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SECOND DIVISION

RAY SHU,· G.R. No. 182573

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, .J, Chairperson,

-versus- BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
PEREZ, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
JAilVIE DEE, ENRIQUETO
MAGPANTAY, RAMON Promulgated:
MIRANDA, LARRY MACILLAN,
AND EDWIN SO, APR 2 3 2014
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION,J.:

We resolve the Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari filed by

1
petitioner Ray Shu (petitioner) seeking the reversal of the decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 19, 2007 and its resolution dated April 4,
2008. These assailed CA rulings annulled the resolution of the Secretary of
Justice finding probable cause for falsification against the respondents.

THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

The petitioner is the President of the 3A Apparel Corporation. He

filed a complaint before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBJ) charging
the respondents of falsification of two deeds of real estate mortgage
submitted to the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank). Both

Penned by Associate Justice Jt>seflnu Gtti)VUI'il·Salongu; concurred in by Associate Justice Vicente

Q. Roxas and Ramon R. Garcia, Rollo, pp. 46.
Decision 1 G.R. No. 182573

deeds of real estate mortgage were allegedly signed by the petitioner, one in
his own name while the other was on behalf of 3A Apparel Corporation.

According to the petitioner, the respondents were employees of

Metrobank. Respondents Jaime T. Dee and Edwin So signed the two deeds
of real estate mortgage as witnesses; respondents Ramon S. Miranda and
Enriqueto I. Magpantay notarized the deeds of real estate mortgage signed
by the petitioner in his own behalf and for the corporation, respectively. The
signature of respondent Larry Macillan, on the other hand, appeared in the
deeds of real estate mortgage which he submitted to the Office of the
Registrar of Deeds for San Juan, Metro Manila. 2 Based on these deeds,
Metrobank foreclosed the two properties securing the 3A Apparel
Corporation’s loan.3

After investigation, the NBI filed a complaint with the City Prosecutor
of Makati (city prosecutor) charging the respondents of the crime of forgery
and falsification of public documents. The NBI supported the complaint
with the Questioned Documents Report No. 746-1098 (questioned
documents report) issued by its Questioned Documents Division. The
questioned documents report states that the signatures of the petitioner
which appear on the questioned deeds are not the same as the standard
sample signatures he submitted to the NBI.4

The respondents argued in their counter-affidavits that they were

denied their right to due process during the NBI investigation because the
agency never required them and Metrobank to submit the standard sample
signatures of the petitioner for comparison.5 The findings contained in the
questioned documents report only covered the sample signatures unilaterally
submitted by the petitioner as compared with the signatures appearing on the
two deeds of real estate mortgage. An examination of the signatures of the
petitioner which appear in several documents in Metrobank’s possession
revealed that his signatures in the questioned deeds are genuine.6 The
respondents also argued that the examination of the documents was
conducted without the original copies of the questioned deeds of real estate
mortgage.

The Ruling of the City Prosecutor

In a resolution dated June 25, 1999, the city prosecutor found no

probable cause against the respondents and, consequently, dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit.

The city prosecutor ruled that the questioned documents report is not
conclusive evidence that the respondents committed the crime charged. It

2 Id. at p. 37
3 Id. at pp. 36, 69
4 Id. at p. 37.
5 Id. at pp. 37-38
6 Id.. at p. 38
only proves that the sample signatures which were submitted solely by the
petitioner are different from the signatures appearing on the questioned
deeds. The pieces of evidence presented before the city prosecutor, which
were not made available to the NBI and which the petitioner does not
dispute prove that the same person executed the questioned deeds.7 The city
prosecutor found that the similarities in the sample signatures submitted by
the respondents and the signatures on the two deeds of real estate mortgage
are so striking that even a layman could see that they were written by one
and the same person.

Furthermore, the documents appended to the respondents’ counter-

affidavit show that the petitioner availed of the credit line and benefited
from its proceeds. Sufficient consideration also supported the execution of
the two deeds of mortgage.8 The city prosecutor also concluded that the
petitioner used his passport when he executed the questioned deeds before
the respondents-notaries public Magpantay and Miranda, without informing
these notaries that the passport had already been cancelled. This finding
presumed the regularity of the performance of duty of a notary public.9

The petitioner appealed the city prosecutor’ resolution to the Secretary

of Justice.10

The Ruling of the Secretary of Justice

The Secretary of Justice reversed the city prosecutor’s findings. She

ruled that the city prosecutor failed to consider the evidentiary value of the
findings of the NBI questioned documents experts. This NBI finding is
entitled to full faith and credit in the absence of proof of irregularity in the
performance of the experts’ duties.11

According to the Secretary, the expert evidence, the disclaimer of the

petitioner that he did not sign any promissory note, the lack of proof of
receipt of the proceeds of the loan, all tended to prove that he did not
execute the subject deeds. The complainant’s evidence is more credible and
suffices to establish probable cause for falsification, as against the
respondents’ questionable and flawed supporting documents.12

In addition, the finding of the city prosecutor that the petitioner’s

‘credit line’ with Metrobank is sufficient consideration for the execution of
the questioned deeds, even if not palpably erroneous, is still gratuitous and
conjectural.13

7 Id. at p. 38.
8 The Inter Office Letter of Metrobank submitted by the respondents show the bank’s approval in
favor of 3A an increased Credit Line amounting to US$1.5 million;
9 Rollo at pp. 38-39
10 Id at. p. 39
11 Id. at p. 71
12 Id. at pp. 71-72
13 Id at p. 72
 The Secretary of Justice denied the respondents’ motion for
reconsideration prompting them to file a petition for certiorari with the CA.
The respondents alleged that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed resolution.14

The ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA granted the petition and annulled the assailed resolution of

the Secretary of Justice.15

According to the CA, the respondents were denied their right to due
process in the proceedings before the NBI and the Secretary of Justice.16

In the proceedings before the NBI, the respondents were not furnished
a copy of the complaint and were not likewise required to file their answer
or to present countervailing evidence. All the evidence at the NBI level
were solely provided by the petitioner.17

In the proceedings before the Secretary of Justice, the respondents

were not furnished with the petition for review that the petitioner filed.
They were not even required to file their answer nor to comment.18

The CA also found that the persons who had been directly and
personally involved in the investigation of the case, like the NBI
investigating agent and the city prosecutor, were convinced that the evidence
were not sufficient for purposes of filing charges against the respondents.
The recommendation for the filing of the complaint came from the NBI
chiefs and the Secretary of Justice who did not personally investigate the
case.19

The CA affirmed the findings of the city prosecutor as he had the

opportunity to examine the documents submitted by the parties, including
the respondents’ evidence which the NBI did not consider. The CA denied
the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration; 20 hence, the present petition.

The Petitioner’s Position

The petitioner assigned the following errors:

First, the CA sweepingly relied on the respondents’ allegation that

they had been denied due process in the proceedings before the Secretary of

14 Id. at p. 39
15 Id. at p. 40
16 Id. at p. 42
17 Id
18 Id.
19 Id. at p. 44
20 Id at. p. 48.
Justice despite their active participation in the proceedings through the filing
of a motion for reconsideration.21

Second, the CA erred in giving credence to the findings of the

investigating NBI agent and the city prosecutor. The Secretary of Justice is
the ultimate authority who decides which of the conflicting theories of the
complainant and the respondents should be given weight.22

Third, an NBI expert’s examination of certain contested documents at

the request of a private litigant does not necessarily nullify the examination
made. Its purpose is to assist the court exercising jurisdiction over the case
in the performance of its duty to correctly settle the issue related to the
documents.23

The Respondents’ Position

In the respondents’ Comment and Memorandum, they reiterated their

argument that they were prevented from participating in the proceedings
before the NBI and the Secretary of Justice, resulting in the denial of their
right to due process.24 Moreover, the questioned documents report issued by
the NBI was one-sided, thus, casting doubt on its veracity and reliability;
thus, it deserves no weight and credence.25 The Secretary of Justice erred in
giving more weight to the questioned documents report and the petitioner’s
self-serving denials.26

In addition, the respondents argued that there was no evidence

pointing to them as the perpetrators of the forgery, if indeed there had been
any. The expert opinion, disclaimer of the petitioner and the alleged lack of
proof of receipt of the proceeds of the loan could only support a finding that
the petitioner did not execute the questioned deeds or obtain loans from the
bank. Too, there was no evidence that the respondents would gain pecuniary
benefits from the commission of the crime.27

The Court’s ruling

We find the petition meritorious.

The respondents were not denied their right to due process

We find no merit in the respondent’s claim that they were denied due
process when they were not informed by the Secretary of Justice of the
pendency of the petitioner’s appeal.

21
Id. at pp. 12, 15-15
22 Id. at pp. 17-18
23 Id at 19
24
Id at. pp. 367-369
25 Id at p. 371
26 Id. at 377.
27 Id at pp. 374, 377
 The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard.
What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but its absolute
absence and lack of opportunity to be heard. Sufficient compliance with the
requirements of due process exists when a party is given a chance to be
heard through his motion for reconsideration.28

In the present case, we do not find it disputed that the respondents

filed with the Secretary of Justice a motion for reconsideration of her
resolution. Therefore, any initial defect in due process, if any, was cured by
the remedy the respondents availed of.

On the respondents’ allegation that they were denied due process

during the NBI investigation, we stress that the functions of this agency are
merely investigatory and informational in nature. It has no judicial or
quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting any relief to any party. It
cannot even determine probable cause. The NBI is an investigative agency
whose findings are merely recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of
crimes upon its own initiative or as public welfare may require in
accordance with its mandate. It also renders assistance when requested in
the investigation or detection of crimes in order to prosecute the persons
responsible.29

Since the NBI’s findings were merely recommendatory, we find that

no denial of the respondents’ due process right could have taken place; the
NBI’s findings were still subject to the prosecutor’s and the Secretary of
Justice’s actions for purposes of finding the existence of probable cause.
We find it significant that the specimen signatures in the possession of
Metrobank were submitted by the respondents for the consideration of the
city prosecutor and eventually of the Secretary of Justice during the
preliminary investigation proceedings. Thus, these officers had the
opportunity to examine these signatures.

The respondents were not likewise denied their right to due process
when the NBI issued the questioned documents report. We note that this
report merely stated that the signatures appearing on the two deeds and in
the petitioner’s submitted sample signatures were not written by one and the
same person.30 Notably, there was no categorical finding in the questioned
documents report that the respondents falsified the documents. This report,
too, was procured during the conduct of the NBI’s investigation at the
petitioner’s request for assistance in the investigation of the alleged crime of
falsification. The report is inconclusive and does not prevent the
respondents from securing a separate documents examination by
handwriting experts based on their own evidence. On its own, the NBI’s
questioned documents report does not directly point to the respondents’
involvement in the crime charged. Its significance is that, taken together

28 P/Insp. Ariel S. Artillero v. Orlando Casimiro, et al., G.R. No. 190569, April 25, 2012;
29 Cabarrus Jr. v. Bernas, A.C. No. 4634. September 24, 1997.
30 Rollo, p. 320
with the other pieces of evidence submitted by the parties during the
preliminary investigation, these evidence could be sufficient for purposes
of finding probable cause – the action that the Secretary of Justice
undertook in the present case.

The Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of

discretion

Probable cause pertains to facts and circumstances sufficient to

support a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
accused is probably guilty thereof.31

It is well-settled that in order to arrive at a finding of probable cause,

the elements of the crime charged should be present. In determining these
elements for purposes of preliminary investigation, only facts sufficient to
support a prima facie case against the respondent are required, not absolute
certainty. Thus, probable cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a
finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would
justify a conviction. 32

The elements of falsification of public documents are as follows: (1)

the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did
not take advantage of his official position; (2) he committed any of the acts
of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and (3) the
falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document.33

In light of the discussion above, we rule that the findings of the

Secretary of Justice are more in accord with the duty to determine the
existence of probable cause than the findings of the city prosecutor.

Contrary to the respondents’ assertions, the Secretary of Justice did

not just merely give credence to the questioned documents report and the
petitioner’s self-serving allegations. The Secretary of Justice made a holistic
review of the parties’ submitted pieces of evidence in ruling that “the expert
evidence, the disclaimer of the petitioner that he did not sign any promissory
note, the lack of proof of receipt of the proceeds of the loan, all tend to prove
that he did not execute the subject deeds. Also, the finding in the assailed
resolution that the ‘credit line’ of the petitioner with Metrobank is sufficient
consideration for him to have executed the deeds is gratuitous and
conjectural.”

From the evidence submitted by the parties, the petitioner offered

sufficient evidence showing that falsification might have been committed
and that the respondents might have been responsible therefor. The NBI’s
questioned documents report states that the questioned deeds of mortgage
and the sample signatures submitted by the petitioner were not written by

31 Villanueva et al. v. Caparas, G.R. No. 190969, January 30, 2013.

32 Id.
33 Panuncio v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 165678, July 17, 2009.
one and the same person. It was also shown that the respondents Dee, So,
Magpantay and Miranda signed and participated in the execution of the two
deeds of real estate mortgage and the respondent Macillan signed and
submitted these documents to the Office of the Registrar of Deeds for San
Juan, Metro Manila. The petitioner also submitted evidence that the
passport used in notarizing the documents was a cancelled passport.
Furthermore, as the Secretary of Justice found, the respondents did not show
that the petitioner received the proceeds of the loan.

The findings of the city prosecutor are not proper in a preliminary

investigation but should be threshed out in a full-blown trial

In contrast, the city prosecutor negated the questioned documents

report issued by the NBI. He concluded that the documents submitted by
the respondents showed that even a layman could see the striking similarities
of the alleged signatures of the petitioner in the questioned deeds and in the
documents submitted by the respondents. He also concluded that the
petitioner misrepresented to the respondents-notaries public Miranda and
Magpantay that the passport used in notarizing the questioned deeds was not
yet cancelled.

In arriving at these conclusions, the city prosecutor already delved

into the merits of the respondents’ defense. This is contrary to the well-
settled rule that the validity and merits of a party’s defense and accusation,
as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated
during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level.34 The
allegations adduced by the prosecution will be put to test in a full-blown trial
in which evidence shall be analyzed, weighed, given credence or
disproved.35 The preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full
and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence.36 Simply put, in
determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the rules of evidence that, as a rule, is
outside his technical knowledge.37

That the findings of the city prosecutor should be ventilated in a full-

blown trial is highlighted by the reality that the authenticity of a questioned
signature cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics, or its
similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature.38 The duty to
determine the authenticity of a signature rests on the judge who must
conduct an independent examination of the signature itself in order to arrive
at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. Thus, Section 22 of Rule
132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a

34 Ricaforte v. Jurado, G.R. No. 154438, September 5, 2007; United Coconut Planters Bank vs.
Looyuko et al., G.R. No. 156337, September 28, 2007.
35 Ricaforte v. Jurado, G.R. No. 154438, September 5, 2007
36 Lee et al. v. KBC Bank N.V., G.R. No. 164673, January 15, 2010.
37 Kalalo v. Office of the Ombudsman et al., G.R. No. 158189, April 23, 2010.
38 Jimenez et al. v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations of the United Prysbeterian
Church in the United States of America et al. G.R. No. 140472. June 10, 2002.
Decision 9 G.R. No. 182573

comparison of the disputed handwriting "with writings admitted or treated as

genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
39
genuine."

Read in this light, the respondents' defense that there are striking
similarities in the specimen signatures they submitted and those of the
questioned deeds is a matter of evidence whose consideration is proper only
in a full-blown trial. In that proper forum, the respondents can present
evidence to prove their defense and controvert the questioned documents
report; they can raise as issue the alleged irregularities in the conduct of the
examination.

The Secretmy of Justice has the power to review the findings of the city
prosecutor

We also find that the CA ened in ruling that the city prosecutor's
findings should be given more weight than the findings of the Secretary of
Justice.

The determination of probable cause is essentially an executive

function, lodged in the first place on the prosecutor who conducted the
preliminary investigation. The prosecutor's ruling is reviewable by the
Secretary who, as the final determinative authority on the matter, has the
40
power to reverse, mod[fy or affirm the prosecutor's determination.

It is well-settled that the findings of the Secretary of Justice are not

subject to interference by the courts, save only when he acts with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; when he
grossly misapprehends facts; when he acts in a manner so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the
41
duty enjoined by law; or when he acts outside the contemplation of law.

Contrary to the findings of the CA, we find that the Secretary of

Justice did not gravely abuse the exercise of her discretion in reversing the
findings of the city prosecutor.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE and SET

ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 19, 2007 and its
resolution dated April 4, 2008.

Ci1!#!iftJ
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice

39 I
d.
40 Villanueva and the Secretary of .Justice v. Caparas, G.R. No. 190969 : January 30, 20 13; This is
embodied in Section 38, paragraph l, Chapter 7, Book IV ofthe Revised Administrative Code.
41 Villanueva et a/ v. Caparas, supra.
Decision 10 G.R. No. 182573

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

....,,y
ARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO J
Associate Justice

. j(}v (tM/
ESTELA : f RLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice