Cayetano v.

Monsod

G.R. No. 100113 | September 3, 1991

FACTS:

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on
April 25, 1991. Petitioner Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Atty. Monsod has worked as a lawyer in the law office of his father (1960-1963); an operations officer
with the World Bank Group (1963-1970); Chief Executive Officer of an investment bank (1970-1986);
legal or economic consultant on various companies (1986); Secretary General of NAMFREL (1986);
member of Constitutional Commission (1986-1987); National Chairman of NAMFREL (1987); and
member of the quasi-judicial Davide Commission (1990).

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman
of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of Monsod’s nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition
for certiorari and prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent possesses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.

HELD:

YES.The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Monsod possessed the required qualification. In the case of
Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected
with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an
appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. In general, a practice of law requires a lawyer and client
relationship, it is whether in or out of court. As such, the petition is dismissed.
OSCAR PIMENTEL VS. LEB G.R. NO. 230642 & 242954. SEPTEMBER 10, 2019
FACTS:

Petitioners in this case assail the unconstitutionality of R.A. 7662 or the Legal Education Reform Act of
1993 which creates the Legal Education Board. Petitioners particularly seek to declare as
unconstitutional the creation of LEB itself, LEB issuances and memorandums establishing law practice
internship as a requirement for taking the bar based on Sec. 7 (g) of RA 7662, adopting a system of
continuing legal education based on Sec. 2 (2) and Sec. 7 (h) of RA 7662, and establishing and
implementing the nationwide law school aptitude test known as the Philippine Law School Admission
Test or the PhilSAT pursuant to LEB’s power to “prescribe the minimum standards for law admission”
under Sec. 7 (e) of RA 7662. Petitioners principally grounded the petitions on LEB’s alleged
encroachment upon the rulemaking power of the Court concerning the practice of law, violation of
institutional academic freedom, and violation of law school aspirant’s right to education under the
Constitution.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the regulation and supervision of legal education belong to the Court. NO

2. Whether the requirement of internship for admission to Bar Examination embodied in LEB
Memorandum pursuant to Sec. 7(g) of RA 7662 is unconstitutional.YES

3. Whether the adoption of system of continuing legal education embodied in LEB Memorandum
pursuant to Sec. 2(2) and Sec. 7(h) of RA 7662 is unconstitutional.YES

4. Whether the establishment of PhilSAT embodied in LEB Memorandum pursuant to Sec. 7(e) of RA
7662 is unconstitutional.YES

RULING:

1. NO. Regulation and supervision of legal education had been historically and consistently exercised
by the political departments. The historical development of statutes on education unerringly reflects
the consistent exercise by the political departments of the power to supervise and regulate all levels and
areas of education, including legal education. Legal education is but a composite of the entire Philippine
education system. It is perhaps unique because it is a specialized area of study. This peculiarity,
however, is no reason in itself to demarcate legal education and withdraw it from the regulatory and
supervisory powers of the political branches.
Two principal reasons militate against the proposition that the Court has the regulation and supervision
of legal education:

First, it assumes that the court, in fact, possesses the power to supervise and regulate legal education as
a necessary consequence of its power to regulate admission to the practice of law. This assumption,
apart from being manifestly contrary to the history of legal education in the Philippines, is likewise
devoid of legal anchorage.

Second, the Court exercises only judicial functions and it cannot, and must not, arrogate upon itself a
power that is not constitutionally vested to it, lest the Court itself violates the doctrine of separation of
powers. For the Court to void RA 7662 and thereafter, to form a body that regulates legal education and
place it under its supervision and control, as what petitioners suggest, is to demonstrate a highly
improper form of judicial activism.

As it is held, the Court’s exclusive rule making power under the Constitution covers the practice of law
and not the study of law. The present rules embodied in the 1997 Rules of Court do not support the
argument that the Court directly and actually regulates legal education, it merely provides academic
competency requirements for those who would like to take the Bar. Furthermore, it is the State in the
exercise of its police power that has the authority to regulate and supervise the education of its citizens
and this includes legal education.

2. YES. This requirement unduly interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court to promulgate
rules concerning the practice of law and admissions thereto. The jurisdiction to determine whether an
applicant may be allowed to take the bar examinations belongs to the Court. Under Sec. 7(g), the power
of the LEB is no longer confined within the parameters of legal education but now dabbles on the
requisites for admissions to the bar. This is direct encroachment upon the Court’s exclusive authority to
promulgate rules concerning admissions to the bar and should, therefore, be struck down as
unconstitutional.

3. YES. By its plain language, the clause “continuing legal education” unduly give the LEB the power to
supervise the legal education of those who are already members of the bar. In as much as the LEB is
authorized to compel mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration
as the LEB deems necessary, the same encroaches upon the Court’s power to promulgate rules
concerning the Integrated Bar which includes the education of Lawyer-professors as the teaching of law
is considered the practice of law.
4. YES. Accordingly, the Court recognizes the power of the LEB under its charter to prescribe minimum
standards for law admission. The PhilSAT, when administered as an aptitude test to guide law schools in
measuring the applicant’s aptness for legal education along with such other admissions policy that the
law school may consider, is such minimum standard. However, the PhilSAT presently operates not only
as a measure of an applicant’s aptitude for law school. The PhilSAT, as a pass or fail exam, dictates
upon law schools who among the examinees are to be admitted to any law program. When the
PhilSAT is used to exclude, qualify, and restrict admissions to law schools, as its present design
mandates, the PhilSAT goes beyond mere supervision and regulation, violates institutional academic
freedom, becomes unreasonable and therefore, unconstitutional.
In Re: Dacanay, B.M NO. 1678, December 17, 2007
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the
practice of law.

Facts:

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to
Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he
became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225
(Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine
citizenship.On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to
resume his law practice.

Issue:

WON petitioner may still resume practice? YES

Held:

Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of
the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the
Philippines. He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and
that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines.Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In
other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.The exception is when Filipino
citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired
pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country
shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225].”
Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost
his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.Before he can can resume his
law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

 the updating and payment of IBP membership dues;

 the payment of professional tax;
 the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is
specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and
update him of legal developments and
 the retaking of the lawyer’s oath.
Cui v Cui

G.R. No. L-18727             August 31, 1964

JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-appellant,
ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant.

Facts:
This is a proving in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The office in
contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili. Judgment was rendered on
27 April 1961 in favor of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by the defendant, Antonio
Ma. Cui, and by the intervenor, Romulo Cui.

The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui
and Dona Benigna Cui for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated
and helpless persons.” It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239). Sec. 2 of the Act
gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to “such
persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them. (embodied in Sec. 2 of the
spouses deed of donation)”

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one
of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro and Dona Benigna Cui. In 1960, the then incumbent
administrator of the Hospicio, resigned in favor of Antonio Cui pursuant to a “convenio” entered into
between them that was embodied on a notarial document. Jesus Cui, however had no prior notice of
either the “convenio” or of his brother’s assumption of the position.

Upon the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a letter to his brother Antonio, demanding that the
office be turned over to him. When the demand was not complied, Jesus filed this case. Lower court
ruled in favor of Jesus.

ISSUE

Who is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio?

HELD

Antonio should be the Hospicio’s administrator.

Jesus is the older of the two and under equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to sec.2 of the
deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the
one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews named, who if not a lawyer (titulo de
abogado), should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or if failing all theses,
should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified.

Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed
the examinations. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred in
1957, was reinstated by resolution, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator
of the Hospicio. The term “titulo de abogado” means not mere possession of the academic degree of
Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice
of law. A Bachelor’s degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic
requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. By itself, the degree merely
serves as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has
“successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by
the Secretary of Education.

The founders of the Hospicio provided for a lawyer, first of all, because in all of the works of an
administrator, it is presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession
would be a distinct asset.

Under this criterion, the plaintiff Jesus is not entitled as against defendant, to the office of administrator.
Reference is made to the fact that the defendant Antonio was disbarred (for immorality and
unprofessional conduct). However, it is also a fact, that he was reinstated before he assumed the office
of administrator. His reinstatement is recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than
that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place.Also, when defendant was restored to the
roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. VS. ATTYS. ANTONIO M. LLORENTE AND LIGAYA P.

SALAYON
FACTS:
This is a complaint for disbarment against respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon
for gross misconduct, serious breach of trust, and violation of the lawyer's oath in connection with
the discharge of their duties as members of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers in the May 8, 1995
elections

Attys. Antonio Llorente and Ligaya Salayon were election officers of the COMELEC and held the position
of Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively for the Pasig City Board of Candidates. The respondents
helped conduct and oversee the 1995 elections.

Then Senatorial candidate Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. alleged that the respondents tampered with the votes
received by them by either adding more votes for particular candidates in their Statement of Votes (SoV)
or reducing the number of votes of particular candidates in their SoV. Pimentel filed an administrative
complaint for their disbarment.

Respondents argued that the discrepancies were due to honest mistake, oversight and fatigue.
Respondents also argued that the IBP Board of Governors had already exonerated them from any
offense and that the motion for reconsideration filed by Pimentel was not filed on time.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondents are guilty of improper conduct as lawyers.

RULING:

Yes.Respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities attended the canvassing of the Pasig
City election returns. The only explanation they could offer for such irregularities is that the same could
be due to honest mistake, human error, and/or fatigue on the part of the members of the canvassing
committees who prepared the SoVs.

There is a limit, we believe, to what can be construed as an honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue,
in the performance of official duty. The sheer magnitude of the error renders the defense of honest
mistake or oversight due to fatigue, as incredible and simply unacceptable.

Indeed, what is involved here is not just a case of mathematical error in the tabulation of votes per
precinct as reflected in the election returns and the subsequent entry of the erroneous figures in one or
two SoVs but a systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the expense of
the petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in the election returns.

A lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if the misconduct also
constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyer’s oath or is of such
character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such
individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct.

Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a breach of

Rule 1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in “unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.” By express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the
government service. In addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as lawyers to “do no
falsehood.”

The Court found the respondents guilty of misconduct and fined them PhP 10,000 each and issued a
stern warning that similar conduct in the future will be severely punished.
VIDAYLIN YAMON-LEACH, COMPLAINANT, v. ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTORGA, RESPONDENT.
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by herein complainant Vidaylin Yamon-Leach
against herein respondent Atty. Arturo B. Astorga on grounds of deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral
conduct and gross violation of his Oath of Office and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Facts:

The respondent urged the petitioner to buy a "beach-front" property of Ms. Villaflora Un in Baybay,
Leyte. Atty. Astorga did not give me a receipt but petitioner trusted him being a distant relative and the
family lawyer. When petitioner returned to the Philippines, he visited Atty. Astorga, who told him that
he has already paid Ms. Un and that he was allegedly working for the transfer of the title of the land to
my name. Atty. Astorga then handed a Deed of Absolute Sale and asked petitioner to sign below the
word "Conforme,". However, there are some strange features in the document, namely: it was undated;
different persons as sellers; it did not contain a description of the boundaries of the land subject of the
sale; and the number of the respective tax certificates of the sellers were not indicated. Atty. Astorga
assured that everything was alright and that he would just make the necessary corrections later.

Petitioner’s brother verified from Ms. Villaflora Un the transaction who informed him that she did not
receive a single centavo from Atty. Astorga. Further verification revealed that the sellers' signatures in
the subject Deed of Sale prepared by Atty. Astorga were forgeries. Atty. Astorga admitted that he has
used the money and made several promises to pay back however, failed to do so. Hence, a case was
filed but respondent filed several motions to request for extension to file his comment.

Issue: Whether or not Atty Astorga should be administratively liable?

Ruling: Yes

Respondent's failure to comply with the Court's several directives to file his comment to the complaint
constitutes willful disobedience and gross misconduct. The Court defined gross misconduct as "any
inexcusable, shameful, flagrant, or unlawful conduct on the part of the person concerned in the
administration of justice which is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of a
cause." It is a "conduct that is generally motivated by a premeditated, obstinate, or intentional
purpose." In previous cases, this Court held that a respondent-lawyer's failure to comply with the lawful
orders of this Court constitutes gross misconduct and insubordination or disrespect which, alone, can
merit the penalty of disbarment.

To stress, the practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal
proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their four-fold
duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and
norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code. Falling short of this standard, the Court will not
hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer by imposing an appropriate penalty based on the exercise of
sound judicial discretion in consideration of the surrounding facts.
As to the merit of complainant's allegations, it is evident from the documents presented that:
respondent was the one who sought the complainant and encouraged her to invest in and buy what he
represented as a "beach-front" property; respondent volunteered to act as complainant's representative
in the supposed purchase of the alleged property as well as the processing of the documents necessary
to transfer title to complainant; respondent not only received but even solicited and demanded
substantial amounts from the complainant in four separate instances totaling P1,819,651.00, which he
himself acknowledged to have received; he misrepresented that the said amount would cover, aside
from the purchase price, expenses for the payment of various forms of taxes, processing fees and his
professional fee; respondent misappropriated the money he received from complainant; respondent
deceived complainant by making it appear that he bought the "beach-front" property when, in fact,
he did not; he defrauded complainant and made false representations by showing a "Deed of
Absolute Sale"25 of another property which appeared to have been executed by the owners thereof,
when in fact, the said owners died eight (8) years prior to the date that they supposedly signed the
said Deed; and respondent even went to the extent of making it appear that these dead people
acknowledged the execution of the subject Deed of Sale before him as a notary public.

Through the foregoing acts, respondent is guilty of violating the provisions of Article 19 of the Civil Code
which states that "[e]very person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."

Respondent also breached his oath as a lawyer to, among others, "obey the laws," "do no falsehood,"
and "conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion."

Respondent is, likewise, guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which states that "a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Any act or omission that is
contrary to, or prohibited or unauthorized by, or in defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards the law is
unlawful. Unlawful conduct does not necessarily imply the element of criminality although the concept
is broad enough to include such element. To be dishonest means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive,
defraud, or betray; be unworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness, and
straightforwardness, while conduct that is deceitful means the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive
misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the
prejudice and damage of the party imposed upon.In order to be deceitful, the person must either have
knowledge of the falsity or acted in reckless and conscious ignorance thereof, especially if the parties
are not on equal terms, and was done with the intent that the aggrieved party act thereon, and the
latter indeed acted in reliance of the false statement or deed in the manner contemplated to his injury.
Deceitful conduct involves moral turpitude and includes anything done contrary to justice, modesty or
good morals. It is an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man
owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Arturo B. Astorga GUILTY of deceit, gross misconduct in
office, violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, and willful
disobedience of lawful orders of the Supreme Court. He is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.
The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to remove the name of Arturo B. Astorga from the Roll of
Attorneys.

MERCURIA D. SO, COMPLAINANT, v. MA. LUCILLE P. LEE,* RESPONDENT.

Facts:

Petitioner sent a letter to Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) alleging that Lee is a defendant in Civil Case
No. 740 and is not fit for admission to the Bar considering her irresponsible attitude towards her
monetary obligations. Defendant admitted that she obtained a P200,000.00 loan from So but had
already paid a total of P140,000.00 for 10 months. Lee explained that due to the losses her business
suffered, she failed to pay the subsequent monthly payments. She pointed out that she did not intend to
evade her obligation to So, but had asked the latter to give her ample time to settle it.

In a resolution, the Court held in abeyance Lee's request to be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys in
view of the pendency of Civil Case Nos. 740 and 1436, and required her to manifest the status of the
aforementioned cases. Lee manifested that Civil Case No. 740 had been dismissed in view of the
Compromise Agreement she had entered into with So. She noted that a Judgment by Compromise had
been issued dismissing Civil Case No. 1436 in view of the Compromise Agreement she had executed with
Bolos.

The Issue

WHETHER LEE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO RETAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH AND SIGN THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS.

Ruling

YES. The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that
they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. It is extended only to the few who possess the high standards of intellectual and moral
qualifications and the Court is duty-bound to prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants, as well as to
exclude those who have been admitted but have become a disgrace to the profession. Section 2, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court provides for the minimum requirements applicants for the admission to the
Bar must possess, to wit:
SEC. 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. - Every applicant for admission as a
member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character, and a resident of the Philippines, and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have
been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)

Moral turpitude has been defined as an act of baselessness, vileness, or the depravity of private and
social duties that man owes to his fellow man or society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty or good morals.

Jurisprudence had deemed the following acts as crimes involving moral turpitude: abduction with
consent, bigamy, concubinage, smuggling, rape, attempted bribery, profiteering, robbery, murder,
estafa, theft, illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, issuance of bouncing checks, intriguing against
honor, violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, perjury, forgery, direct
bribery, frustrated homicide, adultery, arson, evasion of income tax, barratry, blackmail, bribery,
duelling, embezzlement, extortion, forgery, libel, making fraudulent proof of loss on insurance contract,
mutilation of public records, fabrication of evidence, offenses against pension laws, perjury, seduction
under the promise of marriage, falsification of public document, and estafa through falsification of
public document.

Nevertheless, not every criminal act involves moral turpitude. The determination whether there is moral
turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances. In turn, it is
for the Court to ultimately resolve whether an act constitutes moral turpitude. In the same vein, not all
civil cases pertain to acts involving moral turpitude. As defined, acts tainted with moral turpitude are of
such gravity that manifests an individual's depravity or lack of moral fiber.

As such, the pendency of a civil case alone should not be a deterrent for successful Bar examinees to
take their Lawyer's Oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys especially since not all charges or cases involve
acts evincing moral turpitude. The facts and circumstances of each case should be taken into account to
establish that the applicant's actions tarnished his or her moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. If it
were otherwise, one's entitlement to be a member of the legal profession would be seriously
jeopardized by the expedient filing of civil cases, which do not necessarily reflect one's moral character.

Thus, the pendency of Civil Case Nos. 740 and 1436 against Lee is not enough reason to prevent her
from taking her Lawyer's Oath and signing in the Roll of Attorneys. The existence of these civil cases
alone does not establish that she committed acts tainted with moral turpitude.
WHEREFORE, the Court adopts the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant to ALLOW Ma.
Lucille P. Lee to retake the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys subject to the condition that
she: (a) notify the Court within one (1) month from making her first monthly payment to Joseph Bolos;
and (b) inform the Court upon full satisfaction of her monetary obligation in accordance with the terms
and conditions of the January 29, 2019 Judgment by Compromise.

MARILU C. TURLA, COMPLAINANT, v. ATTY. JOSE M. CARINGAL, RESPONDENT.

This administrative case arose from a verified Complaint 1 dated October 8, 2010 filed
by Marilu C. Turla (Turla) against the respondent, Atty. Jose Mangaser Caringal
(Caringal), before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). Turla is the petitioner in Special Proceedings No. Q09-64479 before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 222, wherein Atty. Caringal is the
counsel for the oppositor.

Facts:

A complaint was filed by Marilu C. Turla against the respondent, Atty. Jose Mangaser Caringal (Caringal),
before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Turla
discovered that Atty. Caringal had not attended the required Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) seminars for the Second (MCLE II) and Third (MCLE III) Compliance Periods. Yet, Atty. Caringal
signed the pleadings and motions in several cases on which he indicated the following information after
his signature and other personal details: "MCLE Exemption II & III Rec. No. 000659126 Pasig 8.10.10."4
As it turned out, the receipt Atty. Caringal pertained to was not for his MCLE exemption, but for his
payment of the MCLE non-compliance fee.

Consequently, in her Complaint, Turla charged Atty. Caringal with (1) failure to take the MCLE seminars
for the MCLE II and III compliance periods as required under Bar Matter (BM) No. 850; and (2) violation
of his lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood. She further alleged that even if Atty. Caringal was already
confronted with his deception, he continued to flaunt such duplicity since he still filed pleadings with the
courts afterwards.

Atty. Caringal, in his Answer, countered that Turla's Complaint was a form of harassment since as the
counsel for the oppositor in Special Proceedings No. Q09-64479, he had filed motions in the said case
for Turla to undergo DNA testing to prove her filiation with the deceased over whose estate she was
claiming rights.

In any case, Atty. Caringal averred that he had taken several units for the First (MCLE I) Compliance
Period, which was from April 15, 2001 to April 14, 2004, but was unable to complete the required units.
The Investigating Commissioner of the CBD held that Turla's motives are unimportant to a disbarment
case since the issue is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the
court. He found that there was no question that Atty. Caringal failed to complete the MCLE
requirements for the MCLE II and III compliance periods, but noted that Atty. Caringal paid the non-
compliance fee which then served as his penalty for said infraction. The IBP Board of Governors resolved
to adopt and approve the foregoing Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
with modification that Atty. Caringal be suspended from the practice of law for three years due to his
failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and because of his misrepresentation that he had an
MCLE exemption. Atty. Caringal then filed a Petition for Review by Certiorari before the Court who
referred to the Office of the Bar Confidante. The OBC agreed with the recommendation of the IBP Board
of Governors to impose a three-year suspension on Atty. Caringal from the practice of law.

Issue: Whether or not Atty Caringal should be suspended from the practice of law

Ruling:

YES.The directive to comply with the MCLE requirements is essential for the legal profession, as
enshrined in BM No. 850. The purpose is "to ensure that throughout [the IBP members'] career, they
keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the
standards of the practice of law."27

In case a lawyer fails to comply with the MCLE requirements within the compliance period, Rule 13 of
BM No. 850. It is worthy to note that Atty. Caringal could not be declared a delinquent member as the
sixty (60)-day period for compliance did not commence to run. There was no showing that he was
ever issued and that he had actually received a Non-Compliance Notice as required by the MCLE
Implementing Rules. In addition, by March 11, 2011,28 he had already complied with the MCLE
requirements for MCLE II and III compliance periods, albeit belatedly.

Nevertheless, Atty. Caringal is being held liable for knowingly and willfully misrepresenting in the
pleadings he had signed and submitted to the courts that he was exempted from MCLE II and III.

Considering the foregoing, Atty. Caringal violated his sworn oath as a lawyer to "do no falsehood" as
well as the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

When Atty. Caringal indicated that he was MCLE-exempt in the pleadings and motions he filed, although
in fact he was not, he engaged in dishonest conduct which was also disrespectful of the courts. He
undoubtedly placed his clients at risk, given that pleadings with such false information produce no legal
effect31 and can result in the expunction of the same. Undeniably, he did not stay true to the cause of
his clients and actually violated his duty to serve his clients with competence and diligence.

The Court had previously pronounced that "[t]he appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on
the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts."32 Considering Atty. Caringal's
willful statement of false MCLE details in his pleadings to the prejudice of his clients, aggravate, by his
lack of diligence in fully and promptly complying with the MCLE requirements within the compliance
period, and his seemingly defiant and unremorseful attitude, the Court deems it apt to adopt the
recommendations of both the IBP Board of Governors and the OBC, and imposes upon Atty. Caringal the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for three years.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. Atty. Jose Mangaser Caringal is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) years.