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2017 COAT Practice Manual 4th Edition - Final
2017 COAT Practice Manual 4th Edition - Final
for Tribunals
STANDING COMMITTEE OF
ATTORNEYS-GENERAL
The content of the first edition of this manual was produced for the Council of Australasian Tribunals by the
following team from Monash University:
The content of the manual was revised for this second edition by Professor Andrew Clarke (Head of Victoria Law
School, Faculty of Business and Law, Victoria University) with assistance from Zoe Moses.
The content of the manual was revised for the third and fourth editions by Mark Smyth (Solicitor, Herbert Smith
Freehills and co-author of the latest edition of Control of Government Action). Anne Britton, Justin Toohey and
Emeritus Professor Robin Creyke also reviewed and commented on the fourth edition.
This work is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research or as permitted
under the Copyright Act 1968, no part may be reproduced by any process without prior written permission from
the Council of Australasian Tribunals. Requests and enquiries concerning reproduction and rights should be
addressed to:
Secretary
Council of Australasian Tribunals
The Council of Australasian Tribunals does not warrant or represent that the information contained within this
publication is free of errors or omissions. Neither the Council nor its consultants will be liable to persons who
rely on the information contained in this manual for any loss, damage, cost or expense whether direct, indirect,
consequential or special, incurred by, or arising by reason of, any person using or relying on the publication,
whether caused by reason of any error, omission or misrepresentation in the publication or otherwise.
Contents
This, the fourth edition of the Manual, is the most recent concrete expression of His Honour’s
visionary leadership. It has been achieved under the skilful editorship of Mark Smyth, who
also edited the 3rd edition. Mark Smyth is both a senior practicing lawyer and co-author,
with Robin Creyke and John McMillan, of Control of Government Action; Text Cases and
Commentary, Lexis Nexis 4th edn 2015. Professor Robin Creyke reviewed this edition. We
thank Robin for her valuable contribution.
COAT is indebted to Mark and Robin. Their work has ensured that the Manual now is the
living resource Downes J intended.
COAT’s purpose in first publishing the Manual was to provide a readily accessible and
reliable specialist resource capable of assisting members of civil and administrative tribunals
undertake their challenging work. That remains the broadest expression of its purpose. I am
confident that all tribunal members can find much in this edition that will be of use to them
in that regard.
But COAT is also aware that not every Australasian tribunal has capacity to support routine
in-house programs of professional learning and development. Previous editions of the
Manual have been drawn on by many tribunals as essential induction and training materials.
COAT is confident that this revised and updated 4th edition will continue to be useful for
that purpose. Many new and existing members of tribunals working in high volume areas of
decision making may well find the Manual an essential resource.
This edition of the Manual has a single editor but, as with previous editions, its content has
necessarily drawn on the work of many dedicated contributors from across Commonwealth,
state and New Zealand tribunals. COAT warmly acknowledges all of their intellectual
contributions to the Manual. Without their input the Manual would not exist. Members are
encouraged to consider how they might contribute to future editions.
Anne Britton has supervised the production of both the 3rd and 4th editions on behalf of the
COAT Executive. Anne has charmed time-poor contributors, secured an excellent editor and
successfully produced two editions of the Manual on a miniscule budget. In addition, she has
used her experience as a senior tribunal member and knowledge of the law, to contribute to
the oversight of each edition. I stand in awe!
There is no end point to learning how best to conduct a fair and efficient hearing in a tribunal.
In time this 4th edition will need to be reviewed and replaced but until then I commend it
to you as the next, energetic and vital, stage of the Manual’s evolution as a living resource.
The Hon Duncan Kerr
Chair
Council of Australasian Tribunals
3 March 2017
xii Preface to the Fourth Edition
Comments
The Practice Manual for Tribunals is designed to be a practical resource that assists tribunal
members to undertake their duties. The Council would welcome feedback in relation to the
form and content of the manual and, in particular, any suggestions for additional areas that
should be covered in the manual.
Comments may be directed to the following email address: [email protected]
Chapter One: The Nature of Tribunals 1
1.1. Key points
Jurisdiction and powers:
• There is no single definition of the term ‘tribunal’ which can adequately describe the
range of bodies to which the term is applied, and that can distinguish tribunals from
courts and from the ordinary agencies of government.
• There is a functional distinction between courts and tribunals at the Commonwealth or
federal level, where the Australian Constitution requires a separation of administrative
as opposed to judicial powers.
• In the states and territories of Australia, and in New Zealand (which has a unitary system
of government), the roles of courts and tribunals may be less easy to distinguish and
may overlap. There is not the same strict separation of form and function.
• Most tribunals are established by statute. As creatures of statute, their powers are set
out by statute and limited as such.
1 N Rees, ‘Procedure and evidence in “court substitute” tribunals’ (2006) 28 Australian Bar Review 41 at 41.
Chapter One: The Nature of Tribunals 3
2 L Pearson, ‘The Vision Splendid: Australian Tribunals in the 21st Century’ (Paper presented at the ANU’s Public Law in
the Age of Statutes Conference, ANU, 24 October 2014).
4 Chapter One: The Nature of Tribunals
to distinguish and may overlap. That is, there is not the same strict separation of form and
function as there is at the federal level.3
Parliaments, as sovereign law making bodies, subject to the types of constitutional restrictions
noted above, can choose to give a function to a tribunal rather than a court. It will usually be
for one or more of the following reasons.
• Limitations of judicial review. Courts are tasked with judicial review or certain types
of appeal from administrative decision-makers. Judicial review is, broadly speaking,
concerned with the legality of a decision. Merits review tribunals, by contrast, ‘stand in
the shoes’ of the original decision-maker and can therefore offer external review of an
administrative decision on the basis of both the legality and the merits of the decision.4
• Informality of process. Tribunals are able to operate more flexibly and informally than
courts. This makes them more accessible to parties, and saves costs by reducing the
need for parties to have formal legal representation.
• Specialist members. Tribunals can be staffed with members with specialist skills and
expertise in areas other than law, as well as those with legal qualifications. This makes
tribunals an attractive forum for decision-making in specialised areas, such as planning
and disability assessments.
• Members on flexible terms. From the government’s point of view, the membership of
tribunals is more flexible than for the courts. The government can appoint part-time
members on fixed term contracts, whereas judges are appointed until a specified
retirement age.
At the other end of the spectrum of powers, the functions of tribunals and administrative
agencies overlap. Where the Parliament wants to provide for a body to make administrative
decisions or to review decisions made by somebody else, it can give the function to a tribunal
or to an administrative agency of government, such as a department of state. If it chooses
to give it to a tribunal, the usual reason is that it wants the function carried out with some
degree of independence from government agencies.5
Since there is no agreed definition of ‘tribunal’, it is necessary to specify to which categories
of tribunals this Manual refers. This Manual is written for and about tribunals that are eligible
3 Although state parliaments cannot confer powers on a State Supreme Court which would impermissibly undermine the
institutional integrity of that Court: Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531; International
Finance Trust Co Ltd v New South Wales Crime Commission (2009) 240 CLR 319; W Lacey, ‘Kirk v Industrial Court of
New South Wales: Breathing Life into Kable’ (2010) 34 Melbourne University Law Review 641.
4 See Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 4 ALD 139, 143; Drake v Minister for Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs (1979) 2 ALD 60, 68; Commonwealth, Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee: Report, Parl
Paper No 144 (1971) (the Kerr Committee Report).
5 A more detailed discussion of the functional differences between merits review, primary decision-making and judicial
review appears in: M Smyth, ‘Inquisitorial Adjudication: The Duty to Inquire in Merits Review Tribunals’ (2010) 34
Melbourne University Law Review 230; R Creyke, J McMillan and M Smyth, Control of Government Action (2015,
LexisNexis) ch. 3; P Cane, Administrative Tribunals and Adjudication (Hart Publishing, 2009) ch. 5.
Chapter One: The Nature of Tribunals 5
for membership of the Council of Australasian Tribunals (COAT). Under clause 2(1) of the
COAT Constitution,6 an ‘eligible tribunal’ is:
any Commonwealth, State, Territory or New Zealand body whose primary function
involves the determination of disputes, including administrative review, party/party
disputes and disciplinary applications but which in carrying out this function is not
acting as a court.
This definition excludes courts and bodies whose functions are primarily regulatory, advisory,
policy making or investigatory such as IPART. It includes government tribunals that are part
of a court, but which are not acting as a court when they determine disputes such as the
Administrative Appeals Division of the Magistrates’ Court in Tasmania. These tribunals,
although part of a court, exercise mainly administrative powers.
1.2.2. Jurisdiction
There is an important difference between a tribunal’s jurisdiction and its powers. The word
jurisdiction has different meanings according to context.
• Geographic territory. It is used to refer to the territory within which a power extends.
Because of Australia’s federal structure of government, each state and territory and the
Commonwealth is a separate jurisdiction in the territorial sense. New Zealand is one
jurisdiction.
• Subject matter. Jurisdiction can describe, in a general way, the kinds of matters that
a tribunal is authorised to decide. For example, the taxation jurisdiction of a tribunal
can mean its powers to determine taxation matters. If a tribunal purports to determine a
matter that it has no power to decide, it lacks jurisdiction and its decision, if challenged,
may be invalidated.
• Form of review. Jurisdiction can refer to the form of decision-making, review or appeal
that the tribunal is tasked with undertaking. For example, the review jurisdiction and
the original jurisdiction of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal or the State
Administrative Tribunal in Western Australia refer to different kinds of powers. (These
‘hybrid’ tribunals exercise ‘review jurisdiction’ when they review decisions made by
another administrator or tribunal, and ‘original jurisdiction’ in all other matters.)
The scope of a power. A narrower meaning of jurisdiction refers to the scope of a particular
power given to a tribunal. Whenever Parliament gives a power to a tribunal, it sets limits to
the power. The limits may be express (i.e. in writing) or implied (as a result of, or flowing
from, the written power). This may relate to the procedures for exercising power or to the
type of orders the tribunal can make.
1.2.3. Powers
A tribunal’s powers refer to the actions the tribunal can take and the decisions it can make
within the scope of its jurisdiction. It is conventional to refer to a tribunal’s powers to make
a decision, rather than its power to take action, because actions are based upon decisions.
1.2.3.1. Sources of power
Most tribunals are established by statute. As creatures of statute, their powers are set out
by statute and limited as such. More rarely, public sector tribunals may operate under
non-statutory powers of government. For example, a Minister who has the function of
reviewing government decisions may establish a tribunal to hear the applications and to
make recommendations. The final decision is the Minister’s and the tribunal in this instance
is an advisory body.
While courts have some common law powers, statutory tribunals have only the powers
that parliament has given them. A tribunal must be able to point to a legislative provision
authorising any decision that it makes. The provision may be found in the tribunal’s ‘governing
legislation’—the particular Act of parliament (and any rules or regulations made under it)
that establishes the tribunal and sets out its general powers, membership and procedures.
Powers may also be given to the tribunal by another Act, called an ‘enabling Act’ or an
‘empowering Act’. For example, the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) gives the
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal power to review certain decisions of government
agencies made under the Act.
Most powers are given expressly by legislation, but there may also be an ‘incidental’ or
‘implied’ power to do anything that is reasonably necessary to make the express power
effective. For example, giving advice about how to appeal a decision may be reasonably
incidental to a tribunal’s statutory power to receive and determine appeals. The incidental
power may be expressly given by the statute, or may be implied. For example, a merits
review tribunal is inherently able to receive evidence up to the time its decision is published.
Not all tribunals are established by government. Private sector sporting, religious,
professional, industrial and cultural associations often establish tribunals to deal with
complaints and disputes arising under their rules. These ‘domestic tribunals’ differ from
statutory tribunals in that they get their powers from contract rather than from legislation.
That is, their authority comes from the members’ agreement to abide by the association’s
rules. They must comply with the rules of the association, but are not subject to all of the
general legal requirements that apply to government tribunals. Depending on the subject
matter and nature of its decisions, there may be debate over whether such a tribunal exercises
public or private power and is thus amenable to judicial review.7
7 Justice Kyrou, ‘Judicial Review of Decisions of Non-governmental Bodies Exercising Governmental Powers:
Is Datafin Part of Australian Law?’ (2012) 86 Australian Law Journal 20; J Boughey and G Weeks, ‘ “Officers of
the Commonwealth” in the Private Sector: Can the High Court Review Outsourced Exercises of Power?’ (2013) 36
University of New South Wales Law Journal 316; Agricultural Societies Council of NSW v Christie [2016] NSWCA 331.
Chapter One: The Nature of Tribunals 7
tribunal must identify the relevant criteria in a given case, by considering the purposes
of the Act and the whole legislative scheme, and any lawful policies made by the
administering agency or Minister.
See DJ Galligan, Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of Official Discretion (1986).
powers to enforce its own determinations, for example, by imposing a fine or granting an
injunction.
This limitation on the power of Commonwealth tribunals is not a problem for an administrative
tribunal that reviews decisions of a government agency. The tribunal’s governing Act usually
states that the tribunal’s decision substitutes for the decision under review. The administering
agency is expected to give effect to the tribunal’s decision as its own. There is no breach of
the separation of powers because the tribunal’s decision has the same legal effect as that of
the agency.
A Commonwealth tribunal can be given a range of dispute resolution functions, such as
mediation, conciliation and arbitration that do not involve an exercise of judicial power.
In the Australian states and territories and in New Zealand there is no strict constitutional
separation of powers. Tribunals that are not part of the court system can be given judicial
powers. For example, in an application for the sale or division of co-owned land or goods,
VCAT has power to vary the property entitlements of the co-owners,11 a function that is
essentially judicial in nature. State and territory and New Zealand tribunals can also be given
power to make binding adjudications of disputes between private parties, to enforce their
own decisions, to grant ‘judicial’ remedies such as an injunction, and to award costs.
Administrative tribunals are found at both the state and territory, and Commonwealth
levels of government in Australia and in New Zealand. In Australia, the different range
of subject matters dealt with by state and territory, and Commonwealth tribunals reflects
the division of legislative power under the Australian Constitution.
• Civil tribunals: in the states and territories and in New Zealand, tribunals have taken
over from the courts the determination of some ‘civil’ disputes arising under private
law, in which the government is not necessarily a party. The classes of civil disputes
determined by tribunals vary from one jurisdiction to another, but may include matters
such as accident compensation, insurance, superannuation, consumer credit, building,
mining activity, discrimination, strata title, retirement village, co-ownership, residential
and retail tenancy disputes, and guardianship and mental health. Commonwealth
tribunals cannot be given statutory power to make enforceable determinations of the
rights and liabilities of the parties through an adjudicative process, due to the separation
of powers as described above. This limits the scope for Commonwealth tribunals to
determine civil disputes.
Within the category of review tribunals, there is a further distinction between tribunals which
review decisions of a primary decision-maker (first-tier review tribunals) and those which
review decisions of other review tribunals (second-tier review tribunals). For example,
reviews of decisions of the Department of Human Services (Centrelink) relating to pensions
and benefits are heard by the Social Services & Child Support Division of the Administrative
Appeals Tribunal (first-tier review) and a further right of review lies to the Administrative
Appeals Tribunal (second-tier review). The right to seek second review from the first tier
may be as of right or it may be restricted, for example, to cases where the first-tier panel
made an error of law.
The scope of each tribunal’s review function varies. The High Court has cautioned that the
word “review” “has no settled pre-determined meaning; it takes its meaning from the context
in which it appears”: Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1995)
183 CLR 245 at 261 (Mason CJ, Brennan and Toohey JJ).
The fullest type of merits review is by way of rehearing de novo, in which the tribunal
rehears the matter afresh, is not confined to the evidence or other material that was before
the primary decision-maker, and may consider new submissions and arguments. The parties
will usually present their evidence and submissions again to the tribunal.
Whether a merits review is to be by way of rehearing de novo depends on the relevant
statute. A common kind of legislative provision in tribunal legislation is one like s 43 of the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), which gives a tribunal power to exercise
all the powers and discretions of the primary decision-maker.13 This provision has been
interpreted14 as indicating a legislative intention to provide for de novo merits review.15 By
contrast, a body such as the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal is restricted to deciding
whether the decision of a trustee and/or insurer is ‘fair and reasonable’.
If the tribunal is able to re-exercise the powers of the primary decision-maker, the question is
what standards or criteria should guide its review. In an early decision on the interpretation
of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, a majority of the Federal Court held that
the Administrative Appeals Tribunal was required to consider the material before it and
arrive at the ‘correct or preferable decision’.16 This standard has been widely applied to other
Commonwealth, state and territory tribunals which undertake de novo merits review. Some
tribunal legislation expresses the standard as the ‘correct and preferable decision’, but the
meaning is the same. The tribunal must reach a decision that is legally and factually correct;
but if more than one decision is lawfully open, it must reach the preferable decision.17
The idea that merits review is a re-exercise of the powers and discretions of the primary
decision-maker has the following implications. There is no presumption that the decision
under review is correct. The tribunal is reviewing the decision and not the primary decision-
maker’s reasons. It does not have to find some legal flaw or factual error in the primary
decision in order to overturn it. It is enough that the tribunal concludes that another decision
is preferable.18
By contrast, some tribunals are tasked by statute with a much more confined review task.
For example, the National Energy Law and National Gas Law provide for a ‘limited merits
review regime’ of the Australian Energy Regulator’s distribution and pricing determinations.
13 See also Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 349(1), 415(1); Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) s 139(3).
14 Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth) s 37.
15 Re Greenham and Minister for the Capital Territory (1979) 2 ALD 137; Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic
Affairs (1979) 2 ALD 60 (‘Drake No 1’).
16 Drake No 1 (1979) 2 ALD 60 at 68 (Bowen CJ and Deane J).
17 R Creyke, ‘The Criteria and Standards for Merits Review by Administrative Tribunals’ in R Creyke and J McMillan
(eds), Commonwealth Tribunals: The Ambit of Review (1998, Centre for International and Public Law, ANU, Canberra)
13. See also the discussion of Kiefel J in Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286 at [140].
18 P Cane, Administrative Tribunals and Adjudication (Hart Publishing, 2009) ch. 5.
12 Chapter One: The Nature of Tribunals
Under the limited merits review regime, the Australian Competition Tribunal may only set
aside the AER’s decision if one of four grounds of review are met and the Tribunal is satisfied
that the AER’s decision is not a “materially preferable decision” under the objectives of the
legislation. Similarly the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal may change a decision under
review only if it is unfair and unreasonable.19
For a more detailed recent discussion of the nature and scope of merits review, see M Allars,
‘The Nature of Merits Review: A Bold Vision Realised in the Administrative Appeals
Tribunal’ (2013) 41(2) Federal Law Review 197.
20 JRS Forbes, Justice in Tribunals (4th edn, 2014, Federation Press, Sydney).
14 Chapter One: The Nature of Tribunals
tribunals exercising contractual powers to enforce the rules of an association. Some tribunals
exercise both disciplinary powers and also licensing and regulatory powers in respect of a
particular industry or profession.
Guardianship and administration tribunals and mental health review tribunals exercise a
‘protective’ jurisdiction. They are empowered to make orders to safeguard the interests of
vulnerable persons in special need of the protection of the state.
1.4.4. Diversity of tribunals
Apart from the differences in their subject area and the powers and functions given to them,
tribunals are diverse in the way they are constituted and operate.
• They may be constituted (for some or all matters) by a single member sitting alone, or
by a multi-member panel.
• They may be constituted by ‘lawyer-generalists’, or by members with specialist skills
and knowledge in the subject matter that the tribunal deals with. The ‘lawyer-generalist’
is more common in civil tribunals, and the non-legal specialist is more likely to be found
in administrative tribunals, alongside those with legal qualifications.
• Their members may be full-time, part-time or mixed.
• There may be only one party to the proceedings (as in occupational and business
licensing matters where the tribunal is the primary decision-maker) or there may be
two or more parties. The latter is more common in civil disputes and in merits review
applications.
• Matters may be dealt with at an oral hearing (which may be conducted in the presence
of the parties or by video or phone conferencing), or determined ‘on the papers’ without
an oral hearing.
• Tribunals that conduct oral hearings operate with varying degrees of formality,
depending on the nature of the proceedings. For example, disciplinary proceedings
involving serious allegations against a person are often heard in a more formal and
adversarial or ‘court-like’ manner, while social security and guardianship matters are
usually dealt with in a less formal manner.
• Tribunals that conduct oral hearings may operate in an adversarial manner closely
resembling a court, or may make greater use of their inquisitorial powers. The extent to
which this occurs is influenced by the tribunal’s culture, the tribunal’s statutory powers,
whether legal representation is permitted and the availability of staffing and resources.21
21 See generally: N Bedford and R Creyke, Inquisitorial Processes in Australian Tribunals (Australasian Institute of
Judicial Administration, 2006); R Creyke, ‘ “Inquisitorial” Practice in Australian Tribunals’ (2006) 57 Admin Review
17; J Dwyer, ‘Fair Play the Inquisitorial Way: A Review of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s Use of Inquisitorial
Procedures’ (1997) 5 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 5.
Chapter One: The Nature of Tribunals 15
In interpreting what is said in this Manual, it is important to bear in mind the diversity of
tribunals and to make allowances for the differences between tribunals.
22 Administrative Review Council, Better Decisions: Review of Commonwealth Merits Review Tribunals, Report No 39
<http://www.arc.ag.gov.au/Publications/Reports/Pages/Reportfiles/ReportNo39.aspx> at 2 January 2017.
23 Administrative Review Council, A Guide to Standards of Conduct for Tribunal Members (2009) <http://www.arc.ag.gov.
au/Documents/GuidetoStdsofConduct-RevisedAug2009.pdf> at 2 January 2017.
16 Chapter One: The Nature of Tribunals
25 The different kinds of statutory appeal are discussed in E Campbell, ‘Principles of Evidence and Administrative Tribunals’
in E Campbell and L Waller (eds), Well and Truly Tried: Essays on Evidence in Honour of Sir Richard Eggleston (1982,
LBC, Melbourne) 36–87 and Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000)
203 CLR 194 at 202–3. However, it is important to remember that the key question is the language of the statute, rather
than identifying a category of appeal in the abstract: Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 390 at [89].
18 Chapter One: The Nature of Tribunals
the English courts: as the judicial arm of the Crown, the courts exercised power to restrain
unlawful actions by lower courts and officials purporting to act on behalf of the Crown. This
power was called the ‘supervisory jurisdiction’.
A court exercising supervisory jurisdiction can make various orders: it can quash a decision
taken contrary to law; restrain a decision-maker from acting beyond their power; compel a
decision-maker to carry out a duty in accordance with the law; or declare whether an action
or proposed action is lawful or unlawful.
A person seeking judicial review of a decision cannot ask the court to examine the merits of
the decision, but must show that the decision or the process leading to it was legally flawed.
Only certain kinds of legal flaws are grounds for judicial review. A court might grant an
order in an application for judicial review on grounds such as:
• the decision-maker had no power to embark on making the decision in the first place,
and therefore no power to make the decision
• the decision-maker had power at the outset but made an error of law in the course of
making the decision
• the decision-maker was disqualified from making the decision by reason of bias
• the decision-maker failed to give a fair hearing to persons with interests at stake.
The grounds for judicial review are too many to list here, but are discussed at length in
general textbooks and commentaries on administrative law (see Textbooks and casebooks
in the References section of this Manual). The key grounds of review are also set out in s 5
of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), s 5 of the Administrative
Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1989 (ACT), s 20 of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld),
and s 17 of the Judicial Review Act 2000 (Tas).
protects the right of people affected by a determination of a tribunal to apply for judicial
review of the determination. This right is subject to ‘such reasonable limits prescribed by
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’, in accordance with
s 5 of the Act.
In judicial review, courts will review the legality of a decision but not its merits. If the
tribunal has breached no legal requirement, a court will not set its decision aside simply
because the court thinks another decision is preferable, or that it would have weighed the
evidence or the policy considerations differently. This limitation on the scope of judicial
review derives from the principle of separation of powers. When it reviews the legality
of a tribunal decision, a court is acting judicially. If, on the other hand, the court were to
review the tribunal’s decision on the merits and substitute its own decision, it would be re-
exercising the administrative power of the tribunal.
These limits to judicial review are observed even by courts in the states and territories, and
in New Zealand where there is no constitutional requirement for the separation of powers.
These limits to judicial review highlight the importance of merits review tribunals in
providing a form of external, independent adjudication on the merits to individuals who feel
aggrieved by an administrative decision. This vision of tribunals at the heart of the system of
administrative justice is a key tenet of the ‘New Administrative Law’ in Australia.26
References
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1989 (ACT)
Australian Constitution
Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld)
Judicial Review Act 2000 (Tas)
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ)
Property Law Act 1958 (Vic)
Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth)
Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth)
Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth)
26 R Creyke, ‘Tribunal Reform: A Commentary’ in S Kneebone (ed.), Administrative Law and the Rule of Law: Still Part
of the Same Package? (Australasian Institute of Administrative Law, 1999) 359; R Creyke ‘Integrity in Tribunals’ (2013)
32 Queensland University of Technology Law Journal 45; Justice M D Kirby, ‘Towards the New Federal Administrative
Law’ (1981) 40 Australian Journal of Public Administration 116.
20 Chapter One: The Nature of Tribunals
Case law
Agricultural Societies Council of NSW v Christie [2016] NSWCA 331
Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 183 CLR 245
Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 2 ALD 60 (‘Drake No 1’)
FAI Insurances Ltd v Winneke (1982) 151 CLR 342
International Finance Trust Co Ltd v New South Wales Crime Commission (2009) 240 CLR 319
Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531
Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 390
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 4 ALD 139
Re Greenham and Minister for the Capital Territory (1979) 2 ALD 137
R v Anderson; Ex parte Ipec-Air Pty Ltd (1965) 113 CLR 177
R v Kirby; Ex parte the Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254
Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286
Books
N Bedford and R Creyke, Inquisitorial Processes in Australian Tribunals (Australasian Institute of Judicial
Administration, 2006)
T Blackshield and G Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory (2nd edn, 1998, Federation Press,
Sydney)
P Cane, Administrative Tribunals and Adjudication (2009, Hart Publishing)
R Creyke, J McMillan and M Smyth, Control of Government Action (2015, LexisNexis)
JRS Forbes, Justice in Tribunals (4th edn, 2014, Federation Press, Sydney)
DJ Galligan, Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of Official Discretion (1986)
Chapter One: The Nature of Tribunals 21
Other
COAT Constitution <http://coat.gov.au/about/constitution-and-memorandum-of-objects.html> at 19 February
2017
22 Chapter Two: The Legal Framework
Interpreting legislation:
• All tribunals interpret legislation to ascertain the extent of their jurisdiction and powers.
• A tribunal is bound to follow a court’s ruling on the meaning of a statute.
• Statutory provisions are to be interpreted in the context of the Act as a whole and given
the meaning that would best achieve the purpose or object of the Act.
• In interpreting statutory provisions, if there is an ambiguity not able to be answered by
the words themselves, it is permissible to consider certain extrinsic materials, such as
the statute’s explanatory memorandum.
• Legal presumptions developed under the common law should be used to interpret
legislation, including that statutes do not operate retrospectively, do not interfere with
basic human rights and do not violate rules of international law.
• In practice, tribunals have the power to control their own proceedings. Even if res
judicata and issue estoppel do not formally apply, a tribunal should generally not allow
issues already decided by it to be re-opened without good reason.
Remaking decisions:
• Once a tribunal has handed down its final decision, the doctrine of functus officio applies.
• The tribunal therefore generally has no power to remake its decision unless that power
can be found in the statute or the decision reached was a ‘nullity’ because it was tainted
by jurisdictional error.
more flexible, and the two systems operated in parallel until they were fused or joined in the
nineteenth century.
While tribunals derive their powers from statute, common law principles and methods are,
however, relevant to tribunals in several different ways.
• The rules and principles which determine whether an administrative power has been
lawfully exercised by an executive agency or tribunal are largely of common law origin
in that they have been developed over time by courts and tribunals in the UK and
Australia. These include the principles of judicial review discussed in Chapter One at
1.6.3.
• When they interpret their governing legislation, tribunals and executive agencies use the
common law principles of statutory interpretation that have been developed by judges.
• Only courts can rule authoritatively on the interpretation of a particular statute or
provision. Once a court has declared what the statute means, lower courts and tribunals
are bound by the ruling in accordance with the common law rules of precedent.
Australia has a federal system of government in which each state and the Commonwealth
has its own legislature. The Australian Constitution limits the subjects on which the
Commonwealth is empowered to make laws. This is the section 51 list of powers. A
Commonwealth law purported to be made in breach of the limits in s 51 is unconstitutional,
and there have been many High Court cases related to s 51 legislative subject matter.
States have their own constitutions which, as noted above, usually provide that the State
Parliament has the power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the
state.
Another kind of constitutional issue arises where a state statute conflicts with a
Commonwealth statute on a matter in which the states and Commonwealth have concurrent
legislative powers. Section 109 of the Australian Constitution provides that in such cases the
Commonwealth law prevails, to the extent of the inconsistency.
A further limitation on parliamentary power is related to laws that seek to be retrospective
or to bind future Parliaments.
Retrospective law is that made by a Parliament that is operative before its date of creation.
This means that a person’s rights and liabilities may be affected in a fundamental way, for
what they did or did not do on date X may have been legal, but a law made at a later date may
have made their so acting illegal. Parliaments rarely make retrospective law for it is often
practically unpopular (and inevitably controversial) but they do have the theoretical power to
do so as sovereign bodies. Laws can be retrospective so long as Parliament makes its intention
clear and unambiguous.1 (There is a common law presumption against retrospectivity—see
this Chapter at 2.4.4. below). Parliaments can make laws that operate into the future, subject
to a future Parliament repealing them. A Parliament today cannot usually lock in a law to make
it impregnable to change as this would be in contravention of the form of the constitution
under which the Parliament operates. Constitutions themselves are usually subject to special
rules about how they can be changed (for example the Australian Constitution can only be
changed by a referendum requiring a majority of votes nationally as well as a majority of the
states), but usual laws can be changed by majority vote in Parliament.
1 In Maxwell v Murphy (1957) 96 CLR 261 at 267, Dixon CJ summarised the general approach taken by courts: The
general rule of the common law is that a statute changing the law ought not, unless the intention appears with reasonable
certainty, to be understood as applying to facts or events that have already occurred in such a way as to confer or impose
or otherwise affect rights or liabilities which the law had defined by reference to the past events.
26 Chapter Two: The Legal Framework
provision specifying that Acts commence on the date of Royal Assent or a specified period
after. See, for example, Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), Part 3.2
Usually a statute operates prospectively, that is, it comes into effect (or commences) from
a date later than the date on which the statute receives Royal Assent. But Parliament may
decide to give a statute an effect that is both retrospective and prospective, by specifying that
the statute commences from a date earlier than the date of Royal Assent. As noted above,
retrospectivity is rare and (usually) controversial.
2 See also C Cook et al Laying Down the Law (9th edn, 2015, LexisNexis) 9.9–9.20.
Chapter Two: The Legal Framework 27
The labels are assigned to particular instruments for reasons of convention, and do not
usefully distinguish them. It is more convenient to use generic terms such as subordinate
instruments or legislative instruments as a catch-all. The term ‘legislative instrument’ has
been adopted by the Commonwealth following the introduction in 2005 of the Federal
Register of Legislative Instruments.
• a local authority, or
There are provisions for the most important types of subordinate instrument to be scrutinised
by parliamentary committees in accordance with general standards, for example, the
Commonwealth’s Senate Standing Committee on Regulations and Ordinances.
Parliament may pass a resolution to ‘disallow’ a subordinate instrument, which has the effect
of repealing it.
Each subordinate instrument is made under power delegated by a specific Act, called the
‘parent’ or ‘empowering’ Act. Its title usually incorporates the title of the parent Act, which
simplifies the task of searching for it.
For example, regulations made under the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (NZ) may be called
the Residential Tenancies Regulations. If there is more than one set of regulations, they will
usually have a more specific title added in brackets, for example, the Residential Tenancies
(Caravan Parks) Regulations. A set of regulations will include an authorising provision
which identifies the provision of the parent Act under which they are made, for example,
‘These Regulations are made under s 140 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986’.
3 See Victorian Stevedoring and Contracting Co Pty Ltd v Dignan (1931) 46 CLR 73; Administrative Review Council,
Rule Making by Commonwealth Agencies, Report No 35 (1992) [1.6].
28 Chapter Two: The Legal Framework
4 For a comprehensive discussion of how the courts apply the grounds, see DC Pearce and S Argument, Delegated
Legislation in Australia (4th edn, 2012, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney) chs 12–17; R Creyke, J McMillan
and M Smyth, Control of Government Action (4th edition, 2015, LexisNexis, Sydney) chs 6 and 8; and PA Joseph,
Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (3rd edn, 2001, Thomson, Wellington) ch. 24.
5 Minister for Primary Industries and Energy v Austral Fisheries Pty Ltd (1993) 40 FCR 381.
6 Vanstone v Clark (2005) 147 FCR 299; Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (2013) 249 CLR 1.
7 McEldowney v Forde [1971] AC 632, 658 (Lord Diplock).
8 AN Hall, ‘Judicial Power, the Duality of Functions and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’ (1994) 22 Federal Law
Review 13, 45–48; Re Adams and the Tax Agents’ Board (1976) 1 ALD 251 at 257 (Brennan J).
Chapter Two: The Legal Framework 29
a permit to take abalone in Stingray Bay, the tribunal may make its decision on the basis that
the regulations are invalid insofar as they purport to apply to Stingray Bay. Alternatively, the
tribunal may refer the question of law to a court, if the tribunal’s governing statute provides
for it. This is rare.
Tribunals have taken different approaches to entertaining challenges to the constitutional
validity of a statute or subordinate instrument (see this Chapter at 2.3.1). One approach
is to assume, without expressly deciding, that statutes and their subordinate instruments
are constitutionally valid.9 The Administrative Appeals Tribunal has adopted the following
approach:
(a) the tribunal should approach matters on the assumption that the relevant legislation is
constitutionally valid;
(b) the tribunal is empowered to consider the constitutional validity of legislation in order
to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction to review the reviewable decision, and
if it considers that the legislation is unconstitutional, it should decline to exercise the
jurisdiction purportedly conferred on it by that legislation;
(c) the tribunal can form an opinion on whether legislation can apply within constitutional
limits to particular persons or in particular circumstances, and can act on that opinion
in determining applications for review of administrative decisions;
(d) however, the tribunal does not have jurisdiction to reach a conclusion having legal
effect that legislation is unconstitutional, and such a decision can only be made by a
court exercising judicial power;
(e) the tribunal should nevertheless proceed with caution where such issues arise; and
(f) the tribunal should give consideration to referring a question of law to the Federal
Court (Re Walsh and Commissioner of Taxation (2012) 130 ALD 200 at [19] per
Deputy President Jarvis).
9 Re Zimmax Trading Co Pty Ltd and Collector of Customs (NSW) (1979) 2 ALD 120 at 126 (AAT).
30 Chapter Two: The Legal Framework
10 C Cook et al Laying Down the Law (9th edn, 2015, LexisNexis) ch. 7.
Chapter Two: The Legal Framework 31
11 Commonwealth: s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 New South Wales: s 33 of the Interpretation Act 1987
Victoria: s 35(a) of the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 Queensland: s 14A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954
Tasmania: s 8A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1931 South Australia: s 22 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1915 Western
Australia: s 18 of the Interpretation Act 1984 Australian Capital Territory: s 139 of the Legislation Act 2001 Northern
Territory: s 62A Interpretation Act 1978.
12 New Zealand: s 5(1) of the Interpretation Act 1999.
13 See the approach to interpretation set out in M Kirby, ‘Statutory Interpretation: The Meaning of Meaning’ (2011) 35
Melbourne University Law Review 113.
32 Chapter Two: The Legal Framework
14 See DC Pearce and RS Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (8th edn, 2014, LexisNexis, Sydney) ch. 3.
15 R v Bolton: Ex parte Beane (1987) 162 CLR 514 at 517–18 (Mason CJ, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ).
16 Pearce and Geddes, above n 12, [6.3] at n 3 lists the Interpretation Act provisions of each jurisdiction. These provisions
give statutory force to a common law rule of interpretation.
17 See Pearce and Geddes, above n 12, at [5.2] onwards and [5.3743].
Chapter Two: The Legal Framework 33
Nevertheless, these Acts follow a dialogue model, so that legislation affecting the specified
rights is not directly invalidated but, if the legislation cannot be construed in accordance
with the rights and freedoms affirmed, a court may issue a declaration of incompatibility
with the rights.18 Even without similar legislation, courts and tribunals in other Australian
jurisdictions read statutes with the presumption that Parliament did not mean to restrict
fundamental rights and liberties, such as freedom of movement, access to the courts, the right
to privacy, the right to procedural fairness, and the right of one in possession of premises to
prevent the entry of others. Courts also presume that Parliament did not intend to interfere
with legal professional privilege, the privilege against self-incrimination, enforcement of
contract rights or vested property rights without compensation. The presumptions will be
rebutted only if the statute gives ‘a clear expression of an unmistakable and unambiguous
intention’ to the contrary.19 Usually the contrary intention requires express words, but may
be implied if the statute would otherwise be inoperative or meaningless.20 For example, in
Coco v The Queen,21 the High Court of Australia held that a warrant issued under a statutory
provision that authorised police ‘to use a listening device’ did not authorise police to make
a clandestine entry onto private premises to install the device. The court was not prepared to
imply from the statute authority for conduct that would otherwise be a trespass. There were
no express words to extend the authority so far, and there was no necessity to imply it in
order to give effect to the statute.22
Apart from presumptions of non-interference with common law values, a number of other
rebuttable presumptions are used in the interpretation of statutes. Some of the other main
common law presumptions of interpretation are:
• statutes do not operate retrospectively
• Parliament does not interfere with basic human rights
• re-enactment of a provision or word amounts to approval of a previous judicial
interpretation of the word or provision
• legislation does not bind the Crown
• penal i.e. criminal provisions are strictly construed
• removal of property rights is subject to compensation
• legislation does not have effect beyond its jurisdictional territory
• legislation is presumed not to violate rules of international law and treaty obligations.
18 ibid., C Evans and S Evans, Australian Bills of Rights: The Law of the Victorian Charter and ACT Human Rights Act
(2008, LexisNexis, Melbourne); Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1.
19 Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427 at 435 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
20 ibid.
21 ibid.
22 See also Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277, 304 (O’Connor J).
34 Chapter Two: The Legal Framework
See Justice J Spigelman AC, ‘Principle of Legality and the Clear Statement Principle’ (2005)
79 Australian Law Journal 769.
Usually, tribunals are not part of the court hierarchy. A tribunal is, however, bound by the
rulings of:
• a court to which the tribunal’s decision may be appealed on a question of law
• a court which is empowered to review decisions of the tribunal in accordance with the
common law process of judicial review (see Chapter One at 1.6.3)
• any court which stands above those courts in the judicial hierarchy.
Tribunals are not bound by propositions of law laid down in the decisions of another tribunal
which was not exercising judicial power. For consistency, however, tribunal members
follow decisions of an appeal panel of the tribunal. A more complex position arises for
tribunals which exercise judicial power (such as certain divisions of the amalgamated civil
and administrative tribunals in the Australian states and territories). Regardless of whether
they are formally binding, tribunal decisions may be ‘persuasive’. It is highly desirable that
tribunals maintain, so far as possible, consistency of decision-making within a tribunal. This
can be achieved by applying a prior tribunal decision where convinced of its value on the
basis of a thorough consideration of the factors set out in this Chapter at 2.5.2. The reasons
for this approach have been summarised as follows:
60 The Tribunal is not bound by precedent or the doctrine of stare decisis in the strict
sense in relation to being formally bound by earlier decisions of the Tribunal. However,
for a number of reasons, I consider the Tribunal should ordinarily follow decisions of
the Appeal Panel and decisions of the Tribunal as constituted by the President or the
Deputy Presidents.
61 The reasons why these decisions should be followed is because they are authoritative
and they go some way to seeking to ensure consistency in the Tribunal’s decision-
making ...
63 The Tribunal should only refuse to follow a decision of the Appeal Panel or the
Tribunal as constituted by the President or the Deputy Presidents if it concludes that
the previous decision is clearly wrong. (Judicial Member M A Robinson, Rittau v
Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Service [2000] NSWADT 186).
Common law method draws a distinction between the ratio decidendi (reason for deciding)
and obiter dicta (things said by the way). Only the former is capable of binding courts and
tribunals lower in the hierarchy. The ratio decidendi is any proposition of law expressly or
impliedly used to reach the final decision, or to decide any issue that is a step towards the
final decision. Any other statements of legal principle are obiter dicta and are not binding.
For example, assume that a judge says:
The documents in question were brought into existence for the purpose of being
presented to Cabinet, and are therefore exempt from disclosure under the Freedom
of Information Act. It would be otherwise if they were brought into being for a
departmental purpose, and it was subsequently decided to present them to Cabinet,
but that is not the case here.
36 Chapter Two: The Legal Framework
In this example, the statement in the first sentence is ratio decidendi and the statement in the
second sentence is obiter dicta because it deals with a factual situation that is different from
the facts in the actual case.
The rules of precedent have a more limited application to rulings on the meaning of particular
legislation. A ruling of a court on the meaning of a legislative provision does not bind a
tribunal which is interpreting a different statute, even if the same word or phrase is used.23
23 See Pearce and Geddes, above n 12, [1.7];. C Cook et al Laying Down the Law (9th edn, LexisNexis, 2015) Ch 6.
Chapter Two: The Legal Framework 37
Res judicata may be pleaded as a defence to a lawsuit. It prevents a party from re-litigating
a suit (or ‘cause of action’) that has been determined by a court in an earlier, completed
proceeding between the same parties. This is also called cause of action estoppel (estoppel
means that a party is legally precluded or disqualified from advancing a particular claim or
argument). For example, A sues B for negligently causing damage to A’s car. A’s claim is
dismissed by the court. Later, A brings against B another suit which is essentially the same
as the earlier one. B can plead res judicata.
Related to res judicata is a broader principle of issue estoppel, under which parties are
precluded from challenging a finding on an issue of fact or law decided by a court in an
earlier proceeding between them. For example, assume that in maintenance proceedings
brought by Y against X, a court finds that X is the father of Y’s child. When X later applies
to the court for a contact order, Y opposes the application and argues that X should not
have contact because he is not the father. Y will be estopped from disputing the finding of
paternity made in the earlier proceedings between the parties.
Australian authorities usually reserve the term res judicata to mean cause of action estoppel,
and treat issue estoppel as a separate, although related, principle.24 Sometimes, though, res
judicata is used to mean issue estoppel, which can lead to confusion.
There has been much controversy as to whether these principles should extend to tribunal
decisions, so as to preclude a party re-opening a decision or a finding by the tribunal in an
earlier completed proceeding.
24 The distinction is explained in Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 at 532 (Dixon J).
25 A N Hall, ‘Res Judicata and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’ (1994) 2 Aust J Admin Law 22, and n 2; McEvoy
strongly agrees: T J F McEvoy, ‘Res Judicata, Issue Estoppel and the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal:
A Square Peg into a Round Hole?’ (1996) 4 Aust J Admin Law 37, 38.
26 (1973) 130 CLR 353.
27 (1988) 15 ALD 313.
28 Re Hospital Benefit Fund (WA) Inc and Department of Health, Housing & Community Services (1992) 28 ALD 25, [15].
38 Chapter Two: The Legal Framework
does not apply in the AAT.29 Pearce has concluded ‘it appears that the view rejecting the
applicability of estoppel and res judicata is that which the Tribunal will follow.’30 Having
considered these authorities, Weinberg J reached the contrary decision in relation to the
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT). If a cause of action estoppel can arise
out of a ‘final decision’ made by a ‘judicial tribunal’, and if for this purpose a body can be
a ‘judicial tribunal’ even though it is not a court of law in any strict sense, there seems no
reason why a decision by VCAT, at least in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, should
not be capable of giving rise to such an estoppel. And applying the reasoning, but not the
conclusion, of Wilcox J in Comcare, Australia v Grimes (1994) 50 FCR 60 there is equally
no reason why an issue estoppel cannot arise out of a finding by VCAT in the exercise of
that jurisdiction.
Arguably, this creates a disconformity between the availability of issue estoppel in relation
to AAT proceedings, at the federal level, and VCAT proceedings, at the state level. At some
point, that apparent disconformity may have to be addressed by the High Court. For present
purposes, however, it is sufficient to say that the weight of recent authority suggests that
issue estoppel can arise out of decisions made by administrative tribunals and, in particular,
bodies such as VCAT.31
29 The authorities against it include Comcare Australia v Grimes (1994) 50 FCR 60; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic
Affairs v Daniele (1981) 5 ALD 135; Commonwealth v Sciacca (1988) 17 FCR 476; and Re Jebb and Repatriation
Commission (2005) 86 ALD 182.
30 D Pearce, Administrative Appeals Tribunal (4th edn, 2015, LexisNexis) 329.
31 Morris v Riverwild Management Pty Ltd [2011] VSCA 283. See also Steak Plains Olive Farm Pty Ltd v Australian
Executor Trustees Limited [2015] NSWSC 289 at [35].
32 E.g. Bogaards v McMahon (1988) 15 ALD 313 (Pincus J); Re Hospital Benefit Fund (WA) Inc
and Dept of Health, Housing and Community Services (No 1) (1992) 28 ALD 25 at 29–30 (AAT);
Re Simcock & Repatriation Commission (1993) 29 ALD 881 (AAT).
33 Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Daniele (1981) 5 ALD 135 at 139; Commonwealth v Sciacca (1988) 17
FCR 476 at 480; Midland Metals Overseas Ltd v Comptroller-General of Customs (1991) 30 FCR 87 at 96–97; Comcare
Australia v Grimes (1994) 50 FCR 60 at 64.
34 Kuligowski v Metrobus (2004) 220 CLR 363.
35 ibid. 373–74.
Chapter Two: The Legal Framework 39
conclusive. It is enough that the decision is completely effective unless and until it is revoked
or amended, and that it is ‘final and conclusive on the merits’.36
For issue estoppel to apply, the question to be decided must be identical to the question that
was decided in earlier proceedings. It is necessary to scrutinise the content of the previous
finding to determine if the issue is indeed the same. For example, in Kuligowski v Metrobus,
the issue in the later proceedings was whether the appellant had suffered an ankle injury
at work which rendered him susceptible to further injury.38 In the earlier proceeding, the
tribunal had found that he was no longer incapacitated by the ankle injury at the time. There
was no issue estoppel because the issues were not the same.39
The AAT has recognised that it does not need to resort to the principles of res judicata or
issue estoppel to promote finality of its decisions and prevent abuse of process. The Tribunal
can decline to revisit its findings, or decline to hear evidence afresh, by fully exercising its
statutory powers to determine its own proceedings.40 (Many other tribunals have similar
powers.) In Re Quinn and Australian Postal Corporation,41 the AAT suggested that this
power enabled it to determine whether to allow re-opening of an issue that had been decided
in earlier proceedings between the parties. Where a party seeks to re-open an issue of fact
that has already been determined by the Tribunal in an earlier proceeding between the same
parties, the Tribunal is required to consider whether to allow the matter to be re-opened and
whether to receive evidence afresh.42 In deciding how to proceed, it will need to consider ‘all
relevant circumstances’, including the requirements of procedural fairness.43
In Re Matusko and Australian Postal Corporation,44 the AAT said that it would not generally
allow issues already decided by the Tribunal to be re-opened without good reason. It
summarised the authorities as follows:
The Tribunal should use its flexible procedures to allow further consideration of
issues where there is a reason to do so, for instance:
(i) where there is a different decision
(ii) where there is a clear legislative intent
(iii) where the reconsideration decision is not final
(iv) where there has been a change in circumstances or fresh evidence or
(v) where justice to the parties requires a departure from the general rule.45
For tribunals which have statutory power to control their own proceedings, the approach
adopted in Re Matusko is preferable to relying on res judicata and issue estoppel, which are
of uncertain application to tribunals. The practical effect was summarised recently by former
AAT President Justice Downes:
although no res judicata or other estoppel and no formal doctrine of precedent
exists in administrative law, members of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal will
follow earlier decisions of the Tribunal unless they are satisfied that the earlier
decision is manifestly wrong. This is particularly so when the same issue arises in
proceedings between the same parties.
Effectively there is a res judicata in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal as well as
issue estoppel.46
44 (1995) 21 AAR 9.
45 ibid [33].
46 Justice G Downes, ‘Structure, Power and Duties of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia’ ( <http://www.aat.
gov.au/about-the-aat/engagement/speeches-and-papers/the-honourable-justice-garry-downes-am-former-pre/structure-
power-and-duties-of-the-administrative> )
Chapter Two: The Legal Framework 41
has made a decision is functus officio depends on the terms of the statute under which the
tribunal acts, and on whether the decision is a valid exercise of the tribunal’s power.47
Where tribunal members are asked to set aside or revoke their own decisions, or are
considering doing so of their own motion, it would be wise to consult the tribunal head.
To revoke and remake a decision where there is no power to do so would be to commit a
jurisdictional error. The tribunal will need to consider the following questions, to determine
whether it has the power to re-open its decision.48
1. Has the decision been made or ‘perfected’? Generally, a decision will be perfected
once the tribunal has reached a conclusion on the matter and has communicated it
publicly or to the parties in a way that indicates that it is final.49 Until the decision
has been perfected, it is merely provisional and the tribunal can reconsider it. For
example, in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQOY (2012) 206 FCR 25,
the Court held that the Tribunal could revise a decision which had been sent to the
Registry but not yet communicated to the parties. Justice Logan reasoned at [40] that
‘It is only when the decision of the [Tribunal] as constituted by the particular member
has either been pronounced orally or, if given in writing, sent to the applicant and
to the Secretary in accordance with the notification obligation that the core function
of review is complete. Before then, the member is entitled to have second (or more)
thoughts perhaps on the basis of further reflection on all of the material hitherto to
hand, perhaps stimulated by further material’.
Is the decision invalid because it is affected by a jurisdictional error, such as failure to
comply with statutory procedures? If so, grounds exist for a supervising court to set
the decision aside (see Chapter One at 1.6.2 and 1.6.3). In Minister for Immigration
and Ethnic Affairs v Bhardwaj,50 justices of the High Court of Australia held that a
decision affected by a jurisdictional error is regarded in law as no decision at all; the
tribunal has not validly exercised its power to decide, and is not functus officio. The
tribunal does not have the final say on whether it has made a jurisdictional error, but if it
has done so, it may be entitled to correct its error without waiting for a reviewing court
to set the decision aside.51 However, a finding of jurisdictional error cannot always be
47 Kabourakis v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria (2006) 25 VAR 449; Jayasinghe v Minister for Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs (1997) 48 ALD 265, 274 (Goldberg J); R Creyke, J McMillan and M Smyth, Control of Government
Action (4th edn, 2015, LexisNexis, Sydney) 1021–24.
48 R Orr and R Briese, ‘Don’t Think Twice? Can Administrative Decision Makers Change Their Minds?’ (2002) 35 AIAL
Forum 11–43.
49 Semunigus v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) FCR 533; X v Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs (2002) 67 ALD 355 at 361; Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 109
FCR 18. See also Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRNY (2013) 214 FCR 374.
50 (2002) 209 CLR 597.
51 ibid 612–17 (Gummow and Gaudron JJ), 618 (McHugh J), 638–40 (Hayne J); Comptroller-General of Customs v
Kawasaki Motors Pty Ltd (G405 of 1991) (1991) 103 ALR 661. However, Justice Downes has stated that: ‘except in the
clearest case, the making of a second decision by a tribunal will only lead to uncertainty of result. This is, at the least,
a sound reason for a tribunal to act with extreme caution before reconsidering a matter which has already been decided
…’: Re Michael and Secretary, Department of Employment, Science and Training (2006) 90 ALD 457, 460–61.
42 Chapter Two: The Legal Framework
predicted with confidence, and hence it may be prudent for the tribunal to wait for
a court to determine whether the decision was invalid. New Zealand tribunals have
stronger cause to await a ruling from a supervisory court. The decision in Bhardwaj
has not been considered by New Zealand courts, and is based on a conception of
invalidity that is inconsistent with the New Zealand authorities.52
2 What is the relevant statutory power? Is there an express or implied statutory power
to revoke or vary the decision? Even after a decision has been perfected, a tribunal
may exercise any statutory power to alter or re-open its decision, such as a power to
reinstate a dismissed application, or a ‘slip rule’ that empowers it to correct clerical
errors or accidental omissions from its decision or statement of reasons. In exercising
these powers, the tribunal will need to observe the requirements of procedural fairness
(see Chapter Three).
Are there other statutory indications either for or against an implied power to vary or
revoke? For example, if there is a right to appeal the tribunal’s decision to a second-
tier merits review tribunal, this may indicate that the tribunal cannot reconsider
its own decision.53 The contrary is indicated if the statute says that the tribunal’s
decision is ‘final’. It may also be relevant to consider the nature of the power, and the
consequences a power to re-open tribunal decisions might have for third parties and
for the operation of the statutory scheme.
References
Legislation
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld)
Acts Interpretation Act 1931 (Tas)
Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA)
Australian Constitution
Charter of Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic)
Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT)
Human Rights Act 1987 (NSW)
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA)
Interpretation Act 1999 (NZ)
Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic)
52 Martin v Ryan [1990] 2 NZLR 209; see generally, Joseph, above n 1, 771–76.
53 Sloane v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Multicultural Affairs (1992) 37 FCR 429. See also Minister for
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Watson (2005) 145 FCR 542; VQAR v Minister for Immigration
and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 900.
Chapter Two: The Legal Framework 43
Case law
Administration of Papua and New Guinea v Daera Guba (1973) 130 CLR 353
Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (2013) 249 CLR 1
Blackman v Commissioner of Taxation (1993) 43 FCR 449
Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464
Bogaards v McMahon (1988) 15 ALD 313
Cachia v Isaacs (1985) 3 NSWLR 366
Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427
Comcare Australia v Grimes (1994) 50 FCR 60
Commonwealth v Sciacca (1988) 17 FCR 476
Comptroller-General of Customs v Kawasaki Motors Pty Ltd (G405 of 1991) (1991) 103 ALR 661
Corporation of the City of Adelaide v Corneloup (2011) 110 SASR 334
Director of Housing v Andrew [2009] VSC 441
Kabourakis v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria (2006) 25 VAR 449
Kuligowski v Metrobus (2004) 220 CLR 363
Jayasinghe v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 48 ALD 265
Martin v Ryan [1990] 2 NZLR 209
Maxwell v Murphy (1957) 96 CLR 261
McEldowney v Forde [1971] AC 632
Midland Metals Overseas Ltd v Comptroller-General of Customs (1991) 30 FCR 87
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRNY (2013) 214 FCR 374
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQOY (2012) 206 FCR 25
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Daniele (1981) 5 ALD 135
Minister for Primary Industries and Energy v Austral Fisheries Pty Ltd (1993) 40 FCR 381
Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1
Morales v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1988) 82 FCR 374
Morris v Riverwild Management Pty Ltd [2011] VSCA 283
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Watson (2005) 145 FCR 542
Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277
R v Bolton; Ex parte Beane (1987) 162 CLR 514
Re Adams and the Tax Agents’ Board (1976) 1 ALD 251
Re B and Medical Board (ACT) (1995) 39 ALD 748
Re Hospital Benefit Fund (WA) Inc and Department of Health, Housing and Community Services (No 1) (1992)
28 ALD 25
Re Jebb and Repatriation Commission (2005) 86 ALD 182
Re Matusko and Australian Postal Corporation (1995) 21 AAR 9
Re Michael and Secretary, Department of Employment, Science and Training (2006) 90 ALD 457
44 Chapter Two: The Legal Framework
Books
C Cook, R Creyke, RS Geddes, D Hamer, and T Taylor, Laying Down the Law (9th edn, 2015, LexisNexis,
Sydney)
R Creyke, J McMillan and M Smyth, Control of Government Action (4th edn, 2015, LexisNexis, Sydney)
C Evans and S Evans, Australian Bills of Rights: The Law of the Victorian Charter and ACT Human Rights Act
(2008, LexisNexis, Melbourne)
PA Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (3rd edn, 2001, Thomson, Wellington)
DC Pearce, Administrative Appeals Tribunal (4th edn, 2015, LexisNexis, Sydney)
DC Pearce and S Argument, Delegated Legislation in Australia (4th edn, 2012, LexisNexis, Sydney)
DC Pearce and RS Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (8th edn, 2014, LexisNexis, Sydney)
Bias rule:
• The tribunal must be free from bias, whether actual or apprehended.
• Actual bias arises when it has been established that a decision-maker’s mind is so
closed to persuasion that contrary argument on an issue is ineffectual.1
1 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507.
46 Chapter Three: Procedural Fairness
• The test of apprehended bias is whether a fair minded lay observer might reasonably
apprehend that the decision-maker might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind
to the resolution of the issues.
• Bias may be inferred from a member’s behaviour, statements, personal interests and
past or present associations, or from the way the decision-making process is structured.
• Where a member perceives a logical connection between such an interest or association
and the merits of the decision, they should disclose the interest to the parties.
• The parties may waive the right to object to the decision-maker proceeding to hear and
determine the case.
• Following hearing the views of the parties, it is ultimately the member’s decision whether
to disqualify themselves from hearing the matter.
2 Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 585 (Mason J); Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR
476, 489 (Gleeson CJ).
Chapter Three: Procedural Fairness 47
In general, the more serious the decision and its consequences, the higher the standard of
procedure required.
There are two rules of procedural fairness.
• The hearing rule: a person or body having power to decide a matter must give the
affected persons an opportunity to state their case.
• The bias rule: the decision-maker must not be actually biased or must be impartial and
have no personal stake or interest in the matter to be decided.
3 Chief Justice R French, ‘Procedural Fairness — Indispensable to Justice?’ (Sir Anthony Mason Lecture, Melbourne,
7 October 2010) <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/current-justices/frenchcj/frenchcj07oct10.
pdf> at January 2017; M Aronson, M Groves and G Weeks, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (6th edn, 2017,
Thomson Reuters, Sydney) 376–78 and n 64.
4 Cooper v Board of Works for the Wandsworth District (1863) 143 ER 414, 417–20; Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40; Kioa
v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, 582–84 (Mason J). An alternative view is that the duty is implied by statute: Kioa v West
(1985) 159 CLR 550, 610–11 (Brennan J). The extensive academic debate between these two views is of little practical
import and as the High Court noted in Plaintiff S10/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship 246 CLR 636 at
[97]: ‘a debate whether procedural fairness is to be identified as a common law duty or as an implication from statute
proceeds upon a false dichotomy and is unproductive’.
48 Chapter Three: Procedural Fairness
Some tribunal statutes include a provision such as ‘the tribunal is bound by the rules of
natural justice except to the extent that the Act, or other Acts conferring jurisdiction on the
tribunal, authorise a departure from the rules’. This provision simply states the common law,
which applies even if the tribunal’s governing legislation is silent on the matter. In each case,
the tribunal will be under a common law obligation to observe procedural fairness, subject
to any modifications made by the Act.
In Chapter Two at 2.4.4, it was said that courts apply certain value-based presumptions when
interpreting statutes. Parliament is presumed not to intend to interfere with certain rights and
principles, such as freedom of movement. The presumption can be displaced only by clear
words or necessary implication. One of the common law presumptions relating to values
is that when parliament creates a statutory power to make decisions that affect the rights,
interests or the legitimate expectations of individuals, it intends that the power should be
exercised in accordance with the requirements of procedural fairness.5
This common law presumption is given statutory force in New Zealand. The New Zealand
Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 27(1) affirms the right to procedural fairness:
Every person has the right to the observance of the principles of natural justice by
any tribunal or other public authority which has the power to make a determination
in respect of that person’s rights, obligations or interests protected or recognised
by law.
Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights
and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to
any other meaning.
5 Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596 at 598–600 (Mason CJ, Deane and McHugh JJ); Jarratt v Commissioner of
Police (NSW) (2005) 224 CLR 44, 55–57.
6 The High Court is increasingly expressing scepticism about the value of the concept of legitimate expectation in the
context of breaches of natural justice: Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214
CLR 1; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH (2015) 256 CLR 326 at [30], [61].
Chapter Three: Procedural Fairness 49
If a court finds that the tribunal has breached procedural fairness in reaching its decision, the
court will usually quash the decision and remit the matter to the tribunal for re-determination.
Generally, an application for judicial review may be made as soon as the requirements of
procedural fairness are breached; an affected party does not have to wait until the tribunal has
made its final decision. In this situation, the court may restrain the tribunal from continuing
to breach procedural fairness.7
7 Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82, 116–17. But see Ucar v Nylex Industrial Products Pty
Ltd (2007) 17 VR 492, 519.
8 Administrative Review Council, A Guide to Standards of Conduct for Tribunal Members (2001) < http://www.arc.
ag.gov.au/Documents/GuidetoStdsofConduct-RevisedAug2009.pdf> at January 2017.
50 Chapter Three: Procedural Fairness
9 Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 584 (Mason J). An expansive interpretation of a legitimate expectation can be found
in Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596, 599 (Mason CJ, Deane and McHugh JJ). In that case, parents of two boys
found dead in the outback were held to have a legitimate expectation that they would be heard in opposition to any
potential adverse finding in relation to themselves and the deceased in the coronial inquiry into their sons’ deaths (once
they had been granted representation at the inquiry). But for a contrary, more current, view see n 5.
10 Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564.
11 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273; C Inc v Australian Crime Commission (2008)
106 ALD 453 but see Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1, 12
(Gleeson CJ), 27–28 (McHugh and Gummow JJ), 38 (Hayne J), 47 (Callinan J) and Plaintiff S10/2011 v Minister for
Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 290 ALR 616 at [65] for a more cautious approach to legitimate expectation.
12 See generally Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1.
13 Haoucher v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1990) 169 CLR 648; FAI Insurance Ltd v Winneke (1982) 151
CLR 342.
14 This appears to be the position in New Zealand as well, but this has been questioned: Fraser v State Services Commission
[1984] 1 NZLR 116 (CA) at 121 (Cooke J); PA Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2nd edn,
2001, Brookers, Wellington) [23.3.2].
Chapter Three: Procedural Fairness 51
The common law requirements may be excluded or modified by implication where they are
inconsistent with the particular procedures required by the Act, or with the operation of the
overall legislative scheme. For example, where a statute provides that an official holds office
‘at pleasure’ (that is, without notice or cause), this impliedly excludes any right to receive
natural justice or prior notice before dismissal.15 Where a decision must be made urgently
or with elements of secrecy, certain procedural fairness obligations may also be reduced.16
For a statute to have the effect of excluding or modifying the rules of procedural
fairness, that intention must be clearly manifested. As was noted by the High Court
in Commissioner of Police v Tanos (1958) 98 CLR 383 at 396, an intention to exclude
procedural fairness ‘is not to be assumed, nor is it to be spelled out from indirect reference,
uncertain inferences or equivocal considerations’.17 The following provisions commonly
found in tribunal legislation do not exclude procedural fairness (although the provisions may
be relevant in determining what procedures are required in the circumstances):
• a provision that directs the tribunal ‘to proceed with as little formality and technicality
and with as much expedition as the requirements of the relevant legislation and proper
consideration of matters permit’
• a provision stating that the tribunal may determine its own procedure, and may inform
itself as it thinks fit, without being bound by the rules of evidence.
15 Marine Hull & Liability Insurance Pty Ltd v Hurford (1985) 10 FCR 234, 240–42; Re Hatfield and Comcare [2010]
AATA 848; Leghaei v Director-General of Security (2007) 241 ALR 141; Jaffarie v Director General of Security (2014)
226 FCR 505.
16 Coutts v Commonwealth (1985) 157 CLR 91; Stewart v Ronalds (2009) 76 NSWLR 99. But see also Commissioner of
Police for NSW v Jarratt (2003) 59 NSWLR 87.
17 See also Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252 at 271 (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne,
Crennan and Kiefel JJ).
18 For a list of Commonwealth Acts which expressly exclude decisions from review for breach of natural justice,
including by tribunals, see Australian Law Reform Commission Traditional Rights and Freedoms – Encroachments by
Commonwealth Laws (2016) ALRC 129, ch. 14.
19 See especially Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57.
20 (1990) 170 CLR 596.
52 Chapter Three: Procedural Fairness
of Australia said that the common law rules will apply unless the Act shows an intention to
exclude them.21 The court will not easily be persuaded to find such an intention.
The fact that some of the statutory procedures conform to the common law requirements will
not be taken to show that parliament intended to exclude the other requirements.22 Aronson
et al observe that:
The exhaustive code argument faces an increasingly uphill battle and is regularly
rejected by the courts.23
This means that it may not be enough in all cases for tribunals to follow the procedures
set out in their governing legislation and in their Client Service Charter (if they have one).
The common law may require higher procedural standards, depending upon the nature of
the issues, the seriousness of the consequences of an adverse decision and other relevant
circumstances. Tribunals should therefore consider whether in all the circumstances,
procedural fairness demands more than compliance with the statutory procedures.
For example, the common law may require the tribunal to give the parties an opportunity to
make submissions on material obtained by the tribunal through its own inquiries (such as
online searches) or through the expertise of members, even though the statutory procedures
are silent about it.24
In Uelese v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2015) 256 CLR 203, the High
Court held that the statutory procedure, which mandated that the tribunal must not have
regard to any information presented orally during the hearing unless it had been provided in
a written statement to the Minister in advance, did not preclude the tribunal from considering
information adduced during cross-examination. Failure to consider this material, or to
adjourn the hearing so that the applicant could give the required statement to the minister,
was a denial of procedural fairness.
25 Cains v Jenkins (1979) 28 ALR 219; WABZ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2004) 134 FCR 271.
26 Russell v Duke of Norfolk [1949] 1 AER 109, 118; Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone
Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576; Park v Minister for Fair Trading [2000] NSWCA 96 at [58]; Seiffert v Prisoners Review
Board [2011] WASCA 148.
27 Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 225 CLR 88.
However, as noted above, there are exceptional cases in which the confidentiality and sensitivity of underlying source
material have justified its non-disclosure to an affected party. See for example: Tucker v Minister for Immigration and
Citizenship [2011] FCAFC 16 and Jaffarie v Director General of Security (2014) 226 FCR 505.
54 Chapter Three: Procedural Fairness
credit is in issue. At the same time, ‘a decision-maker is not obliged to expose their
mental processes or provisional views to comment before making the decision in
question’.28
Caution should be exercised in treating prior judicial decisions on the hearing rule as
precedents. The rule cannot be reduced to a code of legal rules for categories of decisions. Its
content is variable and requires particularised assessment. The specific requirements of the
rule depend on the legislative provisions, the nature of the decision to be made, the subject
matter of the case and all the circumstances.
Some examples of the application of the hearing rule are discussed in this Chapter at 3.5 and
in Chapter Five.
Further recent useful discussions of the content of the hearing rule in tribunals include:
• Justice G Garde, ‘Ensuring Procedural Fairness — Tribunals to Courts’ (22 April 2016,
COAT Victoria Chapter Conference) <http://www.coat.gov.au/publications.html> at
January 2017.
• J Longo, ‘Affording Procedural Fairness: Culture and Interpreters in Tribunal Hearings’
(22 April 2016, COAT Victoria Chapter Conference) <http://www.coat.gov.au/
publications.html> at January 2017.
• M Groves and G Weeks (eds) Legitimate Expectations in the Common Law World (Hart
Publishing, 2017).
28 Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576, 591. See also Coutts v
Close [2014] FCA 19, where the Court held at [114] that ordinarily ‘procedural fairness does not require that a decision
make adopt an “open file” policy which would have the effect of disclosing every submission or piece of evidence to an
affected party.’
29 R v Sussex Justices; Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256, 259 (Lord Hewart CJ).
30 Administrative Review Council, above n 4, 12.
Chapter Three: Procedural Fairness 55
Bias means a predisposition to approach the issues in the case otherwise than with an
impartial and unprejudiced mind.31 The presence of bias may be inferred from a member’s
behaviour, statements, personal interests and past or present associations, or from the way
the decision-making process is structured. Examples of behaviour suggestive of bias are
outlined in Chapter Five at 5.4.3. Findings of actual bias are rare because of difficulties
establishing the member’s settled view on an issue.
• disqualifying association, where the appearance of bias arises from the decision-maker’s
association or relationship with a person interested in the proceedings
Each of these categories is discussed below. There may, of course, be other types of cases in
which an apprehension of bias may arise.
• the application of the rule in particular situations is highly flexible, to allow for the
variety of circumstances in which it is applied.
There are three recognised exceptions to the rule that a tribunal member (or other decision-
maker) is disqualified for actual or apprehended bias. These are statutory exceptions, waiver
and necessity.
3.4.3.2. Waiver
There is no disqualification where disclosure of the interest is made, and the parties waive
the right to object to the decision-maker proceeding to hear and determine the case (see this
Chapter at 3.4.8).
3.4.3.3. Necessity
The bias rule is subject to a principle of necessity, which recognises that in some cases a
tribunal or member must be allowed to proceed despite an appearance of bias, if the tribunal
would otherwise be unable to perform its statutory function.42 If the tribunal could not find
enough members to constitute a panel, a member who would otherwise be disqualified for
bias may take part in the decision. This might occur, for example, where all the members
available have received and read an email message from party A that makes prejudicial
statements about party B, and party B does not waive objection. It might also occur in a
small jurisdiction with fewer members.43
42 Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 170 CLR 70 at 88 (Mason CJ and Brennan J).
43 Sanders v Snell (No 2) (2003) 130 FCR 149.
44 Dimes v Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal Pty (1852) 10 ER 301; Auckland Casino Ltd v Casino Control Authority
[1995] 1 NZLR 142 (NZCA).
58 Chapter Three: Procedural Fairness
In Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy,45 the High Court of Australia overruled a long line
of authorities, holding that there was no longer any rule that a decision-maker is automatically
disqualified by reason of a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceedings. No free-
standing rule of automatic disqualification for pecuniary interest or any other cause now
applies in Australia.
and are perceived to have a more insidious effect on impartiality.50 A direct pecuniary or
proprietary interest in the outcome of the case will normally be disqualifying unless the
interest is insubstantial.51
50 ibid. 351.
51 ibid. 358. Compare this to Smits v Roach (2006) 227 CLR 423, where the judge’s brother had the direct financial interest.
52 Calvert & Co v Dunedin City Council [1993] 2 NZLR 460.
53 [2000] 1 AC 119.
54 Joseph, above n 7, [23.5.2(2)].
55 Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568 at 571–72 (Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ).
56 Workers Compensation Commission (NSW), Arbitrators Manual (2002) 45.
60 Chapter Three: Procedural Fairness
57 Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568 at 571–72 (Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ); Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR
488.
58 ibid.; Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288 at 300.
59 Council of Chief Justices of Australia, Guide to Judicial Conduct (2nd edn rev’d., 2007, AIJA Inc, Victoria) [3.3.4 (i)]
<http://www.aija.org.au/online/GuidetoJudicialConduct(2ndEd).pdf> at January 2017.
60 See Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488; Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568; Livesey v New South Wales Bar
Association (1983) 151 CLR 288.
61 Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425 at 435; Administrative Review Council, above n 6, 35–36.
62 Keirl v Kelson (2004) 21 VAR 422, [12] (Byrne J). Further recent examples are B v DPP [2014] NSWCA 232 and
SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80, where it was accepted that
‘the exchanges that occurred went well beyond a mere expression of reservation … the exchanges exposed the Tribunal
member expressing a concluded view before the entirety of the hearing had even concluded that she “[did not] believe
any of that” ’.
Chapter Three: Procedural Fairness 61
63 Aussie Airlines Pty Ltd v Australian Airlines Pty Ltd (1996) 65 FCR 215 at 226.
64 Council of Chief Justices of Australia, above n 40, 12–14 (see ch. Nine at 9.3.3).
65 Lawal v Northern Spirit Ltd [2004] 1 All ER 187, [21]–[23].
66 ibid. 11–12.
67 ibid.
62 Chapter Three: Procedural Fairness
• Past professional association with a party as client does not require disqualification
unless the association relates to the subject matter of the proceedings.68 Applying this
in a tribunal example, a member of a planning tribunal may have previously advised a
developer who is one of the parties in proceedings before the tribunal. If the matter on
which the advice was given is unrelated to the matter presently before the tribunal, the
member can sit.
• A judge who has a current or recent business association with a party usually should
not sit, but a current or recent business association with a witness will not necessarily
be grounds for disqualification. All the circumstances should be considered and, in the
latter case, the relationship should ordinarily be disclosed.
• Friendship or past professional association with counsel or a solicitor for the parties is
not generally a sufficient reason for disqualification.69
• The fact that a witness is personally known to the judge is not a ground for disqualification
unless the credibility of the witness is likely to be in issue, but the relationship should
nevertheless be disclosed to the parties.
• The fact that the tribunal member or decision-maker communicates with third parties
during the hearing about matters arising in the case could, depending on the facts, also
give rise to an apprehension of bias. An unsuccessful claim of bias was made against
Commissioner Ipp, who communicated with the NSW Government about legal matters
generally relating to a current ICAC inquiry before him: Duncan v Ipp (2013) 304 ALR
359.
The ARC’s A Guide to Standards of Conduct for Tribunal Members focuses on perceptions
of bias that may arise from a tribunal member’s private and professional life and associations.
This Guide is considered further in Chapter Nine at 9.3.2. It advises as follows:
• members should have regard to the potential impact of activities, interests and
associations in their private life on the impartial and efficient performance of their
tribunal responsibilities70
• members who have other professional and business activities should ensure that people
from whom they accept work in their private practice do not appear in matters before
them71
• members should avoid involvement in partisan political activity that might adversely
affect perceptions of their impartiality72
68 S & M Motor Repairs v Caltex Oil (1988) 12 NSWLR 358; British American Tobacco Australia Ltd v Gordon [2007]
NSWSC 109; Murlan Consulting Pty Ltd v Ku-Ring-Gai Municipal Council [2008] NSWLEC 318, [42] (Pain J);
Precision Fabrication Pty Ltd v Roadcon Pty Ltd (1991) 104 FLR 260, 264.
69 Morton v The Transport Appeal Boards [2007] NSWSC 888; Taylor v Lawrence [2003] QB 528.
70 Administrative Review Council, above n 4, 42.
71 ibid 43.
72 ibid 44.
Chapter Three: Procedural Fairness 63
Particular care must be taken when attending a ‘view’ that the member does not travel with
one of the parties, their witness or representatives. Any communication between a member and
a witness or party in the absence of other parties may give rise to a reasonable apprehension
of bias, even if the content is unrelated to the case.75 For example, a reviewing court said
that if a member of a civil tribunal were found to have held a five-minute conversation with
the applicants and their spouses in the waiting room in the absence of the respondents before
the hearing commenced, the court would set aside the decision of the member and remit the
matter to be reheard by a differently constituted panel of the tribunal with a ‘stern rebuke’
to the member.76 Even travelling in a lift with a party, witness or legal representative for
one party only should be avoided. Private discussions between a member and a witness
should be avoided altogether.77 A disqualifying communication may occur involuntarily so
far as the member is concerned, as, for example, where the member receives a phone call
at home from one of the parties or a party’s representative.78 The irregularity of the
communication gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that matters relating to the case
were discussed.79
A useful guide to chambers communications is set out in the Federal Court’s recent Guide
to Communications with Chambers Staff <http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/going-to-court/
chambers-staff> at January 2017.
73 ibid. 43–48.
74 R v Magistrates Court at Lilydale: Ex parte Ciccone [1973] 1 VR 122 at 127; Council of Chief Justices of Australia,
above n 40, 15–16.
75 City of St Kilda v Evindon Pty Ltd [1990] VR 771; see also Administrative Review Council, above n 4, 38.
76 Keirl v Kelson (2004) 21 VAR 422, [14] (Byrne J).
77 Re JRL; Ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342.
78 City of St Kilda v Evindon Pty Ltd [1990] VR 771.
79 ibid. 777.
64 Chapter Three: Procedural Fairness
3.4.9.1. Disclosure
The purpose of disclosure is to allow the parties to determine whether grounds for
disqualification exist, and whether to waive their right to object to the member constituting
the tribunal. There is no common law duty to disclose facts and circumstances that would
not legally disqualify the member from hearing the matter.84 There is only a duty not to hear
a matter from which the member is disqualified unless the right to object has been waived.
However, there are reasons why members might disclose a matter even if they do not think
80 British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Laurie (2011) 242 CLR 283, 330–33 (Heydon, Kiefel and Bell JJ).
81 R v Lee; Ex parte Shaw [1882] 9 QBD 394. But see also Hall v New South Wales Trotting Club Ltd [1977] 1 NSWLR
378, 389.
82 See Michael Wilson & Partners Limited v Nicholls (2011) 86 ALJR 14, although the application was unsuccessful
because: ‘in none of the [interlocutory] applications was the trial judge required to make, and in none of the applications
did he make, any determination of any issue that was to be decided at trial’. There were also no findings on the credibility
of witnesses. See in contrast the importance of findings of credibility in British American Tobacco Australia Services
Ltd v Laurie (2011) 242 CLR 283. For a general discussion of how bias may arise in these circumstances, see: A Olijnyk,
‘Apprehended Bias and Interlocutory Judgments’ (2013) 35 Sydney Law Review 761
83 It was held that ‘apprehension of bias in a tribunal member may be increased if the member omitted to disclose their
prior involvement in a matter and did not ask whether there was objection to them continuing to sit. The observation has
added pertinence where the tribunal member knows of their involvement, and knows that the litigant does not, and will
not know until after the proceeding is determined’: Maher v Adult Guardian [2011] QCA 225 at [24]. See also Sengupta
v Holmes [2002] EWCA Civ 1104.
84 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 at 360 (Gleeson. CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
Chapter Three: Procedural Fairness 65
85 ibid.
86 ibid. 360.
87 Administrative Review Council, above n 4, 38–41.
88 ibid. 38.
89 Council of Chief Justices of Australia, above n 40, 15.
90 Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 170 CLR 70; Vietnam Veterans’ Association v Veterans’ Review Board
(1994) 52 FCR 34.
91 Council of Chief Justices of Australia, above n 40, 15.
92 ibid. 13.
66 Chapter Three: Procedural Fairness
to object or to waive objection should also be addressed. The ARC’s A Guide to Standards
of Conduct for Tribunal Members advises:
• Although as a matter of law waiver may be implied, it is suggested that it is a tribunal
member’s responsibility expressly to raise the question of consent with the potentially
prejudiced party.93
• Consent of the parties is not the determinative factor. Even if the parties waive objection,
the member may decide not to sit if they consider that disqualification is the proper
course.94
If the parties do not waive objection, the member will need to consider the submissions of
the parties and decide whether to stand down. The following points should be noted:
• A member is not automatically obliged to stand down where objection is taken following
disclosure.
• The fact that one or more of the parties has an actual suspicion that the member is biased
does not satisfy the test for apprehended bias. The test is an objective one, requiring
consideration of what a fair-minded observer would reasonably apprehend.
• The member should consider all the circumstances, including the stage of proceedings
at which objection is taken, and any costs and delays that might result.
Courts have cautioned judges and tribunal members not to acquiesce too readily to
applications for them to stand down, since this can cause hardship to parties, particularly if
the matter is part heard. To stand down when there are no legal grounds for disqualification
may even amount to an abdication of the member’s duty.95 The member may also consider
whether standing down without sufficient grounds would encourage tactical objections and
abuse of process in other cases.96 If the member decides to sit, the reasons for that decision
should be recorded. So too should the disclosure of relevant circumstances.97 If the member
decides to stand down, the ARC’s A Guide to Standards of Conduct for Tribunal Members
recommends that the member should explain to all the parties why this is being done.98
Tribunal legislation or practice directions may specify the procedures for reconstituting the
tribunal after a hearing has commenced.
to the matter and then make a decision about disqualification. If necessary, the member may
suspend the hearing briefly to consider the question.
If a party raises an objection to the member constituting the tribunal after the hearing has
commenced, otherwise than in response to a disclosure by the member, the tribunal should
inquire when the party first learned of the facts on which the objection is based. If there has
been a delay in taking the objection, the tribunal should ask the party to explain why the
matter was not raised sooner.
Objections on bias grounds are sometimes taken for tactical reasons, such as to have the
matter heard before another member whom the objector believes is more likely to decide the
case favourably to the objector. Parties who know of potentially disqualifying circumstances
are not entitled to bide their time and raise the objection only once they perceive the case is
going against them. To prevent such an abuse of process, the courts insist that objections be
taken at the earliest opportunity once the objector knows of the potentially disqualifying facts
and knows of the right to object.99 If this is not done, the ground of objection may be taken to
have been waived, and cannot later be relied upon to challenge the tribunal’s decision.
99 Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568 at 571–73 (Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ), 587–88 (Toohey J).
100 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507 at 562 (Hayne J).
68 Chapter Three: Procedural Fairness
These systematic differences between courts and tribunals raise a question of how the rules
of procedural fairness are applied to tribunal proceedings.101
• An expert tribunal is entitled to draw upon its general expertise and experience when
evaluating the evidence and reaching its conclusions, and does not have to disclose its
knowledge.102 An apprehension of bias will more readily arise where the tribunal relies
on particular rather than general information. Where the tribunal proposes to rely upon
particular factual information known to it or discovered through its own investigations
and the information is prejudicial to the interests of a party, the tribunal should disclose
the information to the parties and give them an opportunity to respond to it.103 For
example, if a medical member knows that a diagnostic test relied upon by an expert
medical witness for a party is unreliable, the member should put the point to the witness
(if opportunity presents) or otherwise to the party. If the tribunal relies on information
that is from an identifiable source such as a medical journal, the source as well as the
information should be disclosed. That is particularly the case if the source material may
contain errors or be open to misinterpretation: Australian Associated Motor Insurers Ltd
v Motor Accidents Authority of NSW (2010) 56 MVR 108.
• Where the tribunal is relying on its own theory to explain events, it must disclose that
theory to the parties. For example, in Keller v Drainage Tribunal,104 a civil tribunal
decided a claim on the basis that there was a perched water table which had caused the
damage in issue. The existence of a perched water table had not been referred to by the
parties, and the tribunal had given them no indication that it had this theory in mind.
• In some circumstances, a tribunal may rely on its own observations of the actions
or demeanour of a party in reaching its decision. If the tribunal proposes to
use the observation in a way that is prejudicial to the party, it should ask itself whether
the party could reasonably be expected to anticipate how the tribunal might view the
behaviour. If the answer is negative, the tribunal must notify the party and allow them
to respond.
101 See N Bedford and R Creyke, Inquisitorial Processes in Australian Tribunals (2005, Australian Institute of Judicial
Administration Inc, Melbourne).
102 Minister for Health v Thomson (1985) 8 FCR 213 at 217 (Fox J), 224 (Beaumont J). However, this will not be the case
where the knowledge goes beyond professional expertise and amounts to personal knowledge or observation: Koppen v
Commissioner for Community Relations (1986) 11 FCR 360.
103 R v Milk Board; Ex parte Tomkins [1944] VLR 187.
104 [1980] VR 449.
Chapter Three: Procedural Fairness 69
For example, suppose that a party gives evidence that the party is incapable of sitting for
more than an hour at a time due to back pain, but the tribunal observes the person in the
hearing room sitting quite freely for hours at a time. If the tribunal proposes to rely on its
observations of the behaviour to reject the party’s evidence on that matter, it must first tell
the person or their legal representative what it has observed and what conclusion it intends
to draw, and give the person an opportunity to answer the point.105
This is an application of the general principle of procedural fairness that a party must be
given an adequate opportunity to present their case. If a tribunal is proposing to rely upon
evidence that contradicts the testimony of a party or witness, it must ensure that the substance
of that contrary evidence is put to the person so that they have an opportunity to explain the
contradiction. In court proceedings, this is known as the rule in Browne v Dunn.106 Even a
tribunal that is not bound by the rules of evidence may nevertheless be required to apply the
rule to ensure procedural fairness.107
• The following additional points are reproduced from the Workers Compensation
Commission (NSW) Arbitrators Manual.108 A member may have personal knowledge
not simply of a particular field, but also of the people who work within it. However, the
accuracy of the member’s knowledge or information will be untested, and might amount
to little more than gossip. This kind of information must not be taken into account
without the knowledge of the parties.
• Where a member is appointed because the person is known to possess certain knowledge,
the member should take care to base their decision in a particular case on the facts of
that case and not simply in accordance with preconceived views or knowledge.109 If
a member has personal knowledge of particular people involved or events at issue in
a case, apart from knowledge gained from normal professional association, then the
member should disclose the nature of this knowledge to the parties.
References
Legislation
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ)
105 Kassem v Crossley [2000] NSWCA 276 (Unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, Mason P, Heydon JA and Clarke AJA,
13 June 2000).
106 (1893) 6 R 67 (HL).
107 Marelic v Comcare (1993) 47 FCR 437 at 443 (Beazley J); A School v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission
(No 2) (1998) 55 ALD 93 at 111–12 (Mansfield J).
108 Workers Compensation Commission (NSW), above n 37.
109 Koppen v Commissioner for Community Relations (1986) 11 FCR 360.
70 Chapter Three: Procedural Fairness
Case law
A School v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (No 2) (1998) 55 ALD 93
Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564
Annetts v McCann (1970) 170 CLR 596
Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 225 CLR
88
Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1
Auckland Casino Ltd v Casino Control Authority [1995] 1 NZLR 142 (NZCA)
Aussie Airlines Pty Ltd v Australian Airlines Pty Ltd (1996) 65 FCR 215
Australian Associated Motor Insurers Ltd v Motor Accidents Authority of NSW (2010) 56 MVR 108
B v DPP [2014] NSWCA 232
British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Laurie (2011) 242 CLR 283
British American Tobacco Australia Ltd v Gordon [2007] NSWSC 109
Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (HL)
Builders Registration Board of Qld v Rauber (1983) 47 ALR 55
C Inc v Australian Crime Commission (2008) 106 ALD 453
Cains v Jenkins (1979) 28 ALR 219
Calvert & Co v Dunedin City Council [1993] 2 NZLR 460
Cheatle v Davey (1989) 18 ALD 481
City of St Kilda v Evindon Pty Ltd [1990] VR 771
City of Subiaco v Simpson MLA [2014] WASC 493
Clenae Pty Ltd v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Pty Ltd (2000) 205 CLR 337
Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576
Commissioner of Police for NSW v Jarratt (2003) 59 NSWLR 87
Cooper v Board of Works for the Wandsworth District (1863) 143 ER 414
Coutts v Close [2014] FCA 19
Coutts v Commonwealth (1985) 157 CLR 91
Dimes v Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal Pty (1852) 10 ER 301
Duncan v Ipp (2013) 304 ALR 359
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337
FAI Insurance Ltd v Winneke (1982) 151 CLR 342
Fraser v State Services Commission [1984] 1 NZLR 116 (CA)
Haoucher v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1990) 169 CLR 648
Isbester v Knox City Council (2015) 255 CLR 135
Jaffarie v Director General of Security (2014) 226 FCR 505
Jarratt v Commissioner of Police (NSW) (2005) 224 CLR 44
Jeffs v NZ Dairy Production Marketing Board [1967] 1 AC 551
Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488
Kassem v Crossley [2000] NSWCA 276 (Unreported, New South Wales Court of Appeal, Mason P, Heydon JA,
Clarke AJA, 13 June 2000)
Keirl v Kelson (2004) 21 VAR 422
Keller v Drainage Tribunal [1980] VR 449
Chapter Three: Procedural Fairness 71
Guides
Administrative Review Council, A Guide to Standards of Conduct for Tribunal Members (2001, rev’d 2009)
<http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/arcHome.nsf/Page/Publications_Reports_Downloads_A_Guide_to_
Standards_Of_Conduct> at January 2017
Council of Chief Justices of Australia, Guide to Judicial Conduct (2nd edn rev’d, 2016, AIJA Inc, Victoria) [3.3.4
(i)]<http://www.aija.org.au/online/GuidetoJudicialConduct(2ndEd).pdf> at January 2017
Federal Court of Australia, Guide to Communications with Chambers Staff <http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/going-
to-court/chambers-staff> at January 2017
Workers Compensation Commission (NSW), Arbitrators Manual (2002)
Standing:
• Tribunals can only determine disputes upon an application from a person with standing,
that is, the right to appear before the tribunal.
• Standing is conferred by legislation, which usually limits the class of persons who have
standing to apply. Statutes commonly give standing to a person ‘whose interests are
affected by a decision’. There is a significant body of case law on standing.
• ADR services may be delivered by external providers or the tribunal’s members and
staff.
The larger divisional tribunals, and tribunals in which parties are commonly represented,
are more likely to use pre-hearing procedures. The type and format of the procedures varies
widely, and different processes may be used in different lists or divisions of the larger
tribunals.
Preliminary processes may serve different purposes, such as referring parties to alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) processes, exploring possibilities for settlement, controlling the
progression of individual cases, and determining preliminary procedural matters such as
whether to extend the time for making an application. Where the procedures are intended
to control case progression and activity, they form part of the tribunal’s case management
system (see Chapter Eight). In tribunals where a speedy decision is desirable on a topic,
preliminary procedures may be reduced.
Chapter Four: Pre-Hearing 75
4.2.1. Applications
4.2.1.1. Standing
Tribunals are not vested with general power to determine disputes or other matters. They can
only do so upon an application from a person who is entitled to apply. That is, they respond
to applications made to them; they do not initiate applications. The right to apply must be
given by legislation. Legislation usually limits the class of persons who have standing to
apply to the tribunal in relation to a particular dispute or decision. The restriction on standing
may be contained in the tribunal’s governing legislation or in other enabling statutes which
allocate additional jurisdiction to the tribunal.
For instance, under s 27 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), an
application for review of a decision may be made to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal
(AAT) ‘by or on behalf of any person, including the Commonwealth or an authority of the
Commonwealth, whose interests are affected by a decision’.1 The tests for standing before
a tribunal commonly refer to a ‘person whose interests are affected by a decision’. Broadly
speaking, the phrase is taken to mean interests which ‘a person has other than as a member
of the general public and other than as a person merely holding a belief that a particular type
of conduct should be prevented or a particular law observed’.2 It is necessary to consider the
nature of the decision and how it affects the applicant’s interests.3 ‘Interests’ are generally
taken to be property or financial interests, rather than ‘merely emotional’ interests. However,
‘interests’ will extend to the protection of reputation.4 There may be a special provision
relaxing the standing requirement in the case of interest groups. For example, s 27(2) of
the AAT Act (Cth) extends the meaning of ‘interests affected’ so that an organisation or
association of persons, whether incorporated or not, is taken to have interests that are affected
by the decision if the decision relates to a matter included in the objects or purposes of the
organisation or association.
Once an application has been made to the tribunal, the legislation may allow other persons
to apply to the tribunal to be joined as parties. A person applying for joinder as a party is
commonly subject to the same test of standing as the original applicant unless the legislation
provides otherwise. Tribunal legislation usually gives the tribunal discretion to refuse to
join a person as a party to the proceeding even if the person satisfies the standing test.
1 See generally Re Control Investments Pty Ltd and Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (No 1) (1980) 3 ALD 74, 81; Re
Gay Solidarity and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1983) 5 ALD 289; R Creyke, J McMillan and M Smyth,
Control of Government Action (4th edn, 2015, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney) 1161–65. The Administrative Review
Council has recommended that s 27 be adopted as the test for standing, including under the Administrative Decisions
(Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth): Administrative Review Council, Federal Judicial Review in Australia (September
2012). That recommendation has not been implemented at the time of writing.
2 Re Control Investments Pty Ltd and Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (No 1) (1980) 3 ALD 74 at 79 (Davies J).
3 See Re McHattan and Collector of Customs (NSW) (1977) 1 ALD 67; Kannan and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic
Affairs (1978) 1 ALD 489; Re Queensland Investment Corporation and Minister for Transport and Regional Services
(2004) 84 ALD 717; Re Son and Australian Trade Commission (2005) 86 ALD 469.
4 Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596.
76 Chapter Four: Pre-Hearing
There may be other relevant considerations, such as the costs and delays that might result
from widening the dispute, and allowing all parties to be fully informed of the status of the
proceedings and other relevant matters. Some tribunals have an obligation to contact parties
who may have an interest in the proceeding.5
It is sometimes necessary for the tribunal to conduct a directions hearing or other preliminary
procedure to determine whether an applicant has standing to apply, or whether a person should
be joined as a party. These issues require a close examination of the facts and circumstances,
and the relevant case law.
Where the legislation specifies a time limit for making an application, the expiry of the
time period for making a given application should be reckoned in accordance with the
‘time’ provisions in the relevant Interpretation statute for the particular jurisdiction (see the
Reference section of this Manual). These provisions are not in standard form.
To take one example, if a Western Australian statute says that an application for review of
a decision must be made within 28 days from the day on which the decision is made, the
period is calculated by excluding the day on which the decision is made. If the 28th day
falls on an ‘excluded day’ (a Saturday, Sunday, public service holiday, bank holiday or state
public holiday), the period expires on the next day that is not an excluded day.6
The tribunal may have a discretionary power to extend the time period for the making of an
application. Usually the tribunal can extend the time even if the application for extension is
made after the time period has expired.
If the statute gives no specific criteria for deciding whether to grant an extension of time,
the tribunal should consider what would best serve the interests of justice. In doing so, the
tribunal will consider the following factors:
• the financial loss to the applicant and any prejudice to other parties.7
5 Eg, Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth) ss 14A, 15D–F, 15H, 15J.
6 Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 61(1).
7 See eg, Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348 (Wilcox J); Michelotti v Roads
Corporation (2009) 26 VR 609; Hua-Aus Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 75 ATR 886; SZQGO v
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 125 ALD 449.
Chapter Four: Pre-Hearing 77
8 See eg, Re Repatriation Commission and Delkou (1985) 8 ALD 454 (AAT); Re Secretary, Department of Employment
and Workplace Relations and Croysdale (2006) 45 AAR 378; Re Nguyen and ASIC (2011) 55 AAR 85.
78 Chapter Four: Pre-Hearing
case of default without lawful excuse, the tribunal usually has power to dismiss or strike out
an application, to enter judgment by default against a respondent, or to take the failure into
account in awarding costs. Where these sanctions are not available, a further direction may
be given.
4.2.3. Conferences
Many tribunals have power to direct the parties to attend a pre-hearing conference conducted
by a tribunal member or, in some cases, a registrar. The tribunal may hold one conference,
or a series of conferences, or call them as needed. They are usually held in private, and may
be conducted by telephone or videoconference.
Many tribunals use conferences as a pre-hearing process because they are flexible, can
serve multiple purposes, and their relative informality encourages participation by self-
represented parties. Legislation commonly gives the tribunal substantial control over the
way that conferences are conducted. Conferences can be used to explore possibilities for
settlement, to screen or refer matters to ADR processes such as mediation, to identify and
resolve preliminary issues and to manage the progression of cases.
Tribunals use conferences for different purposes, depending on their powers and the caseload.
Some tribunals use them as settlement conferences, where the presiding member uses ADR
methods such as conciliation or mediation. This is more likely to occur where the tribunal
lacks the power to refer parties to ADR processes without their consent.
Where conferences are used to explore possibilities for settlement, there is a need to protect
the confidentiality of communications between the parties. It is common to find in tribunal
legislation a provision restricting the admission, in any subsequent hearing by the tribunal,
of anything said or done at a conference, unless all parties consent. The legislation may also
provide that a member who took part in the conference (i.e. a pre-hearing procedure) must
not constitute, or be part of, the tribunal for the purpose of hearing the proceeding, unless the
parties consent. Alternatively, the statute may provide that the member must not take part in
the subsequent hearing if a party objects.
neutral evaluation and blended processes.9 The AAT has identified the following objectives
that should inform the use of its ADR processes:
• to resolve or limit the issues in dispute
• to be accessible
• to use resources efficiently
• to resolve disputes as early as possible
• to produce outcomes that are lawful, effective and acceptable to the parties and the
Tribunal
• to enhance the satisfaction of the parties.10
ADR in its various forms is now institutionalised in the practice of many tribunals.11 Tribunal
legislation commonly provides for referral of parties to ADR and for settlement agreements
reached in ADR processes to be deemed to be orders of the tribunal. ADR services may be
delivered by external providers to whom the tribunal refers parties, or it may be part of the
range of dispute resolution services offered by the tribunal through its members and staff.
As noted by the National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council (NADRAC),12
the types of disputes that are most likely to be governed by ADR provisions are those
occurring within commercial contexts, workplace relations, international disputes, native
title and family law. The most common arena in which an ADR process is provided for under
Commonwealth legislation is within a statutory authority or court. Tribunals, international
forums and non-government organisations are referred to less frequently.
9 Section 3(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) defines ‘alternative dispute resolution processes’ as
including: conferencing, mediation, neutral evaluation, case appraisal, conciliation, and procedures or services specified
in the regulations, but as excluding arbitration or court procedures or services.
10 Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Guidelines (June 2006, AAT, Canberra) <http://
www.aat.gov.au/LawAndPractice/AlternativeDisputeResolution/ADRGuidelines.htm> at 2 January 2017.
11 See New Zealand Law Commission, Tribunals in New Zealand (January 2008, Law Commission, Wellington) [9.29];
G Downes, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution at the AAT’ (2008) 15 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 137. See,
for example, Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) s 37.
12 National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, Legislating for Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Guide
for government policy-makers and legal drafters <https://www.ag.gov.au/LegalSystem/AlternateDisputeResolution/
Documents/NADRAC%20Publications/Legislating%20for%20Alternative%20Dispute%20Resolution.PDF> at January
2017.
80 Chapter Four: Pre-Hearing
As described by NADRAC,13 the key difference between these processes is the role played
by the ADR practitioner.
• Advisory. In an advisory process, the practitioner ‘considers and appraises the dispute
and provides advice as to the facts of the dispute, the law and, in some cases, possible
or desirable outcomes, and how these may be achieved’.
Legislation may provide for different dispute resolution processes to be used in sequence.
For example, equal opportunity or discrimination complaints may be treated first with an
advisory process, then a facilitative one, and finally a determinative stage for those that
remain unresolved.
Based on the NADRAC Dispute Resolution Terms (2003), and in order to provide greater
clarity on terminology in the provision of ADR services, the following process definitions
were incorporated into the Australian Standard.15
• Arbitration. A process in which the parties to a dispute present arguments and evidence
to a dispute resolution practitioner (the arbitrator) who makes a determination. It is
the most common ADR process referred to in legislation, followed by conciliation,
mediation, negotiation and conferencing.16
• Mediation. A process in which the parties to the dispute, with the assistance of a dispute
resolution practitioner (the mediator), identify the disputed issues, develop options,
consider alternatives and endeavour to reach an agreement. The mediator has no
advisory or determinative role in regard to the content of the dispute or the outcome
of its resolution, but may advise on or determine the process of mediation whereby
resolution is attempted’.
13 NADRAC was established in 1995 as an independent body to provide advice on policy matters to the Federal Attorney-
General. NADRAC concluded in late 2013 following the whole-of-government decision to simplify and streamline
the business of government. Its publications are available on the Attorney-General’s website <https://www.ag.gov.au/
legalsystem/alternatedisputeresolution/pages/default.aspx>.
14 National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, Your Guide to Dispute Resolution (July 2012,
Attorney-General) <https://www.ag.gov.au/LegalSystem/AlternateDisputeResolution/Documents/Your%20Guide%20to
%20Dispute%20Resolution.pdf> at January 2017.
15 Standards Australia, Dispute Management Systems, AS4608–2004, (2nd edn, 2004) Appendix B. This was withdrawn on
13 January 2017 and had not been replaced at the time of writing.
16 Legislating for Alternative Dispute Resolution, above n 12.
Chapter Four: Pre-Hearing 81
practice that should apply to service providers and practitioners.25 NADRAC published
three major policy papers in 2006–07:26
–– Indigenous Dispute Resolution and Conflict Management (January 2006). This
policy recognises that ADR in indigenous communities should involve Indigenous
people at the local level, and needs to take into account Indigenous perspectives on
the nature of disputes and their resolution. The policy contains ten statements of
principle relevant to Indigenous dispute resolution and conflict management.
–– Legislating for Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Guide for Government Policy-
Makers and Legal Drafters (November 2006). This document of more than 100
pages sets out the legislative context in the ADR area and refers to some of the
principles relevant to selecting legislative instruments such as Acts or regulations.
The document is premised on the previous federal government’s promotion of
ADR ‘to relieve stress on the courts … and to foster a more conciliatory approach
to dispute resolution, built on a foundation of constructive engagement between
parties.’27
–– Advice on a New Accreditation System for Family Dispute Resolution Practitioners
(March 2007). This is a discussion paper produced by NADRAC aimed at
providing input into the new accreditation system for family dispute resolution
practitioners. It provides input into key issues including standards, accreditation,
registration and complaints. The paper notes that, ‘these are the issues that have,
over the years, created tension between those who support a deregulated or self-
regulated workforce and those who support increased regulation. Irrespective of
which system is developed it is clear that there is a need to protect consumers from
incompetent service providers, particularly in light of the increased growth in the
market for family dispute resolution practitioners’.28
In July 2012, NADRAC published Your Guide to Dispute Resolution which contains a
consolidated summary of what ADR is, provides practical tips for engaging in ADR processes,
and sets out the National Principles for Resolving Disputes. The National Principles are:
1. self-responsibility is the first step
2. early resolution is good resolution
3. listen and participate
4. be informed when choosing an ADR process
5. use ADR, then the courts
25 ibid. 96.
26 <https://www.ag.gov.au/LegalSystem/AlternateDisputeResolution/Pages/NADRACPublications-A-Z.aspx > at January
2017.
27 Then Attorney General Ruddock MP, ‘Towards a less litigious Australia: The Australian Government’s Alternative
Dispute Resolution initiatives’ (2004) 23 (1) The Arbitrator and Mediator 1.
28 A Framework for ADR Standards, above n 23, 1.
84 Chapter Four: Pre-Hearing
The practice standards cover an overview of the mediation process, specialist topics such as
power issues, impartial and ethical practice, confidentiality, competence, inter-professional
relations, information provided by the mediator, termination of the process, and charges for
services. The standards also cover procedural fairness and the making of public statements
and the promotion of services.
participate ‘in good faith’.37 The legal meaning of ‘good faith’ is that of propriety or honesty.
The AAT has published a guide to good faith in ADR, i.e. the person has to be engaged and
genuine in their participation in the tribunal process.
Research findings are inconclusive on whether compulsory referral increases the likelihood
that disputes will settle before hearing.38 Those who are referred compulsorily to mediation
generally do not object afterwards. It is also clear that few disputants will use mediation if
it is entirely voluntary.39
37 See e.g. s 34A(5) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth).
38 K Mack, Court Referral to ADR: Criteria and Research (2003, AIJA Inc and NADRAC) [1.4.2] <https://www.ag.gov.
au/LegalSystem/AlternateDisputeResolution/Pages/NADRACPublications-A-Z.aspx> at January 2017.
39 ibid.
40 Barrett v Queensland Newspapers Pty Ltd (1999) 20 Qld Lawyer Reps 104 (Samios J).
41 Mack, above n 38.
Chapter Four: Pre-Hearing 87
representation of the parties may be a positive or negative indicator for success, depending
on the attributes of the lawyer. Perhaps the most significant variable affecting the likelihood
of success was the skill of the ADR practitioner.42 Professor Mack concluded that there is no
one set of generally applicable referral criteria. Each tribunal should develop its own criteria,
taking into account ‘its own program goals, jurisdiction and case mix, potential ADR users,
local legal profession and culture, internal resources, and external service providers’.43
By way of example, the AAT has developed the following principles for members
or conference registrars to consider when deciding if an ADR process will assist in the
resolution of the dispute:
• the capacity of the parties to participate effectively
• whether the parties are represented
• the context of the application including the history of past applications by the applicant
• any identified need for urgency
• the number of parties involved in the application
• the complexity of the issues in dispute
• the bona fides of the parties
• cultural factors
• the safety of the parties
• the likelihood of an agreed outcome or reduced issues in dispute
• relative cost to the parties of an ADR process as compared with a determination
• case management requirements of the Tribunal
• whether an ADR process might offer a more flexible solution than a determination
• whether public interest issues require a determination.44
42 ibid., [1.5.1]–[1.5.4].
43 ibid., [1.7], citing H Astor, Quality in Court Connected Mediation Programs: An Issues Paper (2001, AIJA Inc, Carlton).
44 Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Guidelines (June 2006, AAT, Canberra) <http://
www.aat.gov.au/LawAndPractice/AlternativeDisputeResolution/ADRGuidelines.htm> at February 2017.
88 Chapter Four: Pre-Hearing
practitioners.45 With proper management of the issue, self-represented parties can benefit
from participation in ADR processes.
45 National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, A Framework for ADR Standards, above n 22, 110–11.
46 T Altobelli, ‘New South Wales ADR Legislation: The Need for Greater Consistency and Co-ordination’ (1997) 8 ADRJ
203.
47 ibid.
48 In South Australia, admissibility of communications made with a view to compromising a civil dispute is regulated by
s 67C of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA). See also s 131 of the uniform evidence legislation (e.g. Evidence Act 1995 (Cth);
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW); Evidence Act 2008 (Vic).
49 Field v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1957) 99 CLR 285; Rodgers v Rodgers (1964) 114 CLR 608 at 614
(McTiernan, Taylor and Owen JJ); see generally, T Sourdin, Alternative Dispute Resolution (2005, Lawbook Co,
Sydney) [7.430].
50 ibid.
Chapter Four: Pre-Hearing 89
• require the practitioner to report on whether a process has taken place, whether the
dispute has been settled, whether a party has negotiated in good faith or what issues
remain in dispute.
Where confidentiality is not protected by legislation, it may be provided for in an agreement
entered into between the parties and the ADR practitioner before the process commences.
Agreements are not normally used for ADR services provided under statutory schemes.
References
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Case law
Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596
Barrett v Queensland Newspapers Pty Ltd (1999) 20 Qld Lawyer Reps 104
Field v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1957) 99 CLR 285
Hua-Aus Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 75 ATR 886
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
Kannan and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1978) 1 ALD 489
Michelotti v Roads Corporation [2009] 26 VR 609
Re Control Investments Pty Ltd and Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (No 1) (1980) 3 ALD 74
Re Repatriation Commission and Delkou (1985) 8 ALD 454
Re Gay Solidarity and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1983) 5 ALD 289
Re McHattan and Collector of Customs (NSW) (1977) 1 ALD 67
Re Nguyen and ASIC (2011) 55 AAR 85
Re Queensland Investment Corporation and Minister for Transport and Regional Services (2004) 84 ALD 717
Re Repatriation Commission and Delkou (1985) 8 ALD 454
Re Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations and Croysdale (2006) 45 AAR 378
Re Son and Australian Trade Commission (2005) 86 ALD 469
Rodgers v Rodgers (1964) 114 CLR 608
Ruffles v Chilman (1997) 17 WAR 1
SZQGO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 125 ALD 449
National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, A Framework for ADR Standards (April 2001, Attorney-
General’s Department, Canberra) <https://www.ag.gov.au/LegalSystem/AlternateDisputeResolution/
Pages/NADRACPublications-A-Z.aspx > at January 2017
Who Says You’re a Mediator? Towards a National Standard for Accrediting Mediators (March 2004, Attorney-
General’s Department, Canberra) <https://www.ag.gov.au/LegalSystem/AlternateDisputeResolution/
Pages/NADRACPublications-A-Z.aspx> at January 2017
Your Guide to Dispute Resolution (July 2012, Attorney-General’s Department) <https://www.ag.gov.au/
LegalSystem/AlternateDisputeResolution/Documents/Your%20Guide%20to%20Dispute%20Resolution.
pdf> at January 2017
New Zealand Law Commission, Tribunals in New Zealand (January 2008, Law Commission, Wellington)
Guides
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Guidelines (June 2006, AAT, Canberra
<http://www.aat.gov.au/LawAndPractice/AlternativeDisputeResolution/ADRGuidelines.htm> at January
2017
Standards Australia, Dispute Management Systems, AS4608–2004, (2nd edn, 2004), removed and not replaced at
time of writing.
Books
H Astor and C Chinkin, Dispute Resolution in Australia, (2nd edn, 2002, Butterworths)
L Boulle, Mediation: Skills and Techniques, (2001 Butterworths)
Mediation: Principles, Process, Practice, (2nd edn, 2005 Butterworths)
R Creyke, J McMillan and M Smyth, Control of Government Action (4th edn, 2015, LexisNexis, Sydney)
D Pearce and M Allars, Australian Administrative Law Service (1978, LexisNexis, Sydney, loose-leaf)
T Sourdin, Alternative Dispute Resolution (2nd edn, 2005, Thomson Reuters, Sydney)
D Spencer and T Altobelli, Dispute Resolution in Australia: Cases, Commentary and Materials (2005, Thomson
Reuters, Sydney)
Evidence:
• Most tribunals’ legislation provides that tribunals are not bound by the rules of evidence.1
This is important to ensuring flexibility and informality.
• However, common law rules of evidence are useful for determining what material is
relevant, credible and of probative value.
• The privilege against self-incrimination applies in tribunal proceedings.
• It is generally, although not universally, accepted that legal professional privilege applies
to tribunal proceedings.
1 The Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) does not apply to tribunals as its rules apply to a ‘Federal Court’ defined to include ‘persons
or bodies required to apply the laws of evidence’.
2 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594 at [23].
3 J Dwyer, ‘Overcoming the Adversarial Bias in Tribunal Proceedings’ (1991) 20 Federal Law Review 252, 252–53; M
Smyth, ‘Inquisitorial Adjudication: The Duty to Inquire in Merits Review Tribunals’ (2010) 34 Melbourne University
Law Review 230.
4 Hamblin v Duffy (No 1) (1981) 3 ALD 153 at 157.
94 Chapter Five: Hearings
procedures. … [I]n most cases, the investigative or inquisitorial process would be most
apposite’.5
Tribunals have, by virtue of statute, specific inquisitorial powers which ‘enable the
adjudicator to take the initiative in eliciting evidence and formulating legal arguments, and
to control the way in which a case is presented’.6 These include:
• discretion over procedure and the freedom to frame their own procedures in a less
formal way,7
• the power to inform themselves on any matter and to undertake active investigations8
• utilising their own knowledge and making their own inquiries without necessarily being
fettered by the technical rules of evidence and procedure which apply to courts.
An aspect of the informal character of tribunals is that, from time to time, it is appropriate for
tribunal members to obtain information additional to what is formally provided to them by
parties. However, when this takes place, parties must be advised of the information obtained9
and given a proper opportunity to respond to it.10 This is an example of the obligation for
tribunals to extend procedural fairness to parties, explored in Chapter Three.
To the extent that a tribunal undertakes investigations, it must do so in such a way as to avoid
the reality or appearance of bias.11 Thus, where a tribunal does not receive the information
during pre-hearing processes which it needs to make a just and informed decision, it can, at
the hearing:
• raise the problem in the course of the hearing and suggest that extra information be put
before it
• take steps itself to procure extra information but alert any party potentially adversely
affected to the information so that it can locate other relevant information and make
submissions in relation to the new material.
5 Commonwealth, Final Report of the Committee on Administrative Discretions, Parl Paper No 316 (1973), 33 [172](j);
DC Pearce, ‘The Australian Government Administrative Appeals Tribunal’ (1976) 1 University of New South Wales Law
Journal 193, 196.
6 G Osborne, ‘Inquisitorial Procedure in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal—A Comparative Perspective’ (1982) 13
Federal Law Review 150, 150.
7 See e.g. ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) s 23; Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
s 33(1); Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) s 38.
8 See e.g. ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) s 26; Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
ss 33(1)(c), 37(2), 38(1); Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 359(1); Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) s 38(2).
9 See Kappos v State Transit Authority (1995) NSWCCR 386.
10 See e.g. Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 225
CLR 88; Wajnberg v Raynor [1971] VR 665 at 678; Re Macquarie University; Ex parte Ong [1980] VR 449; Australian
Associated Motor Insurers Ltd v Motor Accidents Authority of NSW (2010) 56 MVR 108. However, if the information
obtained is not material or is uncontroversial, case law suggests that non-disclosure will not necessarily amount to a
denial of procedural fairness: Weinstein v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria (2008) 21 VR 29.
11 See R v Optical Board of Registration; Ex parte Qurban [1933] SASR 1.
Chapter Five: Hearings 95
Depending upon the powers given to it by its enabling legislation, a tribunal may be
able to:
• summon a person to attend to give evidence or produce documents, at the request of a
party or on the tribunal’s own motion
• request or require an administering agency to exercise any powers it has to require a
person to give information or give documents
• question witnesses
• authorise a person to take evidence on behalf of the tribunal
• arrange a medical examination or commission a report, or require an administering
agency to do so
• require an administering agency to investigate a matter and report to the tribunal
• enter and inspect premises or authorise a person to do so, or
• refer a question of fact to an expert, expert panel or special referee empowered to advise
or give an opinion, or, possibly, even to decide a question.
See the detailed discussion in Justice D Kerr, ‘Keeping the AAT from becoming a Court’
(2013, AIAL Seminar) <http://www.aat.gov.au/AAT/media/AAT/Files/Speeches%20and%20
Papers/AIALNSWSeminar27August2013.pdf> at January 2017.
12 In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 259 ALR 429, the High Court held that:
For a discussion of the recent case law and circumstances in which the tribunal should undertake inquiries, see:
M Smyth, ‘Inquisitorial Adjudication: The Duty to Inquire in Merits Review Tribunals’ (2010) 34 Melbourne
University Law Review 230; R Creyke, ‘Pragmatism v Policy: Attitudes of Australian Courts and Tribunals to
Inquisitorial Process’, Chapter 2 in L Jacobs and S Baglay, (eds) The Nature of Inquisitorial Processes in
Administrative Regimes: Global Perspectives (Ashgate, UK, 2013); M Groves, ‘The Duty to Inquire in Tribunal
Proceedings’ (2011) 33 Sydney Law Review 177.
13 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 259 ALR 429, [1].
96 Chapter Five: Hearings
to the outcome to constitute a failure to review. If so, such a failure could give rise
to jurisdictional error by constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction.14
The circumstances in which a decision will be flawed for failure to inquire are limited. It
is not the responsibility of a decision-maker to make the applicant’s case for them.15 The
adjudicator is impartial and objective and stands above the fray, represented by the dispute
or issue between the parties. The adjudicator must remain a neutral umpire. However, in a
matter where material is readily available which is centrally relevant to the decision to be
made by the tribunal, an attempt should be made by the tribunal to procure the information.
A failure to do so may render the decision-making of the tribunal unreasonable and give rise
to jurisdictional error.16 In certain cases, the prospects of a tribunal arriving at the correct
or preferable decision are threatened if it does not make its own inquiries.17 An example
occurred where the Administrative Appeals Tribunal was found to have erred in determining
an appeal on a claim for the invalid pension without informing itself on a material question of
fact—namely, the likelihood of suitable work being available to the applicant.18 There may
be a greater expectation that the tribunal will make its own inquiries where the tribunal or
administrative decision-maker has committed an error,19 or the applicant is self-represented.20
14 ibid, [25].
15 Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 169.
16 ibid. See e.g. Tickner v Bropho (1993) 114 ALR 409; Akers v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 20 FCR
363; Li v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 74 FCR 275; Videto v Minister for Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs (1985) 8 FCR 167.
17 See e.g. Dhiman v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1291 at [21].
18 Adamou v Director-General of Social Security (1985) 7 ALN 203.
19 SZJBA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 164 FCR 14, 28–30; SZMYO v Minister for Immigration and
Citizenship [2011] FCA 506.
20 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Le (2007) 164 FCR 151; Akers v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs
(1988) 20 FCR 363; Patricia Hudson and Child Support Registrar [1998] AATA 863 (28 October 1998).
21 See Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 629 (Brennan J).
22 (2005) 225 CLR 88.
Chapter Five: Hearings 97
to grant protection visas to the applicant and his partner. On appeal, the High Court held that
procedural fairness (see Chapter Three at 3.2) required that the Tribunal should have drawn
the applicant’s attention to the information so that the applicant could respond to the adverse
information.23
The relevant person need not be provided with a full copy of the information, if this would,
for instance, tend to disclose the identity of an informer, and thereby be contrary to the
public interest. However, it does mean that the person should be acquainted at least with the
general contents of the information.24
23 ibid [21].
24 ibid [29]. Compare the approaches adopted in Re Pochi and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 26 ALR
247; Tucker v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCAFC 16; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
v Maman (2012) 200 FCR 30; and Coutts v Close [2014] FCA 19. For a general discussion of the approach courts
have adopted in judicial review of tribunal decisions, see generally, R Creyke, J McMillan and M Smyth, Control of
Government Action (4th edn, 2015, LexisNexis) at ch. 10.4.
98 Chapter Five: Hearings
5.4.1. Punctuality
It is important for tribunal members to be seen to treat parties appearing before them with
respect and to model appropriate behaviour at the hearing. Part of this is commencing the
hearing, as far as possible, at the appointed time, and, if that cannot be done, explaining why
and apologising for the delay.
It is helpful for tribunal members to arrive at the hearing venue a suitable period before the
appointed sitting time. This facilitates preparation that is not unduly rushed and enables
commencement of the sitting in a timely way.
When breaks are taken, it is worthwhile making sure that everyone is aware of their expected
duration. This allows parties and witnesses to maintain punctuality. Likewise, it is important
to adhere to the pre-announced duration of breaks, unless there is a good reason to the
contrary.
25 Administrative Review Council, A Guide to Standards of Conduct for Tribunal Members (2nd edn, 2009, ARC,
Canberra) <http://www.arc.ag.gov.au/Documents/GuidetoStdsofConduct-RevisedAug2009.pdf> at January 2017;
Guide to Judicial Conduct (2nd edn, 2007, AIJA Inc, Victoria).
Chapter Five: Hearings 99
needs to be read by the tribunal, it is appropriate for the tribunal to ask the parties to wait or
to stand the matter down briefly.
Use of humour by tribunal members needs to be undertaken with discernment. While a light-
hearted comment or a joke can reduce tension, lighten an atmosphere and put participants
at ease, there is also the risk that it can be misinterpreted. It can induce an impression that a
party or witness or the case generally is not being taken seriously. Tribunal members should
be cautious in employment of jokes, double meanings and light-hearted comments, being
conscious of the impression that their demeanour and behaviour may create.
5.5.2. Interpreters
Matters such as the need for an interpreter also need to be addressed at a very early juncture,
preferably before the hearing commences. The matter should be stood down when adequate
arrangements have not been made in advance for proceedings to be translated. Nothing is
more likely to adversely affect the fairness of proceedings than for them to take place without
parties having an adequate understanding of what is occurring. As a rule of thumb, serious
Chapter Five: Hearings 101
consideration should be given to procuring an interpreter where a party or a witness asks for
one or if there is a suspicion that a person giving information to the tribunal is impaired in
any significant way in communicating to the tribunal or their legal representative. It is always
preferable for suitably accredited interpreters to be used rather than family members or
friends. Failure to arrange for an interpreter may amount to a denial of procedural fairness.26
Tribunal members and parties should ask questions in the usual way when an interpreter
is interpreting questions and answers, maximising the extent to which communication is
taking place directly with the witness. It is recommended that:
• questions be addressed directly to the party concerned and not through the interpreter
(that is, ask ‘What did you do next?’ to the party rather than say to the interpreter ‘Please
ask Mr X what he did next’)
• the member asking the question look directly at the party concerned and not the
interpreter
• sentences be kept short with sufficient breaks to allow the interpreter to interpret the
content as accurately as possible
• tribunal members ensure that interpreters understand that everything that is said must
be translated exactly as said
• tribunal members ensure that interpreters understand that if they need clarification of
what has been said, they should indicate this first to the tribunal
• working conditions and status, including briefings and background
• rates of remuneration
• practices during proceedings, including explaining the interpreter’s role, controlling the
flow of proceedings, alerting the tribunal to cross-cultural differences and dealing with
complaints about interpreters and translations.
The Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration has published a study on interpreter
policies and practices in Australian courts and tribunals,27 which includes recommendations
for qualifications, training and engagement of interpreters.
A number of Australian tribunals have developed policies regarding the use of interpreters,
which may serve as useful guides for members:
• Administrative Appeals Tribunal <http://www.aat.gov.au/steps-in-a-review/overview-
of-the-review-process/interpreters>
• NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal <http://www.ncat.nsw.gov.au/Pages/going_to_
the_tribunal/access_support/interpreters_and_translators.aspx>
26 See the discussion in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Le (2007) 164 FCR 151.
27 See S Hale, Interpreter Policies, Practices and Protocols in Australian Courts and Tribunals: A National Survey
<http://www.aija.org.au/online/Pub%20no89.pdf> at January 2017.
102 Chapter Five: Hearings
The Judicial Council on Cultural Diversity (JCCD) has developed draft Australian National
Standards for Working with Interpreters in Courts and Tribunals with the accompanying
Supplementary Materials to establish minimal and optimal practices for Australian courts
and tribunals. The Standards are accompanied by Model Rules and a Model Practice Note that
give effect to the Standards. The JCCD’s draft standards are subject to a public consultation
process, see <http://jccd.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/National_Standards_for_
Working_with_Interpreters_in_Courts_and_Tribunals_-_Final_Consultation_Version_
June_2016.pdf> at January 2017.
28 However, the validity of subordinate legislation to that effect has been said potentially to be open to an argument that it
is beyond power: see Freedman v Petty and Greyhound Racing Board [1981] VR 1001. Legislation ousting the common
law right to legal representation will also be construed narrowly: Appellant WABZ v Minister for Immigrations and
Multicultural Affairs (2004) 134 FCR 274.
29 See JRS Forbes, Justice in Tribunals (4th edn, 2014, Federation Press, Sydney) 136.
30 For the right, see Edgar and Walker v Meade (1916) 23 CLR 29; R v Visiting Justice at Pentridge Prison; Ex parte
Walker [1975] VR 883; Appellant WABZ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2004) 134 FCR 271; for
the absence of the right, see Maclean v The Workers Union [1929] 1 ch. 602.
31 See e.g. Smith v Aldrich (1993) QCA 253 (Unreported, Queensland Court of Appeal, Pincus, Davies and McPherson
JJA, 9 July 1993); MacNab v Auburn Soccer Sports Club Ltd [1975] 1 NSWLR 54; Cains v Jenkins (1979) 28 ALR 219;
Finch v Goldstein (1981) 4 ALD 419; Doepgen v Mugarinya Community Association Incorporated [2014] WASCA 67.
32 Drew v Attorney-General [2002] 1 NZLR 58.
33 N Bedford and R Creyke, Inquisitorial Processes in Australian Tribunals (Australasian Institute of Judicial
Administration, 2006) 49–52.
Chapter Five: Hearings 103
This process applies to each of the applicant’s or complainant’s witnesses and, at the end of
this aspect of the case, is repeated for the respondent and their witnesses.
Sometimes, the retention of flexibility in the order of proceedings can be constructive, such
as where there are serial, discrete issues that need to be determined, or where there is a
particularly anxious party or witness from whom it may be advantageous to hear out of
order. An example of this can occur in hearings before mental health review tribunals and
guardianship tribunals. By contrast, in matters such as planning disputes, the responsible
authority, defending its decision, often goes first, followed by the objector and the applicant
for the planning permit.
It is often constructive for the chairperson of a tribunal to indicate that questions will be
asked from time to time by members of the tribunal to clarify matters as they arise and also
after cross-examination before re-examination.
Where there is the potential for a matter to be settled, it can be advantageous for the
possibility to be raised by the chairperson of the tribunal at the outset. It can be useful to
offer to stand the matter down or even adjourn it to enable the parties to speak further with
a view to reaching a settlement. Such urging may be particularly appropriate where a party
appears not to have had legal advice and requires it or where costs are likely to exceed the
amount of money in dispute.
Where there is a realistic prospect that an applicant may be in a worse position as a result of
a hearing (for instance, where a debt may be increased, or compensation awarded by a lower
tribunal overturned), it is proper for these issues to be explicitly raised at the outset with
the applicant. The tribunal chairperson should make it clear that this does not mean that a
concluded view on the issue has been formed by the tribunal. Suitable time for the applicant
to reconsider their position should be made available. The same considerations can arise in
respect of respondents where they have adopted an adversarial posture which appears not to
be justified by the evidence adduced or likely to be adduced.
35 See e.g. Harbour Inn Seafoods Ltd v Switzerland General Insurance Co Ltd (1990) 3 PRNZ 653 at 654. But the tribunal
is not required to advise an applicant how to conduct their case: Heyward v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
(2009) 113 ALD 65.
Chapter Five: Hearings 105
reflected upon evidence given in the course of a hearing. It is a fundamental entitlement that
a party who might be troubled by the prior knowledge or interaction of the tribunal member
should be afforded an opportunity to make submissions upon whether the tribunal member
should refrain from sitting on the hearing.
If proceedings are part-heard (in other words, if they have commenced but have needed to
be stopped part the way through), they should generally be adjourned to a tribunal hearing
with the same personnel. However, if a tribunal member hearing a matter dies, becomes
incapacitated or is unable to continue hearing the matter, consideration needs to be given to
adjourning the hearing to allow it to be conducted afresh by a differently constituted tribunal.
Sometimes, parties can agree to the contrary. However, this depends upon the exact terms of
the legislation establishing the tribunal’s hearing processes.
If a party wishes to lodge a late counterclaim, it may be appropriate to dispense with service
requirements, on the basis that its late lodgement will not cause prejudice to the other parties.
Alternatively, the matter may need to be adjourned to enable the other side to respond in the
usual way.
When a party raises complex legal or factual matters which the other side was not in a
position to anticipate or prepare for adequately, it may be appropriate to adjourn the hearing
to allow them to read, reflect and respond to the new issues or submissions.
When a party is taken by surprise (or ‘ambushed’) in relation to important matters raised
by the other side at the hearing, it may be appropriate to adjourn the hearing to enable
them to present answers or contextualise evidence that they would have presented had they
been aware of the need for it. On occasion, too, a matter cannot be finalised within the time
allotted to it. The hearing should not be unduly rushed or take place in circumstances which
are oppressive in an attempt to conclude the hearing. It is important that a party at potential
risk of an adverse decision be given an adequate opportunity to be properly heard and to
make submissions.40 It can also be appropriate for an adjournment to be granted where,
through no fault of a party, an important witness cannot be present. Often the actual presence
of a witness is preferable to relying only on their written statement or report, but this depends
upon the facts of the particular case. The yardstick is whether the tribunal’s decision-making
40 R v Thames Magistrates’ Court; Ex parte Polemis [1974] 1 WLR 1371; Love v AFL Canberra Limited and the Members
of the Disputes Tribunal of AFL Canberra Limited [2009] ACTSC 135.
108 Chapter Five: Hearings
will be disadvantaged by the absence of the physical presence of the witness or whether a
party’s interests will be materially worsened.
A hearing may also need to be adjourned for a variety of reasons. These include:
• a party with limited English requires an interpreter whose presence cannot promptly be
secured
• a party asks for an adjournment to enable relevant material to be placed before the
tribunal when they were not in a position to procure the material prior to the hearing
date, or when the tribunal concludes that it would be substantially assisted by access to
such material
• another person should be joined in the proceedings
• a party is unable to attend, for a legitimate reason
• it is decided that a witness should be summonsed to attend and/or produce documents
• the basis of the hearing significantly changes in running—for example, if serious new
allegations are added in the course of a disciplinary hearing
• it is decided that further expert or other evidence is required.
Failure to grant an adjournment, if unreasonable or procedurally unfair, could ultimately
invalidate the tribunal’s decision. Any refusal to grant an adjournment must be justifiable
on an intelligible and reasoned basis: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013)
249 CLR 332.
the inevitable anxiety engendered by appearance before an official body, highlight the need
for clear and calm communication to parties by tribunal members about matters such as:
• the nature and legal limits of the tribunal’s role
• what is expected and permitted of parties
• how the proceedings will be conducted
• parties’ appeal rights.
Good communication practices relevant to tribunals are set out in Chapter Seven.
While it is unrealistic to expect that all non-legally-qualified parties will be equipped to
conduct themselves with an informed understanding of tribunal processes and enabling
legislation, it remains appropriate to impose limits upon questioning and conduct so as
to facilitate the conduct of orderly, efficient and dignified hearings. However, the absence
of representation for parties imposes upon tribunal members additional responsibilities to
enable parties to participate effectively in proceedings. These extend to:
• the provision of additional information to self-represented parties
• giving guidance about the posing of questions to witnesses
• exploring technical matters of which self-represented parties may be unaware
• posing questions and raising issues which have not been canvassed by parties.
Two useful sources of information on self-represented litigants are the Equality before the
Law Bench Book, produced by the Judicial Commission of NSW, and the Self-Represented
Litigants Literature Review, produced by the Australian Centre for Court and Justice System
Administration, Monash University.41
41 Judicial Commission of NSW, Equality before the Law Bench Book (Judicial Commission of NSW, Sydney, 2006);
E Richardson, T Sourdin and N Wallace, Self-Represented Litigants Literature Review (ACCJSI, Monash University,
2012) <http://www.law.monash.edu.au/centres/acji/projects/self-represented-litigants/self-rep-litigant-lit-review-accjsi-
24-may-2012.pdf> at January 2017. See also E Richardson, T Sourdin and N Wallace, Self-Represented Litigants:
Gathering Useful Information, Final Report (ACJI, Monash University, 2012) <https://www.ag.gov.au/LegalSystem/
Documents/2012%20Report%20Self-Represented%20Litigants%20Report%20-%20Gathering%20Useful%20
Information%20Monash%20University.PDF> at January 2017; T Sourdin and N Wallace, The Dilemmas Posed by
Self-represented Litigants — The Dark Side (ACCJI, Monash University, 2014) <http://www.civiljustice.info/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1031&context=access> at January 2017.
110 Chapter Five: Hearings
It is important for tribunal members to control persistent interruptions and the expression of
abuse or insults directed at the tribunal or witnesses. Generally, this can be done in a way
that is neither heavy-handed nor dependent upon threats.
Early and full explanation of what is acceptable conduct, and the drawing of clear lines in a
calm but firm voice as to what is not permissible suffices in most circumstances. However,
where that proves not to be sufficient, there are other strategies that can be employed.
On occasion, it is anxiety and tension that results in persons (for instance, those with mental
illnesses, personality disorders or intellectual disabilities) speaking in a disrespectful way or
conducting themselves disruptively or abusively. If those causes of stress can be addressed,
this can go a long way toward reducing the problematic behaviours and enhancing the
person’s contribution to proceedings. The following strategies may be found useful:
• reassuring an anxious and apprehensive applicant that they will have a full opportunity
(a little later) to say what they wish to communicate and to ask questions of witnesses
• providing a pen and paper, where the person is literate, to facilitate making notes of
issues that they wish to address
• explaining quietly that the behaviour that the person is engaging in is not helpful to the
tribunal or to the person’s interests, whether that be in terms of ‘winning’ the case or in
being accepted as a reliable, credible witness
• calmly explaining that certain kinds of behaviour in which the person is engaging are
not acceptable or fair to others who are present
• standing the hearing down temporarily to allow the person ‘time out’ to reflect on
whether they want to continue with the hearing, whether there is a specific submission
that they wish to make, or whether they would prefer the matter to be adjourned
• asking a person to speak more slowly so that the tribunal member can take full notes of
everything that they are saying.
Ultimately, the yardstick for managing inappropriate conduct is to consider what needs to
be done to ensure that the hearing proceeds properly, with fairness to parties and in such
away as to command public confidence. If it is necessary to exclude persons from hearings,
112 Chapter Five: Hearings
a number of tribunals are enabled by statute to take such a step where the person’s conduct
is disruptive or amounts to contempt.42
5.6.1. Examination-in-chief
Tribunals are generally not bound by the rules of evidence.43 Where there are multiple parties
and where parties are legally represented it is common, though not a strict requirement, for
the basic rule that applies to examination-in-chief to be applied—namely, that the questions
asked should not be leading in the sense that they:
• directly or indirectly suggest a particular answer, i.e. they plant an idea or suggestion
• assume the existence of a fact the existence of which is in dispute in the proceeding and
as to the existence of which the witness had not given evidence before the questions are
asked.44
It can be useful for tribunals to adhere to this rule as it enables information from witnesses
to be assessed for its reliability.
5.6.2. Cross-examination
There is no general right for parties to cross-examine in tribunals.45 In respect of some
tribunals, however, parties are given a right to cross-examine. For instance in Barrier
Reef Broadcasting Pty Ltd v Minister for Post and Telecommunications46 Brennan J found
that legislation that provided that counsel might ‘examine’ witnesses implied a right to
cross-examine. However, Forbes has argued that there are several good reasons for the law
restricting cross-examination in respect of tribunals because their rules of evidence are less
formal than that of a court:
• many tribunals can conduct ‘hearings’ wholly in writing, meaning that opportunities for
cross-examination do not arise
• tribunals may rely on their own knowledge and cannot themselves be cross-examined
An important role of the tribunal is to ensure that witnesses are not gratuitously attacked,
harassed or demeaned during questioning. The line between robust testing of assertions by
a witness and badgering or harmful interrogation can be a fine one. The presiding tribunal
member has the role of balancing the need to obtain a perspective that enables evaluation of
a witness’s evidence and preventing the tribunal process from causing any harm to witnesses.
5.6.3. Re-examination
Re-examination enables clarification by the person who has previously examined a
witness in-chief of issues that may have become confusing or ambiguous in the course
of cross-examination. It is important for tribunals to prevent re-examination being used as
an opportunity to open up new issues not raised during examination-in-chief. Should that
occur, a further opportunity for cross-examination should be given.
In addition, they tend not to elicit answers from witnesses that will assist the tribunal as
much as open-ended questions, which enable witnesses to say what they actually wish to
communicate. Expression of astonishment or overt doubt is unhelpful from the perspective
of tribunal members appearing to conduct the hearing without preconceived views.
5.6.7. Videoconferencing
Videoconferencing facilities can be very useful for enabling hearings to take place and
witnesses to give evidence when otherwise that would not be possible. Such facilities can
also be financially advantageous. However, the technology brings its own challenges. It
introduces a level of artificiality into proceedings and, by reason of its telescoping of the
field of vision and time delays between questions and answers, it can impair the capacity
of the tribunal to appreciate the context within which a witness is functioning. It can cause
a significant reduction in spontaneity. In addition, it makes assessment of demeanour and
credibility difficult.
Witnesses providing information to a tribunal on camera at distance do so in an environment
to which they are usually unaccustomed. Thus, members should be slow to draw inferences
about credibility or reliability based upon witnesses’ demeanour and answering style on a
videoconferencing hearing.
If a tribunal concludes that it is unable effectively to assess the evidence because the
hearing is taking place by videoconferencing, again it should adjourn the hearing for it to be
reconvened in person.
When documents are provided to the tribunal, or ‘tendered’, they are generally marked as
‘exhibits’ and retained until the conclusion of the hearing. This occurs after they have been
identified by a witness. Where there are two parties, it is common for the documents tendered
by one party to be marked with a letter of the alphabet and for those tendered by the other to
be marked with a number. A technique often used is to tender a document ‘absolutely’ where
a witness can identify it and to simply ‘mark it for identification’ where a witness is shown
a document but is not in a position to identify it.
The advantage of closing submissions is that they have the potential to summarise the most
important parts of the evidence that has been given and enable a party to explain how they
consider the tribunal should view the information before it. They give a final opportunity
for a party to explain how they consider the tribunal should finally determine a matter. The
disadvantage of extending the opportunity for submissions is that they may not assist the
tribunal’s fact-finding responsibility by reason of being disorganised, argumentative, or
‘speechifying’. It is up to tribunals in particular cases to determine whether they will be
assisted by closing submissions.
A further issue when tribunals decide to receive submissions is to determine whether they
should be oral or in writing. Again, practices of tribunals vary. However, where a hearing
has been lengthy (for example, extending for several days or weeks) or complex, it can be
Chapter Five: Hearings 117
of assistance to the tribunal to receive written submissions that bring together the extensive
material in a way which will aid its decision-making.
50 See generally E Campbell, ‘Principles of Evidence and Administrative Tribunals’ in E Campbell and L Waller (eds),
Well and Truly Tried (1982, Law Book Company, Sydney); D Giles, ‘Dispensing with the Rules of Evidence’ (1991) 7
Australian Bar Review 233.
51 See e.g. Australian Football League v Carlton Football Club Ltd [1998] 2 VR 546.
52 See the principles set out in Ileris v Comcare (1999) 56 ALD 301. For instance, in Lipovac v Hamilton Holdings Pty
Ltd (Unreported, ACT Supreme Court, Higgins J, 13 September 1996) at [102], Higgins J noted that ‘the rules relating
to expert evidence at common law are largely based on good sense and fairness’. See too Pearce v Button (1986) 8 FCR
408 at 422; Bannon v The Queen (1995) 70 ALJR 25; DPP v Christie (1914) 10 Cr App R 141 at 164.
118 Chapter Five: Hearings
does not mean that they should be ignored and does not mean that they should in all cases be
wholly abandoned.53 For example, it is essential that evidence permitted before tribunals be
relevant, in the sense of bearing directly on issues that have to be decided. In addition, third-
hand hearsay may well have such minimal probative value that it should not be permitted.54
Opinion evidence from persons not possessed of expertise may not be regarded as helpful.
Information whose relevance is highly tangential or lacking logical probative qualities may
not be regarded as advancing the fact-finding process.55 Where a party had the opportunity to
call a witness, to give evidence personally, to tender documents or other evidence, or to put
them to an expert witness, but the party did not use this opportunity, this may well lead to an
inference that the uncalled evidence would not have assisted their case.56 Tribunals are not
strictly bound by evidentiary rules relating to propensity or similar facts and can allow and
act on material that would fall short of what would be admissible in the courts.57 However,
tribunals should be cautious in doing so. Because a person has engaged in a certain form
of conduct on particular occasions does not necessarily mean that they have done so again.
There is a particular risk in propensity or disposition reasoning because it can result in unfair
prejudice. The yardstick used by the common law courts has been that there should be a
striking similarity58 between other prior matters and that which is the subject of the hearing
before the prior matters should be taken into account. The criminal courts have gone even
further, excluding similar fact evidence unless there is no rational view of the evidence
consistent with the innocence of the accused.59 A useful guideline in assessing the probative
force of similar fact evidence is by reference to:
• the cogency of the evidence showing a person’s ‘bad disposition’
• the extent to which such evidence supports the inference sought to be drawn from it
• the degree of relevance of that inference to some fact in issue in the proceedings.
The obligation of a tribunal is to make ‘every effort … to administer “substantial justice” ’.60
The major challenge for tribunal members, unconstrained by the formal rules of evidence and
procedure, is to determine when information will assist sound fact-finding, as against when
it will not serve a useful purpose in crystallising issues in dispute, evaluating other evidence
and assessing the matters that are required to be the subject of findings of fact. Tribunals
should not act on material of little probative value but significant prejudicial effect.61
53 See in particular A and B v Director of Family Services (1996) 132 FLR 172 at 177, holding that in a curial context where
a statutory provision stated that the rules of evidence need not be applied ‘They should still be applied unless, for sound
reason, their application is dispensed with’.
54 See Gardiner v Land Agents Board (1976) 12 SASR 458 at 474–75.
55 See Re Pochi and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 2 ALD 33.
56 The inference deriving from Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 has been held to be legitimate for tribunals: see Stasos
v Tax Agents’ Board of NSW (1990) 90 ATC 4950.
57 See e.g. Davis v Carew-Pole [1956] 1 WLR 833.
58 See e.g. Makin v Attorney-General (NSW) [1894] AC 57.
59 Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 482–83.
60 War Pensions Entitlements Tribunal; Ex parte Bolt (1933) 50 CLR 228 at 256.
61 See Moore v Guardianship and Administration Board [1990] VR 902.
Chapter Five: Hearings 119
If experts have made assumptions these should be clarified, as should what expert witnesses
regard as the reasons for the differences amongst the views expressed by different experts to
the tribunal.
Tribunals are generally assisted by being able to identify the processes employed by experts
to reason from the basis of data to inference, and whether different forms of reasoning from
the available data could legitimately be employed.
Where expert evidence is unclear or where expert evidence or further expert evidence would
assist the tribunal in its fact-finding, this can be identified by the tribunal, whereupon suitable
arrangements can be made for such expert material to be located. It is prudent for tribunal
members not to play a close role in interacting with such experts because of the risk that
adverse inferences of influence might be drawn by a reasonable observer, leading to allegations
of bias against tribunal members. However, not every interaction between a tribunal member
and an expert witness outside the tribunal may give rise to the appearance of bias.63
62 See generally I Freckelton and H Selby, Expert Evidence: Law, Practice, Procedure and Advocacy (3rd edn, 2005, Law
Book Co, Sydney). See too Daniel v Western Australia (2000) 178 ALR 542; Harrington-Smith v Western Australia
(No 8) (2004) 207 ALR 483.
63 R v Doogan; Ex parte Lucas-Smith [2005] ACTSC 74 (Unreported, ACT Supreme Court, Higgins CJ, Crispin and
Bennett JJ, 5 August 2005). See further I Freckelton and D Ranson, Death Investigation and the Coroner’s Inquest
(2006, Oxford University Press, Melbourne) ch. 17.
120 Chapter Five: Hearings
73 See Farnaby v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (2007) 97 ALD 788; Comcare v Foster [2006]
FCA 6 at [38]–[39]; ALRC Discussion Paper 73, ‘Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies’, ch. 3, 72.
But see Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Market Ltd (2006) 233 ALR 369 for the opposing
view.
74 See Esso Australia Resources Limited v Commissioner of Taxation [1999] HCA 67.
75 Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674 at 685.
122 Chapter Five: Hearings
difficulties. Where there are two or more parties to a hearing, the tribunal needs to be careful
and vigilant to ensure that the additional material, if it is to be taken into account in any way,
is provided to all parties so that they can respond to it.
Should the new material be significant, or should parties seek to respond to it, the hearing
may need to be reconvened for the information to be tested and/or for further submissions
to be made in relation to it. However, often the obligations of procedural fairness can be
satisfied by the tribunal ensuring that all parties have the additional material and that an
opportunity is provided for further submissions to be made in respect of it.
References
Legislation
ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT)
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW)
Evidence Act 2011 (ACT)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)
Evidence Act (NT)
Evidence Act 1977 (Qld)
Evidence Act 1929 (SA)
Evidence Act 2001 (Tas)
Evidence Act 2008 (Vic)
Evidence Act 1906 (WA)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (NZ)
Case law
A and B v Director of Family Services (1996) 132 FLR 172
Adamou v Director-General of Social Security (1985) 7 ALN 203
Akers v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 20 FCR 363
Appellant WABZ v Minister for Immigrations and Multicultural Affairs (2004) 134 FCR 274
Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 72,
(2005) 225 CLR 88
Australian Associated Motor Insurers Ltd v Motor Accidents Authority of NSW (2010) 56 MVR 108
Australian Football League v Carlton Football Club Ltd [1998] 2 VR 546
Australian Postal Commission v Hayes (1989) 23 FCR 320
Bannon v The Queen (1995) 70 ALJR 25
Chapter Five: Hearings 123
Barrier Reef Broadcasting Pty Ltd v Minister for Post and Telecommunications (1978) 19 ALR 425
Brebner v Perry [1961] SASR 177
Brighton v Selpam Pty Ltd [1987] VR 54
BTR Engineering (Australia) v Patterson (1990) 20 NSWLR 724
Cains v Jenkins (1979) 28 ALR 219
Comcare v Foster [2006] FCA 6
Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union v
Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 148
Coutts v Close [2014] FCA 19
Daniel v Western Australia (2000) 178 ALR 542
Davis v Carew-Pole [1956] 1 WLR 833
Dhiman v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1291
Doepgen v Mugarinya Community Association Incorporated [2014] WASCA 67
DPP v Christie (1914) 10 Cr App R 141
Drew v Attorney-General [2002] 1 NZLR 58
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337
Edgar and Walker v Meade (1916) 23 CLR 29
Esso Australia Resources Limited v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 74 ALJR 339
Ex parte Reynolds; In re Reynolds (1882) 20 ch. D 294
Farnaby v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (2007) 97 ALD 788
Finch v Goldstein (1981) 4 ALD 41936 ALR 287
Freedman v Petty and Greyhound Racing Board [1981] VR 1001
Gardiner v Land Agents Board (1976) 12 SASR 458
Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674 at 685
Hamblin v Duffy (No 1) (1981) 3 ALD 15334 ALR 333
Harbour Inn Seafoods Ltd v Switzerland General Insurance Co Ltd (1990) 3 PRNZ 653
Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 8) (2004) 207 ALR 483
Heyward v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 113 ALD 65
Hurt v Rossall (1982) 43 ALR 252
Ileris v Comcare (1999) 56 ALD 301
Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Market Ltd (2006) 233 ALR 369
Jackson v Gamble [1983] 1 VR 552
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298
Kappos v State Transit Authority (1995) NSWCCR 386
King v McLellan [1974] VR 773
Kingham v Cole [(2002]) 118 FCR 289
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550
Li v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 74 FCR 275
Lipovac v Hamilton Holdings Pty Ltd (Unreported, ACT Supreme Court, 13 September 1996)
Love v AFL Canberra Limited and the Members of the Disputes Tribunal of AFL Canberra Limited [2009]
ACTSC 135
124 Chapter Five: Hearings
Triplex Safety Glass Co Ltd v Lancegaye Safety Glass (1934) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 395
Tucker v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCAFC 16
Videto v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 8 FCR 167
Wajnberg v Raynor [1971] VR 665
War Pensions Entitlements Tribunal; Ex parte Bolt (1933) 50 CLR 228
Weinstein v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria (2008) 21 VR 29
Books
N Bedford and R Creyke, Inquisitorial Processes in Australian Tribunals (Australasian Institute of Judicial
Administration, 2006)
R Creyke, J McMillan, and M Smyth Control of Government Action (4th edn, 2015, LexisNexis)
JRS Forbes, Justice in Tribunals (4th edn, 2014, Federation Press, Sydney)
I Freckelton and D Ranson, Death Investigation and the Coroner’s Inquest (2006, Oxford University Press,
Melbourne)
I Freckelton and H Selby, Expert Evidence: Law, Practice, Procedure and Advocacy (3rd edn, 2005, Law Book
Co, Sydney)
S Hale, Interpreter Policies, Practices and Protocols in Australian Courts and Tribunals: A National Survey
(Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, 2011) <http://www.aija.org.au/online/Pub%20no89.pdf>
at January 2017.
Reports
Administrative Review Council, A Guide to Standards of Conduct for Tribunal Members (2nd edn, 2009)
<http://www.arc.ag.gov.au/Documents/GuidetoStdsofConduct-RevisedAug2009.pdf > at January 2017
ALRC Discussion Paper 73, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies (ALRC, 2007)
Commonwealth, Final Report of the Committee on Administrative Discretions, Parl Paper No 316 (1973)
Judicial Commission of NSW, Equality before the Law Bench Book (Judicial Commission of NSW, Sydney,
2006)
Guides
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Interpreters, <http://www.aat.gov.au/steps-in-a-review/overview-of-the-
review-process/interpreters> at January 2017
NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Interpreters and Translators, <http://www.ncat.nsw.gov.au/Pages/
going_to_the_tribunal/access_support/interpreters_and_translators.aspx> at January 2017
Judicial Council on Cultural Diversity, Draft Australian National Standards for Working with Interpreters in
Courts and Tribunals, <http://jccd.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/National_Standards_for_Working_
with_Interpreters_in_Courts_and_Tribunals_-_Final_Consultation_Version_June_2016.pdf> at January
2017
R Creyke, ‘Pragmatism v Policy: Attitudes of Australian Courts and Tribunals to Inquisitorial Process’ Ch 2
in L Jacobs and S Baglay (eds) Inquisitorial Processes in Administrative Regimes: Global Perspectives
(Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2013)
J Dwyer, ‘Overcoming the Adversarial Bias in Tribunal Proceedings’ (1991) 20 Federal Law Review 252
D Giles, ‘Dispensing with the Rules of Evidence’ (1991) 7 Australian Bar Review 233
M Groves, ‘The Imaginary Observer of the Bias Rule’ (2012) 19 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 203
M Groves, ‘The Duty to Inquire in Tribunal Proceedings’ (2011) 33 Sydney Law Review 7
G Osborne, ‘Inquisitorial Procedure in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal — A Comparative Perspective’
(1982) 13 Federal Law Review 150
D C Pearce, ‘The Australian Government Administrative Appeals Tribunal’ (1976) 1 University of New South
Wales Law Journal 193
N Rees, ‘Procedure and Evidence in ‘Court Substitute’ Tribunals’, (2006) 28 Australian Bar Review 41
E Richardson, T Sourdin and N Wallace, Self-Represented Litigants Literature Review (ACCJSI, Monash
University, 2012) <http://www.law.monash.edu.au/centres/acji/projects/self-represented-litigants/self-rep-
litigant-lit-review-accjsi-24-may-2012.pdf> at January 2017
E Richardson, T Sourdin and N. Wallace, Self-Represented Litigants: Gathering Useful Information, Final
Report (ACJI, Monash University, 2012) <https://www.ag.gov.au/LegalSystem/Documents/2012%20
Report%20Self-Represented%20Litigants%20Report%20-%20Gathering%20Useful%20Information%20
Monash%20University.PDF> at January 2017
T Sourdin and N Wallace, The Dilemmas Posed by Self-represented Litigants — The Dark Side (ACCJI, Monash
University, 2014) <http://www.civiljustice.info/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1031&context=access> at
January 2017
M Smyth, ‘Inquisitorial Adjudication: The Duty to Inquire in Merits Review Tribunals’ (2010) 34 Melbourne
University Law Review 230
Chapter Six: Decision-Making 127
Reasons:
• Tribunals are generally required by statute to give reasons for their decisions. Giving
reasons for decisions reflects the values of transparency and accountability that
permeate administrative law.
• Reasons, whether oral or in writing, should contain sufficient information for a losing
party to understand (although not necessarily accept) the outcome.
• Reasons should be extensive enough for a dissatisfied party to exercise their appeal
or review rights and for the higher body to be able to understand the factual and legal
bases of the tribunal’s decision, as well as its reasoning processes.
• Reasons should include:
–– findings on material questions of fact, such as credibility or differing accounts of
incidents
–– identification of the sources of evidence and information upon which such findings
rely
–– brief reference to the law, rule, policy or principle applicable to significant issues
before the tribunal
–– a logical statement of the reasoning process engaged in by the tribunal, showing
the connection between facts, legal principles and the decision arrived at
128 Chapter Six: Decision-Making
Such matters need to be dealt with as preliminary matters, as they logically precede the
issues of fact which may or may not need to be determined, depending upon the threshold
decision of the tribunal.
Preliminary matters generally are questions of law. Tribunals cannot authoritatively
determine questions of law in the same way as a court. However, they are entitled, and often
have a duty, to determine questions of law for the purpose of guiding themselves to make a
lawful decision. In general, tribunals cannot make decisions about the constitutional validity
of statutes.2 However, a tribunal should consider the constitutional validity of legislation in
order to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, and if it considers that the legislation
is unconstitutional, it should decline to exercise the jurisdiction purportedly conferred on it
by that legislation: Re Walsh and Commissioner of Taxation (2012) 130 ALD 200 at [19]
per Deputy President Jarvis. The question of whether a tribunal can determine whether a
legislative instrument is beyond power) has not finally been determined.3
There are two circumstances in which there can be a division of approach, namely, in regard
to the:
Tribunal members should record their dissent when they are of the view that the outcome
should have been different from that which other members of the tribunal in the case have
determined. However, when the difference consists ‘only’ of the reasoning process by which
the ultimate decision is arrived at, the need for the recording of a separate decision may not
be so compelling.
A tribunal member who dissents should ensure that they do not sign the majority decision.
• where a statute expressly or impliedly requires a tribunal to apply the law that was in
force at an earlier date—for example, where an appeal is limited to the question of
whether the primary decision breached a procedure
Take, for example, the following scenario. Q applies for a pension on 30 June 2010 and is
refused in error. On 1 September 2010 an amendment comes into operation that restricts
qualifications for the pension. Q would not qualify if she applied under the new provisions,
and the amending Act gives no indication that it applies retrospectively. Q’s rights accrued
when she was eligible for the pension and applied for it. A tribunal hearing her appeal would
be required to apply the provisions in force at the date of her application.
5 See Re Smith and Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority (1978) 1 ALD 374; Kavvadias v Commonwealth
Ombudsman (1984) 1 FCR 80; Esber v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 430.
Chapter Six: Decision-Making 131
6 Justice G Downes, ‘Best Practice in Drafting: How to Draft Reasons for Decision as Efficiently and Effectively as
Possible – Techniques for Structure, Organisation and Coverage of Essential Issues’ <http://www.aat.gov.au/AAT/media/
AAT/Files/Speeches%20and%20Papers/ExcellenceinDecisionMakingSeminarOctober2010.pdf> at January 2017.
7 See Justice M Kirby, ‘On the Writing of Judgments’ (1990) 64 Australian Law Journal 691; Justice M Kirby, ‘Ex
Tempore Judgments—Reasons on the Run’ (1995) 25 Western Australian Law Review 213, 214.
8 Such an order would be by way of prerogative relief: mandamus or an order in the nature of mandamus to compel
performance. An example is NAIS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 80 ALJR
367.
9 NAIS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 80 ALJR 367.
10 This has been held to be legitimate: see Lek v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1993) 43
FCR 100. However, the member must engage in their own independent fact-finding and reasoning process.
Chapter Six: Decision-Making 133
responsibility of being reasonably satisfied on each component issue. The standard of proof,
or level of evidence, required for such satisfaction is generally considered to be ‘on the
balance of probabilities’—whether it is established that something is more probable than
not, more likely than not.11
However, there is an important qualification in this regard. Although our law knows only two
standards of proof—beyond reasonable doubt and on the balance of probabilities—where
serious allegations are made, the gravity of the assertion requires a higher level of proof than
‘mere balance of probabilities’. As Latham CJ put it in Briginshaw v Briginshaw:12
There is no mathematical scale according to which degrees of certainty of
intellectual conviction can be computed or valued. But there are differences in
degree of certainty, which are real, and which can be intelligently stated, although
it is impossible to draw precise lines, as upon a diagram, and to assign each case
to a particular subdivision of certainty. No court should act upon mere suspicion,
surmise or guesswork in any case. In a civil case, fair inference may justify a finding
upon the basis of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof required
by a cautious and responsible tribunal will naturally vary in accordance with the
seriousness or importance of the issue.
Justice Dixon13 framed the test similarly:
The truth is that, when the law requires the proof of any fact, the tribunal must
feel an actual persuasion of its occurrence or existence before it can be found.
It cannot be found as a result of a mere mechanical comparison of probabilities
independently of any belief in its reality.
No doubt an opinion that a state of facts exists may be held according to indefinite
gradations of certainty; and this has led to attempts to define exactly the certainty
required by the law for various purposes. Fortunately, however, at common law no
third standard of persuasion was definitely developed. Except upon criminal issues
to be proved by the prosecution, it is enough that the affirmative of an allegation is
made out to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. But reasonable satisfaction
is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and
consequence of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made,
the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of
the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must
affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable
satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters ‘reasonable satisfaction’ should not be
produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences.
11 See the principles set out succinctly in Repatriation Commission v Smith (1987) 15 FCR 327; McDonald v Director-
General of Social Security (1984) 1 FCR 354.
12 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 343–44; Barten v Williams (1978) 20 ACTR 10; Re Sutherland [1994]
2 NZLR 242 (HC) at 251 (Barker ACJ).
13 ibid. 361–62.
134 Chapter Six: Decision-Making
Where an allegation of criminal activity (such as fraud) is made, it is ordinarily not appropriate
for a tribunal to make a finding that a person has committed a crime, unless such a finding
is a necessary component of the tribunal’s reasoning. Ordinarily, such language should be
avoided where possible, lest it appear that a tribunal is purporting to decide on collateral
matters such as criminal guilt. It is quite permissible on occasion to make factual findings
that amount to a finding of the commission of a criminal offence as long as the finding is not
phrased as though the tribunal were a criminal court. Since the finding, although not expressed
in criminal law language, is tantamount to a finding of commission of crime, a tribunal can
only make such a finding where it is very confident that the facts underpinning the finding
are established. See the recent approach of the High Court in Australian Communications
and Media Authority v Today FM (Sydney) Pty Ltd (2015) 255 CLR 352 and the discussion
in Balog v Independent Commission Against Corruption (1990) 169 CLR 625.
The President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal has addressed the applicability of onus
of proof and rules of evidence to the AAT in detail in Justice D Kerr, ‘A Freedom to be Fair’
(2013, AGS Symposium, Excellence in Government Decision-making) <http://www.aat.
gov.au/AAT/media/AAT/Files/Speeches%20and%20Papers/FreedomToBeFair21Jun2013.
pdf> at January 2017.
14 In the courts, this concept is known as ‘judicial notice’; in tribunals ‘official notice’.
Chapter Six: Decision-Making 135
course of the hearing. Tribunal members can cite a legal commentary or case authority in
answer to a legal issue even though that source was not mentioned in the hearing. However,
if the discovery of such a commentary or decision was not canvassed at all at the hearing,
there are occasions when the hearing should be reconvened to enable a party or parties to
make submissions in relation to its applicability to the decision to be made by the tribunal.
15 JC Raymond, ‘The Architecture of Argument’ (2004) 7 The Judicial Review 39, 42–43.
136 Chapter Six: Decision-Making
that have to be formed on a very limited view of the persons whose credit is in question’, it
can be preferable not to make them.19
Close observation of the demeanour of a witness tested by probing questions (such as
competent cross-examination) is an aid to reliable decision-making. If a witness is unable
to advance a coherent narrative and varies their story in an effort to avoid inconvenient
questions, this may prompt doubt as to the witness’s truthfulness.20
However, undue reliance should not be placed on observations of a witness’s demeanour.
For instance, Samuels JA has commented:
The cases seem to treat as axiomatic the proposition that a trial judge can reliably
assess the credibility of a witness simply on the basis of their demeanour in the
witness box. But it should not be taken for granted. Indeed, recent scientific studies
cast doubt on the correctness of this view … One might well agree with Lord Atkin
in Société d’Avances Commerciales (Société Anonyme Egyptienne) v Merchants’
Marine Insurance Co (The ‘Palitana’) (1924) 20 L1 L Rep 140 at 142 that ‘an
ounce of intrinsic merit or demerit in the evidence, that is to say, the comparison
of evidence with known facts, is worth pounds of demeanour’ … Nevertheless, I
think it too late in the day to deny the truth of the axiom that forms the basis of a
considerable body of jurisprudence. It may be a fiction, but it has the sanction of
long-established authority.21
This passage was referred to by the High Court in 2003 in Fox v Percy22 where Gleeson CJ,
Gummow and Kirby JJ went on to say:
Considerations such as these have encouraged judges, both at trial and on appeal,
to limit their reliance on the appearances of witnesses and to reason to their
conclusions, as far as possible, on the basis of contemporary materials, objectively
established facts and the apparent logic of events. This does not eliminate the
established principles about witness credibility; but it tends to reduce the occasions
where those principles are seen as critical.
Where there are incontrovertible facts at odds with the evidence of an apparently convincing
witness, logic dictates that the incontrovertible facts prevail over the appearance or demeanour
of the witness. There can be a range of reasons unconnected with truthfulness as to why
people may appear to be evasive, unconfident or even deceptive. There is no straightforward
key to detecting lying or unreliability.23 Non-verbal cues can be particularly prejudicing and
it is important for tribunal members to be cautious in applying their own prejudices to the
process of evaluation of evidence. It is helpful to attempt to:
• analyse evidence on its merits, setting aside the identity of the person who has given it
• factor into the evaluation what is known about the witness’s cultural, economic,
educational and social background, characteristics and potential motives for unreliability
• come to a decision based on only the evidence that is placed before the tribunal
• ignore extraneous information
• be cautious about assumptions of accuracy and unreliability on the part of witnesses
• be wary of concluding that a witness has lied by virtue of factors such as body language
and demeanour
• identify one’s own emotional responses, and attempt to place them to one side
• remain conscious of the standard of proof.
In addition, it is significant for an assessment of veracity and credibility that witnesses
sometimes tell the truth about some matters and not others.
When there is more than one account about a material issue, the task for tribunal members
is not simply to decide which account they prefer but to determine whether they are satisfied
that one of the accounts is correct. If they are not, then it is proper not to accept the account
of either witness.
26 See Justice P Young, ‘Fact Finding’ (1998) 72 Australian Law Journal 21, 21–22; see too Justice J Douglas, ‘How
Should Tribunals Evaluate the Evidence?’ (Paper presented to the 7th Annual AIJA Tribunals Conference, Brisbane, 11
June 2004).
140 Chapter Six: Decision-Making
13. Formal rules such as Browne v Dunn27 and Jones v Dunkel28 may provide the solution.
The rule in Browne v Dunn is explored in Chapter Three and provides that where a
party intends to contradict testimony given by a witness, it should give the witness an
opportunity to comment by putting the substance of the contradictory version to the
witness in cross-examination. Jones v Dunkel deals with the adverse inferences that
may be drawn from the failure to give or call evidence.
14. The truth can sometimes be inferred from the fact that a witness has not said something
or that counsel has not asked the question.
6.3. Reasons
6.3.1. Need for reasons
It is a legitimate entitlement of persons appearing before a tribunal that they will receive
reasons for the tribunal’s decision so that they can understand a decision in a matter affecting
their interests. Giving reasons for decisions underpins the values of transparency and
accountability that permeate administrative law.29
As Justice McHugh noted in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous
Affairs; Ex parte Palme (2003) 216 CLR 212 at [105]:
The rationale of the obligation to provide reasons for administrative decisions is
that they amount to a “salutary discipline for those who have to decide anything
that adversely affects others”. They encourage “a careful examination of the
relevant issues, the elimination of extraneous considerations, and consistency in
decision-making”. They provide guidance for future like decisions. In many cases
they promote the acceptance of decisions once made. They facilitate the work of
the courts in performing their supervisory functions where they have jurisdiction
to do so. They encourage good administration generally by ensuring that a
decision is properly considered by the repository of the power. They promote real
consideration of the issues and discourage the decision-maker from merely going
through the motions. Where the decision effects the redefinition of the status of a
person by the agencies of the State, they guard against the arbitrariness that would
be involved in such a redefinition without proper reasons. By giving reasons, the
repository of public power increases “public confidence in, and the legitimacy of,
the administrative process”.
27 (1894) 6 R 67; see too Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [1983] 1 NSWLR 1 at 16.
28 (1959) 101 CLR 98.
29 Administrative Review Council, Best Practice Guide 4, Decision Making: Reasons (2007) <http://www.arc.ag.gov.au/
Publications/Reports/Pages/Downloads/ARCBestPracticeGuide4Reasons.aspx> January 2017.
Chapter Six: Decision-Making 141
On occasions oral reasons will be sufficient, but often a party will have a right to written
reasons. Usually the duty to provide reasons will arise from legislation. Most tribunals are
under a legislative obligation to give reasons on request. The obligation may be to provide
reasons orally or in writing or both. There is no common law right to reasons unless there
are ‘special circumstances’.30 It is probable that a tribunal can decline to give reasons only if:
• no interests are affected by its decision or
• the decision is not reviewable or
• reasons have already been given or
• (sometimes) the request is not in writing or
• (questionably) legislation does not require the giving of reasons or
• the request is out of time.31
30 See Public Service Board of New South Wales v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656; Sherlock v Lloyd (2010) 27 VR 434, 438;
Hancock v Executive Director of Public Health [2008] WASC 224; Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd v Kocak (2013)
252 CLR 480.
31 See Administrative Review Council, Practical Guidelines for Preparing Statements of Reasons (2002) <http://www.arc.
ag.gov.au/Documents/arcguidelinesnew.pdf> January 2017.
32 Dodson v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 31 FCR 451 at 465; see also Minister
for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 291 (Kirby J).
33 See Comcare v Lees (1997) 151 ALR 647.
34 See Justice A Goldberg, ‘When are Reasons for Decision Considered Inadequate?’ (2000) 24 AIAL Forum 1; W Martin,
‘The Decision-maker’s Obligation to Provide a Statement of Reasons, Fact and Evidence: the Law’ (1999) 51 Admin
Review 19; T Thawley, ‘An Adequate Statement of Reasons for an Administrative Decision’ (1996) 3 Australian Journal
of Administrative Law 189; P Bayne, ‘The Inadequacy of Reasons as an Error of Law’ (1992) 66 Australian Law Journal
302; Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Wraith (1983) 48 ALR 500 at 507 (Woodward J).
35 Administrative Review Council, Commentary on the Practical Guidelines for Preparing Statements of Reasons (2002).
36 [1996] FCA 1670 (Unreported, Federal Court of Australia, 2 August 1996).
142 Chapter Six: Decision-Making
if (a) the appeal court is unable to ascertain the reasoning upon which the decision is based
or (b) justice is not seen to have been done’.37 Reasons should be:
• comprehensible for parties appearing before a tribunal and, on occasions, for the public38
• written for their audience, having regard to the objective of tribunals to be simple,
affordable, timely and fair39
• concisely written without lengthy reproductions of the evidence40
• written in a logical sequence, not a stream of consciousness41
• capable of a logical explanation.42
An issue for tribunals where there are multiple members is the degree of involvement that
each member should have in the reasons. The fundamental principle is that the reasons must
be those of each member (subject to any dissent). It follows that it is inappropriate and an
abrogation of their responsibilities for tribunal members unquestioningly to adopt the draft
of other members.
It is legitimate for standard sentences or paragraphs to be used across decisions (particularly
as to the explanation of matters such as legal tests), provided that the specific issues of the
case are considered individually. Many tribunals have developed reasons templates. These
can be very helpful provided that they are tailored to the facts of specific cases.
Inadequacy of reasons can be a ground for appeal from a tribunal decision.43 The statement
of bare conclusions without the statement of reasons will always expose the tribunal to the
suggestion that it has not given close enough attention, or that it has allowed extraneous
matters to cloud its consideration. There is yet another purpose to be served … An obligation
37 Adopting the views of Gray J in Sun Alliance Insurance v Massoud [1989] VR 8 at 18; Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 469; Civil Aviation Safety Authority v Central Aviation Pty Ltd (2009) 253
ALR 263.
38 See Commonwealth v Pharmacy Guild of Australia (1989) 19 ALD 510; Re Palmer and Minister for the Capital
Territory (1978) 1 ALD 183.
39 See S Tongue, ‘Writing Reasons for Decisions’ in S Kneebone (ed.), Administrative Law and the Rule of Law: Still Part
of the Same Package? (1998, AIAL Inc, Canberra).
40 Sir Frank Kitto in ‘Why Write Judgments’ (1992) 66 Australian Law Journal 787, 792 commented:
Perhaps the most common case of an insufficiently disciplined judgment is one which recites the facts—in a degree
of pedestrian detail that scorns to discriminate between those that really bear on the problem, those that may interest
a story-teller but not one possessing the lawyer’s love of the relevant, and those that are not even interesting but
just happen to be there—which identifies the question to be decided, and then, without carefully worked out steps
of reasoning but with a ‘blinding flash of light’ (as has been said) produces the answer with all the assurance of a
divine revelation.
41 See Raymond, above n 14, 42–43.
42 See Administrative Review Council, above n 30, 13.
43 See H Katzen, ‘Inadequacy of Reasons as a Ground of Appeal’ (1993) 1 Australian Journal of Administrative Law
33; Justice M Kirby, ‘Reasons for Judgment: Always Permissible, Usually Desirable and Often Obligatory’ (1994) 12
Australian Bar Review 121; JRS Forbes, Justice in Tribunals (4th edn, 2014, Federation Press, Sydney) ch. 13; Justice A
Goldberg, ‘When are Reasons for Decision Considered Inadequate?’(2000) 24 AIAL Forum 1; Justice S Rares, ‘Judicial
Review of Administrative Decisions — Should there be a 21st Century Rethink?’ [2014] Federal Judicial Scholarship
18. See also LVR (WA) Pty Ltd v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (2012) 203 FCR 166.
Chapter Six: Decision-Making 143
to give reasons imposes upon the decision-maker an intellectual discipline. The tribunal
is required to state publicly what its reasoning process is. This is a sound administrative
safeguard tending to ensure that a tribunal such as this properly discharges its important
statutory functions.44
However, a statement of reasons need not necessarily be lengthy.45 It needs to be logical.
In addition, appellate courts have made it clear that they have realistic views of what is to
be expected of tribunal decisions. The courts have held that they should not submit tribunal
decisions to meticulous analysis,46 construe them finely and minutely ‘with an eye keenly
attuned to the perception of error’47 or go through the words of the decision-maker with ‘a
fine appellate tooth comb, against the prospect that a verbal slip will be found warranting the
interference of a court of law’.48
44 Commonwealth v Pharmacy Guild of Australia (1989) 19 ALD 510 at 514 (Sheppard J).
45 Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Wraith (1983) 48 ALR 500.
46 Strbak v Newton [1989] NSWCA 202 (Unreported, New South Wales Court of Appeal, Gleeson CJ, Samuels and
Priestley JJA, 18 July 1989) (Samuels JA).
47 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272–73; Collector of Customs v
Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280 at 287.
48 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 292 (Kirby J).
144 Chapter Six: Decision-Making
The High Court of Australia in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf 49
considered what is meant by a requirement that the decision-maker set out findings on
‘material facts’. The Court held that the findings have to be those that the decision-maker did
actually make, not those that legislation requires the decision-maker to make. If the decision-
maker has failed to make a finding required by the Act, the decision may be reviewable on
grounds such as error of law. However, a tribunal does not have to explain in any detail why
it rejected or made no finding about evidence led by the parties that was not material to its
decision.50
51 Some of these suggestions are derivative of proposals advanced by D Fitzgerald, ‘Tribunal Decision Writing’ (Seminar
Paper, Administrative Decisions Tribunal, Sydney, 2000).
146 Chapter Six: Decision-Making
• avoid collateral comments or irrelevancies, instead focusing upon the matter squarely
before the tribunal
• ensure orders are clear, unambiguous and capable of being enforced
• avoid legal terminology and legalese as far as possible; but use the statutory language
when applying a statutory test
• where there is more than one application before the tribunal, make orders that relate to
each application
• do not simply rely on part of submissions of one party52
• avoid metaphors, similes or other flowery forms of expression
• avoid unnecessarily personally judgmental language
• use words and turns of phrase that are not paternalistic, condescending or unhelpfully
emotive
• be conscious of the various audiences of reasons and the potentially harmful consequences
of some forms of language
• use simple, straightforward language, rather than convoluted terminology and jargon
• employ the active voice, rather than the passive: for example, ‘Centrelink asked the
recipient of the pension for details’ rather than ‘the recipient of the pension was asked
by Centrelink for details’
• avoid double negatives: for example, ‘the tenant did not refrain from making undue
noise’
• use parties’ actual names, unless there is a good reason not to do so
• if anonymity is given to a party or a witness, ensure that the anonymising descriptor is
effective—thus, for instance, use of the initials of the person is best avoided
• employ headings, reasonable margins and an accessible font. Paragraph numbers can
also be useful
• proofread the decision carefully before it is provided to the parties.
52 LVR (WA) Pty Ltd v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (2012) 203 FCR 166.
Chapter Six: Decision-Making 147
of cases so that persons without ready access to legal libraries can read the decision cited, if
they wish.53
In addition, if a case is cited to support a proposition, the relevant passage within the case
should be referred to, not just the case generally. This does not mean that substantial passages
from the case need to be quoted in full or even in part, simply that the reader should be
enabled to find the passage and understand its significance to the point being made by the
tribunal.
6.3.5.4. Submissions
An aspect of demonstrating to persons potentially adversely affected by a decision that they
have been treated with respect and been listened to actively is summarising submissions
advanced on their behalf as well as evidence that has been presented.
A failure to refer to a submission is problematic because, amongst other things, it may be
interpreted as indicative of a view that the submission had no merit. Accordingly, if it did
have merit, such failure to refer to it could be regarded as a legal error on appeal.
53 The Australian Legal Information Institute provides a website that can be searched for cases that use media-neutral
citations: <http://www.austlii.edu.au/>.
54 See, specifically, the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), s 13A.
55 See e.g. health information protected by the Health Records Act 2001, s 27.
56 See e.g. the name of a notifier: D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children [1978] AC 171 at 246.
57 See e.g. Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) in relation to information held by Commonwealth Officers.
148 Chapter Six: Decision-Making
6.4. Costs
Some tribunals have a power to order costs. Depending upon the tribunal, the practice may
be for costs to coincide with the successful party. Alternatively, the award of costs may
depend upon considerations set out in the legislation governing the tribunal.
Costs generally recompense a party for their time and expense in attending a hearing, but
also for matters such as:
• the costs and disbursements of witnesses
• the costs of obtaining photographs or other material necessary for the hearing
• travelling to the hearing
• application fees.
Where costs can be awarded, it is appropriate generally to enable submissions to be put as
to whether and in what sum costs should be awarded. Factors such as the following can be
relevant in determining whether costs should be awarded and in what sum:
• the length of the hearing
• the sums involved
• the importance of the issues to the parties
• the legal and factual complexity of the hearing
Chapter Six: Decision-Making 149
6.5. Orders
A tribunal only has the power to make orders to the extent that the statute creating it provides
it with such power. Thus, a tribunal should only make orders within the express terms
allowed for orders within its enabling legislation. Creative orders outside the terms of such
legislative provisions are fraught with risk.
In general, however, it is important that the following guidelines concerning orders by
tribunals be taken into account.
• Orders should be in clear language and convey unambiguously what it is that the tribunal
is mandating be done.
• If a decision of another decision-maker is being overturned or varied, that decision
should be identified with precision.
• To the extent that a previous decision is being varied, this should be specified by explicit
and meticulous reference to what was previously decided.
• Where an order is that a person undertake a task, this should be framed in such a way
that the person knows what they are obliged to do and the task should be capable of
performance.
• Where a timeframe is contemplated for compliance with an order, this should be clear
and not unrealistic or unduly onerous.
• Where any aspect of a decision is contingent, a mechanism that is feasible should be
set out.
6.6. Finality
As a general rule, once a tribunal has reached a final decision in respect to the matter that is
before it in accordance with its enabling statute, that decision cannot be revisited because
the tribunal has changed its mind, made an error within jurisdiction or because there has
been a change of circumstances.59 This arises from the doctrine of functus officio, which
prescribes that once a person or body has discharged a statutory power or duty by exercising
it, the person or body has no authority thereafter to embark upon the exercise again. This
doctrine is explored in Chapter Two. A further issue is the applicability of the doctrines of
res judicata (a matter judged) and issue estoppel. As explored in Chapter Two, it has been
held in respect of res judicata that a judicial determination directly involving an issue of
fact or law disposes once and for all of the issue, so that it cannot afterwards be raised
between the same parties or their representatives. Estoppel is a narrower concept. It covers
only those matters which the prior judgment, decree or order necessarily established as the
legal foundation or justification of its conclusion.60 It is fundamental to the operation of the
estoppel that a dispute between the parties results in what might be described as ‘a final
judgment’, which determines once and for all the dispute between the parties.61 A statutory
tribunal may be a tribunal to which the doctrines extend,62 but the question is whether in
the exercise of its decision-making process it finally decides a question arising between
the parties. The doctrine does not apply when a tribunal is making a ‘mere’ administrative
decision.63 The decision must be one made in respect to an issue between parties, after
considering the evidence and argument.64 An example of a hearing falling outside the scope
of such a doctrine was an ‘informal hearing’ conducted by the Medical Practitioners Board
of Victoria to decide whether a medical practitioner had engaged in ‘unprofessional conduct
not of a serious nature’.65
59 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597 at 603; see too Chandler v Alberta
Association of Architects [1989] 2 SCR 848.
60 Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464.
61 Kabourakis v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria [2005] VSC 493 (Unreported, Victorian Supreme Court, Gillard
J, 20 December 2005) at [86].
62 Thus, for instance, the General Medical Council has been found to be a civil disciplinary tribunal to be regarded as
‘judicial’: Hill v Clifford [1907] 2 ch. 236. A similar decision has been made in respect of the Medical Board of Victoria:
Basser v Medical Board of Victoria [1981] VR 953 at 975.
63 Administration of Papua New Guinea v Daera Guba (1973) 130 CLR 353 at 353. In Pastras v Commonwealth (1966)
9 FLR 152, Lush J considered the procedures and determination of the Commonwealth Commission for Employees
Compensation. His Honour stated (at 155):
The underlying principle of this form of estoppel is that the parties who have had a dispute heard by a competent
tribunal should not be able to litigate the same issues in other tribunals. When the decision-making body is an
administrative body not affording the opportunity of presenting evidence and argument, it seems to me that there is no
room for the operation of this principle.
64 Kabourakis v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria [2005] VSC 493 (Unreported, Victorian Supreme Court, Gillard
J, 20 December 2005) at [87].
65 ibid. at [88].
Chapter Six: Decision-Making 151
References
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)
Health Records Act 2001 (Vic)
Health Professions Registration Act 2005 (Vic)
Case law
Australian Communications and Media Authority v Today FM (Sydney) Pty Ltd (2015) 255 CLR 352
Administration of Papua New Guinea v Daera Guba (1973) 130 CLR 353
Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [1983] 1 NSWLR 1
Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Taylor (1987) 18 FCR 498
Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Wraith (1983) 48 ALR 500
Balog v Independent Commission Against Corruption (1990) 169 CLR 625
Barten v Williams (1978) 20 ACTR 10
Basser v Medical Board of Victoria [1981] VR 953
Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336
Browne v Dunn (1894) 6 R 67
Chandler v Alberta Association of Architects [1989] 2 SCR 848
Civil Aviation Safety Authority v Central Aviation Pty Ltd (2009) 253 ALR 263
Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280
Comcare v Lees (1998) 151 ALR 647
Comcare v Parker [1996] FCA 1670 (Unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Finn J, 2 August 1996)
Commonwealth v Pharmacy Guild of Australia (1989) 19 ALD 510
D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children [1978] AC 171
Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472
Dodson v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 31 FCR 451
Esber v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 430
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118
Hancok v Executive Director of Public Health [2008] WASC 224
HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414
Hill v Clifford [1907] 2 ch. 236
Holden v Architectural Finishes Ltd (1987) 10 PRNZ 685
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298
Kabourakis v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria [2005] VSC 493 (Unreported, Victorian Supreme Court,
Gillard J, 20 December 2005)
Kavvadias v Commonwealth Ombudsman (1984) 1 FCR 80
152 Chapter Six: Decision-Making
Lek v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1993) 43 FCR 100
LVR (WA) Pty Ltd v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (2012) 203 FCR 166
McDonald v Director-General of Social Security (1984) 1 FCR 354
Middleton v The Queen (2000) 114 A Crim R 258
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 469
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323
Minister for Immigration v Pochi (1980) 4 ALD 139
NAIS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 80 ALJR 367
Owen-James v Delegate of the Director-General of the Department of Health (1992) 27 NSWLR 457
Pastras v Commonwealth (1966) 9 FLR 152
Public Service Board of New South Wales v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656
Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Burns (EOD) [2005] NSWADTAP 69
Re Adams and the Tax Agents’ Board (1976) 1 ALD 251
Re Jonsson and Marine Council (No 2) (1990) 12 AAR 323
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Palme (2003) 216 CLR 212
Re Neviskia Pty Ltd and Department of Health and Aged Care (2000) 32 AAR 129
Re Smith and Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority (1978) 1 ALD 374
Re Palmer and Minister for the Capital Territory (1978) 1 ALD 183
Re Sutherland [1994] 2 NZLR 242
Re the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs: Ex parte Duaraiajasingham (2000) 74 ALJR 405
Re Walsh and Commissioner of Taxation (2012) 130 ALD 200
R v Amad [1962] VR 545
Repatriation Commission v Smith (1987) 15 FCR 327
Roncevich v Repatriation Commission (2005) 222 CLR 115
Sherlock v Lloyd (2010) 27 VR 434
Société d’Avances Commerciales (Société Anonyme Egyptienne) v Merchants’ Marine Insurance Co (The
‘Palitana’) (1924) 20 L1 L Rep 140
Strbak v Newton [1989] NSWCA 202 (Unreported, New South Wales Court of Appeal, Gleeson CJ, Samuels and
Priestley JJA, 18 July 1989)
Summers v Repatriation Commission [2014] FCA 608
Sun Alliance Insurance v Massoud [1989] VR 8
Trawl Industries v Effem Foods Pty Ltd (1992) 27 NSWLR 326
Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd v Kocak (2013) 252 CLR 480
Guides
Administrative Review Council, Practical Guidelines for Preparing Statements of Reasons (2002) <http://www.
arc.ag.gov.au/Documents/arcguidelinesnew.pdf> at January 2017
Administrative Review Council, Best Practice Guide 4, Decision Making: Reasons (2007) <http://www.arc.
ag.gov.au/Documents/Revised+Best+Practice+Guide+4+-+Reasons+-+24+April+2008.pdf> at January
2017
Chapter Six: Decision-Making 153
Books
JRS Forbes, Justice in Tribunals (4th edn, 2014, Federation Press, Sydney)
A Vrij, Detecting Lies and Deceit: The Psychology of Lying and the Implications for Professional Practice (2000,
John Wiley, Chichester, New York).
Conference papers
Justice J Douglas, ‘How Should Tribunals Evaluate the Evidence?’ (Paper presented to the 7th Annual AIJA
Tribunals Conference, Brisbane, 11 June 2004)
D Fitzgerald, ‘Tribunal Decision Writing’ (Seminar paper, Administrative Decisions Tribunal, Sydney, 2000)
154 Chapter Seven: Communication
• Research surveys of the users of courts and tribunals have frequently shown that
parties involved in proceedings attach a high priority to the way in which the proceedings
themselves are conducted.
–– It should never be forgotten that tribunals exist for users, and not the other way
round. No matter how good tribunals may be, they do not fulfil their function unless
they are accessible by the people who want to use them, and unless the users re-
ceive the help they need to prepare and present their cases.
• Clear communication processes are particularly important when a tribunal is dealing with
cases involving people from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, those with lower
level literacy and linguistic skills, and people with various kinds of disabilities.
• The media plays a key role in educating and enlightening the community about the place
of tribunals in our governmental arrangements.
• Where appropriate, tribunals should consider the use of websites and social media to
enhance consultation and feedback from stakeholders and the media.
• However, communicating with the public and the media may create problems for the
tribunal concerning, amongst other things, procedural fairness, the tribunal’s integrity
and privacy of tribunal users.
Chapter Seven: Communication 155
• Tribunals ought to consider whether to develop protocols for dealing with the public and
the media. The Judicial Conference of Australia’s publication, Working with the Media: A
Handbook for Australian Judicial Officers, may be a useful starting point.1
7.2. Introduction
All kinds of communication are involved in the lead-up to hearings, during the hearings
themselves, and, very often, afterwards as well. The major question is whether the
communicating which goes on is effective and appropriate. Special attention must be paid
to the needs and interests of the people who are not regular, professional ‘players’ in the
system, notably, the parties to cases, and those who attend to give evidence, to support the
parties or simply as members of the public to observe what happens.
In recent years a lot of work has been done by judicial officers, tribunal members, members
of the legal profession, administrators, law reformers and others to simplify and improve the
legal system and its various processes. Procedures have been rationalised and simplified, a
lot of obscure terminology and jargon, including the use of Latin phrases, for example, has
been removed, and there is now a strong emphasis on the use of ‘plain language’ in the legal
and adjudication systems.
While those reform efforts have been in progress, there have been countervailing forces at
work, because society itself has become a good deal more complex and diverse than in the
past. Not surprisingly, this increased complexity and diversity tends to manifest itself in the
legal system. Societal trends are inevitably reflected in the problems and issues with which
the legal and dispute resolution systems have to deal.
These developments have meant that those responsible for the operation of tribunals have
had to redouble their efforts to achieve as much simplicity and accessibility in the system as
possible. This is certainly not an easy task, especially since tribunals are often operating with
insufficient financial resources.
1 Sir Andrew Leggatt cited in Council of Australasian Tribunals, International Framework for Tribunal Excellence
(November 2012, COAT, Melbourne).
156 Chapter Seven: Communication
2 Chief Justice M Warren, ‘Open Justice in the Technological Age’ (2014) 40 Monash University Law Review 45 <http://
www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MonashULawRw/2014/5.pdf> at January 2017
3 R Creyke ‘Tribunals – “Carving out the Philosophy of Their Existence”: The challenge for the 21st century’ (2012) 71
AIAL Forum 19–33.
Chapter Seven: Communication 157
• Good communication is important in order for the tribunal to find out what the parties
before it are saying about their respective cases. Sometimes this will be straightforward,
especially if the parties are well prepared and articulate in their presentations. In other
instances, considerable skill can be required of the tribunal member in establishing a
process of ‘two-way’ communication with a party (or parties) in order to get a clear
picture of what they are attempting to communicate to the tribunal. This skill can be
vital for effective case resolution.
• Good communication ensures that the process is a full, clear and fair one. Research
surveys of the users of courts and tribunals have frequently shown that parties involved
in proceedings attach a high priority to the way in which the proceedings themselves
are conducted. People in that situation can often accept an adverse result provided they
believe that they have had a full and fair hearing. This will often be dependent on good
communication processes having been deployed by the tribunal in question.
• Good communication processes assist other people who may wish to observe proceedings
to understand what is going on. These are processes of public justice and it is necessary
that they are conducted in as simple and as straightforward a manner as possible.
Good communication processes, therefore, are essential to the proper conduct of individual
cases and to the maintenance of public confidence in the system. Without reasonably high
levels of that confidence, any judicial or quasi-judicial system will struggle to maintain its
proper position in the scheme of governmental arrangements.
A study of court and tribunal process identified five key process-oriented factors as
contributing the perception of fairness and public confidence:
1. The expectations of, and information provided to, participants.
2. The quality of participation granted to participants (i.e. the extent to which, and the
process through which, participants are able to get their story out in a way they view
as accurate and fair).
3. The quality of treatment and, in particular, the respect shown to the participant during
their time at the tribunal.
4. Issues of convenience and comfort, including timeliness and efficiency.
5. Judgments about tribunal members and staff, including whether they were perceived
as helpful and empathetic.4
4 R Moorhead, M Sefton and L Scanlan, Just Satisfaction? What Drives Public and Participant Satisfaction with Courts and
Tribunals (March 2008, Cardiff Law School, Wales) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2425127> at
January 2017; Council of Australasian Tribunals, International Framework for Tribunal Excellence (November 2012,
COAT, Melbourne).
158 Chapter Seven: Communication
A number of tribunals now offer training for members in communicating with the public and
tribunal users, and in drafting reasons for decision that are clear and to the point.5
5 Justice G Downes, ‘Future Directions in Administrative Law: Part 2’ (2011) 67 AIAL Forum 39 <http://www.aat.gov.au/
about-the-aat/engagement/speeches-and-papers/the-honourable-justice-garry-downes-am-former-pre/future-directions>
at January 2017.
6 Judicial College, Equal Treatment Bench Book (2015, Judicial College, London) <https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/equal-treatment-bench-book-2013-with-2015-amendment.pdf > at January 2017.
Chapter Seven: Communication 159
in relation to the conduct of proceedings generally, but with some particular emphases on
cases involving one or more parties who may be in a situation of some disadvantage or from
a particular background:
7.3.2.1. Do …
• Get names and modes of address correct by asking parties how they wish to be addressed.
• Make a point of obtaining, well in advance if possible, precise details of any disability
or medical condition that a person appearing before you may have.
• Allow more time for special arrangements, breaks, and so on, to accommodate special
needs during a hearing.
• Give particular thought to the difficulties facing disabled people who attend tribunals—
prior planning will enable their various needs to be accommodated as far as possible.
• Consider the position of the individual—the stress of attending a tribunal hearing should
not be made worse unnecessarily through a failure to anticipate foreseeable problems.
• Admit a child’s evidence, unless the child is incapable of giving intelligible testimony.
• Ensure that appropriate measures are taken to protect vulnerable witnesses; for instance,
children, those with mental or physical disabilities or those who are afraid or distressed.
• Make provision for oath taking in accordance with different belief systems.
• Take the initiative to find out about different local cultures and faith communities.
• Encourage the use of online communications, including, where appropriate and within
the tribunal’s resources:
–– the use of websites and social media to enhance consultation and feedback from
stakeholders and parties.7 Encourage the provision of access to interpreters and
signers.
• Encourage the provision of appropriate facilities for all tribunal users.
• Help to promote a high standard of service to all tribunal users.
• Support the provision of posters and leaflets in English and local minority languages
and in alternative formats, for example, large print.
7.3.2.2. Don’t …
• Underestimate the stress and worry faced by those appearing for hearings, particularly
when the ordeal is compounded by an additional problem such as a disability or having
to appear without professional representation.
• Overlook the use—unconscious or otherwise—of gender-based, racist or homophobic
stereotyping as an evidential shortcut.
• Allow advocates to attempt over-rigorous cross-examination of children or other
vulnerable witnesses.
• Let the tribunal’s processes become unduly formal. The relative flexibility and
informality of tribunal proceedings make them less intimidating to those unfamiliar
with the legal system.8
• Use words that imply an evaluation of the sexes, however subtle—for instance, ‘man
and wife’, girl (unless speaking of a child), ‘businessmen’.
• Use terms such as ‘mental handicap’, ‘the disabled’—use instead ‘learning disability’,
‘people with disabilities’.
• Allow anyone to be put in a position where they face hostility or ridicule.
• Make assumptions based on stereotypes or misinformation.
• Use offensive words or terminology.
The same document has a detailed treatment of aspects of dealing with cases in which issues
of ethnicity, race, culture or religion may arise. It also has specific sections devoted to dealing
with children, people with disabilities, issues of gender, sexual orientation and other matters.
7 See the detailed discussion in M Bromberg-Krawitz, ‘Challenges of Social Media for Courts & Tribunals’ (2016) <http://
www.aija.org.au/Social%20Media%20Sym%2016/Papers/Krawitz.pdf> at January 2017. For an overview of the use
of the internet and social media by the New South Wales Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal, see: K Ransome,
‘Should Tribunals go Social?’ (June 2012, COAT, Sydney).
8 See generally R Creyke, ‘Tribunals as the Generic Face of Justice: a Challenge for the 21st Century’ (June 2012) <http://
www.coat.gov.au/images/downloads/nsw/tribunals_as_the_generic_face_of_justice-Robin_Creyke.pdf> at January
2017.
Chapter Seven: Communication 161
9 Tenancy Tribunal Bench Book (2004, New Zealand). The manual is not available online; the Tenancy Tribunal should be
contacted directly for access.
10 Mental Health Tribunal, A Guide to Solution-Focused Hearings in the Mental Health Tribunal (2014, Mental Health
Tribunal, Melbourne) <http://www.mht.vic.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Solution-focused-hearings-guide.pdf>
at January 2017.
11 Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration (AIJA), Litigants in Person Management Plans: Issues for Courts and
Tribunals (2001, AIJA, Melbourne) <http://www.aija.org.au/online/LIPREP1.pdf> at January 2017.
12 Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration (AIJA), Report of Forum on Self-Represented Litigants (2004, AIJA,
Melbourne) <http://www.aija.org.au/online/SRLForumReport.pdf> at January 2017.
13 Material produced by the AIJA can be obtained by writing to the Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration Inc,
Ground Floor, 555 Lonsdale Street, Melbourne, Vic 3000, or from the website: <http://www.aija.org.au/index.php/aija-
publications>.
162 Chapter Seven: Communication
also have an interest in ensuring, as far as possible, that reporting of cases, whether it be
by electronic or press media, is accurate and responsible. These are thus matters of mutual
interest to the media and court and tribunal authorities.
The second aspect is a little less obvious and perhaps a bit more one-sided. While the media
is mostly interested only in reporting particular cases, and usually the more sensational the
better as far as they are concerned, courts and tribunals have a more general interest in their
relationship with the media. They well understand, particularly in more recent times, the
key role played by the media in educating and enlightening the community about the place
of the court and tribunal system in our governmental arrangements. This is on the basis that
members of the community develop ideas and impressions about the system through media
coverage of particular cases and events. For a democratic society to work well it is important
that members of that society have a reasonable knowledge of, and regard for, the various
institutions of government, including the judicial and related components. This is often put
in terms of ‘community confidence’ in such institutions. A tribunal’s relationship with the
media is clearly extremely important at a general level as well as in performing its day-to-
day functions.
At a very practical level, the appointment of such people means that their services are
available to the media in the event that particular problems or issues arise. It also means that
the relevant courts and tribunals can themselves approach the media to explain or clarify
matters that may have arisen or to liaise about media coverage of a pending case or cases.
In addition, the appointment of such officers can provide an important internal resource to
individual judicial officers and tribunal members who may need assistance in dealing with
the media on aspects of their work.
At a different level, there will usually be protocols or arrangements adopted by each court
and tribunal in relation to media coverage of cases. There will usually be rules regarding
media usage of notes, sketches, recording equipment, television cameras and so on. These
may be reasonably prescriptive procedures arranged for the organisation as a whole or they
may be more general in nature, leaving quite an amount of discretion to individual members
as to how to proceed. Obviously, the situation of each court and tribunal will differ to some
degree, but it should be a straightforward matter for individual members to find out what the
appropriate operating procedures are for their particular organisation.
14 Judicial Conference of Australia, Working with the Media: A Handbook for Australian Judicial Officers (2004, JCA).
15 ibid., Section 2: ‘The Media: The Answers to the Most Commonly Asked Questions’, [1].
164 Chapter Seven: Communication
judgment. A strategy should be selected and adhered to. It is good to seek professional
advice and, having chosen a strategy, not to change it in mid-stream without very careful
consideration.
Helpful suggestions are also made about different aspects of being an interviewee.
Clearly, the advice provided in this JCA publication is very useful, but its relevance and
application to individual tribunal members will depend very much on what media relations
policy, if any, the tribunal in question has adopted. Any tribunal-wide policy may not entirely
govern the approach of individual members to media issues, but it is likely at least to be heavily
influential. However, even if a particular tribunal has developed policies and procedures in
regard to media relations, the JCA booklet is an extremely useful and interesting source of
information and ideas on such matters and is highly recommended for general reference.
7.5. Conclusion
All people working in courts or tribunals, especially judicial officers and tribunal members,
who conduct hearings and make decisions, need to be aware of the importance of different
kinds of communication skills. This Chapter has briefly highlighted a few key communication
areas:
• the importance generally of conducting proceedings in a clear, simple and fair manner
• the need for the use of plain language; often, the importance of establishing a ‘dialogue’
with parties who appear before the tribunal in question
• the significance of awareness and sensitivity when dealing with people whose racial,
cultural and linguistic backgrounds perhaps put them outside or on the fringe of
mainstream society
• the major role of the media, both print and electronic, in covering proceedings in certain
individual cases and in ‘representing’ the courts and tribunals sectors to the general
public.
References
Guides
Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration (AIJA), Litigants in Person Management Plans: Issues for
Courts and Tribunals (2001, AIJA, Melbourne) <http://www.aija.org.au/online/LIPREP1.pdf> at January
2017
Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration (AIJA), Report of Forum on Self-Represented Litigants
(2004, <http://www.aija.org.au/online/SRLForumReport.pdf> at January 2017 Council of Australasian
Tribunals, International Framework for Tribunal Excellence (November 2012, COAT, Melbourne)
166 Chapter Seven: Communication
Judicial Conference of Australia (JCA), Working with the Media: A Handbook for Australian Judicial Officers
(2004, JCA)
Judicial College, Equal Treatment Bench Book (2015, Judicial College, London) <https://www.judiciary.gov.
uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/equal-treatment-bench-book-2013-with-2015-amendment.pdf> at January
2017
Mental Health Tribunal, A Guide to Solution-Focused Hearings in the Mental Health Tribunal (2014, Mental
Health Tribunal, Melbourne) <http://www.mht.vic.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Solution-focused-
hearings-guide.pdf> at January 2017
Tenancy Tribunal Bench Book (2004, New Zealand)
Journal articles
M Bromberg-Krawitz, ‘Challenges of Social Media for Courts & Tribunals’ (2016) <http://www.aija.org.au/
Social%20Media%20Sym%2016/Papers/Krawitz.pdf> at January 2017
R Creyke, ‘Tribunals as the Generic Face of Justice: a Challenge for the 21st Century’ (June 2012) <http://
www.coat.gov.au/images/downloads/nsw/tribunals_as_the_generic_face_of_justice-Robin_Creyke.pdf>
at January 2017
R Creyke ‘Tribunals – “Carving out the Philosophy of Their Existence”: The challenge for the 21st century’
(2012) 71 AIAL Forum 19
Justice G Downes, ‘Future Directions in Administrative Law: Part 2’ (2011) 67 AIAL Forum <http://www.aat.
gov.au/about-the-aat/engagement/speeches-and-papers/the-honourable-justice-garry-downes-am-former-
pre/future-directions> at January 2017
R Moorhead, M Sefton and L Scanlan, ‘Just Satisfaction? What Drives Public and Participant Satisfaction with
Courts and Tribunals’ (March 2008, Cardiff Law School, Wales) < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2425127 > at January 2017
K Ransome, ‘Should Tribunals “Go Social”?’ (June 2012, COAT, Sydney)
Chief Justice M Warren, ‘Open Justice in the Technological Age’ (2014) 40 Monash University Law Review 45
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MonashULawRw/2014/5.pdf> at January 2017
Chapter Eight: Caseflow Management 167
8.2. Introduction
Caseflow management in a legal context is about managing the progression or movement
of cases through a formal adjudication or dispute resolution system, whether a court or
tribunal. Being an exercise in management, the devising of schemes is very much a matter
for the particular court or tribunal, and, once devised, the scheme in question will usually be
adopted and followed by all the judicial officers and tribunal members.
The important point about this for individual tribunal members is that, while they may have
a say in the collegial formulation of a particular caseflow regime, and will later operate
according to it, they will have very little discretion or leeway as to how it actually works in
practice. Unlike the hearing and decision-making aspects of the role of tribunal members,
the implementation of the caseflow management scheme is a much more mechanistic and
programed function. For those reasons, this Chapter is written as a general guide to the
policy and development of modern caseflow management, which has been adopted across
Australasian tribunal and court systems in the last decade or so. Suggestions as to the
management of cases on a single day can be found in Chapter Five: Hearings.
1 See M Solomon and D Somerlot, Caseflow Management in the Trial Court: Now and for the Future (1987, American
Bar Association).
2 See P Sallmann, ‘Managing the Business of Australian Higher Courts’ (1992) 2 Journal of Judicial Administration 80.
Chapter Eight: Caseflow Management 169
These schemes are now regarded as absolutely vital to the successful conduct of court and
tribunal operations. This is because they involve a managerial approach to the processing of
cases. Traditionally, this aspect of court and tribunal operations was not really managed at
all, at least not in any modern sense, and the result was delay and inefficiency.
The stimulus for the development of caseflow management programs was the growing
frustration and impatience over many years with delay in the processing of cases in courts
and tribunals, that is, caseflow management was basically introduced as a delay-reduction
mechanism. Writing in the late 1980s in the United States, Maureen Solomon, one of the
pioneers of modern caseflow management, observed:
The introduction of this new approach to dealing with the processing of cases in courts and
tribunals was seen as a revolution in the traditional method of dealing with case processing
in common law societies. The old approach relied on broad rules and procedures laid
down over many centuries by the courts, and the conduct of litigation was very much
in the hands of the litigants and their lawyers. The rationale for this was that civil cases
were regarded essentially as private matters between the parties and the role of the courts
was to move into action only when the parties indicated that they were ready for judicial
intervention.
Related to this was a sense that doing justice according to law in the determination of
disputes between parties was the dominant and primary goal and that the pace at which cases
proceeded through the system was not really a relevant consideration at all.
In the second half of the twentieth century there was increasing concern in common law
systems about the problem of caseloads, backlogs and delays. While high standards of
justice prevailed once cases reached the court or tribunal, in many instances it took so long
for them to get there that people became frustrated, disillusioned and even impecunious in
the process.
The principles of modern caseflow management essentially dictate that the court or tribunal
should bear a large responsibility for dealing effectively and efficiently with cases and this
involves supervising their progress from the time of initiation to completion. This is the
sense in which the application of caseflow management principles constitutes a revolution
in the approach to case disposition.
4 For tribunals, consultation would need to be undertaken with major user groups as well as the legal profession.
5 A Eyland, T Wright, M Karras and N Nheu, Case Management Reform: An Evaluation of the District Court of NSW
and County Court of Victoria 1996 Reforms (2003, Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales) 4.
Chapter Eight: Caseflow Management 171
costs and more efficient use of court resources. These ancillary outcomes are now more
explicitly and actively pursued as part of many modern case management systems. Modern
caseflow management was not always received enthusiastically by Australasian courts and
tribunals. Its introduction constituted a cultural and operational revolution and there were
some doubters among judicial officers, tribunal members, court administrators and members
of the legal profession.
In New Zealand, caseflow management was a judicial initiative and flowed on to tribunals
through the leadership of the tribunal head. Over time, the number of critics of caseflow
management seems to have reduced significantly, and it is now well accepted as part of the
day-to-day operational routine of courts and tribunals in Australia and New Zealand.6
In the United States there has been a great deal of research conducted by various institutes and
consultancy bodies. Prominent among these has been the National Center for State Courts
(NCSC). For many years, the Center has provided various forms of assistance to American
courts and tribunals, including the conduct of research. A similar role has been played in
Australasia by the Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration (AIJA), which had a
prominent role in the introduction of caseflow management ideas to courts and tribunals,
commencing in the late 1980s. Since then the Institute has conducted regular caseflow
management seminars for judicial officers, tribunal members and administrative staff. The
purpose of these seminars is to exchange information and ideas with a view to the ongoing
improvement of caseflow management schemes in the courts and tribunals. There has been
considerable success in this regard.
6 Case management is now generally seen by tribunals as a key means of addressing backlogs of cases: Professor M
Lavarch, Report on the Increased Workload of the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT) and the Refugee Review Tribunal
(RRT) (2012, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Canberra).
172 Chapter Eight: Caseflow Management
• goals
• information
• communication
• policies and procedures
• judicial commitment
• administrative staff involvement
• education and training and
• mechanisms for accountability.
7 B Mahoney, ‘Improving the Administration of Justice in Limited Jurisdiction Courts’ (1991) 1 Journal of Judicial
Administration 46, 49.
8 But see also: JJ Spigelman, ‘Judicial Accountability and Performance Indicators’ (2001) 21 Civil Justice Quarterly 18;
JJ Spigelman, ‘The “New Public Management” and the Courts’ (2001) 75 Australian Law Journal 748.
Chapter Eight: Caseflow Management 173
data and knowledge, to monitor progress towards the achievement of goals, to evaluate
the effectiveness of specific policies and programs, and to plan for the resource needs
of the future. Computer technology has also been extremely important in improving the
information capacities of courts and tribunals. This, in turn, has been a boon to the successful
development of caseflow management programs. It enables the continuous monitoring and
supervision that is so important for an effective case processing system.
In a similar way, communication strategies and techniques have been most important.
As Mahoney notes, if there is any one lesson from the research and experimentation of
recent times, it is that good communication and broad consultation are essential if a court
improvement program is to succeed. The regular seminars conducted by the AIJA have been
important in establishing systems of national and international communication between
courts and tribunals on matters of caseflow techniques and strategies. This in turn has been
important in the further development of schemes, not only in Australia and New Zealand,
but elsewhere in the region as well.
As to general policies and procedures, the research indicates that the courts and tribunals
which have been most successful have been those that have accepted basic responsibility
for the expeditious resolution of cases and have devised special rules and procedures for
achieving that purpose. Also of key significance is commitment from judicial and tribunal
leaders.
One of the early challenges for chief judicial officers and tribunal heads was to muster
sufficient support for change from colleagues. To some extent this is an educational process,
often quite a long-term one. This is because judicial officers and tribunal members, especially
those not in positions of any administrative responsibility, are often inclined to continue
doing things the way they have done them in the past. As Mahoney notes, conferences,
seminars, tribunal meetings, and the dissemination of studies and reports, can all play a
role in communicating the goals and objectives of a system and in gathering support for the
successful implementation of that system.
For similar reasons, the involvement and support of court and tribunal staff at all levels is
critical. In this respect the research shows that for all the successful courts and tribunals,
the success of delay reduction programs through caseflow management has often been
heavily affected by the extent to which the non-judicial staff has been aware of the goals
and operational requirements of the systems in question and have worked to support them.
Education and training have been important in developing the schemes and making them
successful. On this aspect, Mahoney observes:
Well designed educational programmes can do a lot to overcome … resistance
especially when they can incorporate recent precedents that support the change—
for example, presentations by judicial officers and staff from other jurisdictions
who have successfully introduced a similar programme in their own courts.9
9 ibid., 54.
174 Chapter Eight: Caseflow Management
This is very much the approach used by the AIJA in the conduct of its early introductory
seminars in the late 1980s and early 1990s, recently resumed in 2005.
Mention has been made of the important developmental work undertaken in Australasia by
the AIJA through its series of caseflow management conferences and seminars involving
judicial officers and tribunal personnel and their relevant administrative officers (New
Zealand has been involved in these AIJA activities since their inception). The methodology
of these meetings is that each court and tribunal is represented by a senior team consisting
of judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative personnel who are able to compare notes with
their counterparts from other courts and tribunals across Australasia as to what is happening
in the world of caseflow management.
By the end of the 1990s most Australian and New Zealand courts and tribunals were
operating with the basic American principles, first promulgated in the 1970s but adapted
to the particular circumstances of their own organisations and their specific operational
requirements. The AIJA conferences and seminars have given them all the opportunity to
refresh their ideas and thinking, to see the results obtained in other jurisdictions, and to
return to their home jurisdictions with material and ideas for the further development of their
own schemes.
In the case of the tribunals sector, this process of research and development was given a
significant boost when the AIJA commenced conducting Annual Tribunals Conferences in
1998. These conferences enable the presentation of papers on many aspects of the work of
tribunals, including those dealing with the more effective and efficient disposition of tribunal
business.
Chapter Eight: Caseflow Management 175
10 Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing Justice: A Review of the Federal Civil Justice System (1999) Report
No.89. <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/lawreform/ALRC/1999/89.html> at January 2017.
11 ibid., 390.
176 Chapter Eight: Caseflow Management
does not mean that it is chaotic, but it is unrealistic to expect that it can be managed
with a view to producing an outcome satisfactory to everybody.12
The fact that there are different and conflicting interests involved in the conduct of individual
pieces of litigation means it is important that courts and tribunals involve the legal profession
and other interest groups in devising appropriate systemic responses to caseflow management
problems.
12 ibid., 392.
Chapter Eight: Caseflow Management 177
case management processes on reducing case duration in all review jurisdictions, and on
engendering a culture of compliance with directions, while Recommendation 127 was
that the AAT should not operate under a single case management model but rather should
utilise a range of practices and procedures adapted to suit its different review jurisdictions,
including those which have been effective and successful in the existing specialist federal
review tribunals.
13 Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, Case Management Seminar, Sydney, 25 February 2005, Report (2005,
AIJA, Melbourne) <http://www.aija.org.au/online/CaseMgt05Report.pdf> at January 2017.
14 ibid., 1.
178 Chapter Eight: Caseflow Management
15 Law Council of Australia, Federal Court of Australia Case Management Handbook (2014, Law Council of Australia)
<http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/FEDLIT/images/pdfs/CaseManagementHandbook.pdf> at January 2017.
180 Chapter Eight: Caseflow Management
By way of example, the AAT has a structured case management process designed to deal
with applications in a flexible and timely manner. When the Tribunal receives an application,
it notifies the primary decision-maker of the application. The decision-maker then has
28 days to provide the Tribunal and the applicant with a statement of reasons for the
decision and all documents relevant to the review: the ‘T Documents’ or ‘Section 37
documents’.
A conference registrar or Tribunal member holds one or more conferences with the
parties—in person or by telephone—to discuss the issues in dispute, identify and consider
additional material that may be obtained and explore whether the matter can be settled.
The future conduct of the review will also be discussed, including whether another form of
ADR. Directions hearings may be held at any time to deal with case management and other
procedural matters.
If agreement cannot be reached, the Tribunal then conducts a hearing and makes a decision.
It uses case management targets to ensure applications are dealt with expeditiously.16
In some AAT registries, a ‘triage’ system for applications has also been trialled. Registry staff,
a conference registrar and a member conduct a daily meeting to examine the previous day’s
applications, assess whether the application is within jurisdiction, and decide on the priority
each case should be accorded in the caseflow process. The process has been educative as all
those involved have gained an appreciation of the procedures, workload and other pressures
faced by the others, and of the various stages needed to progress a file. The initiative has also
enhanced the collegiality in these registries. Prioritising of files has ensured that appropriate
timeliness is achieved.
Practical assistance in the actual handling of hearings can be found in Chapter Five. As to
the handling and management of self-represented litigants, interested readers are referred to
Chapter Seven in which there is reference to a significant growth in the practical literature
designed to assist tribunal members and court officers in this area. Reference is also
recommended to the earlier chapters dealing with the conduct of hearings and related matters.
8.12. Conclusion
Because caseflow management arrangements are very largely determined by each court and
tribunal to suit its own particular circumstances, almost by definition, they become a system-
wide operational arrangement. While each individual judicial officer or tribunal member
may have some discretion as to the application of particular rules and procedures, by and
16 See: G Downes, ‘Case Management in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’ (February 2007, AAT, Sydney) <http://
www.aat.gov.au/about-the-aat/engagement/speeches-and-papers/the-honourable-justice-garry-downes-am-former-pre/
case-management-in-the-administrative-appeals-trib> at January 2017. Administrative Appeals Tribunal, What we do
<http://www.aat.gov.au/about-the-aat/what-we-do> at January 2017. For a diagram setting out the AAT’s process see:
<http://www.aat.gov.au/steps-in-a-review/overview-of-the-review-process> at January 2017.
Chapter Eight: Caseflow Management 181
large, the approach is determined by ‘head office’, and individual officers usually operate
very much within an overall system. This must be so, otherwise the system simply would
not work. A managerial initiative of this nature needs to operate on a centralised basis in
accordance with clearly articulated, understood and uniform procedures.
Systems of caseflow management rely heavily for their effectiveness and efficiency on
the activities of individual judicial officers and tribunal members. This is because modern
caseflow management arrangements dictate that it is no longer simply the job of individual
judicial officers and tribunal members to hear and decide cases but also to handle them as
part of a management scheme used in each particular court and tribunal. This means that
the job of the judicial officer and tribunal member is different from what it used to be. This
might have implications for the future selection of judicial officers and tribunal members,
and also their training and education needs. Also, the role of individual judicial officers and
tribunal members is important in identifying any adjustments and improvements that may be
required in the system from time to time.
References
Government papers and reports
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, What We Do < http://www.aat.gov.au/about-the-aat/what-we-do> at January
2017
Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing Justice: A Review of the Federal Civil Justice System (1999)
Report No.89. <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/lawreform/ALRC/1999/89.html> at January 2017
Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration (AIJA), Case Management Seminar, Sydney, 25 February 2005
<http://www.aija.org.au/online/CaseMgt05Report.pdf> at January 2017
Law Council of Australia, Federal Court of Australia Case Management Handbook (2014, Law Council of
Australia) <http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/FEDLIT/images/pdfs/CaseManagementHandbook.pdf> at
January 2017
Professor M Lavarch, Report on the Increased Workload of the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT) and the RRT
<http://www.immi.gov.au/visas/humanitarian/_pdf/lavarch-review-report.pdf> at 20 January 2013
Books
A Eyland, T Wright, M Karras and N Nheu, Case Management Reform: An Evaluation of the District Court of
NSW and County Court of Victoria 1996 (2003, Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales)
M Solomon and D Somerlot, Caseflow Management in the Trial Court: Now and for the Future (1987, American
Bar Association)
B Mahoney, ‘Improving the Administration of Justice in Limited Jurisdiction Courts’ (1991) 1 Journal of Judicial
Administration 46
P Sallmann, ‘Managing the Business of Australian Higher Courts’ (1992) 2 Journal of Judicial Administration 80
JJ Spigelman, ‘Judicial Accountability and Performance Indicators’ (2001) 21 Civil Justice Quarterly 18
JJ Spigelman, ‘The “New Public Management” and the Courts’ (2001) 75 Australian Law Journal 748
Chapter Nine: Conduct of Tribunal Members 183
–– independence
–– integrity and personal behaviour.
• It indicates the key objectives to which these principles are directed:
–– to uphold public confidence in the administration of justice
–– to enhance public respect for the institution of the judiciary
–– to protect the reputation of individual judicial officers and of the judiciary generally.
• Many tribunals now publish protocols for tribunal users to make complaints about
tribunals members and staff, and setting out the process by which complaints will be
dealt with.
9.2. Introduction
\
1 Justice J Spigelman, ‘Dealing with Judicial Misconduct’ (Paper presented to the 5th World Wide Common Law Judiciary
Conference, Sydney, 2003) 1.
Chapter Nine: Conduct of Tribunal Members 185
9.2.3. Misbehaviour
While boundary lines between acceptable and unacceptable off-duty conduct can no doubt
become blurred, there is little doubt that some behaviour short of a criminal offence could
well be unacceptable in general terms from a tribunal member and could raise questions
about the suitability of that person to continue in the role.
2 ibid.
3 On ethics in relation to tribunal practice see, generally, A Christou, ‘A Moveable Feast: Identifying Ethical Norms Within
Quasi-Judicial Practice’ (Paper presented to the 7th Annual AIJA Tribunals Conference, Brisbane, June 2004).
186 Chapter Nine: Conduct of Tribunal Members
By analogy with the judicial sphere, there is some guidance from the Commissioners who
investigated the case of former Australian High Court Justice Lionel Murphy in the 1980s.4
The Commissioners (Messrs Lush, Blackburn and Wells), dealing with the question as to
what might constitute removable behaviour on the part of a judge, spoke about notions such
as whether:
• the behaviour represents such a serious departure from the standards of proper behaviour
that it must be found to have destroyed public confidence.
While these suggestions are useful, and may apply in general terms to tribunal members, it
will be the relevant decision-maker who will ultimately judge the nature of the behaviour
and its implications. In the judicial sphere this means, as Professor Tony Blackshield has
noted in the Federal judicial context, that ‘misbehaviour’ is essentially a political rather
than a legal notion.5 This is not to deny that a decision by Parliament in relation to a Federal
judicial officer may well be justiciable before the High Court. One of the difficulties in
this area is that there is very little jurisprudence to draw upon in Australasia in relation to
the general notion of misbehaviour, whether it be in a tribunal or judicial context. A signal
exception was LVR (WA) Pty Ltd v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (2012) 203 FCR 166 in
which judicial review was brought to challenge a decision of the AAT on the ground that the
tribunal in its reasons had substantially copied material from the submissions of one of the
parties. This could be characterised as a breach of the obligations on tribunal members of
diligence, impartiality and integrity. Although the Commissioners in the Murphy case were
talking generally of behaviour, which could threaten the position of a judicial officer tribunal
member, it is clear that various behaviours falling well short of a ‘hanging offence’ should
be avoided by people who have judicial and quasi-judicial roles to perform.
A useful rule of thumb is for a tribunal member to avoid behaviour or incidents which might
attract the attention of the editors of newspapers, and find themselves reported on the cover
page. As noted in the Guide to Judicial Conduct:
Precisely what behaviour should be avoided is often difficult to indicate with any precision,
but the fact that there are now various kinds of conduct guides available provides considerable
assistance. This is an improvement on the position in the past.
7 A Guide to Standards of Conduct for Tribunal Members (2nd edn, 2009, ARC, Canberra) <http://www.arc.ag.gov.au/
Documents/GuidetoStdsofConduct-RevisedAug2009.pdf> at January 2017.
8 Above n 6.
188 Chapter Nine: Conduct of Tribunal Members
<http://www.aat.gov.au/AAT/media/AAT/Files/Directions%20and%20guides/Conduct-
Guide-for-AAT-Members.pdf>.
11 Above n 7, at 2.
12 A Guide to Standards of Conduct for Tribunal Members, above n 7, at 57.
190 Chapter Nine: Conduct of Tribunal Members
The basic principles are fleshed out into a series of sub-categories or components and later in
the Guide more detailed comments are provided about each of these elements.
9.3.2.2. Fairness
• A tribunal member should ensure that each party to a proceeding is afforded the
opportunity to put their case. (See Chapter Three at 3.3.3.)
• A tribunal member should act without bias and in a way that does not give rise to an
apprehension of bias in the performance of their tribunal decision-making responsibilities.
(See Chapter Three at 3.4.)
• A tribunal member should be pro-active and comprehensive in disclosing to all interested
parties interests that could conflict (or appear to conflict) with the review of a decision.
(See Chapter Three at 3.4.8.)
• A tribunal member should have regard to the potential impact of activities, interests
and associations in private life on the impartial and efficient performance of their
tribunal responsibilities. Notwithstanding that many tribunal members are appointed to
a tribunal precisely because of their knowledge of and interest in a particular group or
field of professional activity, a high standard of impartiality is required. (See Chapter
Three at 3.4.)
• A tribunal member should not accept gifts where this could reasonably be perceived to
compromise the impartiality of the member or the tribunal.
9.3.2.3. Independence
• A tribunal member should perform their tribunal responsibilities independently and free
from external influence.
13 See also Justice Thomas, Judicial Ethics in Australia (2nd edn, 1997, Law Book Company Ltd) 140–41, 198–99.
Chapter Nine: Conduct of Tribunal Members 191
• While tribunals are part of the executive arm of government, tribunal members should
bring the same quality of independent thought and decision-making to their task as do
judges.
9.3.2.6. Integrity
• A tribunal member should act honestly and truthfully in the performance of tribunal
responsibilities.
• A tribunal member should not knowingly take advantage of, or benefit from, information
not generally available to the public obtained in the course of the performance of tribunal
responsibilities.
• A tribunal member should not use their position as a member to improperly obtain, or
seek to obtain, benefits, preferential treatment or advantage for the member or for any
other person or body.
• A tribunal member should be scrupulous in the use of tribunal resources.
• In private life, a tribunal member should behave in a way that upholds the integrity and
good reputation of the tribunal.
• A tribunal member should be as open as possible about all decisions and actions
(including lack of action) taken in the performance of tribunal responsibilities.
14 Above n 6 at p. ix.
Chapter Nine: Conduct of Tribunal Members 193
15 Above n 6 at p. 3.
194 Chapter Nine: Conduct of Tribunal Members
Activities outside the court are covered in Chapter 5. Assistance is provided in relation to
matters such as:
• membership of government advisory bodies or committees
• making submissions or giving evidence to a parliamentary inquiry relating to the law or
some aspect of the legal system
• judicial officers performing law reform type tasks
• membership of non-judicial tribunals or parole boards
• making public comments and participating in public debate on various matters
• legal teaching and writing for newspapers or periodicals
• appearing on television or radio
• new books—prefaces and book launches
• payment for writing legal books
• taking part in conferences
• professional development
• welfare of fellow judicial officers.
On dealing with the media, see further in this Manual at Chapter Seven.
Chapter 6 of the Guide to Judicial Conduct covers various aspects of conduct further removed
from mainstream judicial activities. It includes matters such as the following:
• judicial officers being involved in commercial activities
• acting as executors or trustees
• accepting gifts
• being engaged in community organisations and public fund raising
• providing character and other references
• participating in social and recreational activities
• membership of clubs
• visits to bars and clubs
• gambling
• involvement in sporting and other clubs and committees.
Chapter 7 is of interest because it deals with a number of ethical or conduct issues which
may affect judicial officers following their resignation or retirement from the bench. These
include matters such as:
• returning to private legal practice
Chapter Nine: Conduct of Tribunal Members 195
16 See, for example, J Pizer, Pizer’s Annotated VCAT Act (4th edn, 2012, JNL Nominees Pty Ltd).
196 Chapter Nine: Conduct of Tribunal Members
People may complain to a government official, such as the Attorney-General, or to the head
of the relevant tribunal or head of the list or division of which the member in question is part.
As mentioned, complainants themselves will usually be people who have been involved in a
case before the tribunal in question but there is no restriction on who may make a complaint
about a tribunal member. Usually, the complaint must be about the conduct of the member
as distinct from a particular decision the member may have made.
Some complaints may allege behaviour of sufficient seriousness to raise the possibility of
the member being removed from office, should the matter be substantiated. This is very
rare. Most will be about matters of far less seriousness. Different jurisdictions and different
tribunals have distinct rules and procedures for dealing with these matters. For that reason,
it is not sensible to go into any detail about particular regimes, nor to attempt to generalise
about how these matters are approached within the tribunals sector as a whole.
It may, however, serve a useful purpose to mention the example of the VCAT in relation
to which some recent significant changes have occurred. Under the Victorian Civil and
Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), the President, who is a Supreme Court Judge, has
power, with the approval of the Minister, to suspend a non-judicial member from office if
the President believes that there may be grounds for removal. If the President exercises the
power of suspension, the Minister must then appoint a person nominated by the President to
undertake an investigation of the relevant member’s alleged conduct.
There will then be a report to the Minister on the investigation, a copy of which is provided
to the member in question and to the President. Such a report may include a recommendation
that the member be removed from office. On receipt of a report containing such a
recommendation, the Minister may, after consulting with the President, recommend to the
Governor-in-Council that the member be removed from office. Until recently the grounds for
removal of a non-judicial member of VCAT were: the conviction of an indictable offence or
an offence, which, if committed in Victoria, would be an indictable offence; being incapable
of performing or neglecting to perform the duties of office; or being unfit to hold office
because of misconduct.17
As a result of a review of conduct and complaint arrangements in Victoria in relation to both
judicial officers and tribunal members, a recommendation was made that the grounds for
removal of judicial officers and non-judicial members of VCAT be the same and that those
grounds should be the same as for Federal judicial officers under the Australian Constitution—
proven misbehaviour or incapacity.18 That recommendation has been adopted in the Courts
Legislation (Judicial Conduct) Act 2005 (Vic). While the actual removal grounds for VCAT
members have changed, the removal procedure has remained the same.
Consistent with what happens in the court system in Victoria, and in most other jurisdictions,
any lower level (non-removal) type complaints about VCAT members are referred to the
President for informal consideration. Variations of this approach are standard practice among
tribunals across Australia and New Zealand.19 Also consistent with a number of other courts
and tribunals around Australia, VCAT has published a Complaints Protocol 20 setting out the
basis and procedure for dealing with a complaint.
As already noted, a complaint must be about the conduct of a member, as opposed to the
decision made by the member. If the matter is about conduct, the President (or delegate) will
consider the complaint and take whatever action is open and appropriate in the circumstances.
While members are expected to be polite, they are also expected to manage proceedings
efficiently and effectively. At times it may be necessary to be brief or assertive.
These general principles are basic and universal among Australasian tribunals, and the
procedural arrangements will tend to vary only in the particular detail which applies from
one organisational setting to another.
9.6. Conclusion
Whereas in many areas of law and procedure governing the operation of tribunals it is
possible, and indeed sensible, to be reasonably definitive, and perhaps even emphatic, about
how things should work, for the most part this is not so in regard to conduct issues. Many
aspects of conduct and ethics affecting tribunal members are not conducive to clear-cut,
definitive statements. They are often open to debate and discussion. That is why much of
the material in this Chapter is not expressed in terms of dos and don’ts but rather as matters
of general advisory principle. Interested readers are strongly recommended to refer to the
ARC and Council of Chief Justices conduct guides for useful discussions of general matters
of principles and suggestions as to what the appropriate approaches might be in particular
circumstances.
References
Cases
LVR (WA) Pty Ltd v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (2012) 203 FCR 166
Legislation
Courts Legislation (Judicial Conduct) Act 2005 (Vic)
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic)
Guides
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Conduct Guide for AAT Members, <http://www.aat.gov.au/AAT/media/AAT/
Files/Directions%20and%20guides/Conduct-Guide-for-AAT-Members.pdf> at January 2017
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Service Charter, <http://www.aat.gov.au/about-the-aat/our-commitment-to-
you/service-charter> at January 2017
Administrative Review Council, A Guide to Standards of Conduct for Tribunal Members
(2001) <http://www.arc.ag.gov.au/Documents/GuidetoStdsofConduct-RevisedAug2009.pdf> at January
2017
Council of Chief Justices of Australia, Guide to Judicial Conduct (2nd edn, 2007, AIJA Inc, Victoria) <http://
www.aija.org.au/online/GuidetoJudicialConduct(2ndEd).pdf> at January 2017
NCAT, Complaints about NCAT, <http://www.ncat.nsw.gov.au/Documents/ncat_factsheet_complaints_about_
ncat.pdf> at January 2017
QCAT, Complaint Policy and Procedure, <http://www.qcat.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/284588/
QCAT-complaints-policy.pdf> at January 2017
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Complaints Protocol, <https://www.vcat.vic.gov.au/sites/default/
files/resources/complaint_about_a_tribunal_member_or_mediator_staff_member_service_or_process_
form.pdf> at January 2017
Books
J Pizer, Pizer’s Annotated VCAT Act (4th edn, 2012, JNL Nominees Pty Ltd)
Justice Thomas, Judicial Ethics in Australia (2nd edn, 1997, Law Book Company Ltd)
Book chapters
AR Blackshield, ‘The Appointment and Removal of Federal Judges’ in B Opeskin and E Wheeler (eds), The
Australian Federal Judicial System (2000, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne)
Conference papers
A Christou, ‘A Moveable Feast: Identifying Ethical Norms Within Quasi-Judicial Practice’ (Paper presented to
the 7th Annual AIJA Tribunals Conference, Brisbane, June 2004)
Justice J Spigelman, ‘Dealing with Judicial Misconduct’ (Paper presented to the 5th World Wide Common Law
Judiciary Conference, Sydney, 2003)
References, Glossary and Index 199
References
General references on Law
T Blackshield and G Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory: Commentary and Materials (6th edn,
2014, Federation Press, Sydney)
S Bottomley and S Bronitt, Law in Context (4th edn, 2012, Federation Press, Sydney)
R Cook, R Creyke, RS Geddes, D Hamer and T Taylor, Laying Down the Law (9th edn, 2015, LexisNexis,
Sydney)
R Hinchy, The Australian Legal System: History, Institutions and Methods (2008, Pearson, Sydney)
R Hughes, G Leane and A Clarke, Australian Legal Institutions; Principles, Structure and Organisation (2003,
Lawbook Co, Sydney)
S Joseph and M Castan, Federal Constitutional Law: A Contemporary View (3rd edn, 2009, Thomson Reuters,
Sydney)
LexisNexis Concise Australian Legal Dictionary (4th edn, 2011, LexisNexis, Sydney)
J Miller, Getting into Law (2002, Butterworths)
Guides
Administrative Review Council <http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/archome.nsf/Page/Publications> at 7
January 2014, available under ‘Other Publications’
— A Guide to Standards of Conduct for Tribunal Members (Revised 2009)
— Practical Guidelines for Preparing Statements of Reasons (Revised 2002) and Commentary on the
Practical Guidelines (Revised 2002)
Council of Chief Justices of Australia, Guide to Judicial Conduct, (2nd edn, 2007, AIJA Inc, Victoria)
<http://www.aija.org.au/online/GuidetoJudicialConduct(2ndEd).pdf> at January 2017
References, Glossary and Index 201
Journal articles
There is a large number of articles on tribunal developments and administrative law.
Journals which publish articles of interest to tribunals include:
AIAL Forum, past issues are available online from the AIAL website under ‘Publications—AIAL Quarterly
Forum’ <http://www.aial.org.au/Publications/PubQuartForum.html> at 7 January 2014
Admin Review, a bulletin published by the Administrative Review Council and available from the Council’s
website at <http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/archome.nsf/Page/Publications> at 7 January 2014
Australian Dispute Resolution Journal
Australian Journal of Administrative Law
Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration
Federal Law Review
202 References, Glossary and Index
Papers given at the annual Tribunals Conference conducted by the Australian Institute of Judicial Administration
are available on the AIJA website at <http://www.aija.org.au/> at 7 January 2014
Public Law Review
Recent relevant articles include:
DG Jarvis, ‘Procedural Fairness as it applies in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’, (2007) 81 ALJ 465.
M Smyth, ‘Inquisitorial Adjudication: The Duty to Inquire in Merits Review Tribunals’ (2010) 34, Melbourne
University Law Review 230
MA Noone, ‘Improving access to justice: Communication skills in the tribunal setting,’ (2006) 16 JJA 18.
N Rees, ‘Procedure and evidence in “court substitute” tribunals’, (2006) 28 Australian Bar Review, 41.
Statutes
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld)
Acts Interpretation Act 1931 (Tas)
Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA)
Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW)
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA)
Interpretation Act 1999 (NZ)
Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic)
Legislation Act 2001 (ACT)
Glossary
Act of Parliament a piece of legislation produced by one of Australia’s nine parliaments
(Commonwealth, six states, two territories)
Adduced a s in evidence adduced in court; providing evidence in a court or tribunal to
prove or disprove a fact; see ch. 5.5.
Administrative power power of tribunals
Balance of probabilities more likely than not; the burden of proof in civil cases
Beyond a reasonable doubt a very high percentage probability; the burden of proof in criminal cases
Burden of proof the duty of one party to make the case out against the other
Common law a system and source of law based on cases and precedent
Cross examination examination of another party’s witness
Delegated legislation legislation made by a person or body other than parliament, but made under
authority granted by parliament
Discretionary powers some choice is involved, as opposed to mandatory powers
Due process fair and just process; due administration of justice
References, Glossary and Index 203
Equity a source of law, arising out of 15th century England; the system arose so as to
try and offset some of the rigidities of the early common law
Examination in chief examination of one’s own witness
Executive a branch of government; in Australia at a Commonwealth level it includes the
Governor General, the public service, and the Federal cabinet
Federal system a system of government based on two or more tiers of government power eg
States and Commonwealth; as opposed to a unitary system
Judicial power power of courts
Jurisdiction the scope of a court’s power to determine a dispute; with statute, the geography
and people over whom it applies
Legislation an Act of Parliament
Mandatory powers no choice is involved, as opposed to discretionary powers
Natural justice procedural fairness. The right to be given a fair hearing and to present one’s
see
case
Obiter dicta that said by the way; all that part of judgment (written or oral) which is not part
of the ratio decidendi
Objective test a test based on a hypothetical or generalised example eg the reasonable adult; as
opposed to a subjective test
Off-duty private life issues. See ‘on-duty’
On-duty carrying out official duties; see ‘off-duty’
Onus of proof See ‘burden of proof’
Precedent here a court is bound by a prior decision of another court, or a court superior in
w
the court hierarchy. The ratio decidendi is binding (as opposed to obiter dicta)
Presumptions a ssumptions or ‘preliminary positions’ that can be overturned, depending on the
circumstances and the evidence adduced. For example, there are eight common
law presumptions as regards the interpretation of statutes
Procedural fairness natural justice; the probity and efficacy of decision-making
Ratio decidendi the reason for a decision of a court in a particular case brought before it; the
central core of the case
Retrospectivity in relation to a statute, an operating date which is before the date of creation
of the Act; there is a common law presumption which applies to the effect that
statutes are presumed not to be retrospective, unless parliament specifically
intends them to be
Separation of powers the doctrine applicable in western democracies that separates courts from
parliaments from the executive
Stare decisis the doctrine whereby a superior court such as the High Court can theoretically
overturn its own prior decisions but will be reluctant in practice to do so
204 References, Glossary and Index
Subjective test a test based on a particular person’s circumstances and knowledge, as opposed
to an objective test
Unitary system a one level system of government, as opposed to a Federal system
References, Glossary and Index 205
Index
examination-in-chief, 5.6.1 G
expert, 5.7.2
evaluating, 6.2.11
facts at odds with, where, 6.2.10 Goals
hearsay, 5.7.1 caseflow management, and, 8.4, 8.6.1, 8.6.2
irrelevant, 5.7.1 Guardianship tribunals, 1.4.3
legal professional privilege, 5.7.4 Guide to Judicial Conduct, 9.3.3
opinion, 5.7.1 background to, 9.3.1
oral. see Oral evidence conduct of tribunal members, 9.1, 9.3
privilege against self-incrimination, 5.7.3 fundamental principles, 9.3.3
rules of, inapplicability of, 5.7.1 misbehaviour, avoiding potential, 9.2.2
similar fact, 5.7.1 key objectives, 9.3.3
sources, identification of, 6.3.3 professional development, 9.4
telephone, 5.6.6 reception of, 9.3.1
videoconferencing, 5.6.7 A Guide to Standards of Conduct for Tribunal
weighing, 6.2.12 Members. see Standards Guide for Tribunal
Ex tempore reasons. see Oral reasons Members
Examination-in-chief, 5.6.1
Exhibits, 5.6.8
Expert evidence, 5.7.2 H
evaluation of, 6.2.11
Explanatory Memorandum, 2.4.3
Hearings, 5.1
Extension of time adjournment of, 5.5.7
application for hearing, 4.2.1.2 affirmation, administration of, 5.6.4
Extrinsic materials, 2.4.3 conduct of, 1.5.2, 5.1
conduct of tribunal members, 5.4
attire, 5.4.2
F demeanour, 5.4.3
punctuality, 5.4.1
Facilitative process disqualification for bias, 5.5.5
alternative dispute resolution, 4.3.1 disruptive conduct, 5.5.11
Facts documentary evidence, 5.6.8
finding of, 6.2.9 duty to inquire, 5.1
material, 6.2.8, 6.3.3.1 evidentiary issues, 5.7
Fairness. see also Procedural fairness additional material, receipt of, 5.7.5
communication, and, 7.3.1 expert evidence, 5.7.2
conduct of tribunal members, 9.1, 9.2.1, 9.3.2, legal professional privilege, 5.7.4
9.3.2.2 privilege against self-incrimination, 5.7.3
fair hearing rule, 3.1 rules of, inapplicability of, 5.7.1
key competency for tribunal adjudication, 1.5.2 express partial exclusion, 3.3.2
perceptions of, process-oriented factors, 7.3 fair hearing rule. see Procedural fairness
Federal Court of Australia inquisitorial nature of, 5.1
caseflow management handbook, 8.10 interpreters, 5.5.2
Finding of fact, 6.2.8, 6.2.9 intimidation and disruption, 5.5.11
management of, 5.5.10
First-tier review tribunals, 1.4.1.1
disruptions, and, 5.5.11
Freedoms, fundamental non-appearance of parties, 5.5.6
legal presumptions as to, 2.4.4 oath, administration of, 5.6.4
Frivolous proceedings, 5.5.8 organisation of, 5.3
Functus officio, 2.1, 2.6 pre-hearings. see Pre-hearings
210 References, Glossary and Index
L
I
Leadership
Impartiality. see also Bias caseflow management principles, and, 8.4, 8.6.1,
conduct of tribunal members, 9.1, 9.2.1 8.6.2
key competency for tribunal adjudication, 1.5.2
Incidental powers, 1.2.3.1
Legal presumptions, 2.4.4
Independence
Legal professional privilege, 5.7.4
conduct of tribunal members, 9.1, 9.3.2, 9.3.2.3
Legal representation, 5.5.3
Information
imbalance in, 5.5.10
caseflow management, and, 8.4, 8.6.1, 8.6.2
Legislation
Inquisitorial proceedings, 5.1, 5.2
delegated, 2.3.2
duty to inquire, 5.2.1
cessation of operation, timing, 2.3.2.3
Integrity delegation of law-making power, 2.3.2.1
conduct of tribunal members, 9.1, 9.3.2, 9.3.2.6 empowering Act, relationship to, 2.3.2.1
key competency for tribunal adjudication, 1.5.2 validity, 2.3.2.2
International Framework for Tribunal Excellence, 7.1 interpreting, 2.1
Interpretation of statutes. see Statutory interpretation key issues, 2.1
Interpreters, 5.5.2 repeal of, 2.3.1.3, 2.3.2.3
retrospective, 2.3.1.1, 2.3.1.2
Invalid decisions, 2.6
sources of law, 2.1, 2.2
Irrelevant evidence, 5.7.1 statutes, 2.3.1
Issue estoppel Acts ceasing to be laws, 2.3.1.3
power to control proceedings, 2.5.3.4 Acts changing laws, 2.3.1.2
tribunal proceedings, in, 2.5.3.2, 2.5.3.3 parliamentary power to make, 2.3.1.1
References, Glossary and Index 211