The National Academies Press: Assessment of Staffing Needs of Systems Specialists in Aviation (2013)

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Assessment of Staffing Needs of Systems Specialists in Aviation
Committee on Staffing Needs of Systems Specialists in Aviation
Board on Human-Systems Integration
Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

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COMMITTEE ON STAFFING NEEDS OF SYSTEMS SPECIALISTS IN AVIATION
NANCY T. TIPPINS (Chair), Valtera, Corporate Executive Board, Greenville, SC

COLIN G. DRURY, Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, University of Buffalo,
State University of New York
T. MARK HARRISON (NAS), Department of Earth and Space Sciences, University of California,
Los Angeles
CHRISTOPHER HART, National Transportation Safety Board, Washington DC
PAUL F. HOGAN, Federal National Security and Emergency Preparedness, The Lewin Group, VA
BRIAN NORMAN, Compass Manpower Experts, LLC, San Antonio, TX
TONYA L. SMITH-JACKSON, Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, North Carolina
A&T State University
WILLIAM J. STRICKLAND, Human Resources Research Organization, Alexandria, VA
ELMORE M. WIGFALL, (Retired) Federal Aviation Administration, Los Angeles, CA
Staff
DANIEL E.J. TALMAGE, JR., Study Director
JEANNE C. RIVARD, Senior Program Officer
ELIZABETH T. CADY, Program Officer

BOARD ON HUMAN-SYSTEMS INTEGRATION
NANCY J. COOKE (Chair), College of Technology and Innovation and Department of Biomedical
Informatics, Arizona State University
ELLEN J. BASS, College of Information Science and Technology and College of Nursing and Health
Professions, Drexel University
PASCALE CARAYON, Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering and Center for Quality
and Productivity Improvement, University of Wisconsin–Madison
MARY (MISSY) CUMMINGS, Aeronautics and Astronautics Department, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology
SARA J. CZAJA, Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences and Industrial Engineering,
University of Miami
FRANCIS (FRANK) T. DURSO, School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology
ANDREW S. IMADA, A.S. Imada and Associates, Carmichael, CA
KARL S. PISTER (NAE), University of California, Berkeley (Emeritus)
DAVID REMPEL, School of Medicine, Division of Occupational and Environmental Medicine,
University of California, San Francisco
MATTHEW RIZZO, Department of Neurology, University of Iowa
BARBARA SILVERSTEIN, Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, Olympia, WA
DAVID H. WEGMAN, Department of Work Environment, University of Massachusetts at Lowell
(Emeritus)
HOWARD M. WEISS, School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology
Staff
BARBARA A. WANCHISEN, Board Director
TOBY M. WARDEN, Associate Board Director
JATRYCE JACKSON, Program Associate
MOSES JACKSON, Program Associate (prior to August 2012)
vi

Preface
In January 2012, Congress mandated that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) ask the
National Research Council (NRC) to review and report back on three areas of the FAA: A staffing model
for Airway Transportation Systems Specialists (ATSS), a review of the air traffic controllers model, and
a study on NextGen, the FAA’s Next Generation Air Transportation System. This first report focuses on
ATSS, the FAA employees who maintain and certify the equipment of the National Airspace System
(NAS). The report reviews various approaches to establishing staffing levels and the variables that should
be incorporated in the development of a model to assist FAA management in correctly establishing
staffing levels and allocating the right number of workers to maintain the NAS safely and efficiently.
I wish to express my appreciation to the members of the committee for their diligent and dedicated
contributions to the study and to the preparation of this report within an ambitious time frame. The
committee’s diverse expertise and experience contributed greatly to the broad perspective that is incor-
porated in this report. The committee is also grateful to the FAA as well as the representatives of the
Professional Aviation Safety Specialists for their active participation throughout the study. The committee
cannot sufficiently thank the NRC staff members—Barbara Wanchisen, Toby Warden, Jeanne Rivard,
Daniel Talmage, Cherie Chauvin, Tina Winters, Elizabeth Cady, and Renée Wilson-Gaines—for their
dedication to the study and to the preparation of this report. We would also like to thank Manu Sharma
for her administrative support throughout the study process. And finally we thank the executive office
reports staff of the Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, especially Robert Katt
(consultant editor), who provided valuable help with editing the report, and Kirsten Sampson Snyder,
who managed the report review process. Without the NRC’s guidance and wise counsel, the committee’s
job would have been even more difficult if not impossible.
Nancy T. Tippins, Chair

Committee on Staffing Needs
of Systems Specialists in Aviation
vii


Reviewers
This report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives
and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the National Research Council’s
(NRC’s) Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and
critical comments that will assist the institution in making its published report as sound as possible and
to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to
the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity
of the deliberative process. We wish to thank the following individuals for their review of this report:
Ellen J. Bass, College of Information Science and Technology and College of Nursing and Health
Professions, Drexel University
Raymond E. Conley, Manpower, Personnel, and Training Program, RAND Project AIR FORCE,
Arlington, VA
Gene T. Crabtree, Jr., (Retired) Technical Operations, Federal Aviation Administration
R. John Hansman (NAE), MIT International Center for Air Transportation, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology
Kurt Kraiger, Center for Organizational Excellence, Department of Psychology, Colorado State
University
Leif E. Peterson, Advanced HR Concepts & Solutions, LLC, Beavercreek, OH
Karlene H. Roberts, Haas School of Business and Center for Catastrophic Risk Management,
University of California, Berkeley
Juan I. Sanchez, Department of Management and International Business, Florida International
University
Thomas B. Sheridan (NAE), Departments of Mechanical Engineering and Aeronautics and
Astronautics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Emeritus)
Philip J. Smith, Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, The Ohio State University
ix

x REVIEWERS
Although the reviewers listed above have provided many constructive comments and suggestions,
they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommendations nor did they see the final draft of
the report before its release. The review of this report was overseen by the monitor, Wesley L. Harris
(NAE), Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics and associate provost, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, and coordinator Jeremiah A. Barondess (IOM), president emeritus and scholar in residence,
New York Academy of Medicine. Appointed by the NRC, they were responsible for making certain that
an independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with institutional procedures
and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content of this report
rests entirely with the authoring committee and the institution.

Contents
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS xv
SUMMARY 1
1 BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 11

Introduction, 11
Airway Transportation Systems Specialists, 12
Roles and Duties, 14
Origin of Study and Statement of Task, 14
Scope and Committee Approach, 15
Importance of Human-Systems Integration, 17
Structure of This Report, 17
2 WORK ENVIRONMENT CONSIDERATIONS FOR AIRWAY TRANSPORTATION

SYSTEMS SPECIALISTS 19
Overview, 19
Discipline Types and Staff Substitutions, 21
Evolving Systems and Services, 25
Acknowledged Problem Areas in the ATSS Work Environment, 26
Needs Identified by ATSS Stakeholders, 27
Other Issues That Impact the Workload and Staffing of ATSS Personnel, 30
Needs Identified by Other Stakeholders, 31
Major Drivers Behind ATSS Staffing Needs, 32
The Next Generation Air Transportation System, 32
Aging Workforce and Succession Planning, 33
External Influences, 33
Internal Influences, 34
xi

xii CONTENTS
Other Considerations for an ATSS Staffing Model, 35

Performance Measures, 35
Risk Assessments, 35
Tracking Maintenance Activities, 37
Balancing Budgetary Priorities, 38
Staffing Model Considerations, 38
Implications for Staffing Models, 39
Summary, 40
3 CONSIDERATIONS IN CREATING A STAFFING MODEL 41

Workforce Modeling as Part of a Larger Cycle of Workforce Planning, 41
Value of Practical Models for ATSS Personnel, 43
Conceptual Approach to Modeling Used by the Committee, 44
Comprehensive Study Design Process, 44
Key Model Considerations, 50
Quality Factors, 60
Summary and Criteria for Assessing Modeling, 60
4 FAA APPROACHES TO ESTIMATING STAFFING OF AIRWAY TRANSPORTATION

SYSTEMS SPECIALISTS 64
History of FAA Modeling Efforts for ATSS Staffing, 65
WSSAS Staffing Model, 65
Tech Ops District Staffing Model, 65
Staffing Approach by Grant Thornton–Led Study Team, 66
Comparison Between Current and Past Models, 67
Findings and Conclusions on WSSAS, 67
Findings and Conclusions on the Tech Ops District Model, 67
Findings and Conclusions on the Grant Thornton Approach, 72
Potential Alternative Modeling Approaches, 73
Other FAA Staffing Models, 73
U.S. Air Force Staffing Models, 74
Other Potentially Relevant Models, 74
A Logical Approach to a New Model for ATSS, 75
Summary and Recommendations, 77
5 IMPLEMENTATION AND SUSTAINABLITILY OF THE STAFFING MODEL 79

Timeline, 79
FAA Staff, 84
Equipment and Other Resources, 85
Funding, 85
Conclusion, 86
REFERENCES 87
APPENDIXES
A Committee Biographies 93
B Open Session Speakers 96

Figures, Tables, and Boxes
FIGURES
1-1 FAA air traffic organization, Technical Operations organizational chart, 12
1-2 A conceptual model of human-systems integration, 18
2-1 Overview of the Technical Operations organization, 20

2-2 A mapping of 8,505 of the 66,749 facilities and equipment locations across the NAS, 24
2-3 Hazard assessment matrix, 36
2-4 Reliability centered maintenance, 37
3-1 OPM’s workforce planning cycle, 42

3-2 Steps for successful modeling, 44
3-3 Logical design process: model development phases for comprehensive study, 45
4-1 Conceptual logical relationship between service and staffing level, 76
5-1 Phases of staffing model development and implementation, 80
TABLES
1-1 Stakeholders Identified by the FAA, 16
2-1 Percentage of 2101 Disciplines Represented by Location, 23
3-1 Notional Example: “Location X” Staffing for a Particular Point in Budget Year, 51
4-1 Structure and Evaluation of Current and Proposed Staffing Models for ATSS, 68
xiii

xiv FIGURES, TABLES, AND BOXES
BOXES
S-1 Statement of Task, 2
1-1 Statement of Task, 15
3-1 Quality Factors, 61

3-2 Potential Criteria for Model Evaluation, 62

Acronyms and Abbreviations
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast

AFL-CIO American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations
AFMS Air Force Manpower Standards
ARSR Air Route Surveillance Radar
ARTCC Air Route Traffic Control Center
ASR Airport Surveillance Radar
ASTARS AVS Staffing Tool and Reporting System
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATCBI Air Traffic Control Beacon Interrogators
ATSS Airway Transportation Systems Specialists
AVS Office of Aviation Safety
CMMS Computerized Maintenance Management Software
DME Distance Measuring Equipment
ESU Environmental Support Unit
FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FSEP Facility, Service, and Equipment Profile
FTE full-time equivalent
FY fiscal year
GNAS General National Airspace System

GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
xv

xvi ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
HSI human-systems integration
ILS Instrument Landing System
LCOM Logistics Composite Model

LDR Labor Distribution Reporting
MIT Miles-in-Trail
MON Minimum Operational Network (of VORs)
NAS National Airspace System

NAVAID navigational aid
NextGen Next Generation Air Transportation System
OCC Operations Control Center

OJT on-the-job training
OPM Office of Personnel Management
PASS Professional Aviation Safety Specialist

PFD personal, fatigue, and delay (time)
PFF Precommission Facility File
POD process-oriented description
RMLS Remote Monitoring and Logging System

RMM Remote Maintenance Monitoring
SOC Service Operations Center

SOC/OCC Service Operations Center/Operations Control Center
SSC System Support Center
TRACON Terminal Radar Approach Control
VOR VHF Omnidirectional Range

VOR/DME VHF Omnidirectional Range/Distance Measuring Equipment
VV&A verification, validation, and acceptance
WBS work breakdown structure

WSSAS Windows Staffing Standards Analysis System

Summary
Within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Airway Transportation Systems Specialists
(ATSS) personnel maintain and certify the equipment in the National Airspace System (NAS). According
to the definitions set forth by the Office of Management and Budget in Circular A-76, the certification
work of ATSS is considered to be “inherently governmental”; that is, tasks performed to maintain and
certify the NAS may only be performed by federal government (in this situation, FAA) employees.
The Technical Operations service unit of the FAA includes more than 9,000 employees, two-thirds of
whom are ATSS personnel.1 In fiscal year 2012, Technical Operations had a budget of $1.7 billion.
Thus, Technical Operations includes approximately 19 percent of the total FAA employees and less
than 12 percent of the $15.9 billion total FAA budget (DOT, 2012).
Technical Operations comprises ATSS workers at five different types of Air Traffic Control (ATC)
facilities: (1) Air Route Traffic Control Centers, also known as En Route Centers, track aircraft once
they travel beyond the terminal airspace and reach cruising altitude; they include Service Operations
Centers that coordinate work and monitor equipment. (2) Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON)
facilities control air traffic as aircraft ascend from and descend to airports, generally covering a radius
of about 40 miles around the primary airport; a TRACON facility also includes a Service Operations
Center. (3) Core Airports, also called Operational Evolution Partnership airports, are the nation’s busiest
airports. (4) The General National Airspace System (GNAS) includes the facilities located outside the
larger airport locations, including rural airports and equipment not based at any airport. (5) Operations
Control Centers are the facilities that coordinate maintenance work and monitor equipment for a Service
Area (Eastern, Central, Western) in the United States (Grant Thornton, 2011). 2
1Rich McCormick, director, Labor Analysis, FAA, presentation to the Committee on Staffing Needs of Systems Specialists
in Aviation, October 19, 2012.
2Ibid.

2 ASSESSMENT OF STAFFING NEEDS OF SYSTEMS SPECIALISTS IN AVIATION
BOX S-1
Statement of Task
An ad hoc committee will conduct a study of the assumptions and methods used by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) to estimate staffing needs for FAA systems specialists to ensure proper
maintenance and certification of the national airspace system. The committee will review available infor-
mation on (A) the duties of employees in job series 2101 (Airways Transportation Systems Specialist) in
the Technical Operations service unit; (B) the Professional Aviation Safety Specialists (PASS) union of the
AFL-CIO; (C) the present-day staffing models employed by the FAA; (D) any materials already produced
by the FAA including a recent gap analysis on staffing requirements; (E) current research on best staffing
models for safety; and (F) non-U.S. staffing standards for employees in similar roles. Additionally, the FAA
will assist in the committee’s efforts by identifying relevant stakeholder organizations and agencies and
facilitating communication with them. Based on its analysis of the available information, the committee will
produce a report that will include
• a description and evaluation of current FAA staffing models and standards for systems specialists;
• recommendations for objective staffing standards that will maintain the safety of the National Air-
space System going forward; and
• recommendations for the steps needed to transition from the current staffing models and ap-
proaches used by the FAA to the plans for staffing recommended by the committee.
At each facility, the ATSS personnel execute both tasks that are scheduled and predictable (e.g., per-
forming regular preventive maintenance, conducting scheduled certification of equipment and facilities
of the NAS, upgrading equipment, standing watch3) and tasks that are stochastic4 and unpredictable in
occurrence (e.g., detecting an adverse event or outage and then repairing and returning certified equip-
ment to use after the event). These tasks are common across the five ATSS disciplines: (1) Communica-
tions, maintaining the systems that allow air traffic controllers and pilots to be in contact throughout
the flight; (2) Surveillance and Radar, maintaining the systems that allow air traffic controllers to see
the specific locations of all the aircraft in the airspace they are monitoring; (3) Automation, maintaining
the systems that allow air traffic controllers to track each aircraft’s current and future position, speed,
and altitude; (4) Navigation, maintaining the systems that allow pilots to take off, maintain their course,
approach, and land their aircraft; and (5) Environmental, maintaining the power, lighting, and heating/
air conditioning systems at the ATC facilities (FAA, 2011b). Because the NAS needs to be available and
reliable all the time, each of the different equipment systems includes redundancy so an outage can be
fixed without disrupting the NAS.
The 2012 FAA Modernization and Reform Act mandated the National Research Council to appoint
an ad hoc committee to study the assumptions and methods the FAA uses to estimate the number of
ATSS personnel needed. This committee was appointed with the statement of task shown in Box S-1.
Rather than establish a standard for staffing models (a staffing model can be used to estimate the
number of ATSS employees needed to fulfill the FAA’s mission), the committee decided to identify
relevant factors and considerations necessary to create a model that will yield a staffing number by a
reasoned, scientifically sound approach. To accomplish its tasks, the committee received briefings and
3“Standing watch” refers to monitoring for adverse events and unscheduled outages of the equipment.
4Randomly determined; having a random probability distribution or pattern that may be analyzed statistically but may not
be predicted.

SUMMARY 3
materials from the FAA and the union representing ATSS personnel, Professional Aviation Safety Spe-
cialists (PASS). It also visited several ATC facilities, collected stakeholder input via a public webpage
(most comments came from ATSS personnel), and examined several staffing models and the factors that
are necessary input into the models. These models and the framework of human-systems integration
(HSI) factors guided the committee’s deliberations and its assessment of various modeling approaches.
In the context of this report, a model depicts how different factors such as workload level or equipment
repair time interact to determine optimal staffing levels (NRC, 2006).
STAFFING FACTORS AND MODEL CRITERIA

In addition to the inherent mix of scheduled and unpredictable tasks performed by ATSS personnel,
staffing needs are further complicated by the FAA’s planned implementation of the Next Generation
Air Transportation System, or NextGen, which will continue to integrate new technology with current
systems in the NAS. Input received from various stakeholders, along with the information received from
the FAA regarding the primary factors to consider when developing a staffing model, informed the com-
mittee’s work. One of the committee’s major tasks was to identify the factors that should be included
in the model; these related not only to manpower staffing but also to the human resources aspects that
feed into modeling. The following nine factors were identified:
1. The time required for new hires, as well as ATSS personnel who are certifying on new equipment,
to complete formal training at the FAA training center in Oklahoma City; the time required for
them to receive on-the-job training (OJT) from more experienced ATSS personnel and complete
the certification activities; and the increased workload on ATSS personnel who provide OJT
2. The distance an ATSS employee must travel to some remote facilities and the time required to
make the trip
3. The potential environmental challenges involved in maintaining equipment that is near a hazard-
ous area or located in places that experience severe weather
4. The time dedicated to serving in the military reserves or taking other forms of leave, including
family and medical leave
5. The ability of ATSS personnel to meet all the job demands on their time without being unduly
fatigued
6. Safety requirements that include the need to have two (or more) workers in some situations (e.g.,
working on high-voltage equipment)
7. Problems with the current FAA time reporting systems, such as Labor Distribution Reporting and
the Remote Monitoring and Logging System, which provide data that are deficient for estimating
the time ATSS personnel spend on daily tasks
8. Upcoming retirements from an aging workforce5
9. Other requirements on ATSS personnel time, such as nontechnical training and administrative
tasks
In addition to identifying the factors to consider when building an accurate staffing model, the com-
mittee reviewed critical steps in the modeling process, including all of the following steps:
5The committee notes that attrition/accession models are best handled as separate human resources algorithms based upon
the staffing model targets.

1. Following a comprehensive study and design process that incorporates the major workload factors
at an appropriate level of detail, links workload to the time required to complete the tasks, and
completes the six steps of the logical design process (i.e., feasibility, familiarization, measurement
design, measurement, analysis and model selection, and implementation)
2. Incorporating key model considerations, including choosing the right type of model to use all
relevant input and provide all required outputs
3. Attending to quality factors, such as ensuring that the model is transparent, scalable, easy to use,
relevant, and valid (NRC, 2006:33)
The committee used the above criteria to examine existing ATSS staffing models including the
Windows Staffing Standards Analysis System (WSSAS) and the Tech Ops District Model. Although
these models meet some of the criteria, overall the committee found them lacking in some areas and
recommends development of a new model using the steps and factors outlined in the report. The com-
mittee also reviewed recent efforts by FAA to examine its past modeling efforts and to assess its needs
for future modeling through a contract with the Grant Thornton consulting firm. The Grant Thornton
reports build on the WSSAS, which is a deterministic6 model, and suggest improvements to the key data
sources. Finally, the committee reviewed the steps necessary to successfully implement a new model,
including estimates of the time needed for each activity (e.g., development, testing, preparation, imple-
mentation, validation, and monitoring results), as well as the role of FAA staff, funding requirements,
and consideration of other resources within the model.
REPORT FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following findings, conclusions, and recommendations are shown in order of appearance in the
report chapters and do not necessarily reflect their order of importance.
ATSS Staffing and NextGen

The Committee understands that the FAA’s planned transition to NextGen is under way, but that
the maintenance requirements are not yet publicly specified. An effective staffing model goes beyond
documenting today’s required ATSS staffing levels; instead, a robust and accessible staffing model should
be capable of incorporating such additional inputs as they become available, not only with respect to
NextGen but also with respect to inevitable continuing technological advances.
Finding 2-1: Changes to the NAS such as NextGen and Minimum Operational Network (MON) imple-
mentation and unspecified decommissioning policies all make the amount of work to be performed by
ATSS personnel ambiguous and complicate the FAA’s task in developing an appropriate staffing model
for ATSS.
Conclusion 2-1: Developing and using a successful staffing model to predict future outcomes will be
limited by unknowns such as decommissioning policies for legacy equipment, installation of NextGen
equipment, and consolidation of facilities.
6A
deterministic model is a mathematical function of multiple inputs such as the type of equipment and the nature of the
task to be performed. That is, a single value of a model outcome variable can be derived from a set of values for all the input
variables.

SUMMARY 5
Recommendation 2-1: The FAA should ensure that ATSS staffing models will incorporate new infor-
mation about the unknown factors that affect ATSS staffing such as NextGen as it becomes available,
consider their staffing implications, and use appropriate modeling techniques to plan for contingencies.
Critical Factors Affecting ATSS Staffing

The job duties and work environment for ATSS personnel, represented by PASS, present special
challenges and issues that should be addressed by an effective staffing model. By reviewing documents
related to the job of the ATSS personnel and considering the perspectives of a wide array of stakeholders,
including the systems specialists themselves, the committee identified several critical factors affecting
demand for systems specialists that result not only from the unusual requirements of this particular
job series but also from the demands placed on ATSS personnel by the external aviation environment.
Although the committee focused much of its effort on the manpower domain, it noted several human
resource areas to address.
Finding 2-2: A number of human resource issues, such as hiring procedures, training requirements,
retirements, and military obligations, affect the number of qualified ATSS personnel who are available
at any point in time to maintain the NAS.
Conclusion 2-2: The committee concludes that human resource issues such as retirements and succes-
sion planning considerations should be addressed in conjunction with any comprehensive manpower
staffing model.
Recommendation 2-2: In accordance with the principles of human-systems integration, the FAA should
build a robust staffing model that takes into account all of the following aspects of the ATSS job series,
in addition to the time that ATSS personnel spend on preventive and corrective maintenance tasks:
• T
raining issues, time to schedule training, the time required to attend training, and the time of
experienced ATSS personnel necessary to provide OJT
• Travel time to and from work sites
• Environmental challenges
• Time dedicated to military reserve service or family and medical leave
• Fatigue mitigation plans
• Safety factors
• Labor Distribution Reporting deficiencies and other data deficiencies
• Aging workforce and succession planning considerations
• FAA’s Next Generation (NextGen) system
• Nontechnical task demands
The Staffing Modeling Process for ATSS

The committee had several discussions on what would be a valid and useful model and how it
could estimate the number of ATSS personnel necessary for maintaining the NAS in a safe, efficient,
and effective manner. These discussions did not focus on a total number of ATSS personnel, but there
was an understanding that, should the model generate a number greater than 6,100, the anticipated FAA
budget would need to be quickly increased to avoid negative implications for the safety and efficiency
of the NAS. In that case the FAA would have to employ risk mitigation to compensate for the less than

sufficient staffing while the requisite budget was approved and additional staff was hired, trained, and
assigned to the appropriate sites.
Conclusion 3-1: Dedicated budget requirements for the ATSS personnel are likely to result from ap-
plication of any comprehensive manpower staffing model and will need to be addressed.
Leaders of the model design and development process should intentionally look backward and for-
ward during the phases of a logical design process so that the end result is logical, valid, and compliant
with the stated purpose. In particular, data examination during the measurement and analysis phases may
necessitate revised data collection procedures or additional research into some of the factors that affect
ATSS staffing levels. Moreover, those who develop the model need to plan for future improvements
to the model as modeling methodology and data collection procedures evolve and as the FAA obtains
greater understanding of the causes of variability in the tasks performed by ATSS personnel. Insights
gained at any phase can redirect the study in unexpected ways; thus, the study team needs to be not only
flexible but also seasoned in handling unexpected situations and understanding which approaches are
most likely to be effective in a given situation.
Recommendation 3-1: The FAA should execute a modeling process that allows for future improvements
in data modeling techniques and applicability.
Assessment of the FAA’s Previous Modeling Efforts for ATSS

To provide a sound basis for recommendations for future ATSS staffing models, the committee com-
pared prior FAA staffing models and the Grant Thornton proposed modeling approach with each other
and against the set of criteria for valid staffing models compiled by the committee. The deterministic
WSSAS model was based on valid structure and suitable types of data and data sources. Essentially,
the WSSAS incorporated the pieces of equipment at each site, the number of technician hours required
for each corrective or preventive maintenance action on each piece of equipment, and the probability
of failure for each type of equipment. These measures were combined to establish the maintenance
workload for each piece of equipment, and workloads were summed across all equipment at a work site.
Allowances were added for technician unavailability, and a factor was added for other required activities.
Time data came from time studies and consensus judgments by subject matter experts, supplemented by
contractor-provided times for new equipment. Neither the reliability of input data to the model nor the
validity of the output staffing levels was measured. The reports generated were useful to supervisors
and administrators, and the WSSAS model was reasonably transparent to all users. However, updating the
model was expensive, and the lack of resources for updating eventually made the model unsustainable.
Conclusion 4-1: The approach represented by the original WSSAS model included many of the impor-
tant variables (e.g., equipment counts and task durations together with failure rates and allowances) to
determine the staffing required at each site.
Finding 4-1: The WSSAS model does not appear to contain stochastic elements in places where these
may have been appropriate.
Finding 4-2: The WSSAS model made no prediction of outcomes such as the impact of staffing levels
on NAS availability and safety.

SUMMARY 7
The Tech Ops District Model is an allocation model only (that is, it aimed only at distributing
available personnel resources effectively irrespective of their collective adequacy to maintain a safe and
effective NAS), rather than a sufficiency model (i.e., a model designed to predict the resources needed
to sustain system performances at an acceptable level). The committee therefore found it to not be an
appropriate basis for moving forward toward a valid model for staffing. It is a regression model that
only shows, at best, how a number of variables are related in a statistical manner to then-current staffing
levels by district. The Tech Ops District Model was never validated against outcome measures. Any work
regression model, without measurement of actual hours required to perform the task, will necessarily
preserve the status quo in terms of staffing, so that the performance consequences will remain the same
and may not meet current or future performance requirements. The committee recommended against
using the Tech Ops District Model as a source of either the modeling framework or data for future work
and did not consider it further as a basis for FAA staffing models.
Finding 4-3: The Tech Ops District Model was an allocation model and not a sufficiency staffing model.
Conclusion 4-2: The Tech Ops District Model is not an adequate framework for future work.
The Grant Thornton approach builds on the WSSAS model but suggests improvements to the key
data sources for the future model. It appears to capture the relationships between equipment and mainte-
nance staffing, and it has provisions for idiosyncratic factors (variances) affecting staffing. Although the
Grant Thornton design represents distinct improvements over WSSAS, the committee has two concerns
with an approach built on the basis of the WSSAS model. First, corrective maintenance in the ATSS
job often occurs in an unscheduled, stochastic manner, and the WSSAS model does not account for the
intrinsically stochastic nature of these events. Even if some elements like mean time between compo-
nent failures can be predicted, some randomness or unpredictability remains, related to the timing and
location of a specific failure requiring corrective maintenance. Before dismissing various probabilistic
aspects of maintenance work and methods, these stochastic elements and their relationship to adequate
and safe staffing levels need to be understood and thoroughly explored to determine if and how they
should be included in the model design.
Second, like the WSSAS and Tech Ops District models, the proposed model does not predict the
consequences or results of staffing at alternative levels. It would be advisable to gather data necessary
to study stochastic properties of outages, required time to repair, and shift profile dynamics. It would
also be helpful to explore potential linkages of key internal Technical Operations performance metrics
to various levels of staffing allocations.
Finding 4-4: The Grant Thornton prospective model builds on the earlier WSSAS model, and thus
inherits some of its strengths and limitations. Its strengths include the same elemental data structure,
supplemented with more recent data partly derived from existing data bases.
Conclusion 4-3: Based on the latest description of the proposed model in the Grant Thornton report, the
limitation of the Grant Thornton approach is the plan for a deterministic model that does not consider
the implications of stochastic elements. Further, it makes no predictions of outcome measures such as
NAS equipment availability and safety.

Future Modeling for ATSS Staffing

The committee applied the modeling approaches and criteria developed in this report from staffing
model knowledge to the WSSAS model, the Tech Ops District Model, and the proposed Grant Thornton
approach to modeling. First, the factual basis of the three models was tabulated and assessed in terms
of the criteria. Next, other sources of successful modeling in similar situations were assessed for the
insights they might add to the future models of ATSS staffing developed by the FAA.
The committee can summarize the attributes and the evaluation of models based on these attributes
as a set of statements about what are good criteria for the FAA’s future modeling efforts. The best sci-
ence currently available supports the following recommendations for a valid and usable model.
Recommendation 4-1: The FAA should develop a new ATSS staffing model based on the modeling
framework and criteria developed in this report. The model should be developed using a model structure
that is based on equipment inventory, failure rates, and time to perform each task and should include
any valid allowances and accommodations. The model structure should include both deterministic and
stochastic estimates for variables such as task duration, as appropriate. The developed model structure
should be based on the different specialties of ATSS technicians, rather than providing just an overall
staffing level at each facility.
Recommendation 4-2: The FAA should develop a model that captures stochastic elements, unless it
can be demonstrated that stochastic aspects of the maintenance process have no material effect on the
staffing. For example, some tasks may exhibit multiple deterministic durations of identifiable elements,
rather than strictly stochastic durations.
Recommendation 4-3: The FAA should incorporate data for the model that are appropriate to the du-
ration and frequency of the tasks modeled and to its data collection capabilities. Specifically, the FAA
needs a process to systematically validate through direct observation both historical estimates of task
durations and estimates by subject matter experts.
Recommendation 4-4: The FAA should ensure that the ongoing data collection and input essential for
model use do not place an unacceptable burden on data providers.
Recommendation 4-5: The FAA should ensure that output reports from the system predict consequences
such as overall NAS availability time, deferred preventive maintenance activities, and overtime required.
Recommendation 4-6: The FAA should ensure that output reports are tailored closely to the needs of
FAA’s internal users at multiple organizational levels, in order to increase transparency of, and user
trust in, the model.
Implementing a Future Model for ATSS Staffing

The committee discusses six steps, each of which comprises a number of activities that should be
undertaken to increase the likelihood of a successful model launch. Each activity requires time and
resources. Ideally, the FAA and its staffing model experts would add to these major steps as needed and
elaborate on each, specifying what needs to be done by whom and creating a schedule to be followed
for each step.

SUMMARY 9
Step 1 includes all the activities associated with the actual development of the model. Step 2 involves
a pretest of the model prior to full implementation, comparing it to five criteria by which a staffing
model should be evaluated: transparency, scalability, usability, relevance, and validity. As review and
improvement of the staffing model is a continuous process, these five criteria should be kept in mind
once the model is implemented and is being validated and amended.
Step 3 focuses on the activities necessary to prepare the FAA to transition from the current state of
staffing to a new process for establishing staffing levels via a carefully constructed staffing model. The
FAA will need to develop a detailed plan to implement the new staffing model and create the timeline for
the transition, checking to see what other events might affect the implementation. Step 4 encompasses
the actual implementation and rollout of the model according to the plans laid out in Step 3, all of
which should logically be synchronized with key FAA human resources, training, and budget processes
to the extent possible. Step 5 is the post-implementation evaluation of the quality of the staffing model
against the five standards of transparency, scalability, usability, relevance, and validity. All of the quality
standards are important, but validity is perhaps the most critical. Unless the results of the staffing plan
allow the FAA to maintain the NAS, nothing else is relevant.
Recommendation 5-1: The FAA should prepare a timeline that details all the activities associated with
model development and implementation that must be completed and should ensure that the resources
necessary to accomplish each are available.
Step 6 includes the activities that are necessary to sustain the model over a period of time: monitor
the staffing model, evaluate its adequacy, and make adjustments as needed. The staffing model that is
produced as a result of this study will be more effective if it is periodically reviewed and updated to
reflect the changing environment of ATSS work. If a review indicates that the staffing model is out-
dated, modifications should be made and the cycle of implementation should begin anew. An effective
and useful modeling process takes into account the lessons that have accrued from each round of the
implementation process and incorporates them into the next iteration of the staffing model, resulting in
a spiral development process.
Recommendation 5-2: Once implemented, the FAA should continue to monitor the effectiveness of
the staffing model by collecting data from multiple sources and should make adjustments as needed
to enhance the accuracy of the model. In addition, the model should be adapted as changes to the major
components of the model are made, such as changes in the tasks performed, equipment used, and train-
ing processes.


Background and Overview
INTRODUCTION
The National Airspace System (NAS) is the integrated network of components necessary to manage
the United States airspace effectively and safely: air navigation facilities, equipment, services, airports
or landing areas, aeronautical charts, information technology, rules, regulations, procedures, technical
information, manpower, and material. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) owns and operates
the air traffic control systems in the NAS. Some of these system components (e.g., navigational aids
and radar facilities) are also used by the U.S. Department of Defense and Department of Homeland
Security in their missions. The NAS continues to evolve as the characteristics of aircraft (e.g., speed
and altitude capabilities); their communication and navigation equipment; and the ground equipment
used for communication, tracking, and guidance evolve and as the usage of the airspace continues to
increase, including the future addition of drone traffic.
The maintenance of the NAS is the responsibility of the Airway Transportation Systems Specialists
(ATSS) (job series 2101) who work for the Technical Operations branch of the FAA Air Traffic Orga-
nization. The organization chart in Figure 1-1, from FAA Notice 1100.332, presents the management
hierarchy for Technical Operations within the Air Traffic Organization and its lines of reporting (FAA,
2012a).
Throughout the history of the FAA, the certification and oversight of the NAS has been considered
to be inherently governmental (FAA, 2011a; Office of Management and Budget, 2003). Almost 50
years ago, the Office of Management and Budget published Circular A-76, Performance of Commercial
Activities, which defines “inherently governmental activity” as “any activity that is so intimately related
to the public interest as to mandate performance by government personnel” (Office of Management and
Budget, 2003).
On December 7, 2000, President Clinton issued Executive Order 13180, Air Traffic Performance
Based Organization, to establish a more businesslike, customer service focused FAA. Executive Order
13180 specifically states that air traffic services are inherently governmental (U.S. Government Printing
Office, 2000). However, on June 4, 2002, President Bush issued Executive Order 13264, which amended
11

Vice President
Technical Operations
AJW-0
Director of Director of Air Traffic Director of Flight Director of National Director of Technical Director of Technical Director of Technical
Operations Support Control Facilities Inspections Services Enterprise Operations Operations - ESA Operations - CSA Operations - WSA
AJW-1 AJW-2 AJW-3 AJW-B AJW-E AJW-C AJW-W
Business Network
Engineering Engineering Engineering
Management Power Services Business Services Management
Services Group - Services Group - Services Group -
Group Group Group Group
ESA CSA WSA
AJW-11 AJW-22 AJW-31 AJW-B1 AJW-E1 AJW-C1 AJW-W1
EOSH Services &

NAS Integration &
Facility Security Flight Inspection Satellite Technical Services Technical Services Technical Services
Support Group
Group Operations Group Operations Group Group - ESA Group - CSA Group - WSA
AJW-13 AJW-23 AJW-33 AJW-B2 AJW-E2 AJW-C2 AJW-W2
Aircraft
NAS Engineering
Facilities Group Maintenance & National
Group Districts Districts Districts
Engineering Group Operations Group
AJW-14 AJW-24 AJW-34 AJW-B3 AJW-Exx AJW-Cxx AJW-Wxx
Communications, Flight Washington Flight Information

Business
Services, & Weather Program Security Systems
Management
Engineering Group Hangar 6 Group Group
Group
AJW-17 AJW-26 AJW-36 AJW-B4
NAS Defense Implementation Safety & Quality Operations

Program Group Services Group Assurance Group Integration Group
AJW-1A AJW-28 AJW-38 AJW-B5
NAS Quality National Business

Assurance & Engineering Flight Program Management
Performance Group Support Group Services Group Group
AJW-1B AJW-29 AJW-39 AJW-B6
Spectrum
Engineering NextGen Facilities
Services Group Group
AJW-1C AJW-2A
FIGURE 1-1 FAA air traffic organization, Technical Operations organizational chart.
SOURCE: FAA, 2012a:25.
Executive Order 13180 and deleted the term “inherently governmental function” from the original order
(U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002). This amendment allowed the FAA to contract some air traf-
fic controller functions to private concerns, largely at smaller air traffic control towers (Wigfall, 2006).
Maintenance and certification of NAS equipment, however, remained a strictly governmental function
that is performed only by the FAA. Consequently, this study focuses only on employees of the FAA.
Airway Transportation Systems Specialists

President Obama’s 2013 FAA budget submission describes the responsibilities of the FAA Technical
Operations branch, and specifically of ATSS, as follows:
Technical Operations ensures that thousands of systems, facilities, and pieces of equipment are operation-
ally ready to manage our nation’s air traffic control system. Without system specialists and management
teams working to complete preventive maintenance and repair down equipment, unscheduled outages can
result in delays in the system, negatively impacting the flying public.
Another component of the Technical Operations organization that serves as a vital link in delivering air
traffic control services is Aviation System Standards’ flight inspection operations. Technical Operations

BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 13
employees conduct airborne inspection of electronic signals from ground-based NAVAIDs [navigational
aids] to support aircraft departure, en route, and arrival procedures. This group evaluates flight procedures
for accuracy, human factors fly-ability, and obstacle clearance. Without this “check,” the NAS would not
be as safe as it is today.
Technical Operations manages their operations by measuring performance of the NAS based on what
Systems or services are available for air traffic control operations (Adjusted Operational Availability).
However, this metric directly impacts FAA’s airport capability metric (Average Daily Airport capacity)
as noted above, as well as our safety reduction goals (Commercial and General Aviation Fatal Accident
Rates). Technical Operations ensures that terminal and en route controllers have all critical parts of the
NAS infrastructure available for the safety and efficient delivery of air traffic services. (Department of
Transportation, 2012:23)
The Technical Operations service unit of the FAA includes more than 9,000 employees, two-thirds
of whom are ATSS personnel.1 In fiscal year 2012, Technical Operations had a budget of $1.7 billion.
Thus, Technical Operations includes approximately 19 percent of the total FAA employees and less than
12 percent of the $15.9 billion total FAA budget (DOT, 2012).
There are five types types of facilities in Technical Operations: (1) Air Route Traffic Control Centers,
also known as En Route centers, which track aircraft once they travel beyond the terminal airspace and
reach cruising altitude and include Service Operations Centers that coordinate work and monitor equip-
ment; (2) Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) facilities, which control air traffic as aircraft
ascend from and descend to airports and generally cover a radius of about 40 miles around the primary
airport, which also include a Service Operations Center; (3) Core Airports (or Operational Evolution
Partnership airports), the nation’s busiest airports; (4) the General National Airspace System, comprising
the facilities located outside the larger locations, including rural airports and equipment not based at any
airport; and (5) Operations Control Centers, the facilities that coordinate work and monitor equipment
for a Service Area (Eastern, Central, Western) in the United States (Grant Thornton, 2011). 2
One general position description covers all ATSS employees in Job Series 2101 in the Technical
Operations unit of FAA’s Air Traffic Organization:
Airway Transportation Systems Specialists (ATSS) install and maintain electronic equipment and light-
ing aids associated with facilities and services required for aviation navigation to ensure a reliable, safe,
and smooth flow of air traffic. This involves work with radar, communications, computers, navigational
aids, airport lighting aids, and electrical/mechanical support for facilities on and off airports within the
network of the National Airspace System. It includes periodic maintenance (inspection and analysis of
equipment with associated adjustments), corrective maintenance, troubleshooting, repair and replacement
of malfunctioning equipment, and certification. ATSS may be required to maintain entire facilities, includ-
ing electronic equipment, electrical power distribution, emergency backup power, power conditioning
systems, and heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems. Many ATSS work out of offices located
at or near airports and on service equipment located on airports, in air traffic control towers, automated
flight service stations, air route traffic control centers, in open fields, or even on remote mountain tops. 3
ATSS personnel maintain equipment and services of the NAS in the three Service Areas (Eastern,
Central, and Western) throughout the United States, Guam, American Samoa, and Puerto Rico. All ATSS
positions are covered by a collective bargaining agreement with the Professional Aviation Safety Special-
1Rich McCormick, director, Labor Analysis, FAA, presentation on Labor Analysis to the Committee on Staffing Needs of
Systems Specialists in Aviation, October 19, 2012.

2Ibid.
3ATSS posting found at https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/ViewDetails/313337100 [May 2013].

ists (PASS), a labor union of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations.
The most recent collective bargaining agreement was ratified on December 16, 2012.
Roles and Duties

ATSS personnel are employed at a variety of facilities throughout the United States and its territories,
ranging from small airports to large TRACON facilities and major airports. All facilities need all special-
ties to cover the equipment, although smaller facilities may use more multi-certified ATSS personnel
while larger facilities will have many ATSS personnel with deeper skills in individual specialties. The
ATSS work is composed primarily of four types of tasks:
1. Performing scheduled (daily, weekly, monthly, etc.) preventive maintenance on equipment

2. Standing watch for detection of adverse events and unscheduled outages (while working on other
tasks)
3. Returning equipment to service following an unplanned outage and after certification
4. Performing upgrades and equipment changes as the NAS evolves
This work is carried out inside the tower/TRACON, at a closely adjacent airfield, or at a remote
location. At smaller facilities, the ATSS personnel typically schedule their own daily tasks based on the
list of required scheduled maintenance or any equipment that is out of service and needs to be repaired
immediately. Priority of tasks depends on the safety of the traveling public and is typically set by under-
standing the impact of equipment outages on the NAS and the deadlines for preventive maintenance or
upgrading equipment. ATSS personnel interact with each other to provide support across specialties,
communicating directly rather than through a hierarchy. Facilities of different sizes use different manage-
ment structures. At facilities with larger staffs, there is more direct coordination by management, while at
smaller facilities work is more likely to be coordinated by the ATSS personnel themselves. At any facility,
the ATSS personnel performing a task can call on technical back-up at two levels—either experienced
technicians with a great deal of knowledge or engineers with even more detailed knowledge—although
these personnel may not be immediately available at all hours. 4
ATSS personnel may pursue certification in five technical disciplines: Communication, Environ-
mental, Navaid, Surveillance, and Automation (FAA, 2011b). Most ATSS will continue with additional
training over their careers in Technical Operations in order to diversify their skills and certify in multiple
disciplines.
ORIGIN OF STUDY AND STATEMENT OF TASK

In February 2012, the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (H.R. 658) was signed by Presi-
dent Barack Obama.5 This law contained requests for studies to be conducted by the National Academy of
Sciences, including a study of the methods and accompanying assumptions of the FAA used to estimate
its staffing needs for FAA systems specialists, referred to in this document as “ATSS.” In the operational
context, ATSS personnel are also referred to as “systems specialists” and as “2101s,” the latter being a
reference to their Office of Personnel Management job classification. In response to one of these requests,
the National Research Council of the National Academies appointed an ad hoc committee in September
4Comments submitted to Staffing Needs of Systems Specialists in Aviation Stakeholder webpage, 2013.
5H.R. 658, 112th Congress: FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012. Available: http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bills/112/hr658 [June 2013].

BOX 1-1
Statement of Task
An ad hoc committee will conduct a study of the assumptions and methods used by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) to estimate staffing needs for FAA systems specialists to ensure proper
maintenance and certification of the national airspace system. The committee will review available infor-
mation on (A) the duties of employees in job series 2101 (Airways Transportation Systems Specialist) in
the Technical Operations service unit; (B) the Professional Aviation Safety Specialists (PASS) union of the
AFL-CIO; (C) the present-day staffing models employed by the FAA; (D) any materials already produced
by the FAA including a recent gap analysis on staffing requirements; (E) current research on best staffing
models for safety; and (F) non-U.S. staffing standards for employees in similar roles. Additionally, the FAA
will assist in the committee’s efforts by identifying relevant stakeholder organizations and agencies and
facilitating communication with them. Based on its analysis of the available information, the committee will
produce a report that will include
• a description and evaluation of current FAA staffing models and standards for systems specialists;
• recommendations for objective staffing standards that will maintain the safety of the National Air-
space System going forward; and
• recommendations for the steps needed to transition from the current staffing models and ap-
proaches used by the FAA to the plans for staffing recommended by the committee.
2012 composed of members representing multiple disciplines. The task of this Committee on Staffing
Needs of Systems Specialists in Aviation (hereafter, “the committee”) is presented in Box 1-1.
At the first meeting of the committee on October 18-19, 2012, the FAA gave additional guidance
regarding the task at hand, informing the committee that a contract between PASS, the labor union that
represents ATSS employees, and the FAA would be ratified and that the staffing level of 6,100, although
arbitrary, would remain in place for the first 16 months of the new contract.6 The FAA representatives
also noted that this number was a base for staffing levels and not a ceiling. The FAA explained in a later
meeting that the agreement called for a “scientifically valid” model to be used to determine the optimal
staffing level for the ATSS class of workers. In discussions with representatives of the FAA, the com-
mittee clarified another requirement of the task, the request for recommendations for objective staffing
standards that will maintain the safety of the NAS going forward. Rather than establish a standard for
staffing models (i.e., the number of ATSS employees needed to fulfill the FAA’s mission), the commit-
tee was asked to identify relevant factors and considerations necessary to create a model that will yield
a staffing number.
SCOPE AND COMMITTEE APPROACH

The scope of the committee’s task was to review relevant FAA reports, data models, performance
metrics, surveys, job descriptions, and information about staffing models from other sources and to
engage the FAA, PASS, ATSS personnel, and other stakeholders of the FAA to achieve the stated goals.
Stakeholders (see Table 1-1) were identified by the FAA,7 and input was requested from several primary
6The
contract vote by PASS had been held and approved prior to the first committee meeting.
7Stakeholder
list prepared by FAA staff and sent by Rich McCormick, director, Labor Analysis, FAA, to the committee on
November 28, 2012.

TABLE 1-1 Stakeholders Identified by the FAA

Stakeholder Category
Air Traffic Management Primary
Professional Aviation Safety Specialists (PASS) Primary
National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) Primary
National Association of Government Employees (NAGE) Primary
Flight Standards Primary
Flight Inspections Primary
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Academy Primary
General Aviation Secondary
U.S. Congress Secondary
Flight Services Stations Secondary
Airlines Secondary
Airports Secondary
Airport Authorities Secondary
Regional Administrators Secondary
Nonfederal Towers Secondary
Other Federal Departments Secondary
Department of the Interior—Fisheries and Wildlife Services
Department of Commerce—National Weather Service
Department of Defense—National Defense Program Office
General Aviation
Foreign Governments Secondary
stakeholders, primarily those who could be contacted directly. In addition, a webpage was set up for
public comment. Most of the respondents were ATSS personnel. The committee also conducted site
visits to observe the work of ATSS personnel in context, to better understand the requirements of the job.
As noted, the committee identified a number of sources of information relevant to achieving its goals,
including documents, discussions, research literature, and committee members’ observations at selected
facilities. The documents reviewed included job descriptions of 2101s in the Technical Operations ser-
vice unit, FAA documentation providing targets and performance outcomes, and information collected
from the union that represents the ATSS personnel, PASS. Information on staffing models and standards
used in other countries was also requested but not received. Additionally, information was gathered at
committee meetings in the form of presentations and discussions by FAA headquarters staff, contrac-
tors, and PASS representatives who shared and discussed current staffing concerns and other challenges.
The committee reviewed staffing models for similar jobs and studied the manner in which these models
integrated safety and efficiency parameters, as well as the approaches used to develop such models. As
detailed below, several facilities were visited to discuss relevant issues with ATSS and related personnel,
including site visits at Leesburg, Dulles, Los Angeles International, Greenville-Spartanburg, and Buffalo.
During the first meeting on October 18-19, 2012, in Washington, DC, the FAA discussed the need
for the study and the key factors that the FAA’s representatives felt needed to be addressed in a staffing
model. The committee deliberated on next steps in the formulation of future meeting agendas and site
visits to better understand the key activities to be conducted for this study.
The second meeting of the committee was held on December 6-7, 2012, in Washington, DC. The
committee visited two sites on December 7, 2012, to further explore workload factors through discussion
with Technical Operations personnel and to develop a contextual understanding of the tasks conducted
by ATSS employees in the course of daily operations. The two sites were the Washington Center in

Leesburg, Virginia, and Washington Dulles International Airport Tower in Dulles, Virginia. The third
meeting was held on January 23-24, 2013, in Washington, DC, and focused on report writing and content
updates. An FAA question and answer session was held at this meeting to gain additional information
and clarifications and to answer questions that were still pending from previous sessions. At the fourth
meeting, held on February 27-28, 2013, in Irvine, California, the committee focused on writing its report.
In addition to the committee meetings, individual members completed site visits at the following FAA
locations: Buffalo, New York; Greenville, South Carolina; and Los Angeles, California.
IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN-SYSTEMS INTEGRATION

The committee discussed several guiding principles to help identify the parameters and models to
define the ATSS workload and establish appropriate staffing levels. These included human-resources
manpower and personnel models, management systems models using operations research and optimi-
zation formulas, and the FAA’s traditional models, which were currently in use. The committee agreed
that an understanding of the relationships among the system components and the workforce was critical
to an integrative effort toward optimizing staffing relative to workload. The committee conceptualized
the maintenance of the NAS as a complex, dynamic system with significant interdependencies among
all system components, including the ATSS personnel who maintain them. The committee drew mainly
from the human-systems integration (HSI) framework because of its history and use across aviation,
defense, aerospace, medical, and other complex organizational systems for the past three decades.
The HSI framework requires that no one component of a system should be considered in isolation;
the careful integration of all systems components maximizes outcomes related to the pursuit of increased
safety and heightened performance (Booher, 2003; National Research Council, 2007). In a traditional
HSI framework, the system comprises multiple domains such as manpower, personnel, training, surviv-
ability, safety, occupational health, environment, habitability, and human factors engineering (U.S. Air
Force, undated). To fulfill the charge of the committee and make recommendations regarding the FAA
Systems Specialists, the focus in this report is on exploring the domains of manpower, personnel, safety,
and training. With respect to addressing workforce needs, the committee felt that the interdependence of
these four areas was particularly relevant to the statement of task. The consideration of environmental
factors in Chapter 2 is a direct consequence of using an HSI framework. It is the committee’s judgment
that the absence of a viable manpower model has undermined the FAA’s capability to systematically
apply an HSI-centered approach across all domains. A conceptual model of HSI is illustrated in Figure
1-2 (U.S. Air Force, undated).
STRUCTURE OF THIS REPORT

This report contains five chapters. This chapter provided an overview of the ATSS job and the
context in which it is performed; it also introduces the HSI framework, which guided the committee’s
considerations. Chapter 2 discusses inputs received from stakeholders related to the variables that should
be included in a staffing model for the ATSS job. It also contains a more detailed synopsis of the com-
mittee’s understanding of the role of ATSS personnel. Chapter 3 presents criteria and characteristics of
good staffing models in general and in particular as they apply to ATSS personnel. In Chapter 4, the
committee evaluates past FAA staffing models according to the criteria discussed. Chapter 5 concludes
with a discussion of the steps the FAA needs to transition to a future model that conforms to the com-
mittee’s recommendations.

FIGURE 1-2 A conceptual model of human-systems integration.

SOURCE: U.S. Air Force, undated.

Work Environment Considerations for

The job duties and work environment for Airway Transportation Systems Specialists (ATSS) pres-
ent special challenges and issues that should be addressed by an effective staffing model for ATSS.
By reviewing documents related to the job of the ATSS personnel and considering the perspectives of
a wide array of stakeholders, including the systems specialists themselves, the committee identified
several critical factors affecting demand for systems specialists that result not only from the unusual
requirements of this particular job series but also from the demands placed on incumbents in the job by
the external aviation environment.
This chapter first reviews factors related to the current design of the ATSS job that will have a
direct bearing on staffing. It then reviews the information obtained from systems specialists and various
stakeholder groups, from presentations and documents, and from a public webpage for collecting com-
ments related to the tasks ATSS personnel perform and to other demands on their time. The criteria for
effective performance as well as the consequences of failure are discussed. The chapter also contains an
overview of other major factors that should be considered as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
develops models to guide the systems specialist staffing process.
OVERVIEW
ATSS personnel are assigned to the Technical Operations branch of the FAA’s Air Traffic Organiza-
tion and are deployed across the United States as they maintain elements of the National Airspace Sys-
tem (NAS). ATSS employees can be collocated where concentrations of facilities and equipment reside
or in teams that travel to support NAS components widely scattered throughout their geographic areas
of responsibility. The NAS itself is divided into three major geographic service areas for the purpose
of equipment maintenance: Eastern, Central, and Western. As Figure 2-1 shows, within each of these
three areas, ATSS personnel are assigned to System Support Centers (SSCs) and support five types of
work sites within Technical Operations: Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCCs), Terminal Radar
19

of
FIGURE 2-1 Overview of the Technical Operations organization.

SOURCE: Rich McCormick, director, Labor Analysis, FAA, ATSS Briefing for the National Academy of Sci-
ences. Presentation to the Committee on Staffing Needs of Systems Specialists in Aviation, October 19, 2012. All
disciplines, including NAVAIDs (navigational aids), are explained in the section on Discipline Types and Staff
Substitution.
Approach Control (TRACON) facilities, Core Airports,1 the General National Airspace System (GNAS),
and Service Operation Centers/Operations Control Centers (SOCs/OCCs). 2
ATSS personnel certify equipment and services to ensure the safety and performance of the NAS.
To accomplish this responsibility, ATSS personnel perform two major functions: (1) scheduled preven-
tive maintenance activities, including inspections to ensure continued certification of equipment as well
as the installation and certification of new equipment; and (2) unscheduled, corrective maintenance and
subsequent certification of repaired equipment, often on an emergency basis when equipment fails (FAA,
2011a). A third, ancillary function is the supervision of both installation of new equipment and decom-
missioning of old equipment. The GNAS work site typically has the lead for these activities, but the
SSCs at the TRACON facilities and ARTCCs support these activities as well. There are other required
tasks and activities—for example, training, administrative duties, and recordkeeping.
1The FAA uses the term “Core” for a list of approximately 30 high-activity airports. For example, “the 30 CORE air-
ports presently handle 63 percent of the country’s passengers and 68 percent of its operations” according to discussions
recorded in Federal Register 77(119) (Wednesday, June 20, 2012). Available: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-06-20/
html/2012-14893.htm [June 2013].
2Rich McCormick, director, Labor Analysis, FAA. ATSS Briefing for the National Academy of Sciences. Presentation to the
Committee on Staffing Needs of Systems Specialists in Aviation, October 19, 2012

WORK ENVIRONMENT CONSIDERATIONS FOR AIRWAY TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS SPECIALISTS 21
Based on observations of task performance, it is clear that ATSS personnel rely on highly developed
skills for many tasks. In addition, ATSS personnel rely on reasoning at the rule-based level (e.g., fol-
lowing a written procedure for preventive maintenance on radar) and the knowledge-based level (e.g.,
understanding why an out-of-specification reading is occurring) (Rasmussen, 1983). The former requires
valid procedure descriptions, while the latter needs both good equipment documentation (e.g., schemat-
ics, wiring diagrams) and detailed knowledge and reasoning ability on the part of the ATSS personnel.
The overarching goal of ATSS personnel is to maximize the availability of equipment and facilities in
good working order in the NAS by performing these two functions—scheduled activities and corrective
maintenance (FAA, 2011a).3 Minimizing failures and reducing the time to repair and certify equipment
are high priorities because equipment failure prevents achievement of this goal.
Scheduled preventive maintenance reduces the probability of equipment failure. Presumably there
is an optimal amount of preventive maintenance that, for a given total staffing cost, will minimize down
time or, conversely, maximize availability. The timing of most equipment failure cannot be anticipated
with certainty. When extensive historical reliability data such as “mean time between failures” exist,
some general predictions about the time frames for failure may be possible. Because the personnel who
conduct the scheduled preventive maintenance are likely to be the same staff who respond to unan-
ticipated failures, corrective maintenance can often be addressed at the same time as an unanticipated
failure. However, the extent to which the preventive and corrective maintenance occur together requires
further examination.
Discipline Types and Staff Substitutions

ATSS work requires expertise in specialties including electromechanical environmental control
systems, power generation, automation, and electronics maintenance. As a result, most ATSS person-
nel specialize in one or more of the five recognized disciplines in the series explained in the following
quotations from the FAA National Airspace Capital Investment Plan (FAA, 2011b) and from a recent
job posting on the Electronic Technicians Association website:
Communication: “Communication between pilots and controllers is an essential element of air traffic
control. Pilots and controllers normally use [VHF/UHF] radios for communication, and because en
route control sectors cover areas that extend beyond direct radio range, remotely located radio sites are
used to provide extended coverage. The controller activates radios at these sites and ground telecom-
munication lines carry the information exchange to and from air traffic control facilities. If ground
links are not available, communication satellite links can be used to connect pilots with controllers.
Backup systems are always available to provide continued ability to maintain communications when
the primary systems fail.” (FAA, 2011b:43)
Surveillance: “To provide separation services to aircraft, air traffic controllers must have an accurate
display of all aircraft under their control. Controller displays use a variety of inputs, including radar and
transponder information, to show the location of aircraft. Surveillance data are provided by the follow-
ing technologies: Primary radar—The radar beam is reflected off the aircraft back to the radar receiver;
Secondary radar—A reply is generated by the aircraft transponder back to the radar in response to a
radar signal; Multi-lateration—Multiple ground sensors receive aircraft transponder signals allowing
triangulation for position; and Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast—Aircraft determines its
location using GPS and broadcasts that information. Automation systems process radar data and other
inputs and send it to the displays. En route facilities use the Air Route Surveillance Radar (ARSR), and
3Mike Perrone, president, Professional Aviation Safety Specialists, AFL-CIO, presentation to the Committee on Staffing
Needs of Systems Specialists in Aviation, December 6, 2012.

terminal facilities use Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR) as primary radars. The ARSR and ASR radars
are primary because they do not require a cooperative transmission from an aircraft to detect and track
its location. En route and terminal facilities normally use secondary radars called the Air Traffic Control
Beacon Interrogators (ATCBI) and Mode Select (Mode S) for traffic separation. Secondary radar sends
a signal to aircraft equipped with a transponder. The transponder sends a reply, which can be processed
to determine the aircraft call sign, altitude, speed, and its position. Using ATCBI or Mode S enhances
the controller’s ability to separate traffic because flight and altitude information supplement the position
display for each aircraft.” (FAA, 2011b:49)
Navaid: “There are two major types of navigational aids: those used for en route navigation, and those
used for precision approach and landing guidance. The en route aids have traditionally been radio trans-
mitters that provide pilots direction and/or distance from their location. The ground based system com-
monly used for en route navigation is the Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range with Distance
Measuring Equipment (VOR with DME). There are more than 1,000 VORs spread across the United
States. They enable pilots to determine an accurate position and also define the Victor and Jet airways,
which are published routes based on straight lines from VOR to VOR. Airways simplify route planning
and provide predictability for air traffic controllers who often must project an aircraft’s future position to
avoid conflicts. Pilots use VOR/DME to follow their planned routes accurately under all visibility condi-
tions” (FAA, 2011b:54). . . .
“Precision landing guidance systems and associated equipment support low-visibility operations by pro-
viding radio signals and approach lights to help pilots land safely in limited visibility. The current most
widely-used precision landing aids are Instrument Landing Systems (ILS) that guide pilots to runway
ends using a pair of radio beams—one for lateral guidance and the other for vertical guidance—to define
the approach glidepath—so that pilots can follow it to the runway using cockpit instrumentation. There
are more than 1,200 ILSs installed in the United States.” (FAA, 2011b:54)
Automation: “Automation is a core element of the air traffic control system. Controllers require a real-
time display of aircraft location as well as information about the operating characteristics of aircraft they
are tracking—such as speed and altitude—to keep the approximately 50,000 flights safely separated
every day. Automation gives controllers continuously updated displays of aircraft position, identification,
speed, and altitude as well as whether the aircraft is level, climbing, or descending. Automation systems
can also continue to show an aircraft’s track when there is a temporary loss of surveillance information.
It does this by calculating an aircraft’s ground speed and then uses it to project an aircraft’s future posi-
tion.” (FAA, 2011b:36)
Environmental: ATSS work on power generation on airfield and ARTCC and TRACON facilities, and
lights used for landing aircraft. Primary responsibilities relate to “the installation, maintenance, modifi-
cation and certification of ENVIRONMENTAL and lighted navigational aids systems and services such
as: Precision approach Path Indicator, Visual Approach Slope Indicator, Approach Lighting System with
Sequenced Flashing Lights, Runway End Identification Lights, Runway Status Lights, Engine Generators,
transfer switches, heating ventilating and air conditioning, and knowledge of the national electric code.”
(Electronic Technicians Association, 2013)
Although safe and effective operation of the NAS requires staffing in all of the above disciplines
nationwide, the type of organization in which an ATSS works affects the specific skills required of that
individual ATSS.4 Although the ATSS job description is broad-based, in actual practice individuals may
operate within the primary discipline of their work site, even if the member has multiple certifications.
When developing a staffing model to describe required staff size or allocating staff, care should be taken
4Rich
McCormick, director, Labor Analysis, FAA. ATSS Briefing for the National Academy of Sciences. Presentation to the
Committee on Staffing Needs of Systems Specialists in Aviation, October 19, 2012.

TABLE 2-1 Percentage of 2101 Disciplines Represented by Location

Discipline 2101 Code ARTCC TRACON Core GNAS SOC/OCCa
Automation Auto 34 26 0 0 0
Communications Comm 28 21 1 0 0
Environmental Env 30 33 19 1 0
Navigational Aid Nav 0 0 4 1 0
Radar Rad 0 0 11 2 0
Multi-discipline (2) M2 4 16 46 7 0
Multi-discipline (3) M3 3 4 10 5 0
Multi-discipline (4 or 5) M4 1 0 8 84 0
Unknown 0 0 0 0 100
Total Percentage 100 100 100 100 100
aThe SOC/OCC disciplines are shown as 100 percent unknown because a recent personnel survey has not been conducted
for the SOCs/OCCs.
SOURCE: FAA Data Extract from existing FAA information management systems, Rich McCormick, director, Labor Analysis,
FAA. January 18, 2013. This is a snapshot of actual discipline distribution in a given past point in time; it does not necessarily
reflect the required discipline distribution.
not to automatically assume that any ATSS employee is skilled across most or all disciplines. Accord-
ing to the information provided to the committee, specialization and work in a particular discipline are
more common in the ARTCCs and TRACON facilities. ATSS personnel assigned to Core Airports and
GNAS facilities tend to be skilled in two or more disciplines.5 Thus, a valid model should determine
ATSS needs by skill area at each location and work site. In some locations, there may be value in con-
sidering multi-disciplined staffing, particularly in smaller work sites. The committee recognized very
early in its study that ATSS job incumbents (even experienced, expert ATSS personnel) are clearly not
interchangeable commodities and therefore cannot not be treated in that manner in a staffing model.
Equipment integral to the NAS can only be certified by ATSS technicians who are trained and
certified to work on that equipment. Because of certification requirements, ATSS personnel are not
interchangeable. In practice, however, especially in small, understaffed, or remote locations, an avail-
able or conveniently located ATSS employee may perform maintenance work under the direction of a
certified technician, and the work will be certified when the certified ATSS employee is available. Table
2-1 shows how ATSS personnel are distributed across disciplines and facilities. The table also indicates
the percentage of ATSS personnel who are able to work in multiple disciplines.
Many Technical Operations work sites are organized and staffed by facility function and discipline.
For example, ATSS personnel in SSCs serving TRACON facilities and ARTCCs maintain equipment
that is associated with the particular facility and almost entirely housed within the compound of that
facility. However, both TRACON facilities and ARTCCs depend on pieces of equipment in remote
areas—outside the compounds of major facilities—that must be maintained. Because the number of
individual pieces of equipment that are located outside of the TRACON and ARTCC facilities is small,
ATSS personnel are not typically assigned to those remote locations for reasons of economy. Instead,
5In Table 2-1, note the specialization and depth at the ARTCC and TRACON locations as compared to use of more multi-
discipline personnel at the Core Airports and GNAS locations.

FIGURE 2-2 A mapping of 8,505 of the 66,749 facilities and equipment locations across the NAS.
SOURCE: Department of Transportation, 2012.
staff in the GNAS and other work sites must travel to these locations to provide maintenance. Thus,
unlike a TRACON facility or ARTCC, the GNAS offices may serve as a location from which ATSS
personnel stage their work and may not have on-site NAS facilities or equipment. Approximately 2,800
members of the 2101-series are assigned to 190 GNAS offices.6 Typically, ATSS personnel assigned
to a Core Airport work on the grounds of that airport; however, some equipment (e.g., radar) may be
located short distances from the airport grounds. Similarly, ATSS personnel assigned to a SOC/OCC
usually work on that property. Figure 2-2 illustrates the nationwide distribution of NAS equipment and
indicates the relative concentration of equipment requiring service.
Beyond the need for certified personnel (by discipline, by work area, and by geographic area), staff-
ing the ATSS job series is complicated by the difficulty of planning the work itself. While there are very
predictable factors associated with the work requirements for any one ATSS employee at a given loca-
tion (for example, preventive maintenance schedules are well-defined), there are also events that occur
unpredictably (for example, corrective maintenance required by equipment failure). Further complicating
the planning task is the need to maintain required standards, so local management establishes “watch”
schedules to ensure the availability of appropriately qualified staff at all required times. 7 The committee
understands that there are limited reliable data available that address the relative time spent (again, by
discipline and by work area) between these types of tasks (i.e., preventive and corrective maintenance).
Thus, planning for ATSS time cannot currently be based on accurate records of past activities.
6Personal communication from Rich McCormick, director, Labor Analysis, FAA, to staff, January 18, 2013. Subject line:
“Tech Ops Headcount.”

7Mike Perrone, president, Professional Aviation Safety Specialists, AFL-CIO, presentation to the Committee on Staffing
Needs of Systems Specialists in Aviation, December 6, 2012.

Evolving Systems and Services

ATSS personnel currently maintain a wide array of equipment and are likely to do so for a consider-
able time to come. The FAA is continually upgrading equipment to facilitate efficiency and safety of the
airways as well as to reduce maintenance requirements, and ATSS personnel have to work effectively
with the new or reconfigured equipment and with the older equipment that remains in place. In many
instances, the changes in equipment are aimed at increasing system reliability. Over time, software has
increased in importance, changing the skill set needed by ATSS personnel but also allowing, for example,
more remote control or reconfiguration of equipment (GAO, 2010).
The FAA’s Next Generation (NextGen) expects to overhaul the NAS comprehensively, based on a
series of continual improvements and upgrades.8 As equipment improvements are being made, the FAA
also plans to decommission obsolete or nonfunctioning equipment. In order to properly model the ATSS
workload and tasks, accurate information is needed about which systems are active, which will no longer
be required, and which will be added.9 In addition, the time frames for new installations and decommis-
sioning will be required. Although the committee received briefing and information on NextGen, it was
not given the actual schedules for installing new equipment and decommissioning older equipment and
was not able to conclusively reflect on the specific details of NextGen and their implications for ATSS
staffing. However, for the purposes of this report, the point is not the precise schedule for NextGen
transitions but rather the importance of taking into account changes to the NAS components and their
impact on staffing needs in future models. In regard to a decommissioning policy, the committee was
told that Technical Operations is working toward developing a more comprehensive document that will
address a national decommissioning process.10
One outcome of the NextGen implementation could be an eventual decrease in the workload for
ATSS personnel overall because there will be fewer ground-based systems to maintain and the replace-
ment systems are expected to have higher reliability than current systems. However, legacy systems will
remain as critical elements of the NAS during the transition and beyond. 11 For example, some radar
systems are likely to be maintained for national security reasons as backup in the event of satellite failure.
As a result, it is highly likely that the workload demands on ATSS personnel will increase (thus increas-
ing the staffing requirements) for some period of time until the removal of the legacy equipment offsets
the demands of the new systems (GAO, 2010). Considering all of these factors, the committee believes
that challenges will exist in staffing individual locations with the right mix of certified personnel in the
proper disciplines, even if a perfect staffing model for the ATSS job series as a whole could be created.
8Steve Bradford, chief scientist, Architecture & NextGen Development, FAA, presentation on the Next Generation Air Traffic
Management System to the Committee on Staffing Needs of Systems Specialists in Aviation, December 6, 2012.
9Dynamic, up-to-date lists of equipment, facilities, and services can be vital ingredients in modeling the current workforce
requirement. The out-year estimates or timelines for adding, removing, or modifying within the system are vital for prediction
of out-year workforce requirements. In the Air Force, when major systems acquisitions are to be added to the inventory, an
official Manpower Estimate Report is mandated as part of the process, and this report can be a basis for out-year budgeting of
manpower (U.S. Air Force, 2011). Similar estimates or modules to be added to a staffing model could help the FAA predict
future needs.
10Personal communication from Rich McCormick to committee staff, March 22, 2013, regarding decommissioning.
11Steve Bradford, chief scientist, Architecture & NextGen Development, FAA, presentation on the Next Generation Air
Traffic Management System to the Committee on Staffing Needs of Systems Specialists in Aviation, December 6, 2012.

ACKNOWLEDGED PROBLEM AREAS IN THE ATSS WORK ENVIRONMENT

Throughout the data-gathering process, multiple stakeholder representatives expressed some con-
sistent concerns that the committee agrees are problem areas within the ATSS work environment. These
problem areas need to be addressed in whatever staffing model is developed.
First, current staffing levels are not optimal at all locations and in all disciplines. That is, the overall
staffing level for ATSS of 6,100, which is specified in the collective bargaining agreement between the
FAA and the Professional Aviation Safety Specialists (PASS) represents a negotiated compromise (GAO,
2010; Professional Airways Systems Specialists, 2000). Even if this were an optimal total number, there
is some level of consensus between staff and management that the distribution of ATSS personnel by
discipline and by work area needs to be improved.
Second, there seems to be agreement among FAA management and ATSS personnel that the process
in place for hiring, training, and certifying new ATSS personnel is not optimal. In many instances, Tech-
nical Operations will hire a new employee and will then have to request a sufficient quota through the
“annual call for training” to train that employee at the centralized facility. The training branch may not
have budgeted for the additional training classes or have space for an additional student. If the training
slot is not granted, then the employee has to wait for space to become available, which can take many
months. After returning from training, there are also issues with availability of appropriate staff to con-
duct required on-the-job training (OJT) that leads to certification because it may be difficult to take a
journeyman technician away from assigned work on the NAS to complete the new employee’s training.
Some ATSS personnel are frustrated by the requirement to train new employees if limited staffing levels
require that they delay their NAS-related work.12
A third problem area is that, because new hires may require 4 to 18 months to become certified in
a single discipline, these new hires will not be one-for-one substitutes for certified staff and will not
be able to contribute as much to accomplishing the maintenance workload as certified staff. Although
noncertified ATSS personnel can work on certain components to alleviate some of the workload pres-
sures of those who are certified, before the equipment returns to service a certified specialist must review
the work performed and certify the equipment. The committee was told that there is an ongoing effort
to adjust the hiring system to address these training delays (i.e., planning for even-flow hiring), which
should address the need to have a scheduled flow of new employees into the NAS maintenance system.
Nevertheless, the committee remains concerned that this adjustment does not address the need to have
adequate specialized training classes on the equipment requiring certification. Reliance on a manual
system referred to as the “annual call” impairs the ability of the agency to be adequately prepared to
train the right number of people in the appropriate training classes, specifically those requiring certifi-
cation.13 Thus, it appears that certain human-systems integration (HSI) domains such as Personnel and
Training (U.S. Air Force, undated) represent concurrent challenges that require continued exploration
and analysis, even as the FAA seeks to create a robust ATSS manpower model.
The varying travel and environmental issues specific to NAS locations represent additional factors
that the committee consistently heard identified as complicating the development of a staffing model.
For example, ATSS personnel at some locations are required to maintain equipment that is located a
significant distance from their typical work location,14 although, to minimize the overall impact of travel
12Comments submitted to the Staffing Needs of Systems Specialists in Aviation Stakeholder webpage, 2013.
13Vaughn Turner, vice president, Technical Operations, FAA, comment to the Committee on Staffing Needs of Systems
Specialists in Aviation, January 24, 2013.
14Mike Perrone, president, PASS, AFL-CIO, presentation to the Committee on Staffing Needs of Systems Specialists in
Aviation, December 6, 2012.

time, ATSS personnel try to plan their remote visits to perform several tasks in one trip to the remote
site. In addition to distance, there are specific accessibility issues present for some ATSS tasks at some
locations. For example, the equipment may be located in an area that is not convenient to major roads
or in an area that requires travel through hazardous terrain or severe inclement weather. In an extreme
example, a piece of equipment located on a mountain top in winter can require several days of snow
clearance to provide ATSS access to even begin the required task (Grant Thornton, 2012). Where travel
and environmental challenges are significant, they should be documented and considered in tailoring
features of a model.
Needs Identified by ATSS Stakeholders

ATSS job incumbents served as one major source of information for the committee. The committee
gathered this information through presentations by representatives from the FAA and PASS, through
visits to ATSS job sites, and through stakeholder comments posted by ATSS personnel on a webpage
the committee established for this purpose. The committee’s summary of ATSS stakeholder perspectives
is categorized around the following issues:
• Training issues
• Training impacts on workload
• Watch schedules and shift assignments
• Equipment issues
• Other issues
Training Issues
Training progression for an ATSS is not a continuous, uninterrupted process that leads to certification
in a predictable fashion, in part because staffing levels play a major role in the availability of a techni-
cian (and the relevant supervisory personnel) to be released for resident training at the Mike Monroney
Aeronautical Center in Oklahoma City. Thus, supervisors and technicians must balance training goals
with workload assignments. Furthermore, student quotas for resident classes are driven by the training
academy’s budget, so availability and access are limited.15 For example, an ATSS trainee may have to
wait months for a resident training slot (itself potentially lasting many months). This resident training
is required before the OJT, which leads to eventual certification, can commence. Further, in most cases,
resident training is not completed in one contiguous block of time; an ATSS trainee may have to make
multiple trips to Oklahoma City to complete a sequence of courses.16 However, if the trainee’s primary
duties have priority and substitute personnel are unavailable, a return to training can be put on hold
for many months. Other forms of training, including equipment manufacturer training, computer-based
instruction, and online training, also take technicians away from their primary duties in maintaining and
repairing the equipment in the NAS.17
Nontechnical training requirements also limit the availability of ATSS trainees. Nontechnical training
includes security training, training involving human resources requirements, and required safety train-
ing. This safety training involves topics such as electrical safety, climbing, working in confined spaces,
hazardous materials, and more. In addition, nontechnical training can include mandated training in equal
16Ibid.
17Ibid.

employment opportunity or other training that may be related to the introduction of a new agency policy
or a change in an existing policy. This type of training is generally directed from the headquarters level
with a high priority and short deadlines for completion.18
Training Impacts on Workload

Many of the skills that ATSS personnel require are acquired by formal OJT or by shadowing certified
staffing specialists. When a new technician returns from training, establishing an effective relationship
between a journeyman technician and the new technician to complete OJT and the certification process
is a critical task. Although some journeymen embrace the opportunity to teach new hires and make an
effort to provide good training and mentorship, others see it as an unwelcome addition to their workload.
The latter attitude could lead to less than effective OJT for some technicians.
Staffing levels may also prevent an effective mentorship between experienced technicians and newly
trained technicians because the journeyman might not have time to provide OJT. Technicians do receive
training to qualify as OJT instructors; however, this training falls short of what is needed to become
good trainers and mentors for the new employees.19 Finally, although an ATSS may complete training
assignments and be certified—a process that can take 3 to 5 years20—this journeyman level of profi-
ciency is not a substitute for the skills of veteran workers. Until technicians have developed extensive
on-the-job experience, their work requires a relatively high level of supervision and oversight. 21 That is,
until a trainee technician is certified, that technician cannot independently maintain, restore to service,
or certify elements of the NAS (tasks that are the highest priorities for ATSS personnel), even though
the trainee is being counted as one of the staff assigned to the facility.
In addition, the time a journeyman technician uses to provide formal OJT or proctor certification
exams for technicians-in-training can conflict with higher priority work on NAS equipment. This conflict
delays both completion of training and certification of the new employee, as well as scheduled preven-
tive maintenance.22 Thus, the training phase affects workload in two ways: by decreasing the effective
number of certified technicians at a facility and by increasing the workload of certified technicians who
maintain the NAS.
Watch Schedules and Shift Assignments

For each of its facilities, the FAA provides guidance on the number and type of ATSS employees
required on each shift throughout the day. This number could change on an hourly basis, depending
on the amount of air traffic expected. This coverage requirement then guides the formulation of the
basic watch schedule, which shows the weekdays and daily hours when coverage is required and also
includes provisions for shift rotations as well as employees’ regular days off. 23 The FAA has conducted
risk assessments of some facilities to determine how to utilize the available employees most effectively.


22Ibid.

However, these risk assessments only address the impact to the NAS if a facility or service becomes
inoperable and there is insufficient staffing to immediately respond. They do not change the magnitude
or nature of the work required to restore service. In risk assessment terms, if the inoperable facility can
be backed up by a nearby facility, then the repair response can be effectively delayed and the impact to
the NAS is minimal. Based partly on these assessments, watch schedules frequently change to provide
coverage of inadequately staffed facilities.24
A risk assessment is completed with many factors being considered, including hours of operation
of the airport and surrounding needs of the user. In addition, they are always completed in conjunction
with the Air Traffic Operations personnel who are the most familiar with equipment usage and system
demands (FAA, 2011a). For example, although a small facility in an area with other facilities nearby
may be most effectively served by coverage around the clock, every day (24/7), a risk assessment could
conclude that a maintenance problem would not significantly affect the NAS because of redundancy in
the nearby systems. The FAA might then reduce the coverage to 16 hours a day with call-back respon-
sibilities. Thus, for 8 hours of each day, there will be minimal or no staff at the facility and employees
would need to be called in for emergencies. Some stakeholders believe that this policy focuses too
strongly on efficiency while potentially undermining effectiveness. 25
Equipment Issues
Because of the varied equipment inventory of the NAS (e.g., communications, navigation, surveil-
lance, environmental, and automation equipment), a typical ATSS employee may be responsible for
three or more highly complex systems. Currently, it is common for an ATSS to be expected to be a
“jack of all trades”—that is, a technician who is able to respond to equipment needs across multiple
systems.26 This issue was affirmed by comments submitted in the stakeholder feedback. 27 Management
in each individual service area must consider the diversity and complexity of the equipment inventory
and have the necessary numbers of ATSS personnel with the required training and skills to respond to
the maintenance and repair needs in that area.
Upgrades, equipment changes, and reconfigurations of existing equipment are frequent and typically
involve both hardware and software changes, resulting in new skill requirements for ATSS personnel,
particularly in the use of software to maintain and reconfigure equipment. Because ATSS employees are
the sole personnel authorized to certify and maintain the NAS and its components (including installing,
testing, troubleshooting, repairing, and certifying all radar, communications, navigational aids, airport
lighting, and backup power systems), realizing value from the approximately $20 billion per year invest-
ment in the FAA hinges significantly on this group of technicians.
The committee also noted that the demands of training and equipment modifications are interrelated.
When equipment is updated or replaced, technicians must acquire the skills through training on the new
equipment. For example, updates to the Critical and Essential Power System at an ARTCC will require
every Environmental Support Unit (ESU) technician at that facility to attend training in Oklahoma City.
The absence of one technician for the several weeks required to complete this training could significantly
affect the staffing levels and watch coverage requirement. Thus, facilities that are already understaffed
may not be able to staff coverage requirements during periods of intensive training on new equipment.
24Ibid.
25Ibid.

Other Issues That Impact the Workload and Staffing of ATSS Personnel
Safety protocols place additional constraints on ATSS personnel workload and their availability.
FAA technical manuals often direct that, for safety reasons, tasks may not be performed without at least
two ATSS personnel being present.28 Working on high-voltage equipment, climbing on ladders, travel
to remote sites under hazardous weather conditions, and rotating shifts at high-impact facilities that are
staffed around the clock are all tasks that require multiple technicians. For example, ESU technicians
work on mechanical and electrical equipment (e.g., batteries, chillers, generators) that require two tech-
nicians for safety reasons. In addition to the regular preventive maintenance on that equipment, ESU
technicians must be available to restore the Critical Power Distribution System without delay if it goes
down.29 Although in theory 7 ESU technicians could staff a facility with 24/7 coverage requirements,
the added requirement that 2 technicians must work on some equipment increases the required mini-
mum number of staff in that discipline to 14, if certified managers are not available to work in situations
requiring two workers.
Travel time to remote facilities, which can be up to 200 miles distant, can further limit the availability
of a technician to perform scheduled maintenance and potentially increase the time a system remains out
of service. Technicians are dispatched from an SSC to remote sites, so managers and technicians must
manage travel time along with scheduling the work itself. The committee was told that overnight travel
for preventive maintenance might not be budgeted, so when ATSS personnel travel to a remote loca-
tion that is several hours away, they must return to their home facility at the end of each day and drive
multiple times to the location to finish the maintenance depending on the manager’s discretion with the
budget. Consistently providing a budget for hotel and meal costs could allow the preventive maintenance
to be completed more quickly and allow more tasks to be completed because less time would be spent
driving.30 When the budget or the staffing does not allow for either of these options, then the efficiency
and effectiveness of maintenance of the NAS could be compromised.
Leaves of absence also limit the availability of ATSS personnel. Some examples include family medi-
cal leave or service in the military reserves, which can leave facilities with significant staffing shortages
for long periods of time. A number of ATSS personnel serve in the military reserves and are called on
to fulfill commitments ranging from weekend service to long-term deployment, although the number of
ATSS personnel who have military obligations and the timing of those obligations is not always known. 31
The committee learned that, although the FAA did not know the total number of ATSS personnel serving
in the military reserves, it does know the number who have taken leave to serve. While commitment
of ATSS personnel to military service should be commended, management at facilities will have some
uncertainty in planning schedules, given this lack of knowledge about the number, duration, and timing
of these commitments and the unpredictability of current and future military conflicts.
Many other factors have an effect on workload. Many are small, but in aggregate they create sig-
nificant demands on the ATSS workload. One such factor affecting availability is worker fatigue. For
example, if a technician were to work excessive amounts of overtime, that individual might experience
chronic fatigue to a level that would jeopardize effectiveness and safety. It is always wise to thoroughly
explore and understand the use of overtime, a possible contributing factor to fatigue, when assessing
28Ibid.
29Ibid.

31Personal communication on numbers of personnel in the military reserves from Rich McCormick to the Committee on
Staffing Needs of Systems Specialists in Aviation, February 12, 2013.

required staffing levels. Article 47 of the current PASS/FAA labor agreement discusses overtime rules
and considerations. In response to a committee request for data on overtime, the FAA provided data on
the use of ATSS overtime during fiscal year 2012. It showed that only 15 percent of ATSS personnel had
no overtime in the year, 50 percent used less than 50 hours, 20 percent used between 50 and 100 hours,
and 3 percent had greater than 250 hours of overtime in that year.32 Continued analyses of documented/
undocumented overtime should be undertaken, usually during the familiarization phase of a model effort
(see Chapter 3), and it should be monitored after model implementation. The FAA provided a manage-
ment plan to mitigate fatigue and its consequent hazards (FAA, 2012b). Although making and enforcing
rules increases the safety of the workers and of the NAS, those actions potentially reduce the available
technician resource. A related factor is the effect that frustrating and annoying circumstances may have
on ATSS personnel and their morale and stress levels. These factors in turn affect other factors that may
have a significant effect on workload. For example, to the extent that morale has an impact on turnover,
a chain of events starting with inability to get training when needed could result in higher turnover.
Another of these factors is administrative tasks; the committee found that a technician’s workload can
be increased by the need to respond to ad hoc requests for such things as spare parts inventories, vehicle
surveys, etc.33
Needs Identified by Other Stakeholders

The committee found that there are multiple stakeholders with an interest in ATSS staffing. To ensure
that the committee had an opportunity to consider the views of stakeholders, the National Research
Council established a webpage that allowed for comments as well as an opportunity to upload longer
documents relating to one or more of four subject areas: Equipment, Training, Workload, and Models. In
addition, respondents could choose None of the Above. Although the committee does not know the exact
participation rate for the comments, the primary stakeholders (see Table 1‑1) were contacted and asked
to advertise the comments webpage to their constituents. The webpage did not require the respondents
to include their job title, but most indicated that they worked for the FAA or a specific Technical Opera-
tions facility. The committee received 168 responses through this webpage for stakeholder input, the vast
majority of which were posted by ATSS employees. By subject area, the leading issue was Workload
(138) followed by Training (99), Equipment (76), and Models (21). The committee’s inspection and
interpretation of the associated written comments yielded a broadly similar emphasis—Insufficient Staff-
ing Level (93), Training Issues (21), Poor Staffing Distribution (8), Appropriate Staffing Level (7), and
Miscellany (19). The broad themes of comments in the Insufficient Staffing Level designation included
a perceived high manager-to-technician ratio and weaknesses of the staffing methods based upon allo-
cation per facility, but the dominant issue was excessive workload demands. Comments designated as
Appropriate Staffing Level generally expressed present satisfaction but included concerns for the future,
given as yet unspecified new demands from NextGen, as well as sequestration cutbacks. The Miscellany
comments ranged from suggested best practices to skepticism about the National Research Council’s
study process.34
32Personal communication on ATSS overtime from Rich McCormick to the Committee on Staffing Needs of Systems Spe-
cialists in Aviation, January 2013.



MAJOR DRIVERS BEHIND ATSS STAFFING NEEDS
The Next Generation Air Transportation System

The FAA currently employs slightly fewer than 6,100 ATSS personnel, who are responsible for
approximately 65,000 individual facilities and equipment that collectively define the NAS (Department
of Transportation, 2012; FAA, 2012c). The principal driver behind ATSS staffing has been the need to
maintain or oversee an extensive system of ground-based navigational, communications, environmental,
and surveillance equipment. Although the largely satellite-based NextGen opens the possibility, at least
in concept, of significantly reducing the existing inventory of ground-based navigation aids (e.g., Non-
Directional Beacon and Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range [VOR]), the FAA has concluded
that a reduced VOR-based navigation network will be required for the indefinite future in the event of
failure of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) (FAA, 2012d). This VOR Minimum Opera-
tional Network (MON) would comprise approximately half of the existing 967 stations, with virtually
no reductions in the western United States (FAA, 2012e). The MON will support non-GNSS guidance
to within 100 nautical miles of airports with Instrument Landing Systems or VOR approach procedures.
This network reduction, planned for completion by 2020, will be accomplished through a combination
of programmed decommissioning and nonrepair of failed units. 35 The continental U.S. Non-Directional
Beacon network is currently being reduced through attrition (Department of Commerce, 2008), with its
functionality compensated in part by GNSS-based approach procedures. As NextGen is not expected
to significantly decrease the current role of ATSS personnel across all disciplines, and it could increase
the complexity of some job tasks (GAO, 2010), the key question in anticipating ATSS staffing levels
to the year 2020 and beyond is the degree to which the decreased work demand from the reduction by
half of the VOR network will be offset or exceeded by the new demands of NextGen. In this regard, the
committee notes that no VOR reductions are currently planned for the Western U.S. Mountainous Area
(FAA, 2012e) where, in general, the least accessible VORs (e.g., on snowy mountaintops rather than
adjacent to runways) are located. Furthermore, the MON will continue to be NAS reportable, and thus
failure within the system will require immediate response by ATSS personnel.
As the FAA transitions to NextGen, decisions will be made on how to redeploy and potentially elimi-
nate staff associated with obsolete systems. The committee emphasizes that such planning is intrinsically
risky, as unproven technology can thwart even the most judicious prognosticator. A relevant example of
such unintended consequences arose when rollout of the En Route Automation Modernization system
was delayed by four years, during which time the FAA reduced resources and eliminated training on the
legacy equipment that the new system was replacing (GAO, 2012). Lastly, the FAA has not yet publicly
specified its comprehensive maintenance requirements for NextGen equipment. An effective staffing
model should go beyond documenting today’s required ATSS staffing levels; instead, a robust and acces-
sible staffing model should be capable of incorporating such additional inputs as they become available,
not only with respect to NextGen but also with respect to inevitable continuing technological advances.
Finding 2-1: Changes to the NAS such as NextGen and MON implementation and unspecified decom-
missioning policies all make the amount of work to be performed by ATSS personnel ambiguous and
complicate the FAA’s task in developing an appropriate staffing model for ATSS.

Conclusion 2-1: Developing and using a successful staffing model to predict future outcomes will be
limited by unknowns such as decommissioning policies for legacy equipment, installation of NextGen
equipment, and consolidation of facilities.
Recommendation 2-1: The FAA should ensure that ATSS staffing models will incorporate new infor-
mation about the unknown factors that affect ATSS staffing such as NextGen as it becomes available,
consider their staffing implications, and use appropriate modeling techniques to plan for contingencies.
Aging Workforce and Succession Planning

A critical potential instability in secure maintenance of the NAS is the large number of ATSS per-
sonnel who are at or nearing retirement eligibility.36 In a 2010 report, the GAO found that 23 percent
of ATSS personnel would be eligible for retirement by 2012, 31 percent by 2015, and more than 50
percent by 2020. Extrapolating from recent retirements, they estimated that the FAA could face more
than 500 retirements in fiscal year (FY) 2015 and about 900 in FY 2020 (GAO, 2010). Although not all
the ATSS personnel eligible to retire are likely to do so in the year they become eligible (and there is no
mandatory retirement age; FAA, 2012f), this potential instability in staff has been exacerbated by the
limitations imposed by the 6,100 ATSS staffing agreement. Because it is sometimes interpreted (errone-
ously) as a ceiling on personnel numbers, this policy has had the effect of severely limiting succession
planning. For example, intensive recruitment of ATSS staff at the end of the FY is typically driven by
recent separations without accounting for the many years it takes to train and certify new technicians. 37
Both PASS and FAA officials acknowledged the nonoptimal consequences of this practice, and the
recently implemented even-flow hiring policy38 may perform significantly better at matching employee
recruitment and hiring to both current and future facility needs. The challenge of modeling future staffing
needs while maintaining and certifying the legacy equipment will continue until the phases of NextGen
implementation are known.
External Influences
The general trend toward outsourcing services that has influenced FAA staffing in several areas (e.g.,
contract towers) appears unlikely to impact ATSS staffing levels significantly because maintenance of
the NAS has been considered an “inherently governmental function,” which means it must be conducted
by government employees and not contractors (Office of Management and Budget, 2003). 39
The committee heard concerns expressed from both FAA management and technician representatives
that maintaining ATSS staffing levels in high cost-of-living regions is a constant challenge. Although
federal employment policies provide for a cost-of-living pay differential in high-cost areas, experience
indicates that the additional remuneration is not preventing a high rate of turnover in some areas. Fur-
thermore, the policy of permitting ATSS personnel to request transfers at any time during their assign-
ment (even allowing ATSS personnel to submit transfer requests on their first day at a location) is a
36The committee believes that attrition/accession models are best handled as separate human resource algorithms based upon
the staffing model targets.

39See discussion in Chapter 1.

continuing source of frustration to planning staffing allocation levels—particularly in high-cost areas. 40

Facilities in these areas sometimes pay for the technician’s training with the assumption that the new
hire will progress through certification and remain on staff, only to have the technician request a transfer
to a lower cost-of-living area as soon as training is completed. Although understandable, this practice
negatively affects management’s ability to schedule watch coverage over the long term. For example,
when a technician who has just completed certification requests a transfer and leaves the facility, the
next technician hired will have to undergo the training and certification process before being able to
work on the NAS without supervision, which could result in months of understaffing for the facility and
additional work for management and ATSS personnel.
Internal Influences
Consolidation of Facilities
The FAA has in some cases realized efficiencies and workplace synergies from collocating geo-
graphically separated facilities (e.g., the Southern California TRACON). In concert with NextGen, future
infrastructure improvements are aimed at consolidation of existing facilities into purpose-designed,
state-of-the-art complexes. For example, the planned New York Integrated Control Facility 41 would
combine both Terminal and En Route facilities that are currently controlled separately from the New
York TRACON in Suffolk County and the New York ARTCC in Nassau County, both on Long Island.
One consideration in choosing a site for relocation is available and inexpensive land, such as an exurban
or semirural site, to both minimize facility costs and provide an affordable environment for employees.
Although locating the new consolidated facility in either Nassau or Suffolk Counties might be expected
to cause minor dislocations to the technician staff, locating it to another location off Long Island may, in
the near and intermediate term, be substantially disruptive to the existing workforce and could stimulate
numerous staff relocations. Thus, an attempt to realize this sort of long-term cost savings needs to be
managed in a manner that minimizes alienation of ATSS staff, possibly by providing transitions staged
in discrete steps over several years.
New and Continuing Knowledge Demands

In individual discussions with ATSS personnel, some specialists reported that access to relevant
programs that extend or diversify their ability to become certified in multiple equipment types within
the NAS were limited by training quotas and travel budget shortfalls. These delays make it more difficult
to complete training progression programs. Also noted was that some training classes were not at a suf-
ficiently high technical level to be useful in the field. For example, a course might consist primarily of
equipment overviews, rather than more in-depth training on equipment operations. 42 This is particularly
true for ATSS personnel coming from military backgrounds who already have relevant knowledge and
skills. Staffing shortfalls that result in ATSS personnel not being able to take advantage of available
training were also noted by ATSS personnel as impediments to professional development. 43
40ATSS personnel comment to committee during site visits to FAA facilities at Leesburg and Dulles, Virginia.
41Austin Aurandt, acting manager, program management team, Air Traffic Control Facilities Directorate, AJW-2, FAA, pre-
sentation titled “Future Facilities” Program Overview to the Committee on Staffing Needs of Systems Specialists in Aviation,
December 6, 2012.
43Ibid.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS FOR AN ATSS STAFFING MODEL
Performance Measures
An important consideration for any staffing model is the effect that inadequate staffing has on the
goals of the organization. The ultimate measure of NAS performance is the availability of the equipment
and facilities in good working order. One such related measure cited to the committee was “Adjusted
Operational Availability,” defined as the ratio of the total time the NAS was fully operational (i.e., not
experiencing an outage) to the maximum time the NAS could have been fully operational over the time
frame measured, such as an FY (FAA, 2011c). This measure gives an idea of how much of the systems
and services were available to the NAS, but it subtracts out the planned nonavailability due to scheduled
maintenance. In FY 2011, the FAA set an Adjusted Operational Availability target of 99.7 percent and
achieved a level of 99.72 percent. The Adjusted Operational Availability measurement may present an
overly optimistic picture of NAS maintenance. For example, because the NAS includes redundant sys-
tems, true outages of the NAS rarely occur. So an outage in one system within the NAS may be masked
by another system providing the same functionality.
The FAA uses a myriad of internal measures and metrics to monitor performance as part of the NAS
Performance Analysis System. Many of these metrics are well worth exploring in relation to model-
ing the resources required to maintain various NAS standards.44 For example, there are intermediate
measures of performance that provide an indication of whether there is understaffing or overstaffing,
including scheduled maintenance backlog, staff overtime, and metrics that capture any temporary staff
supplements from other work sites or temporary reallocation of personnel in the work site to other duties.
Finally, the cost of a particular staffing level provides useful information for comparing alternatives and
assessing levels of performance risk.
Risk Assessments
From the HSI perspective, risk influences every step of the system development cycle (from defini-
tion to end-of-life). Risk is an expression of potential loss; the loss may be loss of life, loss of equipment
or property, loss of work days, loss of system or human functional capabilities, and/or other losses. Risk,
in most staffing contexts, refers to the interaction between the probability of a negative event or hazard
occurring and the severity of the consequences of the event or hazard. The expected value of the risk
is summarized as the probability P multiplied by severity S. With ATSS staffing, risk may be related to
the optimal staffing level: risk is lowered as staffing approaches optimal levels.
In a stochastic model45 of staffing, risk can be estimated as the probability of adverse events and the
time that systems are unavailable resulting from those events. In such a model, risk would be a direct
function of staffing levels. Objective risk can be measured as a function of weighing factors that serve
as contributing coefficients (such as fatigue, stress, training timelines, technological malfunctions, or
maintenance demands) with variables that are part of the system (such as number of overtime hours an
ATSS employee works, travel time to remote locations, or level of air traffic). Another way of assess-
ing risk uses a combination of quantitative methods and qualitative methods that rely on judgments
and decisions of experts. One common method to assess risk, which is represented in Figure 2-3 and
44See detailed listing of Outage, Availability, Restoration, and Reliability measures in FAA, 2011c.
45A stochastic model includes the inputs of time taken by ATSS personnel in all their tasks, but also incorporates the prob-
abilities of unexpected events occurring that affect the time required to complete tasks such as equipment reliability, employee
illness, and weather.

Hazard Likelihood
Hazard
Categories
Classification
FREQUENCY OF
Frequent Likely Occasional Seldom Unlikely
OCCURRENCE
Catastrophic I 1E 1E 2H 2H 3M
SEVERITY Critical II 1E 2H 2H 3M 4L
Marginal III 2H 3M 3M 4L 4L
Negligible IV 3M 3L 4L 4: 4L
Hazard Risk
Index
FIGURE 2-3 Hazard assessment matrix.

2-3.eps
Abbreviations: Extremely high (E), High (H), Moderate (M), and Low (L), Hazard Risk Index Labels: 1 = Unac-
ceptable, 2 = Undesirable with management waiver required, 3 = Acceptable with management review, 4 = Ac-
ceptable without review.
SOURCE: Swallom, Lindberg, and Smith-Jackson, 2003:505. Permission granted by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
described by Swallom, Lindberg, and Smith-Jackson (2003), is based on a combination of graphical

risk assessment tools provided by Kohn, Friend, and Winterberger (1996), Military Standard 882C
(Department of Defense, 1993), and Roland and Moriarty (1990). The FAA employs a similar model
construct (FAA, 2007a).
With this matrix, risk can be assessed in the ATSS staffing plan by conducting a facility visit followed
by a what-if analysis of scenarios resulting from current or estimated staffing levels. For example, an
event that would result in critical negative outcomes (e.g., severe injuries and/or large financial loss) and
that would occur frequently in conditions of low staffing would be unacceptable and lead to extremely
high risk. On the other hand, an event with similar outcomes that is highly unlikely to occur in low
staffing conditions could yield an acceptably low level of risk. Thus, the table reflects both potential
effects and likelihoods of risky events.
The 2006 report by the National Research Council on staffing for aviation safety inspectors suggested
risk should be analyzed at two levels: (1) a detailed analysis focusing on aspects of “system design” (i.e.,
the confluence of factors that drive demand for ATSS); and (2) a macro-level analysis that focuses on
“program risk management” (i.e., the approaches used to promote safety) (National Research Council,
2006). In the 2006 report, the committee considered risk an important factor in exploring the parameters
of a staffing model and establishing staffing levels. Several aspects of the ATSS staffing situation increase
risk. As indicated by stakeholders, risk is increased when hiring lags behind the need for qualified ATSS
personnel. Lack of training or delays in training, both formal and informal, lead to understaffing, a
workforce that has insufficient skills to perform the assigned work, or both. These consequences also
increase risk. As previously mentioned, the demand for scheduled preventive maintenance and relatively
unpredictable corrective maintenance add a level of risk that reflects a range of probabilities and uncer-
tainty in the entire system. Geographic diversity of the NAS facilities also contributes to complexity
and increases risk by limiting the number of certified ATSS personnel available.

Periodic Condition-Based Corrective

Run to Fault
Maintenance Maintenance Maintenance
Periodic Maintenance Condition Based Run to Fault Corrective Maintenance

• Safety-related checks • Time-based actions a conscious decision is employed after a failure
• Preventive maintenance • Cycle-based actions to accept the risk of a or to correct a problem
inspections • Predictive Analysis facility problem or failure
• Performance checks and and Intervention
routine maintenance
FIGURE 2-4 Reliability centered maintenance.

SOURCE: FAA, 2010. 2-4.eps
This can now be shades of green, if preferred
Tracking Maintenance Activities

At present, the FAA has shifted ATSS work to a reliability centered maintenance 46 approach (FAA,
2007b, 2010) from a previous philosophy that stressed more frequent periodic maintenance and cer-
tification activity for many NAS systems. The implementation of an event-based certification process
eliminates the requirement for periodic system and subsystem certification, but mandates certification
prior to commissioning new equipment, upon requests following aircraft incidents, after any adjustment
to the certification parameters, and prior to restoration after any modification or specified interrup-
tions. Rather than more frequent scheduled maintenance activities on some systems, the philosophy of
event-based certification has shifted to “run to fault,” at which point the equipment would be inspected,
repaired or restored, and certified to return to the NAS. Alternatively, failed equipment might also be
decommissioned. Figure 2-4, taken from an FAA pamphlet titled 6000.15E Pocket Reference,47 shows
a “shorthand” perspective of the evolved philosophy of reliability centered maintenance (FAA, 2010).
Remote Maintenance Monitoring (RMM) has been extensively implemented within the FAA (FAA,
2010). Bottino and Hughes (2004) assert that “reliability, suitability, and longevity of navigational aids,
weather processors, and surveillance systems have improved due to the functionalities RMM systems
provide.” Although RMM systems continue to transform the ATSS environment, and NextGen systems
are being implemented with significant reliability enhancements in mind, aging of the NAS legacy sys-
tems and the availability of critical parts for old equipment may counteract those advantages. Currently,
ATSS personnel are required to update multiple nonlinked legacy systems, rather than a single, integrated
system. Both advanced deployment of RMM and the utilization of modern, integrated Computerized
Maintenance Management Software (CMMS) can help optimize utilization of all ATSS maintenance
46Reliability centered maintenance concepts were honed in the aviation realm and have since spread dramatically through
other maintenance-related fields. Ideally, the whole state of reliability and maintainability best practices should be examined
for careful application within the NAS, and lessons from the ATSS world should be shared with others. See Moubray (2001)
for an excellent treatment of this subject.
476000.15E—General Maintenance Handbook for National Airspace System (NAS) Facilities Pocket Reference (FAA, 2010)
was superseded by 6000.15F (FAA, 2011a). In the update, some guidance changes were made as Safety Risk Management
specialists reviewed and concurred that the changes were categorized as having no safety impact and posed no risk to the NAS.
It was finalized in the Safety Risk Management Decision Memorandum dated October 5, 2010.

resources. The FAA may incorporate elements of maintenance resources into an evolved CMMS archi-
tecture to help assess shift scheduling, inventory of spares, and optimal use of personnel to maintain the
NAS. This new system should integrate at least the following:
• Facility, Services, and Equipment Profile data collected and stored in an electronic system to
document the maintenance activities related to the NAS (Grant Thornton, 2011)
• The Remote Monitoring and Logging System used by Technical Operations to track the scheduled
maintenance performed (Grant Thornton, 2011)
• Labor Distribution Reporting (LDR), which is used by Technical Operations to track the time
spent on job tasks (Grant Thornton, 2011)
An evolved CMMS solution would help FAA resource planning and optimization of parts or staffing
through the objective of moving closer to seamless systems that multiply productivity for the people.
This contrasts with the current situation in which ATSS personnel feed similar information into multiple
systems.
Balancing Budgetary Priorities

When ATSS staffing levels are adequate to perform prescribed maintenance activities, risk to NAS
safety is minimized. At the same time, staffing levels will, in part, be determined by the cost of labor
and other budgetary priorities. However, allowing staffing levels to be driven solely by cost is an unac-
ceptable risk to the NAS. Thus, the interactions among staffing levels, NAS performance, and system
costs require further exploration.
Staffing Model Considerations

Any staffing model requires data. LDR records were intended to provide accurate data on the time
spent performing work at each facility, the specific job tasks undertaken, and the associated documenta-
tion of that work.48 However, incorrect data resulting from either underreporting or nonreporting (which
both management and labor agreed were generally due to the unwieldy structure of the LDR system) 49
result in unreliable inferences regarding the amount and type of work performed by ATSS employees.
One example of the multiple problems with LDR is that time recorded for travel to a remote facility
cannot be logged using the same code used for working at that facility. In addition, the administrative
tasks that ATSS personnel must perform during every shift (e.g., time logging, maintenance logs) do not
have LDR codes and are thus not recorded.50 By comparison, the Simplified Automated Logging system
likely provides a more accurate record of the time and types of work performed by ATSS personnel
than does the LDR;51 it could therefore contribute more useful data to a staffing model, once the data
have been evaluated.
49Ibid.

The committee investigation kept in mind an overall HSI approach across the nine major HSI
domains, as they are essential elements in the success of the ATSS workforce in maintaining the NAS. For
example, the size and cost of a workforce are dependent on the level of performance and safety deemed
essential. As discussed in Chapter 1, the personnel, training, human factors, and manpower domains
are interdependent. It should be noted that much of the committee’s effort focused on the manpower
domain. In this report the committee uses the terms staffing models and staffing standards to denote HSI
manpower domain tools for the determination and management of manpower as a resource. Such tools
support decisions about how many workers of what general types are needed to staff the organization
and decisions on what the corresponding workload is.
The manpower requirement estimated by a model may be an overall aggregate number or the number
of personnel by location or by work areas within each location. Depending upon the rigor and approach
involved, the model could potentially account for skills, grades, and qualifications. The ATSS skill uni-
verse includes the five disciplines or skill areas described at the beginning of this chapter. Because of
the current operations involving ATSS personnel and the requirements for appropriate certification, the
supply and demand for each of these skill areas should be accounted for within the model.
Finding 2-2: A number of human resource issues, such as hiring procedures, training requirements,
retirements, and military obligations, affect the number of qualified ATSS personnel who are available
at any point in time to maintain the NAS.
Conclusion 2-2: The committee concludes that human resource issues such as retirements and succes-
sion planning considerations should be addressed in conjunction with any comprehensive manpower
staffing model.
Implications for Staffing Models

Based on its understanding of the ATSS job and work environment, the committee noted several
implications for a staffing model:
• It must capture the full extent of the NAS and its varied components, the geographic dispersion
of facilities, and the staffing implications of travel time to equipment in remote areas.
• It must clearly identify domain disciplines in which ATSS personnel must be proficient to meet
workload demand, and it must quantify the levels of expertise required.
• Performance measures or outcomes, both final (ultimate) and intermediate, should be included
so that the model can provide predictions regarding the outcomes of a given staffing plan.
Recommendation 2-2: In accordance with the principles of human-systems integration, the FAA should
build a robust staffing model that takes into account all of the following aspects of the ATSS job series,
in addition to the time that ATSS personnel spend on preventive and corrective maintenance tasks:
• Training issues, time to schedule training, the time required to attend training, and the time of
experienced ATSS personnel necessary to provide OJT
• Travel time to and from work sites
• Environmental challenges
• Time dedicated to military reserve service or family and medical leave
• Fatigue mitigation plans
• Safety factors
• LDR deficiencies and other data deficiencies

• Aging workforce and succession planning considerations

• FAA’s Next Generation (NextGen) system
• Nontechnical task demands
SUMMARY
The job duties and work environment for ATSS personnel are extremely complex. The job series
encompasses multiple disciplines and requires extensive training. Incumbents confront environmental
and travel issues, are subject to the demands of shift work, and have demands on their time beyond their
assigned technical responsibilities. The implementation of the NextGen system adds an additional layer
of ambiguity and concern regarding ATSS workload. All of these issues are acknowledged by the stake-
holders who provided input to the committee. Any staffing model for ATSS personnel that is intended
to be accepted by appropriate stakeholders will need to address these concerns.

Considerations in Creating a Staffing Model
The primary challenge for the committee was to find ways to create effective staffing models to
determine Airway Transportation Systems Specialists (ATSS) staffing level requirements in Technical
Operations work sites and appropriately accommodate the various stakeholder concerns discussed in
Chapter 2. To address this challenge, the committee reviewed the fundamentals of modeling in general
as applied to developing staffing estimates, which is the subject of this chapter. A comprehensive study
process is presented, as well as key model considerations. The chapter concludes with the quality fac-
tors against which a staffing model is evaluated. The review of these modeling fundamentals sets the
stage for the evaluation of existing models and creation of recommendations for the use of modeling to
successfully define and predict ATSS workforce requirements in future efforts.
WORKFORCE MODELING AS PART OF A LARGER

CYCLE OF WORKFORCE PLANNING
The Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM’s) End-to-End Hiring initiative defined workforce
planning as
the systematic process for identifying and addressing the gaps between the workforce of today and the
human capital needs of tomorrow. Workplace planning is based upon a set of workforce analyses which
provide insight into how agencies can align their workforce to meet human capital goals and objectives
that link to the agency’s mission and strategic objectives. (Office of Personnel Management, 2008:12)
The workforce planning cycle as defined by OPM entails five basic steps as shown in Figure
3-1. Step two of this workforce planning cycle—analyze workforce, identify skill gaps, and conduct
workforce analysis—includes much of the committee’s task, which is to provide the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) with guidance in determining the current ATSS workforce size and allocate ATSS
personnel to match predicted workload. This portion of the cycle can be a difficult and poorly executed
step of an overall workforce planning process, as developing tools to ascertain the kinds, numbers, and
location of workers needed to accomplish an enterprise’s goals and objectives can prove a tremendous
41

FIGURE 3-1 OPM’s workforce planning cycle.

SOURCE: Office of Personnel Management, undated.
challenge. For a large enterprise, skipping the workload assessment/workload analysis dimensions and
only performing a gap analysis on existing position structure and supply, then creating a plan to fill open
positions, will likely be inadequate for defining the number of employees with particular skills sets and
credentials needed in a variety of facilities and geographic locations.
Because ATSS personnel maintain tens of thousands of pieces of equipment of different types
and at various stages of the equipment lifespan across a broad geographic area, and at a high level of
operational readiness, defining and measuring the workload is formidable. Different philosophies about
maintenance—for example, a philosophy of preventive inspections and maintenance versus one of “repair
when the system breaks”—create a wide spectrum of potential staffing outcomes. 1 The expected levels
of performance and tolerances for time between failures of systems may drive the need for extra shifts
or ATSS personnel assigned to a particular problem, facility, or geographic location. ATSS technicians
may be assigned to a particular task or may be in standby status on a shift and available via telephone
for call-outs.
All organizations base staffing decisions on a paradigm of the underlying production process [or the
means by which work is accomplished], whether they do so explicitly or not. This conceptualization is
often referred to as a staffing model. A staffing model is a formal representation of the mechanisms that
drive the need for staffing resources. (National Research Council, 2006:4)
1As the FAA adopted reliability centered maintenance practices, some tradeoffs have already been carefully weighed and
incorporated into the agency’s guidance for technical operations.

CONSIDERATIONS IN CREATING A STAFFING MODEL 43
Changes in the services provided and, in the case of Technical Operations, changes in the amount
or type of equipment maintained should drive the types and numbers of ATSS personnel required. An
effective staffing model should represent work done with existing processes, unless the processes mod-
eled are deliberately modified to reflect anticipated changes in the work; significant change to existing
processes require updating or refining the model to ensure its accuracy. If important factors that have
an effect on staffing are identified and accurately measured, then the algorithms of a good model should
provide useful standards or staffing projections.
VALUE OF PRACTICAL MODELS FOR ATSS PERSONNEL

In many public and private enterprises, human resources account for at least 50 percent of the cost
of the operation and can consume a great deal more of the organization’s financial resources. 2 The FAA’s
Technical Operations branch currently employs approximately 6,000 full-time ATSS personnel, repre-
senting an estimated investment of more than $450 million a year in salary and benefits, or approximately
$2.25 billion over a 5-year budget cycle. The true fully burdened workforce cost (which includes 6,100
workers) is likely higher.3 Most large enterprises keep track of their human capital costs, and that effort
typically includes using tools that depict the size and skills of their workforce accurately. The output
of well-designed modeling tools can strengthen the argument for a correctly sized workforce in budget
discussions by providing clearer and reasoned estimates of the risks if the workforce has fewer people
than the organization’s missions demand. Although technology is essential to the FAA mission of keep-
ing the national airspace safe for movement of passengers and freight, the right mix of talented human
beings is also essential to achieve that mission.
There are many ways to acknowledge the value of the ATSS workforce. Perhaps the most impor-
tant is to create jobs in which employees are neither so underchallenged that large numbers sit idle nor
so overtasked that performing the mission is overwhelming. A properly sized workforce helps ensure
achievement of the FAA’s mission of maintaining the safety of the National Airspace System (NAS) at
reasonable costs and levels of efficiency. Moreover, appropriate levels of staffing are likely to reduce
turnover that is due to morale issues stemming from placing a responsibility on workers that cannot
reasonably be met. An ancillary benefit to careful workforce planning is personal life balance for ATSS
personnel.4 In addition, the value of an accurate staffing model also has to take into account the value
of a high functioning NAS that is both safe and efficient. Although these costs are generally recognized
and can be estimated with varying degrees of precision, it would be impossible to calculate the exact cost
of understaffing in terms of its impact on business and commerce. One outage may have far-reaching
and costly impacts that are never fully identified. Despite the difficulty of specifying the exact dollar
amount, a robust staffing model must consider the far-reaching effects of understaffing.
2For example, a 2011 report stated that 80 percent of U.S. Postal Service outlays were spent on labor costs (U.S. Postal Ser-
vice, 2011). National Income and Product Accounts data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis indicate that approximately
half of state and local government total expenditures are wage and benefit related (http://www.bea.gov/itable/index.cfm) [June
2013].
3This is an approximate and conservative estimate, given the previous negotiated floor/threshold of 6,100 workers. If 6,000
full-time workers were employed at a fully burdened cost of just $75,000 per year per worker (which is on the low side), the
annual cost would be $450 million and the 5-year cost (assuming no inflation) would be $2.25 billion. The FAA employs more
than 30,000 workers and for fiscal year (FY) 2013, the Technical Operations budget request was $1.7 billion, which included
a request for authorization of 8,050 full-time equivalent (FTE) employees (Department of Transportation, 2012).

Throughout the Effort: Logic, Critical Thinking
Comprehensive Study Key Model

Quality Factors Performance
Process Considerations
• Transparency
Well-Developed Key Details • Scalablity
and Executed Adequately • Usability
Phases Addressed • Relevance
• Validity
FIGURE 3-2 Steps for successful modeling.
3-2.eps
CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO MODELING USED BY THE COMMITTEE
The next section of this chapter presents the fundamental aspects of modeling that lead to success.
Figure 3-2 highlights these components: (1) a comprehensive study process, (2) key model consider-
ations, and (3) quality factors that can enhance the likelihood of (4) desired model performance. Because
these components provided the basis for the committee’s assessment of the current assumptions and
methods used by the FAA to estimate ATSS staffing needs and for its recommendations regarding more
appropriate approaches to staffing models, each component is described in more detail below. Expe-
rienced modelers rely more on logic than the rigid application of any given method for developing a
staffing model (Law and Kelton, 2000).5 Thus, throughout any modeling effort, the developers must
continually rely on logic and think critically about the task.
Comprehensive Study Design Process

To be accurate in its estimates, a staffing model should be designed using a comprehensive devel-
opment process that captures major drivers of ATSS workload at the appropriate level of detail and
properly links the workload to the number of person-hours required to achieve the defined tasks of the
job incumbents. Although it was not the intent of the committee to prescribe a detailed staffing model
methodology, this report does discuss the steps in a generic logical model development process so that
essential actions are considered and not overlooked in creating a specific model for ATSS personnel. 6
5For a simulation approach, Law and Kelton (2000) provide examples of essential steps and considerations.
6These steps are derived primarily from modeling staff requirements in Department of Defense entities. The Navy Total Force
Manpower Requirements Handbook, April 2000, lists five steps: Planning, Data Gathering, Data Analysis, Documentation and
Reporting, and Implementation (U.S. Navy, 2000). The Air Force has used similar 6- and 7-step approaches. The Army once
used a 12-step modeling algorithm but allows for many more variations today. The committee’s point here is to focus not on
the amount of steps used but on the employment of a logical, comprehensive, phased approach that includes certain deliberate
activities to create viable manpower staffing models. A caveat is that the conditions under which the military services analyze
staffing requirements are both similar to and decidedly different from those confronted by the FAA. These organizations all
have ATSS-like positions whose incumbents are responsible for maintaining the equipment necessary to manage air traffic
in the airspace. However, the work environment and work rules that may have an effect on staffing vary considerably. For
example, the military services, unlike the FAA, all have a greater degree of control of their personnel. Furthermore, the FAA

✓ 1 Feasibility
✓ 2 Familiarization
✓ 3 Measurement Design
✓ 4 Measurement
✓ 5 Analysis and Model Selection
✓ 6 Implementation
FIGURE 3-3 Logical design process: model development phases for comprehensive study.
3-3.eps
The comprehensive modeling process described here consists of six phases: feasibility, familiarization,
measurement design, measurement, analysis/model development and selection, and implementation.
Most seasoned workforce modeling experts use a similar approach. For example, the Air Force uses its
Management Engineering Program, which describes similar steps that have been refined over decades
to produce generations of effective workforce staffing tools.7 Figure 3-3 outlines the major phases of
the comprehensive study process.
Phase 1. Feasibility
The objective of the feasibility phase is to determine if a modeling study effort should proceed or
should be canceled or delayed due to problems such as nonstandardization, operational or organization
instability, higher or conflicting priorities, and so on. The decision to continue development efforts is
based on initial data- and fact-gathering concerning the responsibilities of job incumbents, the environ-
ment in which work is performed, and the resources available to the modeler such as time records, equip-
ment lifespan data, etc. Two approaches to viewing work are commonly used: a work site approach and
a work process approach. The work site approach focuses on a location and describes all the work that
is done at that location. The work process approach focuses on a particular line of work and describes
how it is performed in multiple locations. The environment to be studied includes dimensions such as
the fiscal/budget situation, technological complexity of the work and equipment and anticipated changes,
and the rate of change associated with the work performed. Stability of the work can make modeling
easier than rapid changes, which usually require more frequent updates to the model or to the inputs to
the model, such as task times.
must comply with work rules and contend with a labor union. Although these differences may not affect what steps need to
be taken to develop a staffing model, they may affect how each step is implemented and what factors are taken into account.
7More information on the Air Force approaches can be found at AFI 38-201 and AFMAN 38-208 Volumes I and Volume II;
Army Guidance includes Army Regulation 570-4 and publications from the U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency; also see
the current Total Army Analysis (TAA) process and MANPRINT.

A critical question to ask is “Do stakeholders agree it is the right time to conduct a study?” A major
consideration in answering it should be the level of effort, time, and resources required to complete a
study in light of the outputs desired. If the decision is to proceed with the study effort, a study scope
and framework are established to guide collection of information needed to plan and conduct model
development. Stakeholders should take the time to carefully define and review study goals, scope, and
milestones, as well as consider the potential limitations of the results.
A number of multi-level considerations are relevant to feasibility. Specifically, there appear to be a
number of potential cross-level interactions among individual training and higher-order factors such as
location and distance. The committee believes that the model would probably benefit from exploring
such nonlinear and cross-level interactions.
A memorandum of agreement should be established between the modelers and the primary stake-
holders that documents what the modelers plan to do, what time frame they will do it in, what will be
required of various stakeholders and the organization, and what output should be expected. A study
announcement should be developed and shared with appropriate stakeholders, who may include manage-
ment representatives from various functions and locations, job incumbents, union representatives, and
others, to inform them of the effort and their responsibilities and to engage their support.
Phase 2. Familiarization
In the familiarization phase, modelers learn about the work and the context in which it is per-
formed. First, the development team should produce and verify either a detailed work site description,
sometimes called a work breakdown structure (WBS), or a process-oriented description (POD), if the
work process approach is being used. A WBS is usually created by taking major work categories or
components and breaking them down into smaller and smaller subcomponents. A POD is designed to
document functions by inputs, process, and outputs, and then identify the subcomponents or details of
these process elements.8 The WBS or POD should contain a fairly complete description of the various
tasks performed in the work sites because it forms the basis for the staffing model. Creating a useful
and accurate WBS or POD at the right level of detail is one of the most important outputs of this phase,
as an accurate accounting of the activities that drive most of the worker effort is directly related to the
accuracy and value of the staffing model output. It is also helpful to create a statement of conditions—
that is, a description of the normal work environment and the operating challenges and unusual condi-
tions faced by workers performing particular types of work in various locations.9 Modelers also find it
useful, if not essential, to capture an initial set of key baseline data, such as the present structure of the
organization, the number of full-time equivalents (FTEs) funded and currently employed, the allocation
of workers across the organization, and staffing information such as details about personnel accessions
by location and specialty.
Another component of this familiarization phase is the identification of potential workload factors
(i.e., those factors that affect the hours of available labor for a work site) and the data sources in which
information about each factor reside. Historical data related to the number of employees, time to comple-
tion for various tasks, failures and outages, etc., can be useful for trend or regression analyses whose
results can inform the model of staffing needs. If the organization does not maintain or does not usu-
ally collect data on some of these potential factors, it must consider how best to gather the information
8Unlike a classic WBS, the Air Force shift to a POD allows ready process mapping and modeling, and may tie more directly
with specified outputs of the activities, which in turn may potentially be more directly linked with performance measures.
9It should be noted that U.S. Air Force manpower studies, and their classic end product, an Air Force Manpower Standard
(AFMS) include a statement of conditions. For more information, see AF/A1MR (2011).

required for accurate modeling and continue to maintain the data bases related to these factors. Examina-
tion of documents related to the job under study, such as official guidance, directives, standards, policies,
performance measures, and transformation plans related to the organization, the work, or the equipment
can also increase the modeler’s understanding of the job and of anticipated changes in the work.
Phase 3. Measurement Design

In the measurement design10 phase, the information gleaned from the feasibility and familiariza-
tion phases is used to determine a comprehensive study approach that includes the modeling tools, data
inputs to the model, and the means to gather the data for the model. A critical question for the study
team is how the data relevant to the modeling task will be gathered. For example, the team might use
interviews of subject matter experts, a time study based on samples of work, or a by-location, by-work-
element shift profile analysis.11 Any combination of methods for collecting data may be used, but the
approaches to collecting data need to be clearly defined, preferably tested on a sample of the overall
workforce, and then refined based upon the lessons learned in the test, prior to conducting full-scale
data collection. In addition, the team must be aware of the potential impact on the people who provide
the data of any intervention necessary for data collection, especially direct observations. Otherwise, the
team may receive distorted information about the nature of ATSS work.
The measurement plan should define samples that are representative of the population and sufficient
to make the types of statistical inferences necessary for modeling. When the job under study involves
a large number of workers across many work locations, the modeler does not necessarily have to mea-
sure in detail the work of every person at every location; instead, a subset of workers and locations that
represent adequately the overall population will be sufficient in most cases. The modeling effort needs
to include enough data points to be representative of the various types of facilities, types of equipment
and tasks, and work centers to be statistically significant. If the organization is investing in a model
covering thousands of FTEs, a 90 percent confidence level or higher may be desired. At one extreme,
a belief that 100 percent of a large population should be measured can incur excess costs and time that
consume study resources. At the other extreme, only measuring a few locations or relying on a small
input sample, in an effort to expedite the effort or save resources, is even more likely to produce an
unrealistic model output—with disastrous results if applied to the whole workforce.
The quality of the job information gathered must be considered, and when data are deficient, steps
must be taken to improve the accuracy of the information to be used in the model. Several approaches
to data verification exist. For example, multiple data collection teams can gather data and measure work
performance at different sites. If multiple teams are used to conduct measurement and data collection,
the study team must provide guidance to standardize the methods for data harvesting. If instead a “same
eyes” approach is used, one team travels to all locations to collect data. Some modelers use a workshop
or series of workshops facilitated by the study leads to collect data from subject matter experts. Often,
the best approach is a combination of methods for systematically studying the tasks required in the job,
the frequency with which the tasks are performed, and the corresponding number of person-hours needed
to accomplish the tasks properly.
10For more information, see U.S. Air Force (1995a, 2003).

11Time studies, work sampling, elemental time, and other methods are not discussed in depth here but may be researched
more in Introduction to Human Factors and Ergonomics for Engineers, Lehto and Landry (2013), and other industrial engi-
neering texts.

A measurement approach must be consistent with the later phases of analysis and model selection.
Consequently, the study team must anticipate the types of models to be explored, designed, and ulti-
mately implemented. At times, the phases of the study process are iterative, so that the modelers must
reconsider earlier decisions based on decisions made in later phases. Often, the limitations of available
data and the feasibility of collecting more robust data constrain the type of modeling possible; when
accurate models are required, such constraints must be remedied with extensive data collection plans.
However, costs are a relevant factor in most modeling projects, and the team, in conjunction with the
organization’s management, must decide what approaches to data collection are affordable. They must
also consider the financial implications of understaffing and overstaffing if the model’s validity is weak-
ened by insufficient data collection.
Phase 4. Measurement
This phase involves the execution of the measurement plan created in phase 3 and refined through
testing. Data collected in this phase contribute to model selection and serve as the input to the selected
model. The quality of the data collected significantly affects the value of the model; thoughtful measure-
ment can make or break the study. All data obtained in this phase must be consistent with the plans for the
study and should be validated by examining the data for completeness, accuracy, and logical consistency.
Phase 5. Analysis and Model Selection

The purpose of model development is to depict accurately the worker to workload relationship in
order to derive the number of workers required by function or discipline and by facility type. Often, cor-
relation and regression techniques are employed to examine the data and determine the worker-workload
relationship. Study experts frequently discover several subpopulations that should be grouped and then
develop separate tools to portray the worker-workload relationships for each group. In the case of the
ATSS modeling challenge, the five different types of facilities may be suitable for individual groupings.
Alternatively, the five disciplines might form the basis for grouping. For example, a model for depicting
Core/Large Airport requirements and a separate model for GNAS, or a model for Environmental and
another for Communications, may produce more accurate results. Statistical tests of the relationship
may be used to determine the sufficiency or best fit of the model equation.
The end result should be an equation with a related set of statistical tools that the organization can
use to determine the staffing requirements. These tools are often used at the location level and then
aggregated to obtain total system requirements. Ideally, algorithms produce a set of tables that indicate
the correct number and skill mix for a work site to accomplish its mission sets. For example, the Air
Force manpower management engineering process has built-in “Smart Sheets” that take workload factor
data as input and produce electronic reports showing the number, skills, and grades of full-time workers
required to match the workload.
The more transparent and accessible for use the model is to different levels of the organization, the
more likely the model is to be embraced by personnel at those levels. However, access to the model
output may be limited, based on the user’s needs so as not to overwhelm the user with massive amounts
of information that are not relevant to that user.
Model design should also take into account the model’s adaptability to changing conditions. An
effective model must accurately depict the current worker-workload relationships, but the better model
also offers “scalability” so that the model can be easily updated as the work or the work environment
change. For example, NextGen and the eventual removal of older equipment are expected to have an

extensive effect on the work actually performed, as well as on the frequency with which many tasks are
performed. Often a modular approach is used so that the relevant components of the model can be updated
without overhauling the entire model. As with any other modeling effort, a sensitivity analysis would
also be appropriate to assess how sensitive the model outputs are to changes in various input variables.
Another component of model design is adherence to good human-systems integration (HSI) prac-
tices, including safety and human factors concerns. The model and its output should ensure that the
staffing levels reflect what is necessary to protect workers’ health (U.S. Air Force, undated).
Often, the model design phase includes validation and verification12 elements, especially for highly
complex models. A rigorous verification process in which predictions are compared to real-world situa-
tions of the past for which outcomes are known is begun at the same time the model is being developed.
Data from the validation and verification effort can be used to refine the model or enhance the data
inputs to it.
The verification, validation, and acceptance (VV&A) processes used to improve the model and
increase the organization’s confidence in it can take other forms. For example, qualified operations
research or staffing model experts, teamed together with functional experts, can evaluate the assumptions,
data quality, and modeling algorithms and point out opportunities for improvement. VV&A activities
should be practiced throughout the modeling effort, both before and after implementation.
Other, more robust, formal VV&A approaches may be useful and worthy of careful consideration;
however, as Carson (2002) noted, “a model developer intermixes debugging, verification and validation
tasks and exercises with model development in a complex and iterative process . . . it should also be noted
that no model is ever 100% verified or validated.” The final determinant of the value of the model will
be the accuracy of the predictions regarding labor necessary to achieve the goals of the job class. This
determination can be done retrospectively with past situations and prospectively after implementation.
Phase 6. Implementation
Implementation of a new staffing model can be complex and requires close attention to how the
model is introduced. How the model is implemented will have an effect on the level of acceptance
achieved throughout the organization. At some point, the recommended model must be presented to
decision makers for approval for use. Revealing the “test” impact of the model to management and
workers within a public-sector function with many diverse stakeholders can be challenging, as there
will typically be perceived “gainers and losers” by location as the workforce is adjusted by the model
results to match the work requirements. It will be useful to stakeholders to have an honest picture of
the future staffing levels derived from the model, as well as an explanation of how they were derived.
Budgets also need to be adjusted before implementation, particularly when there are increases to
the staffing levels. Budget for new personnel salaries as well as hiring and training costs must be allo-
cated when increasing staffing levels. When staffing levels decrease, the costs of reductions in force and
redeployments must be factored into budgets. The committee had several discussions regarding how an
effective model would look and how it could predict an effective number of ATSS personnel necessary
for maintaining the NAS in a safe, efficient, and effective manner. These discussions did not focus on
a total number of ATSS personnel, but there was an understanding that, should the model generate a
number greater than 6,100, the anticipated FAA budget would need to be quickly increased to avoid the
12Validation is the process of determining the degree to which a model or simulation and its associated data are an accurate
representation of the real world from the perspective of the intended uses of the model. Verification is the process of determining
that a model or simulation implementation and its associated data accurately represent the developer’s conceptual description
and specifications in DODI 5000.61 (Department of Defense, 2009).

negative implications for the safety and efficiency of the NAS. In that case, the FAA’s Air Traffic Organi-
zation would have to employ risk mitigation to compensate for the less than sufficient staffing while the
budget was approved and additional personnel were hired, trained, and assigned to the appropriate sites.
Conclusion 3-1: Dedicated budget requirements for the ATSS are likely to result from application of
any comprehensive manpower staffing model and will need to be addressed.
Public announcements related to increases or decreases in head count must be crafted to help out-
siders understand the situation and win the public’s approval. Often, examples of locations where the
work is radically different are persuasive in demonstrating how the local uniqueness was addressed. For
example, higher levels of staffing in locations that experience special environmental conditions, such as
corrosive salt water, extreme temperatures and weather, or extended travel to service remote equipment
may serve to demonstrate the sensitivity of the model.13
Value of a Logical, Comprehensive Design Process

Following a comprehensive design process that contains the essence of the six phases described
above should greatly enhance the likelihood of creating an effective staffing model that enables the
workforce to achieve the organization’s goals. Some of the phases overlap, and ideally, study lead-
ers intentionally look backward and forward in the process so that the end result is logical, valid, and
compliant with the stated purpose. In particular, data examination during the measurement and analysis
phases may necessitate revised data collection procedures or additional research. Moreover, those who
develop the model need to plan for future improvements to it as modeling methodology and data col-
lection procedures evolve and as the FAA obtains greater understanding of the causes of variability in
the tasks performed by ATSS. Insights gained at any phase can redirect the study in unexpected ways;
thus, the study team needs to be not only flexible but also seasoned in handling unexpected situations
and understanding which approaches are most likely to be effective in a given situation.
Recommendation 3-1: The FAA should execute a modeling process that allows for future improvements
in data modeling techniques and applicability.
Key Model Considerations

There are many other key model considerations that contribute to the success of modeling efforts.
In this section, the committee reviews important considerations that will enhance the staffing model.
Consider the Difference Between Workforce Required, Workforce Funded, and Workforce
Filled
Staffing standards produced by a given model are not identical to authorized or filled positions;
required, funded, and filled are three different ways to describe the workforce and the numbers required.
Staffing models may generate a fairly useful recommendation for defining a required workforce that is
often refined by highly knowledgeable staff and managers, who then must compete for necessary funding
in a resource-constrained public sector environment. Thus, the required workforce is not the same as the
13These conditions are termed as a “variance,” which is an adjustment to the model for FTE time added or subtracted from
the core requirements and is used and described in Air Force manpower requirements determination literature such as Air Force
Manual 38-208, Volumes 1 and 2 (U.S. Air Force, 1995a, 2003).

funded workforce. FAA headquarters can create policy and routines to apply standards on an ongoing,
cyclical basis for the creation of staffing plans and projections, and can also provide authorization (i.e.,
formal funding) and justification through planning, programming, budgeting, and execution covering
the ATSS workforce positions. Once positions are recognized and funded, they in turn must be filled.
However, a filled workforce is not entirely dependent on hiring. Other tools of the human resource life
cycle (recruiting, development, sustainment, retirement, and so on) affect the number of positions to
be filled.14 For example, a model could predict a requirement for 18 FTEs to perform communication
systems maintenance in one location, while the budget process may only authorize funds for 16 in that
area, and there may be only 14 persons actually “on board” as filled positions. However, a good staffing
model will provide decision makers with information regarding the expected consequences of under- and
over-staffing. If fewer positions than are needed are authorized, for example, the model may indicate that
a maintenance backlog is likely to emerge or that the risk of nonavailability of the NAS may increase.
If more positions are authorized than are currently in the job, the hiring-training-development cycle
needs to begin. Table 3-1 provides an example of staffing in one location across the five skill sets and
management.
TABLE 3-1 Notional Example: “Location X” Staffing for a Particular Point in Budget Year
Model Driven Authorized or Difference Between
ATSS Skills at Requirement Approved Allocation Actual Fill Filled Status and
Location X (REQUIRED) (FUNDED) (FACE) Authorized/Funded
Management 2 2 1 –1
Environmental 17 15 13 –2
Automation 19 18 17 –1
Communication 18 16 14 –2
Radar 21 18 21 3
Navigational Aid 7 4 5 1
TOTAL 84 73 71 –2
An advanced modeling system for a large enterprise may have both short term (1-2 years) and longer
term (out to approximately 5 years) staffing requirements. The difference between the two estimates
provides forewarning to the organization that changes in staffing levels are likely to occur. Proactive
organizations build staffing-process ramps to increase or decrease the number of individuals with the
skills to match the current staffing needs that are determined by changing equipment, services, and
budget realities. Once the organization determines the extent of change that is likely to occur, it must
adapt other systems (recruiting, hiring, training, etc.) and acquire the necessary funding. 15
14These tools fall under the personnel and training domains of HSI and in themselves may require improved systems and
their own respective modeling algorithms outside this discussion. Examples are maintenance training throughput calculations
and attrition/retirement/hiring estimating tools, among others.
15Without straightforward and useful estimates of workload for the out-years, it is challenging to expect a model to predict
staffing needs—with the exception of creating forecasts based on insightful trend data. Air Force manpower data systems usu-
ally show positions for multiple quarters/years out in the budget cycle, and future adjustments are often calculated based on
known changes in quantity and type of weapon systems that will be present or approved as missions change.

Consider the Difference Between an Allocation and a Sufficiency Model

The National Research Council conducted a study for FAA aviation safety inspectors in 2006 that
had a charge similar to that of the current study on ATSS staffing. Many of the former committee’s con-
siderations at that time are applicable to the current task. Therefore, the present committee has quoted
liberally from that prior report in this section. The following passage, for example, is directly applicable
to the current study, with a few word changes to apply it to ATSS staffing:
[M]odels, such as one for [ATSS] staffing, may be either allocation models or sufficiency models, or both.
An allocation model is one aimed at distributing available resources equitably and effectively irrespective
of their collective adequacy, whereas a sufficiency model is designed to predict the resources needed to
sustain system performance at what is deemed an acceptable level. A sufficiency model is more difficult
to develop. It requires the organization to make decisions about, and set standards for, acceptable perfor-
mance and to develop performance measures so that outcomes can be evaluated against those standards
(i.e., it can be empirically validated).
[B]y providing an estimate of the resources necessary to meet policy and safety goals, a sufficiency model
can be the most rigorous way to determine staffing needs and to support budget requests for [ATSS]
positions.
[D]espite the distinction between sufficiency and allocation roles, we think that an [ATSS] staffing model
should serve both functions. That is, it should be able to estimate aggregate staffing demand, provide
predictions regarding the consequences of alternative levels of staffing, and help guide the allocation of
resources across functions, regions, and offices. (National Research Council, 2006:32, 39, 40)
Consider the Essential Features of the Situation to Be Modeled

“[T]he more faithfully a model captures the essential features of its real-world counterpart, the bet-
ter able it may be to fulfill its intended function” (National Research Council, 2006:30). A powerful
example used elsewhere in government, by the U.S. Air Force, is the model employed to understand,
predict, budget, and allocate aircraft maintenance manpower. Mathematical representations of aircraft
maintenance processes, repair networks, and component failure rates allow analysts to study enormous
amounts of data and apply that data to predict with reasonable accuracy, for example, the number of
Air Force maintenance personnel required to service and support a wing of fighter aircraft in order to
provide a specified desired sortie generation rate. This predictive power is bounded, of course, by access
to the necessary data and by changes within the system that require updating within the model. Mod-
els typically represent the relationship of variables through algorithms and equations that may vary in
complexity and formalization.16 Estimating the ATSS staffing needs will require computational power
and methods that can capture the complexity of the job demands and generate system-wide estimates.
Consider Whether the Model Should Be Descriptive or Predictive

The 2006 report on Aviation Safety Inspector staffing contains a good explanation of whether a model
should be descriptive or predictive. That account is quoted here with additional wording for clarification
and application to ATSS staffing:
16For example, the relationship to demand for meals served and the staffing of a food service operation may be modeled
simply as a straight line approximation of a factor of additional workers per incremental change in how many meals are re-
quired per day.

[M]odels are generally characterized as either descriptive or predictive. Descriptive models typically
document the structure and processes of a system, but they do not add a computational component to
enable predictions about system behavior as a function of system design. An information flow diagram
for a business process is an example of a simple descriptive model. [It shows] the steps, decisions,
and outputs of a process, but alone does not offer insight in terms of the capacity or throughput of the
system. Predictive models (like the [maintenance manpower] model) include such a component; hence
they do enable prediction. In this project we have focused on predictive models because our charge is to
articulate methods for determining the appropriate numbers and types of [Airway Transportation Systems
Specialists] as a function of the factors that drive the demand for their services. Unless a staffing model
can predict with some level of precision how well the [maintenance and service providing] system will
perform given the need structure, it would be impossible to estimate appropriate staffing levels [objec-
tively]. (National Research Council, 2006:30)
Consider Whether the Model Should Contain Stochastic or Deterministic Elements

Models can also be stochastic or deterministic.17 The 2006 report includes an in-depth treatment
of this subject.
Stochastic models, a prominent form of which is the Monte Carlo simulation model, attempt to take into
account the unpredictable elements of system behavior, whereas deterministic ones do not. For example,
[the repair frequencies and time required for each repair of various national airspace subsystems] cannot
be predicted with 100 percent accuracy even under optimal circumstances because of unknown factors.
(National Research Council, 2006:30-31)
Almost every system has some elements of uncertainty in it, so the question is not whether variability
exists but rather how important it is to the system behavior that the model is designed to predict. If ignor-
ing the variable nature of the system is likely to lead to inaccurate predictions or, equally important, a
failure to recognize potential staffing risks, then stochastic modeling techniques should be [considered].
However, if the variability is not likely to [significantly] affect model predictions, or the variability is
small and unimportant, a deterministic model—one that [minimizes treatment of] the stochastic properties
of the system—should suffice. (National Research Council, 2006:31)
These unpredictable elements include an array of factors such as the reliability of individual com-
ponents within each device, employee illness, weather, corrosion, and ease of access affecting the time
required to complete tasks. Equipment failures are inherently stochastic. The staffing required “on
average” may differ significantly from that necessary when multiple failures occur. A stochastic model
provides insights on the risks associated with low probability events that may have significant conse-
quences and potentially high costs.
A deterministic approach to modeling will typically produce the same results for FTEs needed when
the same coefficients or work counts are used, because probability or variation is either not addressed or
removed intentionally through the use of averaged process times. A deterministic approach may involve
many input variables, but in simple terms can be represented as an equation where the FTE require-
ment y is a function of multiple inputs x1, x2, …, xn. A potential risk of deterministic models is that they
predict staffing demand based upon mean values (i.e., average conditions), rather than recognizing that
staffing demand per shift may be significantly greater (or less) than average values due to stochastic
factors such as multiple failures.
17A deterministic model is a function of multiple inputs such as the type of equipment and the nature of the task to be per-
formed. Law and Kelton (2000) provides fundamentals on how to go about addressing many stochastic situations and incor-
porating them into practical model designs.

The committee that wrote the 2006 staffing report noted that a deterministic model can provide suf-
ficient predictive power to yield “fairly straightforward answers to a number of key staffing questions.”
While the complexity and cost of a stochastic model can be high, it is important to incorporate some
stochastic elements that more accurately reflect reality. “It is important to recognize that both the sto-
chastic model and the deterministic model can produce useful expected values for an outcome” (National
Research Council, 2006:31, footnote). Thus, to address the immediate concerns of ATSS staffing, the
creation of an initial series of deterministic algorithms should be followed by development of robust
simulations and queuing models to fully assess stochastic elements of the ATSS job.
Stochastic models provide a better notion of the potential staffing risk associated with unusual
events, such as multiple failures. In the ATSS staffing situation, stochastic modeling may incorporate,
for example, the probability that the appropriate number of ATSS specialists will be available to meet
the demands of required maintenance, because it will take into account queuing issues (e.g., surges and
unscheduled multiple maintenance demands) and the stochastic nature of factors driving the need for
services or repairs.18 Hecht and Handal previously developed and demonstrated a prototype model they
called SMART 4, which explored relationships between maintenance staffing, mean time between out-
ages, mean time to restore, facilities, and other key ratios (Hecht and Handal, 2001; Hecht et al., 1998,
2000). Hecht and Handal’s pioneering work may be a good starting point for bridging from standard
deterministic models (such as ratio unit time equations per equipment or service and evolving support)
and stand-alone powerful modeling and simulation tools for NAS resource allocation analysis. They also
noted that these powerful simulation tools have been possible to create for some time, but their practi-
cal application has been bounded by the cost and complexity of implementation (Hecht et al., 2000).
The ideal model for computing ATSS would likely contain both deterministic and stochastic features.
Consider the Critical Data Required for Analysis or That Drive Workforce Demand
The 2006 report on aviation safety inspector staffing explained the data required for analysis or for
driving workforce demand; that explanation is reproduced here with added wording where applicable:
[T]he distinction between the underlying predictive model and the data needed to make predictions using
the model is critical. A model is created on the basis of the inherent properties of the system that drive
its behavior. In the case of the aviation safety inspection system [maintaining the integrity of the NAS
systems and services,] this includes factors that drive demand for [ATSS] resources and how these [ATSS]
resources are deployed in response to that demand. However, even if these relationships are understood
and well represented in a quantitative model, the model is worthless without the data that enable mean-
ingful and realistic predictions. (National Research Council, 2006:32)
Modeling the relationship between staffing levels and the number and type of equipment mainte-
nance needs in the NAS by region requires collecting data by region. Without a reliable baseline count
and ongoing accounting or data systems that contain this information, there is no practical way to cre-
ate such a model. Because modeling and data collection are interdependent, the cost of developing and
sustaining data collection systems to feed into modeling must be considered. This is not to say that
only “easy to collect” data should be used in the model. Key data that have not been readily available
in the past should not be ignored, and methods to gather these data in a straightforward, economical
manner should be developed. Too often, analysts have created an interesting but impractical manpower
determination tool because of difficulty in routinely gathering the data required for the model’s input
18For a primer on stochastic modeling and simulation concepts relevant to the ATSS maintenance environment, see Beichelt
and Tittman (2012:Section III).

variables. As noted above, a critical step in the model development process is determining the source of
input data and verifying its reliability.
Consider Task Duration and Data Validity Issues19

The utility of a model depends on the data used to populate the model as well as the structure of the
model itself. Validity is defined as the extent to which a measure represents the construct being measured.
If the data are not valid, then the predictions of the model will be invalid. For example, a valid measure
of the time that Task X will take for completion, will be one that is accurate. If task duration estimates
are based on workers who have not fully learned the task or conditions that do not represent the normal
environment in which the task is performed, then the time estimates will not be valid measures of the
time for completion under usual conditions. However, such measures may be valid measures of the time
to complete a task under those unusual conditions.
Another confounding factor in making accurate estimates in task time completion is the bias in
human judgments. Unless time estimations are made by a third party, the judgments may be consciously
or unconsciously skewed. For example, a tedious task may be perceived by a subject matter expert to
have taken longer than it actually did. Alternatively, a subject matter expert who likes to take his/her
time in completing certain types of tasks may indicate a longer time than necessary to ensure the work
can be completed at the preferred pace.
The validity of a measure is limited by its reliability, that is, the extent to which a measure is free from
error and repeated measurements of the same entity (e.g., the same task, event, or object) yield similar
values. If the reliability is low, then so is the validity. If the duration of task i is highly variable, a measure
of duration based on the mean will have a large standard deviation. While the measure may be reliable,
it may not be an accurate estimate of task duration in all situations. The actual time for task i could be
almost constant, but the measurement process (such as relying on subject matter experts’ estimates) may
be error-prone and thus unreliable. Measurement reliability can be improved by using better methods of
data collection; the inherent variability of the task itself is best dealt with by using stochastic models rather
than deterministic models.
The other issue in collecting and using duration data is that of granularity. For example, the duration
of an off-site maintenance task will be composed of at least two components: travel time and core task
completion time. These two components will be affected by different variables, that is, travel distance,
terrain, weather, and traffic for travel time; task complexity and ATSS personnel competence level
for core task time. If the two subtasks are separated, simpler models can be built for each. Times for
completion of the component tasks can be added to obtain the total time for the off-site task. This task
decomposition can be taken to lower and lower levels, eventually ending at the element level of prede-
termined motion-time systems. Synthetic time estimates for new tasks can be computed by aggregating
the known times for each element in the task.
There are three means of collecting data on task duration, each with different levels of reliability,
validity, usefulness, and simplicity of use.
1. Subject Matter Expert Estimates. Asking supervisors or incumbents to estimate durations of tasks
that they have performed in the past is simple and low-cost but generally quite unreliable. Human
memory and judgment suffer from well-known biases (Kahneman et al., 1982) that potentially affect
19For more information, see Kahneman et al. (1982) and Bisantz and Drury (2004).

both reliability and validity of such estimates. Emerging technologies such as mobile devices and other
electronic tracking devices may provide ways of obtaining more accurate time estimates in the future.
2. Historical Data. There are existing data bases such as the Remote Monitoring and Logging System
and the Labor Distribution Reporting system that capture actual times for task completion contempora-
neously and appear to have some relevance for estimating task durations. The data in these data bases
were collected for different purposes (Bisantz and Drury, 2004), and so applying them to duration esti-
mation for staffing models may not be reliable. Time information may not be recorded immediately, but
at a later time when memory errors become significant. Typically such data bases only record total task
duration rather than more meaningful and useful components as noted above. To improve the confidence
in historical data or in subject matter experts’ judgments, their accuracy may be verified by performing
checks such as stopwatch measurement of task duration on a sample of the data.
3. Direct Time Study. A third approach is to observe directly the performance of the task and its com-
ponents and record their durations. Time studies are an expensive proposition if a large amount of data
is required, but the results generally have high reliability and validity. Best practices for conducting such
time studies cover factors such as how many tasks to time, what degree of component decomposition to
use, and how to select tasks and operators for observation and timing. If tasks change appreciably from
time to time and situation to situation, then overall task durations will also change, requiring additional
data collection and associated expense. If task components are measured and only a few components
of the task change, costs can be reduced by only remeasuring that portion of the task that has changed.
Variances: Consider the Model’s Ability to Customize FTE Needs for Special Situations
The term “variance” is used here in the sense of deviation, not in the statistical sense of a measure
of variability of a distribution. Variances adjust core requirements either by increasing (positive vari-
ance) or decreasing (negative variance) earned FTE increments at specified location(s) or situations due
to unique mission or environmental differences. Many models are often created to predict the average
FTE requirement per various levels of workload demanded. Such models thus seek to capture the man-
power required to do work that is common to all applicable locations. However, in actual work settings,
certain processes or work activities are frequently not performed at all locations. Moreover, operational
conditions at a location are not always the “average” conditions depicted within the model. If relevant
and significant, these conditions can be addressed through calculation of positive or negative variances
for the given location and situation.
For instance, a mission variance can add or subtract hours for location‑specific required work that
is not addressed in the work site description (a positive variance) or work identified in the work site
descriptions but not performed (a negative variance). These differences in work should be documented,
evaluated, and approved at appropriate level(s) as a matter of policy, not just through a local team
leader’s preference.
An environmental variance adjusts hours for required tasks that are addressed in a work site descrip-
tion but are affected by environmental differences among locations (i.e., mountainous territory or snow).
The need for environmental variances in NAS maintenance may be based on challenges related to snow
removal, need for de-icing of equipment, effects of a marine/salty environment on required corrosion
control activities, effects of geographical separation on travel times, presence of remote versus on-site
equipment or service monitoring capability, etc. For example, Technical Operations locations that main-
tain “inside the fence” systems may earn a normalized FTE requirement for the equipment maintenance

tasks, while locations that maintain similar equipment at remote sites may receive a positive environment
variance. In such circumstances, a “calculator” may be built into the model to compute the variance for
travel time based upon number of times the team must go to the remote site.
It is usually not cost-effective to pursue and document variances that drive small adjustments. When
building staffing models for small organizations, a half-FTE change may be worth documenting; how-
ever, for large organizations, the study team may establish a larger FTE value threshold for including
variances in the model.
Consider Various Components of Total Staff Time

Ideally, any advanced modeling effort needs to address various components of total staff time, includ-
ing direct productive time, indirect productive time, nonallowed time, nonavailable time, and on-call
time and other work situations (U.S. Air Force, 1995a:53-58).
Productive time is time workers spend doing work that is essential to achieve their mission. There
are two categories of productive work activities: direct work and indirect work. Direct work activities
are required by guidance, technical orders, or directives; are essential to and directly support the work
site’s mission; and can be identified with a particular service or end product. Direct work activities are
considered productive work that must be accomplished as part of the organization’s primary mission.
The time required for direct work tasks should be documented by task, whereas indirect work may be
quantified either through similar means or by applying a previously computed and agreed upon indirect
allowance factor to the total direct hours.20
In contrast, indirect work consists of necessary but supporting activities. Indirect work is performed
in support of the function, does not add value to a particular end product, and may not be readily identifi-
able with a specific output or service. Common examples of indirect work include participating in human
resource activities, giving management direction, preparing reports for higher level review, attending
meetings, and housekeeping activities. If indirect work is not measured independently, then the analysts
need to create an allowance factor and apply that factor as part of the model algorithm by crediting the
measured hours of direct work with a percentage increase based on the indirect allowance factor.
The design of measures of critical data such as time to complete tasks and the careful collection of
that must neither omit measurement of some kinds of data nor double count them. In particular, work
dimensions such as travel, training, and supervisory tasks need to be carefully and consistently accounted
for to ensure inclusion without double or triple counting. For example, if the enterprise-wide mean travel
time associated with preventive maintenance of a specific type of navigational aid were credited to the
task “maintains navigational aid type X” and included in the total average direct process time, then travel
for such activities should not be re-counted as a separate indirect activity. As discussed above, substantial
location-specific deviations from the mean travel time could potentially be computed as a positive or
negative environmental variance. Similarly, the model should not credit travel at each subcomponent
of the task “maintains navigational aid type X” because the travel occurred only one time. Nor should
travel be counted for all tasks performed when a worker made only one trip but performed preventive
maintenance checks on all of the equipment at the remote location.
20U.S. Air Force requirements determination analysts sometimes choose not to perform indirect task measurement for every
function, as the Air Force has created separate standard indirect allowance task descriptions and factors (U.S. Air Force, 2011).

Nonavailable time is time that is directed and approved by management. During this time, the worker
is not available to perform direct or indirect productive tasks. Examples of nonavailable time include
approved leave, medical appointments, additional, directed duties such as serving as a voting liaison or
office security officer, and time spent in approved education and training. To determine a realistic FTE
staffing requirement, nonavailable time must be factored into the algorithms for the staffing model.
When accounting for nonmandatory leaves such as annual leave or medical leave in a staffing model,
the actual documented use of leave and not the maximum days allowed should be used; otherwise, the
model results may be artificially inflated.
Allowances for days off, holidays, leave, and medical absences need to be decided on and approved
(U.S. Air Force, 1995a). The original FAA modeling efforts dating from the 1980s and 1990s took many
of these into account, and Order 1380.40C documents the treatment of the different dimensions (FAA,
1992). Categories of allowable time, such as Labor Distribution Reporting (006), Watch Schedules (031),
Working Hours (032-036), Holidays (038), Annual Leave (040), Sick Leave (041), Family and Medical
Leave (043), Leave for Special Circumstances (044-045), and other such factors are specifically defined
in the current labor agreement between the Professional Aviation Safety Specialists (PASS) and the FAA,
signed on December 16, 2012 (Professional Aviation Safety Specialists, 2012). Other considerations
such as allowed time for meals, breaks, and rest should be considered and carefully defined. It should
be noted that some of the variances in allowances will be stochastic.
Personal, fatigue, and delay (PFD) factors may be incorporated into a staffing model to account for
necessary breaks, trips to the restroom, or other realistic and valid activities. 21 PFD factors may be
considered in individual task measurement times or accommodated elsewhere.
On-call Time and Other Work Situations. On-call time is a period of time when an off-duty worker
is available for work at a specified off-duty location and can be reached by telephone or other means.
When authorized work is required and cannot be deferred to the next shift or work day, a work measure-
ment effort should credit the work site with productive time expended and the travel time needed to get
to the job site and return to the off-duty location. Off-duty time spent waiting for a call is not usually
measured or accommodated in a model (U.S. Air Force, 1995a). However, because the FAA agreement
with PASS regarding ATSS personnel contains a provision for Compensated Telephone Availability,
such time should be considered in the model design process to optimize shift schedule requirements for
meeting peak outages or demands (Professional Aviation Safety Specialists, 2012).
Often, the term “standby time” is used to explain the time a worker is awaiting work. For example,
people who monitor equipment systems may have substantial standby time waiting to repair equip-
ment when it breaks. A study team can measure and include standby time in a model when such duty
is required and no other productive work (direct or indirect) can be accomplished. Workers who are
loaned to perform another function’s tasks should generally not be accounted for or included in a model
for their own function.
21For more information, see Lehto and Landry (2013).

Consider Incorporating Shift Profile Analysis into the Model Development Approach and Model
Application Tools
Maintaining equipment and providing services for a robust and safe NAS can require ATSS work-
ers to be at work, available, or on call for long periods of a day. Coverage of the NAS components 24
hours a day, 7 days a week is not uncommon in many locations. Normal work hours in a traditional
week schedule are 8.5 hours per day, including a meal break, for 5 days each week, with exceptions for
alternate work schedules such as 10 hours per day for 4 days a week, or for overtime and Compensated
Telephone Availability. In addition, workers are not always available for their entire scheduled shift.
Activities such as annual leave, sick leave, military leave, training, and travel to remote sites all result
in compensated workers who are not available to perform the tasks assigned to them during their shift.
A careful analysis of the shift scheduling and the work performed during shift can help optimize the
total system workforce requirements for an organization. For example, the Air Force uses shift profile
analysis to determine the amount of time its maintenance workers are available for direct work.
Consider Potential Indicators of Staffing Sufficiency Issues Before and After Model
Implementation
Seasoned work analysts often check three indicators of staffing sufficiency: (1) use of overtime, (2)
level of work site backlog, and (3) use of shortcuts to accomplish work. Examination of data in each of
these areas can help to reveal the extent of understaffing or overstaffing.
Use of Overtime. Overtime can be useful for addressing greater needs for personnel due to peak work
demands or temporary loss of personnel. However, excess use of overtime (or of borrowed workers from
other organizations and contract workers) may indicate that the threshold staffing levels or shift schedule
designs are not optimal within a work site. Steady use of large amounts of overtime can signal shortfalls
in available “regular shift” FTEs, either from inaccurate staff targets, poor allocation, or inadequate fill
action. In addition, high overtime utilization may indicate less than ideal management practices, which
may lead to fatigue or vigilance problems not conducive to high levels of job performance nor ultimately
to effective maintenance of the safety of the NAS.22
Work Backlogs. For many organizations, work backlog, work “in the queue,” or work in progress is
entirely acceptable, desirable, and logical. For the ATSS enterprise, it appears logical that periodic main-
tenance inspections and preventive maintenance activities would be pending for some period of time,
but not necessarily postponed for an extended time. Presumably, the longer the period of time these
activities are deferred beyond some limit, the higher the inherent risk to the NAS. Some work associated
with almost any activity can be deferred, but work deferred indefinitely can be a sign of insufficient
resources to meet the work demands. An important question for modelers to explore is whether or not
the backlogs are reasonable and growing or decreasing over time, and why (Ouvreloeil, 2001).
Backlogs of work are not always attributable to staffing deficits. Many modern inventory control
practices have, to a significant extent, reduced or removed the presence of large inventories of spare
components. Some maintenance delays may be attributed to the unavailability of parts, not the unavail-
ability of skilled ATSS workers to perform the work. The Air Force, for example, tracks metrics associ-
ated with the nonavailability of parts in order to analyze and improve logistics for aircraft maintenance
processes (U.S. Air Force, 2009).
22For more information on overtime considerations, see Capshaw (2011).

Use of Shortcuts. The FAA operates within a formal Safety Management System that has available an
array of tools and resources to prevent, identify, and analyze risk, including risk management through
maintenance policy and procedure changes (FAA, 2007a). Nevertheless, on-scene work measurement
or expert workshop review of tasks and times for many other maintenance-related fields have shown
that a work site may occasionally employ shortcuts or deviations from standard practices that are not
permitted or described in technical guidance in order to provide a service or maintain the required sys-
tems. Employing these shortcuts could be a valid innovation if properly studied and approved, but may
unfortunately create a hidden level of risk within the system and long-term negative effects overall. In
the modeling arena, if the time required for procedures officially documented in the Technical Operations
guidance is accurately measured, but in practice the work site operates differently from the guidance for
whatever reasons, the time estimates are likely to be inaccurate. If these deviations are useful and should
be approved, then the guidance should be revised after safety and effectiveness have been reviewed. The
underlying rationale for the use of shortcuts may, however, relate to perceptions of time pressure, poor
training, or a lack of updated guidance. Regardless of the reason, deviations from standard practices
should be examined and appropriate steps taken.
Quality Factors
The 2006 study of Aviation Safety Inspector staffing identified five important quality factors related
to predictive models: relevance, scalability, transparency, usability, and validity (National Research
Council, 2006). Box 3-1 defines these five factors, which were used by the current committee as criteria
when reviewing the FAA’s current and planned modeling efforts for ATSS personnel.
The 2006 report emphasized the importance of validity in assessing the value of a model:
Validity is the final and, in many respects, the most critical feature. The extent to which the predictions of
the model correspond to the actual, real-world outcomes constitutes its validity. Indeed, the most power-
ful means of evaluating a model’s worth—the ultimate proof of the pudding—is the direct comparison
of predicted with observed outcome (criterion) measures when such measures are obtainable. It is often
the case that the ultimate criterion (i.e., [NAS] safety) is not directly measurable in any practical sense,
so the model’s predictive validity must be estimated against surrogate criterion measures. (National Re-
search Council, 2006:33)
The prediction of outcomes associated with alternative levels of staffing is a necessary condition for
the model to be testable and its validity assessed. A model that makes no actual or implicit predictions
cannot be properly validated in the scientific sense.
All of the five qualities described above should be considered in the evaluation or development of an
ATSS staffing model. They apply equally to models that the FAA has used or is using as well as to any
future modeling effort it may undertake. (National Research Council, 2006:34)
SUMMARY AND CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING MODELING

A starting point for developing or assessing a staffing model is to review the nature of the work, the
environment under which the work is conducted, and the manner in which the work is accomplished.
The committee’s assessment of the work and the environment suggested that a viable staffing model
for ATSS should

BOX 3-1
Quality Factors
Relevance—capture right level of detail. Relevance concerns the extent to which the model addresses
the important portions of the issues for which it is designed and, equally important, the extent to which
it excludes extraneous or marginally relevant issues or data. Does the model capture all of the important
ATSS workload drivers? Does it operate at the right level of detail?
Scalability—usefulness for aggregation at higher levels, or predicting ATSS staffing needs by type of
organization/facility, division or geographical region, or by required skill or discipline?
Transparency—ease of understanding, or the extent to which the model can be explained and understood
by users of the model and those affected by decisions based on model implementation.
Usability—ease with which the model can be implemented and enhanced to make the predictions for which
it was designed. Does it have an interface that is sufficiently intuitive to enable the model users to enter
data efficiently and accurately? Is it appropriate to the skills and preferences of the intended users? Are
the results presented in ways that support decision making? Can the model easily be updated to reflect
changes in the ATSS work requirements and environment or changes in FAA policy?
Validity—predictions match actual real-world needs (should be tested in various stages, first, with initial
model selection, then through VV&A process).
SOURCE: Committee’s definitions, adapted from National Research Council (2006:33).
• capture the full extent of the NAS, the geographic diversity across facilities, and the staffing
implications of travel time for equipment in remote areas;
• clearly distinguish and quantify domain disciplines required in achieving workload demand; and
• include performance measures or outcomes, both final (ultimate) and intermediate, in order to
provide predictions regarding the outcomes of a given staffing plan.
A staffing model for ATSS should be “sufficient” in that it estimates staffing necessary to accom-
plish a given workload and is not simply a model that allocates a predetermined level of staffing across
work sites. Moreover, because the nature of the workload itself—repairing equipment that fails—has an
inherent stochastic component, serious consideration should be given to developing a stochastic staffing
model. Furthermore, the model should be able to predict consequences associated with staffing at various
levels, and these predicted outcomes should closely relate to what is actually observed at actual staffing
levels. Chapter 3 has discussed the potential criteria for model evaluation. Chapter 4 will review the past
and present FAA models used for the ATSS workers and examine how these models compare to some
of the modeling philosophies that this chapter has explained. It also provides further recommendations
that incorporate considerations introduced in this chapter.
Drawing on the previous discussion of the ingredients for successful modeling (i.e., a logical design
process, key model considerations, and vigilance in seeking to attain the five quality factors), the com-
mittee created a checklist or set of criteria, shown in Box 3-2, with which to evaluate past models,
models in progress, and other potential modeling approaches for the ATSS workforce. This checklist
is intended as an aid to a modeler considering the criteria to use when designing a model for ATSS
employees of the FAA.

BOX 3-2
Potential Criteria for Model Evaluation
Area 1. Logical Design Process

• Comprehensive Design
o Measurement Design—comprehensive plan with steps documenting study approaches, objectives,
means to gather and interpret the data, well-considered sample sizes and sites, amount of informa-
tion to be harvested, with testing and refinement elements included
o Data Type/Sources—logging and tracking of data such as equipment serviced, task, frequency, du-
ration, outages, availability, reliability (per ATSS reporting); requirements for task performance (per
specifications in rules and manuals); hours, overtime, shift; travel; allowances (per human resources
data systems)
o Data Collection Issues—methods (e.g., use of existing or subject matter experts’ estimates, historic
data, or data from conducting direct time study), availability of necessary data, cost and ease of
data collection, level of rigor in the data (e.g., viability, utility, standardization of organizational data),
amount of data to collect
o Analysis/Model Development and Selection—building person-hour to workload relationships that are
statistically valid and useful, creating electronic workbooks and Web systems to use and feed various
reports
o Implementation/Maintenance—include model utilization in policy documents, incorporate into budget
cycle, refine Web platform, continuous cycle for update, addition of new products/services and retire-
ment of legacy elements, etc.
o Model verification, validation, and acceptance procedures defined and carried out
• Stakeholder input (adequate consideration of factors from Chapter 2 should be evident)
Area 2. Structural Detail of Model

• Model Type
o Deterministic and/or stochastic components
o Based upon documenting an accurate foundational work site description, or a process-oriented
description, of work tasks
o Documents standard and unique work conditions and environment components to allow for variances
to normal situation in terms of additives, exclusions, deviations based upon mission, environment, or
technological differences
o Modular features for ease of update/inclusion of NextGen and legacy system changes

• Input variables
o Direct and indirect tasks captured and considered
o Allowances and Nonavailable Time—Personal, Fatigue, Delay, Sick, Leave, Holidays, etc.
o Treatment of travel—without double counting
o Standby Time—thoughtful capture and analysis
o Fixed requirements such as specifications and/or dictated crew size (e.g., usually safety-driven, as
in the “two person” rule)
o Detail of shift analysis and post staffing, to include treatment of peaks to handle contingency-based
work, risk, identification of standby time, along with review of flexibility to do training and deferrable
tasks within the standby
• Output variables
o Estimates needed for entire workforce or subcategories; types of organization, skills, and totals by
location, facility, or other category
o Not only gross FTE estimates but also ability to predict workforce needs by skill area
Area 3. Quality Factors

• Transparency
• Scalability
• Usability
• Relevance
• Validity
Area 4. Performance
• Estimate expected availability rate as function of staffing
• Estimate the cost of various levels of service or risk
• Estimate changes in levels of service and consequence
• Review and address these three issues:
o Use of overtime
o Work backlogs
o Use of shortcuts
• Examine NAS redundancies
• Link to the agency’s performance metrics

FAA Approaches to Estimating Staffing of

Chapter 4 examines how well the existing staffing models for the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) Air Traffic Organization—namely, the Windows Staffing Standards Analysis System (WSSAS),
the Tech Ops District Model, and the new approach planned by the Grant Thornton study team—comport
with the modeling philosophy and criteria developed in Chapter 3. The aim of all three models was, and
is, to help the FAA define its needs for accurate and timely staffing. The committee reviews the exist-
ing two models and the Grant Thornton approach by comparing them against the criteria identified in
Chapter 3 to evaluate how well they meet the needs of the FAA. Next, alternative approaches from other
domains, including the U.S. Air Force, FAA Air Traffic Control, and other countries, are discussed as
additional potential sources for alternative and perhaps better models.
This review provides information regarding the desirable and undesirable features of existing staffing
models and lessons learned from them. The comparison between the two FAA Airway Transportation
Systems Specialists (ATSS) staffing models and their evaluation against explicit, documented criteria
together provide a logical basis for future approaches that are likely to lead to valid models with practical
utility for both staffing level decisions and allocations of a predetermined staff level to sites and tasks.
The committee has highlighted those aspects of existing models that provide useful data and techniques,
to aid the FAA in building on existing capabilities.
The committee drew on a number of sources for its evaluation of the various models, including FAA
reports of evaluations of the two existing models (Grant Thornton, 2011), users’ and technical guides
to the WSSAS model (FAA, 2012g), and a final recommendations report on the existing models and
proposed approach, written by Grant Thornton (2012). These written sources were supplemented by
briefings from relevant personnel at FAA, Professional Aviation Safety Specialists (PASS), and Grant
Thornton, interviews with FAA management and Grant Thornton, interviews with PASS leadership,
and stakeholder input via a public invitation to comment on the project via an Internet website (see
Chapter 2). Another major resource was the committee members’ own expertise in modeling, human-
systems integration (HSI), industrial and systems engineering, organizational psychology, economics,
and operations research and their experience in industry, aviation, the U.S. Air Force, and the Depart-
ment of Defense. Two technical papers on queuing models of ATSS maintenance tasks and their staffing
64

FAA APPROACHES TO ESTIMATING STAFFING OF AIRWAY TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS SPECIALISTS 65
(Hecht and Handal, 2001; Hecht et al., 1998) provided data on the feasibility of stochastic modeling
and outcome prediction in this domain. The enabling legislation for the current study specified that the
resulting report to Congress be completed within 1 year; this time constraint precluded the committee
from gaining hands-on experience with the two existing systems, as neither of them is currently in use
or projected for future use.
HISTORY OF FAA MODELING EFFORTS FOR ATSS STAFFING

The existing staffing models and the Grant Thornton approach are briefly described here as the basis
for more detailed examination and assessment in subsequent sections.
WSSAS Staffing Model

The WSSAS staffing model, which was developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, is an updated,
Microsoft Windows–based version (using the Microsoft Access database management system) of an
earlier MS-DOS-based program. The two factors driving staffing demand in the model are (1) the
number and types of equipment maintained, and (2) the time required to maintain the equipment. The
WSSAS model is based on a synthesis of the required maintenance times for each piece of equipment
in the inventory (Grant Thornton, 2011). Original data on times required for both routine and nonroutine
maintenance come from direct time studies conducted by the FAA or studies conducted by contractors
as part of the development of each piece of equipment. Times for each task are totaled across each unit,
with allowances added for travel time, nonavailable time, and indirect work. An overhead allowance
is also added to cover “technical and program support.” Many reports from the model are available to
managers, but the two most frequently discussed in committee meetings were the “Book 2A” and “Book
2B” reports. The Book 2A report gives overall staffing levels for each unit for current and previous years,
with the added allowances. Book 2B provides a further staffing breakdown by ATSS specialties (FAA,
2012g). WSSAS is a complex model that requires considerable input data on a regular basis to provide
managers with useful information regarding staffing levels. There were no data on reliability or validity
of staffing predictions of this model, although users appeared to trust its outputs.
Tech Ops District Staffing Model

The Tech Ops District Model was developed in 2006 and updated in 2007 as an alternative to
WSSAS.1 It is a regression model based on then-existing staffing levels and six high-level input variables,
including a number of large Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) facilities. Its basic premise
is that the overall 6,100 staffing level (with an annual 2.5 percent reduction in head count based on
“expected efficiencies”) is an exogenously determined (i.e., set by others without regard to the findings
of a model) staffing level that is not subject to change through staffing model analyses. The model uses
six predictors of district-level workload requirements, derived from a larger set of potential workload
predictors. The regression was constructed based on 38 districts and accounted for more than 93 percent
of workload variability in the dataset. All six coefficients were positive and statistically significant, which
are necessary conditions for a structurally sound model as well as a valid one.2 Output from the Tech
1Tech Ops Models: WSSAS and District Model. Personal communication from the FAA to the Committee on Staffing Needs
of Systems Specialists in Aviation, November 29, 2012.

2Rich McCormick, director, Labor Analysis, FAA, data from unpublished 2006 “Technical Workforce Staffing and Training
Plan.”

Ops District Model gives the staffing levels for each district or unit. The Tech Ops District Model is
simpler than the WSSAS model and requires fewer data inputs to produce outputs in each time period.
Staffing Approach by Grant Thornton–Led Study Team

In April 2011, Grant Thornton was commissioned by the FAA to bring together a team, including
representatives from PASS and FAA management. This team assessed the WSSAS and Tech Ops models
and began to develop a new approach. In a presentation to the committee, FAA representatives noted that
“presently, staffing decisions are based on management’s assessment” rather than formal models. 3 The
assessment of the two current models by Grant Thornton (2011) was designed to influence the design of
new models, based on the best features of existing models, to better serve the staffing needs of ATSS. A
design based on this assessment is now being studied (Grant Thornton, 2012), although bids for devel-
opment have not been solicited and the new model is not intended to be completed before developers
can take advantage of any recommendations in this National Research Council report.
Based on their review of the FAA historical models, Grant Thornton has proposed an alternative
approach, which is the subject of this section. Their methodology builds on the positive aspects of the
WSSAS. Staffing demand is estimated from the amount and type of equipment supporting the National
Airspace System (NAS) and the time necessary to maintain each component. The validity of the WSSAS
(and consequently its predictive ability) was questioned by Grant Thornton because of questions regard-
ing the data capture and the integrity of the data inputs used in the model. Because the main causes for
concern with existing models were seen to be validity of data capture and lack of prediction ability, an
improved approach should address these concerns (Grant Thornton, 2011). Note that “predictive abil-
ity” as used by Grant Thornton means the ability to accurately estimate changes in staffing levels as
new equipment enters the NAS. The WSSAS model did not do that very well because of weaknesses
in the data.
To improve the predictive ability of a new model, Grant Thornton made three suggestions: (1) Place
greater emphasis on testing and using valid data with improved data collection processes, potentially
from currently collected sources such as the Facility, Service, and Equipment Profile (FSEP), Remote
Monitoring and Logging System (RMLS), and Labor Distribution Reporting (LDR). (2) Use WSSAS as
a solid basis for testing a new, predictive model’s results in real situations, to evaluate the new model’s
accuracy. (3) Produce reports in a format understandable to the different end users. Such an approach
could use stakeholder analysis (i.e., the systematic collection of the needs of the various stakeholders
for the model) to determine explicit model requirements, collect the necessary data, plan and develop
the model, and evaluate the model results against data. Stakeholder analysis describes the HSI process
of determining what those who have to interact with the model (input, analysis, and output) require
to have the model meet their job needs. Neither WSSAS nor a model constructed by the proposed (to
date) Grant Thornton methodology would be able to predict the performance consequences of staffing
at various levels.
3Rich McCormick, director, Labor Analysis, FAA, presentation to the Committee on Staffing Needs of Systems Specialists
in Aviation, October 19, 2012.

COMPARISON BETWEEN CURRENT AND PAST MODELS

To provide a sound basis for recommendations on future ATSS staffing models, the committee com-
pared in detail the characteristics of each of the above models and compared each model with the criteria
for valid staffing models provided in Chapter 3. The main headings of Table 4-1 are the four criteria areas
of Box 3-2: Logical Design Process, Structural Detail, Quality, and Performance. To provide a succinct
comparison that can guide future modeling efforts, Table 4-1 shows the relevant characteristics of the
compared models as rows, with the three models as columns. Committee findings and conclusions on
each of the three models are presented in the subsections below.
Findings and Conclusions on WSSAS

The WSSAS model was based on valid structure and suitable types of data and data sources. Essen-
tially, WSSAS incorporated the pieces of equipment at each site, the number of technician hours required
for each corrective or preventive maintenance action on each piece of equipment, and the probability
of failure for each type of equipment. These measures were combined to establish the maintenance
workload for each piece of equipment, and workloads were summed across all equipment at the site.
Allowances were added for technician unavailability (e.g., training, leave, travel, etc.), and a factor was
added for other required activities (indirect productive activities, including time at meetings, recordkeep-
ing, housekeeping, etc.). Time data came from time studies and consensus judgments of subject matter
experts, supplemented by contractor-provided times for new equipment. Neither the reliability of input
data to the model nor the validity of the output staffing levels was measured.
WSSAS was a deterministic model; in other words, the effects of unpredictable events were not
factored into the model. The reports generated were useful to supervisors and administrators, and the
model was reasonably transparent to all users. The model has been updated continually since its develop-
ment; however, it has not been used recently. There was never an intention to validate WSSAS against
outcome measures such as NAS equipment availability.
Finding 4-1: The WSSAS model does not appear to contain stochastic elements in places where these
may have been appropriate.
Conclusion 4-1: The approach represented by the original WSSAS model included many of the impor-
tant variables (e.g., equipment counts and task durations together with failure rates and allowances) to
determine the staffing required at each site.
Finding 4-2: The WSSAS model made no prediction of outcomes such as the impact of staffing levels
on NAS availability and safety.
Findings and Conclusions on the Tech Ops District Model

The Tech Ops District Model was an allocation model only (a model aimed at distributing available
resources effectively, irrespective of their collective adequacy), rather than a sufficiency model (a model
designed to predict the resources needed to sustain system performances at an acceptable level). Thus,
it is not an appropriate basis for moving forward toward a valid model for determining staffing require-
ments. It is a nonmeasurement regression model that only shows, at best, how a number of variables are
related in a statistical manner to then-current staffing levels by district. The Tech Ops District Model was
not validated against outcome measures and is restricted by the fixed number of employees (i.e., 6,100).
It does not have the capability to predict numbers needed based on goals of safety and performance.

68
TABLE 4-1 Structure and Evaluation of Current and Proposed Staffing Models for ATSS
WSSAS Tech Ops District Model Grant Thornton Approach
Logical Design Process
Comprehensive Design Uses number and types of equipment Uses a regression model where Plans to use number and types of
Captures major with estimates of task duration dependent variable is workload equipment with estimates of task
workload drivers for each, plus allowances using an staffing. Rather than the tasks duration for each, plus allowances. Key
algorithm described in WSSAS User themselves, six high-level parameters will be estimated largely in
Manual (Grant Thornton, 2012). determinants of workload are the the same way as the WSSAS model.
independent variables.
Stakeholder Input No data on the stakeholder input were Regression-based to give rapid Plans to gather input from stakeholders
Based on needs of all available for this historic model. assessment and minimize input. as basis for structure, inputs, and
users User input not specifically stated to outputs.
committee.
Structural Detail
Model Type Deterministic, additive task-based Multi-variable regression of existing The proposed approach is deterministic

Additive components vs. components based upon number workforce in baseline year against and additive, closely linked to the
regression and types of systems maintained existing drivers. The regression model WSSAS model. It follows the basic
and measured or estimated person- identifies the predictor variables driver of the WSSAS model: equipment
hours required to maintain each. within a district that directly impact inventory and time for maintenance
Model applies allowances to account staffing and uses these variables to of that equipment. It is deterministic
for time spent on nonmaintenance estimate staffing at the district level. in that corrective maintenance is
activities and generates staffing This is actually an allocation model, not considered stochastically but is
requirements. because no true measurement was based on historical, deterministic time
performed. requirements (Grant Thornton, 2012).
Input Variables Captures equipment types Not based on true measurement of Plans use of equipment types and task
Uses all significant and task durations plus travel hours required to perform duties, durations, plus travel times. Intended
inputs times; accommodates other FTE detailed equipment counts, or tasks. inputs:
consumption through use of No coverage of allowances. Variables • New categories of work. Change
allowances. useda: from 3 (recurring, nonrecurring,
• District needs = Number of allowances) to 7 (maintenance,
technical workforce employees monitor and control, other duties,
needed in the district. admin, nonrecurring, travel,
• Maximum hours available. allowances) (Grant Thornton, 2012).
• Number of commissioned and • Adjustment factors. Nonstandard
noncommissioned, nonreportable 2 person, environmental, work area
facilities, services, and equipment. type.
• Number of Air Route Traffic • New workload assessment process
Control Centers (ARTCCs), to determine level of effort (Grant
Large TRACON facilities, national Thornton, 2012).

network centers. • Improved Precommission Facility
File (PFF) for estimating new
staffing requirements as a function
of equipment changes.
Output Variables Variety of reports as WSSAS outputs, Gives District-level staffing based on Plans to use stakeholder input to guide
Produces all required synchronized to the FAA’s budget 2005-2006 levels and planned 2.5% appropriate outputs. Will be Web-
outputs cycle. Book 2A and Book 2B were per year overall staffing reduction. based and use WSSAS outputs as the
most frequently cited as useful basis for required outputs. Plans to
outputs. Book 2A report gives overall apply an organization-specific version
staffing levels for each unit for of overhead within the model for
current and previous years with the District, Service Area, and National
added allowances. Book 2B provides reports. District personnel noted that
a further staffing breakdown by their definition of overhead includes
ATSS specialties. Outputs include administrative personnel, supervisors,
estimations of needed overhead (FAA, and potentially program support. At
2012g:4). FAA headquarters, Technical Support
and additional levels of management are

included (Grant Thornton, 2012).
continued
69
70
TABLE 4-1 Continued

WSSAS Tech Ops District Model Grant Thornton Approach
Sources of Data Relied on direct time study data for Data gathered from sources readily Data sources are improved versions
Subject-matter expert durations, Supplemented by estimates available at higher management and of the following FAA systems (Grant
estimates vs. current gathered by experienced analysts. staff levels. Specific data sources are Thornton, 2012):
staffing vs. time study Other data collected from systems as above, namely: FSEP with improved PFF to better
(see Chapter 3 for fed by a combination of technicians • District needs—Number of predict future demand.
discussion of time who performed maintenance, technical workforce employees RMLS is used for logging and
estimates) data personnel at facilities, and needed in the district. tracking maintenance and has several
management. • Maximum hours available. components:
Uses the following data-specific • Number of commissioned and • logging/tracking tool
sourcesa: noncommissioned, nonreportable • reporting tool
• FSEP—identifies type of facilities, services, and equipment. • scheduling tool
equipment/services, specific • Number of ARTCC, large • log for outages and maintenance
configuration of the equipment TRACON facilities, and national events.
and its location; predicts new network centers. LDR is FAA system for logging time
equipment and decommissioning worked on specific activities. System
of old equipment. has several known weaknesses, but it
• Cost centers (facility). can at least be used reliably to account
• Staffing values file—workload for leave allowances.
level of effort for each eLearning Management System for
configuration of equipment. tracking training; will be suitable as
• Categories of work—recurring, input for training allowance.
nonrecurring, and allowances.
Quality

Usability Output reports were assessed as Easy to use, but output of limited Usability not yet measured, but
Easy to use and update meeting users’ needs. Updated value to users. good process should be followed
through adding data on new for obtaining user input at design
equipment and revising data on stage. Uses archival data sets already
current equipment as physical being collected so should be easier
equipment and processes changed. than WSSAS to update. A likely
New time studies rarely performed. improvement over WSSAS in that
System fell out of use largely because it will be centrally updated and
of difficulty of updating. maintained.
Staffing Validity Was widely seen by users as giving Assumed then-current District Validity in the context of the plans for
Predicts staffing sensible staffing levels until it became staffing levels. This model only this model includes tests to ensure that
levels perceived to be outdated. redistributed resources based on staffing equation code is without error,
appropriate • FSEP data should be used to ratio of current workforce to various works as intended, and incorporates a
identify current NAS systems, workload predictors. Also forced a priori validity of subject matter experts.
subsystems, equip and services in 2.5% per year decrease in available There is no validation in the sense of a
the new model.a resources per year on assumption that prediction that is compared to a realized
• FSEP not as accurate in predicting undocumented efficiencies would be value for staffing consequences. The
out-year additions, deletions, achieved. plans indicate better prediction of new
and modifications to systems, staffing demands with improvements in
equipment, and services due to the PFF.
cumbersome modifications to
model required because of PFF
data limitations.
• Some perception that the model

may have been generous or
overstaffed, as levels predicted
were rarely fully funded and yet
mission objectives still appeared to
be met.
Transparency Widely accepted by administrators Not task-based, thus not transparent Aims for understandable formulation
Ease of understanding and users as transparent basis for to final users. based on task durations for each
workload planning because of logical equipment type, plus allowances.
structure of equipment counts, Similar to WSSAS.
performance times, and allowances.
Scalability Can be scaled down to level of District-based only. Would require Designed to aggregate at necessary
Can be aggregated at individual specialty and scaled up to new regression to aggregate at higher levels, similar to WSSAS. Plans to go
various levels district and national levels. levels or to decompose to individual down to level of individual specialty
specialty level. and be aggregated to district and
national levels.

Performance
Consequence Validity None. No consequences on system None. Outputs will not include consequences
Predicts safety and availability or maintenance backlogs of staffing such as maintenance
throughput outcomes are predicted, and thus WSSAS was backlogs or expected system availability
never tested for validity. rates.
aTech Ops Models: WSSAS and District Model. Personal communication from the FAA to the Committee on Staffing Needs of Systems Specialists in Aviation,
November 29, 2012.
71
Any work regression model, without measurement of actual hours required to perform the task, will
necessarily preserve the status quo in terms of the staffing level that is input to the regression. Therefore,
the performance consequences of the output distribution of staffing cannot be assessed with the model
and may not meet current or future performance requirements. The committee advises against the Tech
Ops District Model as a source of either framework or data for future work, and this report does not
consider it further as a basis for FAA staffing models.
Finding 4-3: The Tech Ops District Model was an allocation model and not a sufficiency staffing model.
Conclusion 4-2: The Tech Ops District Model is not an adequate framework for future work.
Findings and Conclusions on the Grant Thornton Approach

The design proposed by Grant Thornton for a staffing model appears to be an extension of past
efforts. The Grant Thornton approach builds on the WSSAS model but suggests improvements to the
key data sources for the future model. It appears to capture the relationships between equipment and
maintenance staffing, and it has provisions for idiosyncratic factors (variances) affecting staffing.
Although the Grant Thornton design represents distinct improvements over WSSAS, the committee
has two concerns with an approach built on the basis of the WSSAS model. First, corrective maintenance
in the ATSS job often occurs in an unscheduled, stochastic manner, and the WSSAS model does not
account for the intrinsically stochastic nature of these events. Even if some elements like mean time
between component failures can be predicted, some randomness or unpredictability related to the timing
and location of a specific failure requiring corrective maintenance remains. Before dismissing various
probabilistic aspects of maintenance work and methods, these stochastic elements and their relationship
to adequate and safe staffing levels need to be understood and thoroughly explored to determine if and
how they should be included in the model design.
Second, like the WSSAS and Tech Ops District Models, the proposed model does not predict the
consequences or results of staffing at alternative levels. It would be advisable to gather data necessary
to study stochastic properties of outages, required time to repair, and shift profile dynamics mentioned
in Chapter 3. It would also be helpful to explore potential linkages of key internal Technical Operations
performance metrics to various levels of staffing allocations.
Finding 4-4: The Grant Thornton prospective model builds on the earlier WSSAS model, and thus
inherits some of its strengths and limitations. Its strengths include the same elemental data structure,
supplemented with more recent data partly derived from existing data bases.
Conclusion 4-3: Based on the latest description of the proposed model in the Grant Thornton report, the
limitation of the Grant Thornton approach is the plan for a deterministic model that does not consider
the implications of stochastic elements. Further, it makes no predictions of outcome measures such as
NAS equipment availability and safety.
There are a number of criteria based on the committee’s analysis from Chapter 3 that both the
WSSAS model and the proposed Grant Thornton approach meet. Both of these models are task-based,
using counts of equipment to be maintained and times required to maintain each piece as key inputs for
a task. They also include allowances and variances to take account of indirect work, such as meeting
attendance, paperwork, and administrative time, as well as travel time variances. They are solid logical
models with only two omissions from the criteria in Chapter 3: (1) Neither of the models has a stochas-
tic component to capture the inherent variability of task times. (2) Neither model’s outputs are directly

related to risk factors or overall NAS performance and safety. If the FAA were not concerned with these
two issues, then the proposed model would be adequate.
POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE MODELING APPROACHES

Before starting a major effort in model development, organizations commonly look to models that are
in use in analogous situations elsewhere, both internal and external to the organization. These working,
analogous models can provide a reasonable basis for evaluating approaches to new model development,
as well as insights and lessons learned from others’ experiences. In the case of staffing models, an exist-
ing model that is both accepted and used within the organization can be an important starting point for
the development and design of a new model.
Within the FAA, staffing models are used for at least two other job series—en route air traffic con-
trollers (see National Research Council, 2010) and aviation safety inspectors (see National Research
Council, 2006). The committee examined these FAA models for insight into model development pro-
cesses that have worked in the past to give FAA management and staff useful models for staffing the
organization. The committee notes that Section 608 of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Mod-
ernization and Reform Act of 2012 mandates a study of air traffic control staffing, with an approximate
completion date of mid-2014. However, that study is running in parallel with this study, and findings
from it are not yet available.
The committee sought models from organizations that have a workforce similar to the ATSS work-
force. Specifically, the committee attempted to review models from the Canadian and German equivalents
of the FAA, and from the U.S. Air Force.
Other FAA Staffing Models

An effort within the FAA’s Office of Aviation Safety (AVS) organization resulted in creation of
model criteria for staffing standards for the aviation safety inspector workforce (National Research
Council, 2006). The committee understands that the AVS Staffing Tool and Reporting System (ASTARS)
includes a predictive model for both the safety technical specialist workforce and the operational support
workforce. ASTARS provides specific modeling equations for position types (e.g., operations inspec-
tors, maintenance inspectors). The model considers the complexity requirements of specific jobs (based
on factors such as the size of the fleet being inspected, the variety of aircraft type for which a specific
inspector is responsible, and the experience levels of the maintenance staff subject to inspection). The
committee understands that the FAA is also expanding the use of LDR data in ASTARS. The use of LDR
data was considered problematic for the AVS workforce in the past because of reporting inconsisten-
cies among the aviation safety inspectors personnel and limited categories for reporting certain types of
tasks (National Research Council, 2006), and this committee has heard similar concerns from the ATSS
workforce, as discussed in Chapter 2. If the AVS organization has now overcome those concerns about
LDR, understanding their process could help the Technical Operations organization as it develops its
models. Regardless of the use of the LDR for data input, the parallels between the AVS organization
and the Technical Operations organization make the AVS model criteria a useful source for modeling
processes in Technical Operations.

U.S. Air Force Staffing Models

The U.S. Air Force has employed teams of manpower analysts to create staffing models for many
years. Currently, the Air Force Manpower Division of the Air Force Personnel Center (formerly the Air
Force Manpower Agency) provides Air Force officials at all levels with the tools to identify essential
personnel resources required for the effective and efficient accomplishment of the Air Force mission.
These tools are used to program personnel resources and are used as the foundational target for access-
ing, training, assigning, and utilizing Air Force personnel resources. Air Force representatives presented
the committee with an overview briefing of their modeling and requirements determination process.
Because the Air Force includes a number of occupations that are similar to the ATSS job series in the
FAA, the committee spent substantial time reviewing the models that the Air Force uses to establish
staffing standards for some of those occupations.
These models included Air Force Manpower Standards (AFMS) for Ground Radio Maintenance
(AFMS 38AC), Meteorological and Navigation Systems Equipment Maintenance (AFMS 38AA), and
Air Traffic Control and Landing Systems Radar Maintenance (AFMS 38AB) (see U.S. Air Force, 1998,
1995b, 1994, respectively). Each of these models quantifies the manpower required to accomplish the
tasks described in a detailed process-oriented description for varying levels of workload. The AFMS
outline specific core team requirements and predict personnel resource needs based upon counts of spe-
cific equipment sets or equipment equivalents, multiplied by a measurement of personnel-hours required
to maintain the various end-items. Several of the models contain variances for factors such as extended
travel distances, unique equipment, corrosion control, seasonal storm days, and snow and ice removal.
The instructions outline application of various allowances and factors and refer the reader to tables that
show the FTEs required by skill specialty and grade.
Although the Air Force has used these specific models for an extended time, the committee under-
stands that new process-oriented models are currently under development, some of which may combine
existing methods with process modeling techniques. The models the committee reviewed are similar in
process, structure, and output to the FAA’s WSSAS model.
The Air Force employs the Logistics Composite Model (LCOM) program to identify the manpower
positions required to perform many aircraft maintenance activities. It is now a SIMSCRIPT 4 model that
can run on many current desktop PCs, with many tailored versions built for specific weapon systems
and scenarios. The LCOM simulation model integrates stochastic features such as queuing, Markovian
processes, and vast amounts of available maintenance data to support a wide range of investigations into
resourcing, skills required, staffing levels, performance, and consequences. Several iterations of the Air
Force staffing models are usually run to help establish suitable outputs for creating staffing scenarios,
which are often tied to peacetime or wartime utilization of the aircraft fleet.
Other Potentially Relevant Models

Although the committee requested detailed modeling information from NavCanada and Deutsche
Flugsicherung, the Canadian and German counterparts to the American FAA, these private organiza-
tions were not able to release any formal documentation concerning their proprietary staffing models.
4According to the website dictionary.com, SIMSCRIPT is a free-form, English-like general-purpose simulation language
produced by Harry Markowitz and colleagues at RAND Corporation in 1963. It was implemented as a FORTRAN preprocessor
for the IBM 7090 mainframe computer and was designed for large discrete simulations. It influenced Simula. Later versions
included SIMSCRIPT I.5 and SIMSCRIPT II.5.

Another potential source for modeling assistance could be from industry modelers such as those in the
aircraft maintenance sector whose models are proprietary and could not be viewed by the committee.
A LOGICAL APPROACH TO A NEW MODEL FOR ATSS

The search for alternative approaches to staffing models from other enterprises also provided some
insights that largely confirm that a detailed deterministic modeling approach in the near term, with per-
haps a later, more dynamic (stochastic) modeling approach, would be worthwhile and useful if feasible.
The FAA’s modeling efforts based on the 2006 report on staffing models for aviation safety inspectors
(National Research Council, 2006) resulted in the ASTARS model, which has been used to help deter-
mine 2014 and 2015 staffing requirements (FAA, 2012f). The en route air traffic controllers’ model
developed by Mitre’s Center for Advanced Aviation System Development (National Research Council,
2010) has been used in staffing of the en route centers except for those in Anchorage, Guam, and San
Juan and the Oceanic areas of New York and Oakland. Both of these FAA models and those used by
various parts of the Air Force are largely in line with the committee’s criteria discussed in Chapter 3
and summarized in Box 3-2.
The committee concluded from its analysis that the approach suggested by Grant Thornton was
likely to be successful if implemented because it is based on the logically sound approach of the WSSAS
model, rather than on the Tech Ops District allocation model. The WSSAS model was correctly based
on the counts of each equipment type at each location and on the times required for the different main-
tenance needs of those pieces of equipment. In addition, the proposed Grant Thornton approach would
be easier to maintain because it would use data capture from a number of existing sources to supple-
ment the proposed new time study data. Thus, its continuing data requirements would potentially be less
onerous than those of WSSAS, decreasing the risk that the new model would fall into disuse from lack
of updating as NAS equipment and maintenance requirements change over time. The committee notes,
however, that direct time studies can only measure durations of observable tasks. As work becomes less
physical and more cognitive, task durations become more difficult to measure because fewer observable
actions delineate their boundaries. It is still possible to measure overall task durations using time study,
but component elements may not be as clear.
However, the committee has two potential concerns with the proposed model. First, as currently
proposed, it is a deterministic rather than stochastic model, even though it is known that time between
failures and times for maintenance do vary, often considerably. Second, it predicts only staffing outcomes
rather than true performance outcomes. The committee believes it is worthwhile for the FAA to consider
each of these issues in more depth because they represent potential weaknesses that should be addressed
at an early stage of model design. The two issues are related in that the level of service provided by the
ATSS is a function of stochastic factors. In Chapter 3 the committee noted that the workload demand at
any one point in time is highly variable, combining relatively predictable scheduled tasks and relatively
unpredictable unscheduled tasks. The level of workload demand, when matched against the workforce
available, determines the level of ATSS service accomplishment and thus the functioning of the NAS.
The NAS has great designed-in redundancy; it even has mitigations such as increased Miles-in-Trail5
to keep traffic moving when all the redundancy is consumed. At some point though, the sheer number of
tasks instantaneously requiring attention, compared to the available number of ATSS personnel, could
lead to a loss of service. While much of the focus is on the nationwide staffing level, the maintenance
5Miles-in-Trail(MIT) restrictions are one of the most commonly used traffic management initiatives. They are most of-
ten used to manage arrival flows into airports. Traffic managers often use MIT restrictions to protect a destination airport,
particularly when capacity has been reduced due to weather or during periods of high volume. They also use MIT restric-

Probability of Service
Staffing Level
FIGURE 4-1 Conceptual logical relationship between service and staffing level. Probability of service is defined
as potential availability of the NAS. It incorporates both failures and time to restore.
SOURCE: Adapted from multiple figures in Hecht et al. (1998).
system can become overwhelmed locally, even if national staffing is adequate. A truly valid model of
staffing for ATSS personnel should be able to address this issue directly so that decision makers can
make intelligent decisions balancing level of service and taxpayer cost at both local and national levels.
An early example relevant to ATSS is the paper by Hecht and colleagues (1998). Their model used
a stochastic modeling approach with different technician skills, an exponential relationship between
failure rate and duration of repair, and a valid model of redundancy to predict the consequences of dif-
ferent staffing levels. In this way the impact of staffing decisions on overall system performance could
be quantified. Although the specific equipment levels, staffing levels, and redundancies used by Hecht
and colleagues (1998) may no longer be relevant, applying their methodology is likely to result in valid
models.
Better system design can increase the level of service for any given staffing level. For example,
technology improvements, training improvements, or organizational improvements such as better deploy-
ment of multi-skilled ATSS personnel can increase the safety and stability of the NAS. For any given
state of system design, there will be some relationship between service and staffing, generally showing
increased service with increased staffing. This logical relationship is shown in Figure 4-1.
It is not the responsibility of the modelers, nor of this committee, to determine the correct tradeoff
between staffing and service: defining the acceptable tradeoff is a policy role of the decision makers
at the FAA and ultimately of the federal government acting in the public interest. However, the FAA
should provide a model that defines the service/staffing curve with some transparency of its linkage to
underlying, objective drivers of that relationship. Such a model allows for explicit decisions on appro-
tions to smooth out flows to support merging streams. (Definition found at http://www.mitre.org/work/tech_papers/tech_
papers_07/06_0967 [June 2013].)

priate staffing level to meet the desired level of service and also allows for system improvements to be
evaluated in terms of their impact on overall system performance.
The committee has assumed in Figure 4-1 that all instances of service denial are equal, so that prob-
ability of service is the only measure of performance or effectiveness. However, the definition of service
also needs to include a dimension of severity of consequences. The same outage (e.g., of a Primary
RADAR or Radio channel) has far greater consequences at a major airport or en route sector than at a
regional airport. Severity measures could include the number of flights affected or even the number of
near-miss or actual collisions. This finding of differential impact from the same event implies that two
staffing sites requiring the same probability of service should not necessarily be equally staffed. Almost
any safety management system will include the two dimensions of probability and severity in assessing
risks (see Figure 3-3, as an example), so this concept is certainly not novel to the FAA.
A model incorporating both stochastic demand and stochastic ATSS staffing levels would be much
more realistic than a simpler deterministic model. Such a model would also enable those responsible
for staffing ATSS to show the impact of the chosen staffing levels on the measure of most direct interest
to the FAA’s air traffic management customers: the service level of the NAS. Whether a deterministic
or a stochastic model best meets the needs of the FAA is a decision that needs to be made based on the
inputs and modeling effort required in relationship to the outputs needed—and in particular the potential
consequences of ignoring the stochastic relationships. That decision should not be based on cost and
convenience alone.
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter has taken the modeling approaches and criteria developed in Chapter 3 from staffing
model knowledge and has applied them to the WSSAS model, the Tech Ops District Model, and the
proposed Grant Thornton approach to modeling. First, the factual basis of three models was tabulated and
assessed in terms of the criteria. Next, other sources of successful modeling in similar situations were
assessed for the insights they might add to the future models of ATSS staffing developed by the FAA.
The committee can summarize the attributes and the evaluation of models based on these attributes
as a set of statements about what are good criteria for the FAA’s future modeling efforts. The best sci-
ence currently available supports the following recommendations for a valid and usable model.
Recommendation 4-1: The FAA should develop a new ATSS staffing model based on the modeling
framework and criteria developed in this report. The model should be developed using a model structure
that is based on equipment inventory, failure rates, and time to perform each task, and should include
any valid allowances and accommodations. The model structure should include both deterministic and
stochastic estimates for variables such as task duration, as appropriate. The developed model structure
should be based on the different specialties of ATSS technicians, rather than providing just an overall
staffing level at each facility.
Recommendation 4-2: The FAA should develop a model that captures stochastic elements, unless it
can be demonstrated that stochastic aspects of the maintenance process have no material effect on the
staffing. For example, some tasks may exhibit multiple deterministic durations of identifiable elements,
rather than strictly stochastic durations.
Recommendation 4-3: The FAA should incorporate data for the model that are appropriate to the du-
ration and frequency of the tasks modeled and to its data collection capabilities. Specifically, the FAA

needs a process to systematically validate through direct observation both historical estimates of task
durations and estimates by subject matter experts.
Recommendation 4-4: The FAA should ensure that the ongoing data collection and input essential for
model use do not place an unacceptable burden on data providers.
Recommendation 4-5: The FAA should ensure that output reports from the system predict consequences
such as overall NAS availability time, deferred preventive maintenance activities, and overtime required.
Recommendation 4-6: The FAA should ensure that output reports are tailored closely to the needs of
FAA’s internal users at multiple organizational levels, in order to increase transparency of, and user
trust in, the model.

Implementation and Sustainability

of the Staffing Model
The success of any staffing model is dependent on both the validity of the model developed and
the manner in which it is implemented. The purpose of this chapter is to present and discuss both the
requirements for successfully implementing a staffing model and the factors that must be considered to
sustain the use of the model over time.
TIMELINE
Airway Transportation Systems Specialists (ATSS) are responsible for maintaining many types of
equipment in multiple types of locations across a wide geographic area, and as discussed in previous
chapters, many factors affect the staffing levels necessary to maintain the National Airspace System
(NAS) effectively and safely. Consequently, any model that will accurately estimate necessary ATSS
staffing levels will be complex and likely require a considerable amount of time to develop. Similarly,
a complex staffing model is likely to need a great deal of preparation for implementation, ranging from
testing the model to training Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) personnel to use the model, and it
is likely to take a considerable amount of time to implement.
The actual time required to develop such a model should be proposed by the developer. Experts on
the committee who have developed complex models estimate the development time to be between 12
and 24 months for a deterministic model and longer for a robust simulation tool like the Air Force’s
Logistics Composite Model. The implementation time could take 6-12 months in conjunction with the
FAA’s planning, programming, and budget cycle requirements. If there are significant changes to staff-
ing at locations, these may need to be managed over a longer time through attrition, hiring lead times,
etc. The FAA’s 2012 contract with the Professional Aviation Safety Specialists (PASS) labor union,
maintains the 6,100 ATSS staffing level as a staffing floor for 16 months (Professional Aviation Safety
Specialists, 2012). If the developer’s schedule estimates for model development and implementation
exceed the 16-month limit, the FAA will need to determine how to manage staffing levels until the new
staffing model is implemented.
79

1) Staffing Model
Development/
Amendment
6) Monitoring of
2) Staffing Model
Staffing Model
Pretest
Results
3) Preparation for
5) Staffing Model
Staffing Model
Validation
Implementation
4) Staffing Model
Implementation
FIGURE 5-1 Phases of staffing model development and implementation.
5-1.eps
Figure 5-1 provides a high-level overview of the major steps from model development through imple-
mentation. Each of these steps comprises a number of activities that should be undertaken to increase the
likelihood of a successful model launch. Each activity requires time and resources. Ideally, the FAA and
its staffing model experts would add to these major steps as needed and elaborate on each, specifying
what needs to be done by whom and creating a schedule to be followed for each step.
Step 1 in Figure 5-1 includes all the activities associated with the actual development of the model
that have been detailed in the preceding chapters. Specifically, Figure 3-1 in Chapter 3 details the five
phases that should be incorporated into model development. Although the workforce planning process
described in Chapter 3 and the implementation process discussed here in Chapter 5 overlap considerably,
this discussion is meant to highlight the activities related to successful implementation.
Although much of the work falls on the shoulders of the experts designing the model, the input into
the model will likely be the responsibility of FAA employees. The accuracy and the value of the results
of the model are limited by the quality of that input. Inaccurate, biased, or incomplete data can skew the
recommended staffing levels. Data from such time recording systems as the Labor Distribution Record-
ing system are noted for their limitations and the unreliability of their data. Similarly, information about
the time required for maintenance may be highly variable due to the age of the equipment, the amount
it is used, and the environment in which it is used. The FAA staff will need to participate in activities
aimed at developing processes that produce accurate information about the tasks ATSS personnel per-
form and the factors that affect the time required to perform them. Ideally, in the long term, the FAA

IMPLEMENTATION AND SUSTAINABILITY OF THE STAFFING MODEL 81
would embrace information technology enterprise architecture strategies. A comprehensive enterprise

architecture would encompass a visionary review and where appropriate, integration of the entire set of
information technology systems that ATSS workers and their leadership find necessary for data input.
Such an architecture would boost future modeling and total resource control, including control of staffing.
To begin, the FAA may desire to modernize human resource, time tracking, and maintenance systems,
and at the same time integrate them to achieve synergies between these systems, because they are used
by the ATSS workforce, as well as to oversee and manage it.1
The introduction of a staffing model offers an opportunity to establish productive relationships
among the people critical to developing, implementing, and using it, as well as an opportunity to create
systems that interact and support each other, limiting the need for redundant inputs of the same infor-
mation. The modeling experts, data experts, and ATSS functional experts could seize this opportunity
to form an enduring partnership and ensure communications intended to constantly improve the model,
its inputs, and its utility and usability. In addition, the need for an accurate time reporting data base that
feeds the staffing model creates opportunities to improve and integrate human resource systems.
Moreover, the more that FAA employees are involved in the development process—as opposed to
simply arriving one day to learn that a new staffing model is in place—the more likely they will be to
provide the inputs needed to make the model work well and the more they will be to have an “owner-
ship interest” in the model and be willing to help with the inevitable tweaking process as the model is
implemented. For the employees to participate willingly, they must understand that the purpose of the
model is to improve their ability to perform their jobs more efficiently and effectively, rather than, for
example, to see how much the workforce can be reduced or increased.
There are numerous Safety and Risk Management protocols available today to help quantify potential
risks both objectively and subjectively and then prioritize or target those risks that appear unacceptable or
too great not to take proactive measures to manage them better. Current FAA Safety and Risk Manage
ment frameworks and safety metrics may provide a starting point to assist in providing guidelines to
a specific modeling effort. Still, it is highly likely that a team of functional experts—to include those
with significant expertise in assessing and improving safety and decreasing risk—would be useful if
called on to help clarify risks inherent in processes and staffing associated with a particular study effort.
Step 2 involves a pretest of the model prior to full implementation. The purpose of this type of
pretest is to identify problems with the model and its results and rectify them prior to actual model use.
The basis for this evaluation is the set of quality factors described in Step 5. Because the evaluation in
Step 2 is preliminary and precedes the roll-out to users, several aspects cannot be assessed. For example,
usability cannot be studied directly as the ultimate users will not actually use the model prior to the Step
2 evaluation; however, pilot tests with samples of users should be encouraged.
Those who create the model need to generate a “trial model application,” compare the results to
current (or past) staffing levels, and collect data about the impact of the new staffing levels (whether
they are higher or lower or remain the same) on the FAA’s ability to maintain the NAS. For this test of
the model, in addition to collecting hard data for statistical comparisons, such as number and length of
outages, overtime hours, and backlog, the modelers need to prepare to collect qualitative data such as
leaders’ reactions to the differences between actual and proposed staffing levels.
Chapter 3 provides five criteria by which a staffing model should be evaluated: transparency, scal-
ability, usability, relevance, and validity. The new ATSS staffing model should be compared to these
standards and adapted as needed prior to implementation in Step 4. As review and improvement of the
1FAA NAS Enterprise Architecture. Presentation by Jesse Wjintjes, NAS chief architect, to the April 28, 2010, Meeting of
Agency Chief Architects. Available: http://www.jpdo.gov/library/PartnerAgency/Jesse_Wijntjes_Briefing.pdf [May 2013].

staffing model is a continuous process, these five criteria should be kept in mind once the model is
implemented and is being validated and amended.
Step 3 focuses on the activities necessary to prepare the FAA to transition from the current state of
staffing to a new process for establishing staffing levels via a carefully constructed staffing model. This
committee was specifically charged with considering transition in its statement of task (see Box 1-1).
Because the current staffing level for ATSS personnel of 6,100 is dictated by the contract to which the
FAA and PASS agreed (Professional Aviation Safety Specialists, 2012), the transition phase will not
focus on changing the procedures for estimating staffing requirements and allocation of those personnel.
Instead, the transition should focus on installing the new modeling system, procuring equipment (e.g.,
computer equipment to run the model and distribute reports), personnel, and other resources needed to
execute the model, ensure reliable data inputs, and educate users.
In addition, the FAA will need to develop a detailed plan, based upon input from the employees, to
implement the new staffing model. For example, the FAA must decide whether the staffing model should
be rolled out across the country at one time or implemented region by region, determining the pros and
cons to each approach and remediating as many of the disadvantages of the option chosen as possible.
In addition, the FAA must develop the timeline for the transition, checking to see what other events
might affect the implementation. This implementation plan also needs to contend with the implications
of decreased numbers of ATSS personnel needed in some locations and increased numbers of ATSS
personnel needed in other areas. Among such implications are preparing the organization for employee
movement (e.g., movement of ATSS personnel from areas where their expertise is surplus to other areas
where it is needed), employee redundancy, and new hiring demands. If the employee movements are
significant, they can be phased in over many fiscal quarters or several years. To the extent that person-
nel will be moved in ways that require bargaining with the labor union representing ATSS personnel,
the FAA should prepare for and fund contract negotiations with PASS. The current hiring process for
ATSS personnel and the training and certification processes are lengthy. When ATSS personnel are
needed in one location, the FAA must factor the hiring-training cycle into its plans. Although the task
may be daunting, the FAA might also consider improvements to the new hire processes as it develops
and implements a new staffing model.
In addition, the transition plan should include training of both the staff who execute the model and
all the managers and ATSS technicians who are affected by it. A new staffing model should be developed
by model experts in partnership with functional experts and staff. It will be an essential requirement of
implementation to train those who will use it so that all levels can use the reporting mechanisms of the
model. Because of the number of users and their varied needs, training FAA personnel in how to use
the system and interpret the output that is relevant to their work will not be a trivial undertaking, and
the personnel necessary to develop and provide the training, as well as support ongoing usage of the
modeling system, must be funded.
The model is likely to be better accepted if affected personnel (i.e., ATSS personnel and their manag-
ers) are informed of how the model works. This is part of transparency, one of the quality criteria from
the 2006 report, Staffing Standards for Aviation Safety Inspectors (National Research Council, 2006). An
understanding of the statistical intricacies of the model is probably not necessary for most employees;
however, an overview of the input and the considerations that the model takes into account will help
managers and ATSS personnel see how numbers are derived, appreciate the rationale behind increases
and decreases in staffing levels, and understand their role in providing quality inputs into FAA data
systems. This will also help FAA employees to be understanding contributors to periodic model refine-
ments and updates—for the good of the whole team and the system they support. In addition, PASS must

understand the basics of the model and support its development. Without PASS’s active participation, it
is unlikely that a sufficient model can be built or implemented.
Step 4 encompasses the actual implementation and rollout of the model according to the plans laid
out in Step 3, all of which should logically be synchronized with key FAA human resources, training,
and budget processes to the extent possible. It is a tool to help all of these systems to be more accurate
and effective by defining and defending the full-time equivalent requirements needed to serve the NAS.
Step 5 is the evaluation of the quality of the staffing model against the five standards discussed in
Chapter 3: relevance, scalability, transparency, usability, and validity. Once the model is implemented,
the modeling team must determine how well the model and its implementation are doing on the follow-
ing markers of quality:
• Relevance: Does the model capture the important drivers of workload and provide the appropriate
level of detail in the output?
• Scalability: Can the results of the model be accurately aggregated at higher levels to predict staff-
ing needs by facility, geographic region, or discipline?
• Transparency: Is the model understood by the users and those affected by it?
• Usability: Can the model be implemented and improved to make the intended staffing predictions
by those who were intended to use it?
• Validity: Does the staffing level predicted match the actual need and allow the ATSS workforce
to maintain the NAS safely and efficiently?
All of the quality standards are important, but validity is perhaps the most critical. Unless the results
of the staffing plan allow the FAA to maintain the NAS, nothing else is relevant. Also important is the
sustainability of the staffing system. If tasks associated with using the model are so laborious that they
cannot be accomplished in a reasonable period of time, the modeling system is unlikely to be used and
maintained regardless of its validity.
To a large extent Step 5 and Step 2 are similar. Both are designed to evaluate the model’s quality.
The evaluation in Step 5 is usually more extensive because it occurs after the model has been used.
Step 6 includes the activities that are necessary to sustain the model over a period of time: monitor
the staffing model, evaluate its adequacy, and make adjustments as needed. The staffing model that is
produced as a result of this study will be more effective if it is periodically reviewed and updated to
reflect the changing environment of ATSS work.
The FAA should try to identify as many sources of information about the effectiveness of the staff-
ing model as possible. While much information will come from the professionals who use the model to
estimate and allocate ATSS personnel, the FAA should consider identifying best practices from other
large organizations that use staffing models, as well as creating employee suggestion programs and
lessons-learned programs that encourage constructive criticism and helpful suggestions for remediation.
Both quantitative and qualitative data can inform the FAA of the strengths and weaknesses of
the staffing model. Hard data such as outages, overtime, and inspection and preventive maintenance
backlogs relate to the ultimate criterion: maintaining staffing at levels necessary to keep the NAS safe
and efficient. Qualitative data such as supervisors’ perspectives on revised staffing levels, including the
effect on employee fatigue and morale, can also help to evaluate the effectiveness of the model as well
as detect unintended consequences from applying it.
Note that the implementation cycle begins again after Step 6. As results from the FAA’s ongoing
evaluation against the five quality standards indicate where amendments are needed to the staffing
model, modifications should be made and the cycle of implementation should begin anew. An effective

and useful modeling process takes into account the lessons that have accrued from each round of the
implementation process and incorporates them into the next iteration of the staffing model, resulting in
a spiral development process. During this cycle, one change related to the modeling parameters may be
the result of several changes related to the work performed by ATSS personnel. For example, by using
the model through one staffing cycle, the modelers and the users of the model may learn that certain
forms of data are not reliable enough to produce sufficiently accurate estimates of staffing needs. The
inaccuracy of the data may be the result of aging equipment that demands varying amounts of time for
maintenance and repair. At the same time, the quality of the data may be affected by the time record-
ing system. Thus, changes to the model may be based on the retirement of legacy equipment as well as
revisions to the time recording systems currently in use. The timelines for each step of the process are
different across organizations and depend on multiple factors such as the variability of the job across
locations and functions, complexity of the model designed, the number of people who provide informa-
tion or must be informed, the resources available, the capabilities of the contractor who develops the
model, and other factors. Nevertheless, an important first step in the design of a staffing model project
will be to create a timeline that specifies the amount of time to be devoted to each stage of the project.
Recommendation 5-1: The FAA should prepare a timeline that details all the activities associated with
model development and implementation that must be completed and should ensure that the resources
necessary to accomplish each are available.
Recommendation 5-2: Once implemented, the FAA should continue to monitor the effectiveness of
the staffing model by collecting data from multiple sources and should make adjustments as needed to
enhance the accuracy of the model. In addition, the model should be adapted as changes to the major
components of the model are made, such as changes in the tasks performed, equipment used, and train-
ing processes.
In addition to testing the model and engaging in continuous improvement activities, there are several
critical elements related to implementation: the FAA staff who will administer the staffing model; equip-
ment and other resources; and funding for all aspects of the model including consultants, equipment,
FAA staff, training, and other costs. These critical elements are briefly discussed below.
FAA STAFF
FAA employees will be involved in the development and implementation of a staffing model in a
variety of roles. Even when experts employed by a vendor develop a complex staffing model, the FAA
needs to provide staff to guide the project and facilitate access to appropriate data and information to
support the development work. Unless the FAA staff provides input, or assigns functional experts to
periodically work with or as part of the modeling effort, the model that is created is not likely to take
into account accurately the important factors that affect staffing levels and to reflect actual staffing needs.
Similarly, FAA employees are likely to be involved in the actual execution of the model to establish
staffing levels. Again, even if significant work associated with the implementation is contracted to a
vendor, the FAA staff still needs to supply the input to the model, to ensure its accuracy and its thor-
oughness. The FAA will need to plan for these positions and take the steps necessary to ensure they are
filled with personnel with the appropriate knowledge, skills, and abilities.

Finally, the FAA staff provides the necessary continuity and historical knowledge for keeping the
model current and transparent. Without knowledge of how the model was built and has changed over
time, the use of any model becomes a mere rote procedure, performed ritually rather than used for its
original and important purpose.
In addition to the creation and actual execution of the model, there are other tasks that should be
performed during the implementation phase. For example, training of the managers and ATSS personnel
who are affected by the new staffing model will require training personnel who are able to explain both
the model and the implications of its use, not just the mechanics of input and output.
EQUIPMENT AND OTHER RESOURCES

In addition to personnel, other resources related to the implementation of the staffing model include
the computer systems necessary to run the models. The 2012 Grant Thornton report recommends a Web-
based system that allows for broad access and facilitates system updates (Grant Thornton, 2012:28). For
example, the Web-based system should allow multiple, simultaneous users while maintaining control of
the processes centrally. Modules that can be turned on or off, removed, and replaced will contribute to
the flexibility of a complex modeling system. Ideally, the Web-based system is updated continuously via
links to data feeds from other FAA systems. For example, a data base that maintains records of main-
tenance events, repairs, time spent, travel time, etc., could automatically feed and update the staffing
model and revise predictions. Development of this system would need to be funded and implemented
as part of the model development, if this choice is approved.
FUNDING
The investment in a staffing model is likely to be substantial. The FAA must be prepared to pay
for not only the consultants who develop it but also for the information technology systems on which
the resulting model is run, the FAA employees who interface with the consultants, and the training of
FAA employees who use the model. Additionally, the FAA must be prepared either to fund the number
of employees generated by the model or, if not funded, to clearly define and potentially live with the
risks taken on. The agency should also be prepared to explain how these risks would be prioritized and
mitigated. The funding requirement could be particularly challenging if the number of ATSS personnel
determined from the staffing model exceeds the current staffing level of 6,100. The funding must cover
not only the salaries of additional employees but also the processes by which these new employees are
acquired and trained. There are also costs associated with downsizing and relocating ATSS personnel
where they are needed, and these costs should be budgeted if that need arises.
The development and implementation of a staffing model will not occur in a vacuum. There are
undoubtedly many other process improvements related to the ATSS job that could be pursued and that
will have an effect on the ATSS personnel workload and the staffing model. The importance of human-
systems integration (HSI) was discussed in Chapters 1 and 3. As the FAA improves its operations in the
manpower domain of HSI, it will need to seek continued, deliberate improvement and synergy across
the other eight HSI domains. As the FAA implements a new staffing model, it has an opportunity to
evaluate its entire talent management system and optimize each component. For example, training and
certification procedures should be considered at the same time that a new staffing model is being devel-
oped and implemented. Reducing the time to certify technicians, either through more accessible training
or by the ability to certify experienced hires without travel to Oklahoma City, will affect the model’s
effectiveness in maintaining the efficiency and safety of the NAS.

Similarly, revising the process by which the appropriate staffing number is determined will empha-
size the importance of accurate input data and encourage a revision of the processes by which ATSS
personnel’s time is tracked, equipment inventoried, spare parts for the NAS maintained, etc. Process
improvements in how maintenance work is performed are expected to be ongoing, with continuous
improvements. All of these ancillary activities will also require funding in addition to what has been
allocated for the modeling effort.
This report has noted repeatedly the importance of informing ATSS and PASS about the new model
and explaining how it was developed, what it takes into account, how it will be implemented, etc. Funds
must be available for the staff that creates written informational brochures, designs talking points, deliv-
ers this information in an understandable way, and handles the questions that will arise. Because of the
importance of communications to the success of a new staffing model, professionals should be engaged
to maximize the clarity and persuasiveness of the material.
CONCLUSION
The FAA is on the right track by aggressively seeking a new and appropriate manpower model.
The FAA’s contract with Grant Thornton is commendable (Grant Thornton, 2012), but it can be taken
to a better level through deliberate analysis and inclusion of stochastic and performance dimensions in
modeling a required workforce, even as the ATSS workforce takes on the challenge of maintaining the
NAS in the coming decades. The 2-year process that FAA has already undertaken to assess its current
models and data systems and to plan ways to improve its data systems should facilitate model develop-
ment and implementation.
Ideally, the FAA will institute a rigorous implementation process for the new staffing model and
related processes and will embark on the journey of continuous improvement. In the future, the staffing
system will be regularly reviewed and improved at the same time as other process improvements that
will increase both the efficiency and the safety of the NAS. Implementation of a new staffing model
includes a number of tasks, including activities such as acquiring computer equipment to host the model,
educating users, and evaluating the model against the criteria for quality multiple times. A robust staff-
ing model is likely to improve the process for allocating staff and contribute to the maintenance of the
NAS; however, the implementation and use of that staffing model will require considerable attention
and resources from the FAA on an ongoing basis.

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Appendixes


Appendix A
Committee Biographies
Nancy T. Tippins (Chair) is senior vice president at Valtera, a division of the Corporate Executive
Board. Her expertise includes the development and validation of selection tests and other forms of
assessment for management and hourly employees and the design of performance management and
leadership development programs. She has worked extensively with computer-based test administra-
tion, developing her first computer-administered test and test administration platform in 1991. Previ-
ously she worked in Fortune 100 companies developing and validating selection and assessment tools.
She participated in the revision of the Principles for the Use and Validation of Personnel Selection
Procedures and sits on committees to revise the Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing
and the ISO 9000 standards for assessment. She is a member, fellow, and past president (2000-2001)
of the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, a fellow of the American Psychological
Association, and a member of several private industry research groups. She has authored or co-authored
articles on assessment and has served as associate editor for the Scientist-Practitioner Forum of Person-
nel Psychology and on the editorial board of the Journal of Applied Psychology. She has an M.S. and
a Ph.D. in industrial and organizational psychology from the Georgia Institute of Technology.
Colin G. Drury is distinguished professor emeritus of industrial and systems engineering at University
of Buffalo, State University of New York and president of Applied Ergonomics Group, Inc. Previously he
was director of the Research Institute for Safety and Security in Transportation. His recent work focuses
on the application of human factors techniques to inspection and maintenance processes, and he has
published on industrial process control, quality control, aviation maintenance, security, and safety. He
is a fellow of the Institute of Industrial Engineers, the Ergonomics Society, the International Ergonom-
ics Association, and the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society. He received the Bartlett Medal of the
Ergonomics Society and both the Fitts and Lauer Awards of the Human Factors Ergonomics Society.
He received the Federal Aviation Administration’s Excellence in Aviation Research Award (2005) and
the American Association of Engineering Societies’ Kenneth Andrew Roe Award (2006). He has an
Honours B.Sc. in physics from the University of Sheffield, England, and a Ph.D. from the University of
Birmingham, England, in engineering production specializing in ergonomics.
93

T. Mark Harrison (NAS) is distinguished professor of geochemistry in, and former chair of, the Depart-
ment of Earth and Space Sciences at University of California, Los Angeles. His research areas include
lithosphere tectonothermics, experimental and theoretical studies of magma transport, application of
heat flow and diffusion theory to geological problems, development isotopic microanalysis, and plan-
etary formation. He is a fellow of the Australian Academy of Sciences, American Geophysical Union,
Geological Society of America, Geological Society of Australia, and the Geochemical Society. He has
received the Presidential Young Investigator Award and the Day Medal of the Geological Society of
America. He is a lifelong pilot and holds a commercial certificate with instrument and multi-engine
ratings. He has a B.Sc. (Honors) from the University of British Columbia and a Ph.D. in earth sciences
from the Australian National University.
Christopher Hart is vice chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). Previously
he was a member of the NTSB, deputy director for Air Traffic Safety Oversight at the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), and FAA assistant administrator for the Office of Safety, System Safety. He is
a licensed pilot with commercial, multi-engine, and instrument ratings, as well as an attorney. He is a
member of the District of Columbia Bar and the Lawyer-Pilots Bar Association. He has a B.S. and an
M.S. in aerospace engineering from Princeton University and a J.D. from Harvard Law School.
Paul F. Hogan is senior vice president and practice director of Federal National Security and Emergency
Preparedness at The Lewin Group. He applies microeconomics, econometrics, cost-benefit analyses,
statistics, and operations research methods to problems of health economics, labor supply, compensa-
tion, training, performance, military staffing and readiness, and cost measurement. His research in health
economics include workforce studies and measures of Medicare and Medicaid payment accuracy. He
has a B.A. in economics from the University of Virginia and an M.S. in applied economics and finance
from the University of Rochester.
Brian Norman is chief executive officer and founder of Compass Manpower Experts, LLC, and served
recently as senior human resource advisor for the Changes for Justice Project, a U.S. Agency for Inter-
national Development effort with the Attorney General’s Office of the Republic of Indonesia. Previously,
he served as commander of the Air Force Manpower Agency, directing efforts to determine manpower
requirements, develop programming factors, manage Air Force performance management programs,
execute competitive sourcing initiatives, and conduct special studies and analyses. Prior to that, he
served as deputy director of plans and integration, deputy chief of staff for manpower and personnel,
at Air Force Headquarters, where he guided strategic planning, visioning, and concepts of operation
activities for Air Force manpower, personnel, and services. From 1995 through 2012, he served as a
course director and adjunct professor at Ira P. Eaker College for Professional Development, Air Univer-
sity, Maxwell Air Force Base. He has a B.S. in industrial engineering from the University of Missouri,
an M.S. in systems management from the University of Southern California, and an M.S. in strategic
studies from Air University.
Tonya L. Smith-Jackson is professor and chair of industrial and systems engineering at North Carolina
A&T State University. She is founder and director of the Assessment and Cognitive Ergonomics Lab
and co-director of the Safety Engineering and Human-Computer Interaction Labs. She is a member of
the American Society of Safety Engineers, the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, the Institute of
Industrial Engineers, the Association for Psychological Science, and the Society of Women Engineers.
She is certified by the Board of Certification in Professional Ergonomics. Her work has focused on

APPENDIX A 95
research, teaching, and service efforts to ensure processes and technologies are equitable and inclusive
across cultures, genders, abilities, and generations. Her research has been funded by the National Sci-
ence Foundation, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Army Research Office, United
Parcel Service, Toshiba Corporation of Japan, Carilion Clinic, and Carilion Biomedical Institute. She
has a B.A. in psychology from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and an M.S. and a Ph.D.
in psychology/ergonomics from North Carolina State University.
William J. Strickland is president and chief executive officer of the Human Resources Research Orga-
nization (HumRRO) in Alexandria, Virginia. Previously, he was a HumRRO vice president directing
its Workforce Analysis and Training Systems Division. Before that, he served 26 years in the U.S. Air
Force and retired as a colonel. He is a fellow of the American Psychological Association (APA), a past
president of its Division of Military Psychology, and the Division’s representative on APA’s Council
of Representatives. He currently serves on APA’s Policy and Planning Board and as a member-at-large
on the APA Board of Directors. He is a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy and holds a Ph.D. in
industrial and organizational psychology from Ohio State University.
Elmore M. Wigfall is a retired 36-year veteran of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and an
adjunct instructor in the Department of Electronic Technology at Antelope Valley Community College,
Lancaster, California. His FAA experience was in air traffic control technical operations, and he has
held positions ranging from Air Traffic Systems Specialist (electronics technician) to Systems Manage-
ment Office, Manager. He has more than 3,000 hours of FAA technical, management, and leadership
training and has completed more than 150 hours of training in mediation and conflict resolution with
practical application and experience conducting mediations in civil court cases. Currently, he volunteers
with the California Academy of Mediation Professionals as a civil dispute mediator for small claims,
limited jurisdiction, and civil harassment cases in the Los Angeles Superior Court System. He has a B.S.
in Computer Science from the University of Central Oklahoma and an M.P.A. from California State
University, Northridge.

Appendix B
Open Session Speakers
MEETING 1
October 18-19, 2012

Washington, DC
10:00 a.m. Public Welcome & Study Introduction
Barbara Wanchisen, Director, Board on Human-Systems Integration
10:30 a.m. Sponsor Perspective

Charge and Expectations of the Study
2012 Airway Transportation Systems Specialists (ATSS) Briefing for the National
Academy of Sciences0
Rich McCormick, Labor Analysis, ALA-1, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Vaughn Turner, Vice President of Technical Operations Service Unit, FAA
Gene Crabtree, Deputy Vice President of Technical Operations Service Unit, FAA
James Thomas, Program Manager, Technical Operations Workforce, FAA
Kevin Brathwaite, Consultant, Grant Thornton
MEETING 2
December 6-7, 2012

Washington, DC
8:30 a.m. FAA Briefing—Integrated Control Facilities
Future Facilities Program Overview

Austin Aurandt, Acting Manager, Program Management Team, Air Traffic Control
Facilities Directorate, AJW-2, FAA
96

APPENDIX B 97
9:30 a.m. FAA Discussion

Gene Crabtree, Deputy Vice President of Technical Operations Service Unit, FAA
10:30 a.m. Break
10:45 a.m. Air Traffic Control Staffing—U.S. Air Force Manpower Directorate
Kent B. White, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Air Force Personnel Center,
Director of Manpower
Dennis Carter, Chief of Management Engineering, Manpower Directorate
Noon Lunch with Continued Discussion with Attendees

Nancy Tippins, Chair
1:00 p.m. Professional Aviation Safety Specialists (PASS) Presentation and Discussion
Mike Perrone, National President, PASS, American Federation of Labor-
Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)
Rich Casey, National Vice President, PASS, AFL-CIO
3:00 p.m. Break
3:15 p.m. FAA NextGen Presentations

Next Generation Air Traffic Management System
Steve Bradford, Chief Scientist-Architecture & NextGen Development, FAA
NextGen and Technical Operations

Barbara Fisher, Manager for the National Airspace System Implementation
Harmonization Division, ANG-D3, FAA
MEETING 3
January 23-24, 2013

Washington, DC
10:15 a.m. FAA Question and Answer Session
Nancy Tippins, Chair
MEETING 4
February 27-28, 2013

Irvine, CA
Report Writing Meeting


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Committee on Staffing Needs of Systems Specialists in Aviation

Board on Human-Systems Integration

Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education

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International Standard Book Number-13: 978-0-309-28650-3

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COMMITTEE ON STAFFING NEEDS OF SYSTEMS SPECIALISTS IN AVIATION

NANCY T. TIPPINS (Chair), Valtera, Corporate Executive Board, Greenville, SC

Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

BOARD ON HUMAN-SYSTEMS INTEGRATION

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Nancy T. Tippins, Chair

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS xv

1 BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 11

2 WORK ENVIRONMENT CONSIDERATIONS FOR AIRWAY TRANSPORTATION

Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Other Considerations for an ATSS Staffing Model, 35

3 CONSIDERATIONS IN CREATING A STAFFING MODEL 41

4 FAA APPROACHES TO ESTIMATING STAFFING OF AIRWAY TRANSPORTATION

5 IMPLEMENTATION AND SUSTAINABLITILY OF THE STAFFING MODEL 79

Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Figures, Tables, and Boxes

2-1 Overview of the Technical Operations organization, 20

3-1 OPM’s workforce planning cycle, 42

4-1 Conceptual logical relationship between service and staffing level, 76

5-1 Phases of staffing model development and implementation, 80

2-1 Percentage of 2101 Disciplines Represented by Location, 23

Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

xiv FIGURES, TABLES, AND BOXES

1-1 Statement of Task, 15

3-1 Quality Factors, 61

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast

CMMS Computerized Maintenance Management Software

DME Distance Measuring Equipment

ESU Environmental Support Unit

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

GNAS General National Airspace System

Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

xvi ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

HSI human-systems integration

2 WORK ENVIRONMENT CONSIDERATIONS FOR AIRWAY TRANSPORTATION

4 FAA APPROACHES TO ESTIMATING STAFFING OF AIRWAY TRANSPORTATION