17 Lazaro V Agustin
17 Lazaro V Agustin
DECISION
PERALTA , J : p
Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari is the Decision 1 dated
February 21, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 63321. The CA had
a rmed, with modi cation, the Decision 2 dated February 6, 2001 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. 11951-13, which also a rmed,
with modi cation, the Decision 3 dated January 6, 2000 of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Laoag City, Branch 1, in Civil Case No. 2834.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On November 4, 1998, herein petitioners led against herein respondents a
Complaint 4 for partition with the MTCC of Laoag City, alleging as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
II
That the plaintiffs and the defendants are the descendants of the late
Simeon C. Santos, married to Trinidad Duldulao, who died intestate leaving a
parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Natividad Nstra. Sra., Municipality of
Laoag, designated as Lot No. 10675 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag;
III
IV
That in the desire of the children of Simeon C. Santos from whom the
parcel of land originated as owner, his children, namely[:] Alberto, Leoncio and
Alejandra, all surnamed Santos, consented that the parcel of land mentioned in
paragraph II of this complaint be titled in the name of Basilisa, the latter being the
eldest and so Original Certi cate of Title No. 20742 in the name of Basilisa
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Santos was obtained although it was agreed among them that it did not and does
not necessarily mean that Basilisa Santos is the sole and exclusive owner of this
parcel of land, and as embodied in the Title obtained in the name of Basilisa
Santos, the parcel of land is particularly described as follows:
That without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs, the title of the lot
described in paragraph IV of the complaint was transferred into another title
which is now Transfer Certi cate of Title No. T-20695 in the names of Modesta
Agustin, Filemon Agustin, Venancia Agustin, Marcelina Agustin, Monica Agustin,
Gregorio Agustin and Bienvenido Agustin who are the children of the late Basilisa
Santos-Agustin who are herein named as defendants with Monica Agustin now
deceased represented by her children Paul A. Dalalo and Noel A. Dalalo as
defendants; DAEIHT
VII
VIII
IX
That plaintiffs now invoke the intervention of the court to partition the lot
in accordance with the law on intestate succession and to partition the residential
house as specified below. . . .
Petitioners also prayed for the grant of attorney's fees, moral and exemplary
damages, and costs of suit.
Herein respondents led their Answer with Counterclaim, 6 raising the following
as their Special/Affirmative Defenses:
1. The subject parcel of land is owned exclusively by the defendants
as heirs of the late Basilisa Santos, wife of Petronilo Agustin, who was the
original registered owner of the property evidenced by OCT No. 20742; the
plaintiffs never became owners of said land. There was never any agreement
between the ascendants of the plaintiffs and defendants, neither is there any
agreement between the plaintiffs and defendants themselves that in the
ownership, the plaintiffs have a share over the lot;
2. The defendants are the ones paying for the real estate taxes of said
land; SEHDIC
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby a rmed with the
modi cation directing the appellees [herein respondents] to indemnify the
appellants [herein petitioners] in the amount of P68,308.60 as proved by them.
Considering the apparent error of the lower court in quoting the questioned
lot as Lot No. 10675, the same is hereby corrected so as to re ect the correct lot
number as Lot No. 10676 to conform to the evidence presented.
SO ORDERED. 1 0
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA.
On February 21, 2002, the CA issued its presently assailed Decision disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 6, 2001 rendered in Civil Case
No. 11951-13 is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION that appellees
[herein respondents] pay the amount of P68,308.60 in indemnity solely to
appellant Alejandra Santos-Lazaro.
SO ORDERED. 1 1
In their rst assigned error, petitioners contend that Basilisa's sworn statement
which recognizes her siblings' share in the disputed property is a declaration against
interest which is one of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. Petitioners argue
that since the sworn statement was duly notarized, it should be admitted in court
without further proof of its due execution and authenticity; that the testimonies of
Basilisa's nurse and physician cannot qualify as clear and convincing evidence which
could overthrow such notarized document; that the notary public cannot impugn the
same document which he notarized for to do so would render notarized documents
worthless and unreliable resulting in prejudice to the public. CDAcIT
As to the second assigned error, petitioners aver that their co-ownership of the
questioned property with Basilisa did not cease to exist when the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) consolidated its ownership over the said parcel of land. Petitioners assert
that they did not lose their share in the property co-owned when their share was
mortgaged by Basilisa without their knowledge and consent; that the mortgage was
limited only to the portion that may be allotted to Basilisa upon termination of their co-
ownership; that PNB acquired ownership only of the share pertaining to Basilisa; that
when Basilisa bought back the property from PNB, she simply re-acquired the portion
pertaining to her and simply resumed co-ownership of the property with her siblings.
Petitioners also contend that Basilisa's children did not acquire ownership of the
subject lot by prescription, and that neither Basilisa nor respondents repudiated their
co-ownership.
Anent the third assignment of error, petitioners argue that Alejandra Lazaro,
being a co-owner of the disputed parcel of land and not simply a builder in good faith, is
entitled to a partition of the subject residential house.
At the outset, it bears to point out that it is wrong for petitioners to argue that
Basilisa's alleged sworn statement is a declaration against interest. It is not a
declaration against interest. Instead, it is an admission against interest.
Indeed, there is a vital distinction between admissions against interest and
declarations against interest. Admissions against interest are those made by a party to
a litigation or by one in privity with or identi ed in legal interest with such party, and are
admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a witness. 1 5 Declarations
against interest are those made by a person who is neither a party nor in privity with a
party to the suit, are secondary evidence, and constitute an exception to the hearsay
rule. They are admissible only when the declarant is unavailable as a witness. 1 6 In the
present case, since Basilisa is respondents' predecessor-in-interest and is, thus, in
privity with the latter's legal interest, the former's sworn statement, if proven genuine
and duly executed, should be considered as an admission against interest.
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A cursory reading of the subject sworn statement also reveals that it refers to a
parcel of land denominated as Lot No. 10678 while the property being disputed is Lot
No. 10676. 1 7 On this basis, it cannot be concluded with certainty that the property
being referred to in the sworn statement is the same property claimed by petitioners.
Having made the foregoing observations and discussions, the question that
arises is whether the subject sworn statement, granting that it refers to the property
being disputed in the present case, can be given full faith and credence in view of the
issues raised regarding its genuineness and due execution.
The Court rules in the negative.
Settled is the rule that generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary
weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and documents
acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity.
1 8 However, this presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. 1 9
Moreover, not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on
authentication. 2 0 Thus, an a davit does not automatically become a public document
just because it contains a notarial jurat. 2 1 The presumptions that attach to notarized
documents can be a rmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization
was regular. 2 2 DCATHS
It may not be amiss to point out, at this juncture, that the principal function of a
notary public is to authenticate documents. 3 1 When a notary public certi es to the due
execution and delivery of a document under his hand and seal, he gives the document
the force of evidence. 3 2 Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring documents to be
acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the solemnity which should
surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to authorize such documents to
be given without further proof of their execution and delivery. 3 3 A notarial document is
by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and
the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed before a
notary public and appended to a private instrument. 3 4 Hence, a notary public must
discharge his powers and duties, which are impressed with public interest, with
accuracy and delity. 3 5 A notary public should not notarize a document unless the
persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally
appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. 3 6
CSAaDE
In the instant case, the notary public should have exercised utmost diligence in
ascertaining the true identity of the person executing the said sworn statement.
However, the notary public did not comply with this requirement. He simply relied on
the a rmative answers of the person appearing before him attesting that she was
Basilisa Santos; that the contents of the sworn statement are true; and that the
thumbmark appearing on the said document was hers. However, this would not su ce.
He could have further asked the person who appeared before him to produce any
identi cation to prove that she was indeed Basilisa Santos, considering that the said
person was not personally known to him, and that the thumbmark appearing on the
document sought to be notarized was not a xed in his presence. But he did not. Thus,
the lower courts did not commit any error in not giving evidentiary weight to the subject
sworn statement.
The second and third assigned errors proceed on the presumption that
petitioners are co-owners of the disputed property. Since the Court has already ruled
that the lower courts did not err in nding that petitioners failed to prove their claim
that they were co-owners of the said property, there is no longer any need to discuss
the other assigned errors.
WHEREFORE , the petition is DENIED . The February 21, 2002 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63321 is AFFIRMED .
SO ORDERED .
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Corona, Velasco, Jr., Nachura and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Penned by Associate Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr.
and Sergio L. Pestaño, concurring; rollo, pp. 62-72.
7.Id. at 21-22.
8.Rollo, pp. 53-56.
9.Id. at 57-61.
10.Id. at 61.
11.Id. at 72.
12.Id. at 21.
13.Id. at 26.
14.Id. at 29.
15.Unchuan v. Lozada, G.R. No. 172671, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 421, 435.
16.Id.
17.See Exhibit "C," records, p. 85.
18.De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127857, June 20, 2006, 491 SCRA 325, 334; Pan
Pacific Industrial Sales Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125283, February 10, 2006,
482 SCRA 164, 174.
23.Cabang v. Basay, G.R. No. 180587, March 20, 2009, 582 SCRA 172, 186.
24.Id.
25.Id. at 186-187.
26.These recognized exceptions are: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
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judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues
of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record (Bernaldo
v. The Ombudsman and the Department of Public Works and Highways, G.R. No.
156286, August 13, 2008, 562 SCRA 60); and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion (Superlines Transportation Co., Inc. v.
Philippine National Coordinating Council, G.R. No. 169596, March 28, 2007, 519 SCRA
432, 441, citing Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 428 SCRA 79, 85-86
[2004]; see also Grand Placement and General Services Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 142358, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 189, 202, citing Mayon Hotel & Restaurant
v. Adana, 458 SCRA 609, 624 [2005]; Castillo v. NLRC, 367 Phil. 603, 619 [1999] and
Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd. v. CA, supra; Sampayan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
156360, January 14, 2005, 448 SCRA 220, 229, citing Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd. v.
Court of Appeals,, supra, citing Langkaan Realty Development, Inc. v. United Coconut
Planters Bank, 400 Phil. 1349, 1356 [2000]; Nokom v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 390 Phil. 1228, 1242-1243 [2000] and Sta. Maria v. Court of Appeals, 349
Phil. 275, 282-283 [2000]; Aguirre v. Court of Appeals, 421 SCRA 310, 319 [2004]; C & S
Fishfarm Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 442 Phil. 279, 288 [2002]).
27.San Juan v. Offril, G.R. No. 154609, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 439, 445-446.
28.China Banking Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155299, July 24, 2007, 528
SCRA 103, 110.
29.San Juan v. Offril, supra note 27.
30.Id. at 446-447.
31.Vda. de Bernardo v. Restauro, 452 Phil. 745, 751 (2003).
32.Id.
33.Id.
34.Id.
35.Id.
36.Bautista v. Bernabe, A.C. No. 6963, February 9, 2006, 482 SCRA 1, 6.