Makati x x x           x x x           x x x
case (which was filed later) with the Iloilo Case (which was
filed earlier) for the reason that the obligation sought to be "On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those
collected in the Makati case is the same obligation that is statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which
also one of the subject matters of the Iloilo case, x x x?"6 do not create new or take away vested rights, but only
operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of
The Court's Ruling such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning
of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against
The Petition is meritorious. the retrospective operation of statutes."7 (emphasis
supplied)
Thus, procedural laws may operate retroactively as to pending Petitioner likewise assails the validity of the sworn certification
proceedings even without express provision to that against forum-shopping, arguing that the same was signed by
effect.8 Accordingly, rules of procedure can apply to cases pending counsel and not by petitioner as required by Supreme Court
at the time of their enactment.9 In fact, statutes regulating the Circular No. 28-91. For his part, respondent claims that even if it
procedure of the courts will be applied on actions undetermined at was its counsel who signed the certification, there was still
the time of their effectivity. Procedural laws are retrospective in substantial compliance with Circular No. 28-91 because, a
that sense and to that extent.10 corporation acts through its authorized officers or agents, and its
counsel is an agent having personal knowledge of other pending
Clearly, the designation of a specific period of sixty days for the cases.
filing of an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is purely
remedial or procedural in nature. It does not alter or modify any The requirement that the petitioner should sign the certificate of
substantive right of respondent, particularly with respect to the non-forum shopping applies even to corporations, considering that
filing of petitions for certiorari. Although the period for filing the the mandatory directives of the Circular and the Rules of Court
same may have been effectively shortened, respondent had not make no distinction between natural and juridical persons. In this
been unduly prejudiced thereby considering that he was not at all case, the Certification should have been signed "by a duly
deprived of that right. authorized director or officer of the corporation,"13 who has
knowledge of the matter being certified.14 In Robern Development
It is a well-established doctrine that rules of procedure may be Corporation v. Quitain,15 in which the Certification was signed by
modified at any time to become effective at once, so long as the Atty. Nemesio S. Cañete who was the acting regional legal counsel
change does not affect vested rights. 11 Moreover, it is equally of the National Power Corporation in Mindanao, the Court held that
axiomatic that there are no vested rights to rules of procedure.12 "he was not merely a retained lawyer, but an NPC in-house counsel
and officer, whose basic function was to prepare legal pleadings
It also bears noting that the ninety-day limit established by and to represent NPC-Mindanao in legal cases. As regional legal
jurisprudence cannot be deemed a vested right. It is merely a counsel for the Mindanao area, he was the officer who was in the
discretionary prerogative of the courts that may be exercised best position to verify the truthfulness and the correctness of the
depending on the peculiar circumstances of each case. Hence, allegations in the Complaint for expropriation in Davao City. As
respondent was not entitled, as a matter of right, to the 90-day internal legal counsel, he was also in the best position to know and
period for filing a petition for certiorari; neither can it imperiously to certify if an action for expropriation had already been filed and
demand that the same period be extended to it. pending with the courts."

Upon the effectivity of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure on Verily, the signatory in the Certification of the Petition before the
July 1, 1997, respondent's lawyers still had 21 days or until July CA should not have been respondent's retained counsel, who would
22, 1997 to file a petition for certiorari and to comply with the not know whether there were other similar cases of the
sixty-day reglementary period. Had they been more prudent and corporation.16 Otherwise, this requirement would easily be
circumspect in regard to the implications of these procedural circumvented by the signature of every counsel representing
changes, respondent's right of action would not have been corporate parties.
foreclosed. After all, the 1997 amendments to the Rules of Court
were well-publicized prior to their date of effectivity. At the very No Explanation for
least counsel should have asked for as extension of time to file the Non-Filing by Personal Service
petition.
Citing Section 11 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules, petitioner also
Certification of Non-forum faults respondent for the absence of a written explanation why the
Shopping Defective Petition with the Court of Appeals was served on her counsel by
registered mail. In reply, respondent points out that such respondent's contractual breach. In other words, the non-payment
explanation was not necessary, because its counsel held office in -- the res of the Makati case -- is an incident of the Iloilo case.
Makati City while petitioner and her counsel were in Iloilo City.
Inasmuch as the binding force of the Dealership Agreement was
We agree with petitioner. Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 put in question, it would be more practical and convenient to
Rules, personal service of petitions and other pleadings is the submit to the Iloilo court all the incidents and their consequences.
general rule, while a resort to other modes of service and filing is The issues in both civil cases pertain to the respective obligations
the exception. Where recourse is made to the exception, a written of the same parties under the Dealership Agreement. Thus, every
explanation why the service and the filing were not done personally transaction as well as liability arising from it must be resolved in
is indispensable, even when such explanation by its nature is the judicial forum where it is put in issue. The consolidation of the
acceptable and manifest. Where no explanation is offered to justify two cases then becomes imperative to a complete, comprehensive
the resort to other modes, the discretionary power of the court to and consistent determination of all these related issues.
expunge the pleading becomes mandatory.17 Thus, the CA should
have considered the Petition as not having been filed, in view of Two cases involving the same parties and affecting closely related
the failure of respondent to present a written explanation of its subject matters must be ordered consolidated and jointly tried in
failure to effect personal service. court, where the earlier case was filed.18 The consolidation of cases
is proper when they involve the resolution of common questions of
In sum, the Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA by herein law or facts.19
respondent, questioning the orders of consolidation by the Makati
RTC, should not have been given due course. Not only was the Indeed, upon the consolidation of the cases, the interests of both
Petition filed beyond the sixty-day reglementary period; it likewise parties in the two civil cases will best be served and the issues
failed to observe the requirements of non-forum shopping and involved therein expeditiously settled. After all, there is no question
personal service or filing. All or any of these acts ought to have on the propriety of the venue in the Iloilo case.
been sufficient cause for its outright denial.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed
Second Issue: Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Makati RTC
Propriety of Consolidation (Br. 142) dated February 13, 1997 and May 19, 1997 are hereby
REINSTATED. No costs.
Apart from procedural problems, respondent's cause is also
afflicted with substantial defects. The CA ruled that there was no
common issue in law or in fact between the Makati case and the
Iloilo case. The former involved petitioner's indebtedness to
respondent for unpaid beer products, while the latter pertained to
an alleged breach of the Dealership Agreement between the
parties. We disagree.

True, petitioner's obligation to pay for the beer products delivered

by respondent can exist regardless of an alleged breach in the
Dealership Agreement. Undeniably, however, this obligation and
the relationship between respondent and petitioner, as supplier and
distributor respectively, arose from the Dealership Agreement
which is now the subject of inquiry in the Iloilo case. In fact,
petitioner herself claims that her obligation to pay was negated by