Third Division: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RODANTE DE
Third Division: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RODANTE DE
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J p:
The Case
This is an appeal from the April 4, 2008 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01811 entitled People of the Philippines v. Rodante
De Leon y Dela Rosa which affirmed the December 20, 2005 Decision 2 in Criminal
Case Nos. Q-03-122555-56 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 82 in Quezon
City. The RTC found accused-appellant Rodante De Leon guilty of violation of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
The charges against appellant stemmed from the following Informations:
Contrary to law. 3
Contrary to law. 4
On February 16, 2004, appellant was arraigned and pleaded "not guilty" to
the charge against him. After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued.
During the trial, the parties agreed to stipulate on the testimonies of Engr.
Leonard Jabonillo, the Forensic Chemist, and Police Officer 1 (PO1) Oliver Estrelles,
the police investigator of these cases. The prosecution thereafter presented PO2
Noel Magcalayo as its witness. The defense, on the other hand, presented Rodante
De Leon, the accused himself.
The trial court summarized the stipulation of Engr. Jabonillo, as follows:
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
A (NM) = 0.16 gm
B (CC) = 0.18 gm
FINDINGS:
CONCLUSION:
On appeal to the CA, appellant disputed the trial court's decision finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. He argued that the alleged
buy-bust operation conducted by the police officers was tainted with irregularities
and that the prosecution failed to prove the chain of custody of the evidence.
Ruling of the Appellate Court
On April 4, 2008, the CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The
dispositive portion of its Decision reads:
SO ORDERED. 8
I.
The trial court gravely erred in ignoring the fact that the
prosecution failed to prove the chain of custody of the alleged
confiscated items from the accused-appellant.
II.
The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty
of the crimes charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Our Ruling
We sustain appellant's conviction. IcAaSD
Guilt of Appellant Was Proved Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Appellant assails his conviction by contending that the trial court failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. According to him, the trial court
erroneously convicted him on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution despite a
question of the legality of the buy-bust operation. Further, he asserts that the trial
court relied on the disputable presumption of regularity in the performance of the
police function, despite the police officers violated the rule on chain of custody of the
alleged confiscated items.
The contentions are unmeritorious.
It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial court which are factual in
nature and which involve the credibility of witnesses are accorded with respect,
when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts, and speculative, arbitrary,
and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. 9 The reason for
this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses
having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial. 10
After a thorough examination of the entire records of this case, this Court has
failed to identify any error committed by the trial court in its appreciation of the
evidence presented before it and in the conclusion it reached.
In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the Court
has reiterated the essential elements in People v. Pendatun, to wit: (1) the accused
sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another; and (2) he knew that what he had
sold and delivered was a prohibited drug. 11 Therefore, what is material is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court
of evidence of the corpus delicti. 12 Corpus delicti is the body or substance of the
crime, and establishes the fact that a crime has actually been committed. It has two
elements, namely: (1) proof of the occurrence of a certain event; and (2) some
person's criminal responsibility for the act. 13
In the instant case, the prosecution sufficiently established the elements of
the crime. Appellant sold and delivered the shabu for PhP200 to PO2 Magcalayo
posing as buyer; the said drug was seized and identified as a prohibited drug and
subsequently presented in evidence; there was actual exchange of the marked
money and contraband; and finally, appellant was fully aware that he was selling and
delivering a prohibited drug. In fact, PO2 Magcalayo testified, thus:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What time was that when this confidential informant arrived at your
office?
A: Our Chief sir, formed a team for possible buy bust operation.
COURT:
Who formed?
PROS. ANTERO:
A: Us, sir. SPO3 Mario Concepcion, PO2 Fernando Salonga, PO2 Cesar
Collado, PO2 Edmund Paculdar and PO1 Emeterio Mendoza,
your Honor.
COURT:
Were you among the team?
PROS. ANTERO:
A: We prepared the pre-operation report and our Chief handed to me the
two (2) pieces of P100.00 bills as buy bust money.
Q: What initial?
A: NM, sir.
Q: I am showing you these two (2) P100.00 bills, kindly examine the
same whether you know those P100.00 bills?
A: These are the buy bust money that we used in the operation, sir.
Q: What happened after you were given these buy bust money?
Q: Can you tell this Hon. Court how you made a contact with this
Rodante De Leon?
COURT:
What?
PROS. ANTERO:
A: I asked him sir if he has shabu and then he answered yes and
magkano.
A: That was the time when I handed to him the money, sir.
Q: One?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
A: I effected the arrest, sir, and confiscated the buy bust money from
Rodante De Leon. 14
Evidently, all the elements of the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs were
proved in the instant case. The testimony cited above shows clearly that a sale
occurred between appellant, as the seller, and PO2 Magcalayo, as the buyer, for
PhP200 worth of shabu. In addition, the said testimony illustrated the seizing of the
prohibited drug and the exchange of the marked money. As a matter of fact, the trial
court, in disposing of the case, said:
||| (People v. De Leon y Dela Rosa, G.R. No. 186471, [January 25, 2010], 624 PHIL
786-804)
FIRST DIVISION
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; SELF-DEFENSE
DIFFERENTIATED FROM FULFILLMENT OF DUTY. — Self-defense and fulfillment
of duty operate on different principles. Self-defense is based on the principle of self-
preservation from mortal harm, while fulfillment of duty is premised on the due
performance of duty. The difference between the two justifying circumstances is
clear, as the requisites of self-defense and fulfillment of duty are different. The
elements of self-defense are as follows: a) Unlawful aggression; b) Reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; c) Lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. On the other hand, the
requisites of fulfillment of duty are: 1. The accused acted in the performance of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; 2. The injury caused or the offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the
lawful exercise of such right or office.
2. ID.; EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES; FULFILLMENT OF DUTY; A
POLICEMAN IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY IS JUSTIFIED IN USING SUCH
FORCE AS IS REASONABLY NECESSARY TO SECURE AND DETAIN THE
OFFENDER. — A policeman in the performance of duty is justified in using such
force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his
resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself
from bodily harm. In case injury or death results from the policeman's exercise of
such force, the policeman could be justified in inflicting the injury or causing the
death of the offender if the policeman had used necessary force. Since a
policeman's duty requires him to overcome the offender, the force exerted by the
policeman may therefore differ from that which ordinarily may be offered in self-
defense. However, a policeman is never justified in using unnecessary force or in
treating the offender with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when
the arrest could be affected otherwise.
3. ID.; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION FROM
THE VICTIM IS NOT A REQUISITE. — Unlike in self-defense where unlawful
aggression is an element, in performance of duty, unlawful aggression from the
victim is not a requisite. In People v. Delima, a policeman was looking for a fugitive
who had several days earlier escaped from prison. When the policeman found the
fugitive, the fugitive was armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a
lance. The policeman demanded the surrender of the fugitive. The fugitive lunged at
the policeman with his bamboo lance. The policeman dodged the lance and fired his
revolver at the fugitive. The policeman missed. The fugitive ran away still holding the
bamboo lance. The policeman pursued the fugitive and again fired his revolver,
hitting and killing the fugitive. The Court acquitted the policeman on the ground that
the killing was done in the fulfillment of duty. The fugitive's unlawful aggression in
People v. Delima had already ceased when the policeman killed him. The fugitive
was running away from the policeman when he was shot. If the policeman were a
private person, not in the performance of duty, there would be no self-defense
because there would be no unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased. It may
even appear that the public officer acting in the fulfillment of duty is the aggressor,
but his aggression is not unlawful, it being necessary to fulfill his duty.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE POLICEMAN USED FORCE TO PROTECT HIS LIFE OR
THAT OF A STRANGER. — While self-defense and performance of duty are two
distinct justifying circumstances, self-defense or defense of a stranger may still be
relevant even if the proper justifying circumstance in a given case is fulfillment of
duty. For example, a policeman's use of what appears to be excessive force could
be justified if there was imminent danger to the policeman's life or to that of a
stranger. If the policeman used force to protect his life or that of a stranger, then the
defense of fulfillment of duty would be complete, the second requisite being present.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; GRABBING THE M16 ARMALITE CLEARLY SHOWED A
HOSTILE INTENTION AND EVEN CONSTITUTED UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION. —
By suddenly grabbing the M16 Armalite from his unsuspecting police guard, Valino
certainly did not intend merely to escape and run away as far and fast as possible
from the policemen. Valino did not have to grab the M16 Armalite if his sole intention
was only to flee from the policemen. If he had no intention to engage the policemen
in a firefight, Valino could simply have jumped from the jeep without grabbing the
M16 Armalite. Valino's chances of escaping unhurt would have been far better had
he not grabbed the M16 Armalite which only provoked the policemen to recapture
him and recover the M16 Armalite with greater vigor. Valino's act of grabbing the
M16 Armalite clearly showed a hostile intention and even constituted unlawful
aggression. Facing imminent danger, the policemen had to act swiftly. Time was of
the essence. It would have been foolhardy for the policemen to assume that Valino
grabbed the M16 Armalite merely as a souvenir of a successful escape.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE DUTY TO ISSUE A WARNING IS NOT ABSOLUTELY
MANDATED AT ALL TIMES AND AT ALL COST, TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE
LIFE OF LAW ENFORCERS. — The Sandiganbayan had very good reasons in
steadfastly adhering to the policy that a law enforcer must first issue a warning
before he could use force against an offender. A law enforcer's overzealous
performance of his duty could violate the rights of a citizen and worse cost the
citizen's life. We have always maintained that the judgment and discretion of public
officers, in the performance of their duties, must be exercised neither capriciously
nor oppressively, but within the limits of the law. The issuance of a warning before a
law enforcer could use force would prevent unnecessary bloodshed. Thus,
whenever possible, a law enforcer should employ force only as a last resort and only
after issuing a warning. However, the duty to issue a warning is not absolutely
mandated at all times and at all cost, to the detriment of the life of law enforcers. The
directive to issue a warning contemplates a situation where several options are still
available to the law enforcers. In exceptional circumstances such as this case,
where the threat to the life of a law enforcer is already imminent, and there is no
other option but to use force to subdue the offender, the law enforcer's failure to
issue a warning is excusable.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VERBAL WARNING NEED NOT COME FROM THE
OFFENDER HIMSELF. — For what is the purpose of a warning? A warning is
issued when policemen have to identify themselves as such and to give opportunity
to an offender to surrender. A warning in this case was dispensable. Valino knew
that he was in the custody of policemen. Valino was also very well aware that even
the mere act of escaping could injure or kill him. The policemen were fully armed
and they could use force to recapture him. By grabbing the M16 Armalite of his
police escort, Valino assumed the consequences of his brazen and determined act.
Surrendering was clearly far from Valino's mind. At any rate, Valino was amply
warned. Mercado shouted "hoy" when Valino grabbed the M16 Armalite. Although
Cabanlig admitted that he did not hear Mercado shout "hoy," Mercado's shout
should have served as a warning to Valino. The verbal warning need not come from
Cabanlig himself. The records also show that Cabanlig first fired one shot. After a
few seconds, Cabanlig fired four more shots. Cabanlig had to shoot Valino because
Valino at one point was facing the police officers. The exigency of the situation
warranted a quick response from the policemen.
8. POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; GROSS NEGLIGENCE;
POLICEMEN TRANSPORTED AN ARRESTED ROBBER TO A RETRIEVAL
OPERATION WITHOUT HANDCUFFING HIM. — Cabanlig is thus not guilty of
homicide. At most, Cabanlig, Padilla, Abesamis, Mercado and Esteban are guilty
only of gross negligence. The policemen transported Valino, an arrested robber, to a
retrieval operation without handcuffing Valino. That no handcuffs were available in
the police precinct is a very flimsy excuse. The policemen should have tightly bound
Valino's hands with rope or some other sturdy material. Valino's cooperative
demeanor should not have lulled the policemen to complacency. As it turned out,
Valino was merely keeping up the appearance of good behavior as a prelude to a
planned escape. We therefore recommend the filing of an administrative case
against Cabanlig, Padilla, Abesamis, Mercado and Esteban for gross negligence.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This petition for review 1 seeks to reverse the Decision 2 of the Fifth Division
of the Sandiganbayan dated 11 May 1999 and Resolution 3 dated 2 May 2001
affirming the conviction of SPO2 Ruperto Cabanlig ("Cabanlig") in Criminal Case No.
19436 for homicide. The Sandiganbayan sentenced Cabanlig to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four months of arresto mayor as minimum to two years and
four months of prision correctional as maximum and to pay P50,000 to the heirs of
Jimmy Valino ("Valino"). Cabanlig shot Valino after Valino grabbed the M16 Armalite
of another policeman and tried to escape from the custody of the police. The
Sandiganbayan acquitted Cabanlig's co-accused, SPO1 Carlos Padilla ("Padilla"),
PO2 Meinhart Abesamis ("Abesamis"), SPO2 Lucio Mercado ("Mercado") and SPO1
Rady Esteban ("Esteban").
The Charge
Cabanlig, Padilla, Abesamis, Mercado and Esteban were charged with
murder in an amended information that reads as follows:
That on or about September 28, 1992, in the Municipality of
Penaranda, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, SPO[2]
Ruperto C. Cabanlig, SPO1 Carlos E. Padilla, PO2 Meinhart C.
Abesamis, SPO2 Lucio L. Mercado and SPO1 Rady S. Esteban, all
public officers being members of the Philippine National Police,
conspiring and confederating and mutually helping one another, with
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, taking
advantage of nighttime and uninhabited place to facilitate the execution
of the crime, with use of firearms and without justifiable cause, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
one Jimmy Valino, hitting him several times at the vital parts of his
body, thereby inflicting upon the latter, serious and mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, which crime
was committed by the accused in relation to their office as members of
the Philippine National Police of Penaranda, Nueva Ecija, the
deceased, who was then detained for robbery and under the custody
of the accused, having been killed while being taken to the place
where he allegedly concealed the effects of the crime, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of said victim, in such amount as may be
awarded under the provisions of the New Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
Arraignment and Plea
On 15 December 1993, the accused police officers Cabanlig, Padilla,
Abesamis, Mercado and Esteban pleaded not guilty.
Version of the Prosecution
On 24 September 1992 a robbery occurred in the Municipality of Penaranda,
Nueva Ecija. Four days later or on 28 September 1992, the investigating authorities
apprehended three suspects: Jordan Magat ("Magat"), Randy Reyes ("Reyes") and
Valino. The police recovered most of the stolen items. However, a flower vase and a
small radio were still missing. Cabanlig asked the three suspects where these two
items were. Reyes replied that the items were at his house.
Cabanlig asked his colleagues, Padilla, Mercado, Abesamis and Esteban, to
accompany him in retrieving the flower vase and radio. Cabanlig then brought out
Reyes and Magat from their cell, intending to bring the two during the retrieval
operation. It was at this point that Valino informed Cabanlig that he had moved the
vase and radio to another location without the knowledge of his two cohorts.
Cabanlig decided instead to bring along Valino, leaving behind Magat and Reyes.
CDAcIT
Around 6:30 p.m., five fully armed policemen in uniform — Cabanlig, Padilla,
Mercado, Abesamis and Esteban — escorted Valino to Barangay Sinasahan, Nueva
Ecija to recover the missing flower vase and radio. The policemen and Valino were
aboard a police vehicle, an Isuzu pick-up jeep. The jeep was built like an ordinary
jeepney. The rear end of the jeep had no enclosure. A metal covering separated the
driver's compartment and main body of the jeep. There was no opening or door
between the two compartments of the jeep. Inside the main body of the jeep, were
two long benches, each of which was located at the left and right side of the jeep.
Cabanlig, Mercado and Esteban were seated with Valino inside the main
body of the jeep. Esteban was right behind Abesamis at the left bench. Valino, who
was not handcuffed, was between Cabanlig and Mercado at the right bench. Valino
was seated at Cabanlig's left and at Mercado's right. Mercado was seated nearest to
the opening of the rear of the jeep.
Just after the jeep had crossed the Philippine National Railway bridge and
while the jeep was slowly negotiating a bumpy and potholed road, Valino suddenly
grabbed Mercado's M 16 Armalite and jumped out of the jeep. Valino was able to
grab Mercado's M16 Armalite when Mercado scratched his head and tried to reach
his back because some flying insects were pestering Mercado. Mercado shouted
"hoy!" when Valino suddenly took the M16 Armalite. Cabanlig, who was then facing
the rear of the vehicle, saw Valino's act of taking away the M16 Armalite. Cabanlig
acted immediately. Without issuing any warning of any sort, and with still one foot on
the running board, Cabanlig fired one shot at Valino, and after two to three seconds,
Cabanlig fired four more successive shots. Valino did not fire any shot.
The shooting happened around 7:00 p.m., at dusk or "nag-aagaw ang dilim at
liwanag." Cabanlig approached Valino's body to check its pulse. Finding none,
Cabanlig declared Valino dead. Valino sustained three mortal wounds — one at the
back of the head, one at the left side of the chest, and one at the left lower back.
Padilla and Esteban remained with the body. The other three policemen, including
Cabanlig, went to a funeral parlor.
The following morning, 29 September 1992, a certain SPO4 Segismundo
Lacanilao ("Lacanilao") of the Cabanatuan Police went to Barangay Sinasahan,
Nueva Ecija to investigate a case. Lacanilao met Mercado who gave him instructions
on how to settle the case, that he was handling. During their conversation, Mercado
related that he and his fellow policemen "salvaged" (summarily executed) a person
the night before. Lacanilao asked who was "salvaged." Mercado answered that it
was "Jimmy Valino." Mercado then asked Lacanilao why he was interested in the
identity of the person who was "salvaged." Lacanilao then answered that "Jimmy
Valino" was his cousin. Mercado immediately turned around and left.
Version of the Defense
Cabanlig admitted shooting Valino. However, Cabanlig justified the shooting
as an act of self-defense and performance of duty. Mercado denied that he told
Lacanilao that he and his co-accused "salvaged" Valino. Cabanlig, Mercado,
Abesamis, Padilla, and Esteban denied that they conspired to kill Valino.
The Sandiganbayan's Ruling
The Sandiganbayan acquitted Padilla, Abesamis, Mercado and Esteban as
the court found no evidence that the policemen conspired to kill or summarily
execute Valino. Since Cabanlig admitted shooting Valino, the burden is on Cabanlig
to establish the presence of any circumstance that would relieve him of responsibility
or mitigate the offense committed.
The Sandiganbayan held that Cabanlig could not invoke self-defense or
defense of a stranger. The only defense that Cabanlig could properly invoke in this
case is fulfillment of duty. Cabanlig, however, failed to show that the shooting of
Valino was the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty. The
Sandiganbayan pointed out that while it was the duty of the policemen to stop the
escaping detainee, Cabanlig exceeded the proper bounds of performing this duty
when he shot Valino without warning. cHATSI
The Sandiganbayan found no circumstance that would qualify the crime to
murder. Thus, the Sandiganbayan convicted Cabanlig only of homicide. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused CARLOS
ESTOQUE PADILLA, MEINHART CRUZ ABESAMIS, LUCIO
LADIGNON MERCADO and RADY SALAZAR ESTEBAN are hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged. Accused RUPERTO
CONCEPCION CABANLIG is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Homicide and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate sentence of FOUR (4) MONTHS of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of prision
correccional, as maximum. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of
Jimmy Valino the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS,
and the costs.
SO ORDERED. 5
On motion for reconsideration, Associate Justice Anacleto D. Badoy Jr.
("Associate Justice Badoy") dissented from the decision. Associate Justice Badoy
pointed out that there was imminent danger on the lives of the policemen when
Valino grabbed the "infallible Armalite" 6 from Mercado and jumped out from the rear
of the jeep. At a distance of only three feet from Cabanlig, Valino could have
sprayed the policemen with bullets. The firing of a warning shot from Cabanlig was
no longer necessary. Associate Justice Badoy thus argued for Cabanlig's acquittal.
In a vote of four to one, the Sandiganbayan affirmed the decision. 7 The
dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
The Issues
Cabanlig raises the following issues in his Memorandum:
WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE DEFENSE OF FULFILLMENT OF DUTY PUT UP BY CABANLIG
WAS INCOMPLETE
WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN RULING THAT
CABANLIG COULD NOT INVOKE SELF-DEFENSE/DEFENSE OF
STRANGER TO JUSTIFY HIS ACTIONS
WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN SENTENCING
CABANLIG TO SUFFER IMPRISONMENT AND IN ORDERING HIM
TO PAY THE AMOUNT OF P50,000 TO THE HEIRS OF VALINO 9
The Court's Ruling
The petition has merit. We rule for Cabanlig's acquittal:
Applicable Defense is Fulfillment of Duty
We first pass upon the issue of whether Cabanlig can invoke two or more
justifying circumstances. While there is nothing in the law that prevents an accused
from invoking the justifying circumstances or defenses in his favor, it is still up to the
court to determine which justifying circumstance is applicable to the circumstances
of a particular case.
Self-defense and fulfillment of duty operate on different principles. 10 Self-
defense is based on the principle of self-preservation from mortal harm, while
fulfillment of duty is premised on the due performance of duty. The difference
between the two justifying circumstances is clear, as the requisites of self-defense
and fulfillment of duty are different.
The elements of self-defense are as follows:
a) Unlawful Aggression;
Cause of Death:
Cerebral Hemorrhage Secondary To Gunshot Wound In The
Head
The doctors who testified on the Autopsy 36 and Necropsy 37 Reports
admitted that they could not determine which of the three gunshot wounds was first
inflicted. However, we cannot disregard the significance of the gunshot wound on
Valino's chest. Valino could not have been hit on the chest if he were not at one
point facing the policemen.
If the first shot were on the back of Valino's head, Valino would have
immediately fallen to the ground as the bullet from Cabanlig's M16 Armalite almost
shattered Valino's skull. It would have been impossible for Valino to still turn and
face the policemen in such a way that Cabanlig could still shoot Valino on the chest
if the first shot was on the back of Valino's head.
The most probable and logical scenario: Valino was somewhat facing the
policemen when he was shot, hence, the entry wound on Valino's chest. On being
hit, Valino could have turned to his left almost falling, when two more bullets felled
Valino. The two bullets then hit Valino on his lower left back and on the left side of
the back of his head, in what sequence, we could not speculate on. At the very least,
the gunshot wound on Valino's chest should have raised doubt in Cabanlig's favor.
Cabanlig is thus not guilty of homicide. At most, Cabanlig, Padilla, Abesamis,
Mercado and Esteban are guilty only of gross negligence. The policemen
transported Valino, an arrested robber, to a retrieval operation without handcuffing
Valino. That no handcuffs were available in the police precinct is a very flimsy
excuse. The policemen should have tightly bound Valino's hands with rope or some
other sturdy material. Valino's cooperative demeanor should not have lulled the
policemen to complacency. As it turned out, Valino was merely keeping up the
appearance of good behavior as a prelude to a planned escape. We therefore
recommend the filing of an administrative case against Cabanlig, Padilla, Abesamis,
Mercado and Esteban for gross negligence.
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 19436 convicting accused RUPERTO CONCEPCION CABANLIG of the
crime of homicide. We ACQUIT RUPERTO CONCEPCION CABANLIG of the crime
of homicide and ORDER his immediate release from prison, unless there are other
lawful grounds to hold him. We DIRECT the Director of Prisons to report to this
Court compliance within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., dissents.
Separate Opinions
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., dissenting:
PROS. TABANGUIL
A. Yes, sir.
A. The wound of entrance is located at the top of the head. In this part of
the head.
PJ GARCHITORENA
PROS TABANGUIL
Q: In that wound, will you please tell the Honorable Court the position of
the assailant in relation to the victim?
A: The assailant must be at the back of the victim in order to produce the
entrance at the back of the head, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
A: The wound of entrance is located here below the clavicle then made
an exit wound on his right side, right axilla.
PROS TABAGUIL
A: The assailant must be on the left side of the victim in order to produce
that wound, sir.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Q: Before it exit is that the front part of the armpit or the rare part of the
armpit?
Q: But the way you are pointing it, it seems to be closer to the chest
rather than the shoulder?
PROS TABANGUIL
Q: So in that case the assailant must be a little bit backward to the
victim?
PROS TABANGUIL
Q: In the case of this wound no. 3, what would be the position of the
assailant to the victim?
A: The assailant must have been at the left side but a little bit at the
back.
A: Yes, sir. 15
ATTY. JACOBA
Q: You stated also Doctor, that the possible position of the assailant as
regards gunshot wound no. 1 was behind the victim a little to the
left, is that correct?
A: No, I did not say that it was a little to the left. Its just at the back. 16
We concede that the police officers were in danger after Valino grabbed the
rifle although the same was not imminent. It appears that Valino was running away
from the jeep and there is no proof that he, even at one point, faced the police
officers and aimed his rifle towards them. Even Cabanlig testified that:
Q: When you fired the first shot, what was the position of Jimmy Baleno?
A: He was running away from us, sir and he was in a position of about to
rotate "umikot".
JUSTICE SANDOVAL:
PJ:
A: No, sir. 17
Atty. Jacoba:
Q: But when Jimmy Valino grabbed your gun, was it with the left or right
hand?
A: No, sir.
Q: So Jimmy Valino was able to jump out of the vehicle with your gun?
Q: Did you notice if Jimmy Valino was trying to cock the gun?
Q: Now, did you notice what was the position of Jimmy Valino when he
was first shot by Ruperto Cabanlig, was he running away from the
jeep or was he facing the jeep?
That Cabanlig first fired a shot followed by four more shots could not be
considered sufficient warning. The succession of the shots was a mere one or two
seconds thus giving no ample time for Valino to surrender. Besides, as testified to by
Cabanlig, he was giving no warning at all because the shots were directly aimed at
Valino.
ATTY. FAJARDO:
Q: Could you tell more details on that how this incident happened?
A: We had just crossed the PNR bridge, the road was in a very bad way
at that time, the driver was driving slowly and that is where he
took the gun away from Mercado and jumped out of the vehicle
and that is the time I was compelled to shoot him.
Q: What weapon?
A: M-16, sir.
Q: The first five (5) shots that you fired where did you aim?
A: I am not sure exactly where I had hit him, sir but I got the impression
that he was turning around to shoot me (witness making a gesture
as if somebody is holding a firearm) so I fired some more shots at
him.
JUSTICE SANDOVAL:
Q: How about your other police companions what kind of weapons were
they carrying at that time?
ATTY. FAJARDO:
Q: You said that you fired several shots, how did you fire, did you aim it
to the victim?
JUSTICE SANDOVAL:
A: Because he had grabbed the weapon sir, and he could kill anyone of
us. 20
ATTY. JACOBA
Q: Doctor, you are not in a position to state which of these wounds were
inflicted first?
Q: In other words you cannot tell which wound was inflicted first?
A: No sir. 22
SECOND DIVISION
SYNOPSIS
The Supreme Court did not agree with the defense of the petitioner because he
utterly failed to adduce sufficient proof of the existence of a positive strong act of real
aggression on the part of the victim. The trial court found the testimony of Amelia that
the petitioner was one of the principal actors in the slaying of her husband as worthy of
belief, hence, the Supreme Court found that such findings are entitled to the highest
degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. Appellant's conviction for
homicide was affirmed. As to the injuries sustained by Amelia, the Court opined that the
petitioner's homicidal intent had not been indubitably established. Considering that the
injuries suffered by Amelia required medical attendance of only four days, the Supreme
Court held that the offense committed by the petitioner was only slight physical injuries.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
Of the five (5) original accused, 3 only petitioner Ricardo, accused Reynaldo,
Juanito, all surnamed Balunueco, and Armando Flores were indicted in two (2)
Informations, the first for homicide 4 and the second for frustrated homicide. 5 Again, of
the four (4) indictees, only Ricardo and Reynaldo were brought to the jurisdiction of the
court a quo, while Juanito and Armando have remained at large. Accused Reynaldo
died on 17 November 1986. Accordingly, as against him, the criminal cases were
dismissed. Thus, only the criminal cases against petitioner Ricardo Balunueco are
subject of this appeal.
As principal witness for the prosecution, Amelia Iguico narrated that on 2 May
1982 at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening she was coddling her youngest child in front
of her house at Bagong Tanyag, Taguig, when she saw accused Reynaldo, his father
Juanito and brothers Ricardo and Ramon, all surnamed Balunueco, and one Armando
Flores chasing her brother-in-law Servando Iguico. With the five (5) individuals in hot
pursuit, Servando scampered into the safety of Amelia's house.
Dr. Maximo Reyes, NBI Senior Medico-legal officer, declared that on 3 May 1982
he conducted a post mortem examination on the body of the deceased Senando Iguico
and issued an Autopsy Report, which contained the following findings: 7 (a) two (2) stab
wounds and nine (9) gaping hack wounds; and, (b) cause of death was hemorrhage,
acute, profuse, secondary to multiple stab and hack wounds.
Manuel Flores, another witness for the defense, gave a substantially similar
version of the story. He testified that on the fateful day of the incident, while doing some
carpentry work in front of his mother's house, he saw Senando Iguico, 9 a.k.a.
"Bulldog," with a bolo on hand trailing brothers Reynaldo alias "Sayas" and Ramon
while walking towards Bagong Bantay. Suddenly, Senando confronted the two (2)
brothers and started hacking Reynaldo, hitting him on the head, arm and stomach.
Seeing that his brother was absorbing fatal blows, Ramon embraced Senando but the
latter shoved him (Ramon) and directed his fury at him instead. Ricardo went to the
rescue of his brothers but he too was hacked by Senando.
The trial court disbelieved the version of accused Ricardo, thus he was found
guilty of homicide in Crim. Case No. 49576 and frustrated homicide in Crim. Case No.
49577. It reasoned that the testimony of Amelia Iguico was clear, positive,
straightforward, truthful and convincing. On the other hand, according to the trial court,
the denial of Ricardo was self-serving and calculated to extricate himself from the
predicament he was in. Further, the trial court added that the wounds allegedly received
by Ricardo in the hands of the victim, Senando Iguico, if at all there were any, did not
prove that Senando was the aggressor for the wounds were inflicted while Senando
was in the act of defending himself from the aggression of Ricardo and his co-
conspirators. 10
The Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of accused Ricardo, giving full
faith to the direct and positive testimony of Amelia Iguico who pointed to him as the one
who initially axed her husband Senando on the head, shoulder and hand. 11 While the
appellate court upheld the conviction of Ricardo of homicide for the death of Senando
Iguico, it however ruled that his conviction for the wounding of Amelia Iguico, although
likewise upheld, should be for attempted homicide only. On the wounding of Amelia, the
appellate court had this to say — 12
For while intent to kill was proven, Amelia's hack wound in her left
leg was not proven to be fatal or that it could have produced her death
had there been no timely medical attention provided her, hence, the
stage of execution of the felony committed would only be attempted.
Petitioner now imputes errors to the Court of Appeals: (a) in not taking into
consideration the fact that petitioner, if indeed he participated, had acted in defense of
relatives; (b) in giving due credence to the self-serving and baseless testimony of
Amelia Iguico, the lone and biased witness for the prosecution; and, (c) in failing to
consider the several serious physical injuries sustained by petitioner and his brother
Reynaldo Balunueco.
Having admitted the killing of the victim, petitioner has the burden of proving
these elements by clear and convincing evidence. He must rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if the
prosecution evidence is weak it cannot be disbelieved if the accused has admitted the
killing. 14
In the case at bar, petitioner Ricardo utterly failed to adduce sufficient proof of
the existence of a positively strong act of real aggression on the part of the deceased
Senando. With the exception of his self-serving allegations, there is nothing on record
that would justify his killing of Senando.
First, Ricardo's theory that when he reached the crime scene he found Senando
repeatedly hacking his brother Reynaldo who thereafter retaliated by smashing an axe
on the victim's head is implausible in light of the seriousness of the wounds sustained
by the deceased as compared to the minor injuries inflicted upon petitioner and his two
(2) brothers. The fact that three (3) of the assailants suffered non-fatal injuries bolsters
the fact that Senando tried vainly to ward off the assaults of his assailants.
Third, petitioner had a rather erratic recollection of people and events. He vividly
remembered how Reynaldo was injured by Senando but conveniently failed to recall the
events leading to the fatal wounding of the deceased. At another point, he testified that
Reynaldo axed Senando but later retracted his statement by declaring that it was in fact
Senando who hacked Reynaldo. 15 We observe that the killing occurred within or near
the premises of the deceased. This proves per adventure the falsity of petitioner's claim
that it was Senando, rather than he and his kin, who had initiated the unlawful
aggression.
On the injuries sustained by Amelia, we are of the opinion that, contrary to the
finding of the lower court as affirmed by the appellate court, petitioner's homicidal intent
has not been indubitably established. As held in People v. Villanueva, 17 the intent to
kill being an essential element of the offense of frustrated or attempted homicide, said
element must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and with the same degree of
certainty as required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill
should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent
beyond reasonable doubt.
The facts as borne out by the records do not warrant a finding that petitioner
intended to kill Amelia. Contrarily, the circumstances of the instant case indicate the
opposite: (a) that while petitioner was repeatedly assaulting the deceased, Amelia
embraced her husband in an attempt to avert further infliction of pain upon him; and, (b)
when he hit Amelia once on the left leg, a wound of slight nature, he did not do anything
more to pursue his homicidal urge 18 but instead allowed her to scurry away. This set of
details reinforces this Court's belief that petitioner had no intention of killing Amelia but
nonetheless wounded her either because she unwittingly exposed herself in the so-
called "line-of-fire" when she embraced her husband, or that it was intended more to
deter her from further interfering. Had killing Amelia actually crossed petitioner's mind,
he would have opted to hit his quarry on the vital portions of her body or strike her
several times more to attain his objective. But these he never did.
Considering that the injuries suffered by Amelia were not necessarily fatal and
required a medical attendance of four (4) days, 19 we hold that the offense committed
by petitioner is only that of slight physical injuries. Under Art. 266, par. (1), of The
Revised Penal Code, this is punishable by arresto menor the duration of which is from
one (1) to thirty (30) days. 20
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in Crim. Case No.
49576 finding petitioner Ricardo Balunueco guilty of Homicide is AFFIRMED, and there
being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, petitioner is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years, two (2) months and ten (10) days of prision
mayor minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20)
days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. Consistent with prevailing
jurisprudence, his civil liability to the heirs of Senando Iguico is fixed at P50,000.00. The
assailed Decision in Crim. Case No. 49577 for Attempted Homicide, on the other hand,
is MODIFIED. Petitioner Ricardo Balunueco is found guilty only of Slight Physical
Injuries for the wounding of Amelia Iguico, and is accordingly sentenced to suffer a
straight prison term of ten (10) days of arresto menor, and to pay the costs.
||| (Balunueco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126968, [April 9, 2003], 449 PHIL 52-62)
EN BANC
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; HOMICIDE; CONSPIRACY; RESPONSIBILITY OF
PERSONS ENGAGED. — Where several individuals conspire to do grave bodily
harm to another, and homicide or murder results from their acts of aggression, all
who participated in the conspiracy are liable for the killing, in this case murder,
although the actual intention was only to beat up the victim.
2. ID.; MURDER; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE THAT OFFENDER HAD
NO INTENTION TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG. — As murder in this
jurisdiction results from the presence of qualificative circumstances based for the
most part upon the manner in which the crime is committed, and not upon the state
of mind of the accused, it is permissible upon a conviction for murder to allow the
mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a
wrong.
DECISION
STREET, J p:
This appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Pampanga, finding the appellants, Candido Enriquez,
Jose Palacio, Marcelo Franco, Marcelo Bonifacio, Pedro Mocpoc, Vicente Domingo,
and Ambrosio Basa, guilty of the offense of murder and sentencing Candido
Enriquez, as author by induction, to cadena perpetua, with the accessory penalties
prescribed by law, and requiring him to pay the sum of P1,000 to the heirs of the
deceased, Ciriaco D. Gines, and one-eighth of the costs of prosecution; and
severally sentencing Marcelo Bonifacio, Marcelo Franco, Pedro Mocpoc, Vicente
Domingo, and Ambrosio Basa, as direct agents in said murder, to undergo cadena
perpetua, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and requiring them jointly
and severally to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000, and to
pay each one-eighth of the costs of prosecution.
Prior to October 28, 1931, two rival corporations were engaged in the
transportation of passengers in central Luzon, both using passenger trucks, or
busses, propelled by gasoline. These two lines were the Pampanga Bus Co.,
operating, among other places, between Apalit and Masantol, and the Mallorca
Transportation, operating from points in Pampanga to Manila.
The Mallorca Transportation is owned by Fernando Enriquez, father of the
appellant Candido Enriquez, and the latter was its manager with a garage in
Macabebe, Pampanga. For some time prior to the events with which we are now
concerned, the Mallorca Transportation had been called upon to answer various
complaints before the Public Service Commission for infractions of its rules: and as a
consequence of these complaints several fines had been imposed upon Fernando
Enriquez. One Ciriaco D. Gines, an inspector of the Pampanga Bus Co. on its Apalit-
Masantol line, was supposed to be the person who had supplied the material for
these complaints and, as a consequence, he had incurred the ill-will of Candido
Enriquez. This feeling of hostility was increased when, on October 26, 1931, Gines
was seen jotting down the number of one of the trucks of the Mallorca
Transportation, while parked near the station of the Manila Railroad Co. in Apalit.
This seems to have been too much for Candido Enriquez, and he decided that Gines
must be gotten out of the way. Accordingly, on the morning of October 27, he
boarded one of his busses at Macabebe headed for Manila. His purpose, as he
explained to an employee in the garage, was to hire ruffians in Manila who would
beat up Gines so that he would not interfere in the future with the business of the
Mallorca Transportation.
Arriving in Manila, Candido Enriquez found one Jose Palacio, formerly a
chauffeur in the employment of Enriquez, but who had lost his job by reason of some
accident for which he was supposed to have been responsible as driver. Enriquez
told Palacio that he wanted him to procure some ruffians (butañgeros) and bring
them up to Macabebe to beat up Gines. Palacio accepted the mandate and in the
course of the day got into touch with a notorious gangster, named Marcelo
Bonifacio, and four others, Marcelo Franco, Pedro Mocpoc, Vicente Domingo, and
Ambrosio Basa. These five agreed to undertake the job. Meanwhile Candido
Enriquez had already left Manila for Macabebe and upon his arrival in that place he
told two of his employees to be on the lookout for the gangsters who would be
coming up that night. True to schedule, Jose Palacio and his five ruffians boarded
the last truck of the Mallorca Transportation which left Manila at about 5 o'clock the
same afternoon. On this trip the six were charged no fares by the conductor.
Arriving in Macabebe near 8 o'clock, the truck was stopped at an old house
formerly used by Fernando Enriquez but now occupied by Maximo Tuason, a
mechanic of the Mallorca Transportation. Palacio and his five ruffians there
disembarked, and Palacio took them into this house. Before long Candido Enriquez
came in and directed that food be supplied and, finding that sufficient food was not
there available, he gave Tuason money and directed him to procure more food from
a store.
After the men had been fed, Jose Palacio, by direction of Enriquez, showed
the house of Gines to Marcelo Bonifacio. Upon the return of the two from this errand,
the six were taken into the kitchen and Enriquez there discussed with them the plan
for beating up Gines. Bonifacio was for doing the work that night, but Enriquez
objected, saying that an attack made at that hour would attract the attention of too
many people, observing further that Gines was not accustomed to leave his house at
night. It was accordingly decided to wait until early in the morning when Gines would
be leaving his home; and it was at the same time agreed that the stipulated
compensation would be paid on the morning when the work was done.
All then retired to rest, and at about 3 o'clock on the next morning, October
28, Candido Enriquez awoke his employees Amado San Andres and Francisco
Mallari, who were sleeping in a truck of the Mallorca Transportation in the garage,
and instructed them to go that day with Maximo Tuason to purchase stone in the
barrio of Santa Maria, municipality of Bocaue, in the Province of Bulacan.
He then had a conversation with Marcelo Bonifacio, the head of the gang, in
which the latter suggested that his men should be provided with iron bars with which
to beat up Gines. Enriquez agreed and took the men to the garage, where he
delivered to them two small iron bars. Passenger trucks in the garage were then
moved out into the street to make way for truck No. TH-4475, which was to be used
by Tuason and his companions in transporting stone from Santa Maria; but before
going on that errand this truck had something more important to do, which was to
transport Jose Palacio and his five ruffians to the house of Gines and to take them
away on the road to Bocaue, when their work of beating up Gines should be
accomplished.
Accordingly, as daylight approached, Tuason and his companions, as well as
Jose Palacio and his five, boarded the truck No. TH-4475 and started on their way.
Arriving at the house of Gines, Palacio and his men alighted, and Tuason was
instructed to proceed a certain distance so as not to attract attention, and await
Palacio's coming, with the others. Tuason therefore drove on and stopped the truck
a short distance away.
Before the truck left the garage that morning Candido Enriquez delivered to
Maximo Tuason the sum of P8.50, with which to buy stone in Bocaue, and at the
same time he delivered to him P20 more with directions to give it to Bonifacio and
his fellow ruffians when they should have finished the job of beating up Gines. After
the truck had stopped near the house of Gines, Bonifacio approached Tuason and
asked him for the money which Enriquez had placed in the former's hands. In
response to this request, Tuason gave Bonifacio the P20 above- mentioned,
although he had been told to deliver it only after the work of beating up Gines had
been completed. The reason Tuason did this was that he feared he might be
assaulted in case of refusal.
Meanwhile Jose Palacio, who personally knew Gines and was serving as
guide, had posted himself in front of the house where Gines was living. Presently
lights appeared, and as Gines came out, Palacio indicated that he was the man they
were after. Upon being struck, Gines gave an exclamation and in a moment fell to
the ground unconscious. The most serious wound received by Gines was a cut, four
centimeters in length and about seven and one-half centimeters in depth, on the
inner side of the upper part of the calf of the right leg. Other wounds were three
severe contusions, one on an arm and two on the body, and two lighter bruises on
the left side of the back. All of these contusions were evidently caused by the iron
bars which had been provided by Enriquez. The malefactors immediately fled. Jose
Palacio ran to the office of Candido Enriquez and reported that the victim was down;
the other assailants ran towards the waiting truck and the driver carried them rapidly
towards Bocaue. Arriving at Bocaue, the five from Manila got off the truck No. TH-
4475 and boarded another bound for Manila. While still aboard the first truck,
Marcelo Franco threw the iron bar which he had used in assaulting Gines to the
ground near a gasoline station in Bocaue; and Francisco Mallari threw the other iron
bar to the ground in the barrio of Santa Ana. Both of these bars were presently
recovered upon information received from Jose Palacio and were produced in
evidence in court.
Gines was left unconscious upon the ground as his assailants fled. As he
recovered consciousness, he called for help, and his cries attracted the attention of
his father and others who came to his aid. The seriousness of his wounds, especially
the cut on the leg, was apparently not at first realized, and it was 6 o'clock before he
was gotten to the Pampanga provincial hospital. At 3.30 p. m. on the afternoon of
the same day, he died from shock and loss of blood.
As Jose Palacio and his five companions were gathered in by the authorities,
they severally made confessions implicating themselves in varying degrees in the
incident. Jose Palacio and Marcelo Franco admitted that the purpose of the assault
was to put Gines to sleep, and it will be remembered that the former was the person
who had been commissioned by Enriquez to employ the others. Four of the
accused, namely, Franco, Basa, Mocpoc, and Domingo, admitted in these
statements that they had each been paid the sum of P4 for their part in the
enterprise.
Directing our attention now a little more closely to the circumstances of the
attack, we note that Gines, in a declaration made before his death, stated that he
was assaulted by three individuals, and it is satisfactorily proved that these three
must have been Marcelo Bonifacio, Marcelo Franco, and Pedro Mocpoc. Of these
three Franco and Mocpoc used the small iron bars which Enriquez had supplied.
There is no satisfactory proof as to the identity of the individual who used the knife.
Lieutenant Lauro Dizon, of the Constabulary, stated on the witness stand that Jose
Palacio told him that he (Palacio) saw Candido Enriquez give Bonifacio a knife at the
same time that he supplied Marcelo Franco and Pedro Mocpoc with the iron bars to
which reference has been made. This statement was of course competent against
Jose Palacio but not against the others. The trial judge makes no mention of the
incident in his opinion. Vicente Domingo, Ambrosio Basa and any other individual
who may have participated in the crime were apparently posted at places convenient
for keeping a lookout and giving alarm.
Upon the circumstance that the wound made with the knife on the leg of the
person assaulted was the primary cause of death and that the author of this injury
has not been identified, the attorneys for the accused chiefly plant their defense, and
in this connection it is insisted that the conspiracy to attack Gines contemplated only
beating him up and did not include the infliction of injury by means of a cutting
instrument. Such an act, so it is said, was not within the scope of the agreement;
and it is insisted that only the individual who inflicted the cut could be held
responsible for the death, if that person were known. It results, in this view, that none
of the appellants can be held liable further than for the bruises inflicted by means of
the iron bars. These injuries, so it is claimed, would in the natural course of events
have been curable in a few days.
We are of the opinion that this contention is not tenable. The accused had
undoubtedly conspired to do grave personal injury to the deceased, and now that the
injuries actually inflicted have resulted in death, they cannot escape from the legal
effect of their acts on the ground that one of the wounds was inflicted in a different
way from that which had been intended. A blow inflicted by one of the small iron bars
used in this assault might well have resulted in the taking of life, and the
circumstance that a knife was also used in striking the deceased does not relieve the
appellants from the consequence of their joint acts. As has been said by the
Supreme Court of the United States, "If a number of persons agree to commit, and
enter upon the commission of a crime which will probably endanger human life such
as robbery, all of them are responsible for the death of a person that ensues as a
consequence." (Boyd vs. U. S., 450; 35 Law. ed., 1077). In United States vs. Patten,
the court said: "Conspirators who join in a criminal attack on a defenseless man with
dangerous weapons, knock him down, and when he tries to escape, pursue him with
increased numbers, and continue the assault, are liable for manslaughter when the
victim is killed by a knife wound inflicted by one of them during the beating, although
in the beginning they did not contemplate the use of a nife." (42 Appeals, D. C.,
239.)
But the defense has undertaken to prove, as a matter of fact, that the fatal cut
was not inflicted by any of the hirelings brought from Manila, but by Amado San
Andres, an employee of Candido Enriquez. This individual was on the truck No. TH-
4475, which carried Jose Palacio and his gangsters from the garage in Macabebe to
the scene of the killing; and a witness was put on the stand by the defense who
testified that he saw Amado San Andres fleeing from the scene of the tragedy with a
knife in hand just before he climbed into the truck which was waiting. In addition to
this, there was testimony showing a suspicious bloodstain on the foot of San Andres
later in the morning. As against this proof, account must be taken of the fact that San
Andres was taken before Gines a short while before the death of the latter
supervened, and Gines explicitly stated that San Andres was not one of the men
who assaulted him. This circumstance no doubt accounts for the fact that the name
of San Andres was omitted from the information. Upon the whole the defense has
not proved that San Andres was the person who used the knife.
But even supposing that the cut was inflicted by San Andres, it would not
follow that the appellants should for that reason be exculpated from the homicide.
San Andres was an employee of Enriquez. He was present when Enriquez
announced in the garage that he was going to Manila to obtain gangsters to dispose
of Gines. He was present when the Manila contingent arrived at the garage in
Macabebe at about 8 p. m. on the night of October 27, and he was on the truck that
carried the accused (except Enriquez) the next morning on their fatal mission. There
is no proof that any of the accused objected to his participation in the assault upon
Gines or that they did anything to prevent such participation. Cooperation can be
inferred not only from proof of actual previous conspiracy, but from the nature of the
acts done when the unlawful act is committed. Assuming, then, that San Andres was
the person who inflicted the fatal cut, the conclusion would be that he was
cooperating with the appellants with their consent, and the appellants are
responsible for the consequences.
The crime committed in this case was murder, in which alevosia should be
taken as the qualifying circumstance. This circumstance is conspicuous in the fact
that the assault was characterized by surprise and was effected by lying in wait for
the deceased in the darkness of the night. The plan adopted was evidently designed
to insure the execution of the offense without risk to the appellants from any defense
which the deceased might make. Nocturnity and abuse of superior strength may
properly be considered as absorbed in the alevosia. There was present as to all of
the accused, except Jose Palacio, the aggravating circumstance that the offense
was committed for a price in money. There was also present, as to all the appellants,
the circumstance of known premeditation in that the offense had been under
contemplation overnight, and the appellants had ample time to reflect repeatedly on
the manner in which it could best be accomplished.
The trial court gave all of the accused the benefit of the mitigating
circumstance that the offenders had no intention to commit so grave a wrong. The
estimation of this circumstance was proper, and its allowance was not inconsistent
with the finding that the crime was murder (U. S. vs. Candelaria, 2 Phil., 104; U. S.
vs. Luciano, 2 Phil., 96; People vs. Cagoco, G. R. No. 38511, page 524, ante).
The judgment appealed from will be affirmed, it being understood that
reclusion perpetua is substituted for cadena perpetua, in accordance with the
Revised Penal Code. So ordered, with costs against the appellants.
Avanceña, C.J., Hull, Vickers and Butte, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 37408, [October 10, 1933], 58 PHIL 536-545)
EN BANC
SYNOPSIS
SYLLABUS
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CRIME VICTIMS NOT EXPECTED TO RECALL WITH EXACT
PRECISION THE MINUTIAE OF THE INCIDENT; CASE AT BAR. — [W]e find that the
supposed inconsistent and inaccurate details are relatively trivial and do not affect the
veracity of the testimonies of Marlon Tugadi, Jun Quipay, Pepito Tugadi and Raymund
Fontanilla. Indeed, inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the testimonies of witnesses
which refer to minor and insignificant details do not destroy their credibility. Such minor
inconsistencies and inaccuracies even manifest truthfulness and candor, and erase any
suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. . . Verily, victims of crimes cannot be expected to
recall with exact precision the minutiae of the incident. Human memory is not as
unerring as a photograph. Different persons having different reflexes produce varying
reactions, impressions, perceptions and recollections. Their physical, mental and
emotional conditions may have also affected the recall of the details of the incident.
aAHDIc
10. ID.; MURDER; PENALTY; CASE AT BAR. — The penalty for the most
serious offense of murder under Art. 248 of The Revised Penal Code as amended by
Rep. Act No. 7659 is reclusion perpetua to death. It therefore becomes our painful duty
in the instant case to apply the maximum penalty in accordance with law, and sentence
accused-appellants to death.
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
CONDEMNED TO DEATH by the trial court on 26 July 2000 1 for the complex
crime of murder and multiple attempted murder, accused-appellants JIMMEL SANIDAD
and PONCE MANUEL alias PAMBONG now seek the reversal of their conviction as we
review automatically the judgment pursuant to Sec. 22, Rep. Act No. 7659, amending
Art. 47 of The Revised Penal Code. CcaDHT
On 16 January 1999 at around five o'clock in the afternoon Marlon Tugadi, Jun
Quipay, Raymund Fontanilla, Rolando Tugadi, Pepito Tugadi, Delfin Tadeo, Ricardo
Tadeo, Edwin Tumalip, Bobby Velasquez and Dennis Balueg left Budac, Tagum, Abra,
on board a passenger jeepney driven by Delfin Tadeo to attend a barangay fiesta in the
neighboring town of Lagangilang, Abra. When they arrived they joined the residents in a
drinking spree that lasted up to the wee hours the following morning. In the course of
their conviviality, accused-appellants Jimmel Sanidad, Ponce Manuel alias Pambong
and several other residents of Lagangilang joined them in drinking. 2 Marlon Tugadi and
accused Jimmel Sanidad were drinking buddies and members of the CAFGU before
then. 3
On 17 January 1999 at about four o'clock in the morning Jimmel Sanidad and his
companions finished drinking and left. 4 Shortly after, the group of Marlon Tugadi also
stopped drinking and headed home for Budac, Tagum, Abra, boarding the same
jeepney driven by Delfin Tadeo. Seated next to Delfin in front were Ricardo Tadeo and
Rolando Tugadi, while on the left rear seat were Marlon Tugadi, Jun Quipay and
Raymund Fontanilla. Seated on the right rear seat were Bobby Velasquez, Dennis
Balueg, Edwin Tumalip and Pepito Tugadi. 5
With Delfin Tadeo on the wheels the jeepney cruised the rough and gravelly dirt
road of Abra-Cervantes with its passengers completely unaware that danger lurked
ahead in the dark and dreary stretch of the road. The jeepney's headlights sharply
ablaze and glaring illuminated the path and radiated towards the lush vegetation of the
surrounding landscape. As the jeepney approached a plantation, its headlights beamed
at accused-appellants Jimmel Sanidad, Ponce Manuel and two (2) other unidentified
companions who were positioned next to a mango tree at the left side of the road
approximately fifteen (15) meters away. Accused-appellants were armed with an
armalite, a .45 caliber pistol and shotguns with buckshots.
The jeepney was left in shambles. Its tires, headlights and taillights were
shattered; its windshield broken to pieces, and the front and left sides of the vehicle
riddled with bullets. 8 Miraculously, almost all of its passengers, with the exception of
Rolando Tugadi, survived the ambush and suffered only minor injuries. Marlon Tugadi
tried to pull his brother Rolando Tugadi from the vehicle to safety only to realize that he
was not only too heavy, he was already dead. As the pursuing gunmen drew near,
Marlon decided to abandon Rolando and scampered away with the other victims until
they reached a bushy area about fifteen (15) meters away from the vehicle. 9
Meanwhile, the accused caught up with the crippled jeepney. Moments later, fire
engulfed it. The radiant flames of the burning vehicle illuminated the malefactors who
stood nearby and watched the blaze. It could not be determined whether the accused
purposely set the vehicle on fire or the fuel tank was hit during the shooting that ignited
the fire. Marlon Tugadi and Pepito Tugadi later heard one of the unidentified
companions of accused-appellant Sanidad say to him: "My gosh, we were not able to
kill all of them." 10 Thereafter, the accused left the scene, firing their guns
indiscriminately into the air as they walked away. 11
Apparently shaken and dazed by their terrifying ordeal, the victims hid in a culvert
on the side of the road and did not come out until the police arrived at the scene. The
police doused the burning vehicle with water and found the charred remains of Rolando
Tugadi. 12 Likewise retrieved at the crime scene were eighty-five (85) empty shells from
an armalite rifle, two (2) empty shells from a .45 caliber pistol, and a slug from another .
45 caliber pistol. 13
Dr. Maria L. Dickenson, Medico-Legal Officer of Lagangilang, Abra, conducted
an autopsy on Rolando Tugadi immediately after the incident. Her postmortem findings
were: (a) carbonization of the body, (b) long bones of lower extremities still burning, (c)
presence of lower half portion of charred skull, (d) presence of left charred thigh, (e)
presence of right charred thigh, and (f) presence of upper third of charred right leg.
Cause of death: burns, generalized, 6th degree. 14
An Information for murder with multiple attempted murder and malicious mischief
was filed against Jimmel Sanidad, Ponce Manuel alias Pambong, John Doe and Peter
Doe. The defense of the accused rested on bare denial and alibi. They disclaimed
liability for the ambush insisting that at about 4:00 to 4:30 in the morning of 17 January
1999 they were already at home sleeping when they heard the clatter of gunfire and an
explosion nearby. But the trial court disregarded the defense interposed by the accused
and forthwith convicted them of the complex crime of murder and multiple attempted
murder, and sentenced them to death.
In this mandatory review, the legal questions raised essentially centered on: first,
the credibility of witnesses; and, second, the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence.
After a cursory reading of the transcripts, however, we find that the supposed
inconsistent and inaccurate details are relatively trivial and do not affect the veracity of
the testimonies of Marlon Tugadi, Jun Quipay, Pepito Tugadi and Raymund Fontanilla.
Indeed, inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer to
minor and insignificant details do not destroy their credibility. Such minor
inconsistencies and inaccuracies even manifest truthfulness and candor, and erase any
suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. 17
At any rate, the ineludible fact remains that Marlon Tugadi, Jun Quipay, Pepito
Tugadi and Raymund Fontanilla were all at the scene of the crime and almost got killed
during the ambush. They were eyewitnesses to the gruesome death of a family member
in the hands of accused-appellants. What is important is that they conveyed to the trial
court what they actually perceived, including those seeming improbabilities, on that
fateful day; and they categorically supplied all the facts necessary for accused-
appellants' conviction. Verily, victims of crimes cannot be expected to recall with exact
precision the minutiae of the incident. Human memory is not as unerring as a
photograph. 18 Different persons having different reflexes produce varying reactions,
impressions, perceptions and recollections. Their physical, mental and emotional
conditions may have also affected the recall of the details of the incident.
A: Yes sir.
Q: Will you please focus your eyes around and point to that person
Jimmel Sanidad?
Q: Aside from being a CAFGU batch member, what else do you know of
this accused Jimmel Sanidad?
Q: How about the other accused Ponce Manuel alias Pambong, again I
ask you to focus your eyes around and point at him and identify
him?
Victims Jun Quipay, Pepito Tugadi and Raymund Fontanilla were likewise asked
during the trial to identify the malefactors who staged the ambush, and they all pointed
to Jimmel Sanidad and Ponce Manuel. aEIcHA
It must be stressed that the incidents prior to, during and after the attack provided
the victims with more than sufficient opportunity to identify accused-appellants as the
perpetrators of the dastardly acts. The victims had a drinking session with their
assailants that lasted for many hours. During the ambush itself, the headlights of the
victims' vehicle illuminated the assailants. Again, when the vehicle burst into flames
after the ambush, the surroundings were bathed in light including the assailants who
were standing nearby, thus enabling the victims to have a good look at their faces.
These circumstances, coupled with the victims' familiarity with accused-appellants,
rendered a mistaken identification very unlikely.
The general denial and alibi of the defense are too lame to be legally accepted
as true, especially when measured up against the positive identification of accused-
appellants. The doctrine is well settled that denial and alibi are the weakest of all
defenses as they are easy to concoct and fabricate but difficult to disprove. Denial and
alibi should be rejected when the identities of accused-appellants are sufficiently and
positively established by eyewitnesses to the crime.
For alibi to be credible, the accused must not only prove his presence at another
place at the time of the commission of the offense but must also demonstrate that it
would be physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at that time. In the
case at bar, accused-appellants claimed that they were in their respective houses at the
time of the ambush. But the record shows that the house of accused-appellant Jimmel
Sanidad's sister where he was staying in Sitio Bio, San Isidro, Lagangilang, Abra, is but
a mere six (6) to seven (7)-minute walk, or about 700 meters, from the crime scene. 20
While accused-appellant Ponce Manuel lived "in the same place, (in) the same
community." 21
Conspiracy and treachery, as the trial court found, attended the commission of
the crime. For collective responsibility to be established, it is not necessary that
conspiracy be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement to commit the crime. Only
rarely would such an agreement be demonstrable because criminal undertakings, in the
nature of things, are rarely documented by written agreements. The concerted actions
of accused-appellants, however, clearly evinced conspiracy. Their simultaneous acts of
peppering the victims' jeepney with bullets, and thereafter chasing the vehicle to prevent
its escape, were undoubtedly in pursuance of a common felonious design. All these
sufficiently prove beyond reasonable doubt that they conspired to consummate the
killing of the victim. 24
We fully agree with the lower court that the instant case comes within the purview
of Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code which, speaking of complex crimes, provides that
when "a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed in its maximum period." In a complex crime, although two or
more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the
law as well as in the conscience of the offender. 25
The penalty for the most serious offense of murder under Art. 248 of The
Revised Penal Code as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 is reclusion perpetua to death.
It therefore becomes our painful duty in the instant case to apply the maximum penalty
in accordance with law, and sentence accused-appellants to death.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo of 26 July 2000 finding accused-
appellants JIMMEL SANIDAD and PONCE MANUEL alias PAMBONG guilty of the
complex crime of murder and multiple attempted murder and imposing upon them the
supreme penalty of DEATH is AFFIRMED.
Accused-appellants are likewise ordered jointly and severally to: (a) INDEMNIFY
the heirs of the deceased victim Rolando Tugadi in the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity as well as P50,000.00 as moral damages; and, (b) PAY victim Delfin Tadeo
the sum of P50,000.00 for the loss of his jeepney.
||| (People v. Sanidad, G.R. No. 146099, [April 30, 2003], 450 PHIL 449-465)
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
CORONA, J p:
11. Wendy was only 20 years old at the time and was not
in any position to oppose or to refuse her father's orders.
Wendy Mitsuko Sato's supporting affidavit and the special power of attorney
allegedly issued by the deceased Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong in favor of
Wendy were attached to the complaint-affidavit of Mediatrix.
In a resolution dated March 25, 1997, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
dismissed the complaint. 4 On appeal, however, the Secretary of Justice reversed
and set aside the resolution dated March 25, 1997 and directed the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City to file an Information against Sato for violation of Article 315,
paragraph 3 (a) of the Revised Penal Code. 5 Thus, the following Information was
filed against Sato in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87: 6
INFORMATION
Contrary to law. 7
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Basic is the
rule in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the
courts should not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the
application of law where none is indicated. The courts could only
distinguish where there are facts or circumstances showing that the
lawgiver intended a distinction or qualification. In such a case, the courts
would merely give effect to the lawgiver's intent. The solemn power and
duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does not include the
power to correct by reading into the law what is not written therein.
CcSTHI
The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity
terminates with the dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce which gave
rise to the relationship of affinity between the parties. 26 Under this view, the
relationship by affinity is simply coextensive and coexistent with the marriage that
produced it. Its duration is indispensably and necessarily determined by the
marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as the marriage subsists,
such that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by affinity of the
surviving spouse to the deceased spouse's blood relatives. SacTAC
The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues
even after the death of one spouse when there is a surviving issue. 27 The rationale
is that the relationship is preserved because of the living issue of the marriage in
whose veins the blood of both parties is commingled. 28
The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by
affinity between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse
continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the
marriage produced children or not. 29 Under this view, the relationship by affinity
endures even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of the
death of one of the parties to the said marriage. This view considers that, where
statutes have indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the "tie of
affinity" between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded
as terminated upon the death of one of the married parties. 30
After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views,
we hold that the second view is more consistent with the language and spirit of
Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.
First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in cases of jury
disqualification and incest. 31 On the other hand, the continuing affinity view has
been applied in the interpretation of laws that intend to benefit step-relatives or in-
laws. Since the purpose of the absolutory cause in Article 332 (1) is meant to be
beneficial to relatives by affinity within the degree covered under the said provision,
the continuing affinity view is more appropriate.
Second, the language of Article 332 (1) which speaks of "relatives by affinity
in the same line" is couched in general language. The legislative intent to make no
distinction between the spouse of one's living child and the surviving spouse of one's
deceased child (in case of a son-in-law or daughter-in-law with respect to his or her
parents-in-law) 32 can be drawn from Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code
without doing violence to its language.
Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the
family as a basic autonomous social institution are policies of the State and that it is
the duty of the State to strengthen the solidarity of the family. 33 Congress has also
affirmed as a State and national policy that courts shall preserve the solidarity of the
family. 34 In this connection, the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony
and obviate scandal. 35 The view that relationship by affinity is not affected by the
death of one of the parties to the marriage that created it is more in accord with
family solidarity and harmony.
Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws
is to resolve all doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule
for the accused. 36 This is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the
accused shall be presumed innocent unless and until his guilt is established beyond
reasonable doubt. 37
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity. 38 The
rule applies when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal
statute, one that its prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him.
The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to the
accused.
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the
lens of the basic purpose of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to preserve
family harmony by providing an absolutory cause. Since the goal of Article 332 (1) is
to benefit the accused, the Court should adopt an application or interpretation that is
more favorable to the accused. In this case, that interpretation is the continuing
affinity view. ICacDE
Thus, for purposes of Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that
the relationship by affinity created between the surviving spouse and the blood
relatives of the deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the marriage
which created the affinity. (The same principle applies to the justifying circumstance
of defense of one's relatives under Article 11 [2] of the Revised Penal Code, the
mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of grave offense committed against
one's relatives under Article 13[5] of the same Code and the absolutory cause of
relationship in favor of accessories under Article 20 also of the same Code.)
SCOPE OF ARTICLE 332 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE
The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only
applies to the felonies of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said
provision, the State condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in cases of
theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives its right
to prosecute the offender for the said crimes but leaves the private offended party
with the option to hold the offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies
mentioned therein. The plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the
provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling
and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned under
Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft through falsification or
estafa through falsification. 39
The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However, the real
nature of the offense is determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not by the
designation of the offense. 40 What controls is not the title of the Information or the
designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the Information. 41 In other
words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature
of the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the Information. 42 It is
the exclusive province of the court to say what the crime is or what it is named. 43
The determination by the prosecutor who signs the Information of the crime
committed is merely an opinion which is not binding on the Court. 44
A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being
charged not with simple estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents. In particular, the Information states that Sato, by
means of deceit, intentionally defrauded Manolita committed as follows: aDSTIC
(b) he made Manolita believe that the said document was in connection
with her taxes when it was in fact a special power of attorney
(SPA) authorizing his minor daughter Wendy to sell, assign,
transfer or otherwise dispose of Manolita's properties in Tagaytay
City;
(c) relying on Sato's inducement and representation, Manolita signed
and thumbmarked the SPA in favor of Wendy Mitsuko Sato,
daughter of Sato;
The above averments in the Information show that the estafa was committed
by attributing to Manolita (who participated in the execution of the document)
statements other than those in fact made by her. Manolita's acts of signing the SPA
and affixing her thumbmark to that document were the very expression of her
specific intention that something be done about her taxes. Her signature and
thumbmark were the affirmation of her statement on such intention as she only
signed and thumbmarked the SPA (a document which she could not have read)
because of Sato's representation that the document pertained to her taxes. In
signing and thumbmarking the document, Manolita showed that she believed and
adopted the representations of Sato as to what the document was all about, i.e., that
it involved her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark, therefore, served as her
conformity to Sato's proposal that she execute a document to settle her taxes.
Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it appear that
Manolita granted his daughter Wendy a special power of attorney for the purpose of
selling, assigning, transferring or otherwise disposing of Manolita's Tagaytay
properties when the fact was that Manolita signed and thumbmarked the document
presented by Sato in the belief that it pertained to her taxes. Indeed, the document
itself, the SPA, and everything that it contained were falsely attributed to Manolita
when she was made to sign the SPA. DaCEIc
Moreover, the allegations in the Information that:
For this reason, while a conviction for estafa through falsification of public
document requires that the elements of both estafa and falsification exist, it does not
mean that the criminal liability for estafa may be determined and considered
independently of that for falsification. The two crimes of estafa and falsification of
public documents are not separate crimes but component crimes of the single
complex crime of estafa and falsification of public documents.
Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that, to be criminally liable for the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document, the liability for
estafa should be considered separately from the liability for falsification of public
document. Such approach would disregard the nature of a complex crime and
contradict the letter and spirit of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It would
wrongly disregard the distinction between formal plurality and material plurality, as it
improperly treats the plurality of crimes in the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document as a mere material plurality where the felonies are
considered as separate crimes to be punished individually. HcaATE
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS MAY BE
A NECESSARY MEANS FOR COMMITTING
ESTAFA EVEN UNDER ARTICLE 315 (3[A])
The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of the
Revised Penal Code are as follows:
(2) deceit was employed to make the offended party sign the document;
While in estafa under Article 315 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, the law does
not require that the document be falsified for the consummation thereof, it does not
mean that the falsification of the document cannot be considered as a necessary
means to commit the estafa under that provision. DIESaC
The phrase "necessary means" does not connote indispensable means for if
it did, then the offense as a "necessary means" to commit another would be an
indispensable element of the latter and would be an ingredient thereof. 55 In People
v. Salvilla, 56 the phrase "necessary means" merely signifies that one crime is
committed to facilitate and insure the commission of the other. 57 In this case, the
crime of falsification of public document, the SPA, was such a "necessary means" as
it was resorted to by Sato to facilitate and carry out more effectively his evil design to
swindle his mother-in-law. In particular, he used the SPA to sell the Tagaytay
properties of Manolita to unsuspecting third persons.
When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code as a necessary
means to commit another crime, like estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes
form a complex crime under Article 48 of the same Code. 58 The falsification of a
public, official or commercial document may be a means of committing estafa
because, before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another,
the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to
cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of a public, official or
commercial document. 59 In other words, the crime of falsification was committed
prior to the consummation of the crime of estafa. 60 Actually utilizing the falsified
public, official or commercial document to defraud another is estafa. 61 The damage
to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the
document. 62
Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the Information
show that the falsification of public document was consummated when Sato
presented a ready-made SPA to Manolita who signed the same as a statement of
her intention in connection with her taxes. While the falsification was consummated
upon the execution of the SPA, the consummation of the estafa occurred only when
Sato later utilized the SPA. He did so particularly when he had the properties sold
and thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the sale. Damage or prejudice to Manolita
was caused not by the falsification of the SPA (as no damage was yet caused to the
property rights of Manolita at the time she was made to sign the document) but by
the subsequent use of the said document. That is why the falsification of the public
document was used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as a necessary means for) the
commission of the estafa. aAIcEH
The situation would have been different if Sato, using the same inducement,
had made Manolita sign a deed of sale of the properties either in his favor or in favor
of third parties. In that case, the damage would have been caused by, and at exactly
the same time as, the execution of the document, not prior thereto. Therefore, the
crime committed would only have been the simple crime of estafa. 63 On the other
hand, absent any inducement (such as if Manolita herself had been the one who
asked that a document pertaining to her taxes be prepared for her signature, but
what was presented to her for her signature was an SPA), the crime would have only
been the simple crime of falsification. 64
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August
9, 2007 and the resolution dated January 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. S.P. No. 95260 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the
trial court which is directed to try the accused with dispatch for the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public documents.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Intestate Estate of Vda. de Carungcong v. People, G.R. No. 181409, [February 11,
2010], 626 PHIL 177-211)
EN BANC
SYLLABUS
DECISION
ENDENCIA, J p:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Mindoro
sentencing appellant Gregorio Ramirez to life imprisonment for the crime of murder,
and to pay P6,000 indemnity to the heirs of the deceased.
The facts as established by the prosecution, are as follows: On the evening of
April 29, 1955, at about half past eight, a religious organization known as "Iglesia ni
Cristo" was having a religious service in the poblacion of San Teodoro, Oriental
Mindoro, open to the public. Among the spectators was the deceased Crisanto
Manalo who was listening with folded arms to the Minister preaching a sermon on a
platform about thirty meters away. Mariano Canovas, who was also at the gathering
and was about five meters from Manalo, saw appellant Gregorio Ramirez walk in
front of Manalo, then situate himself behind the latter's left side, and, without any
ado, suddenly stab Manalo on the back with a double-edged dagger nine inches
long (Exhibit B). Manalo staggered on his left and fell. Just before the assault, Jose
Evangelista, another spectator, who was about two meters away from Manalo, upon
noticing that appellant was about to stab the deceased, exclaimed: "Goring, don't
hurt him because he has no fighting chance," but before he could finish uttering
these words, appellant had already plunged the dagger on Manalo's back.
The deceased was a short fellow, with short and paralized arms (sinkol), short
and paralized fingers that could not grasp anything as they could not be folded to
reach the palms of his hands, with scars around the neck, and with small narrow
eyes (sinkit), and this evidently explains why Evangelista said that the deceased had
no fighting chance. When Evangelista approached appellant with the intention of
separating him from Manalo and prevent further harm, appellant stabbed
Evangelista twice on the chest, inflicting two wounds thereby, whereupon
Evangelista ran away chased by appellant. For these two stab wounds Evangelista
was hospitalized for nine days.
Immediately after the incident and before Manalo was brought to the
provincial hospital of Calapan, his statement (Exhibit E) was right away taken down
by the chief of police because, Dr. Sulit, one of the witnesses to the affixing of
declarant's thumb mark, urged the chief of police to rush it as Manalo might die at
any moment, as he in fact died early the following morning at the provincial hospital
where he was taken to posthaste. After his death, Dr. Manuel R. Luna of the hospital
performed the corresponding autopsy and found that the deceased sustained a
profound stab wound 2 1/2 inches long and 4 1/2 inches deep, running inward and
downward, located at the infra-scapular region, back, a little below the level of the
left nipple, perforating and lacerating the left diaphragm, lower left lung, stomach and
intestines (Exhibits A and D).
Appellant admits having inflicted the stab wound which caused the death of
the deceased, but pleads self-defense. He testified that while the Minister was
delivering the sermon, two suffocating smokes were noticed, one from a burning
piece of cotton under the platform where the Minister was preaching, which
appellant put out, and another, some fifteen minutes later, in the midst of the
assemblage, which caused the people nearby to cough and shy away; that being a
member of the Iglesia ni Cristo, he went around to look for the person or persons
responsible therefor; that while thus walking around, Jose Evangelista approached
and asked him what he was looking for, and without waiting for his answer,
Evangelista continued, "So you're looking for the man who caused the smoke; it was
I," and at the same time Evangelista grabbed him by the breast and boxed him, the
blow landing on his left face; that soon after, another man who from information he
later found to be one Manikis, gave him a fist blow on the nape which felled him,
face down, and when he intended to get up, Manikis again hit him on the leg,
thereupon the deceased grabbed him by the waist; that he stood up facing
Evangelista, with the deceased at his back still holding him by the waist, and then
Evangelista again tried to grab him by the collar to hit him, hence he drew his dagger
and plunged it on Evangelista twice in succession, and then swung said dagger from
right to left, hitting the deceased who was still holding him by the waist from behind,
thus disposing of his opponents and freeing himself. Appellant further stated that
Evangelista left, the deceased released him from the hold, and Manikis just
disappeared. To corroborate him, appellant offered the testimony of Elpidio
Matanguihan and Dante Gutierrez, his co-members in the Iglesia ni Cristo.
Although we here have two conflicting versions on how the incident started
and developed, they however agree on this point: that the deceased Crisanto
Manalo was stabbed by appellant with a dagger, causing his death. Likewise it
stands without conflict that on the night in question while the Minister was preaching,
two annoying smokes were noticed, which set appellant to walk around, armed with
a dagger, to look for the man who caused them.
Upon careful consideration of these undisputed facts as well as of the
conflicting versions on the case, we are with the trial judge, who saw and heard the
witnesses, in not giving credence to the testimony of appellant and his witnesses.
Aside from the incredible nature of appellant's version, his two witnesses, who in
turn contradicted each other, contradict him in many respect. While he assures the
court that he was knocked down only once, that is to say, upon being hit on the nape
by a certain Manikis, his witness Elpidio Matanguihan states that appellant fell twice:
first when hit by Evangelista on the face, and then again when hit by Manikis on the
nape. Dante Gutierrez's version, on the other hand, is very much different. He said
that appellant, after receiving the blow from Evangelista, did not fall but just turned
his body, and that at this moment Manikis boxed appellant on the nape which felled
the latter, and when appellant stood up and attempted to run, his leg was "balked" or
tipped by Manikis, by reason of which appellant, again fell, and when appellant again
attempted to stand up, he was embraced on the waist from behind by the deceased.
These three different and conflicting versions on a single matter of fact, confusing
and contradictory as they are, should be disregarded for their dubious nature.
Again, while appellant said that he delivered thrusts with his dagger twice in
succession on Evangelista, Elpidio Matanguihan, contradicting him, stated that
appellant just swang the dagger from left to right hitting Evangelista in front, and
then from right to left hitting the deceased behind. On the other hand, Dante
Gutierrez testifying on this point stated positively that Evangelista parried the blow of
appellant, so that the latter had to push the blade on Evangelista and then directed
the dagger on the deceased who was behind.
Furthermore, while appellant and Elpidio Matanguihan state that the
deceased grabbed appellant's waist from behind, Gutierrez states on the other hand
that the deceased embraced appellant on the waist from behind, both facing the
same direction, and graphically showing it to the trial court. Either version could not
have been possible, as it was conclusively shown that the deceased had short and
paralized fingers that could not grasp anything, and his arms could not have
encircled around appellant's waist as they were short and paralized (sinkol).
Moreover, it is hard to believe that the deceased, who was physically inferior and
defective, would dare enmesh himself in a scuffle and risk his life by embracing an
opponent on the waist from behind but whose arms were left free to retaliate. And it
is even more preposterous to suppose that the deceased was behind appellant at
the time he was wounded, for it was physically impossible that the dagger could
have landed precisely on the back of the deceased, left side, with an inward and
downward direction, causing a penetrating wound 4 1/2 inches deep. No matter in
what conceivable manner the dagger thrust might have been delivered, the same
could not have produced the kind and character of the wound inflicted upon the
deceased, and on the precise spot it landed, under the circumstances and relative
positions of deceased and appellant as described by the latter and his witnesses.
Appellant in his brief stresses the fact that, by reason of the failure of the
prosecution to prove any motive, thus affecting the credibility of its witnesses, he is
entitled to an acquittal, considering, besides, that he merely acted in self-defense.
"The question of motive is very important in cases where there is
doubt as to whether the defendant is or is not the person who committed
the act, but when there is no doubt, has in the case at bar, that the
defendant was the one who caused the death of the deceased, it is not
so important to know the exact reason for the deed. (U.S. vs. McMann, 4
Phil., 561; People vs. Ragsac, 61 Phil., 146; People vs. Tastatas, 65
Phil., 543; People vs. Tagasa, 68 Phil., 1947)." 1
There being an admission by appellant himself that he was the one who stabbed the
deceased, there was no need for the prosecution to inquire into his motive. On the
other hand, while it is true that the prosecution failed to prove any motive, the record
reveals that the defense itself has supplied it. It established that there were two
suffocating smokes noticed during the progress of the religious service, which made
appellant to go around. Certainly, the causing of these smokes, presumably by non-
members, which disturbed and interrupted the service, particularly at the time when
the Minister was preaching, is enough motive for any member of the sect to be
offended thereby, particularly appellant who has shown to be a member of some
importance. Armed with a deadly dagger before coming to the meeting as if
expecting trouble during the service from antagonistic elements, appellant has
imposed upon himself the duty to look for the person or persons responsible for the
annoying smokes, and it was not strange for him to pick on the deceased, a non-
member, as one of the authors of the nuisance.
In view of the above findings and considerations, we find it hard to believe in
the self-defense invoked by appellant. He himself admits that he and Evangelista
were friends and never had any misunderstanding of any kind prior to the incident. If
this is so, then there was absolutely no reason why Evangelista, a non-member,
should provoke and attack appellant in a meeting precisely organized and conducted
by the followers of the Iglesia ni Cristo of which appellant is a member in good
standing. Unarmed as he was, it would have been foolhardy for said Evangelista to
adopt an aggressive attitude and thus invite the risk of being manhandled by the
Iglesia ni Cristo followers. And were it true that appellant was assaulted by
Evangelista and Manikis prior to the stabbing of the deceased, his natural and
logical reaction would have been to seek redress by filing the corresponding
complaint against the two. He admits however that he has not done so, but that
instead he was accused by Evangelista of physical injuries. Moreover, Evangelista,
in rebuttal, not only denied having a tussle with appellant before the stabbing of the
deceased, but positively stated that he was alone in approaching appellant, and that
he does not know of any person who responds to the name of Manikis. And lastly,
the deceased himself in his statement Exhibit E which may be considered as part of
the res gestae for it does not meet all the requirements of a dying declaration,
asseverates that he was stabbed all of a sudden from behind, without a word being
said.
The decision appealed from being in accordance with the facts and the law,
the same is hereby affirmed, with costs.
||| (People v. Ramirez, G.R. No. L-10951, [October 23, 1958], 104 PHIL 720-727)
EN BANC
DECISION
PEREZ, J p:
The subject of this present appeal is the Decision 1 dated 18 June 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC No. 00246, affirming the Decision 2 dated 30
September 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte,
Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 21-910, finding herein appellants Wenceslao Nelmida
@ "Eslao" (Wenceslao) and Ricardo Ajok @ "Pordoy" (Ricardo) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double
attempted murder, thereby sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Appellants were likewise ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of each of
the deceased victims, i.e., Police Officer 3 Hernando P. dela Cruz (PO3 Dela Cruz) and
Technical Sergeant Ramon Dacoco (T/Sgt. Dacoco), the amount of P50,000.00 each as
moral damages and P50,000.00 each as civil indemnity for the death of each of the said
victims. Similarly, appellants were directed to pay, jointly and severally, Mayor Johnny
Tawan-tawan the amount of P50,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, as well as the costs
of the suit.
6. Mosanif 5 Ameril;
7. Macasubar 6 Tandayao;
9. Jun Palanas
by then and there firing and shooting them with said high-powered
firearms thereby inflicting upon the persons of [PO3 De la Cruz],
[T/Sgt. Dacoco], [PFC] Haron Angni, [PFC] Ga[p]or Tomanto, Juanito
Ibunalo, M[o]sani[p] Ameril and [Macasuba] Tandayao gunshot
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of the death of
[PO3 De la Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco] and the serious wounding of said
[PFC] Haron Angni, [PFC] Ga[p]or Tomanto, Juanito Ibunalo,
Mosani[p] Ameril and [Macasuba] Tandayao that without the medical
assistance would have caused their deaths, while Mayor Johnny
Tawan[-]tawan and Jun Palanas were not hit. 8
The factual milieu of this case as culled from the testimonies of the aforesaid
prosecution witnesses is as follows:
At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, appellants, together with their aforenamed
co-accused, brought Samuel to a waiting shed in Purok 2, San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del
Norte, the one located on the left side of the road going to Salvador, Lanao del Norte.
Samuel was instructed by appellants and their co-accused to stay in the said waiting
shed while they assembled themselves in a diamond position on both sides of the road,
which is more or less five (5) meters away from the shed. Then, appellants and their co-
accused surreptitiously waited for the vehicle of the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan. 16
A few minutes later, Samuel saw the yellow pick-up service vehicle of Mayor
Tawan-tawan approaching towards the direction of Salvador, Lanao del Norte. The
moment the yellow pick-up service vehicle of Mayor Tawan-tawan passed by the
aforesaid waiting shed, appellants and their co-accused opened fire and rained bullets
on the vehicle using high-powered firearms. Both Macasuba, who was sitting
immediately behind the driver, and PFC Tomanto, who was then sitting on the rear
(open) portion of the yellow pick-up service vehicle, saw appellant Wenceslao on the
right side of the road firing at them in a squatting position using an M-16 armalite rifle.
Macasuba was also able to identify appellants Ricardo, Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo,
Jr., Brigido and Alfredo as among the ambushers. Mayor Tawan-tawan ordered Juanito
to keep on driving to avoid greater casualties. The vehicle stopped upon reaching the
army and Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) detachment in Curva,
Miagao, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Mayor Tawan-tawan then asked assistance
therefrom. 17
Immediately after the ambush, appellants and their co-accused ran towards the
house of Samuel's aunt located, more or less, 10 meters away from the site of the
ambush to get their bags and other stuff. The house of Samuel's aunt was the place
where appellants and their co-accused stayed prior to the incident. Samuel followed
appellants and their co-accused to the house of his aunt. Thereafter, appellants and
their co-accused hurriedly ran towards Barangay Lindongan, Municipality of Baroy,
Lanao del Norte. 18
On the other hand, Mayor Tawan-tawan, Macasuba and the members of the
CAFGU went back to the site of the ambush but appellants and their co-accused were
no longer there. Not long after, SPO4 Medrano, Chief of Police of Salvador Municipal
Police Station, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, and his troops arrived. It was while inside the
Salvador Municipal Police Station that SPO4 Medrano heard gunfire and he came to
know that the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan was ambushed prompting him and his
troops to go to the scene of the crime. Mayor Tawan-tawan informed SPO4 Medrano
that appellant Wenceslao was one of those responsible for the ambush. SPO4 Medrano
and his troops, then, conducted an investigation during which he noticed Samuel at the
scene of the crime. Upon interrogation Samuel denied any involvement in the ambush.
Even so, SPO4 Medrano still found Samuel suspicious, hence, he and his fellow police
officers arrested him and turned him over to a certain SPO4 Micabalo, Chief of Police of
Lala, Lanao del Norte. Samuel was then brought to Lala Municipal Jail in Lanao del
Norte. Subsequently, SPO4 Medrano, together with the members of the CAFGU, PNP
and the rest of the troops who were at the scene of the crime, found a trail of footprints
believed to be from the culprits. They conducted a hot pursuit operation towards
Barangay Lindongan, Municipality of Baroy, Lanao del Norte, where appellants and their
co-accused were believed to have fled. They were able to recover an M-16 armalite rifle
caliber 5.26 concealed near a nipa hut. SPO4 Medrano then sent a Spot Report and a
follow-up report about the ambush. He did not, however, reveal the identity of appellant
Wenceslao so that with a warrant of arrest, appellant Wenceslao could be arrested at
the earliest possible time. SPO4 Medrano also informed the provincial headquarters
about the incident through a radio message. 21
The following day, or on 6 June 2001, Samuel informed SPO1 Suaring, member
of PNP Lala Municipal Police, Lala, Lanao del Norte, that there were electrical supplies
and radio antenna in San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, left by the malefactors. SPO1
Suaring, together with Samuel, Senior P/Insp. Salazar, SPO4 Subingsubing and a
certain SPO4 Sumaylo, proceeded to San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, where they
found the materials near the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) canal, which is 30
meters away from the house of Samuel's aunt. These were photographed. 22
Later, SPO2 Evasco, who was assigned at Lala Police Station, received a call
from Barangay Kagawad Renato Senahon (Brgy. Kgwd. Senahon) that a black
backpack was found in Mount Curay-curay, Rebe, Lala, Lanao del Norte, which is two
(2) kilometers away from the highway. Immediately, SPO2 Evasco and Brgy. Kgwd.
Senahon went to the location. Upon inspection, they recovered from the backpack an
army camouflage with name cloth, one Garand pouch and one fragmentation grenade
cacao type. SPO2 Evasco then brought these to the police station in Maranding, Lala,
Lanao del Norte, and turned it over to Senior P/Insp. Salazar. 23
On 29 August 2001, or more than two (2) months after the ambush, appellant
Wenceslao was arrested while he was in Katipa, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental.
Appellant Ricardo, on the other hand, was arrested on 20 December 2001 while
working in Puting Bato in Sapad, Lanao del Norte. It was Senior P/Insp. Salazar who
effected the arrest of the appellants. 25
Appellant Wenceslao testified that on 5 June 2001, he was in their house with his
family. At around 1:00 p.m., he went outside their house to clean the pigsty and feed the
pigs. Then, at around 2:30 p.m., Jacob Pepito, Rudy and a certain Romy, who is a
military personnel, arrived to get a copy of the election returns of the 15 May 2001
elections upon the orders of Tanny Pepito, a gubernatorial candidate. He told them that
he has no copy of the returns. He then advised them to get it to Atty. Aldoni Umpa (Atty.
Umpa) who has a copy. At that time, he, Jacob Pepito and Romy were outside the
house while his wife and nieces were just eight (8) to 10 meters away from them. After
10 minutes, his visitors left. 26 Suddenly, appellant Wenceslao heard gunfire coming
from the direction of the house of Mayor Tawan-tawan. His nephew, Jeffrey,
approached and informed him that Mayor Tawan-tawan and the latter's group were
ambushed. After about one (1) or two (2) minutes, he again heard gunfire. This time the
bullets were already hitting the roof and walls of their house. He then instructed Jeffrey,
who is also a CAFGU member, to report the said incident and to ask help from the
members of the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Allere, Salvador, Lanao del Norte.
27
When Jeffrey left, appellant Wenceslao stayed at their house. He did not know
where his wife and the rest of the women, who were in their house, went after the
gunburst. After more or less 15 minutes, he walked barefooted and unarmed towards
Camp Allere. There he saw M/Sgt. Cudilla and he informed the former regarding the
incident happened in their house. Not long after, a certain Captain Esmeralda (Capt.
Esmeralda), Commanding Officer of Bravo Company of the Philippine Army, arrived. He
also approached and informed Capt. Esmeralda about the incident in their house. Capt.
Esmeralda then ordered his men to board the samba and a six-by-six truck to fetch
appellant Wenceslao's wife and relatives in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. A six-
by-six truck returned to Camp Allere carrying appellant Wenceslao's wife and relatives.
28 AEDcIH
On the evening of 5 June 2001, appellant Wenceslao, together with his wife and
daughter, slept in his father's house located, more or less, 100 meters away from Camp
Allere and stayed there for five (5) days. Appellant Wenceslao's wife then requested for
transfer to their son's house in Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, as she could no longer
sleep because of what happened at their house. Thus, they went to their son's house in
Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, and stayed there for eight (8) days. During that period of
time, he did not hear of any case filed against him. No policemen even bothered to
arrest him. His wife, however, was still afraid, so they left the house of their son and
moved to Katipa, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. They stayed there until he was
arrested on 29 August 2001. 29
Appellant Wenceslao, however, disclosed that it would only take, more or less, a
15 minute-vehicle ride from his residence in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, to
the site of the ambush in San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte. Also, from his house to
Camp Allere it would only take, more or less, 5 minute-vehicle ride. Appellant
Wenceslao also admitted that he ran for the vice-mayoralty position in Salvador, Lanao
del Norte, against Rodolfo Oban during the 2001 elections. Way back in the 1998
elections, he ran for mayoralty position in the same locality against Mayor Tawan-tawan
but he lost. On both occasions, he and Mayor Tawan-tawan were no longer in the same
political party. Similarly, during the term of Mayor Tawan-tawan in 1998, appellant
Wenceslao revealed that he and his son were charged with illegal possession of
firearm. 30
Other defense witnesses, namely, Armida, Jeffrey and Luzviminda, who are
appellant Wenceslao's wife, nephew and niece, respectively, corroborated appellant
Wenceslao's testimony on all material points. They all denied that appellant Wenceslao
has something to do with the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group.
Nonetheless, Armida admitted that there is a road connecting San Manuel, Lala, Lanao
del Norte, to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. There are also vehicles for hire plying the route
of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, to San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, and vice-versa. 31
Sgt. Garsuta, who also testified for the defense, stated that in the afternoon of 5
June 2001, while he was at the legislative hall in Pigcarangan, Tubod, Lanao del Norte,
to secure the canvass of the elections, they received a radio call from M/Sgt. Cudilla
informing them that Mayor Tawan-tawan was ambushed and the house of appellant
Wenceslao was strafed. Thereafter, Capt. Esmeralda called them to board a six-by-six
truck and to proceed to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. As they passed by San Manuel,
Lala, Lanao del Norte, they stopped to get some information from the police officers
therein. They proceeded to Camp Allere in Salvador, Lanao del Norte. They arrived at
Camp Allere at around 4:30 p.m. to 4:35 p.m. and there he saw appellant Wenceslao
waiting and talking to 1st Sgt. Codilla. Appellant Wenceslao then requested that his
family and some personal effects be taken from his house. Thus, Capt. Esmeralda
ordered them to board a six-by-six truck and to proceed to appellant Wenceslao's
house. Upon reaching the house of appellant Wenceslao, nobody was there. Suddenly,
appellant Wenceslao's wife came out from the nearby house. Then they ordered her to
board a six-by-six truck after taking some personal belongings of appellant Wenceslao
in the latter's house. 33 THADEI
M/Sgt. Cudilla alleged that at around, more or less, 3:00 p.m. of 5 June 2001,
while he was at their command post at Camp Allere, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, his
detachment commander, a certain T/Sgt. Quijano, called and informed him through
radio that an ambush incident happened in his area of responsibility, i.e., Curva Miagao,
Salvador, Lanao del Norte. He advised T/Sgt. Quijano to verify the incident. M/Sgt.
Cudilla then called Capt. Esmeralda to inform the latter about the said ambush incident.
He, thereafter, prepared a perimeter defense in the camp. In the second call of T/Sgt.
Quijano, the latter told him that Mayor Tawan-tawan was ambushed. After about 15
minutes, M/Sgt. Cudilla heard gunbursts from Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte.
Later, more or less, 10 civilians arrived at Camp Allere.
M/Sgt. Cudilla further confirmed that on 5 June 2004, also at around 3:00 p.m.,
he saw appellant Wenceslao at the back of the stage inside Camp Allere near Km. Post
one. Appellant Wenceslao then informed him of the strafing incident in his house. When
their commanding officer arrived, appellant Wenceslao approached the former.
Thereafter, a platoon was organized heading towards Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del
Norte. 34
Appellant Ricardo, for his part, maintained that on 5 June 2001, he was also in
his house in Purok 5, Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, attending to his wife and
children because his wife had just given birth in April 2001. In the afternoon thereof, he
heard a gunburst somewhere in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, followed by
some commotion in the street. Later, his brother, Joji Ajok, arrived and informed him
that appellant Wenceslao was shot in his house. 35
Appellant Ricardo also confirmed that on the early evening of 5 June 2001, he
and his family transferred to the house of his parents-in-law at Camp Allere, Salvador,
Lanao del Norte. He so decided when he heard rumors that the supporters of Atty.
Umpa, the political rival of Mayor Tawan-tawan in the 2001 local elections, were being
persecuted. Being one of Atty. Umpa's supporters, he got scared, prompting him to
bring his family to Camp Allere. They stayed there until the following morning and then
he left alone for Ozamis City, Misamis Occidental, and stayed there for three (3)
months. Thereafter, he moved to Puting Bato in Sapad, Lanao del Norte, where he
worked in the farm of his friend. He stayed there until he was arrested on 20 December
2001. 36 cACTaI
Nevertheless, appellant Ricardo divulged that there was never an instance that
Atty. Umpa was harassed or intimidated by the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan. He
claimed that only Atty. Umpa's supporters were harassed. He also revealed that prior to
the ambush incident, there was never an instance that he was threatened by the group
of Mayor Tawan-tawan. He just presumed that Atty. Umpa's supporters were being
harassed by the people of Mayor Tawan-tawan because others were already harassed.
37
Finding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, most of whom were victims
of the ambush, to be credible, categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and consistent,
coupled with their positive identification of the appellants as among the perpetrators of
the crime and their lack of ill-motive to falsely testify against them, vis-à-vis the defense
of denial and alibi proffered by the latter, the trial court rendered its Decision on 30
September 2005 finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder
with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder and imposing upon them
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the aforesaid trial court's
Decision states:
The Armalite rifle with defaced serial number, the hand grenade
and the [G]arand pouch are hereby ordered turned-over to the Firearm
and Explosive Unit of the PNP Headquarters, Pigcarangan, Tubod,
Lanao del Norte, for proper disposition as authorized by law.
Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without
prejudice on the part of the prosecution to prosecute the case against
the other accused who remain at-large, as soon as said accused are
apprehended. 38 [Emphasis supplied].
Unperturbed, appellants separately appealed the aforesaid trial court's Decision
to the Court of Appeals via Notice of Appeal, 39 and, thereafter, submitted their
respective appeal briefs.
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING [APPELLANT
WENCESLAO] OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON
TESTIMONIES WHICH ARE OF DOUBTFUL VERACITY[;]
VII.
While appellant Ricardo, in his brief, raised this lone assignment of error:
On 18 June 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision
affirming appellants' conviction of the crime charged. The Court of Appeals held that the
evidence on record disclosed that the alleged inconsistencies pointed to by appellant
Wenceslao refer only to minor matters. The same did not damage the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses, particularly that of PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, Juanito and Mayor
Tawan-tawan. Honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial points serve to strengthen
rather than destroy the credibility of a witness to a crime. Moreover, since the
prosecution witnesses positively identified appellants in open court as among the
perpetrators of the ambush, the same must prevail over the alleged inconsistencies, as
well as the defense of denial and alibi interposed by the appellants. Denial is a negative
and self-serving assertion that cannot overcome the victim's affirmative, categorical and
convincing testimony. In the same way, for alibi to prosper, it must be established by
positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was impossible for the accused to be at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission and not merely assert that he was
somewhere else. As in the present case, the trial court took judicial notice of the
distance of seven (7) kilometers between Salvador, Lanao del Norte, where appellants
reside, and San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, where the ambush incident took place.
Appellants, therefore, could not successfully invoke alibi as a defense because it was
not physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime. 42 The Court
of Appeals then decreed as follows:
Appellants, on the other hand, filed their separate Supplemental Briefs, 47 which
were a mere rehash of the arguments already discussed in their respective Appellant's
Briefs 48 submitted before the appellate court. In his Supplemental Brief, appellant
Wenceslao reiterates that: the trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible
errors when they decided a question of substance which is not in accord with
established facts and the applicable laws. 49 He, once again, enumerated the following
errors committed by the appellate court, thus:
I.
The court a quo and the Court of Appeals gravely erred when they
ruled that the inconsistencies committed by the prosecution witnesses
are on minor and trivial points when these inconsistencies are
indicative of the innocence of [appellant Wenceslao][;] HAIDcE
II.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to consider as indicative
of innocence of [appellant Wenceslao] the fact that the authorities did
not include in the police report the name of [appellant Wenceslao] and
did not arrest him immediately after the ambush, or within a couple of
months from the date of the ambush[;]
III.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error
when they deliberately refused or failed to consider and appreciate the
testimonies of the military officers who are neutral, impartial, and
objective witnesses[;]
IV.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals miserably failed to
consider the evidence for the defense despite the clear and
unmistakable proof of their honesty and integrity[;]
V.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals clearly and deliberately
[misinterpreted] the facts and [misapplied] the laws regarding "flight" as
an alleged indication of guilt[;]
VI.
Appellant Wenceslao maintains that he was not at the ambush site on 5 June
2001 as can be gleaned from the testimonies of M/Sgt. Cudilla and Sgt. Garsuta.
Lastly, appellant Wenceslao argues that his flight was not an indication of guilt.
He justified his temporary absence from his residence by stating that it was because of
the traumatic experience of his wife, who had no peace of mind since their house was
riddled with bullets by lawless elements without any cause.
With all the foregoing, the resolution of this appeal hinges primarily on the
determination of credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
Time and again, this Court held that when the issues revolve on matters of
credibility of witnesses, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well
as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not
conclusive effect. This is so because the trial court has the unique opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern whether they
are telling the truth. 51 Moreover, credibility, to state what is axiomatic, is the sole
province of the trial court. In the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that
would have affected the result of the case, the trial court's findings on the matter of
credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal. 52 A careful perusal of the
records of this case revealed that none of these circumstances is attendant herein.
The affirmance by the Court of Appeals of the factual findings of the trial court
places this case under the rule that factual findings are final and conclusive and may not
be reviewed on appeal to this Court. No reason has been given by appellants to deviate
from the factual findings arrived at by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
In the present case, most of the prosecution witnesses, i.e., Macasuba, Mosanip,
PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, Juanito and Mayor Tawan-tawan, were victims of the 5 June
2001 ambush incident. As such, they actually witnessed what exactly happened on that
fateful day, especially Macasuba and PFC Angni, who vividly saw appellant Wenceslao
on the right side of the road and in a squatting position firing at them with his M-16
armalite rifle. Macasuba and PFC Angni, having seated behind the driver and on the
rear (open) portion of the yellow pick-up service vehicle, respectively, both facing the
right side of the road, were in such a position to see without any obstruction how
appellant Wenceslao rained bullets on their vehicle with his M-16 armalite rifle while
they were traversing the road of San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, on their way home
to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Macasuba was also able to identify appellant Ricardo,
Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr., Brigido and Alfredo as among the perpetrators of the
ambush.
It bears stressing that the ambush happened at around 3:00 p.m., in broad
daylight, such that it would not be impossible for Macasuba and PFC Angni to have
seen and identified their assailants, particularly appellant Wenceslao, who was once
chief of Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF), then municipal councilor and twice
elected vice-mayor of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, i.e., 1992 and 1995 elections, and
appellant Ricardo, who is a resident of Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. 53
IHDCcT
The aforesaid assertions of Macasuba and PFC Angni were equally confirmed by
Samuel, an accused-turned-state-witness, who, in his testimony before the open court,
narrated how appellants and their co-accused, Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr.,
Brigido, Alfredo, Alejandro, Ruben, Arnel, and Opao, brought him in the waiting shed in
Purok 2, San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte; assembled themselves in a diamond
position on both sides of the road; surreptitiously waited for the vehicle boarded by
Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group; and executed the ambush from the moment the
vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group passed by the aforesaid waiting
shed.
Similarly, PFC Angni and Samuel's failure to name appellant Wenceslao in their
affidavits/sworn statements as one of the ambushers does not necessarily render their
testimonies implausible and unworthy of belief.
Inconsistencies between the sworn statement and direct testimony given in open
court do not necessarily discredit the witness. An affidavit, being taken ex-parte, is
oftentimes incomplete and is generally regarded as inferior to the testimony of the
witness in open court. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that testimonies given
during trial are much more exact and elaborate than those stated in sworn statements,
which are usually incomplete and inaccurate for a variety of reasons. More so, because
of the partial and innocent suggestions, or for want of specific inquiries. In addition, an
extrajudicial statement or affidavit is generally not prepared by the affiant himself but by
another who uses his own language in writing the affiant's statement, hence, omissions
and misunderstandings by the writer are not infrequent. Indeed, the prosecution
witnesses' direct and categorical declarations on the witness stand are superior to their
extrajudicial statements. 56 Similarly, the failure of a witness to immediately disclose the
name of the culprit does not necessarily impair his or her credibility. 57
Even the discharge of Samuel to become state witness does not negate the fact
that prosecution witnesses, Macasuba and PFC Angni, indeed, saw appellants as
among the perpetrators of the crime. To note, appellants were not the only persons
accused of the crime; they were many including Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr.,
Brigido, Alfredo, Alejandro, Ruben, Arnel, and Opao. In order to give justice to the
victims of the ambush, especially those who have died by reason thereof, all persons
responsible therefor must be penalized. Since Samuel knew all those who have
participated in the ambush incident, his testimony as to the other accused in this case is
material to strengthen the case of the prosecution against them. Unfortunately, the other
accused in this case remained at large until now.
As aptly observed by the trial court, thus: DTIaHE
The records are bereft of any evidence to substantiate the claim of appellant
Wenceslao that the motive of the prosecution witnesses in testifying against him was to
remove him as the only non-Muslim leader in the Municipality of Salvador, Lanao del
Norte, and that it was an act of revenge for opposing Mayor Tawan-tawan during the
1998 elections. Appellant Wenceslao failed to present an iota of evidence to support his
aforesaid allegations. As properly stated by the Court of Appeals, "[m]ere allegation or
claim is not proof. Each party must prove his own affirmative allegation." Also, it must be
emphasized that during the 1998 elections, it was Mayor Tawan-tawan who won the
mayoralty position. It is, therefore, highly implausible for Mayor Tawan-tawan, who
emerged as the victor, to take revenge against the losing candidate, appellant
Wenceslao. As such, appellant Wenceslao failed to prove any ill-motive on the part of
the prosecution witnesses. It is settled that where the defense fails to prove that
witnesses are moved by improper motives, the presumption is that they were not so
moved and their testimonies are therefore entitled to full weight and credit. 63
To repeat, most of the prosecution witnesses are victims of the ambush. Being
the aggrieved parties, they all desire justice for what had happened to them, thus, it is
unnatural for them to falsely accuse someone other than the real culprits. Otherwise
stated, it is very unlikely for these prosecution witnesses to implicate an innocent person
to the crime. It has been correctly observed that the natural interest of witnesses, who
are relatives of the victims, more so, the victims themselves, in securing the conviction
of the guilty would deter them from implicating persons other than the culprits, for
otherwise, the culprits would gain immunity. 64
Contrary to appellant Wenceslao's assertion, this Court is convince that his and
appellant Ricardo's flight from the scene of the crime immediately after the ambush is
an evidence of their guilt. It is noteworthy that after the ambush incident, appellant
Wenceslao immediately left his residence and moved to his father's house, then to his
son's house in Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, and lastly to Katipa, Lopez Jaena,
Misamis Occidental, where he was arrested. Appellant Ricardo did the same thing.
From his residence in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, he transferred to his
parents-in-law's house, then he left alone for Ozamis City, Misamis Occidental, and
thereafter, moved to Puting Bato in Sapad, Lanao del Norte, until he was arrested on 20
December 2001. If appellants were truly innocent of the crime charged, they would not
go into hiding rather they would face their accusers to clear their names. Courts go by
the biblical truism that "the wicked flee when no man pursueth but the righteous are as
bold as a lion." 65
As this Court has oft pronounced, both denial and alibi are inherently weak
defenses which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses that appellants committed the crime. 66 For alibi to prosper, the
requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that
appellants were somewhere else when the crime happened. They must also
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them
to have been at the scene of the crime at the approximate time of its commission. 67
Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-
serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. 68 A mere denial, like alibi, is inherently
a weak defense and constitutes self-serving negative evidence, which cannot be
accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters. 69
In this case, both appellants claimed that they were just in their respective
houses in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, when the ambush incident happened
and they have no involvement whatsoever in the commission thereof.
Withal, it was not physically impossible for the appellants to be at the scene of
the crime in the afternoon of 5 June 2001. As observed by the trial court and the
appellate court, Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, where both appellants' reside, is
only about seven (7) kilometers away from San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, where
the ambush took place. 73
All told, this Court affirms the findings of the trial court and the appellate court
that, indeed, appellants were among the perpetrators of the ambush against Mayor
Tawan-tawan and his group. Prosecution witnesses' categorical, positive and
straightforward testimonies, coupled with their positive identification of appellants as
among the perpetrators of the crime, prevail over appellants' defense of bare denial and
alibi.
As to the crime committed. The trial court, as well as the appellate court,
convicted appellants of double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double
attempted murder. This Court believes, however, that appellants should be
convicted not of a complex crime but of separate crimes of two (2) counts of
murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder as the killing and wounding of the
victims in this case were not the result of a single act but of several acts of the
appellants, thus, making Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code inapplicable.
Appellants and their co-accused simultaneous act of riddling the vehicle boarded
by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group with bullets discharged from their firearms when
the said vehicle passed by San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, resulted in the death of
two security escorts of Mayor Tawan-tawan, i.e., PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco.
The deadly successive shots of the appellants and their co-accused did not allow
the hapless victims, i.e., PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco, any opportunity to put up a
decent defense. The attack was executed by appellants and their-co-accused in such a
vicious manner as to make the defense virtually impossible. Under the circumstances, it
is very apparent that appellants had murder in their hearts when they waylaid
their unwary victims. 75 Thus, as to the death of PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt.
Dacoco, appellants should be held liable for murder.
As regards the victims Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and
Juanito, although they were injured during the ambush and were all hospitalized, except
for Macasuba, it was not mentioned that their injuries and wounds were mortal or fatal
such that without the timely medical assistance accorded to them, they would have
died. 78 However, it does not necessarily follow that the crimes committed against the
aforenamed victims were simply less serious physical injuries. Also, even though Mayor
Tawan-tawan and Jun did not sustain any injury during the ambush, it does not mean
that no crime has been committed against them. The latter were just fortunate enough
not to have sustained any injury on the occasion thereof. Since appellants were
motivated by the same intent to kill, thus, as to Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC
Tomanto, PFC Angni, Juanito, Mayor Tawan-tawan and Jun, appellants should be
held guilty of attempted murder. aHcACT
What brings this case out of the ordinary is the issue of applicability of Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code. Its resolution would determine whether the conviction of
appellants must be for the separate crimes of two (2) counts of murder and seven (7)
counts of attempted murder or of the complex crime of double murder with multiple
frustrated murder and double attempted murder.
In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the
eyes of the law and in the conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime,
thus, only one penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is
known as compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies while the other is known as complex crime proper, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The classic example of the first
kind is when a single bullet results in the death of two or more persons. A different rule
governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is
the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts
constitute separate and distinct crimes. 80
Evidently, there is in this case no complex crime proper. And the circumstances
present in this case do not fit exactly the description of a compound crime.
From its factual backdrop, it can easily be gleaned that the killing and wounding
of the victims were not the result of a single discharge of firearms by the appellants and
their co-accused. To note, appellants and their co-accused opened fire and rained
bullets on the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group. As a result, two
security escorts died while five (5) of them were wounded and injured. The victims
sustained gunshot wounds in different parts of their bodies. Therefrom, it cannot be
gainsaid that more than one bullet had hit the victims. Moreover, more than one
gunman fired at the vehicle of the victims. As held in People v. Valdez, 81 each act by
each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular
moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give
rise to a complex crime. 82
Obviously, appellants and their co-accused performed not only a single act but
several individual and distinct acts in the commission of the crime. Thus, Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code would not apply for it speaks only of a "single act."
There are, however, several rulings which applied Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code despite the fact that several acts were performed by several accused in the
commission of the crime resulting to the death and/or injuries to their victims.
In People v. Lawas, 83 the members of the Home Guard, upon order of their
leader, Lawas, simultaneously and successively fired at several victims. As a result, 50
persons died. It was there held that the killing was the result of a single impulse as
there was no intent on the part of the accused to fire at each and every victim
separately and distinctly from each other. If the act or acts complained of resulted
from a single criminal impulse, it constitutes a single offense. However, "single
criminal impulse" was not the only consideration in applying Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code in the said case because there was therein no evidence at all showing the
identity or number of persons killed by each accused. There was also no conspiracy to
perpetuate the killing, thus, collective criminal responsibility could not be imputed
upon the accused. Since it was impossible to ascertain the number of persons
killed by each of them, this Court was "forced" to find all the accused guilty of
only one offense of multiple homicide instead of holding each of them
responsible for 50 deaths. 84
The Information filed against appellants and their co-accused alleged conspiracy,
among others. Although the trial court did not directly state that a conspiracy existed,
such may be inferred from the concerted actions of the appellants and their co-accused,
to wit: (1) appellants and their co-accused brought Samuel to a waiting shed located on
the left side of the road where the yellow pick-up service vehicle boarded by Mayor
Tawan-tawan and his group would pass; (2) appellants and their co-accused, thereafter,
assembled themselves on both sides of the road and surreptitiously waited for the
aforesaid yellow pick-up service vehicle; (3) the moment the yellow pick-up service
vehicle passed by the waiting shed, appellants and their co-accused opened fire and
rained bullets thereon resulting in the killing and wounding of the victims; (4)
immediately, appellants and their co-accused ran towards the house of Samuel's aunt to
get their bags and other stuff; (5) Samuel followed appellants and their co-accused; and
(6) appellants and their co-accused fled.
With the presence of conspiracy in the case at bench, appellants and their co-
accused had assumed joint criminal responsibility — the act of one is the act of all. The
ascertainment of who among them actually hit, killed and/or caused injury to the victims
already becomes immaterial. Collective responsibility replaced individual responsibility.
The Lawas doctrine, premised on the impossibility of determining who killed whom,
cannot, to repeat, be applied.
Interestingly, in People v. De los Santos, 88 People v. Abella, 89 People v.
Garcia 90 and People v. Pincalin, 91 this Court also applied Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code even though several acts were performed by the accused and conspiracy
attended the commission of the crime. ICAcTa
In People v. De los Santos, 92 a prison riot occurred for two consecutive days
inside the national penitentiary between the members of two gangs, i.e., Sigue-Sigue
Sputnik and Oxo. As a result, nine (9) inmates were killed. Fourteen (14) inmates were
then convicted for the crime of multiple murder. The existence of conspiracy in the
commission of the crime was duly proven. There was, however, no discussion why the
accused were convicted of a complex crime instead of separate crimes.
People v. Garcia 95 and People v. Pincalin 96 have the same factual background
as De los Santos and Abella. They were the third and fourth cases, respectively, of
prison riots resulting to the killing of convicts by fellow convicts while inside the national
penitentiary. In Garcia, the accused were convicted for the complex crime of multiple
murder and double attempted murder, while in Pincalin the accused were convicted for
the complex crime of double murder and frustrated murder. In both cases, this Court
found conspiracy to have attended the commission of the crime.
In applying Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in Garcia and Pincalin, this
Court, gave the same justification as in Abella: that both cases were covered by the rule
that "when for the attainment of a single purpose, which constitutes an offense
various acts are executed, such acts must be considered as only one offense, a
complex one." Correspondingly, "where a conspiracy animates several persons
with a single purpose, their individual acts done in pursuance of that purpose are
looked upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving rise to a complex
offense. Various acts committed under one criminal impulse may constitute a single
complex offense. 97
De los Santos, Abella, Garcia and Pincalin, therefore, were exceptions to the
general rule stated in Article 48 which exceptions were drawn by the peculiar
circumstance of the cases.
It may be mentioned that in People v. Sanidad, 99 this Court, once again, applied
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code although the circumstances of the case were not
the same as in Lawas, De los Santos, Abella, Garcia and Pincalin, where this Court
departed from the general rule.
The application of the Abella doctrine, has already been clarified in Pincalin, thus:
where several killings on the same occasion were perpetrated, but not involving
prisoners, a different rule may be applied, that is to say, the killings would be treated as
separate offenses. Since in Sanidad, the killings did not involve prisoners or it was not a
case of prisoners killing fellow prisoners. As such, Abella would not apply.
To repeat, in Lawas, this Court was merely forced to apply Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code because of the impossibility of ascertaining the number of persons
killed by each accused. Since conspiracy was not proven therein, joint criminal
responsibility could not be attributed to the accused. Each accused could not be held
liable for separate crimes because of lack of clear evidence showing the number of
persons actually killed by each of them.
Our repeated ruling is that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. It is as
though each one performed the act of each one of the conspirators. Each one is
criminally responsible for each one of the deaths and injuries of the several victims. The
severalty of the acts prevents the application of Article 48. The applicability of Article 48
depends upon the singularity of the act, thus the definitional phrase "a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies." This is not an original reading of
the law. In People v. Hon. Pineda, 101 the Court already recognized the "deeply
rooted . . . doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts
constitute separate and distinct crimes." As we observed in People v. Tabaco, 102
clarifying the applicability of Article 48 of the [Revised Penal Code], [this Court] further
stated in [Hon.] Pineda that "to apply the first half of Article 48, . . . there must be
singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law." 103
With all the foregoing, this Court holds appellants liable for the separate
crimes of two (2) counts of murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder.
As to penalty. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposed
for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being neither aggravating
nor mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed upon appellants is reclusion
perpetua for each count, pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 63 104 of the Revised Penal
Code. 105
Appellants are also guilty of seven (7) counts of attempted murder. The penalty
prescribed by law for murder, i.e., reclusion perpetua to death, should be reduced by
two degrees, conformably to Article 51 106 of the Revised Penal Code. Under
paragraph 2, Article 61, 107 in relation to Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, such a
penalty is prision mayor. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance,
the same should be imposed in its medium period pursuant to paragraph 1, Article 64
108 of the Revised Penal Code. 109 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in the
case of attempted murder, the maximum shall be taken from the medium period of
prision mayor, which is 8 years and 1 day to 10 years, while the minimum shall be taken
from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correctional, in any of its periods, the
range of which is 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. This Court, therefore, imposed upon
the appellants the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum, for each count of
attempted murder.
As to damages. When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may
be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or
compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5)
temperate damages. 110
Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that when death occurs as a result of a
crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to be indemnified for the death of the victim
without need of any evidence or proof thereof. Moral damages like civil indemnity, is
also mandatory upon the finding of the fact of murder. 111 Therefore, the trial court and
the appellate court properly awarded civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and
moral damages also in the amount of P50,000.00 to the heirs of each deceased victims.
Article 2230 of the Civil Code states that exemplary damages may be imposed
when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. In this
case, treachery may no longer be considered as an aggravating circumstance since it
was already taken as a qualifying circumstance in the murder, and abuse of superior
strength which would otherwise warrant the award of exemplary damages was already
absorbed in the treachery. 112 However, in People v. Combate, 113 this Court still
awards exemplary damages despite the lack of any aggravating circumstance to deter
similar conduct and to serve as an example for public good. Thus, to deter future similar
transgressions, the Court finds that an award of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in
favor of the heirs of each deceased victims is proper. 114 The said amount is in
conformity with this Court's ruling in People v. Gutierrez. 115
Actual damages cannot be awarded for failure to present the receipts covering
the expenditures for the wake, coffin, burial and other expenses for the death of the
victims. In lieu thereof, temperate damages may be recovered where it has been shown
that the victim's family suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot be
proved with certainty as provided for under Article 2224 of the Civil Code.116 In this
case, it cannot be denied that the heirs of the deceased victims suffered pecuniary loss
although the exact amount was not proved with certainty. Thus, this Court similarly
awards P25,000.00 as temperate damages to the heirs of each deceased victims. 117
The surviving victims, Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and
Juanito, are also entitled to moral, temperate and exemplary damages.
Ordinary human experience and common sense dictate that the wounds inflicted
upon the aforesaid victims would naturally cause physical suffering, fright, serious
anxiety, moral shock, and similar injuries. 118 It is only justifiable to grant them moral
damages in the amount of P40,000.00 each in conformity with this Court's ruling in
People v. Mokammad. 119
This Court likewise affirms the award of P50,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, as
well as costs of the suit, in favor of Mayor Tawan-tawan.
||| (People v. Nelmida, G.R. No. 184500, [September 11, 2012], 694 PHIL 529-581)