546 Phil.

503

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 162053, March 07, 2007 ]
ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEE'S ASSOCIATION-AFW
(SLMCEA-AFW) AND MARIBEL S. SANTOS, PETITIONERS, VS.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) AND ST.
LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER, INC., RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated January 29, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 75732 affirming the decision[2] dated
August 23, 2002 rendered by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC
CA No. 026225-00.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Maribel S. Santos was hired as X-Ray Technician in the Radiology

department of private respondent St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC) on
October 13, 1984. She is a graduate of Associate in Radiologic Technology from
The Family Clinic Incorporated School of Radiologic Technology.

On April 22, 1992, Congress passed and enacted Republic Act No. 7431 known
as the "Radiologic Technology Act of 1992." Said law requires that no person
shall practice or offer to practice as a radiology and/or x-ray technologist in the
Philippines without having obtained the proper certificate of registration from the
Board of Radiologic Technology.

On September 12, 1995, the Assistant Executive Director-Ancillary Services and

HR Director of private respondent SLMC issued a final notice to all practitioners
of Radiologic Technology to comply with the requirement of Republic Act No.
7431 by December 31, 1995; otherwise, the unlicensed employee will be
transferred to an area which does not require a license to practice if a slot is
available.

On March 4, 1997, the Director of the Institute of Radiology issued a final notice
to petitioner Maribel S. Santos requiring the latter to comply with Republic Act.
No. 7431 by taking and passing the forthcoming examination scheduled in June
1997; otherwise, private respondent SLMC may be compelled to retire her from
employment should there be no other position available where she may be
absorbed.

On May 14, 1997, the Director of the Institute of Radiology, AED-Division of

Ancillary Services issued a memorandum to petitioner Maribel S. Santos
directing the latter to submit her PRC Registration form/Examination Permit per
Memorandum dated March 4, 1997.

On March 13, 1998, the Director of the Institute of Radiology issued another
memorandum to petitioner Maribel S. Santos advising her that only a license can
assure her of her continued employment at the Institute of Radiology of the
private respondent SLMC and that the latter is giving her the last chance to take
and pass the forthcoming board examination scheduled in June 1998; otherwise,
private respondent SLMC shall be constrained to take action which may include
her separation from employment.

On November 23, 1998, the Director of the Institute of Radiology issued a notice
to petitioner Maribel S. Santos informing the latter that the management of
private respondent SLMC has approved her retirement in lieu of separation pay.

On November 26, 1998, the Personnel Manager of private respondent SLMC

issued a "Notice of Separation from the Company" to petitioner Maribel S. Santos
effective December 30, 1998 in view of the latter's refusal to accept private
respondent SLMC's offer for early retirement. The notice also states that while
said private respondent exerted its efforts to transfer petitioner Maribel S. Santos
to other position/s, her qualifications do not fit with any of the present vacant
positions in the hospital.

In a letter dated December 18, 1998, a certain Jack C. Lappay, President of the
Philippine Association of Radiologic Technologists, Inc., wrote Ms. Judith Betita,
Personnel Manager of private respondent SLMC, requesting the latter to give
"due consideration" to the organization's three (3) regular members of his
organization (petitioner Maribel S. Santos included) "for not passing yet the
Board of Examination for X-ray Technology," "by giving them an assignment in
any department of your hospital awaiting their chance to pass the future Board
Exam."

On January 6, 1999, the Personnel Manager of private respondent SLMC again

issued a "Notice of Separation from the Company" to petitioner Maribel S. Santos
effective February 5, 1999 after the latter failed to present/ submit her appeal for
rechecking to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) of the recent board
examination which she took and failed.

On March 2, 1999, petitioner Maribel S. Santos filed a complaint against private

respondent SLMC for illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries, allowances
and other monetary benefits. She likewise prayed for the award of moral and
exemplary damages plus attorney's fees.

In the meantime, petitioner Alliance of Filipino Workers (AFW), through its

President and Legal Counsel, in a letter dated September 22, 1999 addressed to
Ms. Rita Marasigan, Human Resources Director of private respondent SLMC,
requested the latter to accommodate petitioner Maribel S. Santos and assign her to
the vacant position of CSS Aide in the hospital arising from the death of an
employee more than two (2) months earlier.

In a letter dated September 24, 1999, Ms. Rita Marasigan replied thus:
Gentlemen:

Thank you for your letter of September 22, 1999 formally requesting
to fill up the vacant regular position of a CSS Aide in Ms. Maribel
Santos' behalf.

The position is indeed vacant. Please refer to our Recruitment Policy

for particulars especially on minimum requirements of the job and the
need to meet said requirements, as well as other pre-employment
requirements, in order to be considered for the vacant position. As a
matter of fact, Ms. Santos is welcome to apply for any vacant position
on the condition that she possesses the necessary qualifications.

As to the consensus referred to in your letter, may I correct you that

the agreement is, regardless of the vacant position Ms. Santos decides
to apply, she must go through the usual application procedures. The
formal letter, I am afraid, will not suffice for purposes of recruitment
processing. As you know, the managers requesting to fill any vacancy
has a say on the matter and correctly so. The manager's inputs are
necessarily factored into the standard recruitment procedures. Hence,
the need to undergo the prescribed steps.

Indeed we have gone through the mechanics to accommodate Ms.

Santos' transfer while she was employed with SLMC given the
prescribed period. She was given 30 days from issuance of the notice
of termination to look for appropriate openings which incidentally she
wittingly declined to utilize. She did this knowing fully well that the
consequences would be that her application beyond the 30-day period
or after the effective date of her termination from SLMC would be
considered a re-application with loss of seniority and shall be
subjected to the pertinent application procedures.

Needless to mention, one of the 3 X-ray Technologists in similar

circumstances as Ms. Santos at the time successfully managed to get
herself transferred to E.R. because she opted to apply for the
appropriate vacant position and qualified for it within the prescribed
30-day period. The other X-ray Technologist, on the other hand, as
you may recall, was eventually terminated not just for his failure to
comply with the licensure requirement of the law but for cause (refusal
to serve a customer).

Why Ms. Santos opted to file a complaint before the Labor Courts and
not to avail of the opportunity given her, or assuming she was not
qualified for any vacant position even if she tried to look for one
within the prescribed period, I simply cannot understand why she also
refused the separation pay offered by Management in an amount
beyond the minimum required by law only to re-apply at SLMC,
which option would be available to her anyway even (if she) chose to
accept the separation pay!

Well, here's hoping that our Union can timely influence our employees
to choose their options well as it has in the past.
 (Signed)

RITA MARASIGAN

Subsequently, in a letter dated December 27, 1999, Ms. Judith Betita, Personnel
Manager of private respondent SLMC wrote Mr. Angelito Calderon, President of
petitioner union as follows:

Dear Mr. Calderon:

This is with regard to the case of Ms. Maribel Santos. Please recall
that last Oct. 8, 1999, Ms. Rita Marasigan, HR Director, discussed
with you and Mr. Greg Del Prado the terms regarding the re-hiring of
Ms. Maribel Santos. Ms. Marasigan offered Ms. Santos the position of
Secretary at the Dietary Department. In that meeting, Ms. Santos
replied that she would think about the offer. To date, we still have no
definite reply from her. Again, during the conference held on Dec. 14,
1999, Atty. Martir promised to talk to Ms. Santos, and inform us of her
reply by Dec. 21, 1999. Again we failed to hear her reply through him.

Please be informed that said position is in need of immediate staffing.

The Dietary Department has already been experiencing serious
backlog of work due to the said vacancy. Please note that more than 2
months has passed since Ms. Marasigan offered this compromise.
Management cannot afford to wait for her decision while the operation
of the said department suffers from vacancy.

Therefore, Management is giving Ms. Santos until the end of this

month to give her decision. If we fail to hear from her or from you as
her representatives by that time, we will consider it as a waiver and we
will be forced to offer the position to other applicants so as not to
jeopardize the Dietary Department's operation.

For your immediate action.

(Signed)
JUDITH
BETITA
Personnel Manager

On September 5, 2000, the Labor Arbiter came out with a Decision ordering
private respondent SLMC to pay petitioner Maribel S. Santos the amount of One
Hundred Fifteen Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P115,500.00) representing her
separation pay. All other claims of petitioner were dismissed for lack of merit.

Dissatisfied, petitioner Maribel S. Santos perfected an appeal with the public

respondent NLRC.

On August 23, 2002, public respondent NLRC promulgated its Decision

affirming the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. It likewise denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioners in its Resolution promulgated on December
27, 2002.

Petitioner thereafter filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which, as previously
mentioned, affirmed the decision of the NLRC.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

I. Whether the CA overlooked certain material facts and circumstances on petitioners'

legal claim in relation to the complaint for illegal dismissal.

II. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion and erred in not resolving with
clarity the issues on the merit of petitioner's constitutional right of security of tenure.[3]

For its part, private respondent St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC) argues in its
comment[4] that: 1) the petition should be dismissed for failure of petitioners to file a motion
for reconsideration; 2) the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the
NLRC and the Labor Arbiter's ruling that petitioner was legally dismissed; 3) petitioner was
legally and validly terminated in accordance with Republic Act Nos. 4226 and 7431; 4)
private respondent's decision to terminate petitioner Santos was made in good faith and was
not the result of unfair discrimination; and 5) petitioner Santos' non-transfer to another
position in the SLMC was a valid exercise of management prerogative.

The petition lacks merit.

Generally, the Court has always accorded respect and finality to the findings of fact of the
CA particularly if they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC and are
supported by substantial evidence.[5] True this rule admits of certain exceptions as, for
example, when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, or the findings of fact
are not supported by the evidence on record[6] or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute
grave abuse of discretion.[7] None of these exceptions, however, has been convincingly
shown by petitioners to apply in the present case. Hence, the Court sees no reason to disturb
such findings of fact of the CA.

Ultimately, the issue raised by the parties boils down to whether petitioner Santos was
illegally dismissed by private respondent SLMC on the basis of her inability to secure a
certificate of registration from the Board of Radiologic Technology.

The requirement for a certificate of registration is set forth under R.A. No. 7431[8] thus:

Sec. 15. Requirement for the Practice of Radiologic Technology and X-ray
Technology. - Unless exempt from the examinations under Sections 16 and 17
hereof, no person shall practice or offer to practice as a radiologic and/or x-ray
technologist in the Philippines without having obtained the proper certificate of
registration from the Board.

It is significant to note that petitioners expressly concede that the sole cause for petitioner
Santos' separation from work is her failure to pass the board licensure exam for X-ray
technicians, a precondition for obtaining the certificate of registration from the Board. It is
argued, though, that petitioner Santos' failure to comply with the certification requirement did
not constitute just cause for termination as it violated her constitutional right to security of
tenure. This contention is untenable.

While the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise
may be reasonably regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health,
morals, peace, education, order, safety, and the general welfare of the people. Consequently,
persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical
knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their
chosen careers.[9] The most concrete example of this would be in the field of medicine, the
practice of which in all its branches has been closely regulated by the State. It has long been
recognized that the regulation of this field is a reasonable method of protecting the health and
safety of the public to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence
and ignorance among those who would practice medicine.[10] The same rationale applies in
the regulation of the practice of radiologic and x-ray technology. The clear and unmistakable
intention of the legislature in prescribing guidelines for persons seeking to practice in this
field is embodied in Section 2 of the law:

Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. - It is the policy of the State to upgrade the practice of
radiologic technology in the Philippines for the purpose of protecting the public
from the hazards posed by radiation as well as to ensure safe and proper
diagnosis, treatment and research through the application of machines and/or
equipment using radiation.[11]

In this regard, the Court quotes with approval the disquisition of public respondent NLRC in
its decision dated August 23, 2002:

The enactment of R.A. (Nos.) 7431 and 4226 are recognized as an exercise of the
State's inherent police power. It should be noted that the police power embraces
the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, educations, good
order, safety or general welfare of the people. The state is justified in prescribing
the specific requirements for x-ray technicians and/or any other professions
connected with the health and safety of its citizens. Respondent-appellee being
engaged in the hospital and health care business, is a proper subject of the cited
law; thus, having in mind the legal requirements of these laws, the latter cannot
close its eyes and [let] complainant-appellant's private interest override public
interest.

Indeed, complainant-appellant cannot insist on her "sterling work performance

without any derogatory record" to make her qualify as an x-ray technician in the
absence of a proper certificate of Registration from the Board of Radiologic
Technology which can only be obtained by passing the required examination. The
law is clear that the Certificate of Registration cannot be substituted by any other
requirement to allow a person to practice as a Radiologic Technologist and/or X-
ray Technologist (Technician).[12]

No malice or ill-will can be imputed upon private respondent as the separation of petitioner
Santos was undertaken by it conformably to an existing statute. It is undeniable that her
continued employment without the required Board certification exposed the hospital to
possible sanctions and even to a revocation of its license to operate. Certainly, private
respondent could not be expected to retain petitioner Santos despite the inimical threat posed
by the latter to its business. This notwithstanding, the records bear out the fact that petitioner
Santos was given ample opportunity to qualify for the position and was sufficiently warned
that her failure to do so would result in her separation from work in the event there were no
other vacant positions to which she could be transferred. Despite these warnings, petitioner
Santos was still unable to comply and pass the required exam. To reiterate, the requirement
for Board certification was set by statute. Justice, fairness and due process demand that an
employer should not be penalized for situations where it had no participation or control.[13]

It would be unreasonable to compel private respondent to wait until its license is cancelled
and it is materially injured before removing the cause of the impending evil. Neither can the
courts step in to force private respondent to reassign or transfer petitioner Santos under these
circumstances. Petitioner Santos is not in the position to demand that she be given a different
work assignment when what necessitated her transfer in the first place was her own fault or
failing. The prerogative to determine the place or station where an employee is best qualified
to serve the interests of the company on the basis of the his or her qualifications, training and
performance belongs solely to the employer.[14] The Labor Code and its implementing Rules
do not vest in the Labor Arbiters nor in the different Divisions of the NLRC (nor in the
courts) managerial authority.[15]

While our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the
protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the
workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to
respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.[16] Labor laws, to be sure, do not
authorize interference with the employer's judgment in the conduct of the latter's business.
Private respondent is free to determine, using its own discretion and business judgment, all
elements of employment, "from hiring to firing" except in cases of unlawful discrimination
or those which may be provided by law. None of these exceptions is present in the instant
case.

The fact that another employee, who likewise failed to pass the required exam, was allowed
by private respondent to apply for and transfer to another position with the hospital does not
constitute unlawful discrimination. This was a valid exercise of management prerogative,
petitioners not having alleged nor proven that the reassigned employee did not qualify for the
position where she was transferred. In the past, the Court has ruled that an objection founded
on the ground that one has better credentials over the appointee is frowned upon so long as
the latter possesses the minimum qualifications for the position.[17] Furthermore, the records
show that Ms. Santos did not even seriously apply for another position in the company.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, pp. 37-50.

[2] Id. at 26-36.

[3] Id. at 5.

[4] Id. at 59-167.

[5]Lopez v. National Steel Corporation, G.R. No. 149674, February 16, 2004, 423 SCRA
109.

[6] JAT General Services v. NLRC, G.R. No. 148340, January 26, 2004, 421 SCRA 78.

[7] Suan v. NLRC, G.R. No. 141441, June 19, 2001, 358 SCRA 819.

[8] Otherwise known as the "Radiologic Technology Act of 1992."

[9] PRC v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 144681, June 21, 2004, 432 SCRA 505.

[10] DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989, 180 SCRA 533.

[11] Supra note 8.

[12] Rollo, pp. 32-33.

[13] Superstar
Security Agency, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 81493 April 3, 1990, 184 SCRA 74;
M.F Violago Oiler Tank Trucks v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 56950-51, September 30, 1982, 117
SCRA 544.

[14] Benguet Electric Cooperative v. Fianza, G.R. No. 158606, March 9, 2004, 425 SCRA
41.

[15] Almodiel v. NLRC, G.R. No. 100641, June 14, 1993, 223 SCRA 341.

[16]Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc., G.R.

No. 162994, September 17, 2004, 438 SCRA 343.

[17] Supra note 15.

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