Glenn Kirby A.

German
Liceo de Cagayan University
Legal Counselling and Social Legislation
Wednesdays, 07:00-09:00 PM

Case Digests

G.R. No. 217910 September 3, 2019

JESUS NICARDO M. FALCIS, III, petitioner, vs.

CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL, respondents.

Doctrines:

a) Lawyers must serve their clients with competence and diligence. Under Rule
18.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, "[a] lawyer shall not handle any
legal matter without adequate preparation."

b) The preliminary conference was not mere make-work. Rather, it was essential to
the orderly conduct of proceedings and, ultimately, to the judicious disposition of
this case. Appearance in it by counsels and parties should not be taken lightly.

Facts:

On May 18, 2015, Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III (Falcis) filed pro se before the Supreme
Court a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. His Petition sought to “declare article 1 and 2 of the Family Code as
unconstitutional and, as a consequence, nullify Articles 46(4) and 55(6) of the Family
Code.”

In a March 6, 2018 Resolution, the Supreme Court set the case for oral arguments, with a
scheduled preliminary conference on June 5, 2018.

During the preliminary conference, Falcis, who appeared on his own behalf and on behalf
of petitioners-intervenors, was ordered to show cause by June 6, 2018 on why he should
not be cited in direct contempt for his failure to observe the required decorum during the
preliminary conference which is a formal session of the Court. At that time, he was
wearing a casual jacket, cropped jeans and loafers without socks.

On June 6, 2018, Falcis filed his Compliance with the show-cause order.

Issue:
Whether petitioner Falcis is guilty of direct contempt of court during the June 5,
2018 preliminary conference.
Ruling:

Yes, Atty. Falcis acted in a contumacious manner during the preliminary conference.

Atty. Falcis is not an uninformed layperson. He has been a member of the Philippine Bar
for a number of years. As an officer of the court, he is duty bound to maintain towards
this Court a respectful attitude essential to the proper administration of justice. He is
charged with knowledge of the proper manner by which lawyers are to conduct
themselves during judicial proceedings. His Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility exhort him to maintain the requisite decency and to afford dignity to this
Court.

Lawyers must serve their clients with competence and diligence. Under Rule 18.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, "[a] lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without
adequate preparation." Atty. Falcis' appearance and behavior during the preliminary
conference reveal the inadequacy of his preparation. Considering that the Advisory for
Oral Arguments was served on the parties three (3) months prior to the preliminary
conference, it was inexcusably careless for any of them to appear before this Court so
barely prepared.

The preliminary conference was not mere make-work. Rather, it was essential to the
orderly conduct of proceedings and, ultimately, to the judicious disposition of this case.
Appearance in it by counsels and parties should not be taken lightly.

Atty. Falcis jeopardized the cause of his clients. Without even uttering a word, he
recklessly courted disfavor with this Court. His bearing and demeanor were a disservice
to his clients and to the human rights advocacy he purports to represent.

G.R. No. L-18727 August 31, 1964

JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-appellant,
ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant.

Doctrine:

"Titulo de Abogado" means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of
Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the
practice of law.

Facts:

The office in contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili.
The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the, spouses Don Pedro Cui and
 Dona Benigna Cui, now deceased. It acquired corporate existence pursuant to Act No.
3239 of the Philippine Legislative.

Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano
Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui. On 27
February 1960 the then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of
Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between them and embodied in a
notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office.
Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his brother's
assumption of the position.

When Dr. Teodoro Cui died, Jesus Ma Cui wrote a letter to Antonio Ma Cui demanding
that the office be turned over to him. As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns
upon their respective qualifications to the position of administrator.

Issue:
Whether the defendant, Antonio Ma Cui is an “abogado” and qualifies as
administrator of Hospicio de San Jose de Barili.

Ruling:

The specific point in dispute is the meaning of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma.
Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas but is not
a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio
Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred (for
immorality and unprofessional conduct), was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10
February 1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the
Hospicio de Barili.

We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context, the term "titulo de
abogado" means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but
membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law.
A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain
academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The
English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and
general signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are by license
officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom
peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.

The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing
test advisedly, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator
should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these,
should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer,
first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall
"make regulations for the government of said institution (Sec. 3, b); shall "prescribe the
conditions subject to which invalids and incapacitated and destitute persons may be
 admitted to the institute" (Sec. 3, d); shall see to it that the rules and conditions
promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act; and shall
administer properties of considerable value — for all of which work, it is to be presumed,
a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would be a
distinct asset.

Under this particular criterion we hold that the Jesus Ma Cui is not entitled, as against
Antonio Ma Cui, to the office of administrator.

It is a fact that the Antonio was disbarred for immorality and unprofessional conduct.
However, it is also a fact that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960, before he assumed
the office of administrator. His reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation,
upon proof no less than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place. When
Antonio Ma Cui was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities
resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.

G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs.

CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office,
respondent.

Doctrine:

There is no express provision of the Philippine Patent Law granting an Officer the
authority to determine the qualifications of persons who will be allowed to practice
before the Patent Office.

Facts:

Respondent is the Director of the Philippines Patents Office. He issued a circular

announcing that an examination will be held to determine who are qualified to practice as
patent attorneys in Philippine Patent Office.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition and injunction against respondent. Petitioner
contented that respondent acted in excess of his jurisdiction because a person who has
passed the bar examination, licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the
Philippines and is of good standing, is qualified to practice in the said office.

In his answer, respondent, through the Solicitor General, maintained that handling patent
cases are not limited to the application and practice of law but also require the application
of scientific and technical knowledge; that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent
Office or any quasi-judicial bodies from requiring additional qualification from those
who would want to handle cases in the said office; and that his jurisdiction was in
accordance with the Republic Act No. 165 (RA No. 165), which is the same with the
United States Patent Law wherein the Commissioner of Patents are authorized to
 prescribe examination in order to determine who are qualified to work in United State
Patent Office.

Issue:
Whether the respondent has the power to regulate who are qualified to practice
law in the Patent Office.

Ruling:

No. A careful examination of Section 78 of RA No. 165, where respondent relied his
argument contending that it was patterned according to the United State Patent Laws,
revealed that the provisions under the said Section “certainly and by far, are different
from the provisions of the United States Patent Law as regards [to the] authority to hold
examinations to determine the qualifications of those allowed to practice before the
Patent Office.”

There is no express provision of the Philippine Patent Law granting an Officer the
authority to determine the qualifications of persons who will be allowed to practice
before the Patent Office. Wherefore, petition granted.

G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.

Doctrine:

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists infrequent or customary

actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. The practice of law by attorneys employed
in the government, to fall within the prohibition of statute, has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services. The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive
as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The word private practice
of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the
public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or inconsideration of his said
services.

Facts:

Defendant was charged with the crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the
Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna. He was represented by counsel de officio but later on
replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the said case was represented by City
Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private
prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice, on the condition that
 every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official
leave of absence without payment for his service.

The appearance of Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the
accused invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al. GR L-1532, November 28,
1947, wherein the Court ruled that “when an attorney had been appointed to the position
of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he
ceased to engage in private law practice.”

The JP Court sustained the legality of the appearance of Fule and subsequently ruled on
the motion by upholding the right of the latter to appear and further stating that Fule was
not actually engaged in the private law practice based on the prohibition under Section
32, Rule 27, now Section 35, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court invoked by the counsel for
the accused.

Issue:
Whether City Attorney Fule violated the provisions of Section 32, Rule 27, now
Section 35, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not
constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules.

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists infrequent or customary

actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. The practice of law by attorneys employed
in the government, to fall within the prohibition of statute, has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services. The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive
as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The word private practice
of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the
public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or inconsideration of his said
services.

Also, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at
bar, who is a relative.

A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs.

ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.

Doctrine:
 People who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar and
may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who has been admitted to the
Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be
considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an "attorney."

Facts:

Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of EB Villarosa and Ashari Alauya was the
Executive Clerk of Court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi. Alauya, through
Alawi, purchased in installments one of the housing units belonging to EB Villarosa.
Later on, Alauya wanted to terminate his contract on the ground that his consent was
vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by
Alawi which made the contract void ab initio.

Alawi filed a complaint accusing Alauya of imputation of malicious and libelous charges
with no solid grounds; and usurpation of the title of “attorney”, among others. According
to Alauya, the complaint had no factual basis. He was merely acting in the defense of his
rights in making those malicious statements because suffered undue injury, mental
anguish, and financial suffering since a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his
salary because of his housing loan. Alauya also justified his use of the title "attorney"
since it was synonymous "counsellors-at-law", a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a
rightful claim. He said he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often
mistaken for "councilor" "konsehal'' or the Maranao term "consial", connoting a local
legislator beholden to the mayor.

Issue:
Whether a Shari’a counselor is considered an “attorney”.

Ruling:

No. People who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar
and may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who has been admitted to the
Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be
considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who,
having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law
in this jurisdiction.

Alauya’s reason that he does not use the term “counsellor or counsellor at law” because it
is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators is of no moment. His disinclination
to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney. Alauya
therefore is reprimanded for the use of excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent
 language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer; and for usurping the title of
attorney.

G.R. No. 175366 August 11, 2008

J-PHIL MARINE, INC. and/or JESUS CANDAVA and NORMAN SHIPPING

SERVICES, petitioners, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and WARLITO E. DUMALAOG,
respondents.

Doctrine:

The relation of attorney and client is in many respects one of agency, and the general
rules of agency apply to such relation. The acts of an agent are deemed the acts of the
principal only if the agent acts within the scope of his authority.

Facts:

Warlito E. Dumalaog (respondent), who served as cook aboard vessels plying overseas,
filed on March 4, 2002 before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a pro-
forma complaint against petitioners — manning agency J-Phil Marine, Inc. (J-Phil), its
then president Jesus Candava, and its foreign principal Norman Shipping Services — for
unpaid money claims, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

By Decision of August 29, 2003, Labor Arbiter Fe Superiaso-Cellan dismissed

respondent's complaint for lack of merit.

On appeal, the NLRC, by Decision of September 27, 2004, reversed the Labor Arbiter's
decision.

During the pendency of the case before the Supreme Court, respondent, against the
advice of his counsel, entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners. He
thereupon signed a Quitclaim and Release subscribed and sworn to before the Labor
Arbiter.

Issue:
Whether the act of Dumalaog in entering into a compromise agreement without
the assistance of a counsel is proper.

Ruling:

Yes, the act of Dumalaog in entering into a compromise agreement without a lawyer is
proper.
 The Supreme Court held that the relation of attorney and client is in many respects one of
agency, and the general rules of agency apply to such relation. The acts of an agent are
deemed the acts of the principal only if the agent acts within the scope of his authority.
The circumstances of this case indicate that respondent's counsel is acting beyond the
scope of his authority in questioning the compromise agreement.

Dumalaog has undoubtedly the right to compromise a suit without the intervention of his
lawyer cannot be gainsaid, the only qualification being that if such compromise is entered
into with the intent of defrauding the lawyer of the fees justly due him, the compromise
must be subject to the said fees.

In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent intended to defraud his counsel of
his fees.

G.R. No. 218721 JULY 10, 2018

BINGA HYDROELECTRIC PLANT, INC., Herein Represented by its Executive Vice-

President, ERWIN T. TAN, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondents.

Doctrine:

The authority to compromise a settled claim or liability exceeding P100,000.00 involving

a government agency is vested, not in the COA, but exclusively in Congress. An agency
of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a
department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled
corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein. The provision applies to all
GOCCs, with or without original charters. A GOCC cannot validly invoke its autonomy
to enter into a compromise agreement that is in violation of the above provision.

Facts:

Binga Hydroelectric Plant Inc (BHEPI), National Power Corporation (NPC), and Power
Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM), entered into a
Settlement Framework Agreement (SFA) to resolve and settle claims and disputes
between BHEPI and NPC in connection with the Rehabilitate-Operate-Leaseback
Contract of the BHEPI at Benguet. The SFA provided that NPC shall pay BHEPI an
amount equivalent to $5,000,000.00. It was preconditioned on the complete settlement of
the unpaid claims of the subcontractors and employees of BHEPI in the amount of
$6,812,552.55 and upon their execution of absolute quitclaims and waivers of rights and
claims against the NPC.

Since NPC failed to comply with the conditions of the SFA, BHEPI filed a case for
specific performance with damages in RTC Baguio City. The RTC dismissed the case.
During the pendency of the appeal with the CA, BHEPI and NPC filed a joint motion to
 approve a compromise agreement which was granted. BHEPI moved for the execution of
the judgment of the CA before the RTC, but the trial court noted that execution of money
claims against the government including GOCCs should be lodged before the
Commission on Audit (COA). Thus, BHEPI filed its petition for money claim before the
COA.

COA denied BHEPI's money claim and ruled that the power to compromise claims is
vested exclusively in the Commission or Congress. COA also ruled that PSALM, an
indispensable party, was not a signatory to the Compromise Agreement. Even if it was,
the Compromise Agreement must still be denied because it was not supported with the
necessary documents.

BHEPI moved for reconsideration but it was denied. COA reiterated its holding that the
power to compromise a claim is vested in the Commission, the President or the Congress.
Hence, it is Congress, upon the recommendation of the Commission and the President,
which has the authority to compromise the claims of BHEPI against the NPC. BHEPI
also argued that Judgment on the Compromise Agreement is already final and immutable
and COA cannot anymore rule on the validity of the Compromise Agreement and on the
veracity of the money claim.

Issues:
a) Whether the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the money
claim; and

b) Whether the finality of the CA's judgment preclude the COA from ruling on
the validity and veracity of the claims.

Rulings:

a) No. COA is correct that the Compromise Agreement is null and void because the
power to compromise the claims in this case is lodged with Congress.

The authority to compromise a settled claim or liability exceeding P100,000.00

involving a government agency is vested, not in the COA, but exclusively in
Congress. An agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the
Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-
owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein. The
provision applies to all GOCCs, with or without original charters. A GOCC cannot
validly invoke its autonomy to enter into a compromise agreement that is in violation
of the above provision.

In this case, the liabilities of the NPC in the amounts of $5,000,000.00 and
P40,118,442.79 far exceed P100,000.00. Congress alone has the power to
compromise the liabilities of the NPC. The participation of the COA, in conjunction
with the President, is merely to recommend whether to grant the application for relief
or not. In its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of BHEPI, the COA
 did make a recommendation to Congress, denying the claim embodied in the
Compromise Agreement.

b) No. The finality of the CA's judgment does not preclude the COA from ruling on the
validity and veracity of the claims. The COA still retains its primary jurisdiction to
adjudicate a claim even after the issuance of a writ of execution. As a matter of fact,
the claimant had to first seek the COA's approval of the monetary claim, despite the
rendition of a final and executory judgment validating said money claim against an
agency or instrumentality of the Government. Its filing with the COA is a condition
sine qua non before payment can be effected.

The duty to examine, audit, and settle claims means deciding whether to allow or
disallow the same. This duty involves more than the simple expedient of affirming or
granting the claim on the basis that it has already been validated by the courts. To
limit it would render the power and duty of the COA meaningless. This rationale also
rings true with the Compromise Agreement at hand, which again, as we have
demonstrated, needs not only the recommendation of the COA and the President, but
also the approval of Congress pursuant to EO No. 292.

G.R. No. 178158 December 4, 2009

STRATEGIC ALLIANCE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

RADSTOCK SECURITIES LIMITED and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION, respondents.

Doctrine:

The authority to compromise a settled claim or liability exceeding ₱100,000.00 involving

a government agency, as in this case where the liability amounts to ₱6.185 billion, is
vested not in COA but exclusively in Congress.

Facts:

PNCC was incorporated in 1966 for a term of fifty years under the Corporation Code
with the name Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). PD
1113, granted CDCP a 30-year franchise to construct, operate and maintain toll facilities
in the North and South Luzon Tollways. Sometime between 1978 and 1981, Basay
Mining Corporation (Basay Mining), an affiliate of CDCP, obtained loans from Marubeni
Corporation of Japan (Marubeni) amounting to 5,460,000,000 yen and US$5 million. A
CDCP official issued letters of guarantee for the loans, committing CDCP to pay
solidarily for the full amount of the 5,460,000,000 yen loan and to the extent of ₱20
million for the US$5 million loan. CDCP Mining secured the Marubeni loans when
CDCP and CDCP Mining were still privately owned and managed. In fine, the
Government owns 90.3% of the equity of PNCC and only 9.70% of PNCC’s voting
equity is under private ownership. the Marubeni loans to CDCP Mining remained unpaid.
 During the Estrada Administration, the PNCC Board of Directors passed a board
resolution admitting PNCC’s liability to Marubeni, which has been denied by the PNCC
officers for two decades. Three months later, Marubeni assigned its entire credit to
Radstock for US$2 million or less than ₱100 million. Radstock filed an action for
collection and damages against PNCC before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong
City, Branch 213 (trial court). the trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment
against PNCC. The trial court ordered PNCC’s bank accounts garnished and several of its
real properties attached.

RTC ruled in favor of Radstock.

Court of Appeals issued a TRO forbidding the trial court from implementing the writ of
preliminary attachment and ordering the suspension of the proceedings before the trial
court and the Court of Appeals.

PNCC and Radstock entered into the Compromise Agreement where they agreed to
reduce PNCC’s liability entered into the Compromise Agreement where they agreed to
reduce PNCC’s liability, supposedly from ₱17,040,843,968, to ₱6,185,000,000. The
Court referred the Compromise Agreement to the Commission on Audit COA for
comment. The COA recommended approval of the Compromise Agreement entered
therein.

Issue:
Whether the PNCC has a power to compromise.

Ruling:

No. Section 20 of the Administrative Code states “Power to Compromise Claims. - (1)
When the interest of the Government so requires, the Commission may compromise or
release in whole or in part, any settled claim or liability to any government agency not
exceeding ten thousand pesos arising out of any matter or case before it or within its
jurisdiction, and with the written approval of the President, it may likewise compromise
or release any similar claim or liability not exceeding one hundred thousand pesos. In
case the claim or liability exceeds one hundred thousand pesos, the application for relief
therefrom shall be submitted, through the Commission and the President, with their
recommendations, to the Congress.”

Under this provision, the authority to compromise a settled claim or liability exceeding
₱100,000.00 involving a government agency, as in this case where the liability amounts
to ₱6.185 billion, is vested not in COA but exclusively in Congress. Congress alone has
the power to compromise the ₱6.185 billion purported liability of PNCC. Without
congressional approval, the Compromise Agreement between PNCC and Radstock
involving ₱6.185 billion is void for being contrary to Section 20(1), Chapter IV, Subtitle
B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987.
 The provision of the Revised Administrative Code on the power to settle claims or
liabilities was precisely enacted to prevent government agencies from admitting liabilities
against the government, then compromising such "settled" liabilities. The present case is
exactly what the law seeks to prevent, a compromise agreement on a creditor’s claim
settled through admission by a government agency without the approval of Congress for
amounts exceeding ₱100,000.00.

What makes the application of the law even more necessary is that the PNCC Board’s
twin moves are manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the Government. First, the
PNCC admitted solidary liability for a staggering ₱10.743 billion private debt incurred by
a private corporation which PNCC does not even control. Second, the PNCC Board
agreed to pay Radstock ₱6.185 billion as a compromise settlement ahead of all other
creditors, including the Government which is the biggest creditor.

G.R. No. 96356 June 27, 1991

NONILLON A. BAGALIHOG, petitioner, vs.

HON. JUDGE GIL P. FERNANDEZ, Presiding Judge of Br. 45, RTC of Masbate; and
MAJOR JULITO ROXAS, respondents.

Doctrines:

a) It is true that property held as evidence in a criminal case cannot be replevied. But
the rule applies only where the property is lawfully held, that is, seized in
accordance with the rule against warrantless searches and seizures or its accepted
exceptions. Property subject of litigation is not by that fact alone in custodia legis.
b) “A thing is in custodia legis when it is shown that it has been and is subjected to
the official custody of a judicial executive officer in pursuance of his execution of
a legal writ." Only when property is lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is it
considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise.
Facts:

Rep. Moises Espinosa was shot to death shortly after disembarking at the Masbate
Airport. Witnesses said that one of the gunmen fled on a motorcycle. On the same day,
petitioner’s house, which was near the airport, was searched with his consent to see if the
killers have sought refuge there. The search proved fruitless.

Two days later, Capt. Roxas and his men from the Philippine Constabulary (PC) seized
the petitioner’s motorcycle and took it to the PC headquarters in Masbate. They had no
search warrant. The motorcycle was impounded on the suspicion that it was one of the
vehicles used by the killers. After an investigation, the petitioner and several others were
charged with multiple murder and frustrated murder for killing Espinosa and 3 of his
bodyguards.
 Petitioner filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 3878) against Capt. Roxas for the recovery of
the motorcycle with an application for a writ of replevin plus damages. The same then
filed an urgent manifestation for the deposit of the motorcycle with the clerk of court of
the RTC of Masbate, on the ground that PC soldiers were using the vehicle without
authority. The motion was granted by Judge Ricardo Butalid.

Judge Butalid later inhibited himself and Civil Case No. 3878 was transferred to Branch
45, presided by Judge Gil Fernandez. In the criminal cases, a change of venue was
ordered from Branch 45 of the RTC of Masbate to Branch 56 of the RTC of Makati.

Judge Fernandez then dismissed the said civil case. He ruled that the motorcycle in
question, now in the possession of the Clerk of Court of Masbate, is to be used as
evidence in criminal case pending trial before Branch 56 of the RTC of Makati. He
further opined that it has no jurisdiction to release evidence impounded or surrendered to
the PC-CIS Task Force Espinosa.

Judge Fernandez highlighted the rule that “property seized in enforcing criminal laws is
in the custody of the law and cannot be replevied until such custody is ended.” For him,
the proper Court to order its release, the motorcycle in question, is the Presiding Judge of
Branch 56 of the RTC of Makati.

Issue:
Whether the warrantless seizure of the motorcycle was unquestionably violative
of the “right to be let alone” by the authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled on the affirmative. As stated, the vehicle cannot even be
detained on the ground that it is a prohibited article the mere possession of which is
unlawful.

In dismissing Civil Case No. 3878, the respondent judge said he had no jurisdiction over
the motorcycle because it was in custodia legis and only the judge trying the criminal
cases against the petitioner and his co-accused could order its release.

It is true that property held as evidence in a criminal case cannot be replevied. But the
rule applies only where the property is lawfully held, that is, seized in accordance with
the rule against warrantless searches and seizures or its accepted exceptions. Property
subject of litigation is not by that fact alone in custodia legis. "A thing is in custodia legis
when it is shown that it has been and is subjected to the official custody of a judicial
executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ." Only when property is
lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is it considered in the custody of the law, and not
otherwise.
 The circumstance that Judge Fernandez ordered the motorcycle to be deposited with the
clerk of court on motion of the petitioner did not place the vehicle in custodia legis. The
respondent judge had no authority over it because it had not been lawfully seized nor had
it been voluntarily surrendered to the court by the petitioner. The private respondent
observed in his comment that "it is only when the exhibits are offered in evidence and
admitted by the court that they are submitted to the custody of the Court, and, before that,
"they are usually in the possession of the prosecution." Even he agrees therefore that the
motorcycle is not in custodia legis.

G.R. No. 196390 September 28, 2011

PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), petitioner, vs.

RICHARD BRODETT AND JORGE JOSEPH, respondents.

Doctrine:

The general rule provides that the RTC has the power to return property held as evidence
to its rightful owners, whether the property was legally or illegally seized by the
government. Property used as evidence must be returned once the criminal proceedings to
which it relates have terminated, unless it is then subject to forfeiture or other
proceedings. However, Sec. 20 of RA 9165 provides that “During the pendency of the
case in the RTC, no property, or income derived therefrom, which may be confiscated
and forfeited, shall be disposed, alienated or transferred and the same shall be in custodia
legis and no bond shall be admitted for the release of the same.”

Facts:

Respondents Brodett and Joseph were accused of violating the provisions of RA 9165 for
the possession and sale of dangerous drugs. In the course of the criminal proceedings,
respondents filed a motion to return non-drug evidence. They sought to reclaim several
non-drug personal items (including a car registered in the name of Brodett’s sister) which
were seized, but the PDEA refused to return the same.

The prosecution argued for the seized effects to remain on hold in order for the parties to
exhaust every possible evidentiary value. The RTC ordered for the car to be released,
which was opposed by the PDEA through their motion for reconsideration. The CA
affirmed the RTC’s decision for the release of the car.

Issue:
Whether the seized car should remain in the custody of the authorities.

Ruling:

Yes. Generally, the RTC is vested with legal discretion in the matter of disposing of
property claimed as evidence, and such discretion extends even to the manner of
 proceeding in the event the accused claims the property was wrongfully taken from him.
Thus, the trial court has the power to return property held as evidence to its rightful
owners, whether the property was legally or illegally seized by the government. Property
used as evidence must be returned once the criminal proceedings to which it relates have
terminated, unless it is then subject to forfeiture or other proceedings.

However, Sec. 20 of RA 9165 provides that “During the pendency of the case in the
RTC, no property, or income derived therefrom, which may be confiscated and forfeited,
shall be disposed, alienated or transferred and the same shall be in custodia legis and no
bond shall be admitted for the release of the same.”

In this case, the RTC granted respondent’s motion to return non-drug evidence when the
criminal proceedings were still going on, and the trial was yet to be completed. Ordering
the release of the car at that point of the proceedings was premature.

G.R. No. 205956 February 12, 2014

P/SUPT. HANSEL M. MARANTAN, petitioner, vs.

ATTY. JOSE MANUEL DIOKNO and MONIQUE CU-UNJIENG LA'O, respondents.

Doctrines:

a) The proceedings for punishment for indirect contempt are criminal in nature.
Specifically, it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to
bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. Intent is a necessary element in criminal
contempt and no one can be punished for criminal contempt unless the evidence
makes it clear that he intended to commit it.

b) The maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary is as important to the

maintenance of freedom of speech. Hence, the Clear and Present Danger rule may
serve as an aid in determining the proper constitutional boundary between these two
rights. This means that the evil consequence of the comment must be extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before an utterance can be
punished.

Facts:

P/Supt. Marantan was the respondent in a criminal case and herein Respondents were the
petitioners, with Diokno as the counsel. While the case was not yet resolved with finality,
Marantan was again involved in a shooting incident. Respondents then held a press
conference regarding Marantan’s guilt and that it was then 8 years since their loved ones
were killed.

Feeling aggrieved, Marantan filed a case to cite Respondents for in contempt of the Court
for a violation under Sec.3, (d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or Not Respondents violated Sec. 3, (d), of the Rules of Court.

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court held that the proceedings for punishment for indirect contempt
are criminal in nature. Specifically, it is an act obstructing the administration of justice
which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. Intent is a necessary element
in criminal contempt and no one can be punished for criminal contempt unless the
evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court held the maintenance of the independence of the
Judiciary is as important to the maintenance of freedom of speech. Hence, the Clear and
Present Danger rule may serve as an aid in determining the proper constitutional
boundary between these two rights. This means that the evil consequence of the comment
must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before an
utterance can be punished.

These were not present in this case. The statements made by the respondents were an
expression of their opinion that their loved ones were murdered by Marantan. This is
their position in the previous case. The court finds no malice in the face of these
statements. Furthermore, they were only stating the time that has passed since the petition
was filed and without any action from the court. There appears no attack or insult on the
dignity of the Court.

G.R. No. 147786 January 20, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.

ERIC GUILLERMO y GARCIA, appellant.

Doctrines:

a) Under Article III of the 1987 Constitution, a confession to be admissible must

satisfy the following requisites: (a) the confession must be voluntary; (b) the
confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent
counsel; (c) the confession must be express; and (d) the confession must be in
writing.

b) The constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation or the Miranda rights do

not apply to spontaneous statements, or those not elicited through questioning by
law enforcement authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the appellant
verbally admits to having committed the offense.

Facts:
 Victor Keyser (Keyser) was the owner and manager of Keyser Plastic Manufacturing
Corporation while the appellant, Eric Guillermo (Guillermo), was an employee thereof.
The appellant was charged for murder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death.
Thus, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) was made subject to an automatic
review at the Supreme Court.

Based on the Information filed, Guillermo attacked, assaulted and hit Keyser on the head
and thereafter cut the latter into pieces using a saw. The appellant initially pleaded guilty
to the charge of murder by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, however,
he withdrew such plea. Upon re-arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the aforesaid
charge.

The appellant contended that his conviction was based on inadmissible evidence as he
was not informed of his constitutional rights when he was investigated by the police nor
was he provided with the services of counsel during custodial investigation.

Issue:
Whether the evidence of the prosecution is sufficient to prove the appellant’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:

Yes. The prosecution had sufficiently proven the appellant’s guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.

Under Article III of the 1987 Constitution, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the
following requisites: (a) the confession must be voluntary; (b) the confession must be
made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (c) the confession must
be express; and (d) the confession must be in writing.

Although the confession of Guillermo to the police fell short of the requisites provided by
the Constitution, the prosecution was still able to sufficiently establish the guilt of the
appellant beyond reasonable doubt through the confessions that Guillermo made to
Campos, the neighboring security guard, and to the members of the media.

The constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation or the Miranda rights do not

apply to spontaneous statements, or those not elicited through questioning by law
enforcement authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the appellant verbally
admits to having committed the offense. When Guillermo was interviewed by the media,
he spontaneously admitted his guilt to them. He even supplied the details regarding the
commission of the crime.

Moreover, under the Rules of Court, a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites
concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements
were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements
must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. All
these requisites are present in the instant case. Guillermo had just been through a startling
occurrence which is the death of his employer. His admission to Campos was made while
he was still under the influence of said startling occurrence and before he had an
opportunity to devise or contrive a story.

It is also important to note that although treachery was not sufficiently proven by the
prosecution as none of the prosecution witnesses knew how the attack was initiated or
carried out by Guillermo, there was one attendant circumstance that the prosecution’s
evidence had proven. Under Article 248, paragraph 6 of the Revised Penal Code,
"outraging or scoffing at the corpse" is a qualifying circumstance. Dismemberment of a
dead body is one manner of outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim.

Thus, the prosecution had sufficiently proven the appellant’s guilt for the crime of murder
beyond reasonable doubt.