Knowledge, Politics and Policymaking in Indonesia

Arnaldo
Pellini · Budiati Prasetiamartati
Kharisma Priyo Nugroho
Elisabeth Jackson · Fred Carden Editors
Knowledge,
Politics and
Policymaking
in Indonesia
Knowledge, Politics and Policymaking in Indonesia
Arnaldo Pellini • Budiati Prasetiamartati
Kharisma Priyo Nugroho • Elisabeth Jackson
Fred Carden
Editors
Knowledge, Politics
and Policymaking
in Indonesia
Editors
Arnaldo Pellini Budiati Prasetiamartati
Overseas Development Institute Knowledge Sector Initiative
London, UK Jakarta, Indonesia
Kharisma Priyo Nugroho Elisabeth Jackson

Winrock International Knowledge Sector Initiative
Bangkok, Thailand Jakarta, Indonesia
Fred Carden
Using Evidence Inc.
Ottawa, ON, Canada
ISBN 978-981-13-0166-7 ISBN 978-981-13-0167-4 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0167-4
Library of Congress Control Number: 2018943295
© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2018

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of
the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation,
broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information
storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book
are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the
editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors
or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims
in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Printed on acid-free paper
This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721,
Singapore
Preface
Knowledge is not power until it is turned into action (Aristotle)
This book has been triggered by a couple of circumstances. The first is the unique
opportunity the editors and contributors have had to be involved directly and indi-
rectly in the implementation of the first phase of Australia-Indonesia Partnership for
Pro-Poor Policy: The Knowledge Sector Initiative between 2013 and 2017. This
programme is now in its second phase and seeks to improve the lives of the
Indonesian people through better quality public policies that make better use of
research, analysis and evidence. The programme is being led by a consortium of
RTI International, the Australian National University, the Nossal Institute for Global
Health at the University of Melbourne, and the Overseas Development Institute in
the United Kingdom.
The uniqueness of the programme is that it is testing the assumption that in order
to strengthen evidence-informed policymaking systems and processes in a country
it is necessary to work in an integrated way on the capabilities to produce good qual-
ity and timely evidence, the capabilities to demand and make use of the evidence
(mainly) within government, the capability to produce synthesis of research results
and reach policymakers, and last but not least the capability of a system of rules and
regulations that encourage the production, demand and use of evidence.
This book is not about the Knowledge Sector Initiative programme, it is about
the Indonesian knowledge sector. The programme has provided a unique view point
from which to observe, study and interact with the actors who are contributing to the
development of Indonesian knowledge sector to try to better understand where it
comes from, where it stands now and (to some extent) where it is going.
As editors of this book we recognise that the main influencing factor in policy-
making is politics, but we also believe that policy decisions can greatly benefit from
access to and use of different types of evidence. This is particularly important when
countries reach a middle-income status and the complexity of policymaking contin-
ues to increase.
v
vi Preface
Being involved in a programme and being able to study and learn from the
Indonesian knowledge sector about the complexity of evidence-informed policy-
making make us think that we ought to capture that learning by writing this book.
The second circumstance that triggered this book was a conversation that one of
the editors had in 2015 with policy researchers and experts on Indonesian politics.
As part of its implementation, the Knowledge Sector Initiative has produced a num-
ber of working papers reflecting on initiatives and programmes that have helped to
strengthen elements of the knowledge sector in other countries. Writing about those
experiences was a way to generate ideas and suggestions about what could be tested
(not copied) in the Indonesian knowledge sector. Those working paper were infor-
mative but did left unanswered the question about what is distinctly Indonesian in
the principles, processes and tools that define evidence-informed policymaking in
Indonesia.
These two circumstances put together led to the production of this book. It is our
way of sharing the knowledge and learning we have acquired in and on the
Indonesian knowledge sector with an international audience of researchers, practi-
tioners and civil servants interested in the way the Indonesian knowledge sector is
evolving.
The intended audience of this book is policy researchers interested in policymak-
ing processes and the use of research-based evidence in Indonesia; practitioners
involved in problem-driven and adaptive development programmes; policymakers
and policy analysts interested in exploring evidence-informed policymaking pro-
cesses in Indonesia; policy researchers in Indonesian think tanks, professors,
researchers and students in Indonesian and international universities; and advisors
and staff of multilateral and bilateral development agencies.
The book is structured in three parts. The three parts structure the book along
elements of the knowledge sector as it relates to public policy: producing knowledge
for policy; knowledge and the politics of policymaking; and the enabling environ-
ment for evidence-informed policymaking. In addition, a general introductory chap-
ter (Chap. 1) provides the background on the topic of the book, and a concluding
chapter (Chap. 9) sums up the main findings of the book. Depending on the reader’s
needs it is possible to read the book cover to cover, or pick any part or chapter and
read it on its own.
We would like to convey our thanks and appreciation to all the authors who con-
tributed to this book. Our special thanks to Ms. Robin Bush, Ms. Derval Usher, Mr.
Andrew Thornley, Mr. Nana Widiestu, Ms. Zuhaira and Mr. Hizbullah Arief. We
thank the Knowledge Sector Initiative partners and team for sharing their experi-
ences in contributing to the development of the Indonesian knowledge sector. We
also thank Bappenas (Ministry for National Development Planning/National
Development Planning Agency), and the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade, the shareholders of the Knowledge Sector Initiative, and RTI International,
for their support. In addition, we thank Ms. Ameena Jaafar of Springer Singapore
for her kind support, all the reviewers, Ms. Alison Raphael for her assistance in copy
editing the book and Mr. Agus Wiyono for the graphic design.
Preface vii
As usual, the views, findings and conclusions expressed in this book are those of
the editors and authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organi-
zations supporting this work.
Tampere, Finland Arnaldo Pellini

Jakarta, Indonesia Budiati Prasetiamartati
Bangkok, Thailand Kharisma Priyo Nugroho
Jakarta, Indonesia Elisabeth Jackson
Ottawa, Canada Fred Carden
Contents
1 Introduction.............................................................................................. 1
Arnaldo Pellini, Budiati Prasetiamartati, Kharisma Priyo Nugroho,
Elisabeth Jackson, and Fred Carden
Part I Producing Knowledge for Policy

2 Linking Academic Research and Policymaking.................................... 13
Budiati Prasetiamartati, Fred Carden, Siti Ruhanawati,
Inaya Rakhmani, and Yanuar Nugroho
3 The Role of Policy Research Institutes in Policymaking
in Indonesia.............................................................................................. 31
Farini Pane, Irene Astuti Kuntjoro, Siti Ruhanawati,
Tanty Nurhayati Djafar, and Kharisma Priyo Nugroho
4 Brokering Knowledge and Policy Analysis Within
the Indonesian Public Sector.................................................................. 47
Arnaldo Pellini, Agus Pramusinto, and Iskhak Fatonie
Part II Knowledge and the Politics of Policymaking

5 How and When Do Policymakers Use Evidence? Taking
Politics into Account................................................................................ 67
Elisabeth Jackson, Endah Bayu Purnawati, and Louise Shaxson
6 Data Innovation for Policymaking in Indonesia................................... 89
Arnaldo Pellini, Diastika Rahwidiati, and George Hodge
Part III The Enabling Environment for Evidence-Informed

Policymaking
7 Reforming the Enabling Environment for Evidence-Informed
Policymaking............................................................................................ 111
Budiati Prasetiamartati, Fred Carden, and Sugiyanto
ix
x Contents
8 Doing Development Differently at Scale................................................ 131

Arnaldo Pellini, Petrarca C. Karetji, and Ade Soekadis
9 Conclusion................................................................................................ 147
About the Editors and Contributors
About the Editors
Arnaldo Pellini is a Senior Research Fellow of the Research and Policy in

Development team at the Overseas Development Institute in London. His back-
ground is in economic development with a specialisation in education policy reforms
in Southeast Asia. He holds a Ph.D. in Education and Development from the
University of Tampere (Finland), and has been working for about 15 years on gover-
nance reforms and on systems and processes to support the production, demand and
use of evidence to inform policy decisions in Cambodia, Vietnam, the Philippines,
Thailand, and Indonesia. Arnaldo has been part of the team implementing the
Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy: The Knowledge Sector
Initiative from 2013 to 2017 when he led the learning and research work of the pro-
gramme. He has published extensively on the use of evidence in policymaking with
the Overseas Development Institute, in addition to academic articles, book chapters,
blog posts and opinion pieces. His 2007 Ph.D. thesis (Decentralisation Policy in
Cambodia: Exploring Community Participation in the Education Sector) was pub-
lished as a monograph by Tampere University Press. He is also the editor of the 2012
publication Engaging for the Environment: The Contribution of Social Capital to
Community-Based Natural Resource Management in Cambodia, published by the
Learning Institute. He is an Associate Editor with the journal Evidence & Policy.
Budiati Prasetiamartati is a Programme Lead at the Australia-Indonesia

Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy: The Knowledge Sector Initiative. She manages the
programme’s work on the enabling environment, which, through multi-stakeholder
working groups, focuses on strengthening evidence-informed policymaking through
legislative and regulatory reforms in the Indonesian knowledge sector. Before join-
ing the Knowledge Sector Initiative, she managed programmes in decentralisation
and local governance for the United Nations Development Programme in Indonesia.
She has worked for over 12 years on governance and governance reform, environ-
mental policy reforms, development planning and programme management with
xi
xii About the Editors and Contributors
multilateral and bilateral organisations, NGOs, governments and research institu-

tions. She has an undergraduate degree in urban and regional planning from
Bandung Institute of Technology, a Master’s in Public Policy and Administration
from the Institute of Social Studies in the Netherlands and a Ph.D. in Coastal and
Marine Resources Management from Bogor Agricultural University.
Kharisma Priyo Nugroho was the Programme Lead at the Australia-Indonesia

Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy: The Knowledge Sector Initiative from 2015 to
2017 when he managed the knowledge production and intermediary component,
working with 16 key Indonesian policy research institutes to address the problems
constraining effective knowledge-to-policy processes. He is now a Research
Associate at the Indonesian Alliance for Policy Research. His professional back-
ground includes accounting and sociology, with a specialisation in research and
evaluation of development programmes in Indonesia in the areas of health sector
policy reform, public sector reform and disaster risk reduction. He holds a Ph.D. in
Sociology from the University of Indonesia and is a Research Fellow at the Institute
of Health Policy and Management at Erasmus University in the Netherlands. In
2016, he co-authored an article on the political economy of Indonesia’s universal
health coverage programme (“Indonesia’s Road to Universal Health Coverage: A
Political Journey”), published in the Oxford journal Health Policy and Planning.
Through his research and advisory work, Kharismahas promotedandadvocatedfor
fair-mindedinternationalresearchcollaborationsbetweeninternationalandsubna-
tional research institutes in Indonesia.
Elisabeth Jackson is a Programme Lead at the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for

Pro-Poor Policy: The Knowledge Sector Initiative. She has lived and worked for
over 7 years in Jakarta in various projects and programmes with international NGOs
and bilateral donors managing development programmes in education, democratic
governance and civil society capacity building. Most recently, she was responsible
for overseeing the Knowledge Sector Initiative for the Australian Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade. She has worked in higher education and development for
over 12 years and has conducted research and published in academic journals on a
range of issues, including state accountability, student politics, civic education and
democracy, Islamic education, private schooling, civil society development and
approaches to policy reform in Indonesia. She has a Master’s degree in Development
Studies and a Ph.D. in Southeast Asian Studies, both from the Australian National
University.
Fred Carden holds a Ph.D. from the Université de Montréal. He is the Principal at

Using Evidence Inc., a research and evaluation consultancy firm that focuses on
improving the use of evidence in policymaking. From 2013 to 2016 he was based in
Jakarta with the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy: The
Knowledge Sector Initiative. Prior to that, he was director of evaluation at the
International Development Research Centre in Canada, where a primary focus of
his work was the influence of research on public policy. Among other publications
About the Editors and Contributors xiii
he is the author of Knowledge to Policy: Making the Most of Development Research

(Sage, 2009) and co-author of Outcome Mapping: Building Learning and Reflection
into Development Programs (IDRC, 2001) and Organizational Assessment: A
Framework for Improving Performance (IDB & IDRC, 2002), and Local Knowledge
Matters: Power, Context and Policy Making in Indonesia (Policy Press, 2018). He
serves on the Board of the global Partnership for Economic Policy network.
About the Contributors
Tanty Nurhayati Djafar is a Programme Officer at the Australia-Indonesia

Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy: The Knowledge Sector Initiative, focusing on
capacity building for leading Indonesian think tanks and universities. Her passion is
to advance social issues, especially expanding access to health services and early
childhood education for people in developing countries. She previously worked in
social service administrative programmes in New York City. Tanty earned her M.Sc.
in Social Enterprise Administration from the School of Social Work at Columbia
University and a Bachelor of Arts in Psychology at Baruch College of the City
University of New York. In 2017 she co-authored a Knowledge Sector Initiative
working paper entitled, “Is Measuring Policy Influence Like Measuring Thin Air?”.
Iskhak Fatonie is a Senior Programme Officer at the Australia-Indonesia Partnership

for Pro-Poor Policy: The Knowledge Sector Initiative. He oversees the programmes’s
multi-stakeholder working group on bureaucracy and public sector reform (involving
policymakers, universities, CSOs, NGOs and local governments). Over the past
8 years he has worked with national and subnational Indonesian government bodies
to provide technical support in the area of public administration. He previously
worked with the United Nations Development Programme in Indonesia, managing
public sector reform, including local governance, regional competitiveness, public
service delivery and regulatory frameworks governing decentralisation. He obtained
his Ph.D. in Political Science, majoring in public administration, from the University
of Vienna. His research interests include public policy, bureaucracy reform, govern-
ment studies, peace studies and political science.
George Hodge manages Pulse Lab Jakarta’s Trade and Economic Competitiveness

portfolio, which includes an eclectic mix of projects to develop better evidence for
development policy. Over the past 14 years he has worked with governments in the
Balkans, the Arab world and Southeast Asia to improve policy and programme
design and delivery. George holds a Bachelor’s degree in Natural Sciences from the
University of Durham, and a Master’s degree in Public Policy and Management
from the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London.
Petrarca Chawaro Karetji joined the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Pro-

Poor Policy: The Knowledge Sector Initiative in August 2016 as the Team Leader.
His experience includes bureaucratic reforms, decentralisation, governance and
xiv About the Editors and Contributors
partnership development among organisations, NGOs, government and research

institutions. As the senior advisor for development partnerships for the Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade at Jakarta’s Australian Embassy, he was responsible for
providing advice to senior management and programme teams, ensuring effective
partnerships with government, civil society and private sector stakeholders, as well
as identifying high-level relationships with the Government of Indonesia. Working
for AusAID between 2010 and 2015, he managed a portfolio of over US$500 mil-
lion in grant funds covering rural development, decentralisation, bureaucratic
reform, community development, social protection and women’s leadership. Prior
to AusAID, Petrarca worked in the World Bank from 2004 to 2008 to establish a
multi-donor support office for Eastern Indonesia which has successfully evolved as
an independent institution (BaKTI – The Eastern Indonesia Knowledge Exchange).
Before the World Bank he directed an international subsidiary delivering a range of
private sector, multilateral, bilateral and Government of Indonesia projects (1995–
2004). Petrarca’s expertise includes programme management, developing and
building interpersonal and organisational networks, knowledge exchange, project
management troubleshooting, institutional analysis, project design and manage-
ment. He has a first degree in education and a Master’s in Development Studies
from Satya Wacana Christian University.
Irene Astuti Kuntjoro was a Programme Officer at the Australia-Indonesia

Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy: The Knowledge Sector Initiative between 2015 and
2017 where she worked closely with 16 Indonesian policy research institutes to
improve their capacity in the areas of organisational development, knowledge pro-
duction and communication. Her professional experience over the past 15 years
evolved around policy analysis, programme management, organisational develop-
ment, development issues, political security affairs and business intelligence for
development organisations, the private sector and think tanks in Indonesia and
abroad. Her first degree was in International Relations from the University of
Indonesia. She obtained her Master’s in International Security and Terrorism from
the University of Nottingham in the United Kingdom under a British Council
Chevening and Open Society Foundation scholarship.
Yanuar Nugroho is an academic, researcher and senior policymaker in the field of

development. He was appointed in 2015 as deputy chief of staff at the Executive
Office of the President, Indonesia, and is currently responsible for analysis and
oversight of strategic issues on social, cultural and ecological affairs, after previ-
ously managing national priority programmes. Since 2004 he has been a research
fellow at the Manchester Institute of Innovation Research, University of Manchester,
in the United Kingdom, and a core member of the Centre for Development
Informatics. In 2007 he earned a Ph.D. in Innovations and Social Change. Yanuar
held the Hallsworth Fellowship in Political Economy of Innovations and Social
Change (2010–2012). He trained as an industrial engineer at the Institute of
Technology in Bandung, Indonesia, and received a British Council Chevening
Award to obtain his M.Sc. in Information Systems Engineering at the University of
About the Editors and Contributors xv
Manchester’s Institute of Science and Technology (2000–2001). Prior to his doc-

toral study, Yanuar was active in Indonesian NGOs and was a visiting lecturer at
some Indonesian universities. From 2012 to 2014, he was seconded from Manchester
to become a special advisor to the President’s Delivery Unit for Development
Monitoring and Oversight. His academic publications address issues of innovation,
development, sustainability and knowledge dynamics. He also contributes to major
Indonesian newspapers.
Farini Pane was a Programme Manager at the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for

Pro-Poor Policy: The Knowledge Sector Initiative between 2015 and 2017. Her
work focused on capacity building for leading think tanks and universities in
Indonesia. She previously worked in the electoral reform and democratic gover-
nance programme at United Nations Development Programme’s Partnership for
Governance Reform in Indonesia and several USAID-funded projects in Indonesia.
Farini earned her Master of Arts in Women’s Studies from Flinders University in
South Australia and a Bachelor degree in English Literature at Padjadjaran
University, Bandung, Indonesia. Her professional experience over the past 17 years
includes civil society strengthening, gender mainstreaming, women’s empower-
ment, project management and policy advocacy.
Agus Pramusinto is a Professor at the Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta,

Indonesia, currently serving as Head of Department at its Faculty of Social and
Political Science, and previously as director of the School of Public Administration.
His research interests include public policy, decentralisation and policymaking pro-
cesses. Among his publications are Bureaucracy Reform, Leadership, and Public
Services and Evaluation in Public Policy. Agus holds a Ph.D. in Policy and
Governance from Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government of the
Australian National University and obtained his Master’s degree in Development
Administration from the same university.
Endah Bayu Purnawati was a Programme Officer at the Australia-Indonesia

Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy: The Knowledge Sector Initiative between 2013 and
2017. Since 2015 her portfolio has included managing relationships with govern-
ment counterparts and some leading civil society organisations, as part of the pro-
gramme’s “knowledge community on village development issues”. Prior to joining
the Knowledge Sector Initiative, she worked on development issues involving
national and subnational governments, universities and civil society organisations
for the United Nations Development Programme and the Australian Embassy in
Jakarta, Indonesia. She received her undergraduate degree from the International
Relations Department of the University of Indonesia, and obtained her Master’s
degree in International Relations from the Australian National University, under the
Australian Development Scholarship programme.
Diastika Rahwidiati is passionate about civic innovation, particularly the thinkers,

doers and fixers that create positive change across Indonesia. As Deputy Head of
xvi About the Editors and Contributors
Office for Pulse Lab Jakarta, she connects ethnographers, social activists and tech-
nologists to the Lab’s big data research projects to add local context and encourage
the diffusion of the technologies they embody. With over 15 years’ experience in
international development assistance, she has managed projects on topics such as
education, policy-relevant research and civil society support. Dias holds a Bachelor’s
degree in Socio-economic Sciences of Agriculture from Bogor Agricultural
University, and a Master’s degree in International Development and Environmental
Analysis from Monash University.
Inaya Rakhmani is a lecturer in the Department of Communication, Faculty of

Social and Political Sciences at the University of Indonesia, and serves as Head of
its Communication Research Centre. An associate at the Asia Research Centre,
Murdoch University, Australia, and a member of the Indonesian Young Academy of
Sciences, she has a particular interest in the cultural political economy of knowl-
edge, information and entertainment, as well as the role of media in democratisation
processes. Inaya is also the author of Mainstreaming Islam in Indonesia: Television,
Identity and the Middle Class (Palgrave MacMillan, 2016).
Siti Ruhanawati was a Programme Officer at the Australia-Indonesia Partnership

for Pro-Poor Policy: The Knowledge Sector Initiative between 2015 and 2017. She
managed the programme’s multi-stakeholder sub-working group on research and
higher education, with a particular focus on identifying and overcoming barriers to
research, including in the area of human resources in higher education. She also
managed capacity building for leading think tanks and universities in Indonesia as
well as being actively involved in the Knowledge Sector Initiative’s gender and
social inclusion task force. Prior to joining the Knowledge Sector Initiative, she was
the lead researcher for Mercy Corps Indonesia, and also conducted research for the
World Bank on community organizations and gender issues. Siti also worked as
project coordinator for a peacebuilding programme in Aceh with the United Nations
Development Programme and the International Organisation for Migration. She has
worked for over 10 years with international non-government organisations and mul-
tilateral and bilateral agencies. She received her Master’s in Development
Management in 2007 from the Asian Institute of Management, in the Philippines;
her Bachelor’s degree is from the Department of Management, University of Gadjah
Mada, Yogyakarta.
Louise Shaxson is a Senior Research Fellow in the Research and Policy in

Development Programme at the Overseas Development Institute in London. Her
work focuses on improving public sector policy and strategy within the broad
framework of evidence-informed policymaking. Over the past 12 years she has
worked with government departments in several countries to strengthen the ways
they source, handle and use evidence. This has included advising on how to take a
more strategic approach to evidence planning, provide scientific advice to ministers
About the Editors and Contributors xvii
and create links between researchers and policymakers. Louise has a M.Sc. in
Agricultural Economics from Cornell University and is currently pursuing a Ph.D.
in Implementation Science at Kingston University in London.
Ade Soekadis was the Deputy Team Leader for the Australia-Indonesia Partnership
for Pro-Poor Policy: The Knowledge Sector Initiative between 2015 and 2017. Prior
to joining the programme, he was the head of operations, programme development
and learning at The Nature Conservancy Indonesia, a United States-based global
environment organisation. Prior to his tenure at The Nature Conservancy, he spent
15 years with various national and multinational corporations in the manufacturing,
chemical, consulting, financial services and pharmaceutical sectors, mainly work-
ing on project management, operational excellence and commercial excellence. Ade
received Master’s and Bachelor degrees in Industrial Engineering from the
University of Houston (United States). His expertise includes project/programme
management, strategic planning, organisational development and operations
excellence.
Sugiyanto is a Monitoring and Evaluation Officer at the Australia-Indonesia

Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy: The Knowledge Sector Initiative. During his career,
he has worked on a range of multilateral and bilateral development programmes in
the areas of education, poverty reduction and natural disaster recovery. He has
extensive experience with capacity building interventions for civil society organisa-
tions and government institutions, including the development of networks and
coalitions and implementation of data-driven decision-making processes. During
the past 7 years he has been increasingly involved in monitoring and learning activi-
ties in development projects. He is particularly interested in innovative approaches
to monitoring, evaluation and learning such as social network analysis and multi-
stakeholder policy networks monitoring. Sugiyanto has an undergraduate degree in
education from Walisongo State Islamic University in Semarang and a Master’s
degree in Humanities with a specialisation in anthropology from the University of
Leiden, the Netherlands.
List of Abbreviations and Other Terms
AAKI Asosiasi Analis Kebijakan Indonesia (Indonesian Policy

Analysts Association)
AIPI Akademi Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (Indonesian Academy
of Sciences)
APBD Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah (Annual regional
budgets)
APBN Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara (Annual state
budget)
AusAID Australian Agency for International Development
Balitbang Badan penelitian dan pengembagan (Research and develop-
ment unit)
Bappeda Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah (Regional
Development Planning Agency)
Bappenas Kementerian Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional/Badan
Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (Ministry for National
Development Planning/National Development Planning
Agency)
BPS Badan Pusat Statistik (National Statistics Office)
CSIS Centre for Strategic and International Studies
CSO(s) Civil society organisation(s)
DDD Doing Development Differently
DFAT Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DJPT Direktorat Jenderal Pendidikan Tinggi (Directorate of General
Higher Education)
DIPI Dana Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (Indonesian Science Fund)
DJPT Direktorat Jenderal Pendidikan Tinggi (Directorate General
Higher Education)
DPME Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
DRPM Direktorat Riset dan Pengabdian Masyarakat (Directorate of
Research and Community Service)
xix
xx List of Abbreviations and Other Terms
ELSAM Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat (Institute for Policy

Research and Advocacy)
KPPOD Komite Pemantauan Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah (Regional
Autonomy Watch)
KemRistekDikti Kementerian Riset, Teknologi dan Pendidikan Tinggi (Ministry
of Research, Technology and Higher Education)
Kemdikbud Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan (Ministry of
Education and Culture)
KSI Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy: The
Knowledge Sector Initiative
KSP Executive Office of President (Office of the President’s Staff)
LAN Lembaga Administrasi Negara (National Institute of Public
Administration)
LIPI Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (Indonesian Institute of
Sciences)
LKPP Lembaga Kebijakan Pengadaan Barang Jasa Pemerintah
(National Goods/Services Public Procurement Agency)
LPDP Lembaga Pengelola Dana Pendidikan (Ministry of Finance
Education Endowment Fund)
LP3ES Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan
Sosial (Institute for Social Economic Research Education and
Information)
MoF Ministry of Finance (Kementerian Keuangan)
MoSA Indonesian Ministry of Social Affairs (Kementerian Sosial
Republik Indonesia)
Musrenbang Musyawarah rencana pembangunan (Consultative develop-
ment planning forum)
NAS United States National Academy of Science
NGO(s) Non-governmental organisation(s)
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAK Pusat Analisis Kebijakan (Centre for Policy Analysis)
Pappitek LIPI Pusat Penelitian Perkembangan IPTEK / Lembaga Ilmu
Pengetahuan Indonesia (Science and Technology Development
Research Centre/ Indonesian Institute of Science)
PDDIKTI Pangkalan Data Pendidikan Tinggi (Higher education
database)
PDIA Problem-driven iterative adaptation
PISA Programme for International Student Assessment
PPIM UIN Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat di Universitas Islam
Negeri (Centre for the Study of Islam and Society at the
National Islamic University)
PRI(s) Policy research institute(s)
PSHK Pusat Studi Hukum & Kebijakan Indonesia (Indonesian Centre
for Law and Policy Studies)
R&D Research and development
List of Abbreviations and Other Terms xxi
RKP Rencana Kerja Pemerintah (Annual national development

plans)
RPJMD Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah (Medium-
term regional development plan)
RPJPD Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Daerah (Long-term
regional development plan)
RPJPN Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Nasional (Long-term
national development plan)
RPJMN Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional (Medium-
term national development plan)
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
SKPD Satuan Kerja Pemerintah Daerah (Local government unit)
SEKNAS FITRA Sekretariat Nasional Forum Indonesia Untuk Transparansi
Anggaran (The Indonesian Forum for Budget Transparency)
Swakelola Self-managed contracts
TAK Tim Analisis Kebijakan (Policy Analysis Team)
UKP4 Unit Kerja Presiden Bidang Pengawasan dan Pengendalian
Pembangunan (Presidential Delivery Unit for Development
Monitoring and Oversight)
UN United Nations
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organisation
USAID United States Agency for International Development
Chapter 1
Introduction

1 I ntroduction: Knowledge, Politics and Policymaking

in Indonesia
Indonesia’s growth and prosperity as a democratic, middle-income country hinges

on the ability of the country’s policymakers to develop effective public policies that
increase productivity and competitiveness and ensure that growth benefits all.
Governance is too complex to be managed without access to good evidence about
the problems and the potential – and actual – impacts of public policy change. Good
governance requires access to different types of evidence – including scientific
research, administrative data, data analytics, professional knowledge and citizen
A. Pellini (*)
Overseas Development Institute, London, UK
e-mail: [email protected]
B. Prasetiamartati · E. Jackson
Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy: The Knowledge Sector Initiative,
Jakarta, Indonesia
e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]
K. P. Nugroho
Indonesian Alliance for Policy Research (ARK Indonesia), Jakarta, Indonesia
Winrock International, Bangkok, Thailand
F. Carden
Using Evidence Inc., Ottawa, ON, Canada
© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2018 1

A. Pellini et al. (eds.), Knowledge, Politics and Policymaking in Indonesia,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0167-4_1
2 A. Pellini et al.
knowledge – and policymaking processes that invest in and make effective use of
such evidence to inform policy decisions. Of course, evidence is only one of the
factors that policymakers need to consider: policy and policymaking are inherently
political, and policy decisions are always bound by what is politically feasible. This
book draws on experiences derived from efforts to strengthen the potential of
evidence-based policymaking in Indonesia. With contributions from academics,
policy researchers, policymakers and development practitioners, the book presents
practice-based insights that deepen understanding of how knowledge and politics
shape Indonesia’s policymaking process.
Indonesia’s strong economic growth over the last decade has enabled it to regain
its lower-middle-income country status, following the Asian financial crisis of
1997–1998. The number of people living in poverty has declined steadily, although
inequality has risen and tens of millions live just above the poverty line. Indonesia
faces many challenges in both generating and using evidence for the public good.
Creating a scientific culture – Budaya ilmiah in Indonesian – must build on the
country’s culture and spirit. Done well it will serve as an engine for enhancing the
social and economic potential of this large and diverse country.
How well equipped is Indonesia to address these challenges? Is the country
developing the intellectual capital required to transform knowledge into growth?
Are universities and think tanks producing research and evidence that is relevant to
the needs of policymakers, or is ‘post-truth’ politics on the rise? What degree of
engagement do citizens exercise in policy processes? How do policymakers make
use of evidence to inform policy decisions? In what ways are new information and
communication technologies changing the way evidence informs policymaking in
Indonesia? What rules and regulations are in place to support the production of
policy research and its use in policymaking? This book examines these and other
key questions through the lens of the Indonesian ‘knowledge sector’, as Indonesia
transitions to a knowledge-based economy. The authors draw their insights and evi-
dence from the experience acquired through the implementation of the Australia-
Indonesia Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy: The Knowledge Sector Initiative, a
donor-funded programme that aims to strengthen the demand for and use of evi-
dence in policymaking in Indonesia.
Indonesia is one of the most populous countries in the world and transitioned to
democratic governance less than 20 years ago. It faces many challenges – uneven
development, a bureaucracy with a tendency towards centralisation, a weak educa-
tional system, much corruption and significant levels of intolerance. But it is also a
country rich in resources, cultures and natural beauty with a resilient population. It
has the potential to be one of the economic powerhouses of Asia and indeed the
world. The knowledge sector is key to realising that potential.
Before exploring the book’s contents, two concepts require clarification. First,
the knowledge sector has been defined as ‘the institutional landscape of govern-
ment, private sector, and civil society organizations that provide research and analy-
sis to support the development of public policy’ (AusAID 2012). The knowledge
sector is horizontal in nature; no one ministry or department is focused on ensuring
1 Introduction 3
its development, but all sectors of the economy need strong knowledge to grow and
develop. The evidence generated can be used not only by governments in policy-
making but also by advocacy organisations and policy think tanks to inform their
recommendations and proposals to government, as well as to the broader society
through the media.
The knowledge sector is weak in Indonesia, as underlined in this book and thor-
oughly documented in a series of diagnostic studies conducted by AusAID (now
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government) (Karetji 2010;
Sherlock 2010; Sumarto 2011; Datta et al. 2011; Suryadarma et al. 2010). It is weak
in the areas of producing high-quality evidence and of demand and use of evidence
to inform public policy. Indonesia’s growth over the past 20 years has relied heavily
on the natural resource sector and a consumption-oriented economy (Indonesia
Investments 2016). Further growth calls for a shift to a production-oriented econ-
omy in which knowledge and innovation play critical roles (Carden 2017).
Klaus Schwab argues that the world is in the early stages of the Fourth Industrial
Revolution that will have profound impacts on global society. He believes that ‘with
effective multi-stakeholder cooperation…the fourth industrial revolution has the
potential to address – and possibly solve – the major challenges that the world cur-
rently faces’ (Schwab 2016, 113). But participating in the new industrial revolution
demands a strong knowledge sector: it calls for a government and population that
can think critically and in interdisciplinary and cross-disciplinary ways. Traditional
sectoral and linear thinking will not help; making the shift to more creative and
innovative ways to govern and enhance production requires new thinking and an
educational system that builds the capacity of its students to think critically. As
demonstrated in this volume, creating an Indonesian knowledge sector that is pre-
pared for the new industrial revolution also calls for changes in the enabling envi-
ronment, which at present hinders the production of knowledge.
Second, this book focuses on a specific aspect of public policy: the use of evi-
dence to inform and influence policy decisions. Evidence-informed policymaking is
about how to ‘help policymakers to make better decisions, and achieve better out-
comes, by using existing evidence more effectively, and undertaking new research,
evaluation and analysis where knowledge about effective policy initiatives and pol-
icy implementation is lacking’ (Davies 2012, 41). The hypothesis is that when high-
quality, timely evidence informs policy decisions, those decisions yield policies
capable of improving people’s lives.
Using different types of evidence to inform policy decisions is not a new idea. It
originated with evidence-based medicine, which is defined as the ‘conscientious,
explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the
care of individual patients’ (Sackett et al. 1996, 71). With respect to public policy,
Sutcliffe and Court (2005) argue that the term ‘evidence-based policymaking’
started to become widely used in international policy debates after the election of
Tony Blair as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in 1997. The United Kingdom
government’s White Paper on modernising government, published in 1999, stressed
that policy decisions should be based on sound evidence and that substantial changes
in the relationship between government and the social research community were
4 A. Pellini et al.
needed to help determine what works and why and what types of policy initiatives
are likely to be most effective (Government of the United Kingdom 1999).1
Worldwide, a number of leaders continued to stress the importance of using evi-
dence to inform policy decisions.
Policy instruments and decisions can be informed by evidence in several ways.
Research-based evidence is only one of the types of evidence that can inform policy
decisions. Shaxson (2016) has identified five main types of evidence that policy-
makers tend to use and access: statistical data from national statistical offices,
administrative data from service providers, research-based evidence, evidence from
citizens and evidence from formal evaluations. Data analytics presents a new source
of evidence that is changing the costs, timeliness and accessibility of data and thus
becoming a new way for policymakers to source evidence (Stuart et al. 2015).
Evidence also plays a useful role in policy by informing preliminary steps that
may or may not lead to a decision or policy instrument. Weiss (1979) argues that
evidence, in the form of research, can help to inform solutions to problems identified
by policymakers or enlighten public discourse, all of which can lead to policy deci-
sions. It can also inform and influence the way decisions are made, so-called proce-
dural changes, such as opening new spaces for more evidence or policy dialogue.
Policymaking is a never-ending process. The end of the policy cycle is the begin-
ning of the next policy iteration. Lindblom (1968) referred to the continuity of the
policy process, where there is no beginning and no end. Effectively, resolving a pol-
icy problem with a policy decision is the start of identifying the next policy problem.
Policy problems evolve and change as does the evidence that can help inform policy
solutions and responses. Evidence-informed policymaking is about the set of meth-
ods that can inform this never-ending process (Sutcliffe and Court 2005). It provides
a basis upon which policymakers can form a judgement, which then may or may not
result in a change in policy. For Cairney (2016), this is not a limitation. It is reality.
Evidence is only one of the many factors that contribute to policy decisions. Others
include politics, beliefs, ideology, individual experiences and expertise.
While politics is a necessary part of the policy change process, it will not suffice
to ensure the rise of a discourse in favour of the use of evidence in policy and prac-
tice. Davies et al. (2000) identify other critical factors: the growth of an increasingly
well-educated and well-informed public, the explosion in the availability of data of
all types, the growth in size and capabilities of the research community, the impor-
tance of productivity growth and international competitiveness and a growing
emphasis on scrutiny and accountability of government. These preconditions face
what Leicester (1999) has defined as the ‘enemies’ of evidence-informed policy:
bureaucratic logic (which argues that processes and procedures are right because
they have always been done that way), consensus (demanding extensive consultation
to find a policy solution that satisfies everyone), politics (when defined as the art of
1
Interestingly, Flynn (1999) notes that the White Paper ‘Modernising Government’ was published
a year later than expected, reflecting the difficulties and negotiations resulting from changes and
reforms in the civil service required by the new emphasis on gathering evidence to inform policy
decisions. https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/52.4.582
1 Introduction 5
the possible, rather than as what is rational or might work best), a civil service cul-
ture (which tends to show a particularly strong distrust of information generated
from outside the system), cynicism (the mind-set of agreeing to the institutional
view, even though the evidence says otherwise) and, last but not least, time – which
is always in short supply in policymaking. These preconditions mirror the require-
ments for successful participation in the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
2 Structure and Content of the Book
The underlying framework for this book is derived from the work of Karetji (2010)
who, in his diagnostic study of the Indonesian knowledge sector produced for
AusAID during the design phase of the Knowledge Sector Initiative, described the
evolution that Indonesia is undergoing from a recent past characterised by the
Soeharto regime that ended in 1998 after 31 years of dictatorship to a future sce-
nario characterised by solid democratic rule. During the Soeharto regime, the role
of the knowledge sector was to generate evidence that would justify the govern-
ment’s autocratic policies. Critical thinking was perceived as a threat and discour-
aged. Consequently, the system of higher education remained under developed.
Karetji’s argument is that Indonesian institutions are moving away from a highly
centralised system with little accountability to citizens and economic policy based
on revenues from oil and other extractive industries. They are moving towards a
more open, democratic system.
Indonesia has a short history as a democracy and remains in transition – the cur-
rent period is known as the ‘reform era’. Karetji argues that Indonesia today is
characterised by a government system that, while in the process of democratising,
has not fully stabilised. Power and authority are still being reconfigured, with a
strengthening of the role of provincial and district governments and of citizens.
However, major budget allocations are still determined by the central government.
Local government authorities often feel a greater need to be accountable to Jakarta
than to their constituents. Patronage systems are still in place, enabling local elites
to access state resources and channel them to their clients, based on ethnic, religious
or geographic links. Economic growth in the regions is largely dependent on public
spending, with limited involvement by the private sector. Although the role of the
knowledge sector in influencing decision makers is becoming stronger, it still
depends on the extent to which it is perceived as supporting political and bureau-
cratic leaders to gain and maintain power and access resources.
On the positive side, the increasing authority and power of local authorities has
enhanced the demand for more local, context-driven solutions. This has provided
greater scope for knowledge to be developed, with a shift from macro-oriented and
external concepts to more local concepts and solutions. As well, a more open atti-
tude towards critical thinking is evolving. Knowledge providers must strive to over-
come policymakers’ suspicions about the intent and purpose of critical perspectives:
are they intended to challenge authority and power or to improve governance?
6 A. Pellini et al.
Thus, knowledge suppliers must gain the confidence and trust of authorities. They
must get better at building strong relationships with both policymakers and those
who influence them, building networks and coalitions to promote evidence and com-
municating their findings in policy terms. Finally, they must develop deeper under-
standing of the institutional and organisational systems in which action needs to be
taken (Carden 2009). In sum, knowledge suppliers must develop strategic approaches
to introducing and presenting new perspectives. The future is about a more ideal and
conducive environment for knowledge producers and suppliers (Karetji 2010). Over
time, the authors envisage an increasingly democratic Indonesia with a stable,
decentralised governance system. As political and bureaucratic leaders become
increasingly accountable to their local constituents, more leaders will be in positions
based on their performance and capacity, with an emphasis on citizen welfare.
In this scenario, Indonesia’s economic growth will be dependent on a strong pri-
vate sector and local industries, with tax-based revenues and increasing accountabil-
ity and public service performance. The role of the knowledge sector will shift
towards supporting government to improve and assess performance. In turn, this
should also increase the need for a knowledge sector able to provide contextual and
internal frameworks. In such frameworks, external concepts and experiences are
positioned as important comparisons, rather than as the main point of reference. In
this environment, independent input and critical thinking would be valued by policy-
makers as the needed knowledge base to increase or enhance policy performance.
Each chapter of this book applies this framework to put into context the specific
components of the knowledge sector. The chapters address the role of universities,
think tanks, decision makers and bureaucrats, as well as the role and potential of data
to support the transition to a knowledge economy and the underlying constraints.
Chapter 2 focuses on the academy. It explores the challenges faced by Indonesian
academics to producing policy-relevant research and using research evidence to
inform policymaking. National- and university-level policies and practices discour-
age academics from undertaking research. These disincentives include lack of fund-
ing, an overly strong emphasis on teaching and undervaluing of research, in terms of
financial rewards and career paths. The chapter highlights the marked divide between
the political world of policymaking and the intellectual world of research: policymak-
ers’ needs and priorities are not well communicated, and academic researchers sel-
dom see policymakers or the public as key audiences for their research. The authors
reflect on these challenges and provide insights into how the development of a strong
research culture in universities could support policymakers to develop appropriate
policy responses to the issues confronting Indonesia today and in the future.
As organisations largely independent of government, policy research institutes
and think tanks have an important role to play in bringing new issues and alternative
viewpoints to the attention of policymakers and the public. In so doing, they help to
improve the quality of policymaking, enrich democratic debate over ideas and pro-
mote government accountability for policy decisions.
Chapter 3 examines the emergence, evolution and role of think tanks in policy-
making in the context of Indonesia’s transition to democracy. Drawing on the expe-
riences of some Indonesian policy research institutes, the chapter reflects on the
1 Introduction 7
opportunities and challenges for think tanks in regard to informing and influencing
public debate and public policy. It explores how and under what circumstances
Indonesian think tanks are able to influence policy and how they can improve their
impact on policymaking.
Policy analysis is a key capability for modern policymaking bureaucracies. As
public policymakers grapple with increasingly complex issues, their need for sys-
tematic evaluation of evidence from a range of sources and sound assessment of
policy alternatives grows. The authors of Chap. 4 examine the nature of policy anal-
ysis within the Indonesian bureaucracy, exploring the role and functions of policy
analysis units as knowledge intermediaries in synthesising and translating knowl-
edge. They explore the challenges faced by bureaucrats and policy analysts in pro-
ducing relevant, quality and timely policy analysis in response to policymakers’
information needs. In addition to departmental research and development units
(Balitbangs) and internal ‘think tanks’ – such as the Ministry of National
Development Planning’s Centre for Policy Analysis – the chapter considers other
ways in which policy analysis is undertaken in the public sector. It reflects on the
motivations underlying the 2014 decision to create a new functional position in the
civil service (‘policy analyst’) and its implications for evidence-informed policy-
making in Indonesia.
Chapter 5 explores how policymakers use evidence. Evidence-based policymak-
ing is both a technical and a political undertaking. Policymakers must have the skills
and knowledge to understand and articulate their evidence needs, source and evalu-
ate evidence and apply it to policy problems. Policymaking organisations also need
systems and processes that support the use of evidence, including adequate human
and financial resources and quality assurance systems. Yet the use of evidence is
also determined by policymakers’ values, beliefs and motivations, the institutional
context within which policy is made and the broader political culture. This chapter
examines the use of evidence in national and subnational policymaking in Indonesia
from a political economy perspective. It outlines how existing processes and sys-
tems for evidence-informed policymaking interact with political and organisational
factors to shape policymakers’ demand for and use of evidence.
Big data and digital innovation are changing the research and policy landscape in
profound ways. Chapter 6 explores this phenomenon and its potential for informing
public policy. In Indonesia the near ubiquity of mobile phones, improvements in
connectivity and coverage and availability of new and cheaper technologies is pro-
viding policy researchers and policymakers with access to new sources of real-time
information and new tools for collecting, managing and analysing large volumes of
data. These developments have the potential to change the way policymakers source
and use evidence to inform policymaking. This chapter examines the implications
of new technologies for policymaking. The authors argue that although advanced
data analytics and data visualisation help to make sense of new data sources and to
attract policymakers to some of these prototypes, actual uptake and adoption are
more likely to depend on political factors.
Knowledge sector actors do not exist in a vacuum. They are immersed in a web
of rules and regulations that define how they link and interact with each other, the
8 A. Pellini et al.
amount of funding available for procuring and generating evidence and the space
for evidence to influence plans and policies. The authors of Chap. 7 examine the
policies, procedures and practices that govern and shape the production and use of
knowledge in policymaking in Indonesia. The chapter begins by examining some of
the challenges that inhibit the production and use of research to inform policymak-
ing. It then discusses two examples of reforms in the enabling environment for
evidence-informed policymaking: funding for research and regulations for govern-
ment procurement of research. These reforms have expanded the space for produc-
ing high-quality, policy-relevant research, enabling policymakers to commission
research from universities and policy research organisations. The authors describe
the policy changes that led to the establishment of the Indonesia Science Fund and
a change in government procurement regulations. The chapter concludes with sug-
gestions about regulatory changes that may still be required to continue reforming
the enabling environment in which Indonesia’s knowledge sector operates.
In recent decades recognition that politics and political institutions matter for
development has increased, along with interest in contextually grounded approaches.
This has stemmed from an acknowledgement that purely technocratic approaches to
development programmes have often resulted in failure because they do not take
into account the nature of political institutions. Nor do they consider the context in
a particular developing country or the interests and incentives motivating powerful
national actors. Policy processes are embedded in specific social, political and
organisational contexts. Approaches that focus on implementing universal best
practices in evidence-informed policymaking are unlikely to be successful. Success
is far more likely through an approach that takes the local context as the starting
point to understanding what issues are relevant to policymakers and developing
contextually appropriate solutions. The authors of Chap. 8 reflect on policy reforms
in the Indonesian knowledge sector and the use of politically smart, locally led
approaches used to achieve those policy changes by a large-scale development
programme.
In the final chapter, the editors synthesise the main conclusions from the various
chapters and look at what lies ahead for Indonesia’s knowledge sector. These are not
easy times for putting forth an evidence-informed approach to policymaking. The
emergence of a post-truth political discourse changes how citizens perceive and
(mis)trust politicians and how the policymaking process appears to conspire against
the use of evidence. However, the findings presented here confirm that intellectual
capital and a policymaking process that values, demands and makes use of timely,
high-quality knowledge and evidence to inform policy decisions are necessary to
boost productivity and strengthen economic growth.
Overall, the findings show that Indonesia is amongst the middle-income coun-
tries that are beginning to invest in finding ways to demand, use and produce more
and better-quality evidence to inform public policy. The authors remain optimistic
that Indonesia has decided to use evidence and knowledge to strengthen economic
development, improve social conditions and contribute to a stronger democracy –
and hope that this volume will contribute to that development.
1 Introduction 9
References
AusAID [Government of Australia. Australian Agency for International Development]. (2012).

Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy: The knowledge sector initiative: Design
document. Jakarta. http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/indo-ks-design.pdf.
Accessed 11 Mar 2014.
Cairney, P. (2016). The politics of evidence-based policy making. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Carden, F. (2009). Knowledge to policy: Making the most of development research. London: Sage
and IDRC.
Carden, F. (2017). How do you evaluate a mental revolution? (Working Paper 22). Jakarta:
Knowledge Sector Initiative. http://www.ksi-indonesia.org/en/news/detail/how-do-you-evalu-
ate-a-mental-revolution. Accessed 20 May 2017.
Datta, A., Jones, H., Febriany, V., Harris, D., Dewi, R. K., Wild, L., & Young, J. (2011). The politi-
cal economy of policy-making in Indonesia. AusAID. Available at: http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/
publications/Documents/indo-ks11-knowledge-policymaking.pdf. Accessed 20 May 2017.
Davies, H. T. O., Nutley, S., & Smith, P. (2000). Introducing evidence-based policy and practice in
public services, In H. T. O. Davies, S. M. Nutley, & P. C. Smith (Ed.), What works? Evidence-
based policy and practice in public services. Bristol: Policy Press.
Davies, P. (2012). The state of evidence-based policy evaluation and its role in policy formation.
National Institute Economic Review, 219(1), 41–52.
Flynn, N. (1999). Modernizing British government. Parliamentary Affairs, 52(4), 582–597. https://
doi.org/10.1093/pa/52.4.582.
Government of the United Kingdom, Cabinet Office. (1999). Modernising government (White
Paper). London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office.
Indonesia Investments. (2016, February 6). GDP in focus: Analysis of Indonesia’s 5.04% eco-
nomic growth in Q4-2015. https://www.indonesia-investments.com/news/news-columns/
gdp-in-focus-analysis-of-indonesia-s-5.04-economic-growth-in-2015/item6470? Accessed 18
March 2017.
Karetji, P. C. (2010). Overview of the Indonesian knowledge sector. Jakarta: AusAID. Available
at: http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/indo-ks8-overview.pdf. Accessed on 21
May 2017.
Leicester, G. (1999). The seven enemies of evidence-based policy. Public Money and Management,
19(1), 5–7.
Lindblom, C. E. (1968). The policy-making process. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
Sackett, D. L., Rosenberg, W. M. C., Gray, J. A. M., Haynes, R. B., & Richardson, W. S. (1996).
Evidence-based medicine: What it is and what it isn’t. BMJ, 312(1996), 71. https://doi.
org/10.1136/bmj.312.7023.7.
Schwab, K. (2016). The fourth industrial revolution. Geneva: World Economic Forum.
Shaxson, L. (2016). Lessons for building and managing an evidence base for policy (Working
Paper 10). Jakarta: Knowledge Sector Initiative. http://www.ksi-indonesia.org/en/news/detail/
lessons-for-building-and-managing-an-evidence-base-for-policy. Accessed 5 April 2017.
Sherlock, S. (2010). Knowledge for policy: Regulatory obstacles to the growth of a knowledge
market in Indonesia. Jakarta: AusAID. http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/
indo-ks13-knowledge-to-govt.pdf. Accessed 9 June 2017.
Stuart, E., Samman, E., Avis, W., Berliner, T. (2015). The data revolution. Finding the missing mil-
lions. London: Overseas Development Institute. https://www.odi.org/publications/9476-data-
revolution-finding-missing-millions. Accessed 10 Apr 2017.
Sumarto, S. (2011). The SMERU research institute: History and lessons learned. Jakarta:
AusAID. Available at: http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/indo-ks12-smeru.
pdf. Accessed 22 May 2017.
10 A. Pellini et al.
Suryadarma, D., Pomeroy, J., Tanuwidjaja, S. (2010). Economic factors underpinning constraints
in Indonesia’s knowledge sector. Jakarta: AusAID. http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/
Documents/indo-ks2-economic-incentives.pdf. Accessed 23 May 2017.
Sutcliffe, S., & Court, J. (2005). Evidence-based policymaking: What is it? How does it work?
What relevance for developing countries? London: Overseas Development Institute. https://
www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/3683.pdf. Accessed 15
Mar 2017.
Weiss, C. (1979). The many meanings of research utilization. Public Administration Review, 39(5),
426–431.
Part I
Producing Knowledge for Policy
Chapter 2
Linking Academic Research
and Policymaking
Budiati Prasetiamartati, Fred Carden, Siti Ruhanawati, Inaya Rakhmani,

and Yanuar Nugroho
Whilst creativity, ideas and questioning are of value in their

own right, economies and societies which invest in research
generally show faster rates of growth in output and human
development.
(Stern 2016)
1 Introduction
This volume explores the role of evidence in producing better public policy in
Indonesia. This chapter builds on the importance of research to that process and
more broadly to socio-economic development. It sees research as foundational to a
strong, knowledge-intensive twenty-first-century economy. Here, we explore the
challenges that Indonesian academics face in producing policy-relevant research.
B. Prasetiamartati (*) · S. Ruhanawati

Jakarta, Indonesia
F. Carden
I. Rakhmani
Department of Communication, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of
Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia
Y. Nugroho
Analysis and Oversight of Strategic Issues on Social, Cultural, and Ecological Affairs,
Jakarta, Indonesia
Executive Office of the President, Government of Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia

14 B. Prasetiamartati et al.
When we think of development as more than mere survival, knowledge is impor-

tant for understanding how to develop an economy and a society that not only grows
economically but does so with equity and in an ecologically sustainable manner.
Development that supports the growth and nurturing of human potential − growth
that addresses major inequities − requires knowledge. It needs knowledge and evi-
dence because in this increasingly complex world, it is no longer viable for a
decision-maker to effectively determine development policy for his or her people
without significant inputs from a range of people and perspectives. In this chapter,
we consider primarily knowledge generated through formal scientific research. In a
forthcoming volume, Nugroho, Antlöv and Carden recognise that knowledge takes
many forms and comes from diverse sources, defined as formal knowledge, profes-
sional knowledge and local knowledge.
This discussion of the links between academic research and policymaking is
based on some basic assumptions. First, universities play a crucial role in building
knowledge through research on issues central to development and thus play a key
role in generating and managing knowledge in an increasingly uncertain world.
Maintaining and building the integrity of the research enterprise are crucial to its
credibility and ultimately to its value in advancing development and supporting
policymaking. Second, universities do not only produce researchers. They also
serve as the training ground for policymakers and bureaucrats – decision-makers
who are in a position to make use of evidence in their decisions (Ford 2012). Third,
we assume that institutions and organisations tend to be weak at accumulating
knowledge. As a result, people need to learn for themselves, and it is people who
make up the institutions that accumulate knowledge, through their life experiences.
People then influence the policies and practices of the organisations through which
they engage. Fourth, organisations are at risk for confirmation bias, that is, listening
only to the like-minded. Universities can ensure a space for the expression of diverse
viewpoints. Finally, we work under the assumption that universities can play a role
in nurturing, managing and documenting knowledge to help mitigate the challenges
faced by many institutions in this regard.
Universities in Indonesia are weak and research within them even weaker. The
Programme for International Student Assessment results, comparing the education
outcomes of high school students (15 years of age) in a number of countries, ranked
Indonesia 62nd out of 72 economies assessed (OECD 2016). This means that stu-
dents start university at a significant disadvantage. Indonesian universities also
receive poor rankings in international comparisons (Rakhmani et al. 2017). Little
research is published − far less than in other economies in the region (see Pellini
et al. 2016). Indonesia spends less than 0.2% of its GDP on research, at least ten
times lower than other countries in the region.
These are indicators, or symptoms, of an overriding problem in Indonesian uni-
versities: the absence of a research culture. In the next sections of this chapter, we
break this broad-based problem into three underlying causes that we believe to be
important starting points, or levers of change, for addressing the lack of a research
culture. The next section explores constraints in the institutional environment, sec-
tion three examines limited financing for research and the fourth section addresses
2 Linking Academic Research and Policymaking 15
the issue of inadequate human resource management. In section five the authors
provide some suggestions for addressing these issues.
There is no single problem that can be ‘fixed’ to improve the place of research in
universities. And these three levers are not the only challenges to be addressed.
There are many other, multifaceted challenges. It can never be known for certain
that any one response will help to move a university closer to a strong research cul-
ture, hence the need for ongoing assessment and reflection on whether and how
universities are reaching their potential and whether a focus on these levers contin-
ues to be relevant.
2 U
niversities as Knowledge Environments: The Teaching-
Research Nexus
Ford (2012) noted that ‘The most intractable barrier to research excellence in
Indonesia is the incentive structure within higher education’. This section argues
that Indonesian universities place low priority on the production of knowledge for
more equitable development. Universities in low- and middle-income countries
have a demonstrated lack of research productivity. In the Asian region, universities
play a role in knowledge production that favours market mechanisms and/or indi-
vidual consultancies (Mok 2008). This contributes to widening the gap between rich
and poor and prolongs the exclusion of social groups. So why argue that knowledge
production should be strengthened at universities to achieve an equitable society
when they often fail to do so?
The authors argue that universities as knowledge producers matter because of
their potential to foster interaction between their three core functions: teaching and
learning, research and community engagement (or tridarma perguruan tinggi). The
institutionalisation of knowledge transfer, generation and selection at universities
can and must be directed towards equitable social development. The speed with
which knowledge is generated and accumulated today is clearly unprecedented
(Foray 2004; Tyfield 2012). This means that there is potential to enhance knowledge
efficiency and quality, providing wider access to many. However, the desired effect
of a more equitable society can only be achieved through the structural transforma-
tion of the institutions mandated to provide knowledge access to the public.
Some argue that in the case of Indonesia, universities are more apt to be market-
oriented than having a clear public-service agenda (i.e. to be more focused on profit
than the public good) (Hadiz and Dhakidae 2005; Karetji 2010; Guggenheim 2012;
Rakhmani and Siregar 2016; Rosser 2016). Moreover, the precondition of quality
knowledge generation that is central in this new economy is currently lacking due
to bureaucratic constraints. These constraints involve limited funding for basic sci-
ences, the stunting of critical thinking among academics and bureaucratisation of
the academic career. Current conditions at Indonesian state universities show an
imbalance between teaching, research and community engagement. This is because
university income is used to pay faculty for teaching, but not for research (see
Fig. 2.1 Total tertiary enrolment (1972 to 2011). (Reproduced from World Bank World
Development Indicators (cited in Rosser 2016, 10))
Rakhmani and Siregar 2016; Rosser 2016). This consistent imbalance has meant
that Indonesian universities generally fail to carry out research.
Indonesian universities have yielded poor academic performance compared to
countries with lower GDP (Guggenheim 2012; Rakhmani 2016). Rakhmani and
Siregar, referring to Hadiz and Dhakidae (2005), note that ‘poor performance in this
respect has been linked to structural problems that are inherent to state universities
and research institutions, whereby most research has, for the longest time, been con-
fined to providing technocratic input for government development strategies’ (2016,
1). This condition prevailed throughout much of the authoritarian New Order regime
under President Soeharto (1967–1998), which systematically narrowed the role of
state universities to the technocratic role of providing input for state programmes.
Since the early 2000s, state universities traditionally funded only through the
state budget have been permitted to seek external income as autonomous state legal
entities (Rakhmani and Siregar 2016). The assumption behind this policy change in
2000 was that authority to manage their own finances would allow state universities
to improve the quality of academic performance. Instead, the outcome has been an
increase of student intake – thereby increasing university income – with no signifi-
cant change in teaching qualifications or support for research (Fig. 2.1).
Consequently, academics take on increased teaching loads, either to secure higher
income or respond to the demands of their department.
Moreover, a study by Rakhmani and Siregar shows that 51% of academic staff in
major Indonesian state universities hold managerial positions − in addition to their
role in teaching, research and community engagement (2016). This places research
even further down on the priority list.
This is not to say that no research is carried out at Indonesian universities.
Academic staff of major Indonesian state universities who do carry out research do
so in such a way that their research network spans sectors, namely, state, private
sector, international donors and universities (see Rakhmani and Siregar 2016).
Significantly, 74% of the research carried out is thematically linked to governance.
This may appear to suggest that the research produced is linked to policymaking
(Ibid.). However, a closer look into the themes shows that research topics selected
are driven by available funding. In other words, the market mechanism is the driving
force within higher education institutions in the whole Asian region, not only
Indonesia (Mok 2008). This is demonstrated in Indonesia by research reports at
major state universities that are rarely turned into academic publications. Only 8%
of academic staff at these universities have published in reputable, peer-reviewed,
international academic journals (Rakhmani and Siregar 2016).
The structure and organisation of academic disciplines was inherited from the
New Order regime and heavily favours teaching over research and academic publi-
cation. The single-discipline nature of academic pursuits has inhibited interaction
and collaboration between researchers across disciplines and reduced the space for
academics to carry out applied research (Nizam 2006; Wicaksono and Friawan
2011; Moeliodihardjo et al. 2012).
Current publication policies lack full appreciation of the complexity of peer
review. The accreditation of journals by the former Directorate General of Higher
Education (Direktorat Jenderal Pendidikan Tinggi – DJPT) also failed to place suf-
ficient emphasis on the quality of peer review (Rakhmani et al. 2017), let alone
address the lack of a peer-reviewed culture. This culture needs to be fostered by
balancing, or properly appreciating, the connection between teaching and learning,
research and community engagement.
The notion of tridarma perguruan tinggi1 of Indonesian universities resonates
with the idea of the teaching/research nexus identified in many studies (Neumann
1994; Colbeck 1998; Griffiths 2004; Robertson 2007; Simons and Elen 2007). A
2012 study by Horta et al. argues for complementarity between teaching and
research, demonstrating through empirical data in the United States that by leverag-
ing the link between teaching and research, academic activities can move beyond
conventional teaching formats. The study’s results show that students demonstrate
higher output when research is at the centre of teaching activities, in what the authors
call ‘inquiry-based curricula’. Students become more actively involved in faculty
research activities. This not only minimises the division of roles between faculty and
students, it also reinforces the link between teaching and research as part of the same
learning process. This, in turn, increases the productivity of scientific output at all
levels (Griffiths 2004). With this in mind, in teaching social sciences and humani-
ties, it becomes essential not only to stimulate critical inquiry and research among
faculty and students but also with the wider community with which they engage and
gather data. Thus, the next practical step would be to link the teaching/research
nexus and evidence-based policymaking as one of the practical outputs.
3 Funding for Research
Carrying out research requires funding, but there is a lack of clarity on how much
Indonesia actually invests in research and development (R&D). Recent estimates by
the Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education show that gross
Teaching and learning, research and community engagement

1
expenditure in R&D in 2015 amounted to 0.2% of GDP (Kompas 2016). This esti-
mate is higher than the often-cited 2014 figure of 0.09% (Pappiptek LIPI 2014). The
2015 figure used a different methodology and included more variables than the
2014 figure, namely, salaries, allocation by local governments and research insti-
tutes. Neither figure covers contributions from the private sector, due to a lack of
data. In any case, both figures demonstrate alarmingly low expenditure when com-
pared to research funding expenditures in most expanding economies in the region
(Fig. 2.2). In 2011, Malaysia was spending 1% of GDP, China 1.7%, Singapore
2.1% and Korea 3.7% (Tilley and Hidayat 2017).
Similarly alarming is that universities’ share of gross expenditure on R&D stood
at just 5.6% between 2000 and 2002 (OECD 2013, 172). This figure is miniscule,
considering that most work done by Ph.D.-level researchers takes place at public
universities. The implication is that most research is carried out outside the univer-
sity and frequently by researchers without Ph.D. qualifications (Brodjonegoro and
Greene 2012). Moreover, the majority of R&D funding in Indonesia (80%) comes
from the government, compared to about 14% from the private sector. By contrast,
research institutions in Malaysia, China, Japan, Korea and Singapore receive over
60% of their research investment from the private sector (Brodjonegoro and Greene
2012; Guggenheim 2012). Further, the Indonesian government contribution to R&D
expenditure has declined precipitously over the past 35 years. The government’s
budget for ‘science and technology’ (which includes R&D, science services for
information systems and statistical activities and education and training in universi-
ties, ministries and nonministerial institutions) as a share of the total state budget
between 1969 and 2013 has been decreasing (Fig. 2.3).
In 2010 the Government of Indonesia issued Regulation No. 93, which included
a measure allowing tax deductions for donations, including for funding research.
Fig. 2.2 Gross expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP (Indonesia’s data contain only four
original data points from different sources. Data for 2000 and 2001 are from UNESCO, 2009 from
a national observation and 2013 from ‘Science and Technology in Indonesia – in Brief’ 2014,
Pappiptek LIPI 2014. The data in between these observations are linear interpolations). (Reproduced
from Tilley and Hidayat 2017)
Fig. 2.3 Ratio of state science and technology and R&D budget to state budget, 1963–2013.
(Reproduced from Pappitek LIPI 2014)
This was an attempt to incentivise private donations and funding for R&D. However,
there have been very few applications of this regulation, and it is little known among
potential donors from the private sector. Its use is further complicated by a general
unwillingness among Indonesians, including the business sector, to interact with the
tax office.
The main source of funding for public and private universities is grants provided
by the state budget through the Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher
Education (Kementerian Riset, Teknologi dan Pendidikan Tinggi – KemRistekDikti)
and managed by the Directorate of Research and Community Service (Direktorat
Riset dan Pengabdian Masyarakat – DRPM).2 In 2017, DRPM was managing more
than 17 different research grant schemes in three main areas: basic research, applied
research and capacity-building research. In addition, DRPM allocates ten grants for
community service that are directed to applied research in communities, ranging
from community technology to collaborative research with local government or the
private sector (DRPM 2016). This fragmentation of a small research funding alloca-
tion makes it difficult for academic staff to access the funds. Modes of disbursement
add to the confusion. The 17 DRPM research grants are disbursed through two main
channels: (1) directly to the university through the ‘decentralised research grant’
scheme (four grant schemes) and (2) through competitive national grants where
academic staff have to apply for funds through their respective universities (13 grant
schemes) (DRPM 2016; Rakhmani and Siregar 2016). Not all academic staff are
2
The Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education (Kementerian Riset, Teknologi dan
Pendidikan Tinggi – KemRistekDikti) is the regulatory body for Indonesia’s higher education. In
2014, the Ministry was formed through a merger of Higher Education (formerly within the
Ministry of Education and Culture) and the Ministry of Research and Technology. Before the
merger, the body managing university research funding was the Directorate General of Higher
Education (Direktorat Jenderal Pendidikan Tinggi – DJPT).
Fig. 2.4 Proposal submissions and acceptance to DRPM research grant scheme. (Adapted from
DRPM 2017)
eligible to apply for the 17 research grants but rather depend on the DRPM’s clas-
sification of university research capacity.
Grant amounts range from IDR 15 million to 200 million (US$1,100–15,000)
per fiscal year, depending on the research scheme, according to DRPM data from
January 2017. Due to the short time frame (1 fiscal year) allowed and the limited
resources, a typical university research project produces no more than a report or
very rarely a journal article, an academic briefing, an opinion piece or an article for
public dissemination (Nugroho et al. 2016).
Funding for research is slowly increasing. Overall, DRPM research grants
increased almost fourfold between 2006 and 2012 (from IDR 76 billion to nearly
IDR 290 billion or US$21 million) (Moeliodihardjo et al. 2012). It continued to
increase to IDR 1.2 trillion (US$90 million) in 2017, according to January data
gathered by DRPM. In spite of this large-scale increase in funding, research grant
funds allocated to DRPM remained low, merely 3% of the total Ministry of Research,
Technology and Higher Education budget in 2016. However, this sum is spread
across 269,351 academic staff in universities across Indonesia (PDDIKTI 2017). As
shown in Fig. 2.4, due to limits on funding, between 2013 and 2017 on average,
only 49% of proposals were funded (around 16,271 of 34,426 proposals).
Of all the types of research grants sought between 2013 and 2017, those for basic
research received only 10–14% of the total managed by DRPM (Fig. 2.5), demon-
strating the lack of funding for basic sciences mentioned above.
A major issue in research funding is that current Indonesian fiscal law and regu-
lation discourages multi-year research programmes. Annual renewals are permitted,
but the lack of initial multi-year commitments creates uncertainty, discouraging
researchers from planning longer-term initiatives. DRPM allows some exceptions
to these regulations, running some collaborative research grant schemes for up to
three years, valued at up to IDR 1 billion (US$75,000) per year. However, even in
these cases, the grants are evaluated annually, and there is no guarantee of continued
funding. As a result, researchers tend to avoid applying for these schemes, even
though they are sufficient to fund basic research.
Fig. 2.5 DRPM research grant scheme. (Adapted from DRPM 2017)
State universities are considered government implementing units (satuan kerja)

and must follow rigid reporting and budgeting guidelines and adhere to cumber-
some bureaucratic procedures for all financial transactions. According to
Brodjonegoro and Greene (2012), this has resulted in limiting the scope of research
that is explorative, flexible and innovative.
Lack of clarity about research funding schemes, together with limited time
frames for research, makes academic staff reluctant to risk their time by applying.
Other challenges faced by academic staff are the requirement to spend the entire
research budget in the same fiscal year, unpredictable timing of fund disbursements
and onerous administrative and financial reporting demands (Rakhmani and Siregar
2016; Suradijono et al. 2017).
A significant shift in research funding has occurred as a result of efforts by the
Indonesian Academy of Sciences (Akademi Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia – AIPI)
to establish the Indonesian Science Fund (Dana Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia –
DIPI) (Brodjonegoro and Greene 2012).3 The Indonesian Science Fund was
legally established in early 2016, confirming the Government of Indonesia’s com-
mitment to funding multi-year research projects. The Indonesian Science Fund is
supported by Indonesia’s Endowment Fund for Education under the Ministry of
Finance. The Fund’s regulatory framework also allows funding from external
sources and has attracted financial support from the Australia-Indonesia
Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy: the Knowledge Sector Initiative, the United
States Agency for International Development and the UK Government (Sabarini
2016). Although it currently provides only a small fraction of the resources
required for Indonesia’s research needs, the Fund’s significance lies in the mod-
ernising effect it can have on the country’s approach to commissioning and fund-
See also Chap. 7, Sect. 3.2.1.

3
ing multi-year research projects. Further discussion of the Indonesian Science

Fund and other regulatory changes is presented in Chap. 7.
4 Careers in Research
Universities’ human resource policies and regulations do not effectively support

research and knowledge production. The Ministry of Research, Technology and
Higher Education (Kementerian Riset, Teknologi dan Pendidikan Tinggi –
KemRistekDikti) has set the goal of developing world-class Indonesian universities.
This will require investment in teaching and the production of high-quality research
capable of leading innovation in the nation and withstanding the tests applicable to
international research.
To achieve this goal, it is important to recognise human resource management as
a core area in higher education (AIPI 2017). Universities face several human
resource challenges. The limited number of qualified Ph.Ds. teaching in universities
in Indonesia has a significant negative effect on the quality of teaching and the
capacity and potential for high-quality research. In Indonesia of 269,351 academic
faculty, only 12% hold a Ph.D., while 15.2% hold only an undergraduate degree; the
majority (63.8%) have master’s level qualifications (see Fig. 2.6).
Academic staff at public universities are civil servants; hence the human resource
policy is guided by national regulations designed to manage a bureaucracy, rather
than a university.4 The Indonesian bureaucracy relies on a centralised system of
promotion, severely limiting the ability of a university to promote its values and
manage faculty performance (AIPI 2017). International evidence shows that tertiary
Fig. 2.6 Educational background of academic staff in Indonesia. (Adapted from PDDIKTI 2017)
4
A relatively small number of autonomous universities have authority to manage their own
resources.
education institutions need autonomy and academic freedom in order to thrive

(Suryadarma and Jones 2013), something that is not possible under the current
human resource structure and regulations.
The performance measurement system within the university sector is based on
the tridarma perguruan tinggi mentioned earlier5, which is regulated through Law
No. 12/2012. All three core areas are considered individual obligations through the
national academic credit system, known as Kum.6 Under the Kum system, advance-
ment is based on achieving a certain number of credit points. Most credits are
awarded through teaching, leaving little incentive to accumulate credits through
research or community service.
A further problem is the lack of a university-level performance assessment system
to ensure implementation of the tridarma perguruan tinggi. Performance manage-
ment systems in place do not capture staff performance, nor do they easily recognise
broader issues, such as low levels of faculty training and the lack of university control
over its human resources. In short, neither the skills nor the incentives are in place to
boost the quality and quantity of research. So even if more resources for research
were to become available, few faculty are in place to use them wisely.
There is an inherent contradiction in the law that governs universities. On the one
hand, universities have the authority to manage academic staff; but on the other, the
academic workload is managed centrally, making it impossible for universities to
play a role in managing their staff (Suradijono et al. 2017).
Indonesian universities do not promote inter-institutional mobility. Nor do they
engage in open international recruitment. Because of entry-level civil service
requirements, there is a strong tendency among Indonesian academics to stay within
their own home institutions. This tends to promote insularity and discourage inno-
vation (Rakhmani and Siregar 2016). While new legislation permits open recruit-
ment (Civil Service Law No.5/2014), very little use has been made of this provision
(Ibid.). This could be mitigated through the engagement of international faculty, as
it takes place in both Malaysia and Singapore. International faculty bring new ideas
and diverse backgrounds that enrich debate and learning, as well as advancing aca-
demic publication (AIPI 2017). Ultimately, creating a more open and dynamic uni-
versity sector would strengthen both research and teaching.
Salary and incentive systems at universities do not promote research and can
even be seen to actively discourage it (Syafrudin et al. 2017). While some dedicated
research staff are hired from time to time, there is a need to effectively link research
5
6
The credit system is a tool for academic assessment. Kum system rules, faculty workload and
promotion of academic staff are expected to increase the performance and productivity of aca-
demic staff in the implementation of tridarma (three main functions) of higher education. The legal
basis for this system is the Joint Ministerial Decision between the Ministry of Education and
Culture and the Head of the State Employment Body (Mendikbud and Kepala Badan Kepegawaian
Negara) No. 61409/MPK/KP/99 and No. 181/1999 on the Operational Guidance on the Functional
Title of Lecturer and Their Credit Values (Petunjuk Pelaksanaan Jabatan Fungsional Dosen dan
Angka Kreditnya). This basis was recently renewed by Ministerial Regulation (Permendikbud)
No. 92/2014, on the Technical Guidance on the Operationalisation of the Assessment of the Credit
Values for Functional Position of Lecturer.
and teaching. This means that time for research needs to be incentivised, both on an
ongoing basis as well as through mechanisms for release time to work on larger
research initiatives. Sabbaticals could be one mechanism. At present, while these
are permitted in principle, they are hindered by civil service regulations that restrict
staff from taking leave (Rakhmani and Siregar 2016). Other mechanisms could also
be introduced, such as buying out teaching time to focus on research for a given
period of time. As noted earlier, this link between research and teaching not only
produces new knowledge but also provides natural opportunities for mentoring
junior researchers and enhancing publication (Suradijono et al. 2017). Moreover, it
improves teaching and increases student engagement in the research enterprise,
with the long-term benefits that implies. These mechanisms need to be managed
within the university system to work effectively.
Without some restructuring of salary and incentive systems, faculty will continue
to spend the bulk of their time in consulting and other activities outside the univer-
sity (Nugroho et al. 2016). According to one study, as much as three-quarters of
faculty time is spent on activities outside the university (Suryadarma and Jones
2013). As a result, the number of publications in international journals is very low
(Pellini et al. 2016). While some universities do provide incentives for peer-reviewed
publications and publication grants are available, these grants are usually too small
to fund the necessary research and cover the time required to produce an article in
an international journal (Nugroho et al. 2016; Suryadarma and Jones 2013).
In spite of these challenges, some bright spots are on the horizon. The government
is taking steps to improve the state of Indonesian universities that could result in
improving the environment for research. New regulations by the Ministry of Research,
Technology and Higher Education (Kementerian Riset, Teknologi dan Pendidikan
Tinggi – KemRistekDikti) on ‘output-based research’ open more space for increasing
research incentives and reducing the administrative burden. Outputs for publication in
an international journal will be valued differently than for a national journal.
Recently the government created a functioning mechanism for mid-level entry to
the civil service. This could facilitate both inter-institutional mobility and the
engagement of international faculty. As well, some universities (especially the
autonomous universities) now have the opportunity to design the academic career
path according to their particular needs and requirements. Progress along these lines
could help make the case for giving more universities these opportunities.
5 T
he Way Forward: Reforming Research Culture
and Connecting the Disconnected
The point of departure of this chapter is that strengthening the research culture in
universities is of paramount importance to reviving the Indonesian knowledge sec-
tor and promoting informed policymaking processes. At present the link between
the academic and policy worlds is broken. Not only does knowledge produced in the
academy rarely inform policy, but overall, Indonesian universities do not have
incentive systems in place either to fund research or to encourage academics to

devote time to research.
Academic research has two important roles to play in informing policymaking:
(1) produce policy-relevant knowledge and (2) provide academic training to future
policymakers. However, these roles are impeded by multifaceted problems, at dif-
ferent levels and in various dimensions. Thus reframing the role of the university is
an important part of strengthening its research culture.
Universities are not merely the arena in which knowledge production happens.
They also serve as a medium through which knowledge production processes are
shaped and reshaped. There is a symbiotic relationship between researchers and the
university. The process of knowledge accumulation, which is very much the domain
of researchers, cannot be successful unless the institution is supportive and nurtures
a research culture. This can only become a reality with adequate funding for
research. While resources cannot always dictate the quality of research outcomes,
they are essential for research to take place.
In the introduction to this chapter, it was noted that the overriding challenge fac-
ing Indonesian universities is the absence of a research culture, which was then
broken down into three subproblems/constraints. The next section suggested how to
transform these challenges into levers of change that can contribute to reforming
research in Indonesian universities and bringing that research closer to policymak-
ing processes.
There is no silver bullet to address such complex problems, so rather than provid-
ing prescriptive recommendations, the authors reflect on some central issues and
offer some key points for reform related to these levers of change as a way forward.
5.1 Universities as Research Environments
First, at a structural level, the reform agenda should be fundamentally directed

towards enabling higher education institutions to give more prominence to research
through its incentive structure and through interactive schemes with knowledge
users. Ideas and initiatives that promote research may be challenged, as teaching is
seen as the priority in Indonesian universities.
Several areas of change could be tested. The first concerns financial and nonfi-
nancial rewards for peer-reviewing publications. Creating incentives for mentoring
or peer review will contribute to improving research quality in academic institu-
tions. A second area for piloting solutions is through incentives for undertaking
multidisciplinary research. Faculties remain compartmentalised, but development
problems tend to be multidisciplinary in nature and require multidisciplinary
responses. A third area of experimentation and learning would be to find ways to
enhance and diversify the interaction and collaboration between students and aca-
demic staff through joint research activities, peer review and mentoring support.
Likewise, greater interaction between university-based researchers and, for exam-
ple, policy researchers in think tanks or government units, as well as other actors in
the knowledge sector, could be piloted. The creation of ‘knowledge hubs’ to facili-
tate interaction between universities and other actors in the knowledge sector, bring-
ing together supply and demand, could be transformative.
The effort to link the administratively separated activities of teaching, research
and community engagement into an integrated knowledge production process
requires funding and organisational support (universities, schools, departments,
study programmes, research centres) to transform existing practices and implement
some of the measures suggested here. Without structural changes that foster these
linkages, it is futile to argue that universities matter in the knowledge economy, and
the achievement of a more equitable society will remain out of reach. Therefore, the
authors of this chapter argue for a reform agenda, the first step of which is a focus
on funding and career tracks that aim to nurture an academic culture in Indonesia.
This reform agenda needs to appreciate both the prevailing bureaucratic model of
Indonesian universities and the desired model of a knowledge ecosystem that delib-
erately interacts with knowledge users.
5.2 Research Funding
Section 3 presented evidence about the low level of government funding allocated
for research. While this change will be among the most difficult, it has to be
addressed; without it, the enabling conditions for quality research will not be in
place. The formation of the Indonesian Science Fund, for example, is quite promis-
ing, but until it is fully operational and of adequate size and scope, much remains to
be done. A clear allocation for research funding in support of development pro-
grammes and priorities is required to ensure better-informed development policies
and practices. Research to facilitate evidence-informed policy demands specific
funding allocations. Some funding also needs to be allocated for ‘blue sky’ research,
to advance knowledge and expand the frontiers of human understanding of nature
and society. The restructuring of funding for research must address both policy
research and research policy.
To achieve fundamental reform, other key issues also need to be addressed. It is
important to put in place a regulatory framework to allocate and reallocate state
budgets for research. Institutional arrangements among existing research institu-
tions are also required, to ensure coordinated and orchestrated efforts to ensure that
the research budget is used wisely. An accountability mechanism is needed to ensure
effective monitoring and oversight of research spending. Finally, although the gov-
ernment still holds the view that the education budget should be spent mostly for
infrastructure and enrolment, the earmarked state budget should also be used to
fund research. If accurately targeted, the funds could represent a significant increase
in funding for research.
5.3 Research as a Promising Career
The third area of this reform agenda addresses the career track of researchers and
academics. The Kum credit system (see Sect. 4 above) is outdated. The evidence
reviewed here suggests that it is detrimental, rather than beneficial, to building
research excellence within universities. Professorship and academic career promo-
tion must be modernised. Universities should be encouraged to develop their own
fairer, more competitive and merit-based research incentives and to reduce admin-
istrative loads. Mentoring and peer review systems need to be built institutionally
within universities to strengthen interaction between senior and junior academics. A
fair and supportive credit system is compatible with mentoring schemes, which are
key to the production of qualified scientific outputs. Mentoring and peer review,
when adequately promoted and supported by appropriate reward systems, will be
instrumental to strengthening research culture in universities.
At the individual level, the reform agenda calls for strengthening relationships
between teaching and research, including the use of research-based teaching materi-
als. Teaching is more engaging when it relies on research findings that are not just
new but relevant and contextual. Teaching can also inspire research, by involving
students in testing new methods in the classroom or laboratory. This way, the promi-
nence of research in the university is organically built and strengthened. One funda-
mental change with immediate impact would be policies on salary or remuneration
for researchers and academics, which are currently not competitive with other occu-
pations of similar standing. A reform in the recruitment and remuneration of
researchers could make a significant difference, especially in ensuring that the best
talents and minds remain in the knowledge sector.
Sabbatical leave, prominent outside Indonesia, could represent a quick win to
boost spirits and send a message of change and reform to researchers. As a tactical
and strategic reform, sabbatical leave requires neither legal changes nor specific
arrangements by the central government (especially for autonomous universities).
All it takes is a decision by the chancellor or rector – which is largely within the
scope of university decision-makers. During their sabbatical, university academics
could work in different sectors (e.g. government or business) or exchange their
teaching time for research or publication. Thus appropriate schemes for sabbatical
leave would provide university academics with ‘fresh air’ in their career: mobility,
knowledge exchange, space for further academic reflection and publication, among
others. This would benefit both the university and the researcher.
A note of caution: to successfully undertake these new tasks, universities will
need to focus on the development and implementation of a strategic human resource
plan that will eventually enhance their ability to contribute to a strong, knowledge-
based economy.
6 Conclusions
The reform agenda proposed in this chapter aims to strengthen both the structure
and practice of research (i.e. the research culture) in Indonesian universities. The
proposed reforms can revitalise Indonesian universities as focal points of knowl-
edge production that inform both the society and the policies through which it is
governed. The principles of tridarma perguruan tinggi7 offer opportunities for
change and for bringing university research closer to policy processes.
A well-interpreted and implemented tridarma perguruan tinggi promotes not
only teaching and research but also community engagement. Community engage-
ment could represent the link between research on policy issues and development
needs – in essence as a platform for exchange. This means using tridarma pergu-
ruan tinggi to overcome the bureaucratic nature of the university, reviving and revit-
alising it to achieve professionalisation. The hard fact is that such exchange never
guarantees that evidence will inform all policies; but without it, there will never be
an informed policy. This is how tridarma perguruan tinggi should be revived and
given new meaning: from a norm to a platform for exchange between academicians
and policymakers.
These challenges in reviving the research culture in Indonesian universities are
not straightforward. The issues touched on are not the only issues, and as they are
addressed, new issues will emerge. The authors see them, however, as key levers of
change where continued efforts could lead to new respect for research within uni-
versities, and hope that we have convincingly argued how important it is to
strengthen university research in today’s knowledge economy. Some aspects out-
lined here are structural, some propose new modalities and some are intended to
strengthen incentives and support for individual researchers. These changes repre-
sent an opportunity to foster the link between research and policy, so that universi-
ties can play a more important role in achieving an equitable society.
References
AIPI [Akademi Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia/Indonesian Academy of Sciences]. (2017). Era

Disrupsi: Peluang dan Tantangan Pendidikan Tinggi Indonesia (Disruption era: Opportunities
and challenges of Indonesian higher education). Jakarta: Indonesian Academy of Sciences.
Brodjonegoro, S. S., & Greene, M. P. (2012). Creating an Indonesian science fund. Jakarta:
AIPI and World Bank. https://www.aipi.or.id/index.php?pg=detilpublikasi&pid=19&type=3.
Accessed 14 June 2017.
Colbeck, C. (1998). Merging in a seamless blend: How faculty integrate teaching and research.
Journal of Higher Education, 69, 647–671.
DRPM [Direktorat Riset dan Pengabdian Masyarakat/Directorate of Research and Community
Services]. (2016). Panduan Pelaksanaan Penelitian dan Pengabdian pada Masyarakat di
Perguruan Tinggi (Guidelines for implementation of research and Community Services in
Universities). Jakarta: Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education.

7
DRPM [Direktorat Riset dan Pengabdian Masyarakat/Directorate of Research and Community

Services]. (2017). Rekap Penelitian Tahun 2013–2017 (Research recapitulation 2013–2017).
Jakarta: Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education.
Foray, D. (2004). Economics of knowledge. Cambridge, MA/London: MIT Press.
Ford, M. (2012). Mechanisms for building research capacity in Indonesia’s knowledge sector
through Australian universities. Jakarta: AusAid. http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/
Documents/building-indonesian-research-capacity-aust-universities.pdf. Accessed 5 June
2017.
Griffiths, R. (2004). Knowledge production and the research–teaching nexus: The case of the built
environment disciplines. Studies in Higher Education, 29(6), 709–726.
Guggenheim, S. (2012). Indonesia’s quiet springtime: Knowledge, policy and reform. In A. Reid
(Ed.), Indonesia rising: The repositioning of Asia’s third giant (pp. 141–169). Singapore:
ISEAS.
Hadiz, V. R., & Dhakidae, D. (2005). Social science and power in Indonesia. Singapore: Equinox
Publishing.
Horta, H., Dautel, V., & Veloso, F. (2012). An output perspective on the teaching–research
nexus: An analysis focusing on the United States higher education system. Studies in Higher
Education, 37(2), 171–187.
at: http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/indo-ks8-overview.pdf. Accessed 5
June 2017.
Kompas. (2016, September 15). Dana Riset Jadi 0,2 Persen PDB, tetapi Cuma Karena Perubahan
Rumus Penghitungan (Research funds became 0.2 percent of GDP, but only due to changes in
the calculation formulas).
Moeliodihardjo, B. Y., Biemo, W., Brodjonegoro, S. S., & Hatakenaka, S. (2012). University, indus-
try, and government partnership: Its present and future challenges in Indonesia. Procedia –
Social and Behavioral Sciences, 52, 307–316. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2012.09.468.
Mok, K. (2008). Varieties of regulatory regimes in Asia: The liberalization of the higher education
market and changing governance in Hong, Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia. Pacific Review,
21(2), 147–170.
Neumann, R. (1994). The teaching–research nexus: Applying a framework to university students’
learning experiences. European Journal of Education, 29, 323–339.
Nizam, N. (2006). Higher education in South East Asia-Indonesia. https://repository.ugm.
ac.id/32578/1/UNESCO_Rihed_Higher_Education_nizam.pdf. Accessed 5 June 2017.
Nugroho, Y., Prasetiamartati, B., & Ruhanawati, S. (2016). Addressing barriers to university
research (Working Paper 8). Jakarta: Knowledge Sector Initiative. http://www.ksi-indonesia.
org/en/news/detail/addressing-barriers-to-university-research. Accessed 5 June 2017.
OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development]. (2013). OECD reviews of
innovation policy: Innovation in Southeast Asia. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264128712-en
OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development]. (2016). PISA 2015 results in
focus. Paris. https://www.oecd.org/pisa/pisa-2015-results-in-focus.pdf. Accessed 5 June 2017.
Pappiptek LIPI [Pusat Penelitian Perkembangan IPTEK Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia].
(2014). Buku Saku Indikator IPTEK Indonesia 2014 (Pocket book of science and technology
indicators Indonesia). Jakarta: Pappiptek LIPI.
PDDIKTI [Pangkalan Data Pendidikan Tinggi]. (2017). Jumlah Dosen Aktif Berdasarkan Jenjang
Pendidikan Tertinggi (Number of active academic staff based on highest education level).
http://forlap.dikti.go.id/dosen/homegraphjenjang. Accessed 2 May 2017.
Pellini, A., Helen, T., & Carden, F. (2016, November 16). Indonesia’s knowledge sector is catching
up, but a large gap persists. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/indonesias-knowl-
edge-sector-is-catching-up-but-a-large-gap-persists-67937. Accessed 5 June 2017.
Rakhmani, I., & Siregar, F. (2016). Reforming research in Indonesia: Policies and practices
(Working Paper No 72). Washington, DC: Global Development Network.
Rakhmani, I. (2016, February 3). Insularity leaves Indonesia trailing behind in the world of social
research. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/insularity-leaves-
indonesia-trailing-behind-in-theworld-of-social-research-53973. Accessed 18 Apr 2018.
Rakhmani, I., Siregar, F., & Halim, M. (2017). Policy journal diagnostic. Jakarta: Knowledge
Sector Initiative. http://www.ksi-indonesia.org/en/news/detail/policy-journal-diagnostic-study.
Robertson, J. (2007). Beyond the ‘research/teaching nexus’: Exploring the complexity of academic
experience. Studies in Higher Education, 32(5), 541–556.
Rosser, A. (2016). Neo-liberalism and the politics of higher education policy in Indonesia.
Comparative Education, 52(2), 109–135.
Sabarini, P. (2016, March 31). Indonesia launches its first multi-year funding scheme for scien-
tific research. The Conversation. http://theconversation.com/indonesia-launches-its-first-multi-
year-funding-scheme-for-scientific-research-56979. Accessed 5 June 2017.
Simons, M., & Elen, J. (2007). The ‘research-teaching nexus’ and ‘education through research’:
An exploration of ambivalences. Studies in Higher Education, 32(5), 617–631.
Stern, L. N. (2016). Building on success and learning from experience: An independent review
of the research excellence framework. London: Government of the United Kingdom. https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/541338/ind-16-9-ref-
stern-review.pdf. Accessed 5 June 2017.
Suradijono, S. H., Probandari, A., Syafrudin, D., Panggabean, H., & Kurniawan, T. (2017).
Addressing barriers to research in university: Cases from four Indonesian universities. KSI
Diagnostic Study. Jakarta: Knowledge Sector Initiative. http://www.ksi-indonesia.org/in/news/
detail/diagnostic-study-of-four-universities. Accessed 14 June 2017.
Suryadarma, D., & Jones, G. W. (Eds.). (2013). Education in Indonesia. Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies.
Syafrudin, D., Nasuhi, H., Darmadi, D., Makruf, J., Umam, S., & Ropi, I. (2017). Addressing
barriers to research in university: A case study of State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah
(Kajian Diagnostik Mengatasi Hambatan Penelitian di Universitas: Studi Kasus UIN Syarif
Hidayatullah). Jakarta: Knowledge Sector Initiative and Centre for Study of Islam and Society
(PPIM) UIN. http://www.ksi-indonesia.org/in/news/detail/kajian-diagnostik-hambatan-peneli-
tian-di-uin-syarief-hidayatullah. Accessed 14 June 2017.
Tilley, H., & Hidayat, D. (2017). The knowledge sector in Indonesia: higher education and R&D
expenditure. Infographic. Jakarta: Knowledge Sector Initiative. http://www.ksi-indonesia.org/
en/news/detail/higher-education-and-rd-expenditure. Accessed 5 June 2017.
Tyfield, D. (2012). A cultural political economy of research and innovation in an age of crisis.
Minerva, 50(2), 149–167.
UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] Institute of Statistics.
Dataset: Science, technology and innovation. http://data.uis.unesco.org. Accessed 20 Jan 2017.
Wicaksono, T. Y., & Friawan, D. (2011). Recent developments in higher education in Indonesia:
Issues and challenges. In S. Armstrong & B. Chapman (Eds.), Financing higher education and
economic development in East Asia (pp. 159–187). Canberra: Australian National University
E-Press. http://www.oapen.org/download?type=document&docid=459234#page=167.
Accessed 25 Jan 2017.
Chapter 3
The Role of Policy Research Institutes
in Policymaking in Indonesia
Farini Pane, Irene Astuti Kuntjoro, Siti Ruhanawati,

Tanty Nurhayati Djafar, and Kharisma Priyo Nugroho
1 Introduction
The role played by Indonesian policy research institutes (PRIs) in policymaking is

evolving. Its features are largely shaped by the dynamic and complex relationships
among state and non-state organisations and international development regimes. It
emerges in different combinations in different periods; and the combinations shift
over time. While many studies on the role of policy research institutes or think-tanks
(McGann 2005; Bach et al. 2012; STATT 2012) conclude that PRIs play a vital role
in the political and policy arenas of local- and national-level policymaking, the sig-
nificance of the role and influence of Indonesian policy research institutes in the real
world of policymaking is understudied.
Empirical evidence on this topic continues to be a challenge; important instances
of success at both the national and subnational levels are usually based on analytical
evaluations rather than precise measures of programme impact. Case studies, ‘suc-
F. Pane (*) · I. A. Kuntjoro · S. Ruhanawati

T. N. Djafar
Jakarta, Indonesia
K. P. Nugroho

32 F. Pane et al.
cess stories or smart practices’ and other types of reports from development projects1
provide evidence of influence by Indonesian PRIs in policymaking. However, these
stories of influence in specific circumstances face inherent limitations when trying
to explain the influence of PRIs in the real world of policymaking, because it is not
linear. What these studies represent is limited to a series of logical propositions that
serve as proxies of the relationships between PRIs and policymakers. Evidence on
how that policy is actually made resides in the domain of bureaucratic knowledge
that is both highly experiential and largely tacit. These studies face both technical
and political limitations in uncovering the real drivers/incentives for policy change.
Nevertheless, the cases help to identify some key features of the roles of Indonesian
PRIs in policymaking, as described below.
2 General Framework
Indonesian PRIs and the policymaking realm co-exist within a general framework
of research and policy relationships. Although the emergence, evolution and dynam-
ics of Indonesian PRIs are context-specific and unique, their role in policymaking –
in terms of how their knowledge products interact with policymaking regimes (i.e.
process, structure and products of the policymaking process) – is similar to these
processes in other countries. For example, the struggle of Indonesian PRIs to influ-
ence development policy echoes some international experiences described by
Fred Carden in Knowledge to Policy (2009). Carden identified three critical moments
(socio-economic crisis, transition and technology) when research can become
exceptionally influential, which can be used to explain the situation in Indonesia:
• Indonesia’s 1997–1999 economic and political crisis demonstrated a failure of
government development policy during the previous decades. This situation
forced policymakers to seek research advice from non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) that they would previously have ignored or dismissed. But at the
time, non-state actors were ill-prepared to present specific, practical solutions to
policymakers’ problems.
• Political systems undergoing transition (e.g. the decentralisation policy that
resulted in direct elections for subnational leaders in the mid-2000s) have gener-
1
See, for example, Yayasan Bakti’s smart practices (http://bakti.or.id/en/smart-practices); the
Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy: the Knowledge Sector Initiative stories of
change series (http://www.ksi-indonesia.org/en/news/index/stories-of-change); the Partnership for
Governance Reform (Kemitraan) success story (http://www.kemitraan.or.id/success-story/); etc.
These kinds of evidence, according to Hunt and Shackley (2009), fall within the category of ‘fidu-
cial science’ that is produced as a service to users, rather than for its own ends, comprising that area
of work which, in principle at least, provides the knowledge base for the production and implemen-
tation of policy decision-making and associated regulations. The audience is thus donors, govern-
ment and other interest groups, rather than primarily academicians. Products are very often within
the ‘grey literature’ and are frequently not peer reviewed (at least formally) but derive their author-
ity from the status of their proponents and their use by significant policy actors.
3 The Role of Policy Research Institutes in Policymaking in Indonesia 33
ated new opportunities for researchers to influence policy both at national and

sub-national levels. Regional Autonomy Watch (Komite Pemantauan Pelaksanaan
Otonomi Daerah – KPPOD) is an example of an Indonesian PRI established in
response to these opportunities.
• The advent and rapid spread of information technologies and social media have
created a ‘social media parliament’, representing citizen voices and manifested
in ‘the wisdom of the crowd’. As a result, public opinion cannot be ignored by
elected policymakers and civil servants, forcing them to explore new ways to
respond and to search out knowledgeable advice.
The literature reflects the experience of Indonesian PRIs, in that the relationship
between research and policymaking is not straightforward. Evidence-informed poli-
cymaking is a complex process in a complicated landscape of interaction and con-
testation, in which successful policy is a combination of politics, evidence and
delivery (Hallsworth et al. 2011). The persistent failure of efforts to rationalise poli-
cymaking elsewhere through, for example, the professionalisation of policymaking
applies also to Indonesia. Experience from Indonesian PRIs shows how repeated
efforts to define and rationalise policymaking have frequently failed to have an
impact, either because policymakers do not see research findings as central to their
decision-making or because technical evidence is seen as less important than politi-
cal evidence (public attitudes and the ‘truth of the many’ (Rose 2017)). In short, the
relationship between research and policy is often tenuous and quite often fraught
(Stone et al. 2001).
2.1 Individuals and Institutions
The role of Indonesian PRIs in policymaking varies, but in large measure, it is still
a function of individuals within institutions. Scanlon and Alawiyah (2015) reported
that the role of individuals in institutions, and within non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) as a whole, is an important factor for understanding how the NGO
sector functions, including its role in policymaking. An NGO is an institutionalised
form of individual activists and personal politics (Antlöv et al. 2006; Antlöv et al.
2010; STATT 2012). As a part of the NGO sector, the role of Indonesian PRIs in
policymaking has been driven by their activist staff and by individual relationships
and patronage networks. Policymakers generally prefer to source evidence and
advice from trusted individuals – often based on long-established relationships,
shared social histories, friendships, ideology and/or political affiliations (Datta et al.
2011). In Indonesia, this situation is exacerbated by complicated public procure-
ment regulations that prohibit the state from procuring research services from non-
profit organisations (see Chap. 7). As a result, policymakers prefer links with
individuals to those with organisations, which nurture the informal nature of
knowledge-to-policy processes in Indonesia. Informal networks become the main
34 F. Pane et al.
platform for information flows from experts and interest groups to decision-makers,
helping them to identify what evidence they need.2
In a sense, the role of PRIs in Indonesian policymaking is not a function of how their
knowledge products influence policy, nor the institutional relationships they build, but
rather how individuals within an organisation work through their relationships and
patronage networks to influence the policymaking process. Although this varies by
region, according to a recent social network analysis among 400 Indonesian PRIs, most
of the dominant actors are Jakarta-based NGOs and university-based think-tanks at the
University of Indonesia and Gadjah Mada University (Lassa et al. 2017).
2.2 Relationship Between State and Civil Society
The role of PRIs in policymaking is situated within the dynamics of the political-
economic relationship between Indonesia’s state and non-state organisations. This
constellation shapes the relationships between social science and power (Hadiz and
Dhakidae 2005), the political economy of research and higher education (Rakhmani
and Siregar 2016) and the history of science and politics of knowledge in modern
Indonesia (Goss 2011). Thus, the social history (contextual emergence and evolution)
of civil society movements in Indonesia is key to understanding the role of PRIs in
policymaking and the politics of knowledge in modern Indonesia. This section pro-
vides a historical timeline of the role played by Indonesian PRIs in policymaking.
Colonial Period and Early Years of Indonesian State Goss (2011) provides historical
data about the relationship between the state and civil society in terms of knowledge
production during the colonial period. During the 1830s and 1840s, when the costs of
the Java War, the Padri War in West Sumatra and the Belgian Revolution brought the
Netherlands to the brink of bankruptcy, a new governor general of the Dutch East
Indies, Johannes van den Bosch, was appointed to increase the exploitation of the
colony’s resources. This was achieved by requiring a portion of agricultural produc-
tion to be devoted to export crops. Around one-fifth of village land had to be devoted
to government crops for export, or, alternatively, peasants had to work in government-
owned plantations for 60 days each year. This policy created demand for agriculture-
related sciences, such as biology and other natural science disciplines.
In the early 1900s, Melchior Treub, an experimental biologist, equipped the Bogor
Botanical Gardens in West Java with a laboratory that became famous among the
European scientific community. It established a platform for knowledge production
2
While notes from some Indonesian PRIs and government officials consider using individuals’
network to be part of an advocacy or communication strategy, Carden (2009) sees that personal
relationships can lead to misgovernment. Personal relationships can lead to a cronyism that will
undermine good governance. For him, ‘…rule by insiderism and influence-peddling is a vice in
any country, and it diminishes the prospects for research to influence policy. Researchers can com-
pete in a policy contest of ideas, but not when the game is rigged by string pullers and special
favours’ (Ibid., 5).
on tropical environments, outside the realm of government. In the 1950s and 1960s,
scientists of the newly established Republic of Indonesia considered how to craft a
distinctly Indonesian biology. However, according to Goss, all of these efforts failed
to create scientific enlightenment in Indonesia because knowledge production was
effectively co-opted by the state. Scientific research was subordinated to the interests
of the colonial government and then of the independent nation. By controlling the
resources for research, the colonial state successfully isolated the scientific commu-
nity from the public. As a result, a civil society-based scientific movement did not
emerge, so there was no general support for the role of science in development.
Soeharto/New Order Era Subordination of scientific research (including the social
sciences) to the state continued into the New Order regime under President Soeharto
(1967–1998). Hadiz and Dhakidae (2005) concluded that the role and development
of the social sciences (civil society-based policy research institutes and universities)
are matters of power. Not only the resources for research but also critical thinking
and curiosity as the basis of social science research were controlled by the state.
However, government and non-government intellectuals shared a need for think-
tank organisations. Non-government intellectuals established the Institute for Social
Economic Research Education and Information (Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan
dan Penerangan Ekonmi dan Sosial – LP3ES) in 1971. In addition to influencing
policymakers, their aim was to influence the discourse among Indonesian techno-
crats. The same year, government-affiliated intellectuals established the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
The 1970s and 1980s saw the beginning of ‘developmentalism’ in Indonesia, as
well as the consolidation of the New Order regime. Many government- and university-
affiliated research centres (including the Indonesian Science Institute–or LIPI) were
established, mainly in response to development challenges or problems. Civil society-
based PRIs were limited in number during this period. Most civil society organisations
(CSOs) were focused on either grass-roots public service delivery or operated as study
clubs (Gordon 1998). Few were engaged in work to influence policy. Even the word
‘advocacy’ was considered politically taboo and categorised as a subversive activity.
End of the New Order Regime and Beginning of the Reformasi The situation
changed in the 1990s. For Lassa et al. (2017), between 1990 and 1999, at least 55
think-tanks were established, mostly by civil society members. Half of these started
as part of the tremendous growth in the number of CSOs throughout Indonesia soon
after the collapse of President Soeharto’s New Order regime in 1998, when tens of
thousands of new CSOs were established (Beittinger-Lee 2009). This boom in pol-
icy research organisations continued and gained momentum throughout the reform
period (Reformasi) and the decentralisation of the state between 2005 and 2009.
These changes show that the activities of civil society groups were interlinked with
the power struggles, democratisation processes and international development
trends of the time. The crisis sparked by Indonesia’s economic and social crisis in
1998–1999 and the state’s inability to provide sufficient security and services to citi-
zens strengthened the long-standing demand for democracy. This contributed to the
resignation of President Soeharto in 1998 and a shift in the international donor
36 F. Pane et al.
agenda for Indonesia, and also shaped the evolution of the country’s CSOs and
PRIs. Much has been written about Indonesia’s civil society and its role in the pro-
cess of democratisation and democratic consolidation. Development partners
brought financial and technical support to Indonesian NGOs and established various
programmes to strengthen democracy, civil society, good governance and the like
with the hope that Indonesia’s civil society would profit from the political opening.
3 F
rom Non-governmental Organisations to Policy Research
Institutes. From Service Delivery to Advocacy and Policy
Research
Most Indonesian PRIs evolved from the NGO sector. During the authoritarian New
Order regime, policymaking was tightly controlled. The government’s development
focus and that of its partners was on poverty reduction (Ganie-Rochman 2002;
Antlöv et al. 2006), which meant that during the 1970s, Indonesian NGOs played an
integral part in development activities, mainly through basic service delivery at the
grass-roots level.
In the 1980s the notion of people’s participation emerged at a time when prog-
ress on poverty reduction did not materialise as expected – or perhaps as a result of
this failure. Some NGOs began to critique the social and political arrangements in
place under President Soeharto’s New Order regime. NGOs working on human
rights issues started to promote the idea that people’s participation is a fundamental
right and that by ignoring popular participation in development processes, the state
was violating basic political and economic rights of its citizen (Ibid.).
By the 1990s, advocacy around this issue provided NGOs with a viable opportu-
nity to adopt a new, more critical role in promoting social transformation. NGOs
voiced concerns about new and old social and political problems. Advocacy allowed
NGOs to speak critically of the government – but precluded accusations of their
involvement in political activity aimed at challenging the government due to the key
idea of people’s participation in development, which they promoted through their
work at the local level and with communities. NGOs gained international support on
several critical issues, such as human rights, women’s participation and environ-
mental sustainability (Ibid.).
Following President Soeharto’s resignation in 1998, Indonesian governments
became more open to the involvement of NGOs in development processes and to the
use of knowledge from NGOs to inform policy decisions. The Reformasi era
brought political reform in the form of new legislation and amendments to the con-
stitution. During this period NGOs were a key driver of political, economic and
social reforms, in particular on women’s rights, anti-corruption, freedom of infor-
mation and religious tolerance. In more technical sectors, such as health, education
and finance, the role of NGOs was limited (Pisani et al. 2016).
The 2000s witnessed a shift in the international donor agenda in Indonesia.
Assuming that the government was now more stable and capable of handling basic
service delivery, development partners shifted their focus to issues such as good
governance, regional autonomy and the justice sector.3 Importantly, they shifted
their engagement strategy to include the Indonesian government as their main coun-
terpart. NGOs, which until then had often served as key implementing partners, had
to adjust their agenda and strategies accordingly. Grass-roots service delivery NGOs
(like Bina Swadaya, Dian Desa and the Appropriate Rural Technology Development
Institute/Lembaga Pengembangan Teknologi Perdesaan – LPTP) shifted their strat-
egies to become ‘consulting contractors’, with the government as one of their ‘cli-
ents’. Some NGOs established a limited company (Perseroan Terbatas) as a way to
access funding. Activists in advocacy NGOs shifted towards providing legal advo-
cacy services (e.g. the Legal Aid Service Foundation – Lembaga Bantuan Hukum)
or policy research (e.g. the Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy, Lembaga
Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat (ELSAM), and the Indonesian Centre for Law and
Policy Studies, Pusat Studi Hukum dan Kebijakan Indonesia (PSHK).
In sum, the evolution of Indonesian NGOs towards a greater role in knowledge
and evidence production could be summarised as:
1 . Service delivery – NGO version 1.0 (1970s–1980s)
2. Advocacy work – NGO version 2.0 (1990s–2000s)
3. Knowledge production – NGO version 3.0 (2010–today)
From 2007 to 2014, most of the policy research institutes that evolved and devel-
oped are those that managed to develop core capabilities and skills in knowledge
production such as project evaluations, assessments and research. It is interesting to
note, however, that among those working in the knowledge sector, only a few func-
tion as knowledge producers – as identified from their peer-reviewed papers in aca-
demic journals (Sumarto 2011). Most of these organisations can be called
‘knowledge crafters’ who do not produce new knowledge, like universities, but
rather synthesise and repackage knowledge gathered from external sources, thereby
creating new forms of knowledge for different purposes and audiences.4
Knowledge crafters serve as a bridge between scientific knowledge and policy-
makers’ needs for evidence. The synthesis and knowledge they generate and com-
municate to the public and policymakers can be considered as ‘professional
knowledge’ based on synthesis and consolidation of secondary sources, connected
to the context in which the policy operates (Nugroho et al. 2017).
3
Human rights issues remained outside the bilateral and multilateral donors’ agendas because they
are like ‘pebbles in the shoe’ in building a development partnership with the government.
4
See Chap. 4 for a review of the concepts of knowledge intermediation and knowledge brokering.
Moreover some of the evidence about the development of the core capabilities of policy research
organisations can be derived from datasets derived from the ca. 400 applications sent in 2012 to the
Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy: the Knowledge Sector Initiative in response
to a call for proposals for the provision of core grants and the ca. 600 applications sent to the
Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy: the Knowledge Sector Initiative local knowl-
edge grants in 2015 and the financial analysis of over 300 NGOs, a study funded by the Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade in 2015 (Scanlon and Alawiyah 2015).
38 F. Pane et al.
4 Policy Research Institutes and the Policymaking System
As producer or crafter of knowledge, the role of PRIs in policymaking is also shaped

by the processes and political economy of the demand for evidence, i.e. the policy-
making system. Different policymaking systems in different eras − colonial era,
early post-independence period (1945–1960s), early New Order (1970s and 1980s),
early post-Soeharto era (1999–2009) and 2010 and beyond − established different
roles for PRIs. Each period had unique characteristics that shaped the institutional
arrangements and strategies used by policy research institutes to influence
policymaking.
During the colonial era, knowledge was utilised to serve colonial and business
interests, which resulted, according to Goss (2011), in limited achievements among
Indonesian scientists in terms of knowledge production, as compared with their
international peers. In the two decades after independence, from 1945 to 1965, the
political focus was on national identity and crafting a distinctly Indonesian science
capability. In the early years of the New Order (1970s), the development agenda and
closed policymaking system forced Indonesian CSOs to play their role through
alternative ‘policy implementation’ by providing direct services to communities.
From the 1980s to the end of Soeharto’s regime in 1998, ‘advocacy’ meant quick
mobilisation of supporters to a demonstration when direct action was deemed nec-
essary. In the post-Soeharto era, relationships became more complex and rich, as
government began to acknowledge and attempt to use NGOs’ expertise and legiti-
macy. NGOs, meanwhile, saw the government as neither too bad (to be the enemy)
nor too good (to be a friend).
The role of PRIs in policymaking is structured according to the type of policy-
making process. In the centralistic policymaking system in place during the New
Order era, the role of PRIs like the LP3ES and CSIS was mainly to encourage
debate and discourse around policy options among the Jakarta elites who largely
controlled the policymaking process. In this situation, the public policymaking
model was the ‘cyclical-linear’ approach, a logical sequence of stages, as described
in Law No. 25/2004 on the National Development Planning System. As shown in
Fig. 3.1, the stages of Indonesian policy making are:
During the New Order, policy research institutes were mainly involved in the
‘pre-decisional’ stages (identifying the problem and building policymaker aware-
ness). The decisional stage was primarily a political process in which PRIs were
seldom involved. New Order technocrats tried to structure the institutional arrange-
ments for supporting better policymaking through the establishment of Research
and Development Units (Balitbangs) within ministries5 and a dedicated ministry for
development policymaking (Bappenas). PRIs generally focused their advocacy
efforts on Bappenas, instead of the Balitbangs, because Balitbangs tended to be less
influential due to political, structural and technical barriers within ministries
(Cislowski and Purwadi 2011). Most Indonesian PRIs view Bappenas as the most
On the role of Balitbangs, see also Chap. 4, Sect. 2.1.

5
Fig. 3.1 Stages of Indonesian policymaking (Authors)
legitimate actor in the policy planning sector (Lassa et al. 2017). Targeting Bappenas
means finding ways to channel policy research to inform the development planning
agenda. Bappenas is also an important node because it deals with multiple policy
issues across all development sectors (health, education, poverty, environment,
etc.). A significant amount of high-level policy research is associated with Bappenas,
which is the hub for strategic agreements with the development partners that often
fund policy research in Indonesia.
Experiences documented since 2012 – through and by the PRIs6 that collabo-
rated with the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy: the Knowledge
Sector Initiative – show that the policy process described in Law No. 25/2004 on the
National Development Planning System is unrealistic. The PRIs note that in a
decentralised public policymaking, policymakers engage different actors at differ-
ent levels, making the distinct, linear stages unrealistic. The ‘stages’ of policymak-
ing do not simply often overlap, they are often inseparable. This has led to a shift in
focus by PRIs in the post-Soeharto era away from a unique focus on the pre-
decisional stages. Today PRIs are spread across all stages of the policy cycle, includ-
ing policy legitimation.
6
See the list of the partners of the Knowledge Sector Initiative at http://www.ksi-indonesia.org/en/
pages/ksi-partners.
40 F. Pane et al.
A key lesson learned by PRIs in their attempts to influence policymaking is that

their research products (i.e. technical knowledge) are necessary, but not sufficient,
to exert influence. Researcher bias tends to neglect politics or treat it as something
to be ‘managed’. Most attempts by researchers to improve policymaking pay little
attention to the role of politics, focusing instead on technocratic aspects alone.
When politics is acknowledged, it is presented as something external to the targeted
policy process, a ‘context’ that must be ‘understood’ or ‘managed’. This attitude
grows out of a long-standing researcher belief, or bias, that the application of
‘higher’ scientific criteria can resolve problems currently mired in the rather dis-
tasteful realm of politics. PRIs have learned that such a treatment of politics is
unrealistic: policymaking can never be separated from politics. As outlined in the
next section, some PRIs have begun to realise that instead of being a negative factor,
politics can add value to policymaking. PRIs are now aware that policymakers draw
on multiple sources of evidence and that their technical evidence and analysis are
never ‘pure’ or above politics.
5 The Real-World Role of PRIs in Indonesian Policymaking
The social history of Indonesian PRIs shows that their roles are shaped by the con-
text and political economy in which they operate. While their primary task is to
conduct policy research – meaning that their main product is knowledge aimed at
influencing policy – their role in the policymaking process goes beyond research.
This section provides specific examples of roles played by Indonesian PRIs. The
examples are derived from the experiences of some of the 16 organisations that col-
laborated with the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy: the
Knowledge Sector Initiative between 2013 and 2017.
Strategic Actors in the Development Community Over the past 15 years, the
most prominent PRIs in Indonesia have acted as strategic partners of bilateral and
multilateral agencies working in international development. PRIs launched as a
result of support by international NGOs7 are not as strong in terms of volume of
policy research as the PRIs that emerged from support from bilateral and multilat-
eral development agencies. The latter have managed to bridge development part-
ners’ interests and bureaucrats’ pragmatic needs for knowledge and policy reform.
The demand for national PRIs to bridge this gap emerged because it is not politi-
cally possible for international development agencies to drive policy reform directly.
At the same time, government officials tasked with executing policies and pro-
grammes need practical support from donors, as they are overwhelmed with a mul-
titude of tasks and suffer from limited budgets and capabilities. Some Indonesian
PRIs have made a conscious decision, for ideological reasons, to keep a certain
7
The emergence and early growth of many Indonesian NGOs was associated with international
organizations such as Oxfam, Ford Foundation, Cordaid, Misereor and ICCO.
distance from government agencies, but others have filled this gap and seized the
opportunity to access funding and strengthen their capacity through support from
international organisations. Some PRIs serve informally as trusted policy advisors
to the government through personal network. When the government needs policy
research, it asks a development partner to fund it and to support those institutions
with which the government has close links.
Providing Data to Support CSO Coalition Advocacy Agendas Most policy

advocacy initiatives in Indonesia are carried out through coalitions or networks,
with a loose division of labour among members. In general, one or two people are
responsible for conducting research or data analysis, as was the case for the Institute
for Policy Research and Advocacy (Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat –
ELSAM) in the example below.
ELSAM was part of a CSO coalition seeking to revise Law No. 13/2006 on the
Protection of Witnesses and Victims, because in their view it created fundamental
limitations on probes into past rights abuses and prevented the Witnesses and
Victims Protection Agency from helping survivors. The new law (Law No. 31/2014),
passed in October 2014, included a measure to step up the Agency’s efforts to sup-
port victims of past human rights abuses. A key factor contributing to the successful
outcome of this advocacy effort was the coalition’s capacity to generate and com-
municate evidence supporting advocacy for policy change. The input to the legal
draft provided by the coalition was widely acknowledged by policymakers. While
most advocacy activities were conducted through a coalition, ELSAM played a
critical role by providing regulatory reviews and drafting the bill. ELSAM also
worked with its network of partner organisations at the subnational level to collect
and analyse data on human rights violations. In addition, ELSAM provided a plat-
form for data collection and managed a national database system.
Creating Public Pressure by Advocating Through the Media and Social
Media At a time when politically appointed policymakers place public perceptions
above the evidence provided by experts, the battle to influence policy has gone
beyond the quality of evidence to include the issue of whose evidence matters.
Policy research institutes in Indonesia are fully aware of these phenomena and know
that their role in policymaking includes a mix of policy research and ‘working polit-
ically’. Seknas Fitra is a PRI and state budget watchdog network that works inten-
sively with the media (especially national opinion makers and newspapers) to
inform and convince policymakers that the change agenda they advocate is sup-
ported by ‘the many’. The strength of their argument lies not only with evidence
generated from their research but also by legitimisation from the public.
Focused on a Core Research Agenda to Build Credibility One of the important

features of effective policy research is the relevance of the research to the policy
reform agenda. However, some Indonesian PRIs approach this proposition differ-
ently, allocating a certain proportion of their budget and resources to conducting
policy research that may not be directly linked to the current policy reform agenda
42 F. Pane et al.
but is considered important and relevant in terms of the country’s long-term social
and economic development. They argue that policy research can accomplish more
when it is unconstrained by policy goals and aligned with the mission of the research
organisation. This is the case for the two examples provided below involving the
SMERU Research Institute, the Sajogyo Institute, the SurveyMETER and the
Centre for the Study of Islam and Society at the National Islamic University (Pusat
Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat di Universitas Islam Negeri – PPIM UIN).
The SMERU Research Institute conducts economic research with a focus on
poverty reduction. In early 2006 SMERU found that the income distribution gap in
Indonesia was widening. SMERU researchers shared these result with policymakers
at Bappenas and the National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction (Tim
National Percepatan Penanggulangan Kemiskinan – TNP2K), which at the time had
other policy reform priorities. SMERU’s management decided to continue the study
on income distribution because they considered this to be a key issue for poverty
reduction. SMERU’s research team thought that continuing their research would
help to generate and accumulate evidence that could be used later on. Ten years
later, in 2016, the income gap and disparities had continued to worsen, and the com-
modity boom in Indonesia had ended. This situation forced policymakers to seek
research advice from SMERU on inequalities in Indonesia that they had previously
ignored or dismissed. These abrupt attitudinal swings rewarded SMERU, which
was prepared to present specific practical solutions to policymakers’ problems.
SMERU was capable of responding because of their accumulated knowledge; the
group’s credibility led the government to look to them for support.8
Research at the Sajogyo Institute focuses on agrarian policies, which they con-
sider central to strengthening community development. The Institute’s ability to
maintain their focus on agrarian reforms has contributed to strengthening their legit-
imacy in this policy arena, which has resulted in the expansion of networks and
linkages with policymakers. In 2013 the Corruption Eradication Commission
research unit sought policy advice from Sajogyo Institute in relation to eradicating
corruption in the natural resource management sector. The Corruption Eradication
Commission research unit worked alongside Sajogyo Institute’s researchers to col-
lect empirical data on corruption cases in forestry and natural resources, conducting
a joint analysis and co-producing a white paper on agrarian conflicts and corruption
in the forestry sector. The two entities then collaborated on a second study to
research and analyse cases of breakdowns in land certification processes reported by
people in the district of Trenggalek District (East Java). The collaboration benefitted
both partners; each gained exposure to new research methodologies for measuring
corruption indicators. The Sajogyo Institute also gained access to a large amount of
field data and information, while the research unit at the Corruption Eradication
Commission gained a collaborative partnership yielding empirical research findings
on forestry and natural resource issues (interview with staff of Sajogyo Institute).
8
Authors’ notes from a series of meeting with SMERU on inequalities in Indonesia, November to
December 2016.
In 2013 SurveyMETER, a research institute established in 2002 in Yogyakarta

and specialised in high-quality data collection and analysis, started an independent
research project in 14 cities to assess the extent to which services and infrastructure
in those municipalities were prepared to cope with the growing elderly population,
as the average age of Indonesia’s population is on the rise. The SurveyMETER
research team conducted a roadshow to present their findings in all the cities. In the
city of Balikpapan, SurveyMETER briefed the mayor, who invited the research
team to be part of the Regional Government Task Force to provide policy recom-
mendations to the local government on how to improve the services and infrastruc-
tures to meet the needs of elderly citizens. SurveyMETER’s engagement with
administrators of cities like Balikpapan has helped to inform policymakers’ deci-
sion and turn policy recommendations into concrete plans and budgets (Suriastini
et al. 2016a, b, c; Pellini et al. 2017).
Over the last few years, the Centre for the Study of Islam and Society at the
National Islamic University (Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat di Universitas
Islam Negeri – PPIM UIN) has gained considerable experience in communicating
policy research results and recommendations to the public and policymakers. This
has not always been the case. PPIM UIN researchers have traditionally concentrated
their efforts on research, rather than communication or advocacy of their findings.
However, since early 2015 evidence-based advocacy has gained a greater impor-
tance in the organisation. That year a new post was created: Director of Advocacy
and Knowledge Management. An organisational policy was introduced requiring
each research study to produce, in addition to the report requested by the client, a
policy brief with clear policy recommendations. Social media is now widely used
by the researchers of PPIM UIN. Two well-attended seminars in 2016 communi-
cated research results on radicalism in Islamic text books and teachers that were
covered by national news media such as Kompas, Tempo and The Jakarta Post.
Policy briefs based on the results were also received positively by the ministers of
Education and Religious Affairs, who both considered follow-up on PPIM UIN’s
recommendations. PPIM UIN also organised internal communications training that
provided significant insights into the importance of research communication. Seven
of the 15 full-time researchers at PPIM UIN have now received training in writing
for journalistic publication and participated in research communication capacity
development organised by the Tempo Institute in Jakarta. Senior researchers of
PPIM UIN regularly contribute op-eds on Islam and society to national newspapers
and are frequently interviewed by national television networks. PPIM UIN has
introduced a policy to digitise all reports and knowledge products, including the
Studia Islamika journal, which received awards from the Ministry of Research,
Technology and Higher Education (Kementerian Riset, Teknologi dan Pendidikan
Tinggi – KemRistekDikt) and is one of only two Indonesian journals registered by
Scopus (Rakhmani et al. 2017).
These examples of the different roles that Indonesian PRIs can play in the poli-
cymaking process demonstrate that a mix of strategies and approaches are required
to develop linkages and collaboration with policymakers and to establish a profile
44 F. Pane et al.
and reputation that enable involvement in policymaking discussions. Some PRIs

decide to work quietly behind the scenes with great success and without much pub-
licity. Others decide to communicate and use that approach to inform policymakers.
The best tactic always depends on the principles of the organisation and the circum-
stances and the nature of the policy issue that the PRI seeks to address. The exam-
ples presented in this section also show that as knowledge crafters and knowledge
providers, Indonesian PRIs’ role in policymaking is often that of intermediary
between the government and the public. Measuring their influence is not simple and
depends on what counts as influence, particularly in the context of Indonesia’s polit-
ical economy, where many layers, actors and outside forces are at play in the decen-
tralised policymaking process.
6 Conclusions
The role of Indonesian PRIs in policymaking processes is part of a dynamic rela-

tionship. It depends on internal factors – such as the state and civil society relation-
ships and power struggles and the ongoing democratisation process – as well as
external factors such as global development trends, the data revolution and interna-
tional politics, in particular the emerging post-truth political discourse.9 As research
institutions, the core mandate of PRIs is to provide research-based evidence to
inform policy decision and policy processes.
If the performance of Indonesia’s PRIs were to be judged by the number of pub-
lications in peer-reviewed journals, they would be rated as weak or very weak.
However, a better measure of their performance is the extent to which they make
their research results available for use by policymakers (Ofir et al. 2016). Here
many PRIs score high as they show a demonstrated capacity to reach policymakers
and inform policy processes with a mix of strategic capacity, research skills and
capacity to understand the political economy and work politically with the bureau-
cracy, development partners and funders.
A key message of this chapter is that Indonesia’s policy process is driven by
values and politics and that from the first post-independence government in the late
1940s to the present, governments have been applying experimentalist approaches
to governance, largely informed by short-term political opportunities, a process of
trial and error, but not so much by evidence and knowledge generated and commu-
nicated by PRIs. This approach reflects the lack of a ‘pause and reflect’ moment
(Sabel and Zeitlin 2008).
Indonesia’s PRIs adopt different roles in their attempts to inform policymaking.
These roles depend on the policy context and circumstances. Key features of effective
PRIs in Indonesia are their links with international bilateral and multilateral develop-
9
Jonathan Rose (2017) defines this as a world in which truth is less important than public attitudes
and everyone has their own (often incompatible) ‘facts’.
ment agencies, credibility in a specific policy area, proactive stance in defining their
policy research agendas, access to policymakers and ability to influence public opin-
ion and acquire public legitimacy. As seen in the illustrations above, a combination of
these skills and capabilities has given PRIs access to policymaking processes.
References
Antlöv, H., Ibrahim, R., & Van Tuijil, P. (2006). NGO governance and accountability in Indonesia:
Challenges in a newly democratizing country (Resource Document). The International Center
for Not-for-Profit Law. http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Indonesia/Peter_NGO%20
accountability%20in%20Indonesia%20July%2005%20version.pdf. Accessed 7 Mar 2017.
Antlöv, H., Brinkerhoff, D. W., & Rapp, E. (2010). Civil society capacity building for demo-
cratic reform: Experience and lessons from Indonesia. VOLUNTAS: International Journal of
Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 21(3), 417−439.
Bach, T., Niklasson, B., & Painter, M. (2012). The role of agencies in policy-making. Journal of
Policy and Society, 31(3), 183–193.
Beittinger-Lee, V. (2009). (Un)Civil society and political change in Indonesia: A contested arena.
Routledge: Studies on Civil Society in Asia.
Carden, F. (2009). Knowledge to policy: Making the most of development research. Thousand
Oaks/Ottowa: Sage/International Development Research Centre.
Cislowski, H., & Purwadi, A. (2011). Study of the role of Indonesian government research units
(‘balitbang’) in bridging research and development policy (Resource Document). Australian
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/
indo-ks3-balitbang.pdf. Accessed 3 Mar 2017.
cal economy of policy-making in Indonesia: Opportunities for improving the demand and use
of knowledge (Resource Document). Overseas Development Institute. http://www.odi.org.uk/
resources/details.asp?id=5985&title=policy-making-politicaleconomy-indonesia-knowledge.
ELSAM. (2016). Mengembangkan prinsip-prinsip HAM di Kabupaten Sikka. http://elsam.
or.id/2016/09/mengembangkan-prinsip-prinsip-ham-di-kabupaten-sikka/. Accessed 12 Mar
2017.
Ganie-Rochman, M. (2002). An uphill struggle: Advocacy NGOs under Soeharto’s new order.
Pustaka Pelajar: LabSosio.
Gordon, J. (1998). NGOs, the environment and political pluralism in new order Indonesia. Journal
of the Southeast Asian Studies Student Association, 2(2), 1–26.
Goss, A. (2011). The floracrats: State-sponsored science and the failure of the enlightenment in
Indonesia. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Hadiz, V. R., & Dhakidae, D. (2005). Social science and power in Indonesia. Equinox: Institute of
Hallsworth, M., Parker, S., & Rutter, J. (2011). Policymaking in the real world: Evidence and
analysis (Resource Document). Institute for Government. https://www.instituteforgovernment.
org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20making%20in%20the%20real%20world.pdf.
Accessed 10 March 2017.
Hunt, J., & Shackley, S. (2009). Reconceiving science and policy: Academic, fiducial, and bureau-
cratic knowledge. Minerva, 37(2), 141–164.
Lassa, J. A., Davis, B., Nugroho, K., & Li, D. E. (2017). Serendipity of think tanks networks and
influence in Indonesia. Manuscript Unpublished.
McGann, J. G. (2005). Think tanks and policy advice in the United States: Academics, advisors,
and advocates. London: Routledge.
46 F. Pane et al.
Nugroho, K., Carden, F., & Antlöv, H. (2017, forthcoming). Local knowledge matters: Power,
context and policymaking in Indonesia.
Ofir, Z., Schwandt, T., Duggan, C., & McLean, R. (2016). Research quality plus. A holistic
approach to evaluating research (Resource Document). International Developer Research
Center. https://www.idrc.ca/sites/default/files/sp/Documents%20EN/Research-Quality-Plus-
A-Holistic-Approach-to-Evaluating-Research.pdf. Accesses 5 Mar 2017.
Pellini, A., Djafar, T. N., & Suriastini, N. W. (2017). Is measuring policy influence like measuring
thin air? The experience of SurveyMETER in producing three episode studies of research-
based policy influence (Working Paper 18). Jakarta: Knowledge Sector Initiative. https://goo.
gl/7K94WB. Accessed 25 Mar 2017.
Pisani, E., Kok, M. O., & Nugroho, K. (2016). Indonesia’s road to universal health coverage: A
political journey. Health Policy and Planning, 32(2), 267–276. https://doi.org/10.1093/heapol/
czw120.
Rakhmani, I., & Siregar, F. (2016). Reforming research in Indonesia: Policies and practice
(Resource Document). Global Development Network. http://cipg.or.id/reforming-research/.
Rakhmani, I., Ruhanawati, S., Darmadi, D., & Pellini, A. (2017, forthcoming). Religious studies
as evidence for policy: Insights from the Centre for the Study of Islam and Society in Indonesia
(Working Paper). Jakarta: Knowledge Sector Initiative.
Rose, J. (2017). Brexit, trump, and post-truth politics. Public Integrity, 19, 1–4. https://doi.org/10
.1080/10999922.2017.1285540.
Sabel, C. F., & Zeitlin, J. (2008). Learning from difference: The new architecture of experimental-
ist governance in the EU. European Law Journal, 14, 271–327.
Scanlon, M. M., & Alawiyah, T. (2015). The NGO sector in Indonesia: Context, concepts and an
updated profile (Resource Document). Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
http://www.ksi-indonesia.org/files/1450222914$1$11C1$.pdf. Accessed 20 March 2017.
STATT. (2012). NGO sector review finding report (Resource Document). Australian Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade. https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/indo-ks15-
ngo-sector-review-phase1.pdf. Accessed 20 Mar 2017.
Stone, D., Maxwell, S., & Keating, M. (2001). Bridging research and policy (Resource Document).
Warwick University. http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/csgr/
research/keytopic/other/bridging.pdf. Accessed 18 Mar 2017.
Sumarto, S. (2011). The SMERU research institute: History and lessons learned. Report to Australia-
Indonesia Partnership on Revitalising Indonesia’s Knowledge Sector for Development. Jakarta:
Knowledge Sector Initiative.
Suriastini, N. W., Pellini, A., Sikoki, B., Fauzan, J., & Rahayu, T. (2016a). Building partnerships
for designing policy: Episode study of Jakarta declaration on dementia- and Age-Friendly City
(Working Paper). Yogyakarta: SurveyMETER.
Suriastini, N. W., Pellini, A., Sikoki, B., Fauzan, J., Pujiastuti, S., & Sukamtiningsih (2016b). Data
that inspires policy: Episode study of City of Balikpapan’s experience towards age-Friendly
City 2030 (Working Paper). Yogyakarta: SurveyMETER.
Suriastini, N. W., Pellini, A., Sikoki, B., Fauzan, J., Dwiyanti, D. H., & Lestari, S. (2016c).
Information strengthens policy: Episode study of the commitment of Denpasar City in integrat-
ing policies of Child-Friendly City, Age-Friendly City, and Green Open Spaces of Healthy City
(Working Paper). Yogyakarta: SurveyMETER.
Chapter 4
Brokering Knowledge and Policy Analysis
Within the Indonesian Public Sector
Arnaldo Pellini, Agus Pramusinto, and Iskhak Fatonie
1 Introduction
Three main groups of actors give life to a knowledge sector: policymakers, who
demand and make use of knowledge and evidence to inform their decisions (see
Chap. 6); knowledge producers, such as universities, think-tanks, and government
analysis units; and data analytics providers, who generate and communicate various
types of evidence to inform the policy process (see Chaps. 1, 2 and 6). While these
groups of actors, with different strengths and capabilities, exist in any knowledge
sector, the linkages between knowledge producers and policymakers cannot be
taken for granted because, as noted by Lindquist (2009), they are inherently loosely
coupled and serendipitous.
Another set of actors that play a vital role in a knowledge sector are intermediar-
ies – individuals or organisations who facilitate communication, synthesis and col-
laboration between knowledge producers and policymakers (Guston 2001).
This chapter is about intermediaries and the role they play in the process of trans-
forming knowledge into policy in Indonesia, with a specific focus on knowledge
intermediaries within the government bureaucracy. Other chapters touch on the role
A. Pellini (*) . I. Fatonie

A. Pramusinto
Public Policy and Administration, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia

of intermediaries outside government institutions. Chapter 2, for example, focuses

on the role of policy research organisations and non-governmental think-tanks.
Here the focus is on individuals and units within the bureaucracy and the consider-
able efforts and investments made by the Government of Indonesia during the
last 5 years to strengthen policy research and analysis. The passage of Law No.
5/2014 on the Indonesian Civil Service is particularly significant in this respect. The
Law marked the end of 4 years of intense and difficult political negotiations and
represented a key step toward modernising the bureaucracy and transforming ‘the
Indonesian civil service into a world-class government administration more pre-
pared to face challenges as the Asian Century looms’ (Effendi 2011). Section 3 of
this chapter places special focus on one of the key measures introduced by the new
law: the role of policy analysts (Jabatan Fungsional Analis Kebijakan).
1.1 E
vidence-Informed Policymaking and Knowledge
Intermediation
Davies (2012) describes the objective of evidence-informed policymaking as being

quite straightforward: ‘to help policymakers make better decisions, and achieve bet-
ter outcomes, by using existing evidence more effectively, and undertaking new
research, evaluation and analysis where knowledge about effective policy initiatives
and policy implementation is lacking’ (41). Translating this objective into practice,
however, is not as straightforward. For Davies some of the key challenges are as
follows: (i) evidence alone does not tell users what to do, although it provides a
basis upon which policymakers can form a judgement; (ii) researchers and policy-
makers often have different notions of the time required to generate sound evidence
and what constitutes sound evidence; and (iii) evidence is only one of the many
factors that contribute to policy decisions, which are also influenced by politics and
the beliefs, ideology, individual experience and expertise of policymakers. Milani
(2005) underlines the political nature of policy decisions and argues that policy
decisions are rarely the direct outcome of social science research; rather they are the
result of conflicting pressures by social actors, entrepreneurs, social interest groups,
political parties and the media.
Given these challenges, the objective of evidence-informed policymaking is not
to provide the absolute best evidence to policymakers but, more realistically, to
provide policymakers with access to the best available evidence at key moments
(Davies 2012). Knowledge intermediaries have a vital role to play here – through
analysis of policy options, synthesis of existing evidence, summarising research
results, outreach to knowledge producers, bringing stakeholders together to discuss
and debate existing evidence, etc. Roth (2003) describes them as acting as brokers
who try to meet the needs of both knowledge producers and decision-makers by
enabling access to different types of types of evidence (e.g. research-generated evi-
dence, administrative data, statistics, data analytics and citizen knowledge).
4 Brokering Knowledge and Policy Analysis Within the Indonesian Public Sector 49
Fig. 4.1 From information intermediary to innovation broker. (Reproduced from Fisher 2010)
The roots of the analysis of the role of knowledge intermediaries in decision-

making processes lie in early studies of boundary organisations, that is, organisa-
tions able to cross the gap between different expertise areas of expertise and to act
beyond the boundaries of a specific sector or domain by encouraging a flow of
information and the ability of these organisations to link science and policy in
applied research settings (e.g. Guston 1999; Guston et al. 2000). In the
evidence-informed policymaking space, analysis and research about the role of
intermediary actors have improved understanding of the subtle, but important, dif-
ferences in the meaning of knowledge intermediation, depending on the degree of
engagement by intermediary actors in policymaking processes (Fig. 4.1).
Fisher describes a range of intermediary roles starting from the relatively simple
and narrow function of making information available to decision-makers to a more
substantial role of helping to transform information into knowledge and assist poli-
cymakers to make informed decisions (the centre of Fig. 4.1), to an even more com-
plex role in which knowledge brokers contribute explicitly to the use of knowledge
in policy decisions, enabling changes in the policymaking context.
Shaxson and Bielak (2012) draw on Fisher’s analysis to (i) categorise the differ-
ent knowledge functions and roles in knowledge-to-policy processes and (ii)
describe different modalities of collaboration between knowledge intermediaries/
brokers and policymakers that help to assess the degree of complexity of a knowl-
edge sector and evidence-informed policymaking system. They argue that the linear
knowledge transfer (or communication) approach to incorporating evidence into
policy is insufficient to capture the complex processes involved in making the best
evidence available to policymakers. They list several knowledge processes that
occur when informing policy decisions:
• Knowledge management: the process of ensuring that knowledge is available by
collecting and storing different types of knowledge, to be accessed when needed
• Knowledge transfer: a one-way process of sharing knowledge, similar to a

teacher-student relationship, which can involve the mutual exploration of a pol-
icy issue or problem
• Knowledge translation: the process of translating knowledge from one format to
another so that the receiver can understand it
• Knowledge exchange: a two-way process of sharing knowledge between differ-
ent groups of people or networks
• Knowledge brokering: a two-way exchange of knowledge about a policy issue or
problem that can foster collective learning
• Knowledge mobilisation: a two-way process that makes use of the existing stock
of knowledge to create new knowledge that contributes to fostering policy
change
Shaxson and Bielak (Ibid.) then take these knowledge processes and merge them
into Fisher’s 2010 illustration of the differences between intermediation and broker-
ing. They describe different degrees of complexity of intermediation in policy pro-
cesses, which the authors cluster under the name ‘K* Framework’ (or K-Star
Framework, depicted in Fig. 4.2).
Starting from the left of the figure, information intermediaries support and
enable access to information from multiple sources, directing policy actors to the
sources of evidence by communicating the information to them. Knowledge trans-
lators take different sources of evidence and analyse them to understand the impli-
cations of the information and try to answer the ‘so what?’ question. They act as
‘translators’ because they communicate the findings of their analysis to policymak-
Fig. 4.2 The K* Framework. (Reproduced from Shaxson and Bielak 2012)
ers, going beyond the original evidence. Knowledge brokers are individuals, teams
or organisations that link the source of information with analysis and with users,
trying to foster collaboration and co-production of analysis and knowledge between
evidence producers and policymakers. The most advanced role is that of the innova-
tion broker, defined as individuals, teams or organisations that actively seek to influ-
ence the policy context by establishing collaborations to co-create knowledge and
by facilitating innovative solutions to policy problems.
The more interconnected the role of intermediaries, the more interconnected will
be the process and systems for making use of evidence in policy processes.
Moreover, knowledge intermediaries play a crucial role in creating demand for
information, analysis and evidence, thereby contributing to generating or strength-
ening a culture of information and use of evidence for policy decision-making
(Fisher 2010).
The effectiveness of the role played by knowledge intermediaries and brokers
depends on two crucial factors. The first is the enabling environment − the set of
rules and regulations that legitimise their role within the bureaucracy and provide
them with the resources and support required to perform their responsibilities. The
second factor, as noted by Mark Considine, is that knowledge intermediaries are
equipped with a mix of hard skills in policy analysis, data gathering and interpreta-
tion of trends, as well as soft skills, such as interaction with a variety of stakeholders
and good understanding of stakeholders’ needs and concerns, how their current
agenda relates to the social or economic situation they face and how they have tried
to solve problems in the past (Pellini 2017). Policy analysis skills are particularly
critical in a modern bureaucracy. For MacRae (1991), without policy analysis pro-
duced by intermediaries, research-based evidence would be used less for policy
choice than for pre-decision enlightenment.
This section stresses the importance of knowledge intermediation (and broker-
ing) in policy processes. It establishes that different degrees of engagement charac-
terise the role of intermediaries in the policy process and that intermediaries can be
individuals or organisations and inside or outside government. They are neither
policymakers nor researchers but share a commitment to producing policy-relevant
data, research or analysis (Lindquist 2001).
The degree to which a bureaucracy has developed its capabilities from the simple
intermediation of information to knowledge intermediation and brokering is an
indicator of its maturity and a recognition that is has developed the systems and
capabilities required to provide policymakers with the best available evidence when
policy decisions are required.
The next section turns to Indonesia and the experience of some of the partners of
the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy: The Knowledge Sector
Initiative, describing the evolution of the intermediation of evidence and policy
analysis in policymaking. It reviews the experience of Balitbangs, the research and
development units in ministries and local governments, some of which have been in
existence for more than 40 years but have struggled to perform as strong knowledge
intermediaries. Section 3 discusses the recent reforms undertaken by the Government
of Indonesia, through the passage on 14 June 2014 of Law No. 5/2014 on the
Indonesian Civil Service, and establishment of the role of policy analysts through
enactment of Ministerial Regulation of Administrative and Bureaucracy Reform
No. 45/2013, on the functional position of policy analyst. The final section presents
the authors’ conclusions.
2 K
nowledge Intermediation and Policy Analysis
in Indonesia
General Soeharto’s highly centralised government ruled Indonesia for 31 years,
from the ousting of President Sukarno in 1967 until Soeharto’s resignation in 1998.
Under a centralised and authoritarian form of government, the policy cycle was
controlled at the centre. Public policies were designed and decided by government
actors; there was very little, if any, public participation in discussions around pub-
lic policy formulation from citizens, civil society, non-government actors or the
private sector (Jackson and Pye 1978; Crouch 1979; King 1982; Emmerson 2001;
Shiraishi 2006).
The institutional set-up of Soeharto’s New Order government restricted the flow
of information within the bureaucracy to top-down lines of control and encouraged
senior officials to grow their sphere of influence through personal skills, wealth and
connections. This arrangement enabled President Soeharto to accumulate and dis-
tribute authority and maintain political order. Decisions were made by policymakers
in Jakarta and implemented by local governments with little or no formal autonomy
(Datta et al. 2017). New Order authoritarianism suppressed critical thinking and
shut down spaces for policy contestation, although it encouraged technocratic input
to policies. Political intervention in the bureaucracy was commonplace; for instance,
promotion criteria were usually based on the approval of bureaucratic higher-ups
rather than on merit. In addition, an unattractive compensation and benefit system
contributed to the poor performance of government officials (Tjiptoherijanto 2007).
As a result, the quality of Indonesia’s bureaucracy was among the worst in the
world, and the country had very poor development indicators (Gie 2003).
President Soeharto resigned in May 1998 due to pressure from civil unrest and
following 12 months of severe economic crisis caused by the Asian financial crisis
(Lloyd and Smith 2001). His resignation led to a rapid transition to democratic gov-
ernance (known as Reformasi), which was rolled out by several presidents, namely,
Habibie, Wahid and Megawati (Shiraishi2006). This period brought very significant
changes to Indonesia’s political landscape. In June 1999, President Habibie pre-
sided over the first multiparty general election in three decades. The same year he
also launched the drafting of a new law on regional autonomy, aimed at devolving
considerable power to local governments, including power over policy decision-
making, budget allocation and control over local resources and activities (Lay 2003;
Pratikno 2003; Green 2005). Law 22/1999 on Local Government and Law 25/1999
on Fiscal Balance between Central and Local Government were passed in 1999,
implemented in January 2001 and revised in 2004 through the passage of Laws 32
and 33, and more recently through Law 23/2014 on Local Government. Laws
22/1999 and 23/1999 transferred powers and financing to the regions in all sectors
except those deemed to be the exclusive jurisdiction of the central government (for-
eign affairs, judicial affairs, monetary matters and religious affairs). Around one-
third of the national budget and three million civil servants were transferred to local
governments. The budget figures remain about the same today, even though the
number of subnational civil servants has increased (Datta et al. 2017). Overall the
implementation of the decentralization reforms started without a well-developed
transition or implementation plan and with very little capacity among local govern-
ments to take on the new responsibilities (Green 2005; Dixon and Hakim 2009).
In recent years President Joko Widodo, who was elected president in 2014, has
attempted to follow through on his election promise to continue, and accelerate, the
reform and modernisation of the bureaucracy. For example, in 2016 President Joko
Widodo instructed the Minister of Home Affairs to annul thousands of local regula-
tions (peraturan daerah) that were not effective or that duplicated each other
(Kuwado 2016).
These were significant political and institutional changes because they all open
up opportunities for greater demand for evidence. This call for more evidence is not
new but has been renewed under the administration of President Joko Widodo and
his insistence on developing processes and systems within the bureaucracy to dem-
onstrate the results of public policies and programmes and the use of the state bud-
get. Balitbangs (i.e. research and development units within ministries) have been in
place since 1969 but have not been very effective in informing policy decisions.
According to Cislowski and Purwadi (2011), Balitbangs are not the only units
within ministries that conduct research. Other units may procure research from uni-
versities or carry out their own research. This can create overlap in terms of produc-
tion and synthesis of research and other types of evidence within ministries. More
recently, Law No. 5/2014 on the Indonesian Civil Service aims to modernise the
Indonesian bureaucracy, applying principles of meritocracy and establishing the
role of policy analyst. Another example is Law No. 23/2014 on Local Governments,
which established Balitbangda within local governments and mandates them to
assist in local policy decisions. Several ministries (Ministry for National
Development Planning/National Development Planning Agency (Kementerian
Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional/Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional –
Bappenas), Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Education and Culture have estab-
lished, over the last few years, rapid response units to provide ministers with fast,
succinct policy analysis and advice.
It has been 19 years since the resignation of President Soeharto and 16 years
since the start of decentralization reforms. From the point of view of demand for
evidence by elected and non-elected leaders at all levels of government − who
determine Indonesia’s policy priorities and are instrumental in approving budget
allocations and regulations affecting knowledge suppliers − Karetji (2010) argues
that Indonesia is transitioning from a past of low accountability and top-down
decision-making to today’s decentralised governance. The shift has involved a lim-
ited but growing demand for evidence as the country is moving towards a future
scenario characterised by solid democratic rule, democratic decentralisation, lead-
ership guided by accountability to citizens, and government organisations that
actively demand different types of evidence from internal and external sources. This
means that central government organisations require (and will require more and
more) data and analysis oriented toward supporting macro-level policymaking.
Local governments, meanwhile, will require an increasing amount of data and
locally relevant analysis as inputs to social development interventions.
The next sections review some Indonesian experiences with knowledge interme-
diation within the government bureaucracy, before describing more in depth the role
of policy analysts.
2.1 K
nowledge Production and Intermediation Within the
Government: Role and Challenges of Balitbangs
Every ministry in Indonesia has a Balitbang responsible for the development of

research plans and programmes in its particular sector (see, e.g. Minister of
Education and Culture Decree no. 36/2010 and Minister of Health Decree no. 1144
/2010). The research results can then be used to inform internal policy decisions or
help to advance knowledge in a specific sector.
These research units have been in place for many years; for example, the
Balitbang at the Ministry of Education and Culture and the Ministry of Health was
established in 1969 and 1975, respectively. Balitbangs are fairly large organisations.
The Balitbang at the Ministry of Education and Culture (Kementerian Pendidikan
dan Kebudayaan – Kemdikbud) consists of 1,166 staff in Jakarta and regional
offices. The unit at the Ministry of Health (Kementerian Kesehatan) has about 420
staff in Jakarta (Cislowski and Purwadi 2011). They are organised as research cen-
tres that may have a thematic focus. For example, the Balitbang at the Ministry of
Education has a Policy Research Centre, a Curriculum and Book Centre and an
Educational Assessment Centre.
At the local level, Balitbangs are one of the several local government units
(Satuan Kerja Pemerintah Daerah – SKPDs) located in both provinces and districts.
Similar to the ministerial Balitbangs, local-level Balitbangs assist district heads and
line agencies with research and analysis to inform local policy decisions.
In their analysis of the ministerial Balitbangs at the ministries of education and
health, Cislowski and Purwadi (2011) found that while budget allocations to
Balitbangs were increasing, they represented a very small percentage of ministry
budgets. For example, the Education Balitbang saw its budget increase from 1.59%
of the total ministry budget in 2009 to 2.22% in 2011. That corresponded

to Indonesian rupiahs (IDR) 1,232,000,000 for 2011 (approximately to US$135,800,1
or US$323 per staff member annually). Not much, considering that the Ministry of
Education and Culture is one of the largest recipients of state budget allocations.2 In
2009 Balitbangs at the Ministry of Health received 1.95% of the ministry budget; in
2011 the percentage dropped to 1.07%, although the amount grew to IDR
540,041,000, representing approximately US$59,5403 for that year, or US$51 annu-
ally per staff member (Ibid.).
The limited availability of budget funding for Balitbangs is also evident at the
local level, as shown in this example from a Balitbang in a district in East Java prov-
ince with 27 staff members.4 In 2016 the Balitbang received around
IDR 1,000,000,000 (c. US$74,850),5 which was allocated to the work of the secre-
tariat and the Balitbangs’ four divisions, each of which is divided into three sub-
divisions. The Balitbang thus had 12 sub-divisions in total. Of the total budget, the
secretariat received IDR 500 million (c. US$37,000) for salaries and other opera-
tional costs. Each division received IDR 125 million (c. US$9,350), leaving each
sub-division with the challenge of operating for a year with the equivalent of
US$3,100.
2.1.1 Challenges Facing Balitbangs
The figures above highlight a critical problem for Balitbangs: funding. The data
show that budget allocations are too small to produce and communicate high-quality
research that can be used by a ministry or the government at large to inform policy
decisions. Limited funding also makes it difficult to attract qualified staff, as salaries
are not competitive and are pegged to the civil servants’ remuneration framework.
Between 26% and 31% of the staff at the two Balitbangs in health and education
lack an undergraduate degree; 43% to 44% possess an undergraduate degree. The
remaining 23% to 29% have postgraduate qualifications, mainly Masters’ degrees
(Cislowski and Purwadi 2011).
Other issues also contribute to the limited influence of Balitbangs in evidence-
based policy processes.
A mix of regulatory barriers and established practices hinders the capability of
ministries and local governments to strengthen the role of Balitbangs. These include
1
Exchange rate on 31/12/2011 1 US$ = 9,070 IDR. See http://www.exchange-rates.org/Rate/USD/
IDR/12-31-2011
2
At number seven, after Public Works and Housing, Defense, Police, Health, Religious Affairs
(Negara 2016)
3
Exchange rate on 31/12/2011 1 US$ = 9,070 IDR. See http://www.exchange-rates.org/Rate/USD/
IDR/12-31-2011.
4
Name of the district withheld
5
Average exchange rate in 2016 1 US$ = 13,360 IDR. Available at http://www.exchangerates.org.
uk/USD-IDR-exchange-rate-history.html
the rigid 1-year budget cycle, which impedes the conducted multi-year research and
studies (see also Chap. 7), the vested interests of various agencies and individuals in
commissioning their own research and the tendency of development partners to
work directly with directorates within ministries, bypassing the Balitbangs. Other
obstacles include the absence of a grand strategy within ministries that clearly
describes their need for evidence and the resources to produce and procure it, with
the help of Balitbangs, the separation between functional staff (specialists) and
structural staff (administrative staff). Lastly, ministries and local governments must
cope with the complexity and ambiguity of the decree on procurement, which leaves
Balitbangs unsure whether or not they can procure research from universities and
think-tanks (see Chap. 7) (Cislowski and Purwadi 2011; Sherlock 2010).
To conclude, using the K* Framework (Fig. 3.2), Balitbangs appear to function
mainly as information intermediaries. They are better positioned than external
think-tanks, for example, to link to policy formulation and implementation pro-
cesses, as well as to decision-makers and senior policymakers in ministries and
local government. However, they struggle. The capacity and resources to conduct
high-quality research and inform policy are simply not available, which poses the
question of whether Balitbangs are necessary at all or whether another type of
organisation or actor is required to provide the research, evidence and policy analy-
sis needed by policymakers.
2.2 Experimenting with the Government Think-Tank Model
Government think-tanks are an alternative model for providing governments with evi-
dence and analysis. Being embedded in the government structure brings several ben-
efits, such as a strong understanding of government programmes and priorities, which
helps to tailor advice to actual policy needs and coordinate across government depart-
ments (Mackenzie et al. 2015). Given the structural problems faced by Balitbangs,
Indonesian governments have been looking into this option for some years.
When President Joko Widodo announced his first cabinet on 26 October 2014, he
used the opportunity to describe it as a ‘working cabinet’ and to make certain struc-
tural changes, including removing Bappenas from the Coordinating Ministry of
Economic Affairs and requiring that it report directly to the president and assume
the role of national ‘think-tank’.
This followed other attempts to incorporate a think-tank function into the gov-
ernment, a gap that different presidents have also tried to fill. For example, in
December 2009, at the beginning of his second term, President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono established the ‘President’s Delivery Unit of Development Monitoring
and Oversight’, known as UKP4 (Unit Kerja Presiden Bidang Pengawasan dan
Pengendalian). At that time, this was understood as a sign that President Yudhoyono
believed that Bappenas was not doing its job of oversight and general evaluation.
UKP4, sitting directly under the president, was seen as more powerful and
well-positioned to provide both timely feedback on outcomes and forward-looking
strategic advice.
The decision to bring Bappenas directly under President Joko Widodo’s office is
a sign that he wants to strengthen its role. Whether Bappenas is able to perform the
new think-tank role in addition to its responsibility for planning, and to some extent
budget allocation, is yet to be seen. What is clear, however, is that, internally, there
have been attempts to develop a think-tank-type unit to better coordinate the
research, analysis and monitoring of development plans that Bappenas is mandated
to carry out.
The Policy Analysis Unit was established in late 2010 as a pilot to support
Bappenas in producing quick turnaround policy products to support Indonesia’s role
in national, regional and international development forums. The Unit’s establish-
ment was supported with funding and technical assistance through a programme
funded by the Australian Government Development Agency (AusAID), from 2011
to mid-2013.6 In 2012, the Policy Analysis Unit was renamed ‘Policy Analysis
Team’, with an executive secretary to manage the production, coordination and
communication of policy products. The goal was to allow for greater ownership of
policy analysis across the different working units in Bappenas. The support contin-
ued when the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy: The Knowledge
Sector Initiative, a joint programme of the Indonesian and Australian governments,
was launched in May 2013. The Knowledge Sector Initiative seeks to improve the
lives of the Indonesian people through better quality public policies that make better
use of research, analysis and evidence. In late 2014 an internal reorganisation at
Bappenas resulted in the renaming of the Policy Analysis Team into its Bahasa
Indonesian wording Tim Analisis Kebijakan (TAK) and the appointment of a new
executive secretary. The fourth iteration of the unit occurred in early 2016, when the
new Minister of Bappenas, Sofyan Djalil, established the Centre for Policy Analysis
(Pusat Analisis Kebijakan, PAK) as a structural unit within Bappenas. The Centre
for Policy Analysis reports directly to the Minister, receives a budget allocation and
is headed by an echelon two official.7
The Centre for Policy Analysis represents a step in the direction of transforming
Bappenas into a national think-tank. It is an opportunity, but there are capability
challenges. The new Centre for Policy Analysis has a clear intermediary function
within Bappenas, which appears to be more than a simple information intermediary
function. The team provides briefs to senior officials, which shows that team
members can act as knowledge translators, using the terminology of the K*

Framework. They also engage with external research institutes and universities,
6
The Knowledge Sector Initiative began to develop a working relationship with the Policy Analysis
Team on 1 July 2013 with the transition of the contractual support to the Knowledge Sector
Initiative.
7
Indonesian public servants work in a highly structured hierarchy. The ministers head this organ-
isation and are appointed by the president. Beneath them is the public service hierarchy which is
organised in both echelons and grades. A person’s management position within the hierarchy is
indicated by their echelon, with echelon 1 indicating the highest and echelon 5 the lowest manage-
ment positions. Secretaries-General and Directors-General are assigned as echelon 1 officials.
Directors and heads of central support units are usually assigned as echelon two, as are the head of
bureau in the Secretariats-General.
with which they collaborate to produce cross-cutting analysis that is packaged into
accessible knowledge products (memos, policy briefs, position papers, etc.) and
submitted to the Minister of Bappenas and the Executive Office of the President
(Kantor Staf Presiden). In this case, the Centre for Policy Analysis acts as a knowl-
edge translator. The challenge lies in the fact that except for a small core team of
full-time staff (structural positions), the Centre’s team is formed by functional staff
serving on a voluntary basis from across Bappenas, limiting continuity. A second
problem is the absence of a strong internal management process for overseeing and
monitoring research activities, which has resulted in delays and insufficient quality
assurance for final research outputs. A third problem is the lack of clear selection
criteria for collaboration with research partners based on organisational or research
capacity (Utama 2017).
3 P
olicy Analysts as Professional Knowledge Intermediaries
Within Government
The passage of Law No. 5/2014 on the Indonesian Civil Service marked a signifi-
cant step in the direction of modernising the Indonesian civil service and bureau-
cracy to meet the policymaking and other needs of a modern economy. The Law
includes provisions for a stronger policy analysis function within the bureaucracy,
which is assigned by Article 44 to the National Institute of Public Administration
(Lembaga Administrasi Negara – LAN). The main role and responsibilities of pol-
icy analysts are described in the Ministerial Regulation of Administrative and
Bureaucracy Reform No. 45/2013 on ‘Functional Position of Policy Analysts’ and
comprise identifying policy problems, forecasting, developing policy recommenda-
tions and monitoring and evaluating policy implementation (Fatonie 2017). Two
government organisations are assigned responsibility for policy analysts. The
Ministry of State Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform (Kementerian
Pendayagunaan Aparatur Negara dan Reformasi Birokrasi) issued a decree that
establishes policy analysis as a functional position in the civil service and defines
modalities for the recruitment of policy analysts from within the bureaucracy. The
LAN is mandated to design and provide training for and accreditation of policy
analysts. The target set by the government is to have at least 6,000 trained and
accredited policy analysts by 2019, working at both the national and subnational
levels (informant interview 2016). The total number of policy analysts across the
bureaucracy when all the positions will be assigned is expected to be close to
200,000 (informant interview 2016).
As noted by Fatonie (2017), policy analysts can play a key knowledge interme-
diation role between knowledge producers in universities, Balitbangs or think-tanks
and policymakers and civil servants, which until now was missing in Indonesia. The
Fig. 4.3 Role of policy analysts and the types of evidence they can generate to inform the policy
process. (Reproduced from Kumorotomo et al. 2013)
role of policy analyst is important during each phase of the policy cycle,8 and one of
the expected outcomes from the insertion of policy analysis in government organ-
isations is that more evidence will be used to inform policy decisions. This is
expected to occur as a result of their closer involvement in policymaking through
problem identification, forecasting, providing policy recommendations, analysis of
policy outcomes and assessment or evaluation of policy performance, as depicted in
the green column of Fig. 4.3 (Dunn 2004, Fatonie 2017).
As shown in the figure, the evidence produced by policy analysts can help to
clarify the nature and political economy of policy problems and the expected out-
comes of different policy options, as well as to provide criteria for comparing differ-
ent policy options and alternatives. While policies are being tested and implemented,
policy analysts can assess their outcomes and impact. To provide these inputs, policy
analysts must know where to find the data and be able to analyse the data and trans-
form it into evidence, which is then synthesised and communicated to policymakers
(see Fig. 4.4). At a minimum, they may play the role of information intermediaries,
but hopefully, with time, they can become more involved in policymaking processes
and take up the role of knowledge brokers described in Fig. 4.2.
Good policy analysis requires skills. Since 2015, the LAN has trained and certi-
fied about 100 civil servants from ministries and local governments (e.g. from the
8
Academic Paper on Functional Position of Policy Analyst in Indonesia, University of Gadjah
Mada (UGM) and National Institute of Public Administration (LAN), December 2013
Fig. 4.4 The knowledge translation process. (Reproduced from Kumorotomo et al. 2013)
Ministry of Communication and Information, Secretariat General of the Indonesian

House of Representatives, National Resilience Agency and Ministry of Home
Affairs) as policy analysts. There are two types of application and certification pro-
cesses for policy analysts. The first is through a competency test for junior civil
servants. The second is through job transfer or promotion (also known as ‘inpass-
ing’) for mid-level to senior civil servants.
The target of 6,000 policy analysts by 2019 is very ambitious and will test the
capacity of the LAN to prepare this new cadre of civil servants. To realise this plan,
the LAN has established collaboration with some top-level universities (University
of Gadjah Mada, University of Diponegoro and University of Indonesia) to conduct
training for policy analysts. The training programme lasts for three weeks and
involves classroom-style teaching provided by institute staff and academics.
3.1 Opportunities and Challenges for Policy Analysts
Section 3.1 explains that the role of knowledge intermediaries can involve different
degrees of complexity and sophistication, depending on the enabling environment
in which they perform their role. Thus, there is scope for experimentation with dif-
ferent degrees of complexity in undertaking policy analysis – if one important chal-
lenge can be overcome.
In June 2016, the Ministry of State Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform
(Kementerian Pendayagunaan Aparatur Negara dan Reformasi Birokrasi) issued a
decree that regulates the job grading (kelas jabatan) of policy analysts, organising
them into four categories: beginner, junior, mid-level and senior. The position of
policy analyst is a functional position, and the four categories determine the appli-
cable remuneration level and additional incentives. The post’s status as a functional
position carries a risk of overlapping with the tasks and role of other functional
positions, which are basically advisory roles (e.g. expert staff or staf ahli). As a
result, some questions remain to be clarified, such as the difference between the role
of a policy analyst, a development planner in Bappenas and a researcher working,
for example, in a ministerial Balitbang. All three perform (to various degrees)
research and analysis and could be asked to produce a research synthesis or policy
brief. These overlaps need to be resolved because they raise the risk of limiting the
added value to policy processes that policy analysis can bring. Without a clear dis-
tinction of roles, skills and responsibilities, policy analysis can be relegated to a
secondary role − which will not attract potential candidates.
The second option assumes that policy analysts are posted in a specific unit and
dedicated to any local government department (dinas). They can work collectively
and be assigned to serve any local agency that needs their expertise in making policy
recommendations. Based on this model, a unit containing policy analysts could be
established so that a local government may need only 10–15 policy analysts who
work collectively. However, the consequence would be that policy recommenda-
tions cannot be delivered as quickly as with the first model. In addition, the limited
number of policy analysts and their separate offices, distant from those of decision-
makers, is liable to inhibit communication between policymakers and policy
analysts.
The recruitment of policy analysts, particularly at senior level, may pose a chal-
lenge. Junior policy analysts are nominated by the ministry or agency where they
work. They then receive training to equip them with the technical and policy com-
petencies required. But recruiting senior civil servants as policy analysts may be
more challenging, as senior officials who hold a structural position may be reluctant
to exchange their role, where they can exert some authority, for a functional role as
policy analyst, which is mainly advisory.
The continuing development of a culture of demand and use of evidence in poli-
cymaking will be a key success factor for the role of policy analyst. Without demand
from policymakers and civil servants, the analysis produced by analysts does not
have a client. Although demand for evidence-based research is slowly growing
within Indonesia’s bureaucracy, policy decisions are still made based on perceptions
or intuition and without a strong appetite for critical evidence (Nur Rochmi 2015).
4 Conclusions
Various attempts have been made to strengthen the knowledge intermediation func-
tion within Indonesia’s government organisations over the last few decades. The
results have been modest. Balitbangs have not been able to move beyond the role of
information intermediaries. In response to this situation, the Ministry of State
Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform (Kementerian Pendayagunaan Aparatur
Negara dan Reformasi Birokrasi) is conducting an assessment aimed at deciding

whether and how to revitalise the role of Balitbangs or whether they should be
dismantled.
The strengthening of Bappenas’ role as the national think-tank − and within
Bappenas of the role of think-tank units such as the PAK – is a work in progress and
may require considerable structural reform, as well as increased organisation and
research and analysis capacity. Politics will also play an important role in this
regard.
The establishment of the policy analyst position is a promising step toward mod-
ernising Indonesia’s bureaucracy and developing a system for introducing more evi-
dence and analysis into policy decisions. The training curriculum developed by the
LAN focuses on the analytical skills required for policy analysis and knowledge of
the policy cycle. With time, it should also include greater emphasis on the soft skills
mentioned by Considine (see Sect. 1.1) that are required to interact with different
stakeholders and understand the political economy of current policy agendas.
The newly established Indonesian Policy Analysts Association (Asosiasi Analis
Kebijakan Indonesia – AAKI), founded in September 2016, includes 110 policy
analysts in ministries and local governments and is a very promising initiative to
strengthen the role, functions and visibility of policy analysts. The objective of the
Association is to become a hub not only for policy analysts but also for other knowl-
edge producers and intermediaries (e.g. in Balitbangs, policy analysis units in min-
istries, NGOs and CSOs, and research and development units in the private sector,
universities and the media) who play a role in policy research and evidence-informed
policymaking.
Policy analysis creates an opportunity to develop the knowledge-brokering func-
tion within government entities described by Fisher (2010) and Shaxson and Bielak
(2012). This can help to strengthen the demand for and use of evidence in the policy
cycle in Indonesia and ensure the development of spaces where government organ-
isations actively demand analysis and evidence (Karetji 2010) and, as noted by
Shaxson (2014), internal and external stakeholders discuss what evidence is needed
to help address policy priorities.
References
Cislowski, H., & Purwadi, A. (2011). Study of the role of Indonesian government research units
(‘Balitbangs’) in bridging research and development policy. Jakarta: AusAID.
Crouch, H. (1979). Patrimonialism and military rule in Indonesia. World Politics, 31(4), 571–587.
Datta, A., Nurbani, R., Satria, G., Antlöv, H., Fatonie, I., & Sabri, R. (2017, forthcoming). Policy,
change and paradox in Indonesia: Implications for the use of knowledge (Working Paper).
Jakarta: Knowledge Sector Initiative.
National Institute Economic Review, 219(1), 41–52.
Dixon, G., & Hakim, D. (2009). Making Indonesia’s budget decentralisation work: The challenge
of linking planning and budgeting at the local level. International Public Management Review,
10(1), 119–169.
Dunn, W. N. (2004). Public policy analysis: An introduction. Upper Saddle River: Pearson-
Prentice Hall.
Effendi, S. (2011). Finally, a new civil service law. The Jakarta Post. http://www.thejakartapost.
com/news/2014/02/03/finally-a-new-civil-service-law.html. Accessed on 25 Apr 2017.
Emmerson, D. K. (2001). Indonesia beyond Soeharto: Negara, Ekonomi, Masyarakat. Jakarta:
Gramedia.
Fatonie, I. (2017). End of intervention report: Support to the National Institute of Public
Administration (LAN) on strengthening the capacity of policy analysts. Internal report. Jakarta:
Knowledge Sector Initiative.
Fisher, C. (2010). Knowledge brokering and intermediary concepts. Analysis of an e-discussion
on the Knowledge Brokers’ Forum. http://www.preventionweb.net/files/workspace/33381_
knowledgebrokeringandintermediaryco.pdf. Accessed 21 Apr 2017.
Gie, K. K. (2003). Reformasi Birokrasi dalam Mengefektifkan Kinerja Pegawai Pemerintahan
(Bureaucratic reform toward a more effective government official’s performance). Jakarta:
Workshop Gerakan Pemberantasan Korupsi, PBNU.
Green, K. (2005). Decentralization and good governance: The case of Indonesia. Munich Personal
RePEc Archive. https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18097/1/Decentralization_and_Good_
Governance-The_Case_of_Indonesia.pdf. Accessed 2 Apr 2017.
Guston, D. (1999). Stabilizing the boundary between politics and science: The role of the office of
technology transfer as a boundary organization. Social Studies of Science, 29, 87–111.
Guston, D. (2001). Boundary organizations in environmental policy and science: An introduction.
Science Technology and Human Values, 26(4), 299–408.
Guston, D., Clark, W., Keating, K., Cash, D. Moser, S., & Powers, C. (2000). Report of the work-
shop on boundary organizations in environmental policy and science, 9–10 December 1999,
John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. https://www.hks.harvard.edu/
gea/pubs/huru1.pdf. Accessed 15 Apr 2017.
Jackson, K. D., & Pye, W. (1978). Political power and communications in Indonesia. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Karetji, P. C. (2010). Overview of the Indonesian knowledge sector. Jakarta: AusAID.
King, D. Y. (1982). Indonesia’s new order as a bureaucratic polity, a neopatrimonial regime or a
bureaucratic authoritarian regime: What difference does it make? In B. Anderson & A. Kahin
(Eds.), Interpreting Indonesian politics: Thirteen contributions to the debate. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
Kumorotomo, W., Purwanto, E. A., Pramusinto, A., Widaningrum, A., Dwiputrianti, S., &
Rahmalia, M. (2013). Naskah akademik jabatan fungsional analis kebijakan (Academic Paper
on Policy Analysts as a Functional Position). Jakarta/Yogkjakarta: National Institute of Public
Administration/University of Gadjah Mada.
Kuwado, F. J. (2016, June 13). Jokowi: 3.143 Perda Bermasalah Telah Dibatalkan (Jokowi:
3.143 local regulations have been cancelled). Kompas.com. http://nasional.kompas.com/
read/2016/06/13/17215521/jokowi.3.143.perda.bermasalah.telah.dibatalkan. Accessed 15 Apr
2017.
Lay, C. (2003). Otonomi daerah dan keindonesiaan. In A. G. Karim (Ed.), Kompleksitas Persoalan
Otonomi Daerah di Indonesia (pp. 3–32). Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar.
Lindquist, E. A. (2001). Discerning policy influence: Framework for a strategic evaluation of
IDRC-supported research. International Development Research Center. http://www.bettere-
valuation.org/sites/default/files/discerning_policy.pdf. Accessed 19 Apr 2017.
Lindquist, E. A. (2009). There’s more to policy than alignment. Research Report. Canadian Policy
Research Networks Inc. http://observgo.uquebec.ca/observgo/fichiers/80533_RCRPP_A.pdf.
Accessed 22 Apr 2017.
Lloyd, G. J., & Smith, S. L. (2001). Thoughts on Indonesian history. In J. L. Gayson & S. L. Smith
(Eds.), Indonesia today: Challenges of history (pp. 1–13). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Mackenzie, J., Pellini, A., & Sutiyo, W. (2015). Establishing government think tanks: An overview
of comparative models (Working Paper 4). Jakarta: Knowledge Sector Initiative.
MacRae, D. (1991). Policy analysis and knowledge use. Knowledge and Policy, 4(3), 27–40.
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02693086.
Milani, C. R. S. (2005). Evidence-based policy research: Critical review of some international pro-
grammes on relationships between social science research and policy-making (Policy Papers
No. 18). UNESCO. http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001834/183415e.pdf. Accessed 30
Apr 2017.
Negara, S. D. (2016). Indonesia’s 2016 budget: Optimism amidst global uncertainties. Perspective,
2016(3), 1–13. https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2016_3.pdf.
Accessed 2 May 2017.
Nur Rochmi, M. (2015). Studi pembelajaran pelatihan Calon Analis Kebijakan (CAK) (transl.
Lessons learned from the training for policy analysts). Report. Jakarta: National Institute of
Public Administration (LAN) and Knowledge Sector Initiative.
Pellini, A. (2017). Knowledge sector interview with Professor Mark Considine. Knowledge Sector
Interviews. http://www.ksi-indonesia.org/en/news/detail/knowledge-sector-interview-with-
professor-mark-considine-by-arnaldo-pellini. Accessed 2 Apr 2017.
Pratikno. (2003). Desentralisasi, pilihan yang tidak final. In A. G. Karim (Ed.), Kompleksitas
Persoalan Otonomi Daerah di Indonesia (pp. 33–56). Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar.
Roth, J. (2003). Enabling knowledge creation: Learning from an R&D organization. Journal of
Knowledge Management, 7(1), 32.
Shaxson, L. (2014). Investing in evidence: Lessons from the UK Department for Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs (Working Paper 2). Jakarta: Knowledge Sector Initiative. http://www.
ksi-indonesia.org/files/1421384737$1$QBTM0U$.pdf. Accessed on 15 May 2016.
Shaxson, L., & Bielak, A. (2012). Expanding our understanding of K*. A concept paper emerg-
ing from the K* conference held in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada, April 2012. United Nations
University. http://www.alnap.org/resource/10031.aspx. Accessed 10 Apr 2017.
market in Indonesia. Jakarta: AusAID.
Shiraishi, T. (2006). Technocracy in Indonesia: A preliminary analysis (RIETI Discussion Paper
Series). Research Institute for Economy, Trade & Industry. http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publica-
tions/dp/06e008.pdf. Accessed 21 Apr 2017.
Tjiptoherijanto, P. (2007). Civil service reform in Indonesia. International Public Management
Review, 8(2), 31–44.
Utama, S. (2017). End of intervention report: Bappenas Policy Analysis Team (PAT) and Tim
Analisis Kebijakan (TAK). Internal report. Jakarta: Knowledge Sector Initiative.
Part II
Knowledge and the Politics
of Policymaking
Chapter 5
How and When Do Policymakers Use
Evidence? Taking Politics into Account
Elisabeth Jackson, Endah Bayu Purnawati, and Louise Shaxson
1 Introduction
The preceding chapter discussed how to ensure that policymakers have access to the
best available evidence at key moments and the role of knowledge intermediaries in
facilitating that access, using both ‘hard’ (disciplinary) and ‘soft’ (relationship-
building) skills. But this is not a passive process in which policymakers simply rely
on the right evidence to appear at the right time. A hard and careful look permits
identification of the signals policymakers send out about what issues they are con-
sidering and what evidence they need to help them address their policy goals and to
manage any opportunities and risks that might arise. These signals, collectively, can
be understood as the ‘demand’ for evidence. This chapter discusses how to improve
the demand for evidence within the Indonesian context, focusing on key policy
planning processes at the national and subnational levels. As this demand becomes
more clearly articulated, it becomes easier for others to see and understand what is
needed and how it can be provided most effectively.
Demand for evidence is shaped by a mixture of individual skills, organisational
relationships and organisational processes. The latter two are very much shaped by
politics, that is, by the power relationships created within the bureaucracy. At the
individual level, policymakers need technical skills in sourcing, evaluating and inter-
E. Jackson (*)
Jakarta, Indonesia
E. B. Purnawati
Global Green Growth Institute, Jakarta, Indonesia
L. Shaxson

68 E. Jackson et al.
preting evidence − such as the ability to appraise the quality of a research report or
to synthesise the results of several related studies. But policymakers generally work
in teams, and collectively their interests, values and beliefs influence what evidence
is considered to be credible and useful and is therefore put forward for consideration
in decision-making processes. Powerful groups (such as business lobby groups) or
highly regarded experts (such as scientists) can play a significant role in determining
what evidence is listened to and what is excluded (Jones et al. 2012).
Organisational politics also shape the demand for evidence. Government minis-
tries and departments are complex organisations: power is embedded in the organ-
isational structures and processes that dictate what evidence is needed at what points
in the decision-making process (Farid 2017). For instance, a technical guideline is
an operational form of power because it specifies what is to be done, in what order,
using what evidence (Ibid.).
Several recent studies have examined key aspects of the demand for evidence,
including the political economy of policymaking in Indonesia (Datta et al. 2011),
national policymakers’ acquisition of research evidence (Datta et al. 2016) and sub-
national governments’ use of evidence in policymaking (Sutmuller and Setiono
2011; Zhang 2015). However, significant gaps remain for gaining a full understand-
ing of the factors shaping demand for evidence in Indonesia.
This chapter examines the factors that shape how evidence is used in Indonesia’s
planning processes, with a focus on the national 5-year development plan (Rencana
Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional – RPJMN) and regional 5-year plans
(Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah – RPJMD). Although some poli-
cies will emerge outside these processes in response to emerging events, these plan-
ning documents provide a structure through which to analyse the factors that
influence how and when Indonesian policymakers seek out and utilise evidence.
The authors use a broad definition of ‘evidence’, encompassing statistical and
administrative data, research evidence, evidence from policy implementation and
evaluation and the views and experiences of citizens and other stakeholders (Wills
et al. 2016). The chapter draws from three frameworks that describe (i) policymak-
ers’ capacities and motivations (Newman et al. 2012); (ii) how their interests, values
and beliefs affect what evidence is perceived to be credible (Jones et al. 2012); and
(iii) organisational issues that influence how evidence is sourced, interpreted and
used (Shaxson et al. 2016).
The chapter begins with a brief outline of national and regional development
planning processes, highlighting the main points at which evidence is required.1 It
then discusses the individual, organisational and contextual factors that influence
that demand, before reviewing approaches to building individual and organisational
capacity that have been used successfully in other middle-income countries. The
chapter concludes with suggestions on how these approaches could be adapted to
the Indonesian context.
1
The chapter focuses on the executive body of government. For those interested to see how the
legislature demands and uses evidence, see Sherlock (2010) and Sherlock and Djani (2015).
5 How and When Do Policymakers Use Evidence? Taking Politics into Account 69
2 Policymaking Processes in Indonesia
Indonesia has a range of formal processes for regular planning and budgeting and
for developing national and subnational laws and regulations. Two main formal
policy processes take place at the national level: long- and medium-term develop-
ment planning and the development of laws and regulations. All development plan-
ning is the responsibility of the Ministry for National Development Planning/
National Development Planning Agency (Kementerian Perencanaan Pembangunan
Nasional/Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional – Bappenas) and its subna-
tional counterparts, the Bappedas. The current long-term national development plan
(Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Nasional – RPJPN) was prepared in 2005.
It sets out Indonesia’s priorities for achieving a nation that is self-reliant, progres-
sive, just and prosperous, through efforts to improve innovation and competitive-
ness, ensure equitable and sustainable development, maintain peace and stability,
uphold democracy and justice and improve Indonesia’s global influence. It is closely
linked to the long-term regional development plans (Rencana Pembangunan Jangka
Panjang Daerah – RPJPD), which set out similar goals for decentralised regional
governments.
Bappenas uses the RPJPN to prepare 5-year plans that outline different focus
areas for development. These plans are based on an evaluation of achievements
under the previous 5-year plan and an assessment of the current context and key
issues. They draw on background studies either commissioned or conducted by
Bappenas.2 Preparation of the national plan is also aligned with the electoral cycle,
ensuring that its priorities and targets are informed by the president’s priorities.
Bappenas then uses the RPJMN to prepare annual plans (Rencana Kerja Pemerintah –
RKP) that outline national development objectives, sector priorities and perfor-
mance indicators and targets. The annual plans also set out indicative funding levels
for ministerial and cross-ministerial programmes in each sector. Once the RKP has
been finalised, responsibility shifts to the Ministry of Finance, which uses it to guide
the development of the annual state budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja
Negara – APBN). At the subnational level, elected leaders formulate regional 5-year
plans (Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah – RPJMD), which draw
from the RPJPD, and regional Bappedas use the 5-year plans to formulate their
annual plans, which guide the development of regional budgets.
At the national level, sectoral ministries then use the RPJMN to formulate their
5-year strategic plans, which guide the development of annual sectoral work plans
and which, in turn, refer back to the RKP. A similar process takes place at the sub-
national level: the RPJMD is used by local governments to formulate regional
annual work plans, which shape the 5-year strategic plans of regional working units.
The local government units (Satuan Kerja Pemerintah Daerah – SKPD) develop the
sectoral work plans from that. This complex system is set out in Fig. 5.1.
2
Bappenas funds are often limited, leading to requests for development partners’ assistance for
these studies.
Fig. 5.1 Indonesia’s integrated system of planning and budgeting at national and regional/local
levels (Reproduced from Bappenas 2013) (see slide 4 at http://perpustakaan.bappenas.go.id/lontar/
file?file=digital/138227-%5B_Konten_%5D-Konten%20C9673.ppt)
Responsibility for monitoring the plans lies mainly with Bappenas, which over-
sees implementation of the RPJMN by sectoral ministries and liaises closely with
staff at the Office of the President’s Staff (Kantor Staf Presiden – KSP) to monitor
priority development programmes. Sectoral and annual work programmes at both
the national and subnational levels are linked to specific budgeting processes led by
the Ministry of Finance.
These processes incorporate evidence to varying degrees and at different points
in the process (Datta et al. 2011; Sheppard 2012). Law 25/2004 on the National
Development Planning System mandates the use of evidence in formulating RPJMN
and RPJMD, including evidence gathered for strategic planning by ministries/agen-
cies and subnational governments. The RPJMN process is fixed: consultative devel-
opment planning forums (musrenbang) are required from the lowest level of
government within a province up to the national level. This bottom-up process is
designed to ensure that citizens’ aspirations and proposals are filtered through to
national policies.
However, the musrenbang process is widely considered to be ineffective (Kompas
Online 2008), in particular because it places greater emphasis on procedure than on
ensuring participation by all stakeholders. This results in a degree of ‘elite capture’,
meaning that diverse priorities at the village, municipal and district levels are not
transparently or effectively reflected, and evidence that comes directly from citizens
tends to be under-represented in both provincial and national-level plans.
Once the RPJMN and RPJMD have been finalised, Law No. 12/2011 on the
formulation of laws and regulations requires the use of academic papers (naskah
akademik) in all policy formulation processes. These papers, based on research or

legal studies, are published and intended to improve accountability for addressing
policy concerns. They follow a tightly specified format that outlines the legal need
to address the problem, the theoretical and empirical background and an analysis of
existing laws and regulations.3 But while the planning process is well specified, and
the RPJMN provides a checklist for how to produce ‘outputs’ of the policy process,
little emphasis is placed on using evidence to assess what works and what does not
(Wasono and Maulana 2018).
The RPJMN is a tightly prescribed process, which tends to restrict the sources of
evidence used to develop the laws and regulations that flow from it; as Datta et al.
(2011) suggest, such ‘formal bureaucratic rules… provide weak incentives for
policy-makers to invest in, demand and use knowledge in order to produce good
outputs and outcomes’. There may be more leeway to strengthen the use of evidence
in the development of laws and regulations through building coalitions with like-
minded people to provide the best available evidence during the formulation of
academic papers. For example, between 2007 and 2013 a group of civil society
organisations worked collaboratively with lawmakers to provide an ‘alternative’
academic paper to the draft submitted by the government as evidence, leading to the
passage of Law 6/2014 on Villages. They succeeded in influencing the expert staff
and lawmakers in the national parliament by providing necessary evidence during
the legislation process (Pellini et al. 2014).
3 F
actors Influencing Policymakers’ Ability to Search
for and Use Evidence
In their study of the acquisition of research evidence by the Indonesian executive

branch, Datta et al. (2016) identify a range of barriers to acquiring and using research
evidence within government departments. Some of these are concerned with the
supply of research evidence, such as the length of time required to produce research,
poor quality and lack of policy relevance of research and limited expertise on some
policy issues. This section focuses on three additional factors: (i) individual factors,
such as individual policymakers’ skills, knowledge and attitudes; (ii) organisational
factors such as inadequate funding for policy research, lack of reliable data, chal-
lenges in procuring research and limited discretion to act on research findings; and
(iii) factors related to the policy environment.
3
The full text of Law No. 12/2011 is available at http://kelembagaan.ristekdikti.go.id/wp-content/
uploads/2016/08/UU-12-Tahun-2011.pdf. The implementing regulations for the law are outlined
in Presidential Regulation (PP) No. 87/2014, available at https://www.setneg.go.id/index.
php?option=com_perundangan&id=404372&task=detail&catid=6&Itemid=42&tahun=2014.
Fig. 5.2 Individual factors shaping policymakers’ demand for evidence (Reproduced from
Newman et al. 2012)
3.1 Individual Factors
A range of skills, knowledge, resources and attitudes shape policymakers’ capacity

and motivation to seek and use evidence. These include critical thinking and ana-
lytical skills, evidence literacy skills, sectoral knowledge and experience and per-
sonal and professional networks (Newman et al. 2012) (see Fig. 5.2).
The level and mixture of capacities that policymakers need differ according to
seniority and the types of decisions they are required to make. Within the executive,
senior decision-makers such as ministers, deputy ministers and directors general
need to be able to consider evidence and apply it to policy problems. Directors,
heads of sub-directorates and special and expert staff need to be able to synthesise
and evaluate evidence both to inform their own decision-making and to feed into
decision-making by more senior officials. Moreover, since officials at the director-
ate and sub-directorate level are usually responsible for commissioning research
evidence (Datta et al. 2011), they need to be able to identify and articulate evidence
needs, develop terms of reference, evaluate the quality of research products and
determine their implications for policy. Finally, a range of staff, including those
within individual directorates and sub-directorates and in research and development
units (Balitbang), need the skills and knowledge to be able to identify relevant infor-
mation, assess its quality and present it in the form of a summary or policy brief
(Ibid.). Individual people’s attitudes towards evidence and their capacity to handle
it effectively can have a major impact on overall organisational capacity, as dis-
cussed below.
3.2 Skills in Evidence Literacy
Finding, evaluating and using evidence in policymaking requires a range of high-

level cognitive skills, including the ability to identify and synthesise often highly
technical information from a range of sources, evaluate the quality of evidence and
arguments and apply the results to concrete policy problems. Yet Indonesia’s educa-
tion system does not adequately equip graduates with critical thinking and analyti-
cal skills or information literacy skills. Recent data collected as part of the OECD
Survey of Adult Skills, for example, reveals low levels of literacy proficiency –
defined as the ability to understand, evaluate, use and engage with written texts –
among Indonesian adults. In the survey, adults in Jakarta who had completed tertiary
qualifications of between 2 and 4 years scored only slightly above the OECD aver-
age for those who did not complete upper secondary school and 20% below the
OECD average for those with a tertiary education (OECD 2016; Pritchett 2016).
Although learning continues throughout a person’s career, these results suggest
that Indonesian graduates – including those who enter the civil service − begin their
working life with a deficit in some of the key skills required to critically search for,
assess and apply evidence. This situation is likely to be exacerbated at the subnational
level, given that Indonesia’s best universities are located in major cities and towns on
Java and that positions in the subnational civil service tend to be filled with graduates
of local universities. In addition, poorly designed entrance examination and recruit-
ment processes based on nepotism and patronage mean that the most suitable candi-
dates are not always selected (Turner et al. 2009; Blunt et al. 2012), although recently
introduced changes – including the use of an online candidate registration system and
computer-assisted testing – aim to make recruitment more transparent.4
3.3 Critical Thinking and Analytical Skills
Figure 5.3 shows that while the majority of civil servants at the national level hold
an undergraduate degree, this is not the case at the provincial or district levels. Data
from the National Civil Service Commission show that in 2016 just over 6% of
Indonesia’s 4.5 million civil servants – including over 1.7 million teachers, as well
as health workers and other technical roles − have a master’s degree, while 0.3%
See http://www.bkn.go.id/produk/cat-bkn.
4
Fig. 5.3 Educational qualifications of civil servants at national, provincial and district levels, 2013
(Reproduced from SIPAN 2017)
Table 5.1 Samples of structural positions with educational background in select ministries
Minister/
Highest level deputy Echelon 1/ Echelon 2/
of education minister DG level director level
Bappenas Bachelors – – –
Masters – 6 29
Doctorates 1 10 19
Kementan (Ministry of Bachelors – – –
Agriculture) Masters – 8 49
Doctorates 1 8 41
Kemenko PMK (Coordinating Bachelors 1 3 2
Ministry for Human Development Masters – 6 24
and Culture) Doctorates – 5 6
have a doctorate.5 A further 46% have an undergraduate degree, the minimum quali-
fication required for employment at the two highest ranks of the public service (BPS
2016; www.bkn.go.id). Within national-level ministries and agencies, senior policy
officials often have higher degrees. Table 5.1 below shows three examples of degrees
obtained by officials at the top three levels of the hierarchy, based on information
from ministry websites in January 2017. The highest concentrations of people with
5
This is in part a result of generous scholarship schemes from the Indonesian government as well
as several foreign governments, which have enabled many civil servants to pursue postgraduate
education overseas, including in Japan, the United States, the Netherlands, Australia and the
United Kingdom.
advanced degrees are in the Ministry of Education and Culture, the National
Development Planning Agency, the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs,
the Coordinating Ministry for Human Development and Culture and the National
Institute of Public Administration.6
At the most senior levels of the civil service educational qualifications (which
link to capacity for critical thinking and analysis) are higher. For example, at
Bappenas, the Coordinating Ministry for Human Development and Culture and the
Ministry of Agriculture most deputy ministers, directors general and directors have
master’s degrees and many have doctorates, including from overseas institutions.
At the national level, job-specific training is implemented by the education and
training centres (Pusat Pendidikan dan Pelatihan – Pusdiklat) of the relevant minis-
try or agency, while the National Institute of Public Administration (Lembaga
Administrasi Negara – LAN) manages compulsory leadership training for staff
seeking promotion. LAN courses, which are linked to promotion to more senior
roles (with associated increases in base salaries and allowances), have in the past
tended to focus on general management and administrative skills (Turner et al.
2009). To some extent this is a legacy of the suppression of critical thinking and
scholarship within universities, research organisations and civil society during the
32-year rule of President Soeharto (1967–1998). During this time, scholarship was
directed towards reinforcing state-sanctioned interpretations of social and economic
development (Hadiz and Dhakidae 2005; Nugroho 2005).
However, this is changing: LAN has revised the curriculum for its leadership and
pre-service training programmes to emphasise professional competency, and the
Ministry of State Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform (Kementerian
Pendayagunaan Aparatur Negara dan Reformasi Birokrasi) has requested that all
government agencies develop competency standards for all positions and a 5-year
plan for developing employee competencies (LAN 2015a, b). The policy analyst
role, which is described in Chap. 4, is an important step towards improving formal
analytical skills, such as data gathering and interpreting trends, as well as soft skills
for analysis and interaction with different stakeholders. However, at the subnational
level, budgets for technical training are often limited, leading to lack of staff with
the requisite skills (Turner et al. 2009; World Bank 2009; Tjiptoherijanto 2014).
3.4 Sectoral Knowledge and Experience
In the 2011 study by Datta and others, some informants noted that while inadequate
training of technical and managerial staff was a challenge, an even greater challenge
was the way that civil service staff were categorised, supervised, remunerated and
promoted. As in many other countries, encouraging policymakers to build up their
sectoral knowledge relationships is not easy. Indonesia requires civil servants
See http://sipan.menpan.go.id/. Based on 2013 data.

6
h olding positions in echelons two to four7 to move to different posts every 3 years,
to build breadth of experience and prevent capture by special interests. The policy is
not always enforced uniformly across government institutions, although in general
one-third of these officials are moved each year in ministries and other state institu-
tions. These staff members are not only rotated within their ministry or agency but
often between different geographical locations. Rotation between different director-
ates general within the same ministry is rare (World Bank 2009). Senior officials,
such as deputy ministers and directors general, can provide some continuity, but
where lower-level officials do not have an educational background in a particular
policy area (e.g. health), they may lack the technical ability to generate and interpret
evidence (Datta et al. 2011).
3.5 Personal and Professional Networks
Personal networks are an important resource in most professions, providing access

to information, influence, goods and services. In Indonesia, personal networks and
patron-client relationships were central to the organisation of power within the
political and bureaucratic elite at both the national and subnational levels during the
Soeharto period. This pattern persisted into the Reformasi era, beginning in 1998.8
The importance of personal networks is reflected in the evidence-seeking behav-
iour among policymakers in national ministries and agencies. A survey of mid-level
and senior policymakers found that expert advice, accessed through personal net-
works, was the second most preferred type of knowledge after statistical and admin-
istrative data (Datta et al. 2016; see also Sherlock 2010; Datta et al. 2011). These
sorts of informal networks help build social capital because they are based on rela-
tionships of trust; evidence acquired in this way is seen by policymakers as highly
credible (Datta et al. 2011). In addition to professional connections with current and
former colleagues, networks may be based on shared educational experiences
(school or university), family and kin relationships, membership in a religious
organisation or congregation, ethnicity and cultural background, political affilia-
tion, membership in professional associations, involvement in non-profit organisa-
tions and business connections.
Professional networks tend to rely on connections to individuals rather than to
organisations. Production of background documents for RPJMN and RPJMD, for
7
The Indonesian public service is a tightly structured hierarchy. Ministers are appointed by the
president. Beneath them, public servants are organised in both echelons and grades, with echelon
1 indicating the highest and echelon 5 the lowest management positions. Secretaries general and
directors general are echelon 1. Directors and heads of central support units are usually echelon 2,
as are the head of bureaux in the secretariats general.
8
The cases described in Aspinall and Sukmajati (2016), for example, underscore the importance of
legislative candidates’ personal networks in electoral competition at the local level (see also
Buehler 2009). Significantly, a high proportion of candidates in local legislative elections come
from the ranks of the bureaucracy (Buehler 2010, 2013; Mietzner 2010).
example, is often contracted out to individual consultants rather than institutions.

This may be related to the fact that under Presidential Regulation No. 54/2010, it is
easier to contract an individual via direct appointment than to appoint civil society
organisations or universities via open tender (see also Chap. 7).
3.6 Organisational Factors
Shaxson et al. (2016) outline a series of organisational factors influencing the
demand for evidence. These include the organisational systems and processes and
the different cultures of evidence that collide with or reinforce each other to shape
the demand for evidence, as depicted in Fig. 5.4.
Organisational Systems and Processes As noted above, the RPJMN and RPJMD
provide the overarching framework for planning, sourcing and interpreting evidence
in the Indonesian policy process. Their planning and budgeting processes are quite
rigid, and the tendency is to simply add new policies on top of existing ones.
Although regulatory review is a mandatory part of the academic papers that support
Fig. 5.4 Organisational influences on policymakers’ demand for evidence. (Adapted from
Shaxson et al. 2016)
RPJMN, it is often not done well, resulting in a large number of overlapping or

inconsistent regulations (Wasono and Maulana 2018).
In a study of five districts in three provinces, Zhang (2015) notes the limited
funding for policy research in local governments, indicating that research is not a
priority. Even though there is a requirement to have background studies or evalua-
tion to inform the RPJMD processes, this is being overlooked, as the cycle of plan-
ning and budgeting has become simply a repetitive process driven by administrative
and compliance concerns. The strength of the planning and budgeting system − and
the weakness of processes of monitoring and evaluating outcomes − means that
policymakers are more worried about whether the relevant plans and budgets meet
legislative requirements than whether the quality of those policies will improve the
welfare of their citizens.
Cultures of Evidence The formal planning and budgeting processes for RPJMN and
RPJMD guide policymakers towards a highly structured and somewhat restrictive
approach to defining what evidence is sought and how it is used. Combined with the
challenges of engaging with external organisations around evidence (as outlined in
Chap. 7), this has in the past generated an introverted culture of evidence with a
strongly hierarchical flavour. In addition, a weak commitment to policy evaluation
within Indonesian ministries denotes a culture of using evidence to demonstrate
compliance with a plan, rather than delivery of outcomes for the economy, environ-
ment and society. Furthermore, an inflexible budgeting process means that officials
cannot easily mobilise resources if requests arise during the financial year, for exam-
ple, for commissioning studies and research, monitoring implementation or holding
public consultations. The default is to turn to development partners to commission
specific pieces of evidence, reinforcing a culture of dependency on others.
The bureaucratic culture remains strong at the subnational level, where policy-
makers receive orders from the top and have little discretion in interpreting goals or
designing specific policies (Karetji 2010). However, this too is changing: as decen-
tralisation gives more authority to local governments, many local leaders are begin-
ning to demonstrate innovative approaches to governance. The election of figures
such as Ridwan Kamil in Bandung or Nurdin in Bantaeng shows that despite rigid
directives from the central government, it is still possible to find innovative ways to
serve the public.9
Data Quality At an organisational level, the quality of statistical and administrative
data is problematic. Most obviously, computer and Internet skills vary widely across
the country, and Internet access is often highly problematic in archipelagic Indonesia.
This means that access to and use of administrative evidence varies widely by
geography. At a more macro level, there are other concerns. District, provincial and
national data are often mismatched: while data from the National Statistics Office
(Badan Pusat Statistik – BPS) is widely used as the official reference data for min-
9
Tempo magazine has named the ten most influential regional heads in Indonesia based on a number of
criteria, including efforts to tackle corruption and innovation in good governance. See https://nasional.
tempo.co/read/news/2017/03/03/173852419/tempo-beri-penghargaan-10-kepala-daerah-teladan-2017.
Fig. 5.5 Issues in the wider policy environment influencing policymakers’ demand for evidence.
(Adapted from Broadbent 2012)
istries and subnational governments, each ministry also produces its own data in
accordance with its specific needs. In the same way that policy coordination between
ministries and agencies is poor, so is data coordination, which makes data sharing
problematic. The Office of the President’s Staff (Kantor Staf Presiden – KSP) is
currently developing a comprehensive regulation on data governance – Satu Data
(One Data) – with the aim of developing a single reference point for administrative
and statistical data in Indonesia (see also Chap. 6).10
3.7 The Wider Policy Environment
The broader policy environment affects demand for evidence and consists of vari-
ous factors in both formal and informal institutions within a country or region
(Broadbent 2012). Here it is conceptualised as three issues, as depicted in Fig. 5.5.
First is the strength of the culture of enquiry and how this is developed through
10
The draft regulation is currently being developed. See http://opengovindonesia.org/front/detail/news/
forum-konsultasi-publik-rancangan-peraturan-presiden-satu-data-indonesia-upaya-konkret-pemerin-
tah-merangkul-publik-dalam-proses-pembuatan-kebijakan.
institutions such as higher education. This culture influences wider societal values
and beliefs about the use of research and the extent to which it is socially acceptable
to challenge power structures. The second is attitudes towards the institution of poli-
cymaking itself, and what and who should drive it, which shapes the role of research
in these processes. The third related issue is public ideas about accountability: to
what extent policymakers are held accountable for the ‘quality’ of their decisions
and scrutinised by other state or civil society organisations, including the popular
media.
Very little empirical research on the effects of the wider policy environment on
the demand for evidence has been undertaken. Jones et al. (2012) note that using
evidence in the policy process has as much to do with issues of power and politics
as it does with problem-solving and rational debate. This echoes Farid’s (2017)
observation in relation to technical guidelines: that power is embedded in positions
and organisational structures. Different groups of people hold different values and
base their actions on different belief systems, not always in their own rational self-
interest. They may use evidence as ammunition to win an argument or to build
broad coalitions to promote a particular cause; they may even withhold evidence to
simplify decision-making. Their values and beliefs shape how problems are con-
ceived and presented (see also Bacchi 2012) and serve to bind coalitions together,
giving weight to particular aspects of evidence and to people with particular types
of knowledge or expertise. In this way, policymakers’ interests, values and beliefs
influence what they perceive to be credible evidence – which may or may not coin-
cide with the perceptions of others in the policy process.
Since 1998 the political context in Indonesia has been changing. The introduc-
tion of direct elections for president and vice president has affected notions of
accountability, political competition and the changing role of civil society. Although
there is no formal requirement to report on progress towards key policy goals, evi-
dence is increasingly demanded as part of public accountability. For example, the
Indonesian Forum for Budget Transparency (Sekretariat Nasional Forum Indonesia
Untuk Transparansi Anggaran – SEKNAS FITRA), a 13-member network of civil
society organisations from five regions, advocates for the Indonesian government to
open up national and subnational budgeting processes to the public. Since 1998 it
has produced evidence on issues of gender, inclusiveness and budget transparency
to encourage wide scrutiny of the national budget (Rakhmani et al. 2017).
At the subnational level, decentralisation and direct elections for provincial gov-
ernors, mayors and district heads have brought government and policymaking closer
to the people. While there is not a strong culture of enquiry in Indonesia and while
it is generally not acceptable to challenge authority, there is an emerging culture of
critique and protest in some segments of the population (Karetji 2010). This raises
the potential for greater accountability, as politicians strive to provide evidence to
demonstrate that they are responsive to public aspirations. In some places civil soci-
ety plays an important watchdog role, but this depends heavily on the presence or
absence of local civil society organisations.
4 O
ther Countries’ Approaches to Improving Policymakers’
Demand for Evidence
Strengthening the ‘demand’ for evidence is a relatively new area of work within
wider efforts to strengthen state capability in Indonesia. The previous analysis por-
trays the complexity of the Indonesian policy environment in relation to how evi-
dence is sought and used. Shaxson et al. (2016) set out a range of different issues
that could be addressed at the individual, team and organisational levels to ensure
that evidence is gathered, interpreted and used effectively. These might include
training policy officials in searching for and appraising the quality of evidence;
creating spaces for debate with people and organisations using different types of
evidence; building independent advisory committees to advise departments on the
effective use of evidence; and training officials in how to communicate complex,
uncertain or rapidly changing evidence.
This section reviews approaches to building individual and organisational capac-
ity to demand and use evidence that have been used in other countries. Drawing
from other countries’ experience provides a useful source of ideas for how to address
specific issues and build organisational cultures and systems for increasing policy-
makers’ demand for evidence.
4.1 S
trengthening Personal Awareness and Skills for Using
Evidence
Improving the capacity of individuals to source, appraise, interpret and use evidence
has been done in two ways: through the provision of dedicated training and through
on-the-job mentoring. Training is delivered in two main ways – as part of the wider
curriculum within civil service colleges that conduct mandatory training for public
servants (government officials and parliamentarians) and training in specific meth-
odologies, such as evaluation, by specialist providers.
Many countries have civil service colleges, and designing curricula specifically
related to evidence could be an effective way to reach many officials simultane-
ously, particularly if attendance at specific courses is mandatory as part of the pro-
motion process. Training several people from the same organisation can be
beneficial, because they can form a core group with a common understanding, able
to take forward the evidence agenda when they return to their home ministries. In
Ghana, for example, the Civil Service Training Centre developed a training pro-
gramme to build capacity of mid-level civil servants in areas such as searching for
evidence, assessing and appraising its quality and communicating it effectively
(Government of Ghana 2017; Ademokun et al. 2016). The University of Cape
Town’s Graduate School of Development Policy and Practice runs a similar course
for senior civil servants covering the different uses of evidence in decision-making
processes, examples of specific tools that can be used and the institutional cultures
required to support more effective use of evidence (UCT n.d.). Training can also be
given on specific methodological issues, such as on managing, designing and con-
ducting impact evaluations (Wotela 2017) − although the level of technical skills
required prior to taking these courses is often very high, so they may only be acces-
sible to one or two people in a ministry.
Another form of transferring skills is on-the-job mentoring, that is, linking indi-
vidual policymakers to individual evidence specialists. While mentoring has long
been used in organisational development and capacity-building efforts, formal pro-
grammes to establish mentoring arrangements specifically for evidence-related
issues are scarce. In South Africa, the University of Johannesburg set up such a
programme and found that aside from ensuring that what is learnt during training
can be put to immediate, practical use, this approach also helped to create networks
of like-minded people that can expand into institutional relationships over time
(Langer et al. 2015).
The Forum Kajian Pembangunan (Development Study Forum)11 was jointly
organised between the Government of Indonesia, think-tanks, civil society organ-
isations and development partners in a relatively formal setting. However, less for-
mal and more participatory processes to increase awareness can be a useful precursor
to more formal training programmes, such as curriculum development and mentor-
ing. In Canada, the Partnership Group for Science and Engineering hosts a series of
breakfast meetings at which parliamentarians are given brief presentations about
new research findings and interaction with scientists is encouraged (PAGSE n.d.).
This informal style of breakfast meeting is intended to help break down barriers and
encourage discussion.
4.2 S
trengthening Organisational Approaches to Using
Evidence
Personal skills and behaviours to improve the use of evidence need to be supported
and reinforced by wider forces that influence how people work and how they interact
with each other to source, appraise, synthesise, interpret and communicate evidence.
But because of how different cultures of evidence interact, stimulating demand also
means strengthening organisations, cultivating appropriate relationships and influ-
encing the wider context (Newman et al. 2012; Punton et al. 2016). Strengthening the
demand for evidence is not a simple matter of implementing training courses. The
way individual people incorporate better use of evidence is influenced by processes
specific to their organisation, as was seen with the RPJMN process.
11
Forum Kajian Pembangunan was initiated by the Australian National University’s Indonesia
Project. Seminars or discussions are hosted by participating organisations in Indonesia, such as
government agencies, research institutes or development partners. The seminars are also an oppor-
tunity to disseminate new research findings. Further information on Forum Kajian Pembangunan
is available at www.fkpindonesia.org.
In South Africa, the Biodiversity and Conservation policy team of the Department
of Environmental Affairs was finding it challenging to access the evidence they
needed when they needed it. They were keen to develop relationships across the
environment sector to generate greater awareness of what the key policy questions
were and what evidence would be needed to answer them. In 2016 the team devel-
oped the first National Biodiversity Research and Evidence Strategy and
Implementation Plan, which worked with a wide group of stakeholders to set out the
key policy questions for biodiversity and conservation policy in the short, medium
and long term, so that the research community would be better able to target their
evidence to meet policy needs (Department of Environmental Affairs 2016).
Clarifying the key policy questions was seen as an important way of signalling what
evidence was needed and building relationships with external evidence providers
and intermediaries.
Also in South Africa, since 2012 the Department of Planning, Monitoring and
Evaluation (DPME) has developed and implemented a national evaluation system to
support policy evaluations and to ensure that the findings from such evaluations are
actively used to improve policymaking (DPME 2011, 2016). Drawing on the expe-
rience of the Sistema Nacional De Evaluación De Gestión Y Resultados (SINERGIA)
in Colombia (Cassidy and Tsui 2017a), over the past 5 years the DPME has worked
to build the capacity of line ministries to commission, monitor, interpret and use the
evidence that emerges from evaluations of policies, plans, projects and programmes
(Goldman et al. 2015). Different types of evaluation are conducted, depending on
what is relevant to a particular policy or programme; an important part of the system
is DPME’s support to line ministries to inform programme managers and help them
use the information effectively to support change. From the start, DPME worked to
create buy-in from ministries, to ensure that the national evaluation system reflected
real demand for evaluation evidence and was not seen as a top-down approach by
central government (Ibid.). The national evaluation system intends to cover all pro-
vincial governments and all central government departments and may ultimately
also work with metropolitan areas and state-owned companies (DPME 2016).
In the United Kingdom, the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
(Defra) has produced a series of ‘evidence investment strategies’, which set out how
Defra ensures that policy development and implementation is well supported by
evidence. Over time the department has experimented with different organisational
structures, systems and processes to improve the quality of the evidence it uses and
to improve the flow of evidence to policy teams and senior decision-makers (Defra
2014; Shaxson 2014; Shaxson et al. 2016).
Finland’s Government Policy Analysis Unit sits in the Office of the Prime
Minister and is responsible for commissioning research and presenting evidence to
inform government decisions on future strategic and economic policies. A linked
organisation, the Strategic Research Council, funds long-term multidisciplinary
research across multiple ministries, to prevent such research from being undertaken
in ministerial ‘silos’ (Cassidy and Tsui 2017b).
5 Conclusions
The demand for evidence in Indonesian policymaking is shaped by the complex

interplay of several factors, but the politics of evidence are slowly changing. Levels
of technical evidence-related skills in both national and subnational governments
are low and inconsistent, and although training in technical (as opposed to adminis-
trative) aspects of policymaking is improving, the heavy bureaucratic requirements
of the RPJMN and RPJMD processes, as well as procurement restrictions, discour-
age an open and innovative approach to acquiring, appraising and using evidence.
However, the increasing demand from civil society for demonstrable progress is
instilling a greater sense of need to use evidence effectively to show how govern-
ment is delivering outcomes for citizens. The international examples above show
that although it is important to learn lessons from others, ultimately Indonesia will
need to develop its own tailored approach to strengthening evidence-informed poli-
cymaking within government.
Training and skills development will continue to be key to ensuring that the new
policy analyst function performs well. For maximum benefit, it should be extended
to the wider network of analysts throughout national and subnational governments
who perform similar roles. While the numbers remain low in the initial phase, for-
mal training could be complemented by a programme of peer-to-peer support. This
would help strengthen the informal relationships that play an important part in
building social capital to find the evidence needed at the time it is needed. But as the
numbers grow, the challenge will be to develop capacity-development processes
that balance the need for consistent levels and types of skills with local-level inno-
vations that respond to local needs for evidence.
Strengthening demand is ultimately as much about strengthening the quality of
the processes through which evidence is sourced, appraised, interpreted and used as
it is about the quality of the evidence itself. This means that developing organisa-
tional processes for improving the use of evidence will help ensure that once trained,
people return to work in organisations that are receptive to the principles of evidence-
informed policymaking. The international examples given above emphasise the
need to think strategically about what evidence is likely to be needed and build
relationships that will deliver that evidence effectively.
To achieve that end, greater collaboration with non-governmental knowledge
producers will be increasingly important in Indonesia, to ensure that evidence
reflects the voices of civil society. Amending procurement regulations to allow gov-
ernment to commission research from a range of organisations would broaden the
range of evidence provided, and encouraging officials involved in policymaking to
attend seminars and conferences where they could engage with these organisations
in person would strengthen relationships and thereby enrich the search for
evidence.
Monitoring and evaluating policy is a notable weakness in Indonesia. While

efforts to improve the consistency and quality of administrative data are under way,
this will not – in itself – strengthen the demand for evidence. Indonesian civil soci-
ety still has a relatively weak voice in policy debates, but it is growing. Strengthening
its calls for holding the government accountable for its promises could be one of the
most effective ways to ensure that policymakers actively seek out evidence and use
it to diagnose problems, reflect on what has been achieved in the past and make
evidence-informed plans for the future.
References
Ademokun, A., Dennis, A., Hayter, E., Richards, C., Runceanu, L.-E., Cassidy, C., Liebnitzky, J.,
Suliman, S., & Kovacs, M. (2016). Evidence-informed policymaking toolkit. Oxford: INASP.
Aspinall, E., & Sukmajati, M. (Eds.). (2016). Electoral dynamics in Indonesia: Money politics,
patronage and clientelism at the grassroots. Singapore: NUS Press.
Bacchi, C. (2012). Introducing the ‘What’s the Problem Represented to be?’ approach. In
A. Bletsas & C. Beasley (Eds.), Engaging with Carol Bacchi: Strategic interventions and
exchanges (pp. 21–24). Adelaide: The University of Adelaide Press.
Badan Kepegawaian Negara. (2017). Computer assisted test. http://cat.bkn.go.id/
Bappenas. (2013). Presentation delivered by the Minister of Bappenas at Musrenbang RPJMD
for West Java province in Bandung, 10 September (Resource Document). http://perpustakaan.
bappenas.go.id/lontar/file?file=digital/138227-%5B_Konten_%5D-Konten%20C9673.ppt.
Blunt, P., Turner, M., & Lindroth, H. (2012). Patronage, service delivery, and social justice in
Indonesia. International Journal of Public Administration, 35(3), 214–220.
BPS [Badan Pusat Statistik]. (2016). Statistik Politik Tahun 2016 (2016 political statistics). Jakarta:
Badan Pusat Statistik.
Broadbent, E. (2012). Politics of research-based evidence in African policy debates: Synthesis of
case study findings. Report. Evidence-based Policy in Development Network. https://www.
odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9118.pdf. Accessed 2 June
2017.
Buehler, M. (2009). The rising importance of personal networks in Indonesian local politics: An
analysis of the district government head elections in South Sulawesi in 2005. In M. Erb &
P. Sulistyanto (Eds.), Deepening democracy in Indonesia (pp. 101–124). Singapore: Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies.
Buehler, M. (2010). Decentralisation and local democracy in Indonesia: The marginalization
of the public sphere. In E. Aspinall & M. Mietzner (Eds.), Problems of democratization in
Indonesia: Elections, institutions and society (pp. 267–285). Singapore: Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies.
Buehler, M. (2013). Married with children. Inside Indonesia 112 (April–June). http://www.insi-
deindonesia.org/feature-editions/married-with-children. Accessed 2 June 2017.
Cassidy, C., & Tsui, J. (2017a). Global evidence policy units Colombia: Sinergia. Jakarta:
Knowledge Sector Initiative. http://www.ksiindonesia.org/en/news/detail/evidence-policy-
unit-in-colombia-sinergia. Accessed 25 May 2017.
Cassidy, C., & Tsui, J. (2017b). Global evidence policy units. Finland: Government Policy
Analysis Unit Politiikka-analyysiyksikkö. Jakarta: Knowledge Sector Initiative. http://www.
ksi-indonesia.org/en/news/detail/evidence-policy-unit-in-finland-the-government-policy-anal-
ysis-unitpolitiikka-analyysiyksikk-. Accessed 25 May 2017.
cal economy of policy-making in Indonesia: Opportunities for improving the demand and use
of knowledge (Resource Document). Overseas Development Institute. http://www.odi.org.uk/
resources/details.asp?id=5985&title=policy-making-politicaleconomy-indonesia-knowledge.
Datta, A. Hendytio, M. K., Perkasa, V., & Basuki, T. (2016). The acquisition of research knowledge
by national-level decision makers in Indonesia (Working Paper 16). Jakarta: Knowledge Sector
Initiative.
Defra [Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs]. (2014). Making the most of our evi-
dence: A strategy for Defra and its network. London: Department of Environment, Food and
Rural Affairs.
Department of Environmental Affairs. (2016). National biodiversity research and evidence strat-
egy (2015–2016): Strategy document. Pretoria: Department of Environmental Affairs.
DPME. (2011). National evaluation policy framework. Pretoria: Department of Planning,
Monitoring and Evaluation. http://www.dpme.gov.za/keyfocusareas/evaluationsSite/
Evaluations/National%20Evaluation%20Policy%20Framework%2011%2011%2025.pdf.
Accessed 18 July 2017.
DPME. (2016). National evaluation plan 2016–2017 to 2018–2019. Pretoria: Department of
Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation. http://www.dpme.gov.za/keyfocusareas/evaluationsSite/
Evaluations/National%20Evaluation%20Plan%202016-17%2016.03.31.pdf. Accessed 18 July
2017.
Farid, H. (2017). Distribution of power through inclusive bureaucracy. KSI interview 31/03/2017.
http://www.ksi-indonesia.org/en/news/detail/hilmar-farid--distribution-of-power-through--in-
clusive-bureaucracy. Accessed 3 June 2017.
Goldman, I., Mathe, J., Jacob, C., Hercules, A., Amisi, M., Buthelezi, T., Narsee, H., Ntakumba,
S., & Sadan, M. (2015). Developing South Africa’s national evaluation policy and system: First
lessons learned. African Evaluation Journal, 3(1), 9.
Government of Ghana. (2017). GIMPA ends INASP’s VakaYiko evidence informed policy mak-
ing toolkit trial. http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/media-center/news/3371-gimpa-ends-
vakayiko-s-evidence-informed-policy-making-toolkit-trial. Accessed 18 July 2017.
Hadiz, V. R., & Dhakidae, D. (2005). Introduction. In V. R. Hadiz & D. Dhakidae (Eds.), Social
science and power in Indonesia (pp. 1–30). Jakarta/Singapore: Equinox Publishing/Institute of
Jones, H., Jones, N., Shaxson, L., & Walker, D. (2012). Knowledge, policy and power in interna-
tional development: A practical guide. Bristol: The Policy Press.
Karetji, P. C. (2010). Overview of the Indonesian knowledge sector. Jakarta: AusAID. Available at:
http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/indo-ks8-overview.pdf. Accessed 10 May
2017.
Kompas Online. (2008). Musrenbang dinilai tidak efektif serap aspirasi (National development
planning consultations ineffective in capturing aspirations). http://nasional.kompas.com/
read/2008/11/25/01372556/musrenbang.dinilai.tidak.efektif.serap.aspirasi. Accessed 4 Apr
2017.
LAN [Lembaga Administrasi Negara]. (2015a). Modul pelatihan analis kebijakan (Policy analyst
training module). Jakarta: Lembaga Administrasi Negara.
LAN [Lembaga Administrasi Negara]. (2015b). Laporan tahunan 2015 (Annual report 2015).
Jakarta: Lembaga Administrasi Negara.
Langer, L., Stewart, R., Erasmus, Y., & de Wet, T. (2015). Walking the last mile on the long road
to evidence-informed development: building capacity to use research evidence. Journal of
Development Effectiveness, 7(4), 1–9.
Mietzner, M. (2010). Indonesia’s direct elections: Empowering the electorate or entrenching the
New Order oligarchy? In E. Aspinall & G. Fealy (Eds.), Indonesia: Soeharto’s new order and
its legacy (pp. 173–190). Canberra: ANU E-Press.
Newman, K., Fisher, C., & Shaxson, L. (2012). Stimulating demand for research evidence: What
role for capacity building? IDS Bulletin, 43(5), 17−24.
Nugroho, H. (2005). The political economy of higher education: The university as an arena for the
struggle for power. In V. R. Hadiz & D. Dhakidae (Eds.), Social science and power in Indonesia
(pp. 143–166). Jakarta/Singapore: Equinox Publishing/Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development]. (2016). Skills matter:
Further results from the survey of adult skills. Paris: OECD Publishing.
PAGSE. (n.d.). Bacon and Eggheads. http://pagse.org/en/breakfasts.htm. Accessed 18 July 2017.
Pellini, A., Angelina, M., & Purnawati, E. (2014). Working politically: A story of change about
the contribution of research evidence to the new village law in Indonesia. Jakarta: Knowledge
Sector Initiative.
Pritchett, L. (2016). The need for a pivot to learning: New data on adult skills from Indonesia.
Research in Improving Systems of Education [RISE] blog, 9 August. http://www.risepro-
gramme.org/content/need-pivot-learning-new-data-adult-skills-indonesia. Accessed 8 June
2017.
Punton, M., Lloyd, R., & Vogel, I. (2016). Insights from the evidence: what works to build capacity
for evidence-informed policy making, for whom, and why? Brighton: ITAD.
Rakhmani, I., Pellini, A., & Nurhidayat, Y. (2017). Linking values and research evidence for policy
advocacy: The journey of the Indonesian Forum for Budget Transparency (Working Paper 19).
Jakarta: Knowledge Sector Initiative.
Shaxson, L. (2014). Investing in Evidence : Lessons from the UK’s Department of Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs (Working Paper 2). Jakarta: Knowledge Sector Initiative.
Shaxson, L., Datta, A., Tshangela, M., & Matomela, B. (2016). Understanding the organisa-
tional context for evidence-informed policy-making. Report. Pretoria/London: Department of
Environmental Affairs/Overseas Development Institute.
Sheppard, J. (2012). Indonesia: Government capacity to assure high quality regulation. Background
report for OECD review of regulatory reform in Indonesia. Paris: OECD Publishing.
market in Indonesia. Jakarta: AusAID. Available at http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/
Documents/indo-ks13-knowledge-to-govt.pdf. Accessed 10 July 2017.
Sherlock, S., & Djani, L. (2015). Update on constraints in the enabling environment to the pro-
vision of knowledge in executive and legislative government. Jakarta: Knowledge Sector
Initiative.
SIMPAN [Sistem Informasi Pendayagunaan Aparatur Negara]. (2017). http://sipan.menpan.go.id/.
Sutmuller, P. M., & Setiono, I. (2011). Diagnostic on evidence-based public policy formulation
under decentralisation. Jakarta: AusAID. Available at http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/
Documents/indo-ks6-decentralisation.pdf. Accessed 9 May 2017.
Tempo Online. (2017, March 3). Tempo beri penghargaan 10 kepala daerah teladan
(Tempo gives awards to 10 influential regional heads). https://nasional.tempo.co/read/
news/2017/03/03/173852419/tempo-beri-penghargaan-10-kepala-daerah-teladan-2017.
Tjiptoherijanto, P. (2014). Reform of the Indonesian civil service: Racing with decentralization
(Working Paper in Economics and Business IV:2). Depok: Faculty of Economics, University
of Indonesia.
Turner, M., Imbaruddin, A., & Sutiyono, W. (2009). Human resource management: The forgotten
dimension of decentralisation in Indonesia. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 45(2),
231−249.
UCT [University of Cape Town]. (n.d.). Evidence-based policy-making and implementation.
http://www.gsdpp.uct.ac.za/gsdpp/courses/evidence_based_policy_making_implementation.
Wasono, A., & Maulana, M. (2018). Critical study on development planning and budgeting in
Indonesia (Working Paper 27). Jakarta: Knowledge Sector Initiative.
Wills, A., Tshangela, M., Shaxson, L., Datta, A., & Matomela, B. (2016). Guidelines and good
practices for evidence-informed policymaking in a government department. Report. Pretoria/
London: Department of Environmental Affairs/Overseas Development Institute.
World Bank. (2009). Support to civil service reform in Indonesia: Report from a programming
mission to Jakarta. Washington, DC/Jakarta: The World Bank.
Wotela, K. (2017). A proposed monitoring and evaluation curriculum based on a model that insti-
tutionalizes monitoring and evaluation. African Evaluation Journal, 5(1), 8 pages. 10/4102/
aej.v5i1.186.
Zhang, D. (2015). Do local governments in Indonesia produce evidence-based policies? Jakarta:
The Australia Indonesia Partnership for Decentralisation/Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade.
Chapter 6
Data Innovation for Policymaking
in Indonesia
Arnaldo Pellini, Diastika Rahwidiati, and George Hodge
1 Introduction
In February 2015, Kenneth Benoit and Kenneth Cukier presented at a public lecture
at the London School of Economics on the impact of big data on social science
research, in which they stated that ‘the ubiquity of big data has the potential to trans-
form the way we approach social science’.
According to the United Nations Global Pulse, the United Nations Secretary-
General’s flagship innovation initiative on big data, ‘the volume of data produced
globally means that 90 per cent of all the data in existence today – back to the inven-
tion of the Phoenician alphabet – has been generated during the past 2 years alone’
(United Nations Global Pulse 2016).
Indeed, growth has been exponential. In 1995 less than 1% of the world’s popu-
lation used the Internet. Today that figure has risen to around 46% (Internet Live
Stats 2017).1 The milestone of 1 billion Internet users was reached in 2005; the
second billion was reached in 2010 and the third in 2014 (Fig. 6.1).
Today more households own a mobile phone than have access to electricity or
clean water (United Nations Global Pulse 2016). This means that more and more
individuals and organisations are at the same time producers, owners and consumers
of data (Ibid.). We are living through a data revolution that offers unprecedented
1
‘Internet users’ is defined as an individual who can access the Internet at home via any device type
and connection (Internet Live Stats 2017).
A. Pellini (*)
D. Rahwidiati · G. Hodge
Pulse Lab Jakarta, Jakarta, Indonesia

Fig. 6.1 Global Internet users (Reproduced from Internet Live Stats 2017)
opportunities to learn about human behaviour, as noted in the United Nations white
paper on ‘Big Data for Development: Challenges & Opportunities’ (United Nations
Global Pulse 2012).
The data revolution has been defined as:
An explosion in the volume of data, speed with which data are produced, the number of
producers of data, the dissemination of data, and the range of things on which there are data,
coming from new technologies such as mobile phones and the Internet of things and from
other sources, such as qualitative data, citizen-generated data, and perceptions data.
(IEAGDRSD 2014)
The data revolution not only has the potential to transform society and social sci-
ence research, as argued by Benoit and Cukier (2015), but also to transform what is
at the core of this book: evidence-informed policymaking processes and systems.
Broadly speaking, policy makers rely on five main types of evidence: (1) statisti-
cal data (e.g. from national statistical offices); (2) administrative data (e.g. from
government sources, such as hospitals and schools); (3) research-based evidence
(e.g. from universities or think-tanks); (4) evidence from citizens (e.g. from feed-
back or complaint systems) and other stakeholders, such as private sector analysis;
and (5) evidence from evaluations conducted by government or non-governmental
institutions (Shaxson 2016).
The remarkable progress in new information technology for collecting and ana-
lysing data is changing the way policy makers can source and use evidence, adding
real-time big data analytics to their evidence toolkits. Data analytics, defined here as
the systematic computational analysis of data, provides relevant, accessible and
timely data to policy makers and civil servants to better inform their choices and
decisions on, for example, extending public services into remote communities or
implementing programmes and policies more efficiently (Stuart et al. 2015).
The scale and size of the datasets that can be processed by big data tools is
unprecedented and cannot be matched by any research sampling technique or cen-
6 Data Innovation for Policymaking in Indonesia 91
sus. A vast amount of metadata can be collected, for example, about the ways citi-
zen move, what they buy, what information they search for online or what they think
about public services. The raw data can then be analysed more quickly and more
cheaply than was the case for traditional research approaches. This is extremely
appealing to governments because it creates new, quicker and cheaper ways to
gather information, identify problems and monitor the progress of public pro-
grammes and policies. The scientific research methods traditionally used to gener-
ate evidence for policy can seem dated.
With the data revolution, the size of the dataset has grown so much that only
astronomical scale measures can be used to capture the volume of data. Scales like
petabytes, exabytes and zettabytes (Benoit and Cukier 2015) are finding their way
into policy parlance. Khoso (2016) estimates that 2.5 exabytes of data are produced
every day. That is the equivalent to 530,000,000 million songs, or the memory stor-
age of 150,000,000 iPhones, or the hard-disk capacity of five million laptops or
90 years’ worth of high-definition videos.
This led Chris Anderson, the former editor-in-chief of Wired magazine, to argue
that with big data we no longer need to understand the causes leading to effects;
instead, correlation is sufficient to derive conclusions and new knowledge. ‘Who
knows why people do what they do? The point is that we can track it, measure it
with great fidelity. The numbers speak for themselves’ (Anderson 2008).
Anderson’s point spurred a vigorous debate. Timmer (2008), for example, argued
that correlations merit a scientist’s attention, but it is the mechanism that explains
these correlations that helps us to generate hypotheses, make predictions and
develop practical applications. Similarly, Tim Harford (2014) wrote in an article
published in the Financial Times that Anderson’s faith in big data is at best an opti-
mistic oversimplification. Harford quoted David Spiegelhalter, Winton Professor of
the Public Understanding of Risk at Cambridge University, who stated that relying
solely on correlations is ‘absolute nonsense’.
The debate rages. What is not under discussion is that the data revolution is
ongoing. It presents great opportunities, as well as numerous technical and legisla-
tive challenges. This means that if governments and policy makers are to use evi-
dence from big data to improve the well-being of citizens and societies, they need
to learn and understand what data analytics (such as descriptive analysis or machine
learning) can and cannot offer, as well as the risks involved with using big data for
public policy and evidence-based policymaking.
1.1 Benefits and Opportunities
Philip Davies (2012) has argued that the objective of evidence-based policymaking
is not to provide the absolute best evidence to policy makers but, more realistically,
to provide policy makers with access to the best available evidence at a given point
in time (see Chap. 1, Sect. 1).
While imperfect information is part of the reality of policymaking, the problem
is that the best available evidence that governments have at their disposal to inform
public policy decisions is often poor, and there is much that governments do not
know, as highlighted in the examples below.
Carr-Hill (2013) estimates that as many as 350 million people worldwide are not
covered by traditional household surveys. This means that there could be as many
as 25% more people living on less than US$ 1.25 a day than the 1.1 billion people
estimated by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) in 2013. According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), official universal primary education enrolment
statistics may overstate children’s school attendance at the appropriate age by about
10% (UNESCO 2010). Infant mortality is another example of the unavailability of
reliable data. More than 100 countries do not have functioning systems to register
births or deaths, meaning that fewer than one in five births occur in countries with
complete civil registration systems. The remainder occur either in countries with
incomplete registries or with no data at all (World Bank and World Health
Organization 2014). Data and knowledge are also lacking about such basic informa-
tion as how many people live in cities; how many girls are married before the age of
18; what percentage of the world’s poor are women; what are the outcomes of
primary-level basic education in sub-Saharan Africa, South-East Asia or Latin
America; how many street children are there worldwide; and how many people in
the world are hungry (Stuart et al. 2015).
The list is long. Without these data it is difficult for governments to be confident
about policy decisions and allocations to state budgets for public programmes and
public services. Policy decisions will always be based on imperfect information, but
data innovation – defined as the use of new or nontraditional data sources and meth-
ods to gain a more nuanced understanding of our complex world – can help to
reduce some of the unknowns in unprecedented ways.
The data revolution is enabling a dramatic expansion in the amount of data that
governments can collect. It is making it cheaper to store and process raw data, so
that their analysis can be translated into evidence for use by policy decision-makers
and government units (United Nations Global Pulse 2016). Data analytics methods
can help to overcome the limitations of survey-based data collection and statistical
analysis (Stuart et al. 2015). Data innovation and the spread of mobile phone tech-
nology are making the political debate more participatory. Such tools provide space
for marginalised groups to become part of the policy discussion by developing a
shared sense of identity or a common platform through which they can articulate
their problems and views on existing policies and programmes (United Nations
Global Pulse 2016). Information and communication technologies have opened new
channels of communication that provide new and cheaper ways for citizens and civil
society groups to generate evidence and establish social networks, play a role in
policy processes and demand greater accountability from policy makers and civil
servants in national and local government (IEAGDRSD 2014).
Visualisation techniques and technology for data can create new ways to synthe-
sise and communicate data analytics, serving as powerful catalysts for group discus-
sion and further scrutiny of data (Bollier 2010). Margetts (2013) maintains that data
innovation offers policy makers a chance to design and implement policies and
programmes that are more citizen-focused and based on better understanding of

citizens’ problems and needs. New information systems can also help to monitor
and quickly respond to feedback or alerts during emergencies, such as floods and
other natural disasters, as well as to easily record citizens’ experience of public
services through social networking platforms.
To sum up, as elaborated at the New Zealand Data Futures Forum (2014a), the
new data environment provides many benefits to governments: competitive advan-
tage through innovation and a world-leading data environment; business opportuni-
ties through new markets and an expanded knowledge sector; better public services
arising from data-driven efficiencies and better targeting; better places to live, work
and play – smart cities and optimal use of natural resources; everyday life trans-
formed through automation, personalised services and informed choices; and
increased transparency, generating greater trust and empowered citizens.
The opportunities are there, but so are perils and challenges.
1.2 Perils and Challenges
Rapid advances in data innovation and information technology are challenging gov-
ernments to find ways to maximise their potential for informing public policy and
minimising risks. For Lips and Mansell (2015), strong, long-term vision and politi-
cal leadership are critical success factors for the mobilisation of human and finan-
cial resources, along with the adoption and use of data-driven innovation and
evidence for policymaking. Leadership is necessary because data innovation
requires governments to invest in both large-scale information systems and institu-
tional capacity within the bureaucracy to manage and utilise these systems.
Data innovation can be disruptive and shift power balances within governments,
which can result in resistance against evidence and reduced uptake of data analytics
in policy development processes. Lipps and Mansell (Ibid.) offer an instructional
example from New Zealand. Since 2006 the government has been committed to
developing new, evidence-based approaches to investing in social policy and service
provision. The Ministry of Social Development championed sharing, integration
and use of social sector data to inform funding decisions and increase the efficiency
of social programmes. In 2011 the Ministry built up its data integration and analyt-
ics capability to better understand which social services have the greatest positive
impact on the most vulnerable communities, in order to redirect service provision to
particular groups. This initiative encountered considerable resistance from social
sector agencies. One reason expressed by government agencies concerned privacy
risks linked to sharing data. Another was linked to the shift in power over policy and
investment decisions for public services implied by mandating the Ministry of
Social Development to collect and analyse the integrated data.
Another example of the disruption that data innovation can bring concerns the
role of national statistics offices. Stuart et al. (2015) argue that the data revolution is
stimulating new demand for vastly improved statistical services, for which national
statistical offices may lack resources and capability. Davies (2017) also highlights
that the data revolution poses formidable challenges for statistical offices because
big data provides far greater opportunities for quantitative analysis than any amount
of statistical modelling. Moreover, Davies points out that data analytics generates an
entirely new type of knowledge: data is captured first and research questions come
later, when vast datasets are mined to search for patterns, trends, correlations or
emergent moods. This new form of knowledge is challenging the traditional role
that national statistics offices have played in providing analysis and evidence to
inform the policy cycle.
These new types of knowledge are not devoid of perils and challenges. Due to the
pace of the data revolution, governments can find themselves struggling to design
an adequate regulatory framework to manage the complexity of the data innovation
landscape. For example, privacy violation through data collection and data person-
alization is an area of concern for governments and the public (Bollier 2010). The
question is how to maximise the benefits of data innovation for policymaking and
for society at large while minimising the risk of misuse of data.
Some governments are beginning to navigate these perils and challenges, in
order to take advantage of the opportunities. The New Zealand Data Futures Forum,
for example, was established in 2013 to initiate a nationwide discussion of these
questions and define the principles that would guide government use of data innova-
tion. The Forum involved representatives from businesses, government, academia
and members of the general public, including community groups. Through research
and consultation over a two-year period, the Forum proposed four guiding p rinciples
to help New Zealand manage data innovation:
• Value: New Zealand should use data to drive economic and social value and cre-
ate a competitive advantage for the nation.
• Inclusion: all members of New Zealand society should have the opportunity to
benefit from data use.
• Trust: transparency and openness should form the foundations on which to build
trust and enhance understanding about what data is held and how data is col-
lected, stored and used.
• Control: individuals should have control over the use of their personal data and
be able to determine the level of privacy they desire, based on improved insight
into how their personal data is processed and used (New Zealand Data Futures
Forum 2014b).
This chapter touches upon both the challenges and opportunities of data innova-
tion for public policy in Indonesia. It seeks to reflect on the lessons generated by
‘data for policy’ pilots at the national and subnational levels implemented by Pulse
Lab Jakarta, the United Nations data innovation lab established in 2012. The chap-
ter asks: What factors enable the uptake of data innovation by policy makers? What
can prevent that uptake? Is data analytics putting policy researchers and statisticians
out of business? The next section turns to Indonesia and describes its rapidly
expanding data ecosystem.
Fig. 6.2 Mobile connectivity by country as of January 2017 (Reproduced from Kemp 2017)
2 Indonesia’s Data Ecosystem
Indonesia is a giant in the digital world. The number of Internet users grew from
two million in 2000 to 55 million in 2012 and reached 132.7 million in 2016, with
an increase of 45 million Internet users in 2016 alone (Kemp 2017). Data from
Internet Live Stats show that in 2016 Indonesia was ranked at number 12 (out of 201
countries), with Internet penetration at 51% of the total population (Ibid.).
By 2013 Indonesia was already amongst the top five countries on Facebook, with
64 million users actively accessing their accounts on a monthly basis (Grazella
2013). In 2017 the number of active Facebook users was estimated at 106 million
(Kemp 2017). Indonesia is the fifth largest country for Twitter use (Sadowski 2017);
Jakarta posts more tweets per day than any other city in the world (Johnson 2013).
Social media and mobile technology are booming. Indonesia ranks number three
in Southeast Asia in terms of mobile connectivity (Fig. 6.2). In 2016 the total num-
ber of unique mobile users was 173.6 million; by 2018 this number is expected to
hit 200 million (Statista 2017). Indonesia has 371.4 million mobile phone subscrip-
tions, representing 142% of the total population (Kemp 2017).
At present the higher estimates shown in Fig. 6.3 suggest that over half the coun-
try is online and has 106 million active social media users, representing 40% of the
population (Kemp 2017).
These figures confirm the point by Das et al. (2016) that Indonesia is making
progress in all four of the ‘disruptive technologies’ that drive the digital revolution:
mobile Internet, cloud computing, Internet of Things and advanced big data analyt-
ics. Indonesia has a great and untapped potential when it comes to data innovation
and data analytics, and the issue of how the country can harness the abundance of
its digital data for socioeconomic development is rapidly emerging. New data
sources could give policy makers near real-time feedback – by assessing public
sentiment, identifying behaviour patterns and providing references for predicting
the effects of policies and programmes. For example, in the case of heavy rains, the
analysis of the tweets in Jakarta is used to alert emergency authorities and provide
them with timely information about floods to inform emergency response as well as
planning flood mitigation interventions (Floodtags 2017).
Fig. 6.3 Social media use in Indonesia as of January 2017 (Reproduced from Kemp 2017)
Data alone are not information and cannot inform decisions. It is the analysis of
data that generates the information and evidence upon which policy makers can act.
The quality of data is critical for the type of analysis that can be conducted, and
therefore the quality of the evidence generated from data analytics. The Government
has collected vast datasets over the years (e.g. in the areas of social welfare, health
and education), which are useful for calibrating big datasets owned by the private
sector, by, for example, weighting big data insights related to certain social cohorts
based on government data on their prevalence in the broader population. But ques-
tions have been raised concerning the timeliness of these data, as well as their reli-
ability, validity and interoperability. In addition, specific to Indonesia’s complex
institutional structure, existing data management systems are not well integrated,
either within or between sectors or between national and subnational governments.
The One Data Indonesia (Satu Data Indonesia) initiative being implemented by the
Office of the President’s Staff (Kantor Staf Presiden, KSP) and the Ministry for
National Development Planning/National Development Planning Agency
(Kementerian Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional/Badan Perencanaan
Pembangunan Nasional – Bappenas) is addressing these issues.
Regulatory challenges must also be overcome to maximise the opportunities for
producing timely, good-quality evidence from data analytics. One issue for the
Government of Indonesia is that many, if not most, of the big datasets are owned by
private enterprise. Social networking organisations, telecommunications compa-
nies, online marketplaces and retailers of fast-moving consumer goods own datas-
ets from which they can analyse economic and social trends in a more nuanced
manner than that afforded by national statistics. To access these datasets, the
Government must either regulate, purchase or partner – each option creates specific
regulatory challenges. In addition, while one part of government may have access
to a particular dataset, other applications of the data related to social, environmen-
tal or economic policy may be unexploited due to lack of coordination amongst
government agencies.
Examples of applications of these new datasets to policy issues by the Government
of Indonesia are beginning to emerge, such as statistical reports by the Ministry of
Tourism on tourism arrivals, based on data from mobile telecommunications net-
works (Netralnews 2017). Similar examples are explored further in the next section.
The important point here is to highlight that these initiatives are exploratory in
nature, but are generating insights into the ‘social life of data’ within public
institutions.
In exploring the politics of data innovation in the policy cycle, it is important to
return to the issues of quality, validity and integration of government statistics.
These challenges, in part driven by the complexity of Indonesia’s institutional
arrangements, have meant that the data collected are often not used effectively
across the policy cycle. Those statistics collected tend to be used for the planning
and implementation stages, but not to adjust policies or respond to emerging issues.
This, in turn, is connected to the fact that many existing systems do not have effec-
tive mechanisms for monitoring the impact of policy actions.
The policy cycle in Indonesia (and elsewhere) is a simplification of the reality of
policymaking. The rational model involves a logical progression from defining the
issue, setting priorities and analysing options to policy implementation and finally,
evaluation. The reality is far more complex. Cohen et al. (1972) developed a ‘gar-
bage can model of organisational choice’, which conceives of organised anarchies,
characterised by problematic preferences, unclear technology and fluid participa-
tion. The model views a ‘choice opportunity’ as a ‘garbage can’ into which various
kinds of problems and solutions are dumped by participants as they are generated.
In such an environment, insights gleaned from data analytics sit alongside other
forms of evidence, supporting or undermining competing policy agendas. Policy
development processes in some Indonesian institutions more closely resemble the
rational model, but others resemble the garbage can model. Either way, this overtly
political space in Indonesia has resulted in some big data tools being used as politi-
cal tools to advance public administration reform agendas, alongside their roles as
generators of evidence. Some anecdotal evidence also suggests that big data tools
have been used to respond to emerging issues, but to date no evidence is available
to demonstrate that the tools are being used for policy or programme adjustment
during implementation. This remains a missed opportunity.
As information systems improve, it will be possible to empower front-line staff
to combine their local knowledge with evidence derived from data and to act on
these insights. This will have profound implications for power relations within the
state, enabling better tailoring and adaptation of policies and programmes to prob-
lems and needs. As economic competitiveness is closely linked to state effective-
ness, it is imperative that the Government of Indonesia invest political and financial
capital in improved knowledge production, which can then inform policy. This
includes, but is not limited to, evidence from data innovation. Some progress has
been made in this regard, with the centralisation of statistics production at the
National Bureau of Statistics and experimentation by line ministries with big data
tools. But further progress would reap rewards in policy areas ranging from agricul-
ture and trade to social protection, health services and beyond.
The next section describes experience with some of these processes at Pulse Lab
Jakarta, the data innovation lab jointly established by the Government of Indonesia
and the United Nations to promote data innovation for public policy in Indonesia.
3 P
ulse Lab Jakarta: Experimenting and Learning
About Data Innovation for Public Policy
Pulse Lab Jakarta is part of ‘Global Pulse’, the flagship United Nations innovation
initiative on big data and data revolution for sustainable development. The initiative
was launched in 2010, driven by two important factors. The first was the decision by
then-United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to establish a ‘Global Impact
and Vulnerability Alert System’. This step was taken in response to member coun-
tries’ request to track, in real-time, the needs of vulnerable populations in the wake
of the 2008 global economic crisis and the global food price crisis that followed
(United Nations Global Pulse 2015). A second driver was the recognition that big
data offer opportunities to gain better understanding of changes in human well-
being and obtain real-time feedback on how well policy responses or development
programmes are working (United Nations Global Pulse 2017). More recently, the
2016 adoption by UN member nations of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals
provided an additional imperative for the United Nations to embrace the data revo-
lution. These goals (and their 169 targets) set an ambitious human development
agenda to be reached by 2030. One of the challenges was how to track progress
against these goals and their targets and indicators, a challenge that data innovation
can help to address (United Nations 2017).
The vision underpinning the United Nations Global Pulse is that of a future in
which big data is harnessed safely and responsibly as a public good. The objectives are
to (i) promote awareness of the opportunities afforded by big data; (ii) forge public-
private partnerships for data, tools and expertise; (iii) conduct joint research projects to
evaluate the potential of new methodologies; (iv) build innovative tools for real-time
monitoring; and (v) drive adoption of new approaches across the public sector (Ibid.).
Activities undertaken through the United Nations Global Pulse initiative are
clustered under five sectors (food and agriculture, economic well-being, climate and
resilience, humanitarian action and public health) and four cross-cutting themes:
data privacy and data protection, gender, real-time evaluation and the Sustainable
Development Goals agenda (Ibid.).
In 2012, following the annual summit of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations − where the United Nations Secretary-General and the President of
Indonesia pledged their commitment to creating an innovation centre of excellence
in the region − Pulse Lab Jakarta was officially opened. It was the first United
Nations Global Pulse initiative office to be opened outside United Nations headquar-
ters in New York; in 2014 a second regional office was opened in Kampala, Uganda.
3.1 Pulse Lab Jakarta
Pulse Lab Jakarta is a partnership between the United Nations, through United
Nations Global Pulse, and the Government of Indonesia, through Bappenas. The
overarching objective is to access and use high-quality, real-time ‘big data’ to
inform policymaking, planning and budgeting, as well as to develop the capacity

and capabilities of government agencies, including selected subnational govern-
ments, in the process. Pulse Lab Jakarta’s activities are overseen by a steering com-
mittee composed of representatives of the Government of Indonesia and the United
Nations in Indonesia, which provide overall guidance and strategic direction to the
work of the Lab (Pulse Lab Jakarta 2016a).
The projects and prototypes developed by Pulse Lab Jakarta are guided by a two-
track strategy. The first is an ‘innovation driver track’, where the design and imple-
mentation of research projects through the Lab provides governments across Asia
and the Pacific Islands, United Nations agencies and development partners with
access to data products, toolkits, platforms and expertise to strengthen and improve
data-driven policy decisions. The second is an ‘ecosystem catalyst track’, focused
on collaboration with regional governments to develop regulatory frameworks and
technical standards that address data sharing and privacy protection challenges and
provide public sector organisations with policy guidance and technical assistance to
strengthen their capability for integrating real-time evidence from data analytics
into their decisions (Pulse Lab Jakarta 2016b).
In August 2014 Pulse Lab Jakarta received funding from the Australia-Indonesia
Partnership for Decentralisation to test ways to improve service delivery at the sub-
national level through more effective feedback loops between citizens and govern-
ments. This funding continued in 2015, when Pulse Lab Jakarta signed a partnership
agreement with the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy: The
Knowledge Sector Initiative to (1) equip government agencies with tools to generate
and analyse data in real time in order to provide timely responses, engage effec-
tively with citizens, evaluate policy effectiveness and better address the develop-
ment challenges facing Indonesia; (2) demonstrate that adopting innovative IT-based
methods leads to improved development outcomes, as measured by the govern-
ment’s own indicators; and (3) build partnerships across the technology and private
sectors, civil society and government that utilise each partners’ comparative advan-
tage to raise productivity amongst the poor (Ibid).
The following section shows how these objectives are being pursued and the
approach that Pulse Lab Jakarta has adopted to carry out its activities.
3.1.1 Pulse Lab Jakarta: Approaching Development Sensibly
At the inception of the Lab, much of its activities were supply-driven, in that the
team would identify potentially useful datasets and establish proof of concepts for
their application to policy issues. After publication of the results, if a partner were
interested, the Lab would transform the data products into data tools and embed
them within the partner’s information systems.
This has evolved to a situation where the starting point is more often client
demand for solutions to policy and delivery problems. Initial discussions with the
partner involve an assessment of the nature of the problem(s) and the appetite for
solving it together, through joint analysis, co-design and sharing of resources, as
well as a discussion about the various possible solutions – some of which may not
involve or require data innovation. This initial stage helps to clarify whether Pulse
Lab Jakarta is best placed to address the partners’ problems and whether identifying
a solution falls within the Lab’s areas of expertise.
After defining the problem(s), the Lab team and the partner follow an ‘agile’
development process, which can involve exploratory data analysis and user research
to better explore the problem, its drivers and opportunities; design workshops with
the partner and stakeholders; building and testing data tools based on the evidence
and learning along the way; and revisiting the problem as it evolves, to re-think and
revise the response.
The process, which starts from the problem(s) the partner(s) wants to solve,
involves translation into real-world terms of the suggestions made by proponents of
‘problem-driven iterative adaptation’ (PDIA), discussed in greater depth in Chap. 8.
When presenting the PDIA, Andrews et al. (2012, 2017) suggest a focus on solving
local problems that are locally owned and are debated, defined and refined by local
people in an ongoing process. Further, they suggest working through local conve-
ners who mobilise all stakeholders to tackle common problems and introduce rele-
vant changes; avoid the introduction or reproduction of ‘expert’ solutions considered
‘best practices’; and replace predetermined linear processes involving strict moni-
toring and compliance systems with design and implementation through rapid
cycles of planning, action and reflection. Last but not least they urge: learn through-
out the process.
Over the last 4 years, Pulse Lab Jakarta has designed and implemented a number
of prototypes and pilots that began as research projects to explore the use of big data-
sets for policy or at a client’s request. For example, ‘Haze Gazer’ is a crisis analysis
and visualisation tool that enhances disaster management responses by providing
analytics of real-time data on fire/haze hotspots. A second, more client-driven, exam-
ple is the work undertaken with the Indonesia Infrastructure Initiative, for which
Pulse Lab Jakarta tested ways to crowdsource the monitoring of p rovincial road
infrastructure projects in order to better target physical inspection by engineers.
The next section highlights two specific projects with explicit links between data
and policymaking and the learning they provided on data for policy processes at the
national and subnational levels.
3.2 National Citizen Feedback Dashboard
The first iteration of the National Citizen Feedback Dashboard was developed with
the Government of Nusa Tenggara Barat Province, which through its young and
progressive governor, Muhammad Zainul Majdi, already had a functioning SMS-
based system for gathering citizen feedback on public services from across the
province. It became clear that while the SMS-based system was gathering substan-
tial data in the form of complaints, little analysis of this metadata was taking place.
After consultations, and with the endorsement of the head of the Regional
Development Planning Agency (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan
Daerah – Bappeda), Pulse Lab Jakarta proceeded to design and develop a citizen
feedback dashboard that processed, analysed and visualised data coming from the
SMS-based system, as well as data on complaints captured by public discourse on
Twitter in the Nusa Tenggara Barat Province.
Based on the dashboard developed with the Nusa Tenggara Barat local govern-
ment, the Pulse Lab Jakarta team worked with LAPOR!, the national citizen feed-
back platform, which at the time was based at the Office of the President’s Staff
(Kantor Staf Presiden – KSP). A national citizen feedback dashboard was devel-
oped to process, analyse and visualise data from LAPOR! and social media, notably
Twitter. Both dashboards captured trends in complaints, as well as geographic com-
plaint hotspots, which complemented the system’s case-by-case administration.
KSP integrated the dashboard into the LAPOR! public website, and LAPOR!
staff have confirmed that the aggregated visualisation of citizen complaints pro-
vided by the dashboard is useful for determining key issues and problems prevalent
in a given area prior to a field visit. The analysis also complements reports submit-
ted by line ministries as part of the day-to-day business of government. The tool has
been used as an example of the potential of data analytics, as part of the Jokowi
Administration’s efforts to advance public sector reform.
The merits of such a dashboard include short-term results such as enabling
decision-makers to obtain insight into public opinion and perceptions and offering
a snapshot of trending topics and hotspots across Indonesia. Evidence of these
short-term results is already available. In the medium term, using the dashboard
enables officials to process citizens’ feedback at low cost and at scale, as well as to
be more responsive to citizens’ needs by prioritising trending issues. Feedback from
the Office of the President’s Staff (Kantor Staf Presiden – KSP) indicates this to be
the case. This analysis can then be complemented with triangulation and validation,
using social science research methods and techniques to gain a deeper u nderstanding
of the reasons underlying citizen sentiments and needs. The long-term results could
include strengthened governance, such as enhancing accountability and helping
constituents understand how their feedback is processed. It is too soon to tell
whether this will be the case.
This case study demonstrates the importance of political commitment to inte-
grating data tools into public sector information systems, as well as the significance
of in-house resources and capacity for managing and further developing the tool.
3.2.1 Malaria Case Rapid Reporting
In 2015 Pulse Lab Jakarta provided a small grant (approximately US$5,500) to the
Malaria Centre in South Halmahera District of North Maluku Province to conduct a
2-month project on malaria case reporting (Lapor Cepat Kasus Malaria – LaCaK
Malaria). This was one of Pulse Lab Jakarta’s series of four data innovation mini-
grants given to ‘catalyse innovation in collecting, analysing and visualising data that
will help the Government of Indonesia in providing more effective services to its
citizens’. The funds were to be used to ‘produce a workable prototype that can be
scaled after testing’.
Malaria is endemic across the Maluku Islands. In South Halmahera District, the
traditional system of compiling reports – by hand, from front-line health centres
delivered monthly in hard copy to the district-based Malaria Centre – was consid-
ered at best inefficient and at times ineffective. The South Halmahera Malaria Centre,
part of the district government, was keen to champion the target of making North
Maluku Province malaria-free by 2019, in line with Ministry of Health objectives.
The Malaria Centre proposed to develop a cell phone-based malaria reporting
system using an unstructured service supplementary data menu browser. Following
the two-month grant period, the result was a reporting system that captures data
from nine distinct fields (patient name, date of examination, test results, etc.) for
malaria patients, as well as nine distinct fields on medicine stocks. Currently, 30 of
32 front-line health clinics in South Halmahera routinely report through LaCaK
Malaria. The other two districts are in locations with poor cell phone coverage.
The initiative encouraged district governments to adopt regulatory measures to
ensure that LaCaK Malaria is incorporated as a routine reporting mechanism. Rapid
reporting and aggregation of data was facilitated by cross-checking malaria diagno-
ses. LaCaK Malaria also allowed South Halmahera’s Malaria Centre to better monitor
malaria and related malaria stocks and to promote quicker action to combat its spread.
The Malaria Centre achieved a significant result for ensuring the sustainability of
LaCaK Malaria by successfully advocating for passage of a regional regulation in
late 2015 to ensure that LaCaK Malaria is fully funded under the South Halmahera
Malaria Centre’s budget, provided from regional government funds through an
annual allocation of IDR 100 million (US$ 7,500),2 which increases the Centre’s
overall annual budget from IDR 400 million (US$ 30,000) to IDR 500 million (US$
37,500). The Centre achieved this budget allocation following requests to, and sus-
tained engagement with, both Bappeda and the district health department following
the initial successful testing of the system.
LaCak Malaria has proven to be a popular and cost-effective means to improve
malaria reporting and monitoring. In this instance, the local champion was the key
to the success, by mobilising resources and developing capacity through trial and
error (this iteration of the monitoring system was informed by learning from the
Centre’s previous, unsuccessful, reform efforts). Policy and technology uptake
beyond the individual champions or units represents a significant challenge. Lack of
interest in any initiative that does not originate from a central ministry is often cited
as a barrier to uptake, as is lack of access to appropriate data sources that can feed
into analytical dashboards on a regular basis.
3.3 Learning from Experimentation
Reflecting on Pulse Lab Jakarta’s experience to date, Usher and Rahwidiati (2017)
write: ‘When Pulse Lab Jakarta started out in late 2012, we were pretty much the
only big data shop in town. But 5 years later we are surrounded by a network of
USD 1 = IDR 13,317 Google exchange rate on 24 May 2017.

2
policy-makers, data scientists and entrepreneurs, keen to use the affordances of the
data revolution for public good’. So, what key lessons about Indonesia’s data eco-
system and data innovation for policy initiatives have emerged from the work of
Pulse Lab Jakarta over the last four years?
Government organisations’ capability to make use of new data and data tools
depends on the capacity of the organisations’ staff, internal and external rules and
regulations and the capacity and intent of the organisation to invest and expand
those capabilities. This chapter has shown that the amount of data that the govern-
ment could access is growing exponentially. In harnessing the full power of these
data, however, significant challenges remain in relation to the capacity of policy
makers and civil servants to develop and apply the data tools, knowledge about the
kind of evidence and information that data analytics can and cannot offer and the
complementarity between data analytics and other sources of evidence.
Ongoing government-led initiatives are seeking to improve access to and sharing
of data. For example, the One Data Indonesia (Satu Data Indonesia)3 initiative
driven by the Office of the President’s Staff (Kantor Staf Presiden – KSP) and
Bappenas is testing ways to compile data from various ministries and make them
available not only to government agencies but also to research organisations, think-
tanks and the general public. These are promising steps, but challenges remain due
to the legacy of complex rules and regulations around data governance.
Indonesia’s enabling environment for the use of data in policy is evolving rap-
idly. Key pieces of legislation are being developed or revised to establish a more
favourable environment for accessing data. Examples include laws on national
development planning (Law No. 25/2004), village governance and development
(Law No. 6/2014), social protection (Laws No. 40/2004 and 24/2011), population
administration (Law No. 23/2006), public service (Law No. 25/2009), regional
autonomy (Laws No. 32 and 33/2001) and freedom of information (Law No.
14/2008).
Big data analytics provide significant opportunities for informing policy, but
alone are not sufficient to inform policy decisions. Data analytics can provide great
insights on correlation, but traditional research and analysis is still necessary to
understand, for example, the background and reason for trends captured through
data analytics.
The data revolution is not only about big data. The analysis of small data can also
make a difference in terms of policy. The experience from the Malaria Centre in
South Halmahera shows that data innovation does not always require the most
advanced technologies, sophisticated equipment or large budgets. Appropriate, and
familiar, technologies can help to improve public services and introduce innovation
under the leadership of local-level civil servants to address specific locally defined
problems. As is often the case, leadership at the top has been shown to be a critical
component for the success of data tools in Indonesia’s public sector.
Regarding approaches to testing solutions for data-to-policy problems, the expe-
rience of Pulse Lab Jakarta demonstrates the power of networks. The approach
adopted by Pulse Lab Jakarta was to establish strong partnerships with local players
Available at http://data.go.id/
3
on data products to promote the uptake of data analytics and contribute to policy
change. This network approach also helped to build relationships with government
officials at the national and subnational levels, through local partners.
Policy researchers and data analysts face similar challenges in terms of seeing
the results of their work being used by policy makers. Testing ways to bring more
data innovation into policy requires a good understanding of the context in which
policy makers and civil servants operate and the problems they face or want to
solve. Political economy analysis, problem identification and prioritisation and
stakeholder mapping can ensure relevance and help to reduce the risk of rushing
into solutions or policy recommendations that are technically sound but politically
unfeasible.
The approach adopted by Pulse Lab Jakarta – to identify problems and test data
for policy solutions – took some time to consolidate. The main challenge was famil-
iarising the stakeholders and governance partners with an approach that is not lin-
ear, is open to failure and tries to start from clear needs rather than solutions. The
methods are evolving and showing that an iterative and adaptive approach to devel-
oping data-driven solutions, prioritising learning throughout, is also gaining ground
in policy circles (Usher and Rahwidiati 2017).
4 Conclusions
In a 2014 article published in the Financial Times, entitled ‘Big data: are we making
a big mistake?’, Tim Harford was cautious about touting the opportunities provided
by big data: ‘Big data do not solve the problem that has obsessed statisticians and
scientists for centuries: the problem of insight, of inferring what is going on, and
figuring out how we might intervene to change a system for the better’. As high-
lighted by the Royal Society (2017), data analytics, specifically the branch of
machine learning, has issues of interpretability and validity, linked to opacity in the
way machine learning systems reach conclusions, due to their inability to identify
cause-effect relationships. At the end of the day, Harford quotes Professor David
Hand of Imperial College London: ‘Nobody wants data. What people want are
answers’.
This chapter discussed the use of data analytics as a source of evidence for
policy decisions, describing the data ecosystem in Indonesia and existing opportu-
nities and perils for using data innovations in policymaking. Data analytics can
certainly provide insights to policy makers, which they can then choose to use to
inform policy decisions. Data innovation is a new source of evidence, in addition
to traditional sources of insights such as research-based evidence, evaluation,
administrative data and citizen knowledge (Shaxson 2016). The extent to which all
these different types of evidence are demanded and used to inform policy decisions
is an indicator of the strength of a country’s evidence-based policy processes. The

experience of Pulse Lab Jakarta demonstrates that several factors determine
whether policy makers take into consideration the recommendations that emerge
from data analytics. Some of these factors are technical, such as the quality of data
analytics or the clarity of the policy recommendations. Other factors are political,
such as the political implications of what the evidence suggests. The enabling envi-
ronment of rules, regulations and capabilities that enable the production, demand
and use of data analytics for policy decisions influences both the technical and
political factors.
There are clear similarities in the ways that traditional forms of evidence and
data analytics integrate into the policy process. In both cases, the likelihood of
informing policy lies in strong analytical methods, good storytelling, a good under-
standing of the policy context and a clear policy problem, knowledge of the poli-
cymaking process to identify entry points and links with networks of actors who
can help to synthesise or channel the evidence to policy makers (Young and
Mendizabal 2009). The uptake of both research-based evidence and data analytics
by policy makers is determined by similar contextual factors, such as the degree of
leadership and authority to affect policy change and demand and use evidence;
acceptance (the extent to which those who will be affected by the policy change
accept the need for change and use evidence to achieve it); and ability, defined as
the availability of time, funds, skills, regulations and the like to achieve policy
change (Andrews et al. 2015).
Big data analytics, and data innovation more broadly, generate new types of evi-
dence that complements more traditional forms of research. Case studies from Pulse
Lab Jakarta suggest that to truly harness the data revolution, efforts to gain insights
from new data sources should move toward exploring how these insights can be
used in conjunction with existing bodies of research, instead of seeking to replace
them. The insights gleaned from correlation still require validation and an analysis
of causation. Big data analysis still requires a solid grounding in statistics. The
added value of data analytics is that it allows a much speedier analysis of policy
strategy and directions, and it can develop rapid feedback loops that allow, almost
in real-time, changes to policy implementation without the need to wait for the
results of the next census. While making use of the power of the data revolution may
require changes in the skill set of statisticians and social science researchers (Benoit
and Cukier 2015), it is the combined collaborative effort of expertise from multiple
domains that will most likely yield fresh, valuable insights for policy makers.
Data innovation offers a unique opportunity to the Government of Indonesia to
strengthen and expand the use of evidence to make better policy decisions on, for
example, how to organise service delivery or empower citizens to have a say in poli-
cies that influence their lives. In conjunction with other types of evidence it pro-
vides, data innovation can help to better understand the problems people face and
expand the options for improving solutions though policies and programmes.
References
Anderson, C. (2008). The end of theory: The data deluge makes the scientific method obsolete.
Science. https://www.wired.com/2008/06/pb-theory/. Accessed 10 Apr 2017.
Andrews, M., Pritchett, L., & Woolcock, M. (2012). Escaping capability traps through problem-
driven iterative adaptation (PDIA) (CGD Working Paper 299). Washington, DC: Center for
Global Development. http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1426292. Accessed 25
Mar 2017.
Andrews, M., Pritchett, L., & Woolcock, M. (2015). Doing problem-driven work (CID Working
Paper 307). Boston: Center for International Development, Harvard University. https://bsc.cid.
harvard.edu/files/bsc/files/doing_problem_driven_work_wp_307.pdf. Accessed 16 Apr 2017.
Andrews, M., Pritchett, L., & Woolcock, M. (2017). Building state capability. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Benoit, K., & Cukier, K. (2015). The challenge of big data for the social sciences. Public Lecture.
London School of Economics. http://goo.gl/Rmi56P. Accessed 12 Apr 2017.
Bollier, D. (2010). The promise and peril of big data. Washington, DC: The Aspen Institute. https://
www.emc.com/collateral/analyst-reports/10334-ar-promise-peril-of-big-data.pdf. Accessed 19
Apr 2017.
Carr-Hill, R. (2013). Missing millions and measuring development progress. World Development,
46, 30–44.
Cohen, M., March, J., & Olsen, J. (1972). A garbage can model of organisational choice.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 17(1), 1–25.
Das, K., Gryseels, M., Sudhir, P., & Tan, K. T. (2016). Unlocking Indonesia’s digital opportu-
nity. Jakarta: McKinsey Indonesia Office. http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey%20
Offices/Indonesia/PDF/Unlocking-Indonesias-digital-opportunity.ashx. Accessed 20 Nov
2016.
National Institute Economic Review, 219, 41–52.
Davies, W. (2017, January 19). How statistics lost their power – And why we should fear what
comes next. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/19/crisis-of-statis-
tics-big-data-democracy. Accessed 18 Apr 2017.
Floodtags. (2017). Real-time flood mapping on basis of twitter and DEM. Floodtags. http://flood-
tags.com.webhosting109.transurl.nl/blog/2015/10/02/twitter-used-to-crete-real-time-flood-
maps. Accessed 18 Apr 2017.
Grazella, M. (2013). Facebook has 64m active Indonesian users. The Jakarta Post, June 18. http://
www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/06/18/facebook-has-64m-active-indonesian-users.html.
Accessed 22 April 2017.
Harford, T. (2014, March 28). Big data: Are we making a big mistake? The Financial Times.
https://www.ft.com/content/21a6e7d8-b479-11e3-a09a-00144feabdc0. Accessed 18 Apr 2017.
IEAGDRSD [Independent Expert Advisory Group on a Data Revolution for Sustainable
Development]. (2014). A world that counts: Mobilizing the data revolution for sustainable
development. New York: United Nations. http://www.undatarevolution.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/11/A-World-That-Counts.pdf. Accessed 26 Mar 2017.
Internet Live Stats. (2017). http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/. Accessed 26 Apr
2017.
Johnson, P. (2013). Six Twitter statistics that you may not know. ITWorld. http://www.itworld.
com/article/2833036/big-data/6-twitter-statistics-that-you-may-not-know.html. Accessed 22
Apr 2017.
Kemp, S. (2017). Digital in Southeast Asia in 2017: Regional overview. We Are Social Blog.
https://wearesocial.com/blog/2017/02/digital-southeast-asia-2017. Accessed 18 Apr 2017.
Khoso, M. (2016). How much data is produced every day? Northeastern University Level blog.
http://www.northeastern.edu/levelblog/2016/05/13/how-much-data-produced-every-day/.
Lips, M., & Mansell, J. (2015). Lessons from the New Zealand Data Futures Forum: How
to unlock the value of data-driven innovation and new ‘evidence’ in policy-making
(Working Paper 5). Jakarta: Knowledge Sector Initiative. http://www.ksi-indonesia.org/
files/1447136024$1$6A28V8B$.pdf. Accessed 2 Apr 2017.
Margetts, H. (2013). The promises and threats of big data for public policy-making. The Policy
and Internet Blog October 28. http://blogs.oii.ox.ac.uk/policy/promises-threats-big-data-for-
public-policy-making/. Accessed 28 Apr 2017.
Netralnews. (2017). Indonesia’s move to count on mobile positioning data lauded by UN world tour-
ism. Netralnews. http://www.en.netralnews.com/news/culture/read/3093/indonesia...s.move.
to.count.on.mobile.positioning.data.lauded.by.un.world.tourism. Accessed 25 Apr 2017.
New Zealand Data Futures Forum. (2014a). New Zealand’s data future. https://www.nzdatafu-
tures.org.nz/discussion-documents. Accessed 10 Apr 2017.
New Zealand Data Futures Forum. (2014b). Navigating the data future: Four guiding principles.
https://www.nzdatafutures.org.nz/discussion-documents. Accessed 10 Apr 2017.
OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development]. (2013). Development co-
operation report. Paris: OECD. http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/
development/development-co-operation-report-2013/numbers-of-people-living-under-usd-
1-25-per-day-1990-2010_dcr-2013-graph6-en#page1. Accessed 25 Apr 2017.
Pulse Lab Jakarta. (2016a). Six monthly report January–June 2016. Jakarta: United Nations.
Pulse Lab Jakarta. (2016b). Annual report. Jakarta: United Nations.
Royal Society. (2017). Machine learning. https://royalsociety.org/topics-policy/projects/machine-
learning. Accessed 2 May 2017.
Sadowski, M. (2017). Social media statistics for Indonesia. Social Memos. http://socialmemos.
com/social-media-statistics-for-indonesia. Accessed 23 Apr 2017.
Shaxson, L. (2016). Lessons for building and managing an evidence base for policy (Working
Paper 10). Jakarta: Knowledge Sector Initiative. http://www.ksi-indonesia.org/en/news/detail/
lessons-for-building-and-managing-an-evidence-base-for-policy. Accessed 5 Apr 2017.
Statista. (2017). Number of mobile phone users in Indonesia from 2013 to 2019. Statista. http://
www.statista.com/statistics/274659/forecast-of-mobile-phone-users-in-indonesia/. Accessed
20 Apr 2017.
Stuart, E., Samman, E. Avis, W., & Berliner, T. (2015). The data revolution: Finding the miss-
ing millions. Report. London: Overseas Development Institute. https://www.odi.org/
publications/9476-data-revolution-finding-missing-millions. Accessed 10 Apr 2017.
Timmer, J. (2008). Why the cloud cannot obscure the scientific method. Ars Technica, June 25.
https://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2008/06/why-the-cloud-cannot-obscure-the-scientific-
method/. Accessed 12 Apr 2017.
UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization]. (2010). Education
for all monitoring report: Reaching the marginalised. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
United Nations. (2017). Sustainable development goals. http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelop-
ment/sustainable-development-goals. Accessed 25 Mar 2017.
United Nations Global Pulse. (2012). Big data for development: Challenges & opportunities.
New York: United Nations Global Pulse. http://www.unglobalpulse.org/sites/default/files/
BigDataforDevelopment-UNGlobalPulseJune2012.pdf. Accessed 5 Apr 2017.
United Nations Global Pulse. (2015). Global pulse annual report. New York: United Nations.
http://unglobalpulse.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Pulse%202015%20Annual%20Report_
final%20spreads.pdf. Accessed 4 Apr 2017.
United Nations Global Pulse. (2016). Integrating big data into the monitoring and evaluation of
development programmes. New York: United Nations Global Pulse. http://unglobalpulse.org/
sites/default/files/IntegratingBigData_intoMEDP_web_UNGP.pdf. Accessed 18 Apr 2017.
United Nations Global Pulse. (2017). United Nations global pulse. New York: United Nations.
http://www.unglobalpulse.org/about-new. Accessed 28 Mar 2017.
Usher, D., & Rahwidiati, D. (2017, March 10). Navigating Indonesia’s data innovation ecosystem:
A reflection. Nesta Blogs. http://www.nesta.org.uk/blog/navigating-indonesias-data-innova-
tion-ecosystem-reflection. Accessed 12 Mar 2017.
World Bank and World Health Organization. (2014). Global civil registration and vital statistics:
Scaling up investment plan 2015–2024. World Bank: Washington, DC.
Young, J., & Mendizabal, E. (2009). Helping researchers become policy entrepreneurs (Briefing
Paper 53). London: Overseas Development Institute. https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/
odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/1730.pdf. Accessed 20 April 2017.
Part III
The Enabling Environment for Evidence-
Informed Policymaking
Chapter 7
Reforming the Enabling Environment
for Evidence-Informed Policymaking
Budiati Prasetiamartati, Fred Carden, and Sugiyanto
1 Introduction
This chapter starts from the premise that addressing the institutions of the knowl-
edge sector and the rules that guide its development is key to the changes needed for
a robust twenty-first-century economy. These institutions can either inhibit or foster
the development of strong evidence and capacity for use in policymaking. In a study
for the World Bank on how to move to high-income country status, Agenor et al.
(2012) make the case that three crucial issues must be addressed: (1) access to
advanced infrastructure (high-speed communications and information infrastruc-
ture), (2) enforcement of property rights and (3) labour market reform. To deliver on
these issues, Indonesia needs a strong education system to build a population capa-
ble of developing an economy and creating the infrastructure for an information-
based economy (to develop e-commerce). As noted by respected Indonesian
economist Simanjuntak, Indonesia lags behind in both areas (Jakarta Post 2015), as
was also highlighted in previous chapters.
The web of rules and regulations that surround a system can make it harder or
easier to move ahead on these issues. As argued in this book and in earlier studies –
such as Karetji (2010), Sherlock (2010), AusAID (2012) and Sherlock and Djani
(2015) – the rules and regulations surrounding the creation and transmission of
knowledge for informing policy mitigate against progress. They hamper researchers
B. Prasetiamartati (*) · Sugiyanto

Jakarta, Indonesia
F. Carden

by creating conditions at universities that discourage research through a lack of both

career and financial incentives and by not making funds available to researchers for
undertaking the fundamental research that undergirds innovation. Moreover, rules
and regulations hamper decision makers from using evidence, through strictures on
how the government commissions and rewards research generation. These restric-
tions so limit the research that can be commissioned from Indonesian researchers
that donors have become the de facto policy research unit for government. As noted
by Eko Prasojo, former deputy minister of Bureaucratic Reform, ‘bureaucratic
reform as a collective change in various ministries and institutions as well as local
governments… is declining in both orientation and motivation’ (Prasojo 2016).
Prasojo argues that reforming the bureaucracy is a central prerequisite to a vibrant,
performance-based and well-functioning civil service that has the capacity to reform
the rules and regulations that govern economic and social development.
This chapter focuses on two challenges to the enabling environment where recent
progress has been made, creating significant changes: regulations governing the
procurement of research and funding channels for research. The first is very much a
government issue, regulating how and where research can be procured by govern-
ment departments and agencies, and requirements around its implementation
(Jackson et al. 2017). The regulations hamper the government’s flexibility in pro-
curing research from Indonesian research centres, many of which are in the non-
profit sector. It also discourages other researchers due to issues related to financing
and short time frames. As a consequence, a large proportion of policy research is
funded (hence managed) by international agencies, each of which has its own
agenda and priorities. The second issue discussed in this chapter, funding for
research, suffers from two challenges. One is the serious underfunding of research,
as outlined in Chap. 2; the other is lack of appropriate mechanisms to support
transparent, competitive multi-year research grants (Brodjonegoro and Greene
2012).
The chapter adopts the ‘development entrepreneurship’ approach articulated by
Faustino and Booth (2014). The four distinctive features of development entrepre-
neurship touched upon here in relation to reforms are:
• Goal: Selection of reform objectives that are technically sound, politically fea-
sible and can be sustained over the long term by local institutions.
• Process: Explain how the programme worked flexibly and politically, which
should demonstrate responsiveness to opportunities, adaptation to changing con-
ditions and the power to adjust resources to address these opportunities and
conditions.
• People: Identify partners in reform; partners should have the capacity to under-
take the work, relationships to support the changes sought, knowledge of the
socio-political systems at play and a willingness to take risks.
• ‘Intrapreneurship’: Describing the role of external support. The team and approach
should be able to identify and build on external supporters to meet its goals.
The chapter concludes with a final reflection on the use of the development entre-
preneurship framework and suggestions about regulatory changes that may be still
7 Reforming the Enabling Environment for Evidence-Informed Policymaking 113
be required to continue the reform of Indonesia’s enabling environment for the

knowledge sector.
2 Two Key Challenges in the Enabling Environment
During the design of the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy: The
Knowledge Sector Initiative (KSI) in 2011 and 2012, diagnostic studies were under-
taken to identify a range of issues that inhibit the production of research evidence
and its use in policymaking at both the national and local levels.1 This included
exploration of the enabling environment, where policies, rules and regulations gov-
ern how the supply and demand sides interact and how research systems operate
(Guggenheim 2012). At this early stage, these issues were only broadly defined as
rigid and restrictive procurement regulations, the structure and administrative pro-
cedures of the civil service, limited government funding for policy research and the
roles and functions of knowledge intermediaries in the national research system
(Guggenheim 2012; AusAID 2012).
Early in its implementation, KSI supplemented this review of barriers with a
focus on gaps in the institutions of the knowledge sector, notably the lack of a strong
institution to play a policy advisory role with government (e.g. a robust academy of
science), as well as the weak research culture in Indonesian universities (Carden
2016; Nugroho et al. 2016).
Limited government funding for research was discussed in detail in Chap. 2. In
summary, Indonesia spends less than 0.2% of its GDP on research – at least ten
times lower than other countries in the region. Within this modest budget, there are
more than 17 different research granting schemes for universities managed by the
Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education (Kementerian Riset,
Teknologi dan Pendidikan Tinggi – KemRistekDikti)2 each with its own require-
ments and eligibility criteria. Not all academic staff are eligible to apply for these
grants; they depend on the Ministry’s classification of their university research
capacity. Due to limits on funding, fewer than half the academic research proposals
are funded (see Chap. 2). Indonesia has no state budget allocation for research
grants to non-governmental research institutions.
Particularly important in relation to state-funded research is that current
Indonesian fiscal law and regulation discourages multi-year research programmes.
Although annual renewals are permitted, the inherent uncertainty discourages
researchers from planning multi-year initiatives. Finally, research funding from
state budgets follows rigid reporting and budgeting guidelines and involves cumber-
1
See http://www.ksi-indonesia.org/index.php/publications/2015/08/10/14/diagnostic-studies-on-
the-knowledge-sector.html.
2
The chapter uses the Bahasa Indonesia acronym KemRistekDikti to refer to the Ministry of
Research, Technology and Higher Education (Kementerian Riset, Teknologi dan Pendidikan
Tinggi).
some bureaucratic procedures (McCarthy and Ibrahim 2010; Brodjonegoro and

Greene 2012).
In addition to limited investment in research, government procurement regula-
tions make it difficult to source research externally. The provision of goods and
services to government, including research, is ruled by procurement regulations.
Procurement regulations are open to multiple interpretations, and high-level offi-
cials continue to insist that nothing in the regulations prevents government from
engaging with universities and non-government policy research institutes
(Guggenheim 2012). In practice, however, for universities to engage with govern-
ment, they need to create a commercial entity; they cannot engage directly as a
university. This added layer of bureaucracy discourages institutional research, leav-
ing research projects in the domain of universities that are subject to different regu-
lations and can be engaged through ‘self-managed’ (swakelola) contracts (Sherlock
and Djani 2015). In practice, government generally uses ‘self-managed’ contracts to
engage with individual experts from universities and non-government policy
research institutes, which is easier than contracting with the universities’ private
sector entities. This more casual approach to commissioning research consultancies
limits the potential for providing the government with high-quality research and
policy analysis, as it does not draw on the broader resources of the university and,
given time restraints, does not permit depth in the research. From the perspective of
universities and non-governmental policy research institutes, this practice builds
personal connections rather than building sustainable universities and research
centres.
Finally, as noted in the introduction to this chapter, when government depart-
ments and agencies want to commission serious research, these financial and regu-
latory impediments often lead them to seek assistance from the international donor
community. This outsourcing of policy research negatively affects the government’s
ability to manage its own research agenda, because the research commissioned must
also align with the agenda of the external agency. Further, the research is likely to
be conducted largely by the agency’s staff or its own national researchers, drawing
on the Indonesian research community only for secondary support. This further
undermines the development of strong Indonesian research capacity.
3 Understand Problems and Develop Solutions
Despite this somewhat daunting picture, the KSI team, drawing from the develop-
ment entrepreneurship framework, has been able to identify two key problems in
Indonesia’s enabling environment for evidence-informed policy. This section
explains how the programme arrived at these two reforms and facilitated local lead-
ership to develop solutions.
3.1 Goal: Selection of Reform Objectives
Working politically requires the identification of reforms that are both technically
sound and politically feasible. Technical soundness is judged in terms of sustainable
impact on development processes, using the three criteria of impact, scale and sus-
tainability. Faustino and Booth (2014) define impact as the likelihood that the
reform will change the incentives and behaviour of organisations and individuals,
thus improving outcomes. Scale refers to the likelihood the reform will have effects
going well beyond the project, while sustainability refers to the likelihood the
reform will continue beyond the life of the intervention; that is that it will be insti-
tutionalised as part of the everyday practice of the government bureaucracy or
locked in through market dynamics.
The idea of an Indonesian Science Fund3 emerged from the thinking and experi-
ence of Satryo Brodjonegoro, an Indonesian professor who spent many years con-
sidering why it was that even elite Indonesian universities didn’t have the same
research culture that he found in the United States and Japan. He found many
causes; in particular, Indonesian professors are paid extremely poorly, forcing them
to divert time that should be dedicated to scholarly pursuits to activities such as
consulting; and government funding available for university research was limited to
short-term practical applications, making it hard for Indonesians interested in basic
research to secure funding for their projects (Emont and Pellini 2017).
This question motivated Brodjonegoro, then vice-president of the Indonesian
Academy of Sciences (Akademi Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia – AIPI)4 to collabo-
rate with Michael Greene from the United States National Academy of Sciences to
write a white paper on ‘Creating an Indonesian Science Fund’ (2012). The white
paper was published by AIPI, with support from the World Bank and the Australian
Government.
In mid-2014 the Australian aid agency (then AusAID) and the KSI team met with
AIPI officials. The president of the Academy, Sangkot Marzuki, brought up the
white paper written in 2012 in the discussion. The paper describes the lack of inde-
pendent funding for scientific research and the bureaucratic complexities associated
with existing research grants. It outlines a way forward in the form of a proposal for
a grants scheme to fund basic scientific research. AIPI’s vision of revitalising its role
in developing scientific excellence and establishing an independent Indonesian
Science Fund was strongly aligned with KSI’s aim of strengthening Indonesia’s
enabling environment for research, including resolution of the problem of limited
investment in research. AIPI understood that if the science fund was to be sustain-
able, it needed both political and financial support.
3
The Indonesia Science Fund in Bahasa Indonesia is called Dana Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia
(DIPI). The chapter uses the English language wording.
4
The chapter uses the Bahasa Indonesia acronym AIPI to refer to the Indonesian Academy of
Sciences (Akademi Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia).
The Knowledge Sector Initiative, as a programme, required authorisation to pro-

ceed on such an initiative, especially given its political nature. The Programme
Steering and Technical Committee is co-chaired by the Ministry for National
Development Planning/National Development Planning Agency (Kementerian
Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional/Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional –
Bappenas) and the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Former
Minister of Bappenas, Armida Alisjahbana, was a strong advocate for AIPI and, as
KSI’s main government counterpart, actively encouraged the programme’s support
for the Academy and the science fund proposal. This green light made it possible for
the KSI team to develop a programme of support with AIPI.
At the same time, KSI was exploring other constraints in the enabling environ-
ment that had been identified in the programme’s design document. In mid-2014,
the programme commissioned an update of the 2010 diagnostic study on regulatory
obstacles to evidence-informed policymaking. The study found that despite some
reforms, procurement regulations remained largely unchanged vis-à-vis the produc-
tion of policy research (Sherlock and Djani 2015).
In consultation with KSI-supported policy research institutes, and recognising
the serious limitations these regulations placed on the institutes, KSI agreed that it
might be politically feasible to address this issue. Defining the reform objective
began with strengthening the evidence base and scanning for possible political allies
in the government. In mid-2015, a political opportunity arose when Bappenas,
KSI’s government partner, informed the KSI team that the National Goods/Services
Public Procurement Agency (Lembaga Kebijakan Pengadaan Barang Jasa
Pemerintah – LKPP)5 – which falls under Bappenas’ jurisdiction – was in the pro-
cess of drafting revisions to procurement regulations. KSI acted on this opportunity,
and together with its policy research partners discussed a plan to engage with the
LKPP.
Both of the reforms discussed here met the requirement of being technically
sound (Faustino and Booth 2014), because they directly relate to the impact, scale
and sustainability of the enabling environment for a healthy knowledge sector.
Revisions to procurement legislation affect government procurement practices and
will become part of the everyday practice of government bureaucracy. Establishment
of the Indonesian Science Fund would change the way research funding is awarded,
basing it on a competitive and merit-based selection process, open to any type of
research entity in Indonesia.
One criterion for good development entrepreneurship that was not raised by
Faustino and Booth (Ibid.) is the role of evidence as a critical tool for raising aware-
ness and focusing the attention of policymakers and potential coalitions.
5
The chapter uses the acronym LKPP to refer to the National Goods/Services Public Procurement
Agency (Lembaga Kebijakan Pengadaan Barang Jasa Pemerintah).
3.2 P
rocess: How the Programme Worked Flexibly
and Politically
The KSI programme team explored the context of these two reforms to find the most
effective entry points. This section describes both the role of external actors and
events and how KSI’s team contributed to the change process. The interventions are
successful because all necessary players were involved. Ongoing coordination and
exchange, both formal and informal, made a difference to the contributions of each
actor.
3.2.1 Funding for Research6
The Indonesian Academy of Sciences had a vision for an independent science fund
that did not fall under the country’s bureaucratic umbrella. The Act of Parliament
that established the Academy (Government of Indonesia 1990) permits it to operate
both within and outside the parameters of government, so bringing the Fund under
that same umbrella would give it the necessary flexibility. The Academy also com-
mitted to a second point: that the bulk of the funding for the Indonesian Science
Fund should be Indonesian. Although foreign aid programmes offered support, AIPI
wanted to ensure that the initial funding was Indonesian. Using its network and
influence, the Academy turned into the Ministry of Finance, which supported estab-
lishment of the fund. In December 2014, the Academy organised an event during
which the Minister of Finance stated his support for an Indonesian Science Fund, in
the presence of the Ambassador of the United States, representatives from the
Embassy of Australia and Bappenas officials.
Following this initial success, the AIPI Silver Jubilee celebrations in May 2015
provided an opportunity to generate further support. At this high-level event –
attended by the ministers of Finance and National Development Planning, members
of the Academy and international donors – the Indonesian Academy of Sciences
formally announced the establishment of the Indonesian Science Fund. The event
was widely reported by national media and generated significant interest among
Indonesian researchers and scientists (Emont and Pellini 2017).
Following the achievement of this milestone, the Ministry of Finance’s Education
Endowment Fund (Lembaga Pengelola Dana Pendidikan – LPDP) was the first gov-
ernment body to commit funds for the science fund. The Ministry signed a memo-
randum of understanding with the Academy in August 2015 for the establishment of
the Indonesian Science Fund.
The Jubilee announcement raised public expectations. However, at that time the
Indonesian Science Fund still had no legal basis, no established sources of funding
and no presidential approval. Although AIPI housed prominent and well-connected
Indonesian scientists, they could not swiftly advance the fund through the remaining
This section draws on Emont and Pellini (2017).

6
hoops of Indonesia’s bureaucracy. It was clear that the Academy needed a dedi-
cated, full-time individual to see the project through. In August 2015, KSI sup-
ported AIPI to hire a consultant with strong academic and government networks to
fill the post of national coordinator and work closely with the Academy to guide the
embryonic Science Fund through the maze of bureaucratic approvals. A team of
legal advisors was also recruited by KSI to provide legal analysis for the Fund’s
establishment and work closely with the coordinator. The first attempt to hire a legal
team was not successful, as the team did not have the ability to translate the
Academy’s vision into a suitable legal analysis (Prasetiamartati 2016). For the sec-
ond attempt, the consultant hired to coordinate the establishment of the Fund acted
as an intermediary between the Academy’s vision and the legal analysis prepared by
the team of legal advisers, with good results.
During this time, the United States National Academy of Sciences continued its
long-standing support to the Academy, through support from the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID). The United States National
Academy of Sciences had contributed to a number of capacity building and research
efforts with AIPI, such as support for a consensus report on maternal and child mor-
tality (NRC and AIPI 2013), as well as support to young researchers to join the
Indonesian-American Kavli Frontiers of Science Symposium (AIPI 2014, 2017) −
a symposium that brings young researchers together to explore the frontiers of sci-
ence in a range of fields. USAID and KSI also supported AIPI and its ‘Young
Academy’ to propose a long-term research agenda for the nation (AIPI 2016).
President Barack Obama’s former science envoy to Indonesia, Bruce Alberts (2009
to 2011), who is also a distinguished scientist and former president of the United
States National Academy of Sciences, maintained a long-term relationship and
advisory role with AIPI. Taken together, these collaborative initiatives contributed
to the formal and informal relationships needed for the Fund’s success.
The coming together of external and internal players resulted in the formal estab-
lishment of the Indonesian Science Fund. The coordinator had met with members of
the Academy’s executive committee and other AIPI members to urge them to sup-
port the Fund. In October 2015, the Academy’s General Assembly voted in favour
of amending the bylaws and constitution to support the Indonesian Science Fund.
The coordinator also lobbied his networks close to President Joko Widodo to gain
his support. These efforts paid off when, during his first state visit to the United
States in October 2015, the President announced the Indonesian Science Fund as
part of Indonesia’s commitment to the US-Indonesian scientific cooperation. In
concerted efforts, the president and vice president of the Academy, its secretary
general, the coordinator and legal team then began the lengthy bureaucratic process
of legally establishing the Fund, drafting documents and meeting with officials at
the ministries of Finance, State Apparatus and Bureaucratic Reform and Ministry of
Research, Technology and Higher Education (KemRistekdikti), to obtain approval
and signatures. These efforts culminated in the signing of a presidential decree in
February 2016, which formally established the Indonesian Science Fund.
3.2.2 Reforms in the Procurement of Research7
Following an updated diagnostic study that signalled no significant change in the

procurement regulations that inhibit institutional engagement between non-profit
organisations and government (Sherlock and Djani 2015), the KSI programme team
tried different approaches to identify champions and key actors who shared this
concern. The programme was aware that policy change requires individual
Indonesian champions and actors as well as coalitions. Finding these champions
was achieved through interactions with KSI’s core partners from policy research
institutes, as well as using KSI events to interact with potential champions. For
example, the team organised a knowledge-sharing event to promote the findings of
the diagnostic study.
At least four junctures contributed to the reform process; that these took place
during a short time frame was important to building momentum.
First The programme team learned from Bappenas in mid-2015 that LKPP had
begun to revise the presidential regulation on procurement. It was important to act
quickly if unique research-related needs were to be inserted into the process. This
news was followed by a meeting of the KSI team, a representative from one of its
policy research partner organisations, the Indonesian Forum for Budget Transparency
(Sekretariat Nasional Forum Indonesia Untuk Transparansi Anggaran – SEKNAS
FITRA), with a deputy director of LKPP in early July 2015. The meeting discussed
the particular obstacles faced by government actors in procuring policy research.
During the meeting, the deputy director confirmed that the Agency was revising the
regulations and acknowledged that the current regulations did not effectively address
procurement of research. He welcomed the programme’s input.
Second KemRistekDikti was created in October 2014, when the President Joko
Widodo’s new administration merged the Ministry of Research and Technology
with the Directorate General of Higher Education. Two key champions of the reform
process were appointed to serve in this new structure and promoted the issue of
procurement for research. Starting in August 2015, KSI began to engage with two
individuals at the new Ministry, and in the months to follow, they played a lead role
in reforming procurement regulations. One had been an academic and thus had a
keen understanding of the issues at stake.
Third Two of KSI’s policy research partner organisations (Article 33 and SEKNAS
FITRA) were engaged from early on in the process. Both organisations cited pro-
curement regulations as a key factor inhibiting them from bringing research evi-
dence to bear on policymaking, as well as having a negative impact on their financial
sustainability.
This section draws on Jackson et al. (2017)

7
Fourth The interests of another partner organisation (AKATIGA, a research and

advocacy organisation focused on marginalised groups) went beyond research. One
of AKATIGA’s senior researchers saw an opportunity to expand NGOs’ access to
public funding by amending the procurement regulations on self-managed (swake-
lola) contracts to allow these organisations to bid for any government contract, for
example, contracts to provide services for vulnerable groups. In pursuing this
agenda, the researcher was able to draw on his personal connection to the director
of LKPP. At a meeting in early November 2015, the director responded positively to
this idea. AKATIGA provided LKPP with a policy brief outlining its recommenda-
tions and continued to engage with the Agency over the following months.
These four junctures supported the reform process. More broadly, in the last
decade, some government agencies have become more open to seeking input from
civil society organisations, in part due to recognition of these organisations’ expertise.
These factors meant that high-level officials at KemRistekDikti and other government
agencies were more disposed to collaborating with the KSI programme and its policy
research partners, a situation on which the programme was able to capitalise.
Knowing that policy research institutes, LKPP, Bappenas and KemRistekDikti
all supported a change in research procurement legislation, KSI facilitated interac-
tions among key actors and brought in relevant expertise. To help develop recom-
mendations to improve the regulations, in July 2015 KSI engaged a procurement
specialist from Transparency International Indonesia who had previously worked
with LKPP. His analysis of the country’s procurement regulations identified a num-
ber of areas where changes could be made to accommodate procurement of research.
This analysis was then presented to a number of KSI’s research partners as well as
to KemRistekDikti. Following these discussions, a policy brief highlighting the
importance of open competition, fairness, consistency, transparency and stream-
lined processes for multi-year funding for research projects was submitted to LKPP.
Also in mid-2015, the KSI team established a working group around the broad
theme of research and higher education. It was made up of representatives from the
programme’s research partners, AIPI and KemRistekDikti. A subgroup was tasked
to work specifically on procurement and develop a strategy for change. The sub-
group’s first meeting in October 2015 included representatives from Bappenas and
five KSI research partners: Article 33, SEKNAS FITRA, AKATIGA, Institute for
Social Research and Advocacy (Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat –
ELSAM) and the Indonesian Centre for Law and Policy Studies (Pusat Studi Hukum
dan Kebijakan Indonesia, PSHK). During the meeting, KSI facilitated a discussion
using the Overseas Development Institute’s ‘RAPID Outcome Mapping Approach’
to define policy change objectives and the ‘Alignment Influence and Interest Matrix’
(Hearn 2014) to map key stakeholders. This process helped to identify a number of
important actors who had not yet been engaged. The discussion also produced a
change strategy and action plan for the next 18 months.
One of the action plans was to convene all relevant stakeholders and research
partners to discuss what had been achieved to date and determine the next steps for
improving the environment for research. Facilitated by KSI in late December 2015,
KemRistekDikti hosted an intergovernmental and multi-stakeholder meeting,

attended by high-level representatives from LKPP, KemRistekDikti, Bappenas, the
University Rectors’ Forum, the Ministry of Finance and the Audit Board. Participants
agreed that the revised regulations needed to accommodate procurement of research
over multiple years. They suggested that a new section be included in the
regulations.
Changes in the context and bringing key actors together aligned to support the
reform process. In January 2016 KemRistekDikti held a number of meetings with
the LKPP and the Ministry of Finance to follow up on these discussions. As a result,
in addition to the revised procurement regulations, it was agreed that a new Ministry
of Finance decree to streamline financial reporting requirements for research proj-
ects was needed. Implementing regulations would be issued by LKPP and guide-
lines on quality assurance by KemRistekDikti. To support the development of these
documents, KSI engaged a research administration specialist from Diponegoro
University and a legal drafter from the Indonesian Centre for Law and Policy Studies
(Pusat Studi Hukum dan Kebijakan Indonesia – PSHK). The Ministry of Finance
decree on output-based research was issued in June 2016, followed by implement-
ing guidelines on quality assurance processes for research outputs issued by
KemRistekDikti.
During the course of a series of workshops facilitated by KSI, staff from LKPP
and KemRistekDikti worked together with research partners from the Indonesian
Centre for Law and Policy Studies (Pusat Studi Hukum dan Kebijakan Indonesia –
PSHK) and AKATIGA to draft the new section of the procurement regulation cover-
ing research. The team also drafted two implementing regulations on procurement
of research services and on self-managed (swakelola) contracts, to be issued by
KemRistekDikti and LKPP, respectively.
Following the workshops, KSI continued to engage with LKPP and the Ministry
to refine the draft. The Agency confirmed that the draft includes articles on procure-
ment of multi-year research, as well as provisions allowing NGOs to bid on a wide
range of government contracts. The draft of the revised procurement regulation was
discussed at a Cabinet meeting in late December 2016, chaired by the President, and
has since gone through a series of inter-ministerial meetings led by the Coordinating
Ministry of Economic Affairs, before its submission to the Cabinet Secretariat for
endorsement by the President. The procurement regulation was endorsed by
President Joko Widodo on 15 March 2018.
3.3 People: Partners in Reform
The third distinguishing feature of development entrepreneurship is the people and

organisations that play a role in the process. Faustino and Booth (2014) defined
development entrepreneurs as leaders who commit to making social organisations
work for the greater good by creating the circumstances that lead to the adoption of
better institutions.
Fig. 7.1 Layers of reform actors in the research funding reform. (Adapted from Denney 2016)
3.3.1 Partners in Research Funding Reform
Leadership by key actors at AIPI determined the overall strategy and tactics for
promoting the Indonesian Science Fund and defined the stakeholders that needed to
be engaged in the Fund’s establishment. KSI played a supporting and facilitation
role, providing financing and technical expertise to help AIPI to build the legal
foundation for the Fund. A critical factor allowing the Academy to bring the
Indonesian Science Fund to fruition was the identification of sustainable sources of
funding. Throughout the process, the Academy engaged with potential funders,
including the Ministry of Finance Education Endowment Fund (Lembaga Pengelola
Dana Pendidikan – LPDP) and USAID − with which the Academy had been col-
laborating for many years − to secure financial commitments and support.
Denney (2016) describes the layers of reform actors, as depicted in Fig. 7.1:
• KSI team: Technical advisor, programme manager, programme officer
• Reform team: President and vice president of AIPI, secretary general of AIPI,
national coordinator, a legal advisory team
• Partners: Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Ministry of Finance Education
Endowment Fund (Lembaga Pengelola Dana Pendidikan – LPDP), Bappenas,
the State Secretariat, KemRistekDikti, and Ministry of State Apparatus and

Bureaucratic Reform (MoSA-BR in the figure)
Faustino and Booth (2014) suggest a need to map the different layers of actors
involved in an intervention. In the case of the Indonesian Science Fund, the layers
could be defined as follows. At the foundation were KSI’s technical advisor and
programme manager, who coordinated actors within the KSI team and liaised with
the reform team. The programme manager identified technical and political gaps
within the reform team and worked with KSI’s programme officer to mobilise a
national coordinator and legal advisory team to join the AIPI reform team. The KSI
programme played an integral role in enhancing the ability of key actors to bring
about reform. Its programme staff maintained momentum through regular coordina-
tion and meetings with the reform team.
The reform team was comprised of the senior leadership of the Academy, along
with the coordinator and the legal advisory team. The national coordinator relied on
political skills and networking, using personal and professional contacts to ensure
that the technical analysis was seen by the appropriate people. The legal advisor
provided technical analysis of legal issues. AIPI’s president and vice president also
used their personal and professional networks to bring the technical analysis to the
right people. Administrative support for penetrating the government bureaucracy
was provided by AIPI staff.
3.3.2 Partners in Procurement Reform
The procurement issue was addressed jointly by KSI’s partner organisations, mak-
ing use of the earlier diagnostic study (Sherlock and Djani 2015). The KSI pro-
gramme team and partners then built a reform team consisting of a procurement
specialist, a legal specialist and a research specialist. These specialists provided
technical analysis, as well as utilising their personal and professional networks to
ensure that it was seen by appropriate stakeholders. The reform team came from
different institutions, but they communicated frequently, talking and listening in
equal measure. Their interactions at formal meetings or discussions were facilitated
by the KSI team, which led to iterative learning, coordination of effort and broker-
ing of relationships.
The layers of reform actors shown in Fig. 7.2 included:
• KSI Team: Technical advisor, programme manager, programme officers
• Reform team: Procurement specialist, the Indonesian Centre for Law and Policy
Studies (Pusat Studi Hukum dan Kebijakan Indonesia, PSHK) legal specialist,
research specialist, KemRistekDikti, National Goods/Services Public
Procurement Agency (Lembaga Kebijakan Pengadaan Barang Jasa Pemerintah –
LKPP), AKATIGA
• Partners: Bappenas, SEKNAS FITRA, ELSAM, Coordinating Ministry for
Human Development and Cultural Affairs (Kementerian Koordinator Bidang
Pembangunan Manusia dan Kebudayaan – PMK), the Office of the President’s
Fig. 7.2 Layers of reform actors in the research procurement reform. (Adapted from Denney
2016)
Staff (Kantor Staf Presiden – KSP), Ministry of Finance (MoF), Indonesian

Institute of Sciences (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia – LIPI)
The loose coalition of reform-minded senior bureaucrats and policymakers, non-
governmental policy research institutes and individuals with technical expertise
hired by KSI was a critical factor in moving the procurement reform forward. KSI
played an active role in brokering relationships between key stakeholders, particu-
larly in the initial phase of the reform. In addition, KSI played an important role by
providing technical expertise on the issue of procurement to key government stake-
holders. KSI staff identified the main actors who needed to be engaged and brought
them together. Through a series of meetings and discussions, KSI worked with these
stakeholders to build consensus around the problem and develop a strategy for
addressing it. This approach facilitated the creation of new links between the
research partners and relevant government agencies, as well as among government
agencies.
Leadership by key individuals was also critical to the procurement reform. The
deputy director of LKPP (later its director) provided authority for the reform,
although it was like-minded mid-level agency staff who attended the working meet-
ings in which the issues were discussed and the regulations drafted. The two senior
Fig. 7.3 Social network analysis in the procurement reform (Authors)
officials from KemRistekDikti took on a much more active leadership role, utilising
their own political networks and understanding of bureaucratic systems and pro-
cesses to bring in stakeholders from other government agencies whose support was
necessary for the reform to succeed.
The evolution of relationships and networks around procurement regulation can
be illustrated using a social network analysis (Fig. 7.3). The node represents the
organisation; the size of the node refers to the organisation’s level of importance
(centrality) within the network. The line between two nodes represents levels of
interaction; the thicker the line the more intensive and routine the communication.
The graph shows the evolution of interactions (i.e. the network) from June 2015 to
December 2016, demonstrating that the reform team increasingly performed its role
of facilitation.
The graph shows a significant shift of role played by KemRistekDikti, marked by
increasingly bigger node in three stages. Although negligible in the first stage, it
increased during the second stage and then became the most influential actor on the
last stage. The Ministry has authority to develop research policy. Moreover, KSI’s
partner organisations have shown effective pathways for bringing their capital into
the network. This capital was then transferred into strategic action to achieve out-
puts, increasing the number of partners brought in by the reform team.
These teams shared the three building blocks of trust summarised by Heathfield
(2016). They had trust in each other and the expertise needed to maintain the reform
and perceived their actions and direction as mutually reinforcing rather than
self-serving.
3.4 Intrapreneurship: External Supporters
‘Intrapreneurs’ are people who start new businesses or lines of work within their
organisations to add value. Development intrapreneurs demonstrate the ability to
adapt and change a development programme to increase its usefulness, rather than
simply following a clearly defined path.
As described earlier, the process of policy change requires iterative ‘learning by
doing’. KSI is able to work this way because of the support from its Programme
Steering and Technical Committee, co-chaired by Bappenas and the Australian
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Both KSI shareholders approved the pro-
gramme’s work plan and reports. With their support, KSI staff could facilitate the
reform process and engage closely with key stakeholders. In addition, they engaged
as stakeholders, working with other stakeholders to define the problem and break it
down into its component parts.
In the case of the Indonesian Science Fund, as early as 2014 a key Bappenas staff
member told the KSI team that success in seeing through the establishment of the
Indonesian Science Fund would be the programme’s ‘legacy’. While this interven-
tion was not in KSI’s original work plan, Bappenas endorsed the programme’s sup-
port to AIPI for establishment of the new Fund. Without this green light, it would
have not been possible for KSI to continue its support (Prasetiamartati 2016; Emont
and Pellini 2017).
In addition to the development intrapreneurship of Bappenas and the Australian
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Indonesian Science Fund exists due to
support from the USAID, as well as the Newton Fund and British Council, with
whom AIPI partners. These international development agencies also exercised
intrapreneurship by providing critical support for establishing the Fund and its early
operations.
In September 2015, the Indonesian Academy of Sciences and the national coor-
dinator of the Fund met in Washington, D.C., with the National Academy of Science,
National Science Foundation, National Institutes of Health, Smithsonian Institution,
State Department and USAID. The meetings revealed a commitment by those insti-
tutions to support the establishment of the Indonesian Science Fund. In January
2016, a delegation from AIPI and the Indonesian Science Fund visited the Royal
Society in the United Kingdom and learned about research funding systems and
areas of scientific excellence (Emont and Pellini 2017). This expansion of the
Fund’s contacts and relationships was another factor permitting its successful estab-
lishment and will serve the Fund well in years to come.
4 Conclusions
This chapter tells the story of how the KSI team put the concepts of working flexibly
and politically into practice. It provides practical illustrations from which other
practitioners seeking to work in these ways can draw. The emphasis on drawing
together staff and networks with strong political relationships, and the ability to
leverage these relationships to influence reform, offers insight into how programmes
might work politically.
This chapter follows the framework of development entrepreneurship built by
Faustino and Booth (2014). However, one criterion not raised in their study is the
role of evidence as a critical tool both for raising awareness and gaining the atten-
tion of policymakers and for developing potential coalitions. In the case of the
Indonesian Science Fund, considerable space for change existed from the outset.
The evidence presented in Brodjonegoro and Greene’s 2012 paper, together with the
professional reputations and deep understanding of the issues of key individuals
within the leadership of the Indonesian Academy of Sciences, lent credibility to the
problem and the proposed solution. It also provided the authority to begin the reform
process. In the case of procurement reform, a policy brief highlighting the impor-
tance of open competition, fairness, consistency and transparency and streamlined
processes for multi-year funding of research projects was discussed thoroughly with
reform actors and sent to LKPP (Jackson et al. 2017).
The changes to procurement regulations, however, do not address the financial
and human resource costs of bidding, complex bureaucratic procedures, slow dis-
bursement of funds and an aversion to what are perceived to be corrupt procurement
practices that make many research organisations reluctant to bid on government
contracts (Sherlock 2010). These challenges need ongoing efforts and suggest the
need for behavioural change, which will take many years. But the revised regulation
does open doors for non-profit organisations to provide knowledge services to the
government. It also opened the door to broad consultations on deficiencies in pro-
curement that could be built on to address the remaining challenges.
As noted in Jackson et al. (2017) the policy reforms described in this chapter
represent initial steps toward improving the enabling environment for evidence-
informed policymaking. However, for the reforms to be successful in improving the
way policy research is commissioned and used, policymakers’ attitudes and behav-
iour on seeking and procuring research will also need to change. Universities and
policy research institutes will also need to be willing to engage with government
agencies and participate actively in government procurement processes. As the
Knowledge Sector Initiative moves into its second phase, as of mid-2017, it will
continue to monitor this and other reforms in the enabling environment to evaluate
whether the interventions are having the expected impact.
References
Agenor, P. R., Canuto, O., & Jelenic, M. (2012). Avoiding middle income growth traps (World
Bank. Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Series. Number 98). The World Bank.
AIPI [Indonesian Academy of Sciences]. (2014). Indonesian-American Kavli Frontiers of Science
symposia 2011–2013. Jakarta: AIPI.
AIPI [Indonesian Academy of Sciences]. (2016). In https://aipi.or.id/index.php?pg=detilpublikasi
&pid=58&type=2. Accessed 9 June 2017 (Ed.), SAINS45: Indonesian science agenda -towards
a century of independence. Jakarta: AIPI.
AIPI [Indonesian Academy of Sciences]. (2017). Indonesian Academy of Sciences annual report
2016. Jakarta: AIPI. https://aipi.or.id/index.php?pg=isidata&jurnal=65. Accessed 9 June 2017.
AusAID [Australian Agency for International Development]. (2012). Australia-Indonesia partner-
ship for pro-poor policy: The knowledge sector initiative, design document. http://dfat.gov.au/
about-us/publications/Documents/indo-ks-design.pdf. Accessed 11 Mar 2014.
Brodjonegoro, S. S., & Greene, M. P. (2012). Creating an Indonesian science fund. Jakarta: AIPI
and World Bank. https://aipi.or.id/index.php?pg=detilpublikasi&pid=19&type=3. Accessed 9
June 2017.
Carden, F. (2016). Reflections on academies and science advice (Working Paper 13). Jakarta:
Knowledge Sector Initiative. http://www.ksi-indonesia.org/en/news/detail/reflections-on-acad-
emies-and-science-advice. Accessed 24 June 2017.
Denney, L. (2016). Reforming solid waste management in Phnom Penh (The Asia Foundation
and the Overseas Development Institute. Working Politically in Practice Series. Case Study
No. 8). London: Overseas Development Institute. http://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/06/Working-Politically-and-Flexibly-to-Reform-Solid-Waste-Management-in-
Phnom-Penh.pdf. Accessed 19 Apr 2017.
Emont, J. & Pellini, A. (2017). Investing in knowledge: The establishment of the Indonesian sci-
ence fund (Working Paper 20). Jakarta: Knowledge Sector Initiative. http://www.ksi-indonesia.
org/en/news/detail/investing-in-knowledge-the-establishment-of-the-indonesian-science-fund.
Faustino, J. & Booth, D. (2014). Development entrepreneurship: how donors and leaders can fos-
ter institutional change (Working Politically in Practice Series – Case Study No. 2). London:
Overseas Development Institute and San Francisco: The Asia Foundation.http://asiafoundation.
org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Development-Entrepeneurship-How-Donors-and-Leaders-
Can-Foster-Institutional-Change.pdf. Accessed 19 Apr 2017.
Government of Indonesia. (1990). Law 8/1990 on the Indonesian Academy of Sciences. http://
www.hukumonline.com/pusatdata/detail/19965/node/671/undangundang-nomor-8-ta-
hun-1990. Accessed 17 Apr 2018.
Guggenheim, S. (2012). Indonesia’s quiet springtime: Knowledge, policy and reform. In A. Reid
(Ed.), Indonesia rising. The repositioning of Asia’s third giant (pp. 141–169). Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore.
Hearn, S. (2014). Outcome mapping practitioner guide: Alignment, interest, influence matrix.
London: Overseas Development Institute. http://www.outcomemapping.ca/nuggets/alignment-
interest-influence-matrix. Accessed 12 Mar 2017.
Heathfield, S. M. (2016, August 26). Trust rules: The most important secret about trust, about.
com. http://humanresources.about.com/od/workrelationships/a/trust_rules.htm. Accessed 9
June 2017.
Jackson, E., Prasetiamartati, B., Sadikin, M. C., Sugiyanto, and Pellini, P. (2017). Commissioning
knowledge for policy reforms in the procurement of research in Indonesia (Working Paper
23). Jakarta: Knowledge Sector Initiative. http://www.ksi-indonesia.org/file_upload/
Commissioning-Knowledge-for-Policy-Reforms-in-the-14Jun2017160257.pdf. Accessed 24
June 2017.
Jakarta Post. (2015, December 16). RI should focus on e-economy study: Djisman. http://www.the-
jakartapost.com/news/2015/12/16/ri-should-focus-e-economy-study-djisman.html. Accessed
9 June 2017.
Karetji, P.C. (2010). Overview of the Indonesian knowledge sector. Jakarta: AusAID. Available at
http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/indo-ks8-overview.pdf. Accessed 5 June
2017.
McCarthy, J. & Ibrahim, R. (2010). Review of social science capacity building support to
Indonesia’s knowledge sector. Jakarta: AusAID. http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/
Documents/indo-ks9-socialscience.pdf. Accessed 5 June 2017.
National Research Council & AIPI. (2013). Reducing maternal and neonatal mortality. Washington
DC: National Academies Press. https://aipi.or.id/index.php?pg=isidata&jurnal=24. Accessed 9
June 2017.
Nugroho, Y., Prasetiamartati, B., Ruhanawati S. (2016). Addressing Barriers to University
Research (Working Paper No. 8). Knowledge Sector Initiative. http://www.ksi-indonesia.org/
en/news/detail/addressing-barriers-to-university-research. Accessed 9 June 2017.
Prasetiamartati, B. (2016). End of intervention report: Capacity development for AIPI and the
establishment of the Indonesia science fund (Internal report). Jakarta: Knowledge Sector
Initiative.
Prasojo, E. (2016, January 7). One Year On: The turning point of bureaucracy reform. http://eko-
prasojo.com/2016/01/07/one-year-on-the-turning-point-of-bureaucracy-reform/. Accessed 16
Jan 2016.
market in Indonesia. Jakarta: AusAid. https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/
indo-ks13-knowledge-to-govt.pdf. Accessed 9 June 2017.
Sherlock, S. & Djani, L. (2015). Update on constraints in the enabling environment to the provi-
sion of knowledge in the executive and legislative government (KSI diagnostic study). Jakarta:
Knowledge Sector Initiative. http://www.ksi-indonesia.org/en/news/detail/update-on-con-
straints-in-the-enabling-environment-to-the-provision-of-knowledge-in-executive-and-legisla-
tive-government. Accessed 9 June 2017.
Chapter 8
Doing Development Differently at Scale
Arnaldo Pellini, Petrarca C. Karetji, and Ade Soekadis
1 Introduction
Development is a process of change and transformation that involves finding new

and better ways to solve such problems as providing more and better education,
reforming social security or piloting a universal minimum wage. The list is long.
Change can emerge from within a society and political system or be the result of
external political influence. Whatever the origin of the change, with change comes
unpredictability (Pellini 2007). Jane Jacobs (2000) in her book, The Nature of
Economies, highlights this unpredictability, describing development as an open-
ended process, a qualitative change that ‘can’t be usefully thought of as a line, or
even a collection of open-ended lines. Development operates as a web of interde-
pendent co-developments’ (19).
Since the 1950s academicians, researchers, politicians, civil society leaders,
bureaucrats, civil servants, philanthropists, experts, administrators and others have
grappled with the unpredictability and complexity of change processes in develop-
ment. The search for answers to development problems has resulted in a constant
process of change in social and economic theories, as well as in the ways that devel-
A. Pellini (*)
P. C. Karetji
Research Triangle Institute International, Jakarta, Indonesia
A. Soekadis
CARE Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia

opment programmes are designed, funded and implemented. In the 1950s, economic
modernisation theory suggested that higher rates of economic growth could be
achieved through linear stages of development (Rostow 1960). In the 1960s the
emphasis shifted to the need to provide education and health services and strengthen
human capital (Schultz 1962; Singer 1964). In the mid-1960s, Albert Hirschman was
one of the first intellectuals to reflect on the nature of development programmes,
describing them as ‘a long voyage of discovery on the most varied domains, from
technology to politics’ (1967, 35). The late 1970s and 1980s brought a renewed
emphasis on neo-liberal economic theory and the emergence of structural adjustment
programmes, under the so-called Washington Consensus (Arndt 1987; Adelman
2000; Addison 2005). During this decade Dennis Rondinelli challenged develop-
ment orthodoxy, reflecting on how governments and development organisations
around the world designed and implemented programmes and projects. He con-
cluded that while the complexity and uncertainty of development activities were
growing, the methods used to plan and manage development activities were not
adapting to the growing complexity and uncertainty (Rondinelli 1989). The 1990s
and 2000s brought a focus on sustainable development and the recognition that
development has multiple social, cultural and political dimensions and that in essence
‘development’ means that individuals have the freedom to make life choices (Sen
1988, 1999). This led to the emergence of a post-development era discourse, which
acknowledged that ‘there is not a proven formula for growth that can be rolled out in
country after country like some kind of development franchise’ (Wheelan 2002,
207). Development involves searching for solutions to problems that local stakehold-
ers and communities see as their own, without relying on blueprints from overseas or
cultural and moral guidance from donor agencies (Parfitt 2002; Escobar 2011).
The point of this excursus into 50 years of development theory is to show that the
evolution of development theories has shifted in parallel to that of ideas on how to
operationalise and implement development interventions. The previous chapters of
this book describe problems, solutions and opportunities in the Indonesian knowl-
edge sector on evidence-informed policymaking from the viewpoint of a relatively
large development initiative, such as the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Pro-
Poor Policy: The Knowledge Sector Initiative (KSI 2017). This chapter focuses on
the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy: The Knowledge Sector
Initiative (KSI) itself and reflects on the principles and mechanisms required to
manage a large programme seeking solutions to problems in the Indonesian knowl-
edge sector. In particular, the authors reflect on the applicability of emerging ideas
that fall into the category of ‘doing development differently’ (DDD).
2 D
oing Development Differently: One Way to Find
Solutions to the Wicked Hard Problems of Development
Albert Hirschman, during the 1960s, and Dennis Rondinelli, in the 1980s, were
rather isolated in their critique of how development programmes were being
designed and implemented. More recently, however, their work has contributed to
8 Doing Development Differently at Scale 133
revamping the debate over whether development interventions work and, if not,
what ought to change. This has led to the emergence of a discourse and literature
known as ‘doing development differently’ (Andrews et al. 2012, 2017).1 This litera-
ture draws on multiple analyses of development interventions in the area of gover-
nance and building state capacity and makes the case for a different approach and
tools to development interventions that practitioners, civil servants and researchers
can adopt to design, fund and implement development programmes seeking to
address the so-called wicked hard problems.2 These are problems that Andrews
et al. (2015) define as being simultaneously ‘logistically complex, politically con-
tentious, without known solutions and containing numerous opportunities for pro-
fessional discretion’ (126).
Over the past two decades, Andrews et al. (2012) argue, the idea of transplanting
solutions and models from modem economies has permeated too many − if not
most − governance programmes, which has led many of them to fail to deliver on
their stated objectives and outcomes: strengthening the capability of state systems.
The Quality of Government Institute at Sweden’s University of Gothenburg3
assessed countries’ improvements in capability and service provision from 1984 to
2008 and showed that of the 87 countries they track, 62 have achieved no progress
in state capability (see Pritchett 2013). Even among the 25 that show improvement,
the typical country may take over 200 years to reach the level of state capability of
Portugal in 1985 (Ibid.).
Government interventions fail because they attempt to (1) introduce and repro-
duce expert solutions considered ‘best practices’, (2) develop predetermined linear
processes, (3) impose strict monitoring and compliance systems, (4) evaluate prog-
ress too late in the process, and (5) assume that implementation and reaching goals
largely happen by edict, with support at the top (Andrews et al. 2012). In other
words, development interventions fail because they tend to focus on what institu-
tions and organisations in the recipient countries should look like rather than on
what they actually do and the problems they face (Pritchett 2013).
A number of communities of practice have emerged over the last few years to
discuss and debate the insights and suggestions emerging from DDD thinking and
analysis. Algoso and Hudson (2016) identified nine different communities of prac-
tice involving practitioners, policymakers, researchers and activists.4 While these
1
Other terms have emerged during the last few years, e.g. ‘Thinking and Working Politically’ and
‘Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation’. We cluster them under the doing development differently
umbrella of ideas.
2
See Grindle (2004), Briggs (2008), Ramalingam and Jones (2008), Rodrik (2008), Adler et al.
(2009), Booth (2011), Pritchett et al. (2013), Ramalingam (2015), and Green (2016).
3
See http://qog.pol.gu.se/.
4
Doing Development Differently is a community of researchers and practitioners convened by the
Overseas Development Institute and Harvard Kennedy School. Its manifesto calls for development
to focus on locally defined problems, tackled through iteration, learning and adaptation (http://
doingdevelopmentdifferently.com/).
Thinking and Working Politically is a semi-regular convening of representatives from various
donor agencies, think tanks and international NGOs that discusses the use of politically aware
approaches to aid and development work (https://twpcommunity.org/).
communities and initiatives may differ in the emphasis they assign to specific DDD
elements or actors, what they have in common is their critique of pre-planned, lin-
ear, solution-based approaches to development.
Communities of practices are contributing to the growing body of evidence
derived from programmes that are trying to apply and operationalise DDD princi-
ples. The key suggestions, drawn from a number of contributions (Fabella et al.
2011; Booth and Unsworth 20145; DDD Manifesto 2014; Faustino and Booth 2014;
Williamson 2015; Green 2016; Andrews et al. 2017), are summarised below:
• Focus on solving problems that are owned, debated and defined by local people
and stakeholders.
• Engage a broad set of actors to ensure that reforms are viable, legitimate and
relevant. In other words, identify and test interventions that are technically sound
and, importantly, politically feasible.
Global Delivery Initiative (GDI) is a cross-donor collaboration led by the World Bank to
deepen the know-how for effective operational delivery of aid and development (http://www.
worldbank.org/reference/GDI/).
Global Partnership for Social Accountability (GPSA) was established by the World Bank in
2012 and funds and convenes civil society organisations and governments to discuss social
accountability initiatives (http://www.thegpsa.org/).
Making All Voices Count (MAVC) is a 5-year programme that started in 2013, funded by mul-
tiple development partners (i.e. UK Department for International Development, USAID, Swedish
International Development Agency and the Omidyar Network) to find, fund and learn from innova-
tions that support accountable governance (http://www.makingallvoicescount.org/).
Transparency and Accountability Initiatives is a community of practice composed of transpar-
ency and accountability practitioners from many countries (http://www.transparency-initiative.
org/workstream/impact-learning).
Analysis-Driven Agile Programming Techniques (ADAPT) is a collaboration between Mercy
Corps and the International Rescue Committee to identify, develop and spread the use of adaptive
management approaches in complex aid and development projects (https://www.rescue.org/
adaptcasestudies).
Smart Rules is an internal initiative that started in 2014 at the UK Department for International
Development, which acknowledges that complex interventions require a different approach to pro-
gramme management that can adapt to and influence local contexts and support evidence-based
decision-making (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
dfid-smart-rules-better-programme-delivery).
Collaborating, Learning and Adapting (CLA) is the USAID framework and internal change
effort for incorporating collaboration, learning and adaptation at its missions and among imple-
menting partners (https://usaidlearninglab.org/faq/collaborating-learning-and-adapting-cla).
5
Booth and Unsworth (2014) looked at seven programmes implemented between 2000 and 2014 in
different parts of the world to identify positive lessons for adopting an iterative and adaptive
approach to programme implementation: the Western Odisha Rural Livelihoods Programme in
India (WORLP); the Rural Livelihoods Programme; Land Titling in the Philippines and the Tax
and Health Reform Programme in the Philippines by The Asia Foundation; the Disarmament,
Demobilisation and Reintegration in DRC Peace Direct in North Kivu led by the Centre Résolution
Conflits (CRC); the European Union Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT)
Action Plan; the Pyoe Pin programme in Myanmar; and the Enabling State Programme in Nepal.
• Work through local conveners who have the authority and credibility to mobilise
all those with a stake in the process to tackle common problems and introduce
relevant change.
• Develop a good knowledge of the political economy of the space in which a
development programme operates to be able to design pilots and experiments,
pursuing activities that look promising and dropping others.
• Programme teams have to be politically informed, with an in-depth understand-
ing of what has happened previously in a particular sector, including the evolu-
tion of formal and informal relationships and linkages among actors.
• Development interventions that address ‘wicked hard problems’ need to be able
to invest considerable time and resources into brokering relationships and dis-
covering common interests around problems with local partners.
• Project management needs to avoid following linear paths and instead allow for
considerable muddling through and experimentation around defined and agreed
goals.
• Do not wait for statutory evaluations to learn. Blend design and implementation
through rapid cycles of planning, action and reflection to discuss and share les-
sons and design new solutions.
• Development partners’ staff need to continuously update their knowledge of the
political economy dynamics of the country and/or sector in which they invest.
• Programme funders provide resources, ideas and suggestions but must also be
willing to take a back seat, avoiding dominating the agenda (i.e. what to do) or
the process (i.e. how to do it).
• Programme funders can support this adaptive process by not setting spending
targets but rather allowing funding requirements to emerge.
The authors of this chapter agree and embrace these principles and suggestions;
however, as individuals working in large development programmes that tackle some
of the wicked hard problems of governance and state capability, they ask whether
and how these principles can be applied when operating at scale. For example, the
first phase of the KSI programme (2013–2017) managed a yearly budget of approxi-
mately AUD 12–14 million (c. US$9.1–10.6 million) and operated in the vast land-
scape that is the Indonesian knowledge sector. Can a programme of this size be
adaptive, flexible and iterative as DDD proponents suggest?
3 T
he Challenges for Doing Development Differently
at Scale
KSI is a joint programme between the governments of Indonesia and Australia that
supports the Indonesian government to address its key development challenges
through more effective public policies that make better use of research, analysis and
evidence (KSI 2017). KSI operates at scale at two levels: (1) the landscape, or con-
text, in which the programme operates – the Indonesian knowledge
sector – discussed in previous chapters, and (2) the size of the programme in terms
of budget, team and operations, which is the focus of this section. In particular, it
explores four major challenges for a programme that is learning to apply DDD prin-
ciples at scale: (1) a challenge to programme operations and administrative systems,
(2) a challenge related to the capacity required within the programme team, (3) a
challenge for monitoring and learning, and (4) a challenge of replication and learn-
ing to be a DDD programme. The authors’ reflections are based on the experience
of implementing the programme over the last 4 years and the results that emerged
from the international workshop ‘Doing Development Differently: A Workshop on
Thinking and Working Politically and Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation’ co-
organised by KSI, KOMPAK (Kolaborasi Masyarakat dan Pelayanan untuk
Kesejahteraan) and the World Bank, held in Jakarta in March 2017.6
A programme such as KSI – which explicitly attempts an integrated approach to
solving problems in the demand, use, production and intermediation and enabling
environment for evidence-informed policymaking in a country – has never been
tried before. The first phase of the programme, from May 2013 to June 2017,
received a budget of AUD 60.5 million (c. US$45.8 million).7 The programme team
at the time consisted of 45 full-time staff and numerous consultants. The second
phase of the programme began in July 2017 and will run through mid-2022, with a
budget of up to AUD 60 million (c. US$45.4 million). The KSI programme reports
and is accountable to Bappenas, which co-chairs the programme’s technical secre-
tariat and steering committee, along with the Australian Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, which is the sole funder of the programme.8
During its first phase, the programme worked with a wide range of ministries and
government agencies, including the Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher
Education (Kementerian Riset, Teknologi dan Pendidikan Tinggi, KemRistekDikti);
the Office of the President’s Staff (Kantor Staf Presiden, KSP); the National Institute
of Public Administration (Lembaga Administrasi Negara, LAN); the National
Goods/Services Public Procurement Agency (Lembaga Kebijakan Pengadaan
Barang Jasa Pemerintah, LKPP); the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of State
Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform (Kementerian Pendayagunaan Aparatur
Negara dan Reformasi Birokrasi); the National Civil Service Agency (Badan
6
See http://www.dddworkshop2017.org.
7
The original value of the first phase of the program was AUD 100 million (c US$75.7 million).
This was amended in 2015, following adjustments to Australia’s aid program. The pilot pro-
gramme to inform the design of KSI – implemented by The Asia Foundation – commenced in
March 2010 and included core funding and technical, advocacy and organisational capacity-
building support for eight Indonesian policy research organisations over a period of 18 months.
The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (then Australian Agency for International
Development or AusAID) also commissioned a range of diagnostic studies on the state of
Indonesia’s knowledge sector. These are available at http://www.ksi-indonesia.org/en/news/
detail/diagnostic-studies-on-the-knowledge-sector.
8
Within Bappenas, the programme is managed under the Deputy Minister for Economic Affairs
and within the Australian Agency for International Development by the Minister Counsellor for
Governance and Human Development.
Kepegawaian Negara, BKN); the Ministry of Villages, Development of

Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration (Kementerian Desa, Daerah Tertinggal
dan Transmigrasi); and the Coordinating Ministry for Human Development and
Cultural Affairs (Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Pembangunan Manusia dan
Kebudayaan). In addition to these government counterparts and partners, KSI
engaged in partnerships with 16 prominent Indonesian policy research institutes and
think tanks (see Chap. 2).9
Due to its experimental nature and the political nature of the wicked hard prob-
lems that affect Indonesia’s knowledge sector, KSI was uniquely positioned to adopt
a DDD approach. However, during the first phase of the programme, it became clear
that a large-sized programme faces specific challenges to do so.
3.1 The Challenge for Programme Operations
Large-scale development programmes require a large operations system, that is, the
processes and teams responsible for financial management, bookkeeping, procuring
goods and services and managing grants to programme partners and overall admin-
istration (payrolls, office rental, etc.) In a large programme like KSI, there is a ten-
sion between being adaptive and flexible in terms of the design, planning and
implementation of activities and the need to follow the administrative requirements
spelled out in a standard operating procedure manual signed by both the govern-
ment counterpart and the funder. Finding solutions to thorny problems, as suggested
by the proponents of PDIA, involves analysis and identification of subproblems as
well as planning and implementing a number of parallel activities (i.e. experiments,
pilots, prototypes, etc.) to test some solutions, as depicted by the orange lines in
Fig. 8.1. Activities that do not seem to work are then dropped, while those showing
progress are continued.
This way of working poses a challenge related to administrative and financial
procedures for programme operations, which usually follow a linear logic based on
plans and budgets that describe predictable activities and outputs over a 12-month
period. Moreover, these yearly plans and budgets are submitted for approval to a
steering committee chaired by the government counterpart and the programme
funder. Sign-off by the steering committee means that the programme is committed
to deliver specific activities to government and non-government partners for the fol-
9
The 16 policy research partners were AKATIGA, Article 33, CSIS, ELSAM, Institute for Research
and Empowerment (IRE), Komite Pemantauan Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah (KPPOD), Pusat
Kebijakan dan Manajemen Kesehatan Universitas Gadjah Mada (PKMK UGM), Pusat Penelitian
HIV/AIDS Universitas Atma Jaya (PPH Atma Jaya), Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat
Universitas Islam Negeri (PPIM UIN), Pusat Studi Hukum dan Kebijakan (PSHK), Pusat Studi
Agama dan Demokrasi Universitas Paramadina (PUSAD Paramadina), Pusat Kajian Politik
Universitas Indonesia (Puskapol UI), Sajogyo Institute (SAINS), Seknas FITRA, SMERU
Research Institute and SurveyMETER. Short profiles of the 16 partners can be found at http://
www.ksi-indonesia.org/files/1444374225$1$BTXGW$.pdf.
Fig. 8.1 From identifying problems to testing solutions (authors)
lowing 12 months. Because of the need to present a clear and coherent annual plan
and budget to the steering committee, these do not usually include parallel pilot
activities to solve a particular problem. Changing plans during the year is not sim-
ple, as it requires approval from the programme’s technical secretariat and steering
committee. This rigidity is compounded by the fact that a large programme such as
KSI usually plans to utilise 100% of the annual budget allocated by the funder. As a
result, the programme team is under considerable pressure over the course of the
12 months to spend the allocated budget, since it is usually not possible to shift
unspent funds to the following financial year. An interesting dynamic of large-scale
programmes is that the larger the budget, the greater the perceived risks of not being
able to deliver on programme objectives and outcomes, and thus the more systems
in place to control the use of funds and, simultaneously, the greater the pressure to
spend down the budget.
Not all of the problems identified by the KSI programme and its partners are
wicked hard or require doing development differently. Problems of capacity to carry
out and communicate policy research can be solved with simple and straightforward
training and mentoring support. However, the problems of capability in demand and
use of evidence (see Chap. 5) or in the enabling environment (see Chap. 7) can ben-
efit from the flexibility and adaptability suggested by the DDD approach. It is
possible to do so if all the systems in a programme (planning, implementation and
operations) support this way of working. If, on the other hand, the implementation
and operations teams follow different principles and logic, the opportunity cost
inherent in multiple, small-scale experiments running in parallel, with uncertain
outcomes, becomes too high, and the only choice is to fall back to a set number of
activities and pilots.
The KSI programme experienced these challenges and tried to find ways to
enable a more flexible and adaptive approach to the implementation of programme
activities. For example, funding for the 16 policy research organisations and think
tanks that partner with KSI was not based on detailed annual activity plans, deliver-
ables and budgets. The approach was to require the research partners to prepare
overarching plans to address problems they wanted to solve in their organisations
and to broadly define the cost categories for doing so. Some policy research partners
decided to fund new research activities; others used the funding to create new roles
in the organisation and hire new staff, while others sent staff to conferences and
workshops to present research results. The advantage of this flexible grant-making
arrangement was that changes in specific activities by the policy research partners
did not require contract modifications but simply a communication and discussion
with the KSI programme and operations teams, thus saving time and costs.
Pilots with government partners on the demand and use of evidence have not
enjoyed the same flexibility and tend to be planned over a 12-month cycle. Due to
regulations governing bilateral programmes, government partners cannot receive
grants and funding in the same way as non-government partners. This means that
the programme officers who design and develop the plans with government partners
are also directly involved in the implementation of activities, making it difficult to
manage and oversee a number of parallel pilots. This, in addition to pressure for
spending the allocated budget, means that priority is placed on implementing and
delivering outputs, rather than taking the time to assess whether or not solutions
show sign of traction. Moreover, a pilot with a government partner cannot always be
stopped quickly if the effort is not showing results, as this can imply a political cost
for the programme.
Large-scale development programmes, which, like KSI, would benefit from
adopting DDD, need to find ways to extend the flexible approaches and adaptive
implementation to the ways in which operations teams function. This requires
changes in the way plans and budget are developed and signed-off by the pro-
gramme’s governing bodies. Among possible solutions are:
• Plan activities for 6 months instead of 12 months.
• Enable a partial budget allocation in the annual plan, which would leave funding
available for new pilots and emerging solutions the following year.
• Decentralise implementation decisions within the team, allowing the team leader
and senior management team to spend more time on building relationships with
key stakeholders rather than administrative tasks.
• Invest in strengthening the capacity and understanding of the whole team (pro-
gramme and operations) in adaptive management and flexible budgeting, and
revise standard operating procedures accordingly.
• Invest time and resources to continuously communicate with the funder and gov-
ernment partners about how flexible planning and budgeting can help reduce the
opportunity costs of adjusting fixed plans.
Some interesting initiatives and emerging lessons can be cited in this area. For
example, work by The Asia Foundation in the Philippines, in conjunction with the
Coalition for Change programme (Faustino and Booth 2014), has shown that six
simple management tools can be sufficient to manage the sharing of information
and accountability reporting between the implementing team and the funder, which
in this case was the Australian Agency for International Development.10 The USAID
Learning Lab11 and Collaborating, Learning and Adapting Framework12 are another
example of a development partner taking concrete action to find ways to include
more collaboration, learning and adaptation in the programmes it designs and funds,
in order to ensure that programmes are grounded in a strong evidence base and
remain relevant throughout implementation.
A number of programmes implemented by Oxfam showed that ‘implementing
evolutionary approaches, such as setting up multiple pilots, can improve the design
of programmes in contexts where processes for achieving outcomes are not clear’
(Schlingheider et al. 2017, 27).
However, much needs to be learned and tested to strengthen the capability of
programme operations to support and adopt DDD principles when it would be
effective and useful to do so. KSI is learning how to do that and can therefore con-
tinue to build on interesting lessons as it enters its second phase of
implementation.
3.2 The Challenge of Skills on the Programme Team
Applying DDD principles requires a programme team with the experience and
capacity to do so. From the point of view of senior management, it means either
finding individuals with experience in adaptive management of programmes or
investing the necessary financial resources and time to build the skills and knowl-
edge of the existing team. Both options present some challenges. Since DDD prin-
ciples are part of an emerging discourse, only a small number of programmes
worldwide are currently experimenting with this approach. It is not yet a main-
stream approach, thus it is not easy to find people with the requisite skills and under-
standing. The second option involves capacity building. The staffing of large-scale
programmes occurs relatively quickly during the inception phase (i.e. the first 6 to
10 months). It has to happen quickly because from day one, a large programme is
under pressure to use the available budget and needs to move quickly into planning
and implementation of activities. This limits the resources and time available for
training staff on DDD. Moreover, the funder may also expect that a programme that
claims to adopt DDD is able to hire the staff needed to do so and may thus prohibit
the use of the programme budget for staff training. But what are the skills needed?
10
The six management tools described in Section 7 of the paper by Faustino and Booth (2014) are
‘1) a table to describe the political economy analysis of the interventions called technically sound,
politically possible reform; 2) a theory of change; 3) a table to describe the link between project
intervention and outcomes; 4) a timeline table to record significant events, key milestones or prog-
ress markers achieved and relevance, setbacks and other major changes; 5) a table to describe the
team of development entrepreneurs; 6) a mapping of coalition attitudes toward reforms and influ-
ence’ (29–30).
11
See https://usaidlearninglab.org.
12
See https://usaidlearninglab.org/faq/collaborating-learning-and-adapting-cla.
KSI has learned that a résumé showing 10–12 years of experience with donor-
funded programmes is not sufficient for building a team able to apply DDD princi-
ples. It may even be the wrong skills and type of experience. Team members need to
have strong facilitation and moderation skills. They also need to have analytical
skills to understand a particular political and economic context. These skills are usu-
ally acquired only after years of engagement in policy advocacy and coalition build-
ing and limited to individuals with the leadership, confidence and creativity to
undertake activities with uncertain outcomes. The challenge for large-scale develop-
ment programmes is not just to find and hire these individuals but also how to give
them the space required to maximise the skills and experience they bring to the
team. This is a problem because, in reality, staff in large programmes tend to devote
a considerable amount of time to administrative tasks (development of terms of ref-
erences, budgets, monitoring of spending, hiring of consultants, accountability
reporting, etc.). In addition, funders of large programmes often want to see smaller
and leaner teams implementing highly political programmes, which in a sense goes
against the principles of investing sufficient time in building a large network of rela-
tionships with partners. The latter approach not only allows better understanding of
the underlying problems that partners want to solve but also leads to better under-
standing of how to choose and decide which solutions to test and which not to test.
3.3 The Challenge with Monitoring and Learning
Doing development differently requires programme teams to invest considerable

time and effort in actively monitoring and learning from programmes. Feedback and
reflections during meetings are critical to gaining better understanding of the prob-
lems, choosing possible solutions and deciding which pilots to stop and which to
continue or expand. This cannot be done by a dedicated monitoring and learning
team or unit in isolation but rather requires all team members to see learning (and
the sharing of learning) as part of their job description.
Three sets of challenges exist in relation to monitoring and learning in large
development programmes. First, due to the need to quickly establish a programme
team during the inception phase and get on with planning activities and allocating
budgets, monitoring and learning units tend to consist of experts with considerable
experience in meeting donor accountability reporting requirements. But the job
description of programme team members may not include learning responsibilities.
Monitoring, evaluation and learning teams tend to be separated from the work of the
programme teams and from day-to-day interaction with partners, and their leaders
may not sit on the senior management team. As a result, monitoring, evaluation and
learning teams develop their own plans for monitoring activities, which may exclude
the programme team and external partners (Pellini and Shaxson 2017). The second
challenge is related to one of the key early deliverables of the monitoring, evalua-
tion and learning teams: the monitoring, evaluation and learning framework. This
often triggers a milestone payment from the funder and demands a great deal of
detail, resulting in complicated fretworks and systems (Ibid.).13 A third challenge is

that adaptive programmes – especially in the field of social change and policy inno-
vation – may implement several pilots at the same time. This is challenging for the
monitoring and learning team, especially if its work is not closely linked with that
of the programme team. The rich compilation of very specific case studies and sto-
ries of change may also be seen by the funder and government counterparts as being
too specific and not answering well the so what? question. At the same time, too
much aggregation and synthesis carry the risk that the information becomes too
generalised – and again not useful for funders and government counterparts (Ibid.)
Possible solutions to these challenges involve a commitment by senior pro-
gramme management to invest resources in developing different learning capacities
within teams and making sure that monitoring and learning are seen as a key part of
the job description by every team member. To strengthen a learning culture, it is
possible to create incentives for contributing to learning by rewarding writing and
publications, creating space for open discussion about what works and what does
not and generating evidence that being involved in monitoring and learning actually
helps to improve day-to-day work with partners. The senior management of the
programme has to put in place a strategy to ensure collaboration between the moni-
toring and learning and programme teams by creating space for reflection and shar-
ing that has a clear purpose, such as informing programme staff about decisions,
validating evidence of progress or involving the monitoring and learning team in the
design of prototypes. All this requires a flexible environment that provides authentic
delegation of authority and decision-making within teams.
Monitoring and learning systems have to be fit for purpose. There is no need to
over-engineer them. It can be useful to apply the same principles suggested by the
DDD approach: start small, test a few simple tools, and ask questions that help you
learn. Work with the funder and government counterpart to agree on a DDD
approach to monitoring and learning, and define the tools and processes that work
for the programme, the funder and the counterpart. Finally, invest in team capacities
and capabilities that really help to inform an adaptive approach.
3.4 The Challenge of Replication
Every development programme is under pressure to replicate and scale up success-

ful approaches and solutions. But what does replication and scaling up means for a
programme adopting DDD principles? Doesn’t scaling up and replication go against
the principles of finding and testing technically sound and politically feasible solu-
tions to locally defined problems? A traditional interpretation of replication and
scaling up by development partners works for problems that require the same
13
A closely linked issue here is that an upfront plan with predetermined indicators is more in tune
with a ‘logframe’ mindset than with a more adaptive ‘theory of change’. The former makes adapta-
tion more difficult, as it may result in less flexibility to design new pilots as opportunities emerge.
technical solutions over and over again, for example, building schools, health cen-
tres or roads in rural areas. It is, however, inadequate for solving wicked hard prob-
lems as defined in this chapter (Sect. 2). Owen Barder (2014) noted that for
programmes addressing wicked hard problems, the idea of ‘scaling up’ is more
elusive than it may appear. He refers to Lant Pritchett’s work on problem-driven
iterative adaptation, which notes that the aim should not be to build successful
organisations but rather to create instances of success from which effective, locally
owned organisations can emerge. The problem for funders and development pro-
grammes is that replicating such instances is not possible, because the nature of the
problem is always specific to a particular context and circumstances. Instead of
replication and scaling up, programmes that seek to adopt the DDD approach should
replicate the use of the principles they try to embrace, learning to become DDD
programmes by replicating and scaling up the art of ‘muddling through’ to find
solutions to wicked hard problems – not the solution itself (Lindblom 1959).
4 Conclusions
The KSI programme is learning about doing development differently. The increas-
ing understanding of the knowledge sector landscape acquired during the first phase
of the programme is contributing to changes in approach to addressing the problems
that programme partners want to solve in the knowledge sector. As the programme
entered its second phase in July 2017, it is worth noting some key differences with
phase one, which represent a sign of being more explicit about adopting some DDD
principles:
1. During the first phase, KSI provided grants to 16 local policy research institutes
and focused on building individual organisations’ capacity. In the second phase,
the programme will prioritise efforts to solve common problems affecting the
research partners and mobilise their collective capacity to do so.
2. Much effort during in the first phase of the programme went into establishing
relationships of trust with a broad range of stakeholders across national minis-
tries, civil society and private sector. During the second phase, the team will try
to leverage these relationships to address problems in the knowledge sector that
matter to a wider range of actors.
3. The first phase of the programme focused on national-level problems related to
the demand for and use of evidence in Indonesia’s development planning pro-
cess. During phase two, the programme will pilot and test some problem-driven
interventions at the subnational level to start building a foundation for engage-
ment with local government and other subnational knowledge sector actors.
4. During the first phase of the programme, the team was at times overwhelmed by
the scale of the country’s knowledge sector. The number of problems and actors
made it difficult to decide where to start. During phase two the programme will
continue to apply a problem-driven approach but will do so by seeking more
specific entry points – looking at Indonesia’s policy cycle and the problems of
accessing and using evidence during the agenda-setting stage, planning and bud-
geting through to implementation and monitoring and evaluation of public poli-
cies and programmes.
As KSI enters its second 5-year phase, it has become clear that the programme is
doing more than addressing problems in the Indonesian knowledge sector; instead
KSI is part of the evolution of Indonesia’s knowledge system. This is an important
distinction because it influences the way the programme plans, implements and
monitors its activities and operations and makes a DDD approach even more rele-
vant. Defining the knowledge sector as a sector can lead to a traditional approach to
implementation that aims to find scalable solutions across the sector. It can lead to
a technocratic approach focused more on technical solutions than on their political
feasibility. To see the knowledge sector as a system means to accept that individuals,
organisations and institutions do not operate in a vacuum. Each is in a process of
evolution, shaped by an external environment that includes other institutions, which
are themselves evolving.
It is not possible to solve problems that organisations face within a system if the
authorising and enabling environments are not in place to do so (Adler et al. 2009).
The programme team, government partners and funder need to agree on what that
enabling environment is. It starts by accepting, as Jane Jacobs (2000) put it, that
development and social change is an open-ended process that operates as a web of
interdependent co-developments and not along linear paths. It continues by hiring
the right skills, putting in place management and operational systems that decentral-
ise decision-making and allowing continuous adaptation and learning from suc-
cesses and failures. In the words of the ancient Chinese sage Lao-Tsu, it means to
‘let reality be reality’: accept complexity, embrace failure, treasure learning and
experience. Acceptance does not mean resignation or fatalism. It means, to para-
phrase Burkeman (2016), ceasing to pretend that policy change and social change
aren’t as complex, complicated, uncertain and political as they actually are.
References
Addison, T. (2005). Development policy. An introduction for students (Discussion Paper No. 9).
Helsinki: World Institute for Development Economics Research.
Adelman, I. (2000). The role of government in economic development. In F. Tarp (Ed.), Foreign aid
and development. Lessons learnt and directions for the future (pp. 48–79). London: Routledge.
Adler, D., Sage, C., & Woolcock, M. (2009). Interim institutions and the development process:
Opening spaces for reform in Cambodia and Indonesia (Working Paper No. 86). Brooks World
Poverty Institute, University of Manchester. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1421808. Accessed
12 Mar 2017.
Algoso, D. and Hudson, A. (2016). Where have we got to on adaptive learning, thinking and work-
ing politically, doing development differently etc.? Getting beyond the People’s Front of Judea.
From Poverty to Power Blog, http://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/where-have-we-got-to-on-adaptive-
learning-thinking-and-working-politically-doing-development-differently-etc-getting-beyond-
the-peoples-front-of-judea/. Accessed 19 Mar 2017.
Andrews, M., Pritchett, L., Woolcock, M. (2012). Escaping capability traps through problem-
driven iterative adaptation (PDIA) (Working Paper 299). Washington, DC: Center for Global
Development. http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1426292. Accessed 21 Mah
2017.
Andrews, M., Pritchett, L., & Woolcock, M. (2015). Building capability by delivering results:
Putting Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA) principles into practice. In A. Whaites,
E. Gonzales, S. Fyson, & G. Teskey (Eds.), A governance practitioner's notebook: Alternative
ideas and approaches (pp. 123–133). Paris: OECD-DAC Network on Governance.
Andrews, M., Pritchett, L., & Woolcock, M. (2017). Building state capability. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Arndt, H. W. (1987). Economic development. In History of an idea. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press.
Barder, O. (2014). Evidence and scale. Notes for remarks to the CIFF Board dinner, 16th May
2014. http://cf.owen.org/wp-content/uploads/2014-05-16-CIFF-Board-Dinner-Evidence-and-
scale-as-delivered2.pdf. Accessed 18 Mar 2017.
Booth, D. & Unsworth, S. (2014). Politically smart, locally led development (Discussion Paper).
London: Overseas Development Institute. https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/
publications-opinion-files/9158.pdf. Accessed 28 Mar 2017.
Booth, D. (2011). Aid effectiveness: Bringing country ownership (and politics) back in (Working
Paper 336). London: Overseas Development Institute.
Briggs, X. (2008). Democracy as problem-solving: Civic capacity in communities across the
globe. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Burkeman, O. (2016, April 8 How to love your daily commute. The Guardian. https://www.the-
guardian.com/lifeandstyle/2016/apr/08/how-to-love-your-daily-commute-oliver-burkeman.
Escobar, A. (2011). Encountering development: The making and unmaking of the third world.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Fabella, R. V., Faustino, J., Mirandilla-Santos, M. G., Ciatiang, P., & Paras, R. (2011). Built on
dreams, grounded on reality: Economic policy reform in the Philippines. Manila: The Asian
Foundation.
Faustino, J. & Booth, D. (2014). Development entrepreneurship: how donors and leaders can fos-
ter institutional change (Working Politically in Practice Series – Case Study No. 2). London:
Overseas Development Institute and San Francisco: The Asia Foundation.
Green, D. (2016). How change happens. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Grindle, M. (2004). Good enough governance: Poverty reduction and reform in developing coun-
tries. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, 17,
525–548.
Hirschman, A. O. (1967). Development projects observed. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution
Press.
Jacobs, J. (2000). The nature of economies. New York: Random House.
KSI. [Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy: The Knowledge Sector Initiative].
(2017). About KSI. http://www.ksi-indonesia.org/en/pages/knowledge-sector-initiative.
Lindblom, C. E. (1959). The science of muddling through. Public Administration Review, 19(2),
79–88.
Parfitt, T. W. (2002). The end of development? Modernity, post-modernity and development.
London: Pluto Press.
Pellini, A. (2007). Decentralisation policy in Cambodia. Exploring community participation in
the education sector (Acta Universitatis Tamperensis 1235). Tampere: University of Tampere.
Pellini, A. & Shaxson, L. (2017). Doing development differently means doing monitoring, evalua-
tion & learning differently too. BetterEvaluation.org. https://goo.gl/4ocNgy. Accessed 10 May
2017.
Pritchett, L. (2013). Folk and the formula. Fact and fiction in development. Helsinki: World
Institute for Development Economics Research.
Pritchett, L., Samji, S., Hammer, J. (2013). It’s all about MeE: Learning in development projects
through monitoring (“M”), experiential learning (“e”) and impact evaluation (“E”) (Working
Paper 322). Washington, DC:. Center for Global Development. https://www.cgdev.org/publica-
tion/its-all-about-mee-using-structured-experiential-learning-e-crawl-design-space. Accessed
23 Mar 2017.
Ramalingam, B. (2015). Aid on the edge of chaos. Rethinking international cooperation in a com-
plex world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ramalingam, B., and Jones, H. (2008). Exploring the science of complexity: Ideas and impli-
cations for development and humanitarian efforts (Working Paper 285). London: Overseas
Development Institute.
Rodrik, D. (2008). Second-best institutions. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings,
98(2), 100–104.
Rondinelli, D. A. (1989). Development projects as policy experiments: An adaptive approach to
development administration. London: Routledge.
Rostow, W. W. (1960). The stages of economic growth: A non-communist manifesto. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Schlingheider, A., Pellfolk, E., Maneo, G., Desai, H. (2017). Managing to adapt. Analysing adap-
tive management for planning, monitoring, evaluation, and learning. London: London School
of Economics and Political Science.
Schultz, W. T. (1962). Investment in human capital. In E. S. Phelps (Ed.), The goal of economic
growth (pp. 106–120). New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc..
Sen, A. (1988). The concept of development. In H. Chenery & T. N. Srinivasan (Eds.), Handbook
of development economics (Vol. I, pp. 9–26). Amsterdam: North Holland.
Sen, A. (1999). Development as freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Singer, H. W. (1964). Education and economic development. In H. W. Singer (Ed.), International
development: Growth and change. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Wheelan, C. (2002). Naked economics. In Undressing the dismal science. New York: W.W. Norton
& Company.
Williamson, T. (2015). Change in challenging contexts (How does it happen? Research report).
London: Overseas Development Institute. https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/
publications-opinion-files/9829.pdf. Accessed 28 Mar 2017.
Chapter 9
Conclusion

1 Introduction
These are not easy times to argue, as do the authors of this book, for an evidence-
informed approach to policymaking. Changes in politics, policymaking and the way
citizens see and perceive the policymaking process seem to conspire against it.
One of the most prominent campaign claims made during the United Kingdom’s
Brexit referendum (23 June 2016) was that the United Kingdom is sending GBP
350 million (c. US$450 million)1 a week to the European Union and that these funds
should instead be spent on the British National Health Service. The claim relied on
the maximum possible calculation of the costs of the United Kingdom’s European
Union membership, disregarding both the rebate that the country receives and direct
1 GBP = 1.26 US$. Google 8 July 2017

1
A. Pellini (*)
B. Prasetiamartati · E. Jackson
Jakarta, Indonesia
K. P. Nugroho
F. Carden

European Union spending in the United Kingdom.2 This fact caught people’s atten-
tion only after the results were presented (Rose 2017).
A second recent example is President Donald Trump’s decision to make good on
his campaign pledge to abandon the October 2016 Paris Agreement on climate
change. So far of the 197 countries that signed the agreement, 150 countries have
ratified it. President Trump’s decision ignores a huge amount of scientific evidence
about the human contributions to climate change and places the United States
alongside Nicaragua and Syria as the only countries that are not part of this land-
mark accord.
Chapter 6 demonstrated that digital information technologies are providing
unique opportunities to add new, timely and less costly analysis and evidence to the
toolkits that policymakers can use to inform their decisions. At the same time, tech-
nology is also changing politics and the way elections are won or lost and by whom.
The Guardian newspaper has been investigating how some data analytic companies,
by collecting and analysing information on British and American voters from social
network platforms and datasets, have managed to identify ‘persuadable’ voters on a
massive scale and target them with individualised political messages and evidence
(Cadwallader 2017).
Widespread accessibility to digital and social media is contributing to the rise of
‘fake news’, that is, ‘wholly or mostly fabricated stories in the style of news reports
usually posted online and often shared virally which cater separately to both those
on the left and the right’ (Rose 2017, 2). Politics seems to have contributed to this
phenomenon, possibly because of the strong ideological split between political per-
spectives on right and left (Ibid.).
Twenty years have passed since Tony Blair was elected as Prime Minister of the
United Kingdom. His emphasis was on generating and using more and better-
quality evidence to modernise the government and improve the way policy deci-
sions were made. Today a similar belief in the need to use evidence in policymaking
appears to be lacking. For Rose (2017), we live in a time of bitter divisions between
different groups of citizens and ‘politicians are routinely placed at or towards the
bottom of indices of trust’ (Rose 2017, 1). Political philosopher Michael Sandel
believes that this mistrust between citizens and politicians has its roots in the
increasing marginalisation of large parts of society as a result of globalisation
(Sandel 2017). Many believe the political system is broken and cannot be trusted.
The policymaking process is perceived as technocratic and removed from people’s
lives and problems. Data, figures and analysis presented by the system cannot be
trusted and are either ‘fake’ or manipulated.
2
Bennet and Kirkup (2017) report that in 2015, the United Kingdom full membership fee to the
European Union was GBP17.8 billion. This amount is reduced to GBP 12.9 billion by the instant
rebate the United Kingdom receives and to ca. GBP 6 billion due to the amount spent by or through
the European Union in the United Kingdom. This corresponds to ca. GBP 115 million per week.
9 Conclusion 149
These are not easy times for arguing in favour of evidence-informed policymak-
ing. But is the situation so dire? Andrew Anthony (2017), in a recent interview with
scientist Shaughnessy Naughton,3 notes that scientific evidence can be used to jus-
tify a bad policy decision. However, it is important to question everything and
remember that experts are needed to question facts, derive new facts and help to
accept facts.
The underlying assumption of this book is that high-quality, timely evidence can
help to make policy decisions that can solve the problems people face. No perfect
evidence-informed policymaking system exists anywhere in the world. Due to the
political nature of policymaking, an evidence-informed approach is something that
can be achieved through incremental reforms and changes in the way evidence is
produced, demanded and used. The editors of this book argue that a strong knowl-
edge sector and the consistent and systematic use of evidence in policymaking con-
tributes to the social, political and economic evolution and development of a country,
equipping it to meet the challenges of the Fourth Industrial Revolution playing out
in the twenty-first century (Schwab 2016).
Therefore, it is important to argue for an evidence-informed approach to policy-
making. The alternative − opinion-based policymaking based on ideologically
driven evidence – should be avoided. Good evidence matters for policy more than
ever, and there is room for optimism. Brexit, fake news, and ideology versus climate
change science are not, after all, global phenomena. They are alarming symptoms in
some Western countries, but are not global trends.
Louise Ball (2017) has collected some examples from middle-income countries
that are investing in processes and systems to demand and introduce more evidence
into policymaking. In South Africa two initiatives are particularly significant. In
2012, the Department of Environmental Affairs published a plan to ensure that all
its policies are based on robust evidence (Department of Environmental Affairs
2012). The Department for Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, established in
2009 within the presidency, has a mandate to facilitate, influence and support effec-
tive planning, monitoring and evaluation of government programmes. It also
engages in building a culture of evidence use through capacity development and
training for senior ministry officials (Cassidy and Tsui 2017a). The Government of
Colombia is another example of building a culture of demand and use of evidence
within government. The Government Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (Sistema
Nacional de Evaluación de Gestión y Resultados – SINERGIA)4 has been instru-
mental in holding government to account for over two decades and is currently
engaging in generating and using evidence to drive the National Development Plan
to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (Cassidy and Tsui 2017b). The
Malaysian Government’s Performance Management and Delivery Unit (Unit
3
Shaughnessy Naughton is the founder of science activist group 314 Action, which seeks to pro-
mote science, technology, engineering and maths education and helps scientists become politi-
cians. The name refers to the first three digits of the mathematical ratio pi, a scientific imprint that
occurs everywhere in life (Anthony 2017).
4
See https://sinergia.dnp.gov.co/Paginas/inicio.aspx.
Pengurusan Prestasi Dan Pelaksanaan - PEMANDU)5 is the largest delivery unit in

the world. Its mandate is to implement and monitor the National Transformation
Programme, which consists of a set of high-level governmental priorities to trans-
form the economy and society, in addition to making data publicly available and
having a strong emphasis on public communications to increase government
accountability to citizens (Cassidy and Tsui 2017c).
Indonesia, which is at the centre of this this volume, is among these countries
(and governments) that are investing in their development processes by strengthen-
ing the capability the country’s policymaking systems and testing ways to make
better use of evidence to inform policy decisions and support and sustain the devel-
opment of effective public policies (see Chap. 1). In this concluding chapter, the
editors summarise the key findings and share some thoughts about what lies ahead
for Indonesia’s knowledge sector.
2 Summary of Findings
The intent of this book was to examine and describe the evolution of the Indonesian
knowledge sector and the use of knowledge and evidence to inform policy deci-
sions.6 Among the questions that the authors wanted to investigate were: How well
equipped is Indonesia to face the challenges posed by the Fourth Industrial
Revolution? Is the country developing the intellectual capital required to transform
knowledge into public policies that support and sustain equitable growth? Are uni-
versities and think tanks producing research and evidence that is relevant to the
needs of policymakers or is post-truth politics on the rise? How do policymakers
make use of evidence to inform policy decisions? In what ways are new information
and communication technologies changing the way evidence informs policymaking
in Indonesia? What rules and regulations are in place to support the production of
policy research and its use in policymaking? (See Chap. 1.)
To raise these questions and provide responses, the authors drew on the analyti-
cal framework developed by Karetji (2010) who describes the Indonesia’s evolution
from a recent past of low accountability, top-down decision-making with very lim-
ited demand for evidence to inform policy to today’s semi-decentralised governance
environment. In the new environment, accountabilities are still towards the centre or
local patrons, but the demand for evidence to inform public policy by the national
and local governments is evolving and increasing. The future scenario is one of
solid democratic rules, with accountability mainly to citizens and with government
organisations that proactively invest in funding and procuring evidence to inform
policy decisions. Each chapter applies this evolutionary analytical framework to a
5
See https://www.pemandu.gov.my.
6
The Indonesian knowledge sector was defined in Chap. 1 as ‘the institutional landscape of gov-
ernment, private sector, and civil society organizations that provide research and analysis to sup-
port the development of public policy’ (AusAID 2012).
9 Conclusion 151
specific aspect of Indonesia’s knowledge sector: the role of universities; the role of
policy research institutes in informing policymaking; the function of knowledge
intermediaries within government organisations; how government organisations
demand and utilise evidence; the changes that the data revolution and data analytics
are bringing to evidence-informed policymaking; and the rules and regulations that
can support and enable an evidence-informed approach to policymaking. Last but
not least, the book offers reflections on designing and implementing a flexible and
adaptive development programme in the knowledge sector 8.7
The concluding section of each chapter presents specific findings linked to the
topic of the chapter; below the editors draw some high-level key findings.
2.1 L
eadership at the Top Alone Is Not Sufficient
for Developing a Culture That Values the Use of Evidence
in Policymaking
Chapter 1 points out that the idea of a ‘knowledge sector’ is a construct. The
Indonesian knowledge sector isn’t a sector in a traditional sense like, for example,
the education sector or the health sector. There isn’t a single ministry in Indonesia
that focuses on ensuring the development and strengthening of evidence use in poli-
cymaking. The knowledge sector cuts across all sectors, as policy decisions are
made in all economic and social sectors.
The findings from Chap. 2 about stronger involvement of policy research institutes
in policymaking, Chap. 3 on the establishment of the policy analyst role, Chap. 5 on the
evolving demand for evidence from government organisations and Chap. 7 on signifi-
cant reforms in the regulatory environment of the knowledge sector seem to confirm
Karetji’s analysis about the evolving demand and use of evidence in policymaking, as
well as the implementation of reforms to help strengthen and sustain this trend.
These are positive signs, but they need to be balanced against the evidence that
research organisations − such as universities, research and development units within
government and policy research organisations − struggle to produce quality research
when compared to similar organisations in other middle-income countries. The
quality of research and evidence and the availability of evidence are aspects of the
problem in the knowledge sector. Improving the quality of evidence and the com-
munication of research findings needs to be complemented by a strong and consis-
tent demand for evidence from policymaking and policy-implementing organisations.
A clear role for knowledge intermediates within and outside of government is also
required, along with a set of rules and regulations that create the incentives required
7
As mentioned in Chap. 1, as editors and authors, we derived insights, experiences and evidences
from the experience acquired through the implementation of the Australia-Indonesia Partnership
for Pro-Poor Policy: The Knowledge Sector Initiative, a donor-funded programme which was
launched in 2013 which aims to strengthen the demand and use of evidence in policymaking in
Indonesia.
to continue the development of a culture of demand and use of evidence within the
bureaucracy and throughout the policy cycle.
Given that the knowledge sector is cross-cutting, a strong culture of demand and
use of evidence requires, across the bureaucracy, the recognition that high-quality
and timely evidence matters for policymaking and that strengthening demand and
use is ultimately as much about strengthening the quality of the processes through
which evidence is sourced, appraised, interpreted and used as it is about the quality
of the evidence itself (see Chap. 5).
Leadership is key to achieving this recognition and attitude. However, drawing in
particular from the insights in Chap. 8, the authors stress that it is not realistic to
expect this leadership to exist at the very top of the political systems (i.e. the presi-
dency) and that it will somehow trickle down within the bureaucracy. This type of
unrealistic assumption about the role of champions in public policy reforms, as
mentioned by Andrews et al. (2012), is one of the reasons why so many governance
and public policy development programmes and reforms have actually failed.
Leadership, intent and commitment from the top are certainly necessary, but success
in shaping a new culture of demand and use of evidence requires acceptance (and
leadership) at different levels of the bureaucracy, by civil servants and others respon-
sible for implementing the many changes required to translate a policymaking cul-
ture that values evidence into a policymaking system that demands and uses
evidence to inform policy decisions. In other words, without acceptance by civil
servants within the bureaucracy, leadership (even from the very top) alone cannot
change behaviours and attitudes towards the use of evidence in policymaking.
2.2 A Strong Knowledge Sector Requires Strong Foundations
A strong culture that favours the use of evidence for policymaking is not only the
result of strong leadership and acceptance throughout the bureaucracy but also of
strong foundations in research capability, which in turn is linked to a strong educa-
tion system. Human capital, which is the result of investment and reform in educa-
tion and higher education, is the foundation upon which a sustainable,
evidence-informed policymaking culture and system can be built.
The authors of Chap. 2 stressed that Indonesian academics, in terms of publica-
tion and international visibility, are struggling to compete with their colleagues in
Southeast Asia and East Asia. Moreover, and more worryingly, according to the
international comparison by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) Programme for International Student Assessment for 2015,
Indonesia’s 15-year-old students struggle to understand core school subjects such as
science, reading and mathematics.8 Indonesian schools, despite large budget alloca-
8
The Programme for International Students Assessment results, comparing the education out-
comes of high school students (15 years of age) in a number of countries, ranked Indonesia 62nd
out of 72 economies assessed (See http://www.oecd.org/pisa/) (OECD 2016).
9 Conclusion 153
tions to primary and lower secondary education, cannot yet compete with those of
other middle-income economies.
The point is that there is a link between the quality of education (and higher
education) and the strength of a culture within the bureaucracy that demands and
uses evidence. Strengthening the use of evidence in policymaking requires the
identification of specific problems in the systems, tools, capability and attitudes
within the knowledge sector. It also requires that solutions to these problems are not
only technically sound but also politically feasible. At the same time, it is important
to recognise that without also addressing problems in the education system and thus
strengthening of human capital, the knowledge sector will always remain weak.
This weakness will have an influence on all areas of the knowledge sector. A strong
education system not only prepares future generations of researchers but also future
generations of public servants and bureaucrats.
The need to address problems in the education sector is made even more urgent
by the data revolution. The authors of Chap. 6 note that big data is profoundly
changing the way we approach social science (Benoit and Cukier 2015) and the
evolution of evidence-informed policymaking trends over the next 10–20 years. If
over the next 10 years Indonesia’s education system acquires the capability to pro-
duce the research and analytical capacity and skills required today, it will still be 10
years behind, particularly in the areas of data analytics and innovation. After all, as
noted by Benoit and Cukier (Ibid.), 10 years from now, social science researchers
will need to know and work with coding, or else their knowledge and skills may
well be outdated.
2.3 The Knowledge Sector is an Evidence Ecosystem
Chapter 1 defines the Indonesian knowledge sector as a sector in which govern-

ment, private sector and civil society organisations provide research and analysis to
support the development of public policy (AusAID 2012). This definition is used
explicitly and implicitly throughout all chapters. Only in Chap. 8, when discussing
the principles of doing development differently applied to a large development pro-
gramme, have the authors used the term knowledge system.
This is a subtle but significant difference. The term sector, particularly when
applied to actors, systems and processes related to evidence-informed policymak-
ing, is reminiscent of a linear approach to the design and implementation of policy
reforms and programmes to tackling persistent problems. This approach has often
resulted in technocratic interventions that are solution-driven and measured by inad-
equate behavioural indicators. Utilising the sector definition of Indonesia’s knowl-
edge sector carries the risk that the design of programmes and reforms by the
Indonesian government and development partners will reflect traditional bureau-
cratic structures and accountabilities. Traditional sectors such as health and educa-
tion have a ministry in charge of designing and implementing policies and managing
the policy cycle for specific reforms. However, this is not the case for the knowledge
sector which, as mentioned above and in Chap. 1, is horizontal in nature with no one
ministry or department responsible. The complexity, the politics and the diversity of
actors and types of evidence in the knowledge sector are more reminiscent of a
system or, to borrow a term from big data, an evidence ecosystem.
Why is it important to see the knowledge sector as an evidence ecosystem?
First, to see the knowledge sector as an evidence ecosystem means to accept that
the actors in the system are linked in a complex web of interlinked relationships
whereby they not only want to produce and use evidence but also want to influence
each other. This web cuts across policy areas and policy sectors. It is wider than any
individual sector.
Second, it is because changes in capability within the evidence ecosystem are
evolutionary, rather than linear and based on the principles of engineering, which
are so common in development programmes (Green 2017). The evolution of a sys-
tem, as noted by Jacobs (2000), involves a process that constantly produces increas-
ing diversity and co-development relationships. As it evolves, it generates greater
complexity. Importantly, the evolution of such a system is governed by uncertainty,
rather than the certainty and linearity of results-based programmes.
Donella Meadows (2009) defines a system as ‘an interconnected set of elements
that is coherently organised in a way that achieves something’ (11). In brief, a sys-
tem consists of elements, interconnections and a purpose. The elements are the easi-
est parts to see, because they are visible and tangible. In the knowledge system,
elements include, for example, universities, policy research institutes, policy analy-
sis units, ministries, local governments, civil servants, researchers and data scien-
tists. Interconnections are the relationships that hold these elements together. It is
more difficult to understand these interconnections and why elements are linked as
they are. Interconnections often reflect information flows. The government, for
example, needs information about the economy, social problems, education and
health to decide on policies and fund programmes. The purpose is the hardest part
of a system to spot, as it may not be articulated orally or in writing. The purpose
must be deduced from behaviour, rather than rhetoric or stated goals, for example,
a commitment to use more research-based evidence in policymaking followed by
the establishment of new funding mechanisms for think tanks and policy research
organisations (see Chap. 7).
Changes in a system require mapping and understanding all three aspects of the
system. Government interventions and development programmes often focus on
changes to the elements (e.g. new research organisations, trained civil servants,
etc.) − which usually have the least impact on the system but are easier to measure
and report on. Some interventions venture further, looking at ways to change or
influence interconnections in the system (e.g. forums between researchers and poli-
cymakers, coalitions among advocacy organisations and knowledge producers,
etc.). This can have a positive impact on the system but may not last. Very few
interventions venture so far as to try to influence or change the system’s purpose,
which is the level capable of instituting the most profound changes to the system.
9 Conclusion 155
Duncan Green (2016) posits that trying to change a system requires that the
implementing team, government counterparts, programme partners and funders are
comfortable with the fact that change is a slow and steady process that may not fit
the set timeframe often imposed on development programmes. Time is required to
learn about the system and identify the spaces where change is happening or the
conditions for change are in place. Rushing quickly into planning and delivery of
outputs is not productive. The ideas that emerge from this approach are like bets;
they may or may not work.9 Activities and plans need to be flexible and should be
stopped if the conditions for change are no longer in place. System change demands
being alert to changes in elements, interconnections or purposes by being an active
member of several networks and coalitions. It also calls for acknowledgement that
luck plays an important role in success and that, as Albert Hirschman once said,
solutions may be found by accident. Practitioners should undertake multiple paral-
lel experiments and be prepared to learn and discuss openly why pilots and experi-
ments may have failed. They should explore and broker partnerships with local and
international actors to learn about alternative solutions. Finally, they should be curi-
ous and look for positive deviances, that is, for individuals or organisations that
have managed to solve similar problems.
All this, Green admits, poses an overwhelming challenge to traditional linear
planning approaches and established ways of working in development and reform
programmes, which prefer simple and neat narratives that in reality are only possi-
ble in hindsight (Gladwell 2010; Green 2016).
3 Final Thoughts
Klaus Schwab (2016) argues that the world has entered the early stages of the Fourth
Industrial Revolution. To be part of this new industrial revolution and to benefit
from it in terms of equitable economic growth, better services and technology that
contribute to improve people’s livelihood will require Indonesia to invest in and
develop a strong knowledge system/evidence ecosystem. This investment has two
dimensions. The first is to create the enabling environment in which knowledge
producers, actors who demand and use evidence, and knowledge intermediaries
have the resources and spaces for the generation and critical sharing of knowledge
and evidence. The second is to continue to develop a culture and positive attitude
towards the value of high-quality and timely evidence for informing policy decision
and the overall strategic direction of the country. This requires investments in human
capital through building strong capabilities and foundations through investments to
strengthen the education system and universities.
As Indonesia enters the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the complexity and range
of public policy issues faced by the country are increasing and require well-trained
9
See the interview with Jaime Faustino of the Asia Foundation in the Philippines at https://youtu.
be/TYBdeljpMz0 (ODI 2014).
policy professionals (Friedberg and Hildebrand 2017). Such professionals should

be able to understand and navigate the politics of policymaking as well as knowing
how different types of evidence can help inform policy decisions throughout the
policy cycle. This new industrial revolution is accompanied by a data revolution,
creating enormous opportunities for governments and policymakers to strengthen
knowledge systems and better understand policy problems, progress, responses and
solutions.
Introducing more and better evidence into policy decisions is one of the opportu-
nities that can be nurtured as Indonesia seeks ways to maximise the benefits of the
data revolution and the Fourth Industrial Revolution. To do so requires an optimistic
and progressive view of the future. It requires what Adelman (2013), describing the
influence that the Italian intellectual Eugenio Colorni had on Albert Hirschman,
defines as the ‘benefit of the doubt’. For Colorni, doubt was creative because it
opened the door for alternative ways of seeing the world and freedom from ideo-
logical constraints, all of which could lead to new political strategies. Doubt also
meant accepting the limits of individual knowledge, liberating actors from the belief
that one must know everything before taking action.
Writing this book has helped the authors to better understand the elements and
interconnections of the Indonesian knowledge system. It has also raised questions
about how well we understand the purpose of the knowledge system and its subsys-
tems. The process has provided some answers but also raised questions (i.e. doubt).
This is not a failure but rather part of the discovery to which it is hoped that this
book will contribute.
References
Adelman, J. (2013). Worldly philosopher: The Odyssey of Albert O. Hirschman. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Andrews, M., Pritchett, L., & Woolcock, M. (2012). Escaping capability traps through problem-
driven iterative adaptation (PDIA) (Working Paper 299). Washington, DC: Center for Global
Development. http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1426292. Accessed 21 Mar
2017.
Anthony, A. (2017, March 18). The climate change battle dividing Trump’s America. The
Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/science/2017/mar/18/the-scientists-taking-the-fight-
to-trump-climate-change-epa. Accessed 25 Apr 2017.
AusAID [Government of Australia. Australian Agency for International Development]. (2012).
Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy: The Knowledge Sector Initiative: Design
document. Jakarta. http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/indo-ks-design.pdf.
Ball, L. (2017). Developing and emerging countries buck the ‘post-truth’ trend, ODI opinion.
London: Overseas Development Institute. https://www.odi.org/comment/10512-developing-
and-emerging-countries-buck-post-truth-trend. Accessed 3 June 2017.
Bennet, A., & Kirkup, J. (2017, March 10). How much money does Britain currently pay the EU?.
The Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/how-much-do-we-spend-on-the-eu-and-
what-else-could-it-pay-for/. Accessed 10 June 2017.
9 Conclusion 157
Benoit, K., & Cukier, K. (2015). The challenge of big data for the social sciences. Public Lecture,
London School of Economics. http://goo.gl/Rmi56P. Accessed 12 Apr 2017.
Cadwallader, C. (2017, May 19). Did big data tips it for Brexit? The Guardian Weekly (pp. 26–30).
Cassidy, C., & Tsui, J. (2017a). Global evidence policy unit in South Africa: The Department for
Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME). Jakarta: Knowledge Sector Initiative. http://
www.ksi-indonesia.org/en/news/detail/evidence-policy-unit-in-south-africa-the-department-
for-planning-monitoring-and-evaluation-dpme-. Accessed 15. June 2017.
Cassidy, C., & Tsui, J. (2017b) Global evidence policy units Colombia: SINERGIA. Jakarta:
Knowledge Sector Initiative. http://www.ksi-indonesia.org/en/news/detail/evidence-policy-
unit-in-colombia-sinergia. Accessed 15 June 2017.
Cassidy, C., & Tsui, J. (2017c). Global evidence policy units Malaysia: PEMANDU. Jakarta:
Knowledge Sector Initiative. http://www.ksi-indonesia.org/file_upload/Global-Evidence-
Policy-Unit-in-Malaysia-PEMANDU-14Jun2017162907.pdf. Accessed 15 June 2017.
Department of Environmental Affairs. (2012). Environment sector research, development and
evidence framework: An approach to enhance science-policy interface and evidence-based
policymaking. Pretoria: Department of Environmental Affairs of the Republic of South Africa.
https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/docs/environmental_research_framework.
pdf Accessed 4 June 2017.
Friedberg, E., & Hilderbrand, M. E. (Eds.). (2017). Observing policy-making in Indonesia.
Singapore: Springer.
Gladwell, M. (2010). What the dog saw: And other adventures. London: Penguin.
AusAID [Australian Agency for International Development]. (2012). Australia-Indonesia
Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy: The Knowledge Sector Initiative, Design document. http://
dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/indo-ks-design.pdf. Accessed 11 Mar 2014.
Green, D. (2017). How change happens. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jacobs, J. (2000). The nature of economies. New York: Random House.
at http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/indo-ks8-overview.pdf. Accessed on 21
May 2017.
Meadows, D. H. (2009). Thinking in systems. A primer. London: Earthscan.
OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development]. (2016). PISA 2015 Results in
Focus. https://www.oecd.org/pisa/pisa-2015-results-in-focus.pdf. Accessed 5 June 2017.
ODI [Overseas Development Institute]. (2014). Jaime Faustino on development entrepreneurship.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TYBdeljpMz0. Accessed 10 June 2017.
Rose, J. (2017). Brexit trump, and post-truth politics. Public Integrity: American Society for Public
Administration, 19, 555. https://doi.org/10.1080/10999922.2017.1285540.
Sandel, M. (2017). In conversation with Michael Sandel: Capitalism, democracy, and the pub-
lic good (London School of Economics Public Lecture podcasts). London: London School
of Economics and Political Sciences. http://www.lse.ac.uk/website-archive/newsAndMedia/
videoAndAudio/channels/publicLecturesAndEvents/player.aspx?id=3770. Accessed 27 May
2017.
Schwab, K. (2016). The fourth industrial revolution. Geneva: World Economic Forum.

Knowledge, Politics and Policymaking in Indonesia

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Knowledge, Politics and Policymaking in Indonesia

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Arnaldo

Kharisma Priyo Nugroho Elisabeth Jackson

ISBN 978-981-13-0166-7 ISBN 978-981-13-0167-4 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018943295

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2018

Printed on acid-free paper

Knowledge is not power until it is turned into action (Aristotle)

Tampere, Finland Arnaldo Pellini

Part I Producing Knowledge for Policy

Part II Knowledge and the Politics of Policymaking

Part III The Enabling Environment for Evidence-­Informed

8 Doing Development Differently at Scale................................................ 131

About the Editors

Arnaldo Pellini is a Senior Research Fellow of the Research and Policy in

Budiati Prasetiamartati is a Programme Lead at the Australia-Indonesia

multilateral and bilateral organisations, NGOs, governments and research institu-

Kharisma Priyo Nugroho was the Programme Lead at the Australia-Indonesia

Elisabeth Jackson is a Programme Lead at the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for

Fred Carden holds a Ph.D. from the Université de Montréal. He is the Principal at

he is the author of Knowledge to Policy: Making the Most of Development Research

About the Contributors

Tanty Nurhayati Djafar is a Programme Officer at the Australia-Indonesia

Iskhak Fatonie is a Senior Programme Officer at the Australia-Indonesia Partnership

George Hodge manages Pulse Lab Jakarta’s Trade and Economic Competitiveness

Petrarca Chawaro Karetji joined the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Pro-­

partnership development among organisations, NGOs, government and research

Irene Astuti Kuntjoro was a Programme Officer at the Australia-Indonesia

Yanuar Nugroho is an academic, researcher and senior policymaker in the field of

Manchester’s Institute of Science and Technology (2000–2001). Prior to his doc-

Farini Pane was a Programme Manager at the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for

Agus Pramusinto is a Professor at the Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta,

Endah Bayu Purnawati was a Programme Officer at the Australia-Indonesia

Diastika Rahwidiati is passionate about civic innovation, particularly the thinkers,

Inaya Rakhmani is a lecturer in the Department of Communication, Faculty of

Siti Ruhanawati was a Programme Officer at the Australia-Indonesia Partnership

Louise Shaxson is a Senior Research Fellow in the Research and Policy in

Sugiyanto is a Monitoring and Evaluation Officer at the Australia-Indonesia

AAKI Asosiasi Analis Kebijakan Indonesia (Indonesian Policy

ELSAM Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat (Institute for Policy

RKP Rencana Kerja Pemerintah (Annual national development

Arnaldo Pellini, Budiati Prasetiamartati, Kharisma Priyo Nugroho,

1 I ntroduction: Knowledge, Politics and Policymaking

Indonesia’s growth and prosperity as a democratic, middle-income country hinges

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2018 1

2 Structure and Content of the Book

AusAID [Government of Australia. Australian Agency for International Development]. (2012).

Budiati Prasetiamartati, Fred Carden, Siti Ruhanawati, Inaya Rakhmani,

Whilst creativity, ideas and questioning are of value in their

B. Prasetiamartati (*) · S. Ruhanawati

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2018 13

When we think of development as more than mere survival, knowledge is impor-

Teaching and learning, research and community engagement

State universities are considered government implementing units (satuan kerja)

See also Chap. 7, Sect. 3.2.1.

ing multi-year research projects. Further discussion of the Indonesian Science

Universities’ human resource policies and regulations do not effectively support

education institutions need autonomy and academic freedom in order to thrive

incentive systems in place either to fund research or to encourage academics to

5.1 Universities as Research Environments

First, at a structural level, the reform agenda should be fundamentally directed

5.2 Research Funding

5.3 Research as a Promising Career

AIPI [Akademi Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia/Indonesian Academy of Sciences]. (2017). Era

Tampere, Finland Arnaldo Pellini

Part I Producing Knowledge for Policy

Part II Knowledge and the Politics of Policymaking

Part III The Enabling Environment for Evidence-Informed

8 Doing Development Differently at Scale................................................ 131

Petrarca Chawaro Karetji joined the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Pro-

1 I ntroduction: Knowledge, Politics and Policymaking

2 Structure and Content of the Book

5.1 Universities as Research Environments

5.2 Research Funding

5.3 Research as a Promising Career

2.1 Individuals and Institutions

2.2 Relationship Between State and Civil Society

4 Policy Research Institutes and the Policymaking System

5 The Real-World Role of PRIs in Indonesian Policymaking

The roots of the analysis of the role of knowledge intermediaries in decision-

2.1.1 Challenges Facing Balitbangs

2.2 Experimenting with the Government Think-Tank Model

3.1 Opportunities and Challenges for Policy Analysts

2 Policymaking Processes in Indonesia

3.1 Individual Factors

3.2 Skills in Evidence Literacy

Finding, evaluating and using evidence in policymaking requires a range of high-

3.3 Critical Thinking and Analytical Skills

3.4 Sectoral Knowledge and Experience

3.5 Personal and Professional Networks

3.6 Organisational Factors

3.7 The Wider Policy Environment

1.1 Benefits and Opportunities

1.2 Perils and Challenges

2 Indonesia’s Data Ecosystem

3.1 Pulse Lab Jakarta

3.1.1 Pulse Lab Jakarta: Approaching Development Sensibly

3.2 National Citizen Feedback Dashboard

3.2.1 Malaria Case Rapid Reporting

3.3 Learning from Experimentation