Serdoncillo Case Digest

Serdoncillo vs.
Spouses Fidel
FACTS:
The subject premises was formerly part of the estate of H. V. Ongsiako. The
legal heirs of H.V. Ongsiako organized the United Complex Realty and Trading
Corporation (UCRTC) which subdivided the property into 14 lots, Lots 555-A to
666-N. The subdivided lots were then offered for sale with first priority to each of
the tenants, including the private respondents and petitioner.
Petitioner continued paying rentals to H.V. Ongsiako’s wife, Mrs. Rosario de
Jesus. Thereafter, the collection of rentals was stopped prompting petitioner to file
on June 30, 1987, Civil Case No. 5456 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay
City for consignation of rentals against UCRTC, Rosario de Jesus and the spouses
Carisima. The consignation was granted by the trial court and was eventually
affirmed on appeal by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109 on October
25, 1989.
On May 5, 1989, UCRTC executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of private
respondents-spouses Benolirao for Lot 666-H. This sale was annotated at the back
of UCRTC’s title on Lot 666-H .
On June 2, 1989, after unsuccessful oral and written demands were made
upon petitioner, UCRTC instituted an action against her for recovery of possession
of the subject premises before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 114
docketed as Civil Case No 6652. On July 15, 1990, the trial court rendered its
decision dismissing the complaint of UCRTC for lack of merit.
UCRTC did not appeal the aforesaid decision of the Regional Trial Court, hence, the
same became final.
On November 20, 1989, Serdoncillo instituted Civil Case No. 7749 for
the Exercise of Preferential Rights of First Refusal against UCRTC and private
respondents-spouses Fidel and Evelyn Benolirao praying for the annulment of
sale of a portion of lot 666-H sold to the Benolirao spouses on the ground that
said transfer or conveyance is illegal. She claimed that she has the preferred
right to buy the said property and that the same was not offered to her under
the same terms and conditions, hence, it is null and void. UCRTC and private
respondents prevailed and this case was dismissed. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the same was dismissed on July 9, 1992.
On November 20, 1990, private respondents made their final demand on
petitioner reiterating their previous demands to vacate the property. On December
13, 1990, private respondents filed their complaint for recovery of possession of the
subject premises against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 108, docketed as Civil Case No. 7785.
The issues having been joined, trial on the merits ensued. On June 30, 1992,
the trial court rendered its decision in favor of private respondents.
Aggrieved by the trial court’s decision, petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals alleging that the lower court should have dismissed the complaint of
private respondents considering that based on the letter of demand dated
November 20, 1990, the action filed should have been unlawful detainer and not an
action for recovery of possession. On July 14, 1994, the respondent Court of Appeals
rendered its decision sustaining the findings of the trial court and dismissed the
appeal of petitioner.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent regional trial court and the court of appeals committed grave
abuse of jurisdiction in deciding as an accion publiciana an ejectment or unlawful
detainer case (the jurisdiction of which clearly pertains to the inferior court), a case
basically involving an easement of right of way.
HELD:
NO. It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the
complaint irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the
jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the
answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction
would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction
of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in
the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are
the ones to be consulted. Accordingly, the issues in the instant case can only be
properly resolved by an examination and evaluation of the allegations in the
complaint in Civil Case No. 7785.
In this regard, to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an
occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint must
sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the
class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, without resort to parol
testimony, as these proceedings are summary in nature. In short, the
jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the
complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer,
as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or
an accion reivindicatoria.
A reading of the averments of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7785
undisputably show that plaintiffs (private respondents herein) clearly set up title to
themselves as being the absolute owner of the disputed premises by virtue of their
transfer certificates of title and pray that petitioner Serdoncillo be ejected
therefrom. There is nothing in the complaint in Civil Case No. 7785 alleging any of
the means of dispossession that would constitute forcible entry under Section (1)
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, nor is there any assertion of defendant’s possession
which was originally lawful but ceased to be so upon the expiration of the right to
possess. It does not characterize petitioner’s alleged entry into the land, that is,
whether the same was legal or illegal nor the manner in which petitioner was able
to construct the house and the pig pens thereon. The complaint merely avers that
a portion of the lot owned by private respondents and its right of way have
been occupied by petitioner and that she should vacate. The action therefore
is neither one of forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer but essentially
involves a dispute relative to the ownership of 4.1 square meters of land
allegedly encroached upon by petitioner and its adjoining right of way.

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